Non-Lucid Dreamers Actualize Volition As Ego Ex- Ecutive Capacity by Engaging in Problem Solving Miloslava Kozmová Boston, Massachusetts

Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R

Non-lucid dreamers actualize volition as ego executive capacity by engaging in problem solving Miloslava Kozmová Boston, Massachusetts

Summary. Within the already-investigated described nocturnal cognitive problem-solving phenomenon (Kozmová, 2008, 2012, 2015), the goal of this exploratory study was to determine the contexts in which non-lucid dreamers engage in problem-solving by voluntary actions and behaviors and to characterize volition and its range in kinetic (motile) and communicative (expressive) modalities. The 979 cross-cultural operationally defined problem-solving dreams were analyzed by the method of grounded theory. The analysis of individual occurrences of problem-solving behaviors and actions as volition-based executive skills (ego executive capacity) in addition to other types of cognitions, yielded a total of exemplary 54 dreams with contexts of self-preservation, intrapersonal situations, and interpersonal relationships. The initial emergent cross-state characterization of volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams calls for reappraisal of neurophysi- ological theories that did not yet consider the existence of volition as an executive skill that is sustained or could emerge during non-lucid dreaming.

Keywords: Volition, problem-solving, executive function, executive skills, higher order cognition, ego executive capacities, non-lucid dreaming, grounded theory

1. Introduction apparent especially when dreamers encounter particularly vexing situations that require problem-solving (Kozmová, In 1855, the French Académie des Sciences Morales et Poli- 2015). tiques posed the following question that focused on the psy- Earlier considerations and studies demonstrated the exis- chology of consciousness within the realm of nocturnal life: tence of problem-solving in non lucid dreams (e.g., Glucks- “What mental faculties subsist, or stop, or change consider- man, 2007; Glucksman & Kramer, 2004; Greenberg, Katz, ably during sleep?” (df. Hervey de Saint Denys, 1867/1977; Schwartz, & Pearlman, 1992; Greenberg & Pearlman, 1975, cited in Schwartz, 2000, p. 56). Ever since, regarding non- 1983). Wolman & Kozmová (2007) conceptualized problem- lucid dreaming during which dreamers remain unaware, on a solving as part of the executive process belonging to ra- continuum, of the existence of the external world (van Eden, tional thought processes in which any time the non-lucid 1913), researchers have already elucidated as subsisting in dreamer uses his or her own capacities for mental actions dreaming several mental phenomena of waking life. These and reaching conclusions, the act of volition is involved (p. mental capacities include higher order cognition, including 841) and it accompanies these nocturnal mental acts. Vo- self-reference; reflective awareness; self-reflection; speech; lition, in this case, is understood as a mentally “pursuing reflectiveness; meta-cognition; and various cognitive pro- a self-selected goal” (Kozmová, 2012, p. 58) and it is the cesses, such as planning and decision-making, and execu- also the core of problem-solving during nocturnal non-lucid tive skills (e.g., Cicogna, Cavallerro, & Bosinelli, 1991; Ka- dreaming. In addition, in the described multilayered noctur- han, 1994; Kahan & LaBerge, 1996, 2011; Kozmová, 2012; nal cognitive problem-solving phenomenon, its three direct Kozmová & Wolman, 2006; Meier, 1993; Purcell, Mullington, modalities (executive thought, using emotions, and behav- Moffitt, Hoffmann, & Pigeau, 1986; Snyder, 1970; Wolman & iors and actions; Kozmová, 2008, p. ii) “represents a variety Kozmová, 2007). of dreamers’ attempts to resolve the situations in the sense Other waking-life phenomena with cross-state occurrenc- that the dreamer, with his or her own authority (as a person es, such as emotions (e.g., Schredl & Doll, 1998), have been or self in the role of a decision-maker and actor), reacts to found in non-lucid dreaming also as continuing (for review, the situation” (p. 83). This direct, deliberate problem-solving see Nielsen & Carr, 2011). The continuity of experiencing and strategizing in the cognitive domain—the dreamers’ use emotions connected or integrated with cognition becomes of any of the eight identified executive thought processes during a dreamer’s experiences experience—is considered as “building blocks of volitionally pursuing a self-selected Corresponding address: goal” (Kozmová, 2012, p. 58). It is the also the core of prob- Miloslava Kozmová, Ph.D., 72 Westland Avenue, #101, lem-solving. This collection of mental actions has been de- Boston, MA 02115, USA. fined and exemplified (as a taxonomy) while accompanied Email: [email protected] by volition within the immediacy of non-lucid dreams in the form of dreamers’ intellectual and cognitive “attempts for Submitted for publication: September 2016 resolution of dilemmas within immediacy of their dreams” Accepted for publication: April 2017 (Kozmová, 2012, p. 51).

30 International Journal of Dream Research Volume 10, No. 1 (2017) Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R

Yet, despite the richness of the abovementioned research dreams (e.g, Domhoff, 1996, 2011; Glucksman, 2007; Hall, studies that examined higher order cognition’s elements 1951). Despite this lack of knowledge, while approaching of waking consciousness as cross-over mental capacities the contemplation of these illustrative dreams in a prima subsisting in non-lucid dreaming consciousness, the voli- facie manner (first impressions), one might notice that the tion remains only partially explicated as far as its intellectual dreamer reports experiences of some undetermined threats and cognitive capacities (Kozmová, 2012). The comprehen- and problems. She makes decisions and thus becomes en- sive and inclusive research of volition as one of the most im- gaged with problem-solving activities within spontaneously portant and intriguing experiences, mental capacities, and arising, unplanned, and uncalled-for circumstances brought phenomenological features of consciousness that abounds about by the dream. The dreamer actively proceeds to han- in waking life (Farthing, 1992) remains enigmatic and almost dle ongoing difficulties by using her self-awareness and vol- absent from scientific discourse. untary variety of self-initiated strategies, actions, and evalu- The additional rudimentary beginnings of quantitative ative and appraising thoughts. Even her lack of a critical consideration of volition in dreaming can be also seen in reflective quality of distinguishing conscious states of wak- the concept of “choice” (Kahan & LaBerge, 2011), or in its ing and dreaming (e.g., Rechtschaffen, 1978) did not seem retrospective occurrence investigated with quantitatively to prevent her from using initiative, strategizing, and taking based questionnaires in various states of consciousness charge (Kozmová, 2008) that demonstrates the intactness (Dresler et al., 2014). Yet, besides the already-mentioned of her nocturnal mental faculties: The dreamer, in addition executive ego capacities accompanied by volition (Koz- to using feelings and thoughts, actively pursued goals, de- mová, 2012), the additional descriptive consideration of termined the course of events with her capacities for vocal how else and when could volition come about or become expression and other actions to deal with the situations and actualized in non-lucid problem-solving dreams is missing thus demonstrated intentionality and volition (Purcell, Mof- from the scholarship of consciousness studies. The fact that fitt, & Hoffmann, 1993, p. 214). volition as a richly endowed experience exists, though, is Because, as seen in two anecdotal illustrations, at least illustrated by the following anecdotal examples that depict one dreamer expanded her volition beyond its accompani- the dreamer (both dreams are part of a research archive col- ment of decision-making (Kozmová, 2012), there is an indi- lected for the previous research studies; Kozmová & Wol- cation that volition might be sustained (Hervey de Saint De- man, 2006; Wolman & Kozmová, 2007), the experiences of nys, 19867/1977) in more than one aspect (Kozmová, 2012) her volition, and its additional range. This scope of volitional in the non-lucid dreaming state. Prior to stating hypotheses mental activities came into its existence under the strained and research questions, it seems fruitful to review propo- and curiosity-driven difficulties that the dreamer decided to sitions and conceptualizations about volition in non lucid deal with and problem-solve: dreaming and in the waking states of consciousness. 1. Now I saw the bug sitting on top of the open shoebox. The top was facing inside out. I thought the bug escaped. Conceptualization of Volition in the Psychology of It flew around me, landed on the ground. I stepped on Non-Lucid Dreaming Consciousness it. I was stepping on it with my tennis shoes, and I was trying to aim a hard step at the bug so I would kill it. It Even though the previously mentioned dreamer, while did not want to die. I was applying pressure and it did asleep, became an agent, an originator, a volitional deci- not do much good; the bug was getting out from under- sion-maker, and an initiator with instrumentality of thought neath my tennis shoe and escaping. After all that stomp- and action (Grand, 1982), on phenomenological grounds ing, it started to change; it changed twice, from black Hobson (2009a) asserted that “most experienced dream to brown, larger one, and from that to a bluish round reporters say that they decided nothing at all in their non- one, sort of like a ball with a diameter of one centimeter. lucid dreams. Things just happened to them, spontaneously Parts of it were dead, the wings and legs, but the core as it were. They did not have the dream as much as the body remained. I said to someone, I think I said it to a dream had them!” (p. 81). Thus, the theory about volition boy, “Bring me a hammer.” I thought perhaps if I aimed in non-lucid dreaming state of consciousness predicts a well, I would be able to kill it. The hand appeared, I don’t loss of “agentive control” (Voss, Holzmann, Tuin, & Hobson, know whose hand it was, and gave me a long needle. 2009, p. 119) and “normally involuntary dream experience” The needle was about 15 centimeters long. I thought (Hobson, 2009c, p. 41). In other words, the “executive ego” that I would not be able to kill it with the needle, I would (Hobson, 2007, p. 79) known as a mental faculty of a wak- need to aim right in the middle of it, and that does not ing life—the “ego-self” that uses will and volition (Meissner, seem like a good strategy because the bug could harm 2011, p. 1123)—is considered continuously inoperative dur- me while I am trying to aim. I thought the hammer would ing non-lucid dreaming (Hobson, 2007, p. 79). Voss et al. have been a better choice. (2009) also predicted “loss of volition” (p. 1198) based on 2. I had a destination in mind where I am going. I knew I state-dependency of the brain (Hobson, 2009a). had to pass J.’s house. I also knew that on the way ei- In neuropsychological terms, the prevailing state-depen- ther I could pass through the place—the clinic where Dr. dency-based hypothesis of consciousness and its formal P. practiced—or I could avoid it. I decided to go through features states that volition in a non-lucid dreaming state of the place even though I felt a bit of fear. I thought, What consciousness is “weak” based upon “disinhibited subcor- will I do if I meet him in the hallway? Nevertheless, I de- tical network activation” (Hobson, 1997, p. 391). Because cided to go through the clinic (Kozmová, 2008, pp. 4-5). these neural correlates are deemed diminished during non- Without dialogue with the dreamer, it remains unknown what lucid dreaming (Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000), might be the symbolic, psychological, emotional, or cross- the theorizing follows earlier neuroimaging reports (e.g., state reaching significance of concerns that could reflect Braun et al., 1996) reviewed by Maquet et al. (2005), who re- waking life situations represented in the abovementioned emphasized that “volitional control is notoriously decreased

International Journal of Dream Research Volume 10, No. 1 (2017) 31 Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R in dreams” (p. 223). Under these circumstances, “executive addition, in Kahan and LaBerge’s (2011) work with individu- ego functions” (e.g., attention, planning, decision-making, als’ dream samples from interrupted late-night REM sleep and volition) are considered “deficient” (Hobson, 2007, p. and waking experiences and individuals’ responses to the 79) or actually lost (Hobson, 2009a). In other words, under Metacognitive, Affective, Cognitive Experiences (MACE) the assumption of isomorphism or one-to-one correspon- questionnaire, the the higher-order cognition’s element dence between physiology (with investigations aimed to termed choice could be considered as a component of voli- find neural correlates) and psychology (with investigations tion with its underpinning and accompaniment of executive of phenomenological features within the dream reports), the skill of decision-making (Kozmová, 2012; Wolman & Koz- presumed disengagement of the frontal cortex in non-lucid mová, 2007). dreaming (e.g., Hobson, 2002) is equal to its inoperative- ness (Hobson, 2007, p. 79). In this formulation, the non- Conceptualization of Volition in the Psychology of lucid dreamers are stuck, in static suspension, with the Waking Consciousness lack of “voluntary agency” (Hobson, 2007, p. 75). Voss et al. (2009) also extended their speculation and claimed that In the psychology of waking consciousness, will, or voli- only in lucid dreaming volition, as one of the “psychological tion, as one of the ego executive capacities, is considered functions,” returns with wake-life reactivation of dorsolat- to be an “active intrapsychic mechanism” (Rangell, 2009, p. eral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, p. 1198). As Killgore (2010) 1159) that is a “central and essential component of human emphasized regarding waking life executive skills accompa- psychic functioning” (Meisner, 2011, p. 1123). The volitional nied by volition, for use of executive ego capacities, DLPFC engagement of processes of executive capacities allows in- is considered a neural region of interest that supports these dividuals to become “involved in the control and coordina- mental activities. tion of willful action towards future goal states” (Goel, Rao, Despite the previous predictions about the lack of voli- Durmer, & Dinges, 2009, as paraphrased in Killgore, 2010, tion during a non-lucid dreaming state of consciousness, pp. 118-119). Thus, volition accompanies a variety of ego there are, however, several notable theoretical and research executive capacities including specific cognitive process- exceptions (including data about executive skills accom- es of planning, judgment, decision-making (Kilgore, 2010); panied by volition; Kozmová, 2012) upon which further de- “flexible interactions with environment” including noticing of velopment of interest in investigation of volition could be “novelty values” (Fosse & Domhoff, 2007, p. 52); and in- instantiated. ternal behavior (Faden & Duchamp, 1986). Ego executive First, the applicable theoretical position is of Smith et al. capacities further include attention; noticing, self-reflective (2004), who proposed that non-lucid dreamers could engage awareness; synthesis of new information (Hobson, 2009a); in self-initiated “motivated behavior” upon their unsatisfac- organizing internal experiences; motivating oneself; exercis- tory experiences, notably, “an experience of a discrepancy ing agency; voluntarily acting in one’s behalf; and reflecting between an existing state and a preferred, or more valued upon one’s actions (Jenkins, 2001; Rychlak, 1994; Workman state” (p. 504). et al, 2000). Volition, as the capacity of an executive ego Second, Purcell, Moffitt, and Hoffmann (1993) investi- that a person internally autonomously initiates and which gated dreamers’ degree of developed cognitive behaviors then accompanies these processes, is viewed as a “central with volition-intentionality as an underlying instrumental and essential component of human psychic functioning” phenomenon that influences the transformation of dream- (Meisner, 2011, p. 1123). ers’ change in state of consciousness from being non-lu- In experiential terms, Dijksterhuis and Aarts (2010) pro- cid to becoming lucid (p. 218). The authors’ Dream Scale posed that people motivate themselves and thus behave Control Categories in Abbreviated Form contains a range of volitionally according to their goals. Further, using one’s intentional-volitional actions that include ego styles in terms mental capacities for taking part in decisively volitional be- of involvement, activity, effort, and feeling expressiveness: havior or in pursuing goal-oriented behavior (in terms of “set, Progressively, the individual dreamer’s presence and activi- strive for, and attain”) brings about the “sense of agency or ties in the dream range as follows: (a) not being present; (b) willfulness in that we experience ourselves as the cause of being present as an observer but not participating; (c) be- our own behavior as a result of decisions and actions” (p. ing present as an observer with some personal opinions or 468). Dijksterhuis and Aarts, similarly to Jenkins (2001), Ry- comments about observed dream events; (d) the dreamer chlak (1994), and Workman et al. (2000), further asserted being a main actor but when experiencing difficulty; he or that volition is also a central organizing principle that people she acts incompetently and does not have communicative use to define and understand themselves (p. 468). means available; (e) the dreamer might be using some basic In addition, the subjective experience of volition comes behavior to save himself or herself in a difficult situation; about upon “awareness of one’s goal-directed self-reflec- (f) the dreamer might be taking charge of his or her own tive ‘now’” with simultaneously occurring decision-making behavior and using expressiveness (communication) that (Fisher, 1986, p. 9). Volition has been defined as “the act of leads to success; (g) the dreamer is thinking about a solu- deciding upon and initiating a course of action. Synonym: tion to a problem and implementing it behaviorally without will” (English & English, 1958, as cited in Farthing, 1992, p. knowing that there is a world outside one’s own dreaming 38). As Farthing further proposed, a person acting volition- mind; and (h) the dreamer becomes lucid and able to “exert ally could do it either through some type of obvious behav- control over dream events or outcomes” (p. 219). ior, or the person could pursue acting volitionally in his or Third, Dresler et al.’s (2014) investigation of volitional her mind. Also, in order for it to be voluntary, this experi- components of consciousness with the use of retrospective ence ought to be accompanied by a “conscious feeling of questionnaires while focusing on the differences in volition’s volition” or belief that one is acting and thinking deliberately existence between waking, non-lucid dreaming, and lucid and with personal choices in mind, in other words, taking dreaming pointed to at least some interest in the topic. In into consideration possible options (Farthing, 1992, p. 38).

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Furthermore, Farthing delineated that acting volitionally with terests” and that “no attention has yet been paid to those choices in mind (regarding “what to do, when to do it, or crucial functions by scientists interested in consciousness” both”) is accompanied by a “feeling that it could have been (p. 80). otherwise” (p. 38). As Farthing suggested, for inclusion of The previous appeal for operationalization of volition (Hob- a feeling of volition into elements of consciousness, the son, 2009a) already came to an initial fruition: Kozmová’s person acts intentionally or volitionally and is “consciously (2012) research of executive skills in existence during non- aware of the decision to act before the action is initiated.” lucid problem-solving dreaming established that the eight Thus, at a minimum, to act volitionally means “to be aware distinct higher order processes of executive ego are initiat- of a decision and able to report it” (p. 39). ed and accompanied by volition. The present author aimed Farthing’s (1992) propositions about volition in terms to expand the knowledge about cognitive and intellectual of the awareness of making mental decisions and/or act- aspects of volition by additional assumed volitional mental ing voluntarily upon the world (in terms of objects, people, acts while taking into consideration Maquet et al.’s (2005) situations, circumstances, problems, etc.) include also us- re-evaluation of human sleep. ing one’s own body either in the mental act of imagination Regarding executive processes occurring during nightly (Nielsen, 2011) by itself or in an interaction in the real-world sleep, Maquet et al. (2005) asserted that volitional motor contexts. An additional aspect of acting volitionally means actions (illustrated earlier in this article) are examples of ex- communicating to one’s self or others in time and space ecutive skills: as initiation, complement, or accomplishment of intended Executive processes coordinate external information, behavior or action. At the same time, voluntary actions and thoughts, and emotions and organize actions in relation to behaviors, whether mental or in the real world, ought to be internal goals. The [person’s] selection of motor actions accompanied or concluded by feelings of alternatives (Far- may directly rely on external stimuli, but in other cases thing, 1992). it is based on the perceptual context or whole temporal Theorists have further asserted that when the act of vo- episode during which the individual is acting. (p. 221) lition is in use during awake time, with support from the Thus, when considering awareness of internal goal cues frontal lobes (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, [DLPFC]; dur- (Klinger, 2013, p. 1) in the landscape of endogenous ran- ing waking, the thought processes of planning and deci- dom or self-created perceptual dream contexts, the non- sion making physiologically are believed to occupy the lucid dreamer might find cues for volitionally attaining goals dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and medial parietal regions; in various situations that require problem-solving upon en- Cabezza & Nyberg, 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; these countering overt or covert problems. Based upon Maquet et regions are considered deactivated in REM sleep, Hobson al.’s (2005) assertion of executive skills including “selection et al., 2000), an awake individual with intact executive ego of motor actions” (p. 221), it seemed reasonable to focus has “the ability to plan and coordinate willful (for emphasis, purposefully on two additional aspects of volition: (a) mental italicized by the present author) action in the face of alter- motile behaviors and actions strategies; and (b) as indicated natives, to monitor and update action as necessary and to earlier by Purcell et al. (1993) in their intention-volition scale, suppress distracting material by focusing attention to the dreamers’ communications as verbally expressed behaviors task at hand” (Jones & Harrison, 2001, p. 464). Thus, the both in the service of problem-solving. For this reason, with use of higher order cognition processes of executive ego the larger goal of investigating whether volition as mental capacities sustains individuals in their involvement in voli- capacity could be sustained (df. Hervey de Saint Denys, tional control and subsequent volitional actions toward fu- 1867/1977, as cited in Schwartz, 2000, p. 56) in non-lucid ture goal states (Killgore, 2010). problem-solving dreams, the goal of the present study was Taken together, as Killgore (2010) detailed, for executive to capture hypothesized kinetic (mental physical motion or processes to be accompanied by volition requires a “com- motile action) and communicative (expressiveness in a form plex integration of information” and includes “coordinated of verbal speech) properties of volition that dreamers might interaction of cortical and subcortical networks within the use for their problem-solving efforts in the pursuit of the so- brain”; these operations are held together and supported lutions or satisfaction of curiosity. by the prefrontal cortex (p. 119). In terms of psychological The rationale for mapping out problem-solving volitional and intellectual functioning, using voluntarily the abovemen- kinetic and communicative actions and behaviors is sup- tioned collection of executive capacities is considered by ported by the following theories and investigations: Dreams some authors as a quintessence of well-being (e.g., Work- with physical movement are considered “typical” (Freud, man et al., 2000). 1900/1966, p. 241), and physical motion is “employed when- ever is needed” (p. 237). Dream motion, as part of dream- Background, Rationale, and Research Questions ers’ psychology, is a salient pervasive experiential feature (Porte & Hobson, 1996). For example, in Hall’s (1951) study For the exploratory qualitative work about volition as one of 10,000 dreams, the dreamers performed actions “as a of the executive ego capacities with assumed range occur- change in bodily position” (p. 62) in 34% of them. In Sny- ring in non-lucid problem-solving dreams, the researcher der’s (1970) study, in close to one third of 635 REM sleep followed Fosse and Domhoff’s (2007) claim that dream sci- laboratory dream reports, dreamers performed “active ex- ence is in the state of “noteworthy absence of contributions ertions” (p. 144). Strauch and Meier (1996) mentioned that from core processes of executive thought” (p. 50). In ad- in just one dream 16 motor activities and movements oc- dition, Hobson (2009a) asserted that volition as an experi- curred (p. 41). Fosse, Stickgold, and Hobson (2004) consid- ence and function in non-lucid dreaming belongs to types ered “sensations in any sensorimotor modality,” including of mental phenomena that are not yet operationalized even “kinesthetic sensations . . . realistic, akin to perceptions” (p. though there is nothing “more crucial or central to our in- 299), a dominant part of dreamers’ experiences. Recently, Kahan and LaBerge (2011) investigated, through a phenom-

International Journal of Dream Research Volume 10, No. 1 (2017) 33 Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R enological lens, dreamers’ own behaviors in dreams as an lem-solving strategies that dreamers are capable of employ- ongoing cognitive activity, and Kahan and Claudatos (2016), ing for resolving situations encountered during dreaming?” in their extended study of the phenomenological features (Kozmová, 2008, p. ii). From this research emerged a com- of dreams, listed self-movement as one of the sensory and plex description of the phenomenon of nocturnal cognitive structural categories of dreams (pp. 167-168). In addition, problem-solving strategies (Kozmová, 2008) with several the motility as a possible part of dreamers’ problem-solving core variables (Kozmová, 2012, 2015), and volition in the repertoires has not yet been investigated in dream science. form of behaviors and actions is understood as a core vari- Furthermore, focusing on communication as an expres- able of direct problem-solving modality (Kozmová, 2008). sion of volition within executive skills during dreamers’ To reiterate, in the framework of non-lucid problem-solv- problem-solving efforts is warranted by the following no- ing dreams occurring in the dreaming minds, volition as part tions: The interactions in dreams include “verbal as well of executive processes is not yet fully understood in theory, as motor activities” (Strauch & Meier, 1996, p. 118), and nor has it been sufficiently investigated by research and speech is deemed as “the principal means of social interac- subsequently offered in initial cross-state characterization. tion in dreams” (Meier, 1993, p. 67). In dreams, speech, as As I explained previously (Kozmová, 2008, p. 35), on the one of the higher order cognitive skills, is considered “pro- most rudimentary level, the dreaming brain and the dream- ductive cognitive activity” (Kilroe, 2016, p. 13) and a “mo- ing mind could be distinguished in terms of the subjective tor breakthrough” (Wolchover, 2012, para. 3). In addition, experience during sleep. The brain as an organ regulates Hobson (2009a) proposed that “dream speech is in need of the need for sleep and could be considered an inherent in- much more careful study” (p. 18); Kilroe (2016) echoed this stigator of involuntary existing sleep stages, which are not sentiment by highlighting that speech is an “understudied consciously regulated by individuals (Monaco & Cavanna, area of dream research” (p. 14). Moreover, it is also not yet 2007). The dreaming mind, on the other hand, could be de- known whether dreamers even use speech—as an action or fined in terms of mental activities or “sum-total of mental op- behavior—for problem-solving. erations” (Goldberg, 1980, p. 7) active during dreaming that At the same time, more complex characterization (based contribute to the rise of subjective experiences in dreams. in data of narratives) of volition as a psychological feature The contribution of the study rests in offering findings about and part of mental life phenomena (Hobson, Pace-Schott, & dreamers’ contexts which serve for deliberate (volitional) ac- Stickgold, 2003) in waking and non-lucid dreaming states of tions and behaviors in problem-solving dreams (Kozmová, consciousness that either initiates or accompanies problem- 2008). This extended research of dreamers’ volitional cogni- solving goal-oriented subjective experiences of conscious tive kinetic and communicative behaviors and actions has states is so far missing from the science of consciousness. not yet been disseminated through article publication. The present author hypothesized that volition, based on The present exploratory study with its focus on dreamers’ anecdotal examples and research that previously identi- use of volition was guided by the following research ques- fied it as accompanying executive thought processes in tions: “In which contexts are some non-lucid dreamers able non-lucid dreaming (Kozmová, 2012; Wolman & Kozmová, to use their motile and communicative volitional capacities”? 2007) could subsist in additional varieties “considerably and “What types of non-lucid dreamers’ behaviors and ac- during sleep” (df. Hervey de Saint Denys, 1867/1977, as tions (in a variety of discernible strategies) demonstrate cited in Schwartz, 2000, p. 56). For this reason, the inves- dreamers’ capacities for using cognitive kinetic and com- tigator assumed that volition could be researched and de- municative volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams?” scribed. Also, in the view of Hobson et al. (2003) sugges- tion, its characterization in its initial cross-state form as one 2. Method and Materials of “psychological features” (p. 221) could be initiated. With appealing to “more detailed attention to phenomenology” 2.1. Assumptions and Operational Definitions (Hobson, 2009b, p. 812), the “emergent theory” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 136) of expanded concept of volition Assumptions. Explications of assumptions and philosophi- could be offered cal foundations that guide particular research generally as- Additionally, the investigated phenomena (including sist in reducing investigative biases in the use of methods dreaming phenomena; Kozmová, 2015) occur in contexts and discussion of results (Gantt & Melling, 2009). Several (Charmaz, 2008; for the exception of experiencing devel- suppositions disclosed below informed the present study: opmentally based static images without contexts, see 1. The collection of archival dreams used in the current Domhoff, 2003). For this reason, the part of the research of research consists of dreams recalled spontaneously at volition needed to focus on delineating contexts in which home without any preceding arrangements with dream- individual dreamers use it to problem-solve with an overt ers. The dreams are deemed to be from the latter Rapid or covert goal in mind. Then, the range of volitional motor- Eye Movement (REM) sleep period, which is, with its ic and communicative expressions dreamers used during physiological arousals and psychological and emotional problem-solving could be explicated. activities, the closest to the waking state of conscious- In summary, the current research focuses on studying the ness (Strauch & Meier, 1996). Thus, upon awakening, landscape of endogenous random- or self-created dream- without any external prompts, dreamers have the near- ing contexts within which individual dreamers are behaving, est direct recollecting access to their REM-sleep subjec- acting, and communicating when encountering challenges tive experiences (p. 60). or curiosities while volitionally making “attempts for resolu- 2. Dream reports are deemed to be a legitimate source of tion of dilemmas within immediacy of their dreams” (Koz- subjective data appropriate for scientific inquiries con- mová, 2012, p. 51). The study constitutes a smaller part of ducted by systematic investigations (Domhoff, 2003; the previous larger exploratory research that has been guid- see also dream science works in three volumes edited ed by the question, “What is the scope of cognitive prob- by Barrett & McNamara, 2007).

34 International Journal of Dream Research Volume 10, No. 1 (2017) Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R

3. Dream narratives as the “first-person accounts of sub- see also Kahan, 1994). Consciousness denotes an ability jective experiences” contain data about “psychological to recall and describe internal experiences. These recalled features” of the person’s mind; this information about descriptions (offered orally to self or others or shared in a dreamers’ mental lives can be characterized and cat- written or pictorial form) could include non-salient, salient, egorized (Hobson et al., 2003, p. 231). and surprising elements of subjective experience which may 4. The investigations of phenomena are irreducibly linked remain experienced, stored in memory, developed further in to contexts in which these are occurring (Charmaz, 2008) imagination, or could be volitionally acted upon—internally including mental phenomena related to the dreaming life or externally—by internal or external prompts to action. and occurring in dreaming life (Kozmová, 2015). (Kozmová, 2012, p. 51) 5. Non-lucid dreamers retain parts of their working mem- Dream. Pagel et al. (2001) documented that groups of ory and have some access to memories acquired dur- authors working in various disciplines define the concept ing waking life. For example, dreamers notice dream of dream differently. Based upon previous research, for the environments and remember their skills and abilities present study the author delineated the dream as including skill of labeling experienced feelings, using a subjective experience that occurred during sleep. When thinking and knowing, and specifying their subjective awake, the experient spontaneously recalled it, and de- preferences including personal values. These particulars scribed it, to oneself in an oral or in a written form, in a might also serve as vantage points for dreamers making story-like fashion. In this narrative, which could closely fol- choices during non-lucid dreams (e.g., Kozmová & Wol- low one segment or several sequential scenes of the dream, man, 2006; Wolman & Kozmová, 2007). the awake dreamer might depict some or all of the following 6. During sleeping and dreaming, dreamers are immersed features of subjective experience that occurred while be- in their dream worlds and are, for the most part, disen- ing in the role of a dreamer: The images seen, the action gaged from sensory contact with individuals or other ex- performed or participated in, the solitary or shared engage- ternal realities that could be helpful in problem-solving. ments, the situations observed, the perceptions noticed, The dreamers are problem-solving on their own and are feelings felt, and thoughts thought. (Kozmová, 2012, pp. using their individual mental abilities to handle the situa- 52-53) tions that arise (Kozmová, 2012). Because dreams can be divided into many different types, 7. Even though in some dreams the characters could and not in every dream the dreamer might participate in a become actively engaged in helping dreamers resolve problem-solving way in the ensuing situation, it seemed difficult situations, preventing them to solve, or actu- practical to separate dreams into two different catego- ally making situations worse for the individual dreamers ries: (a) narratives of descriptive dreams that contain “the (Kozmová, 2008, 2017), the focus of the present study is descriptions of scenery, the situations, the actions of the on dreamers’ own motile and communicative volitional dreamer or other characters, and his or her observations or faculties and capacities. The characters’ doings (be- experiences within that dream” (Kozmová, 2008, p. 72); and haviors and actions) as part of the internal idiosyncratic (b) narratives of problem-solving dreams in which an inde- dynamics of the dreamer’s nocturnal life, are excluded pendent reader would be able to discern that the dreamer from the present study. was propelled or prompted to make an active choice in 8. The dreams of dreamers from the same culture could the presence of a situation or event, one which he or she elucidate some contexts and volitional strategizing that might have recognized, defined, or identified, and explic- comprise problem-solving. The dreams of many differ- itly described within the dream. Alternatively, in the report ent dreamers from several different cultures would allow it could be observable that during the dream the dreamer for a creation of a composite, richer picture (initial cross- might have implicitly hinted at and not describe, yet acted state characterization) of the problem-solving contexts, upon, some precipitating event. The “precipitating event” dreamers’ attempts, and use of volitional capacities. is not always stated in a dream report. Knowledge of this Operationalized definitions. For the current study, the fact is the result of a pilot study conducted prior to the cur- author developed and advanced several definitions desig- rent research: The dreamers sometimes only indicate or im- nated for research with dreams. plicitly hint about the problems they are solving (Kozmová, Consciousness. The present author defined the concept 2007). The discernible active choices as responses to inter- of consciousness based on several suitable sources (Far- nally generated, perceived, and later described situations thing, 1992; Kozmová, 2008; Kozmová & Wolman, 2006; or images could be visible and construed as reactions to Purves et al., 2008; W. James, 1890) as subjective aware- an emotionally realistic immediacy of the dream or to some ness of oneself as an experient, actor (also includes the role other unidentifiable cause. The overt or covert events, to of participant; Kozmová & Wolman, 2006), observer, and which dreamers reacted, could be characterized by an in- thinker distinct from other experients, actors, observers, dependent reader as realistic or imagined vicissitudes of and thinkers regardless and including of recognition and life in general (e.g., ambiguities, puzzlements, distresses, acknowledgment of separateness between waking, dream- dilemmas, conflicts, concerns, difficulties, worries, threats, ing, or altered states—which could be momentary or longer or dangers). (Kozmová, 2008, pp. 72-73) than a few minutes—of conscious existence. Conscious- The examples of descriptive and problem-solving dreams ness further includes noticing and awareness of sensations, with covertly and overtly stated problems can be seen in perceptions, emotions, thoughts, and memories registered Table 1. in the primary and in reflective mode of experiencing. The Non-lucid dreaming. In a non-lucid dreaming state of term reflective has been defined by the present author as consciousness, dreamers periodically live in and are im- a concept that belongs to identifiable rational or second- mersed in “a convincing simulation of waking reality experi- ary thought processes that exist within higher order skills ence” (Nielsen, 2011, p. 596). In this state, the dreamers in non-lucid dreaming (e. g., Wolman & Kozmová, 2007; are “captured and held” within the context of immediate

International Journal of Dream Research Volume 10, No. 1 (2017) 35 Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R non-lucid dream situations: Dreamers remain without direct tries (Argentina, Brazil, England, Japan, and two republics connection to their known waking world, and their critical of the former Soviet Union—Russia and Ukraine). In addi- capacity to reflect upon the waking world existing outside of tion, in the United States, each of 32 women and 66 men dreaming is, for the most part, not available (Rechtschaffen, donated one self-selected dream; this specific dream col- 1978). In this position, they are singularly engaging their lection remained incomplete due to permanent loss through own internal capacities that come to life in this altered state computer failure. of consciousness. While participating in dream seminars, all dream workers Problem-solving. The mental activity of problem-solving were protected under the approval of the Saybrook Institu- was operationalized as a process that encompasses indi- tional Review Board (SIRB). For the concision of the sample vidual dreamers’ distinctive ways of strategizing efforts, in- size of each group (N = 100), some friends and relatives of cluding “attempts for resolution of dilemmas within imme- participants each contributed one dream. diacy of their dreams” (Kozmová, 2012, p. 51). The participants, ages 20 to 70 years, with a few young- Kinetic (motile) activities. Fisher (1986) understood con- er or older exceptions (median age was about 40 years), sciousness as “intentional, goal-directed movements” and were from middle- and upper-middle-class socioeconom- as “a domain of internalized motion” with mental activities ic groups; they came with motivation to learn more about compared to “muscular acts” (Fisher, 1986, p. 3). For the au- themselves through working with their self-selected dreams. thor, consciousness involves accord between having infor- Later, the donated dreams were professionally translated mation (“what”) and using it (“how,” Konorski, 1962) which into English, and some groups of those were used for quan- implies movement. In non-lucid dreams, motile behavior has titative content analyses (e.g., Krippner, Winker, Rochler, & been termed “fictive movement” (Porte & Hobson, 1986) Yashar, 1998; Krippner & Weinhold, 2001). and “kinesthetic fantasy” (Nielsen, 1993). In the present As described earlier (Kozmová, 2012, 2015), 10 lucid study, in the mental environment of dream that simulates dreams were not part of the current research. From the waking life (Nielsen, 2011), all conscious motile movements remaining 1,288 cross-cultural non-lucid dreams, with the of the dreamers’ bodies or their parts—self-movements— in operationalized definition of a problem-solving dream, 979 dream space are conceptualized as a dreamer’s own cogni- (67%) dreams, as a working sample, were selected for tive activity (Kahan & LaBerge, 2011). primary analysis. The national origin of problem-solving Communicative activities. As a speech, for the present dreams is as follows: Argentina (M = 76, F = 71); Brazil study, the author considered mental activity of the individual (M = 69, F = 72); England (M = 74, F = 66); Japan (M = 81, dreamer (not the other characters in the dream) that involved F = 77); Russia (M = 75, F = 75); Ukraine (M = 90; F = 78); the articulating words. This verbal expressiveness of ideas, feel- United States (M = 25; F = 50). ings, comments, or asking questions could be “directed at Primary analysis led to the emergence of the complex no one in particular” (Kilroe, 2016, p. 142); to oneself; or to multilayered description of the nocturnal cognitive problem- other characters in dreams in order to solve problems or solving phenomenon with direct, self-monitoring, and indi- satisfy curiosity. rect modalities (Kozmová, 2008). The secondary analysis Volition. The present author tentatively as occurring when of volitional executive processes is already published (Koz- dreamer in the immediacy of a situations is “pursuing a self- mová, 2012); the contexts (Charmaz, 2008) and volitional selected goal” (Kozmová, 2012, p. 58). kinetic and communicative problem-solving efforts needed for categorization based on collection of individual saturat- 2.2. Participants and Procedure ed instances (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) consisted of using 54 exemplary dreams in which dreamers, as a strategy, used at As I previously described the sample of participants (Koz- least one type of action and behavior within the context of mová, 2012, 2015), the current research consisted of using a covert or overt problem or a feeling of curiosity (Kozmová, 1,298 archival dreams. The dream narratives were gathered 2008). These dreams than collectively represent a variety or retrospectively during the years 1990 to 2004 from 100 range of individual instances of the non-lucid dreamers’ vo- males and 100 females who self-selected a dream and par- litional kinetic and communicative activities and behaviors. ticipated in dream seminars conducted in six different coun-

Table 1. Examples of Descriptive and Problem-Solving Dreams

Type of Dream, Gender, Country, Year Dream Narrative

Descriptive dream, male, England, 1996 I am in an old historic building, in the only room that had been preserved with its original décor. The walls had an intricate raised pattern, which I ran my hand over, feeling the re- lief with my fingertips. The pattern was a light reddish-brown on an off-white background. Problem-solving dream, female, Ukraine, All that happens is very simple. My task is to keep a very small thing, somewhat like a 1995 needle, in my hands and not let it fall down or out of my hands. As I am trying to do this, very big things are falling down on me from above as if to interfere with my task. I try to get away from them. All these events make me feel very bad. Problem-solving dream, implicitly A woman puts a finger into my watch bracelet. Immediately, I start to beat her. Nobody (overtly) stated problem, male, Argen- can stop me. tina, 1992 Problem-solving dream, explicitly I was putting on my makeup. My mother took it away from me. She also took away my (overtly) stated problem, female, USA, jewelry and the other things I used to make myself beautiful. I could not get them back, 1996 and I was very sad.

36 International Journal of Dream Research Volume 10, No. 1 (2017) Volition in non-lucid problem-solving dreams I J o D R

Previously, the volition noticeably represented by dream- homogeneous samples and the control groups (e.g., Cozby, ers’ use of their mental faculties during sleep became one 1997). One of the developers of the method, Glaser (1992), of the six core variables of the nocturnal cognitive problem- solidified the flexible work with the method by explaining solving phenomenon; the partial and complete description that the research starts with analyzing and comparing any- of the emerged phenomenon is not part of the current re- where within a limited or open sample. The analyzing work search and is presented elsewhere (Kozmová, 2008, 2012, continues until the point of saturation (no novel variants are 2015). Because the phenomenon is a multilayered charac- found, only increasing amount of repetitiveness in investi- terization of conscious activities, the categorized individual gated elements, modalities, processes, etc., are occurring). processes that represent dreamers’ active use of mental Thus, using the method promotes data-focused instead of capacities might overlap. hypothesis-focused research (the latter might follow after the phenomenon is described). 2.3. Grounded Theory Method As I explicated elsewhere the detailed description of grounded theory method and exactly how to work with it As I described elsewhere (Kozmová, 2012, 2015), the se- within analysis of emotional component (core variable) of lected grounded theory method considers contexts with problem-solving dreams in mind (Kozmová, 2015), the which phenomena are linked (Charmaz, 2008). From data present research continued to be qualitative by analysis of observed in the contexts, the often intuitive and “theoreti- dream narratives. It was also subjective (by acknowledging cally sensitive” researcher (Glaser, 1978) generates a de- the author’s prior knowledge that included testing grounded scription of the investigation’s object—the phenomenon method theory in a pilot study, Kozmová, 2007). In addition, under consideration also known as core variable (Glaser it clarified the author’s specific theoretical preconceptions, & Strauss, 1967, p. 46). As Glaser (1992) asserted, the notions, and knowledge (e.g., their explications could be variable could be found in the narratives of individuals’ found in “Introduction,” and “Assumptions and Operation- responses, habits, actions, behaviors, reactions, or expe- alized Definitions”). riences within contexts and environment. To define the vari- As I further explained (Kozmová, 2015), while investigat- able, the researcher uses questions explicitly designed for ing the invisible yet intuited phenomenon that occurs in the specific research. The questions are applied with intention minds of sleeping individuals, the present researcher worked to specify sameness, similarities, and contrasts of individual in agreement with the principles of grounded method theory occurrences of the phenomenon. The goal of this method (Glaser, 1992; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, see Appendix is to form, from narratives, abstract concepts of a phenom- A). The investigator carried out, by working with diversity enon by delineating and capturing its emerging elements of data (Charmaz, 2008) the actual analytical comparative to create the phenomenon’s structure (Suddaby, 2006). At work by reliance on her own mental faculties, intellect, psy- the same time, the researcher develops, from data analysis, chology of being, emotional maturity, and rigorousness of an emerging theory by coding categories and their dimen- scientific approach—all used in the service of categorizing sions, modalities, properties, processes, and other distinc- and offering an initial cross-state characterization of kinetic tive markers (including outliers type), often described in “ in and communicative aspects of volition found in non-lucid vivo language” (in the language of participants) and docu- problem-solving dreams. mented in memos. The authors who previously have researched dream nar- According to Glaser (1992) and Henwood and Pidgeon ratives using limited or complete tenets of grounded theory (2003), the main objective of this research segment is to at- include English (2002); Gilbert (2004); Hill (1998); Kozmová tain saturation of the phenomenon’s elements that create its (2007, 2008, 2012, 2015); Matheny (2001); and Sungy structure. Saturation is completed upon finding in sampling (2001). In addition, Glaser’s (1993) collection of research and analysis quantity and sameness but no new variety. demonstrated that the method has been successfully ap- With accomplished saturation of categories and developed plied in the social sciences, nursing, and medicine. The complex descripti