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Rare Books & Special Collections Tarlton Law Library University Of
Rare Books & Special Collections Tarlton Law Library University of Texas at Austin 727 E. 26th St., Austin, Texas 78705-3224 512/471-7263 SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS RESEARCH FILES, 1823-1955, Bulk 1860-1939 Inventory Date printed: SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS RESEARCH FILES Inventory Extent: 1.25 linear ft. (3 boxes). Frank, John P., 1917-2002- John P. Frank, a noted attorney and constitutional scholar, was born in 1917. He received his LL.B. at the University of Wisconsin, and his J.S.D. from Yale University. He was law clerk to Justice Hugo L. Black at the October, 1942 term, among other prominent positions. He taught law from 1946 to 1954 at Indiana and Yale Universities. He has authored 12 books on the Supreme Court, the Constitution and constitutional law. A senior partner with the Phoenix firm of Lewis and Roca, which he joined in 1954, Frank was lead counsel on the ground-breaking Miranda v. Arizona case, and served as counsel to Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. While serving on the Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank led a group that worked on drafting revisions to Rule 11 attorney sanctions. Frank also served from 1960 to 1970 on the Advisory Committee of Civil Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Scope and Content: The collection consists of research into U.S. Supreme Court nominations of the 19th and 20th centuries, and includes 8 inches of printed materials and 7 microfilm reels (35mm), 1823-1939 (bulk 1860-1939), collected by Frank, for a research project concerning Supreme Court nominations. -
Abington School District V. Schempp 1 Ableman V. Booth 1 Abortion 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 Bill of Rights 66 Birth Control and Contraception 71 Abington School District v. Schempp 1 Hugo L. Black 73 Ableman v. Booth 1 Harry A. Blackmun 75 Abortion 2 John Blair, Jr. 77 Adamson v. California 8 Samuel Blatchford 78 Adarand Constructors v. Peña 8 Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell 79 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 10 Bob Jones University v. United States 80 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 13 Boerne v. Flores 81 Advisory Opinions 15 Bolling v. Sharpe 81 Affirmative Action 15 Bond v. United States 82 Afroyim v. Rusk 21 Boumediene v. Bush 83 Age Discrimination 22 Bowers v. Hardwick 84 Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 24 Boyd v. United States 86 Allgeyer v. Louisiana 26 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 86 Americans with Disabilities Act 27 Joseph P. Bradley 87 Antitrust Law 29 Bradwell v. Illinois 89 Appellate Jurisdiction 33 Louis D. Brandeis 90 Argersinger v. Hamlin 36 Brandenburg v. Ohio 92 Arizona v. United States 36 William J. Brennan, Jr. 92 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing David J. Brewer 96 Development Corporation 37 Stephen G. Breyer 97 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 38 Briefs 99 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 38 Bronson v. Kinzie 101 Assembly and Association, Freedom of 39 Henry B. Brown 101 Arizona v. Gant 42 Brown v. Board of Education 102 Atkins v. Virginia 43 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 104 Automobile Searches 45 Brown v. Maryland 106 Brown v. Mississippi 106 Bad Tendency Test 46 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company 107 Bail 47 Buchanan v. -
Supreme Court Justices
The Supreme Court Justices Supreme Court Justices *asterick denotes chief justice John Jay* (1789-95) Robert C. Grier (1846-70) John Rutledge* (1790-91; 1795) Benjamin R. Curtis (1851-57) William Cushing (1790-1810) John A. Campbell (1853-61) James Wilson (1789-98) Nathan Clifford (1858-81) John Blair, Jr. (1790-96) Noah Haynes Swayne (1862-81) James Iredell (1790-99) Samuel F. Miller (1862-90) Thomas Johnson (1792-93) David Davis (1862-77) William Paterson (1793-1806) Stephen J. Field (1863-97) Samuel Chase (1796-1811) Salmon P. Chase* (1864-73) Olliver Ellsworth* (1796-1800) William Strong (1870-80) ___________________ ___________________ Bushrod Washington (1799-1829) Joseph P. Bradley (1870-92) Alfred Moore (1800-1804) Ward Hunt (1873-82) John Marshall* (1801-35) Morrison R. Waite* (1874-88) William Johnson (1804-34) John M. Harlan (1877-1911) Henry B. Livingston (1807-23) William B. Woods (1881-87) Thomas Todd (1807-26) Stanley Matthews (1881-89) Gabriel Duvall (1811-35) Horace Gray (1882-1902) Joseph Story (1812-45) Samuel Blatchford (1882-93) Smith Thompson (1823-43) Lucius Q.C. Lamar (1883-93) Robert Trimble (1826-28) Melville W. Fuller* (1888-1910) ___________________ ___________________ John McLean (1830-61) David J. Brewer (1890-1910) Henry Baldwin (1830-44) Henry B. Brown (1891-1906) James Moore Wayne (1835-67) George Shiras, Jr. (1892-1903) Roger B. Taney* (1836-64) Howell E. Jackson (1893-95) Philip P. Barbour (1836-41) Edward D. White* (1894-1921) John Catron (1837-65) Rufus W. Peckham (1896-1909) John McKinley (1838-52) Joseph McKenna (1898-1925) Peter Vivian Daniel (1842-60) Oliver W. -
The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation William G
Marquette Law Review Volume 79 Article 2 Issue 2 Winter 1996 The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation William G. Ross Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 401 (1996). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol79/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW Volume 79 Winter 1996 Number 2 THE RATINGS GAME: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE JUDICIAL REPUTATION WILLIAM G. ROSS* INTRODUCTION The rating of United States Supreme Court justices is an increasingly favorite pastime among scholars, judges, journalists, students, and practicing attorneys. Once the domain of a few pundits who made personal lists of the all-time "greatest" justices,' surveys are becoming more formal and are embracing more participants. The most extensive * Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law of Samford University; A.B., Stanford, 1976; J.D., Harvard, 1979. The author was one of the scholars polled in the 1993 Blaustein- Mersky survey that is discussed in this Article. The author thanks Professor Roy M. Mersky of the University of Texas for advice and encouragement in connection with this Article and for his permission to publish the results of that survey as an appendix to this Article. -
The Rededication of Court of Appeals Hall
The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" The Rededication of COURT OF APPEALS HALL Albany, New York October Fifth, 1959 The Historical Society of the Courts of the State of New York New York State Judicial Institute 84 North Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603 phone: (914) 682-3222 The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" IN THE RESTORATION and modernization of Court of Appeals Hall, formerly the old State Hall, erected in 1842, and occupied by the Court since January 8, 1917, we have had the utmost co-operation and the devoted services of many persons in public and private life. We are especially grateful to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, former Governor Averell Harriman, the members of our State Legislature, the Attorney General, the State Comptroller, the Directors of the Budget, the Superintendents of Public Works and their staffs, the State Architect, the Appellate Division of the Third Department, the Mayor of Albany and his Commissioners, the consulting architects, the general contractor, the subcontractors, and the many skilled craftsmen and co-workers. The restoration of this 117 year old building to its original architectural beauty, and its modernization to cope with the business of the Court, will aid in serving the cause of justice for many years, and Court of Appeals Hall will be a monument to which not only the People of Albany but those of our Empire State may point with pride. CHIEF JUDGE The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" COURT OF APPEALS HALL TODAY The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" Rededication Presiding HON. -
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873 David P
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873 David P. Curriet The appointment of Salmon P. Chase as Chief Justice in De- cember 1864, like that of his predecessor in 1836, marked the be- ginning of a new epoch in the Court's history. Not only had the Civil War altered the legal landscape dramatically; Chase was to preside over an essentially new complement of Justices. Of those who had sat more than a few years with Chief Justice Roger Ta- ney, only Samuel Nelson and Robert Grier were to remain for a significant time. With them were six newcomers appointed be- tween 1858 and 1864, five of them by Abraham Lincoln and four of them Republicans: Nathan Clifford, Noah H. Swayne, Samuel F. Miller, David Davis, Stephen J. Field, and Chase himself. These eight Justices were to sit together through most of the period until Chase's death in 1873. Taney's longtime colleagues James M. Wayne and John Catron were gone by 1867; William Strong, Jo- seph P. Bradley, and Ward Hunt, appointed at the end of Chase's tenure, played relatively minor roles. The work of the Chase period was largely done by eight men.1 Chase was Chief Justice for less than nine years, but his ten- ure was a time of important constitutional decisions. Most of the significant cases fall into three categories. The best known cases, which serve as the subject of this article, involve a variety of ques- tions arising out of the Civil War itself. Less dramatic but of com- parable impact on future litigation and of comparable jurispruden- tial interest were a number of decisions determining the inhibitory effect of the commerce clause on state legislation. -
Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court Jeffrey S
Cornell Law Review Volume 96 Article 11 Issue 6 September 2011 Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court Jeffrey S. Rosenthal Albert H. Yoon Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeffrey S. Rosenthal and Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1307 (2011) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol96/iss6/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JUDICIAL GHOSTWRITING: AUTHORSHIP ON THE SUPREME COURT Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoont Supreme Court justices, unlike the President or members of Congress, perfom their work with relatively little staffing. Each justice processes the docket, hears cases, and writes opinions with the assistanceof only their law clerks. The relationship between justices and their clerks is of intense interest to legal scholars and the public, but it remains largely unknown. This Arti- cle analyzes the text of the Justices' opinions to better understand judicial authorship. Based on the use of common function words, we find thatJus- tices vary in writing style, from which it is possible to accurately distinguish one from another. Their writing styles also inform how clerks influence the opinion-writingprocess. CurrentJustices, with few exceptions, exhibit signif- icantly higher variability in their writing than their predecessors, both within and across years. -
Justices of the Supreme Court
20688_Tables-Lists.qxd 8/27/07 2:36 PM Page A-14 Justices of the Supreme Court Term of Years of Life Term of Years of Life Service Service Span Service Service Span John Jay 1789–1795 5 1745–1829 Melville W. Fuller 1888–1910 21 1833–1910 John Rutledge 1789–1791 1 1739–1800 David J. Brewer 1890–1910 20 1837–1910 William Cushing 1789–1810 20 1732–1810 Henry B. Brown 1890–1906 16 1836–1913 James Wilson 1789–1798 8 1742–1798 George Shiras, Jr. 1892–1903 10 1832–1924 John Blair 1789–1796 6 1732–1800 Howell E. Jackson 1893–1895 2 1832–1895 Robert H. Harrison 1789–1790 — 1745–1790 Edward D. White 1894–1910 16 1845–1921 James Iredell 1790–1799 9 1951–1799 Rufus W. Peckham 1895–1909 14 1838–1909 Thomas Johnson 1791–1793 1 1732–1819 Joseph McKenna 1898–1925 26 1843–1926 William Paterson 1793–1806 13 1745–1806 Oliver W. Holmes 1902–1932 30 1841–1935 John Rutledge* 1795 — 1739–1800 William D. Day 1903–1922 19 1849–1923 Samuel Chase 1796–1811 15 1741–1811 William H. Moody 1906–1910 3 1853–1917 Oliver Ellsworth 1796–1800 4 1745–1807 Horace H. Lurton 1910–1914 4 1844–1914 Bushrod Washington 1798–1829 31 1762–1829 Charles E. Hughes 1910–1916 5 1862–1948 Alfred Moore 1799–1804 4 1755–1810 Willis Van Devanter 1911–1937 26 1859–1941 John Marshall 1801–1835 34 1755–1835 Joseph R. Lamar 1911–1916 5 1857–1916 William Johnson 1804–1834 30 1771–1834 Edward D. -
The Waite Court at the Bar of History
Denver Law Review Volume 81 Issue 2 Article 8 December 2020 The Waite Court at the Bar of History Donald Grier Stephenson Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Donald Grier Stephenson, The Waite Court at the Bar of History, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 449 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. THE WAITE COURT AT THE BAR OF HISTORY DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.t INTRODUCTION "I have at last finished the opinion," Chief Justice Waite wrote to Bancroft Davis, the Court's Reporter of Decisions, on March 5, 1888. One suspects that Waite audibly exhaled as he penned that sentence.2 His reference was to the Telephone Cases,3 arguably the most significant patent litigation in the late nineteenth century, at least in terms of its ef- fects on the development of the telecommunications industry in the United States. Waite had been at work on his opinion for months, and understandably so. 4 Arguments in the cases had been heard over twelve days in January and February 1887. 5 The bench had split four to three over these eight challenges in circuit courts to Alexander Graham Bell's 1876 patent for the telephone. 6 A description of each of the patent dis- putes, Waite's opinion sustaining the patent, and Justice Bradley's much shorter dissent, all consumed more than five hundred pages-the entirety of volume 126 of the United States Reports.7 Waite's effort had been a burden, even for a Chief Justice accustomed to overwork. -
The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Judicial Independence, 1860-1873
Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1949 The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Judicial Independence, 1860-1873 John Fay Philbin Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Philbin, John Fay, "The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Judicial Independence, 1860-1873" (1949). Master's Theses. 798. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/798 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1949 John Fay Philbin ~-.--------------------------------------------, THE SUPREME COURT .AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL INDEl'ENDENCE 1860-1873 BY' JOHN FAY PHILBIN A THESIS SUBUITTED IN PARTIAL FULFII...LMElrr OF THE REQUIRE~S FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LoYOLA UNIVERSITY JUDE 1949 • VITA Johu Fay Philbin was born in Chicago in 1922. He was educated in the Chicago public sohools. attending Robert Emmet Grammar School and Austin High Sohool. graduating from. the latter in 1939. From 1939 to 1943 he _s a student at Wright Junior College. Chioago. Illinois, and Chioago Teaohers College. In 1943. he entered military servioe and seM'EJd three years in the United States Army Air Foroe. Upon discharge, he returned tc Chicago Teachers College and received a Baohelor of Education degree from. -
The Chief Justice As Leader: the Case of Morrison Remick Waite
William & Mary Law Review Volume 14 (1972-1973) Issue 4 Article 6 May 1973 The Chief Justice as Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite D. Grier Stephenson Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Legal Biography Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Repository Citation D. Grier Stephenson Jr., The Chief Justice as Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite, 14 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 899 (1973), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss4/6 Copyright c 1973 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr THE CHIEF JUSTICE AS LEADER: THE CASE OF MORRISON REMICK WAITE D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.* What does all this mean? I suppose I shallrealize it all bye and bye. But it seems strangenow.' In recent years, social scientists have found the role of the Chief Justice of the United States to offer an intriguing example of leadership in small groups. Moreover, as political scientists become increasingly concerned with the influence which court conferences and intra-court social rela- tions have on judicial decision-making, it is necessary that the concept of judicial leadership be supplied a firmer empirical underpinning. Based in part on the earlier work of Professor Robert F. Bales,2 Profes- sor David Danelski in 1960 applied the concept of dual leadership func- tions-"task" and "social" leadership-to the judicial behavior of the Chief Justice.3 According to Danelski, a task leader presents his views with force and clarity; defends those views successfully in debate and discussion with his colleagues; provides guidance for perplexing ques- tions; and assumes substantial responsibility for making suggestions, orienting discussions, and writing opinions. -
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases - Freedom: Constitutional Law
Chicago-Kent Law Review Volume 70 Issue 2 Symposium on the Law of Freedom Part Article 8 I: Freedom: Personal Liberty and Private Law December 1994 Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases - Freedom: Constitutional Law Richard L. Aynes Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases - Freedom: Constitutional Law, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 627 (1994). Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol70/iss2/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. CONSTRICTING THE LAW OF FREEDOM: JUSTICE MILLER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES RICHARD L. AYNES* "[O]ne of the canons of construction never to be lost sight of is to give effect, if possible, to every word of the written law." Fourteenth Amendment author John A. Bingham' "Criticism of [the Slaughter-HouseCases] has never entirely ceased, nor has it ever received universal assent by members of this Court." Justice William Moody2 INTRODUCHION The Slaughter-House Cases3 are simultaneously unremarkable and extraordinary. They are unremarkable because the matter at is- sue-whether butchers can be required to ply their trade at a central, state-franchised facility-has long since ceased to be a matter of con- cern.