SIPRI Background Paper December 2020

THE SUMMARY w This SIPRI Background TRAINING MISSION IN Paper provides an overview of the European Union Training : AN ASSESSMENT Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and assesses its impact on Somalia’s conflict dynamics paul d. williams and hussein yusuf ali since it was established in 2010. The second of three country- specific papers, it is part of a larger SIPRI project analysing I. Introduction the effectiveness of the EU’s The European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) training missions in Somalia, the Central African Republic pro­vides the pillar of the European Union’s (EU) efforts to help and Mali. All three papers will stabilize the country.1 Established in 2010, EUTM Somalia’s early mandate feed into a synthesis paper that focused on delivering tactical training support to the newly reconstituted will offer a comparative Somali National Army (SNA) working for the Transitional Federal Govern­ analysis of the missions and ment (TFG). Strategic advising was added in 2013 during the mission’s third recommendations for the way mandate renewal. forward. EUTM Somalia is now part of the Comprehensive Approach to Security The paper analyses EUTM (CAS) plan, adopted in 2017 by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Somalia’s main training and international partners as part of a security pact.2 EUTM Somalia’s objectives advisory activities before are to increase ‘the proficiency, effectiveness, credibility and accountability assessing its political and of the Somali defense sector to enable Somali authorities to take over security operational impacts. It then responsibilities progressively’.3 The mission hopes to achieve these goals summarizes the main factors by delivering training and strategic advice. This includes tailored training that account for the mission’s successes and limitations, and and capacity-building activities to help deliver a ‘sustainable Somali-owned sketches three future scenarios training system’ and, since 2016, training companies, ideally that for the mission. 4 are multi-clan and integrated. The strategic advising and mentoring of SNA It concludes that EUTM general staff and Ministry of Defence (MOD) personnel includes drafting Somalia had a positive political keystone documents and policies and encouraging civilian oversight of the impact on the EU’s relationship SNA. with the Federal Government This paper provides an overview of EUTM Somalia’s activities and an of Somalia and the African assessment of its impacts since it was established in 2010. It is based on a Union. However, the mission’s review of relevant primary and secondary sources, 42 semi-structured inter­ impact on Somalia’s conflict views with various stakeholders and two focus group discussions with SNA dynamics was very limited until officers. These interviews were conducted during July and August 2020. 2019, when a direct link was The interviews were carried out adhering to social distancing practices in finally established between EUTM Somalia training and or remotely due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) operational deployment of pandemic in 2020. Nearly half of the interviewees were SNA officers who Somali units in offensive and had received some form of EUTM Somalia training. Other interviewees stabilization operations.

1 Other EU entities in Somalia include the civilian EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia), the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR Somalia) and the EU delegation. 2 Specifically, EUTM Somalia supports CAS Strand 2A, which deals with the military dimension, while EUCAP Somalia supports Strand 2B, the police dimension. See UK Government, ‘ Somalia Conference 2017: Security pact’, Policy paper, 11 May 2017. 3 EUTM Somalia, ‘Factsheet’, Aug. 2019. 4 EUTM Somalia, ‘Mandate and objectives’, [n.d.]; and EUTM Somalia, [n.d.]. 2 sipri background paper were officials from the EU and various international partners to EUTM Somalia, including the African Union (AU), the United Nations and a range of states. All interviews and focus groups were conducted on a confidential basis. A framework developed by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON), a network of over 40 research partners from across the globe, is used to assess the mission’s impact.5 The framework measures the impact of a peace operation by its ability to prevent armed conflict and sexual violence; build confidence among local parties; stabilize the area; protect civilians; strengthen public safety; promote human rights; contribute to peace dividends; extend state authority; support institution building and development; reform the security sector; promote the rule of law; and support community policing and transitional justice. The framework explains an operation’s impact with reference to the following factors: the primacy of politics; realistic mandates and matching resources; a people- centred approach; legitimacy and credibility; coordination and coherence; and promoting the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This paper is organized as follows: Sections II and III summarize the background and context in which EUTM Somalia works and the activities it undertakes. Section IV analyses the impact of EUTM Somalia, focusing on the political, operational and general dimensions, as described by the interviewees. Section V uses the relevant factors from the EPON framework to explain EUTM Somalia’s successes and limitations. Section VI outlines three plausible future scenarios for the mission, and section VII summarizes the main conclusions.

II. Background

EUTM Somalia was established on 15 February 2010 and deployed to on 7 April 2010 because the situation in Somalia was considered too dangerous.6 The need for such a mission can be traced to December 2006 when Somalia’s TFG was brought to Mogadishu with the help of over 10 000 Ethiopian soldiers. In the process, the TFG and Ethiopian forces ousted the Union of Islamic Courts, which had controlled Mogadishu since June of the same year.7 In response to what it saw as the installation of an illegitimate Somali government and an Ethiopian invasion, the Islamist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahedin Youth Movement, or al-Shabab) led an armed resistance.8 As battle ensued, al-Shabab’s recruits increased dramatic­ally, and so too did ’s casualties and financial costs. Within months, Ethiopia’s then prime minister, , was looking for a way out of Mogadishu by pushing the AU to take over the job of protecting the TFG. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) duly deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, paving the way for Ethiopia’s withdrawal in January 2009.

5 Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, About‘ us’, [n.d.]. 6 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)’, L87/33, 31 Mar. 2010. 7 For details, see Williams, P. D., Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission, 2007–2017 (: Oxford, 2018), chapters 1–3. 8 See Hansen, S., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group (Hurst Publishers: London, 2013). the eu training mission in somalia: an assessment 3

However, one of the problems was the lack of an effective national Somali army. It was this capability gap that EUTM Somalia was designed to help fill. Politically, EUTM Somalia was intended to help strengthen