Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume XXIV, May, 1978 Ethiopia, Ethiopian, Page 28989 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Ogaden Area recaptured by Ethiopian Forces with Soviet and Cuban Support -International Ramifications of Ethiopian-Somali Conflict - Incipient Soviet and Cuban Involvement in Ethiopian Warfare against Eritrean Secessionists -Political Assassinations inside Ethiopia In the armed struggle in the Ogaden area of eastern Ethiopia between Ethiopian troops and Somali forces– consisting mainly of units of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) supported by regular troops and aircraft of the Somali Democratic Republic (although the latter did not acknowledge the presence of its forces in Ethiopia until Feb. 21, 1978)–a turning point was reached in January-February 1978 as a result of two successive counter-offensives by the reorganized Ethiopian Army with strong Soviet and Cuban support both on the ground and in the air, and in mid-March Somalia [see 26650 A; 26931 A; 27323 A]. withdrew the remainder of its troops from Ethiopia. The Soviet and Cuban involvement in the conflict with Somalia, and also in Ethiopian Government operations against Eritrean secessionist movements, became a major factor in early 1978 in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and strong concern was expressed by various Western governments at the apparently increasing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. Soviet influence in the area had initially been concentrated on Somalia, but as explained in Somalia had in November 1977 expelled all Soviet experts, had withdrawn military facilities which had been granted to the Soviet Union and had abrogated the 1974 treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and had in addition broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba. Although the Somali forces had approached the city of Harar (Harer) in November 1977 [see 28730 A], having captured the strategic town of Jijiga further to the east in September [see page 28634; for maps, see pages 28432 and 28633], they made no further advances and the first Ethiopian counter-offensive was launched on Jan. 21–22 with the use of Soviet-made T-55 tanks, armoured troop carriers, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and 155 mm and 185 mm artillery–this equipment being far superior to any of the (largely also Soviet-supplied) arms at the disposal of the Somali forces. A second counter-offensive was reported to have begun on Feb. 3, to have involved an estimated 120 Soviet T-54 and T-62 tanks, advancing from north of Dire Dawa and east of Harar, and to have resulted in at least 3,000 Somali deaths by Feb. 6. According to later reports, a force of helicopter-borne Soviet tanks had landed in the rear of Somali forces who had thus been encircled and destroyed. The Somali Government stated on Feb. 8 that over 600 tanks were advancing through the northern Ogaden while refugees added that the tanks were supported by MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft "hunting in packs of 30 at a time". The ruins of Jijiga, against which a special offensive had been started on Feb. 19, were re-occupied by Ethiopian forces after severe fighting on March 3–5. According to Somali intelligence sources, quoted on Feb. 10, the Soviet officer leading the Ethiopian offensives was General Grigory Grigoryevich Barisov, who had been among the Soviet military advisers to Somalia before their expulsion in November 1977 [see 28460 A]. Not only did Somalia's tank forces suffer heavy losses, but the Somali Air Force virtually ceased to operate by early February, some of its aircraft having been shot down, others being grounded for maintenance and others still not having been committed to battle against superior Ethiopian aircraft. The Somali Government proclaimed a general mobilization on Feb. 9 and a state of emergency on Feb. 11, when it repeated the order for general mobilization and announced that regular troops would be sent to the front. General Aden Abdullahi Nur, a member of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party's Central Committee, claimed on Feb. 13 that in the Mogadishu region alone 30,000 young volunteers had presented themselves for military service. An earlier claim by the Somali authorities that Ethiopian aircraft had carried out a number of raids on towns in northern Somalia was officially denied in Ethiopia. Early in December 1977 Hargeisa was said to have been attacked by Ethiopian jets causing the death of at least nine persons, and on Dec. 28 it was officially claimed in Mogadishu (the Somali capital) that eight Ethiopian aircraft had raided Hargeisa (killing two children and injuring 13 persons) and also Berbera, and that altogether six Ethiopian aircraft had been shot down. On Feb. 7 six Ethiopian aircraft were said to have again bombed Berbera and Hargeisa. Mr Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State, declared on Feb. 10 that in agreement with other Western countries the United States was ready to supply Somalia with arms if the current Ethiopian counter- offensive should turn into aggression against Somalia, but that the Soviet Union had assured him that Ethiopian troops would not enter that country. (Mr Vance also said that what was happening in the Horn of Africa was "not compatible" with a reduction of forces in the Indian Ocean on which US-Soviet discussions had been taking place for over a year.) Lieut.-Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian head of state, confirmed on Feb. 14 that Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali border, saying: "We will not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of other people. The defensive war we are waging goes as far as our frontier." An appeal made by the commander of the Ethiopian forces on Feb. 8 for the immediate surrender of Somali armed forces on Ethiopian territory "under pain of total destruction" remained unheeded. However, after the fall of [see below] Jijiga on March 5 it appeared that the Somali forces had largely ceased offering resistance to their more numerous and better equipped opponents and were withdrawing, while Ethiopian forces successively occupied all major strategic points in the Ogaden area. The Franco-Ethiopian Railway Company announced on Feb. 25 that the Addis Ababa-Djibouti line, which had been cut by Somali guerrillas in June 1977 [see 28633 A], had been reopened to traffic on that day. President Carter of the United States, in a message to President Siyad Barreh of Somalia on March 7, proposed that a ceasefire should be called in the Ogaden area and that it should be supervised by neutral observers who would also be able to prevent reprisals against the civilian population. In response President Siyad Barreh informed President Carter on March 8 that Somali troops would be withdrawn from the Ogaden area and that he was informing the ambassadors of France, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of this decision, and was asking them what aid their countries would henceforth accord to Somalia. During the night from March 8–9 the US Government informed the Soviet Government of the Somali Government's decision and asked the USSR to show "moderation" on the battle ground and to facilitate a separation of the fighting forces. The Somali withdrawal was officially announced on March 9 by the Central Committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, which stated that Somalia had had to "send some units of its forces to support the liberation movements in Western Somalia" and that it was not Ethiopia which had forced Somalia to withdraw, but the presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in that country (estimated by US sources at 11,000 Cuban and about 1,500 Soviet military personnel, said to be under the command of General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, first deputy commander of Soviet ground troops). On the same day the Somali Government appealed to the great powers to ensure "the withdrawal of all foreign forces present in the Horn of Africa" and "recognition by the interested parties of the right to self- determination" of the population of the Ogaden area, and also called on the same powers to begin a process which would lead to "a negotiated, peaceful, just and durable settlement" in the area. In the Somali announcement it was also stated that Somalia had been "advised by big powers to solve the problem in a peaceful manner"; that these powers had guaranteed the withdrawal of foreign troops from the area and had promised that "the rights of Western Somalia" would be safeguarded; and that the Somali decision had been taken partly because "allied foreign forces" had "launched attacks and continuous air raids against some parts of the Somali Democratic Republic". President Carter, speaking at a press conference on March 9, welcomed the Somali announcement of the troop withdrawal. The United States hoped, he said, that the result of this decision would be an immediate end to the bloodshed in that area; that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) could move quickly to help all parties to end hostilities and to agree on measures enabling the Somali forces to return rapidly to their country; and that, as soon as the Somali withdrawal was complete and Ethiopian forces had re-established control over their own territory, the withdrawal of "the Soviet and Cuban combat presence" would begin. He went on: "The United States looks forward to the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from the two countries, Ethiopia and Somalia, at an early date. We stand ready to assist the OAU in working out the basis for negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia which would ensure the territorial integrity of all countries in the region and the honouring of international boundaries." He added that before the United States would be ready to discuss providing economic aid or selling defensive weapons to Somalia there would have to be a tangible withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden and a renewed commitment not to dishonour the international boundaries of either Ethiopia or Kenya.