JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Lessons from Kosovo

Military Transformation

Effects-Based Operations Spring02 POWs and Missing Personnel

Installation Force Protection

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out. —Basil Liddell Hart JFQ AWord fromthe

B–52 returning from Afghanistan. Combat Camera Squadron (Cedric H. Rudisill) Combat Camera Squadron st Chairman 1

n the last issue of Joint Force Quarterly, I out- first priority was accelerating transformation. lined my three top priorities as Chairman— With the President setting the goal, Secretary winning the global war on terrorism, im- Rumsfeld is aggressively taking action to change I proving joint warfighting capabilities, and the Department of Defense on many fronts, from transforming the Armed Forces. In this issue, I revamping military strategy to streamlining the want to discuss in more detail my thoughts on planning, programming, and budgeting system transformation, the third priority. and adopting better business practices. Transformation has become one of the The area of transformation that I am most hottest topics inside the Beltway—and with good concerned about is military transformation, reason. Highlighting the urgent need to protect a much narrower slice of the larger DOD effort. America from terrorism, President Bush, speaking During testimony before the House and Senate at the Citadel last December, declared that his (continued on page 4)

Spring 2002 / JFQ 1 ■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman 60 Operational Deception in the by Richard B. Myers Information Age by Milan N. Vego 8 From the Field and Fleet: Letters to the Editor 67 The Evolution of Peace

JFQ Operations Doctrine ■ by Richard B. Lovelock 12 Lessons from the War in Kosovo by Benjamin S. Lambeth

20 Military Transformation and Legacy Forces by Williamson Murray and Thomas O’Leary

28 Europe’s Military Revolution by François L.J. Heisbourg

33 The Republic of Korea Approaches the Future by Jiyul Kim and Michael J. Finnegan

41 Australia and the Quest for the Knowledge Edge by Michael Evans

52 Seeking Synergy: Joint Effects-Based Operations by Price T. Bingham 74 Creating a New Path for Joint Education

PHOTO CREDITS by Robert M. Antis and Claudia H. Clark

The cover of this issue shows AH–1W, Enduring Freedom (USS Bonhomme Richard/Spike Call). The front inside cover 82 Recovering and Accounting features CH–46 hoisting emergency personnel at Apra for Prisoners of War and Harbor, Guam (Fleet Imaging Command, Pacific/Marjorie McNamee); soldiers clearing house near Kamenica, Missing Personnel Kosovo, during Joint Guardian (55th Signal Company/ by Thomas E. Erstfeld Christina Ann Bennett); F–15Es on line being readied for Enduring Freedom (U.S. Air Force/Dave Nolan); and Marine tanks on Egyptian range, Bright Star ’01/’02. The 89 Closing the Barn Door— table of contents depicts Land Warrior fighting system (Fort McPherson/Susan Norvick) and P–3 departing (Fleet Installation Force Protection Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Arlo K. Abrahamson). The back inside cover captures E–3 AWACS taking off from Elmendorf Air Force Base, by John L. Cirafici Alaska, Northern Edge ’01 (U.S. Air Force/Wayne Clark). The back cover pictures USS Curtis Wilbur in the North Arabian Sea for Enduring Freedom (U.S. Navy/Ted Banks); amphibious assault vehicle on Red Beach, Kernel Blitz (13th Marine 94 Planning War in Peacetime Expeditionary Unit/Fidencio J. Hernandez); F–15C climbing from Kadena by Michael C. Desch airbase, Japan, Cope North ’02–1 (18th Communications Squadron/Marvin Krause); and M1 tank during force-on-force training, Bright Star ’01/’02 (55th Signal Company/Robert Hyatt).

2 JFQ / Spring 2002 SPRING 2002 / NUMBER 30

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 111 The Fight for Peace: A Book Review 105 George Henry Decker by Geoffrey D.W. Wawro

■ THE JOINT WORLD 113 MacArthur’s Air War: 107 Doctrine and Lessons Learned A Book Review by Thomas E. Griffith, Jr. ■ OFF THE SHELF 114 110 War by Any Name: Military History A Book Review Reconsidered: by Kalev Sepp A Book Review by Holger H. Herwig

Joint Force Quarterly

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays, USAF Director Director of Publications Executive Editor Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S. Government Printing Office Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 116 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 May 2002

Spring 2002 / JFQ 3 ■ Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF (continued from page 1) Publisher Armed Services Committees in February, I said ADVISORY COMMITTEE that the goal of military transformation is foster- ing changes that result in a dramatic improve- VADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN ■ National Defense University Chairman ment over time in the way combatant comman- ders wage war. First, we must acknowledge that LTG John P. Abizaid, USA ■ The Joint Staff such improvement requires more than new tech- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman nology; it must involve change across the Armed Forces in areas such as doctrine, organization, MG Reginal G. Clemmons, USA ■ National War College training, people, and facilities. Second, it calls for A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College a cultural change in our thinking and use of our RADM David R. Ellison, USN ■ Naval Postgraduate School capabilities to achieve more effective results. Third, military transformation requires improved ■ BG Mark P. Hertling, USA The Joint Staff interoperability, flexibility, and adaptability to Col Craig S. Huddleston, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College support and achieve national security objectives in a dynamic international environment. MG David H. Huntoon, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Having established the broad outline for the MG Robert R. Ivany, USA ■ U.S. Army War College process of military transformation, the next step is Maj Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College determining how to achieve it. In the near term, we need to focus on improving joint linkages, fus- MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces ing combat power, and eliminating gaps and Maj Gen Bentley B. Rayburn, USAF ■ Air War College seams among combatant commands, services, and

RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN ■ Naval War College supporting defense agencies. We must improve joint command, control, communications, com- Brig Gen John T. Sheridan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College

Col John H. Turner, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College not surprisingly, it is easier EDITORIAL BOARD to study past revolutions than to Stephen J. Flanagan ■ National Defense University Chairman create or control new ones

Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University Col John M. Calvert, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- 4 Col Stephen D. Chiabotti, USAF ■ School of Advanced Airpower Studies sance (C ISR) capabilities to better connect all these entities in the battlespace. Finally, we need Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University to synchronize and leverage ongoing service trans- COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy formation through continuous joint experimenta- LtCol Thomas J. Felts, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College tion under U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). I firmly believe that by integrating combat power ■ Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University and the core competencies of the services we will Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces accelerate transformation and create the changes

COL Timothy S. Heinemann, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College necessary to address an array of both current and future threats to national security. CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN ■ Naval War College The need for change is not new. History is re- COL Paul Herbert, USA ■ National War College plete with militaries that deliberately pursued new ideas, while in more recent years much has been Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College written about a revolution in military affairs Daniel T. Kuehl ■ Information Resources Management College (RMA). JFQ alone has published over thirty articles Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation on all aspects of the subject. Not surprisingly, it is much easier to study past revolutions than to cre- William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College ate or control new ones. RMAs may result from de- John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago liberate actions taken by necessity, but rarely are LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute their outcomes preordained. Prior to World War II, the Marines experimented with combined arms ■ COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College warfare for amphibious operations, the U.S. and James H. Toner ■ Air War College Japanese navies developed carrier-based aviation,

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University and the German army fielded combined arms

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

4 JFQ / Spring 2002 Myers (Angela Virnig) USS Theodore Roosevelt

Joint direct attack munition on USS Theodore Roosevelt, forces—each illustrating a deliberate Enduring Freedom. effort to transform military capabili- ties. The motivation to improve warfighting was provided by what each nation considered to be the President Bush challenge to its security. As dramatic addressing the Nation,

as these examples are, none in- December 11, 2001. Lock) T. (Jeremy Combat Camera Squadron st volved a linear process from the ini- 1 tial concept to full realization of en- hanced military capabilities. The organizations involved had one thing in common: tactics, techniques, and procedures, and improve an institutional willingness to experiment and our ability to achieve rapid, decisive effects change. I am convinced that the deliberate steps throughout the battlespace. we have taken to synchronize and support service As a result of previous experimentation in- and joint transformation will create that same sights, current operational demands, and lessons mindset. I am also convinced that the joint experi- learned, JFCOM has created a standing joint force mentation process at JFCOM will have a central headquarters. A central component of MC 02 and and sustaining role in military transformation. future experiments, this headquarters is part of an Summer 2002 should provide a watershed for investigation into how to eliminate the ad hoc na- joint experimentation. JFCOM is working closely ture of current operations, improve joint interop- with the services, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Spe- erability, and enhance operational effectiveness. cial Operations Command, and U.S. Transporta- The insights gained from the experiment will be tion Command to combine several transformation reflected in recommendations on doctrine, organi- initiatives in the largest joint field experiment zation, training, leader development, and other ever conducted, Millennium Challenge ’02 (MC areas that impact transformation. 02). This experiment is designed to improve C4ISR by evaluating warfighting concepts and related

Spring 2002 / JFQ 5 ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Jumping near communications technology—led to the second Ulan Batar, Mongolia. transformational leap, allowing commanders to mass firepower using dispersed forces. Modernization efforts over the past thirty years are leading to a third transformational leap. We are already exploiting the potential of preci- sion-guided munitions, using the global position- ing system (GPS) to guide joint direct attack mu- nitions (JDAMs) on targets with deadly accuracy. Thus we envision combatant commanders being able to achieve mass effects on an enemy without having to mass either forces or firepower. On occasion, we can almost immediately foresee radically new military capabilities brought about by technological improvements in a modernization program (for example, with stealth technology). From concept to acquisi- tion, planners envisioned the operational im- pact of stealth-capable aircraft defeating robust integrated air defense systems. This important advancement coupled with precision-guided munitions has dramatically improved joint warfighting capabilities. But usually it is difficult to perceive the Special Operations Group (Michael Farris) Special Operations Group d broader potential of technologies in the concept 353 stage. More often it takes incremental develop- ment and refinement to realize their transforma- tional qualities. GPS represents this latter type of Experimentation is crucial, but it is not the change. Though an important development, its only transformation path. Modernization and re- use to enable precise navigation in operations capitalization also play a part. While sudden doc- around the globe did not, by itself, dramatically trinal, organizational, and technological break- improve warfighting. It took further develop- throughs are possible through experimentation ment and companion technologies to synchro- and should be vigorously pursued, history sug- nize the timing of fires and communications and gests that there is also a linkage between trans- the movement of forces, as well as to pinpoint formation and incremental modernization of key the delivery of ordnance. These advances in combination have vastly improved joint war- fighting capabilities. the requirement to maintain readiness must be Whether transformation comes in incremen- balanced with modernization investments and tal steps or radical leaps, it does not occur in a vacuum. As the world changes, so do the threats. the need to accelerate transformational changes The standing requirement to maintain readiness for today’s conflicts and potential adversaries must be balanced with modernization invest- programs. The development of modern firepower ments and the need to accelerate the introduc- is an example. There have been many small, de- tion of transformational changes. liberate steps to enhance weapon systems during The global war on terrorism has spurred in- the past century. These incremental improve- novative thinking, which may in turn allow us to ments have led to three major transformational optimize many modernization programs—taking leaps in military effectiveness. The first was the older systems in unforeseen directions. We have development of weapons such as automatic used so-called Cold War relics such as B–52s, de- small arms, machine guns, and tanks—coupled signed for intercontinental strategic strikes, and with development of both wire and wireless P–3s, intended to hunt submarines, in novel communications—which enabled operational ways. B–52s armed with JDAMs now provide and tactical commanders to mass both forces and close air support. P–3s, flown in tandem with firepower with unprecedented effect on the bat- Joint Stars and unmanned aerial vehicles, provide tlefield. Further developments in weapons, to in- clude rockets, cruise and ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons—linked by satellite and digital

6 JFQ / Spring 2002 Myers Signal Company (Andres J. Rodriguez) Signal Company (Andres th 55 U.S. and Afghan forces, Operation Anaconda. real-time intelligence, reconnaissance, and target- and capabilities to validate and explore other ing data to Army, Marine, and Special Operations approaches to transformation. Forces units. B–52s and P–3s are not, in and of I look forward to MC 02 and the work by themselves, transformational. But how they have the standing joint force headquarters to improve come to be used does represent a transformation. joint warfighting. These efforts will contribute Modernization and the innovative use of C4ISR greatly to transformation and better prepare us have dramatically improved the way U.S. Central to face a complex array of threats. More impor- Command has been able to fight the war, includ- tantly, I look forward to the ideas of the men and ing the shortening of sensor-to-shooter decision women in the Armed Forces, pursued on the cycles through the use of real-time data collected frontlines of the global war on terrorism and from a web of sensors. through forums such as Joint Force Quarterly. Cre- Recent combat operations in Afghanistan il- ativity is the fuel that will power innovation and lustrate how modernization programs contribute improvements in joint warfighting and military to transformation and dramatically improved ca- transformation throughout the 21st century. pabilities for combatant commanders. Continued modernization of complementary joint-capable RICHARD B. MYERS systems and platforms and additional improve- Chairman ments in C4ISR and other emerging technologies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is crucial. We seek greater operational flexibility through plug-and-play capabilities, quickly mix- ing and matching forces as conditions dictate. We seek further integration of warfighting sys- tems and development of standing joint force headquarters for all combatant commands. Finally, we seek to experiment with new ideas

Spring 2002 / JFQ 7 ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

international relationships that constitute a peaceful Allied efforts to defeat al Qaeda and Taliban, Letters... strategic environment by promoting stability; pre- and subsequent operations to root out terrorist cells venting and reducing conflict and threats; and de- in Yemen, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, and pos- INTERWAR YEARS terring aggression and coercion.” sibly other countries, do not demonstrate America’s To the Editor—Frederick Kagan has written Next, Kagan decries withdrawing forces from unpreparedness for war or a lack of military readi- another excellent synthesis of history and derived overseas in favor of long-range strike capabilities ness. But that’s not the point. Operation Enduring wisdom. His “Strategy and Force Structure in an In- because that “would immediately increase instabil- Freedom is not the kind of two-front major theater terwar Period” (JFQ, Spring/Summer 01) is both ity by signaling that America is no longer commit- war Kagan had in mind. well supported and direct in its advice. There is, ted to the peace.” As evidence, he points to past Events in Afghanistan bear out Kagan’s com- however, a crucial gap in the logic underpinning aggression by North Korea, North Vietnam, Iraq, ments on shaping, which aims to maintain “peace his recommendations. and Serbia. But what he fails to recognize is that and stability in regions of vital national interest” lest Kagan outlines his recipe for accomplishing the US global presence was greater, not less, when a power vacuum occur “when traditional structures readiness (shaping, maintaining, and preparing) that aggression occurred and it did not deter it. collapse.” Yet after the defeat of the Soviets in while simultaneously acknowledging but skipping In writing off U.S. nuclear capabilities as hav- Afghanistan, what vital interests remained? As it lightly over the crucial point that almost no democ- ing become “largely irrelevant to regional security,” turned out, there were several thousand vital inter- racy accomplishes this task in the absence of an Kagan reveals the greatest fault of his argument: a ests, but those did not become apparent until later. identified and sustained threat. In other words, he singular focus on fighting the last war (indeed, per- The functions of shaping are engagement is preaching to the choir while neglecting the rest haps even a war of 60 years ago). We would be and deterrence. Engagement helps demonstrate of the flock. What confronts the United States is naïve not to realize that inherent in the U.S. aban- U.S. commitment and resolve while fostering condi- not a lack of resources but rather the absence of donment of the strategy of two nearly simultaneous tions conducive to the spread of democratic capi- sustained political will. major regional conflicts is the option of resorting to talism. Deterrence, on the other hand, is demon- Perhaps it is time thinkers and actors on the nuclear weapons should an aggressor exploit the strated only by failure. Cold War thinking survives national stage consider other methods to act on U.S. preoccupation elsewhere. when it comes to deterrence: “Nuclear phantoms Kagan’s thoughts on readiness. While actions such Fourth, in discussing force structure, Kagan still survive in our minds,” quipped a Russian pan- as those pursued by the Creel Commission would argues that “the real test will be how many troops elist at a conference on emerging threats. We’ve likely be illegal today, other routes can be explored. are ready to go without notice at any time.” But the known for some time that it takes something other Kagan is undoubtedly correct in saying that this is real test is how rapidly the military transportation than a nuclear arsenal to deter terrorist aggression, an interwar period. The conundrum is bringing that system can get those troops to the battlefield. The and shaping with boots on the ground forward realization to the national security community and problem with force structure is not the number of presence is part of the deterrence equation. selling it to the rest of America. divisions or air expeditionary forces, but whether we Interestingly, the war against terrorists illus- —MAJ Robert Bateman, USA have adequately addressed thruput. trates another of Kagan’s points: “A great power that Center for Strategic and International Finally, Kagan concludes that the Army can meet only one major challenge at a time makes Studies should adopt a brigade-sized model similar to that it more likely that a second enemy will take advan- recommended by Douglas Macgregor in Breaking tage of that power’s preoccupation with the first.” To the Editor—While I agree with Frederick the Phalanx. But he wants to have things both He offers that the “focus on the European conflict in Kagan’s overall message—that the United States ways, claiming that “any force short of 15 divisions 1941 was a precondition to the Japanese attack on must have the goal of “prolonging the current ”would be insufficient for the future but then ar- British and American possessions in the Pacific.” epoch of peace and prosperity as long as possible gues that the division is a relic of the Cold War that Boots on the ground also serve another pur- and being ready to fight and win the conflict that must be abandoned. pose when it comes to employing long-range preci- will ultimately end it”—I question some of his as- While the historian Kagan seems to want the sion weapons. As Operation Enduring Freedom sertions as well as his seemingly contradictory con- Nation to prepare to again defeat the forces of Nazi shows, and as Kagan argues, no matter how capa- clusion about the best way to accomplish that goal. Germany, history suggests that the best way to pro- ble airpower might be, it is even more so when ap- First, I am astonished at Kagan’s limited defi- long an epoch of peace and prosperity is through plied in a joint way, with combatants on the ground nition of what it means “to shape” the global envi- prevention, early intervention, and deterrence. The to accurately target enemy positions. ronment. In his view, America “must continually joint force has a critical role in all three. Although the war against terrorists must oc- shape the international environment by the use of —MAJ Peter C. Giotta, USA cupy much of our energy and resources, it is a force or its threat, and by stability and peace opera- Joint Military Intelligence College major regional war—or two simultaneously—that tions when appropriate.” He advocates “aggressive worries Kagan. We must currently execute the involvement” as “the best way” to accomplish these To the Editor—The guiding tenets of national toughest parts of national security strategy. While three tasks. I think he has his priorities backward. security strategy—shape (the international environ- involved in a fight, we must also continue shaping While it is true that, as the national military strategy ment), respond (to the full spectrum of crises), and activities. In addition, we must prepare by trans- states, “The Armed Forces help shape the interna- prepare now (for an uncertain future)—are being forming the force to meet future threats. Even more tional environment primarily through their inherent put to the test as events unfold in the wake of the worrisome is that too much emphasis might be deterrent qualities,” that deterrent capability pro- terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Frederick placed on technology without considering innova- vides a backdrop to the true means of shaping the Kagan argues in “Strategy and Force Structure in tions in organization and doctrine. environment: “foster[ing] the institutions and an Interwar Period” that “military preparedness is Emphasizing the need to maintain readiness urgent in periods of apparent peace just like during during transformation, the author cites organizational periods of tension.” How right he is. changes the Air Force and Marine Corps have al- ready made. He calls on the Army to do the same

8 JFQ / Spring 2002 FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■ and “abandon the Cold War model of Army organiza- While defeating the Nazis was the only op- weapons, the areas of operation become transpar- tion.” The division structure does not accord with the tion, World War I and abortive attempts to enforce ent. These systems in combination with unmanned way we currently train or operate, which focuses on the Versailles treaty had eroded any possibility of aerial vehicles clearly show that we can speak of a brigade training and deployments. This is likely to re- public support for preventive war. For over sixty real revolution in military affairs. But technological sult in a volatile readiness mix within divisions called years, Neville Chamberlain and Munich have served conditions are only part of what is needed. As Ad- upon to fight in a major conflict. as the paradigms of “peace at any price.” Cham- miral Bill Owens pointed out in Lifting the Fog Of At the core of Kagan’s force structure argu- berlain, however, fully represented the temper of his War and in a speech to the Clausewitz Society in ment is what he describes as an “unfounded as- people in 1938. Britain had gone to war in 1914 Berlin, it will be important to combine technology sumption: in 1990 the active components of the because it felt the costs of German hegemony over with coherent doctrine. Armed Forces were prepared to defeat a Soviet at- Europe to be unbearable. In the future, the wider spectrum of engage- tack and, since that threat was clearly much The lessons of history are often complex and ment of the Air Force against maneuvering tank greater than any threat or combination of threats are seldom easily applied. More specifically, the units could shift the weight from maneuver to fire- today, the military in this interwar period should be evidence suggests that, in this instance at least, power. Against the background of synchronized op- smaller and less costly. This assumption does not democracies were able to recognize and respond to erations between the Air Force and Special Opera- accord with historical reality; it prejudges the ques- the threat within the context of their normal political tions Forces, linear battles such as we observed tion of what force structure we need, coming to processes. The fact that their generals could not during the Persian Gulf War will become less mean- what is clearly a wrong answer.” put this power to use should not obscure that fact. ingful. The Army—driven by the vision of General A relative lack of funding and resources for A more subtle interpretation of the record suggests Eric K. Shinseki—has drawn sound conclusions militaries is a longstanding issue, especially in de- that the trip wires for preventive war, the strictures from that new situation. The lean structures of the mocratic countries. Rueful of America’s wealth, an of Versailles, were poorly calculated to maintain new interim brigades and especially their means for Italian general observed at a NATO reserve forces public support. Further, though Hitler fortunately re- reconnaissance and intelligence are similar to the conference, “You have the first and second best mains unique, it would appear that criminals and organization of Special Forces. With planned new military in the world.” madmen are not easily deterred by a rational calcu- equipment, these Army forces could become active Kagan is right to call for increased resource lation of the odds; they can only be defeated. at the same time through the whole depth of an allocation during interwar years. That the largest in- Public support—the willingness to “pay any area of operations and work closely with the Air crease in defense spending in 20 years had to price, bear any burden”—was, is, and should re- Force. Robert Scales describes such operations in a come on the heels of a national catastrophe is main the foremost bulwark of international stability. monograph called “Future Warfare Anthology,” pub- somewhat ironic. But it may be sufficient to put our A hyperactive, overly interventionist foreign policy lished by the U.S. Army War College in 2001. Tech- defense orientation, posture, and transformation that drains resources and mires the Nation in moral nology and doctrine alone are not sufficient. It needs activities on the right track. ambiguity only exhausts that stout willingness to do commanders on all levels who are able to manage —Charles F. Hawkins what is both right and necessary. the huge amount of information and—for the con- Historical Evaluation and Research —MAJ Wade Markel, USA duct of an operation—to distinguish important from Organization Army Transformation Office superfluous information. —Bruno Lezzi To the Editor—The interwar years show that RETHINKING SO/LIC Neue Zürcher Zeitung democracies are slow to recognize and prepare for To the Editor—I read “Special Operations danger, according to Frederick Kagan. In fact, they As a former director of Opera- Forces after Kosovo” by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. (JFQ, To the Editor— demonstrated the reverse. Britain and France con- tions, Plans, and Policy for U.S. Special Operations Spring/Summer 01–02) with great interest. Against fronted Germany in 1940 with superior material Command, I am compelled to comment that “Special the background of Kosovo and Afghanistan, the co- strength. The Germans had 2,439 light and Operations Forces after Kosovo” by Charles Dunlap operation between Special Operations Forces and medium tanks, of which over 1,700 were light, is a thinly-veiled service-centric attack by a non-SOF the Air Force could serve as a model for new oper- against 3,079 Allied tanks, most of which were officer on Army Special Operations Forces: rangers, ational concepts. These operations have shown that medium or heavy; 7,378 German artillery pieces Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil af- modern information technology provides the re- faced 13,974; 3,369 Nazi aircraft faced 4,981; and fairs. The author’s appreciation of the future or SOF sponsible commanders the optimal means to coor- 135 Wehrmacht divisions confronted Allied 152. ground operations is limited to “snatch missions.” dinate such actions. The preeminent strategic im- Nor should one forget the immense investment in His assumption that unconventional warfare is a portance of air operations has become evident. the Maginot Line. Further, contrary to the myth of dying concept is thoroughly disproven in Afghanistan. The vision Giulio Douhet—the airpower theo- German might cultivated by the Nazis, the relative His understanding of PSYOP is limited to the tactical rist of the interwar period—formulated 1921 in The strength of antagonists was much the same (broadcasts and leaflets), and he desires to civilianize Command of the Air could be reality in a few years. throughout the 1930s. The Nazi domination of Eu- civil affairs, not understanding its combat roles of Although it is difficult to compare wars—remem- rope cannot be attributed to either an untimely campaign deconfliction and support and manage- bering Clausewitz’s observation that they are like recognition of the threat or an unwillingness to ment of displaced personnel and prisoners. Finally, chameleons—the offensive operations in Afghan- meet it. he states that SOF shouldn’t execute counterdrug istan may allow the conclusion that the Air Force— So why were the Germans not deterred? The missions, one of the better training vehicles for Spe- as an instrument of asymmetric warfare—is able to answer is Adolf Hitler. Gerhard Weinberg makes it cial Forces. Such are the results when one draws have decisive impacts on the outcome of wars. clear that der Fürher was absolutely bent on war, sweeping conclusions from a small conflict. Due to the opportunities given by modern not merely as a means to his insane objectives but networks of systems for reconnaissance, com- —MG Geoffrey C. Lambert, USA as an end in itself. Such a monster was not to be mand and control, and the engagement of U.S. Army Special Forces Command deterred, only destroyed.

Spring 2002 / JFQ 9 ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

To the Editor—Charles Dunlap began his arti- Of the 6,766 sorties planned, over half were Navy plagued by a groundless, indeed irrational, cle by asserting that “Allied Force was the first aborted due to weather and a third were adversely prejudice against battleships. major operation in which aircraft achieved victory affected by weather. Fewer than half of the targets The NSFS gap can be quickly and affordably without the need for a land campaign.” This is were effectively engaged. Moreover, from 15,000 closed by extensively modernizing USS Iowa and patently wrong and only serves to undermine the feet pilots cannot tell a tank from a derelict car with USS Wisconsin to create a new class, the battleship spirit of joint operations. a pipe sticking out of the windshield. The report guided-missile (BBG). This could be accomplished in Despite claims about precision and ability, air- stated: “Almost completely unchallenged, Yugoslav about a year for $1 billion—the original cost of the power did not force the enemy to abandon the battle. forces could disperse and hide....When revealed, ill-fated USS Cole. Each BBG would provide 96 That was achieved by the credible threat, indeed the slowness in the sensor-controller-shooter sequence much needed Tomahawks much sooner with an reality, of engaging U.S. ground forces, as embodied often gave them enough time to relocate [and hide] ability to perform more missions and at half the cost by Task Force Hawk. Slobodan Milosovic did not give before attacks began.” of alternatives. the order to withdraw until the Russians told him U.S. With the documented inability of airpower to In September 1992, the Navy officially shifted ground forces were coming and that if his forces did be 24/7 and all-weather, the only remaining means from a blue water to a brown-water (littoral warfare) not withdraw, Russia could not help them. The fact of supporting joint Special Forces in the littorals is strategy. With this shift, the Navy acquired an in- that Serb forces largely withdrew—intact—is a tes- with naval surface fire support (NSFS). creased responsibility for providing troops ashore timony to the inability of airpower to destroy tactical The difficulty of meeting NSFS needs stems with reliable, tactically-responsive, accurate, high- combat forces in the field despite its effectiveness from the Navy’s inability to provide a volume of fires: volume NSFS under all conditions. Without this sup- when it went “downtown,” destroying strategic tar- a large enough platform (ship) to carry both multiple port, our troops ashore run the risk of needless gets such as bridges, road and rail networks, and the guns and sufficient ammunition, and a weapon sys- heavy casualties, being defeated, or both. power supply. tem that delivers a large enough payload with the —Major Tracy A. Ralphs, USAR The Allied Force Munitions Assessment Team lethality to destroy armored or hardened targets in a Suffolk, Virginia and Joint Intelligence Team Survey concluded that manner that is tactically responsive and affordable airpower expended some 14,000 bombs—mostly in large quantities. In short, that is the problem with To the Editor—The article by Charles Dunlap precision guided munitions (PGMs)—against com- missile solutions for NSFS. The Marines know their has been partially overtaken by events. The Afghan bat forces in the field and destroyed 14 tanks, 18 requirements can be met with reactivated battle- campaign has taught the defense establishment armored personnel carriers, and 20 artillery/mor- ships. General James Jones stated, “I regret we and the citizens who fund it more about modern tars—not much of a return on our investment and took them [battleships] out of service before we had Special Operations Forces (SOF) than any informed not a very effective means of providing fire support actually fixed the naval surface fire support prob- analysis ever could. A picture of bearded Special to special operations forces. lem.” Unfortunately, the purse strings are held by a Forces soldiers on horseback, carrying laptops in their rucksacks, is worth a thousand words. A major lesson of Afghanistan is that SOF are the glue that enables joint, interagency, and multi- national forces to function as a team. Linkage with Announcing the first event in American aircraft, the Northern Alliance resistance, the 2002–2003 symposia program CIA operatives, and NATO special forces troops il- lustrated what the SOF community has known all along: humans are still more important than hard- ware. Rather than being marginalized, Special Joint Operations Symposium Forces have been brought to the center of the new security architecture. What is surprising about Dunlap’s article is that it comes from the Air Force, the service that eliminated Special Operations from its doctrine Homeland Security: during the 1980s. Indeed, the consistent refusal of its leaders to buy special operations aircraft The Civil-Military Dimension was a key reason that Congress finally had to di- rect the formation of U.S. Special Operations (Co-sponsored by the University of Maryland) Command. It is gratifying to hear that the service has accepted SOF (even its own) as a legitimate player in joint operations. September 19–20, 2002 It is equally gratifying that the CIA has real- ized that technology cannot replace human sources of intelligence. Another picture Americans will not Information on symposia is available via the National Defense University soon forget shows CIA agent Johnny “Mike” Spann World Wide Web server. Access by addressing www.ndu.edu/inss/ inside the Mazar-e-sharif prison just before he was symposia/symposhp.html. Programs and other materials are normally murdered by terrorists. SOF is the link between the posted 90 days prior to events. CIA and DOD on the ground. Two things make SOF special: the capability to insert small numbers of highly trained, independent

10 JFQ / Spring 2002 FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■ thinkers behind enemy lines to train and advise guer- the conflict between using planned exercises for There are in fact other approaches a guerrilla rilla forces in their own languages, and the capability experimentation are valid and point out the compe- fighter might use. At sea, there is a form of uncon- to conduct surgical operations in confined spaces. tition for assets between the need to train and the ventional warfare that has been practiced and is Starting with hostage rescue, certain units have de- need to experiment. However, in a budget-con- currently being planned by potentially hostile but veloped the tactics for attacking an enemy where no strained environment, this conflict cannot easily be weak navies that I call delay, disruption, denial, and technology can get them—in underground bunkers resolved. The article also astutely points out that demoralization (D4). In this form of maritime war- and caves. The genesis of this adaptation appeared a there is inappropriate competition among CINCs fare, the weaker side attempts to get a lucky hit on decade ago with the threat of weapons of mass de- over experimentation. a key ship type in hopes of slowing things down to struction developed and controlled underground. I applaud Cooke for a well-written and get some strategic wiggle room, possibly dissuad- Dunlap is rightly concerned about SOF being thought-provoking article. However, this debate has ing further enemy advance due to the lack of the spread too thin, a very real danger in a community gone on for seven years and is a primary reason ship’s combat potential, or maybe demoralizing the whose mantra is quality, not quantity. If the commu- the program has had so many starts and stops. It is enemy populace due to the high casualties that nity cannot grow beyond bureaucratic and physical time for those with such ideas to provide concrete normally attend the loss of a ship (everybody being limits, the challenge of retaining focus must be met thoughts on the asymmetric threat that would drive aware of the Somalia debacle). through specialization within SOF. SEALs are still in us to revolutionary change and explain how to get While it is easy to imagine the Iraqis pursing the mountains and Green Berets are still in the to the future they envision. a D4 strategy, one can also interpret their actions as water. A key advantage of joint organization has —Col John A. Clauer, USMC opportunistic—just stirring up the environment to been squandered. Philadelphia Consortium (Villanova get us to make a mistake. Another possibility is that Islands have always functioned as engines of and University of Pennsylvania) their actions are meant only for domestic consump- evolution. The bureaucratic isolation of Special Op- tion—to maintain military morale or popular legiti- erations Forces has produced an evolution in joint- UNCONVENTIONAL macy by standing up to the Americans. If Baghdad mindedness from which all can learn. The paradox STRATEGY is acting on any of these motivations, it is hard to of a community apart becoming the glue for others see how Webb’s strategy of indirect dominance can be explained by good leadership, joint doctrine, To the Editor—“A New Twist in Unconventional would solve the problem. Moreover, as a strategy of and realistic training with foreign militaries and in War: Undermining Airpower” by Gary Webb (JFQ, reprisal, it does not appear that it would seize the joint exercises around the globe. Spring/Summer 01) does a service by defining a initiative as he asserts. Webb goes on to state that —CAPT Paul Shemella, USN (Ret.) mode of warfare that is very real but not widely rec- the threat of retaliation may discourage further mis- Naval Postgraduate School ognized in the arena of air superiority. Recognition of chief. Again, he offers no basis for his thinking, and the kind of war is being fought is a first step in win- the sad history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a EXPERIMENTATION ning it. For this he deserves our appreciation. cautionary example of the ineffectiveness of Many of Webb’s observations are insightful reprisal strategies. To the Editor—In “Reassessing Joint Experi- and useful. Veterans of operations over Iraq have Airpower is a potent and essential tool in the mentation” (JFQ, Spring/Summer 01–02), Thomas complained about our strategy, and many of his arsenal of democracy, but it is just one of many and Cooke gets to the heart of the problem with future assertions justify that concern. Our strategy is de- should not be wielded in isolation. Hacking our way experimentation. The problem is hampered by the fensive, reactive, and expensive without having suf- through the Gordian knot of Middle East politics will debate between those who want to take us into the ficient suppressive effect on Iraqi efforts to rebuild require more than the blunt instrument of military unknown and those who want to build bridges from an offensive potential. force. Webb’s recognition of a guerrilla mode of air the current to the future force. Cooke uses the word However, as the author proceeds into more warfare is both brilliant and useful, but his concept revolution without an adequate definition. A revolu- detailed description and prescription, he wanders of indirect dominance gets us off track. tion in military affairs requires a catalyst. In the past dangerously off track. He ascribes a Maoist-type —Robert C. Rubel it has been technologies such as the stirrup, horse, approach to Iraqi guerrilla warfare, appearing Naval War College gunpowder, flight, or wireless communications. to engage in what one CINC has called “data-free What is the enabler today for a revolution in research.” He offers no evidence that the three- warfighting? The major area that offers promise is phase method is being used or is even known. information technology. Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020 at- tempted to harness information technology to take the joint force into the 21st century. Those familiar with the program believed joint experimentation should focus on those joint C4ISR capabilities that information technology will change and that will empower the force to apply the military art in a dif- ferent way. Many also believed new capabilities that Missing an issue? would be a part of this new joint force are the purview of service experimentation programs/labs. Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limited Piggybacking on service experiments was a wise quantities to members of the Armed Forces and public way to enhance joint C4ISR capabilities and also to institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the allow the services to verify their experimentation in address or FAX number listed on the masthead. support of joint operations. Cooke’s arguments on

Spring 2002 / JFQ 11 ■

Escorting Serb detainees to Kosovo-Serbian border. Marine Division (Craig J. Shell) d Lessons 2 from the War in Kosovo By BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH

llied Force, the most intense and sus- an unprecedented exercise in the discriminate use tained military operation in Europe of force, essentially airpower, on a large scale. since World War II, represented the There were highly publicized civilian fatalities; A first extended use of force by NATO yet despite 28,000 high-explosive munitions ex- as well as the first major combat operation con- pended over 78 days, no more than 500 noncom- ducted for humanitarian objectives against a state batants died as a direct result, a far better per- committing atrocities within its own borders. At a formance in terms of civilian casualty avoidance cost of more than $3 billion, it was also expen- than either Vietnam or Desert Storm. sive. Yet in part because of that investment, it was But Allied Force was a less than exemplary exercise in U.S. and NATO strategy and an object lesson in the limitations of Alliance warfare. A balanced appraisal must accordingly account not Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior staff member at RAND only for its signal accomplishments, but its short- and the author of NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and comings in planning and execution, which nearly Operational Assessment. made it a disaster.

12 JFQ / Spring 2002 Lambeth

Milosevic insisted as a point of principle that no foreign troops would be allowed on Kosovar soil. Today, with some 42,000 soldiers from 39 coun- tries performing daily peacekeeping functions, Kosovo is an international protectorate safe- guarded by both the United Nations and NATO, rendering any Serb claim to sovereignty over the province a polite fiction. Second, the Alliance showed that it could function under pressure even in the face of hesi- tancy by political leaders of member states. In seeing the operation to a successful conclusion, it did something it was neither created nor config- ured for. The proof of success was that cohesion held despite the combined pressures of fighting a war and actually going into Kosovo with no fixed exit date even while bringing in new members. Finally, for all the criticism directed at less Signal Company (Lorenzo A. Sam) Signal Company (Lorenzo

th steadfast Allies for their rear-guard resistance and 55 questionable loyalty during the air war, even the Administering first aid Greek government held firm to the end, despite to Serbs in Kosovo. 90 percent of its population supporting the Serbs Allied strikes against dispersed and hidden through large-scale street demonstrations. True forces were largely ineffective, in part because of enough, there remain unknowns about Allied the NATO decision at the outset to forgo even the steadfastness in future confrontations along Eu- threat of a ground invasion. Hence Serb atrocities rope’s eastern periphery. Yet NATO maintained against the Kosovar Albanians increased even as the one quality essential to Allied Force—in- air operations intensified. Some observers claimed tegrity as a fighting cooperative. that the bombing actually caused what it sought to prevent. Yet it seems equally likely that Milose- Grinding Away vic would have unleashed some form of Opera- Despite its accomplishments, enough dis- tion Horseshoe, the ethnic cleansing campaign, comfiting surprises emanated from Allied Force to during the spring or summer of 1999 in any suggest that air warfare professionals should give event. Had NATO not finally acted, upward of a careful thought to what still needs to be done to million Kosovar refugees may have been stranded realize its joint warfare potential instead of bask- in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro with no ing in airpower’s largely singlehanded success. hope of return. Many of the surprises entailed tactical shortfalls. Although Allied air strikes were unable to Examples abound: the targeting process was inef- halt Milosevic’s campaign before it was essentially ficient, command and control arrangements were accomplished, they completely reversed its effects complicated, and enemy integrated air defense in the aftermath of the cease-fire. More than system challenges indicated much unfinished 600,000 of the nearly 800,000 work in planning suppression of air defense. In by any reasonable measure, ethnic Albanian refugees from addition, elusive enemy ground