The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation

Policy Studies 9 The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation Konrad Huber East-West Center Washington Policy Studies A Publication of the East-West Center Washington Editor: Dr. Muthiah Alagappa The aim of Policy Studies is to present scholarly analysis of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia in a policy relevant manner. Written for the policy community, academics, journalists, and the informed public, the peer-reviewed publications in this series will provide new policy insights and perspectives based on extensive fieldwork and rigorous scholarship. Each publication in the series presents a 15,000- to 25,000-word investigation of a sin- gle topic. Often publications in this series will appear in conjunction with East-West Center research projects; stand-alone investigations of pertinent issues will also appear in the series. 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Submissions should be sent to: Editor, Policy Studies East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Submissions can also be forwarded by e-mail to [email protected] The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation Policy Studies 9 The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation Konrad Huber Copyright © 2004 by the East-West Center Washington The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation by Konrad Huber ISBN 1-932728-17-1 (online version) ISSN 1547-1330 (online version) Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/Publications/publications.htm East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 293-3995 Fax: (202) 293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org The Policy Studies series contributes to the Center’s role as a forum for discussion of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Center. This publication is a product of the East-West Center Washington project on Managing Internal Conflicts in Asia. For details see pages 93–101. The project and this publication are supported by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Contents List of Acronyms v Executive Summary vii Introduction 1 Third-Party Involvement 5 Separatist Conflict in a “Resource-Rich” Province 13 How Did HDC Broker the COHA? 18 Why Did the COHA Fail? 30 Lessons 40 Putting Aceh in Perspective 70 Endnotes 77 Bibliography 87 Background of the Aceh Conflict 90 Map of Aceh, Indonesia 92 iv Konrad Huber Project Information: The Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflicts in Asia 93 • Project Purpose and Outline 95 • Project Participants List 99 Policy Studies: List of Reviewers 2003–04 103 Policy Studies: Previous Publications 104 List of Acronyms AID all-inclusive dialogue ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations Brimob Brigade Mobil (paramilitary police) COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operations Zone) DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives; lower house of national parliament) GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) GOI Government of Indonesia HDC Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IOM International Organization for Migration JSC Joint Security Committee LNG liquefied natural gas LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNLF Moro National Liberation Front MP-GAM Majelis Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement Government Council) vi Konrad Huber NAD Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (official name of the province of Aceh since 2001) NGO nongovernmental organization ODA official development assistance OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique OTK orang tak dikenal (unknown person) SRSA Swedish Rescue Services Agency TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia’s military) USAID US Agency for International Development Executive Summary This paper examines the unprecedented role played by a nongovernmental organization, the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialog (HDC), in facilitating negotiations between the Indonesian government and the armed Acehnese separatist movement GAM. These negotiations led in 2000 to a ceasefire, known as the “humanitarian pause,” that held fitfully into 2001. The major breakthrough, however, came in December 2002 when the parties signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This agreement, COHA, envisioned a cease-fire followed by demilitarization meas- ures and an “all-inclusive dialogue” on autonomy provisions followed by provincial elections in Aceh. Within months, however, this agreement broke down, and Indonesian security forces launched their largest-ever military operations in the restive province. Based on extensive interviews with participants in the negotiation process, this analysis tries to understand what caused the breakdown by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of a nongovernmental institution like HDC in facilitating, mediating, and then attempting to guide implementation of complex, risk-prone accords between battle-hardened adversaries. This paper first reviews the growing literature on third parties in mediating internal conflicts, not just during the negotiations leading to an accord but also in the all-important phase of “peace implementation” once a pact has been signed. Before and during the negotiation process, media- tors rely on varying approaches and different sources of influence to recon- viii Konrad Huber cile parties. Once a peace deal has been concluded, one of the major chal- lenges of implementation is to deal with “spoiler” parties either inside or outside the negotiation process that seek to undermine a nascent accord for partisan gain or even to block any agreement out of a deeper opposition to peace. A particular concern, therefore, is the political authority invested in the third party charged with guaranteeing implementation of an accord. In contrast with nongovernmental organizations like HDC, states acting indi- vidually or collectively through an inter-governmental body like the United Nations (UN) or a regional forum arguably have important advantages in mediating and then safeguarding accords in armed disputes. A brand-new organization, HDC was nonetheless able to gain entry into the long-running conflict between GAM rebels and the Indonesian state and bring about significant agreements between the belligerents early 2000 and late 2002. The conflict in Aceh stems both from Acehnese griev- ances and from the brutal response of Indonesian security forces to armed insurrection sustained sporadically by GAM ever since declaring Aceh’s independence in 1976. At stake is also the province’s resource wealth, par- ticularly from natural gas. Revenue-sharing is a key element of the central government’s offer of special autonomy (now enshrined in a partially implemented law proposed in 1999 and passed in 2001). In late-1999 HDC fortuitously identified the potential for promoting dialogue on humanitarian issues in Aceh at a time when the Indonesian political system was undergoing considerable change following three decades of authoritar- ian rule under retired Gen. Suharto. From early 2000 onward, HDC used humanitarian issues as a point of entry, focused on efforts at confidence- building through face-to-face dialogue and on-the-ground cooperation during the “humanitarian pause” of 2000–01, and eventually attempted the “political dialogue” which yielded the December 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, or COHA. During this process, HDC worked closely with key government pro- ponents and GAM’s exiled leadership based in Sweden for a negotiated solution, and attempted to cultivate a role for Acehnese civil society representatives in the peace process.

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