The Philippines

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The Philippines 16 ThE PhiliPPiNES It is one of the most beautiful archipelagos in South- East Asia and home to some of the most easy-going people in the world, or so the tourist brochures tell us. Yet in the southern Philippines lurks one of the most protracted and difficult conflicts in South-East Asia today. Rebecca Hinchey reports. The massacre of eight Hong Kong nationals during an and the sizable Islamic Moro groups of the south. incident in a bus and the massacre of 60 people including For the Moros issues of autonomy, self-determination 32 journalists in a single event in late 2009, briefly and poverty are at the heart of the conflict, while for brought the problems in the Mindanao region under the the newly elected Philippines Administration the central international spotlight, providing a rare glimpse of the platform is how to successfully integrate a minority situation in one of Australia’s nearest neighbours. population into their island territories. The Mindanao conflict has been plagued by an on- The situation is complicated by factors including the and-off armed battle since the 1970s, but has a much growth of non-Islamic communities in the region, the longer history of tension dating back to the 16th century. splintering of Moro representation, international Islamic Centred on the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and terrorism and inter-clan rivalries. Tawi-Tawi, the sticking point has been the failed As the Lowy Institute’s East Asian experts Dr Malcolm implementation of a succession of peace agreements. Cook and Dr Kit Collier point out, solving such profound In 2009 alone 610,000 people were displaced in the problems will be slow and require ‘extensive economic southern archipelago. Mass displacement joins aerial and political change and foreign support’. bombardments, armed violence, kidnappings and the The conflict in the southern Mindanao and Sulu killing of civilians in the human rights abuses besetting regions of the Philippines traces its roots all the way back the region. to the Spanish colonisation of the Philippines in 1565. Dr Ronald May, Emeritus Fellow at the Australian Despite their domination, the reach of Spanish power National University’s Society and Governance in never made it to the Islamist practising people of the Melanesia Program says: “You can subscribe to one of south, who had evolved as sophisticated Sultanates after those emails where every day you hear about another the arrival of Islam in the 13th century. atrocity, this person’s been kidnapped and burnt.” The Moros - named by the Spanish after their detested The abuses are a manifestation of the long-running enemy and prior rulers of Spain, the Moors - fought tensions between the predominantly Christian Philippines against their would-be conquistadors in a series of wars REFUGEE TRANSITIONS ISSUE 24 17 spanning four centuries. vigilante groups during the period 1970 to 1972. This period planted the seeds of mutual suspicion that The MNLF came out into open warfare when in 1972 continues among the three main inhabitants of present- then President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos day southern Philippines: the Moros also called the declared martial law. This period was undoubtedly the Bangsamoro, comprising approximately 20 percent of bloodiest of the conflict. the population; Filipino-Christian settlers, comprising 75 Dr Inamullah Khan, secretary-general of the World percent; and non-Christian and non-Muslim indigenous Muslim Congress, estimated that between the years people known as the Lumads, comprising five percent. 1969 to 1976 about 60,000 people died, 54,000 were In a paper addressing ethnic and religious conflict wounded and 350,000 people displaced in the Moro in the Southern Philippines, Dr Jamail Kamlian, vice conflict. chancellor of the Office of Research and Extension at Such substantial losses forced the international Mindanao State University, writes that Moros believe the community to take note with the Organisation of the conflict was caused by the Christian settlers. Christian Islamic Conference stepping up as a major international Filipinos believe the Moros are traitors, kidnappers, land player whose influence continues today. grabbers, troublesome and warlike, and the Lumads The organisation, particularly member Libya, helped blame both groups for the fighting. negotiate the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which brought an When the United States took over the Philippines in end to the most brutal period of the conflict. Under its 1882 they succeeded in dominating the rulers of the terms 13 provinces would be given autonomy, subject to south, although spasmodic armed resistance against the a plebiscite among the people living in those areas. new colonial power continued. In 1942 the Philippines From the start implementation of the agreement became independent and the then predominantly Islamic faced insurmountable hurdles. In 1977, and without southern regions were incorporated into the nation. agreement, the Marcos Administration created two This was despite protestations and a petition from autonomous governments in 10 provinces with a vote to a large group of Muslim leaders who stated in the be held in April. With the exception of some generals, Danslan Declaration: “…we do not want to be included who took up ruling position in the autonomous regions, in the Philippines for once an independent Philippines the MNLF rejected their actions and resumed a less is launched, there would be trouble between us and intense armed resistance. the Filipinos because from time immemorial these two Concurrently cracks began to appear in the MNLF peoples have not lived harmoniously together”. leadership culminating in the creation of the Moro Islamic The Australian National University’s Dr May says the Liberation Front (MILF) with Hashim Salamat at its helm. Muslims were right to be fearful of Christian dominance As Soliman Santos describes in his Human and forced conversions. “Heavy migration into Mindanao Development Report Evolution of the Armed Conflict from the more populous areas of Luzon and the Visayas on the Moro Front, the split resulted from a number of brought conflicts over land and threatened the authority differences, the Nur Misuari-led MNLF believed it was of traditional Muslim political leaders ... Muslim and best to pursue peace negotiations, work for autonomy, tribal populations often lost their rights to traditional be secular-nationalist and centralise decision-making and land through land grabs, dubious legal transactions and the MILF believed it was best to pursue armed struggle even dealings by unscrupulous Muslim leaders”. for independence, be more Islamic and pursue a more Migration was encouraged by the United States consultative structure. Administration and the independent Philippines It also centred on ethnic allegiances between Tausug, Government, both as a means of establishing new dominant in the Sulu Archipelago, and Maguindanao, agricultural industries in the resource-rich south and of more dominant on Mindanao island. quelling any resistance from its Muslim inhabitants --by Ethnicity has had a strong influence on the conflict, but changing the cultural mix of the area. In 1903 the Muslim Associate Professor Bronwyn Winter, an expert in social population of Mindanao was estimated at 76 per cent movements in the Philippines at the University of Sydney; but by 1980 that figure had fallen to just 23 per cent. cautions against oversimplification. “When we talk about The 1960s and 70s saw an increase in hostilities any of these so-called ethnic conflicts, they’re always between Muslim and Christian settlers culminating in the political, they’re always about power, they’re always formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) a about money, territory, land, those sorts of things.” still-powerful organisation which took up arms in support In 1986 when Marcos was ousted, Corazón Aquino of an independent state. came to power and resumed peace talks with both According to Dr Macapado Muslim, President of groups, resulting in the 1987 Jeddah Accord between Mindanao State University, two key abuses gave rise to the Republic of the Philippines and the MNLF. The Jeddah the contemporary armed struggle: the Jabidah massacre Accord was an attempt to revive the Tripoli Agreement of 1968, where 28 young Muslims in the Philippine Army which led to the formation of the Autonomous Region of were murdered by their superior officers, and the killing Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). of Muslims and razing of their buildings by Christian THE PHILIPPINES 18 As per both the Tripoli and Jeddah agreements a bank robberies and various terrorist attacks and atrocities plebiscite was held in 13 provinces and a number of cities, by the shadowy Abu Sayyaf.” with only the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, The immergence of international terrorism emanating Sulu and Tawi-Tawi opting in to the ARMM. Both the from the Mindanao region, the attack on the twin towers MNLF and the MILF rejected the referendum. in 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ established a In 1992 General Fidel Ramos took the reins of power in convenient pretext for the scaling up of US involvement, Manila and reopened peace negotiations with the MNLF, whose long-standing interests in the Philippines had much to the annoyance of many who believed it was never ended. giving fuel to a spent force now that the MILF was more According to academics like University of Sydney’s Dr dominant. Winter, US involvement has more to do with securing Nevertheless in 1996 the Jakarta Agreement strategic interests in the region than securing a victory was signed between the MNLF and the Philippines against Abu Sayyaf. “A US Defence Department government. This too was designed to implement the Quadrennial review from 1997 is explicit in stating where Tripoli Agreement, with Misuari assuming governorship US military presence in the Philippines is keeping open of the region amid wide spread hopes of an end to the the free lanes of trade,” Dr Winter says.
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