Ms. Buratti Francesca N.2 JUNE 2021

Ms. Buratti Francesca

CHINA BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT (BLUF) ASSESSMENT

N.2 JUNE 2021

Executive summary

The China BLUF Assessment from June 2021 analyzes Beijing’s reaction to the new NATO’s Communique definition of China as a systemic challenge to the international order and to the Alliance security. Not surprisingly China’s official reaction to the statement has been of criticism and rejection. At the same time, the analysis shows that unusually harsh responses from China on G7 and NATO are a sign that President Xi is very much afraid of a western united anti-China front: Beijing is trying to leverage Europe hoping that it remains fragmented and divided in its approach to China within the Atlantic Alliance.

Like last month report, the June’s monitoring also confirms China’s aggressive posture within the international fora, aimed at pursuing the ‘China dream’ and at achieving the ‘national rejuvenation’ through a “rule-setting” attitude. Special attention is given to Beijing diplomatic activities within the BRICS, the SCO and ASEAN.

In the Indo-Pacific, China’s military activities during the month of June have been particularly offensive with Malaysia and Japan. With reference to Taiwan, the approaching of the 100 anniversaries of the Chinese Communist Party has opened speculations in the west on what the next step of President Xi Jinping’s would be for the making of the ‘China dream’ and for achieving ‘national rejuvenation’. This of course, include investigating feasible timing for the Taiwan invasion.

In conclusion, Chinese evolving role in Africa and the MENA region is widely reviewed in this assessment. Beijing has intensified multilateral cooperation with major local powers in Afghanistan, like Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. Moreover, in the wider MEN region, Chinese presence in the arms market and in the military-security domain is steadily growing. Lastly, a new report reveals that Beijing’s long-term design in the African continent is not to encourage or support Africa’s development for its own sake but rather to make the continent fit into a new subsystem comprising much of the global South that China aspires to dominate once the new Sinocentric order will be settled.

Thematic Assessment

Diplomacy

1. China refutes the new NATO’ statement that it poses a systemic challenge to the international community. June 14th has opened a new era for the Atlantic Alliance. After a long negotiation, the member countries of NATO released the Summit’s official statement and the Allies jointly identified China as a systemic challenge to the international order and to the alliance security. Beijing’s reaction to the new Statement has been both harsh and severe. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian at a Regular Press Conference on June 15 stressed that China does not pose

NOT CLASSIFIED Page 1 of 13 "systemic challenges" to anyone, and that Beijing will firmly safeguard (its) sovereignty, security and development interests.1 However, it is more cause of concern the tone full in resentment used by China in attacking NATO, both by leveraging on historical frictions that by urging the Alliance to abandon its “Cold War mentality”. Quoting the Chinese spokesperson: “NATO has a long history of poor records. It is up to its neck in debt morally and has brought wars and instability to the world for many times. The international community will not forget the 78 days of indiscriminate bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO without the approval of the UN…The Chinese people will never forget the historical tragedy of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. This is a debt of blood that NATO owes to the Chinese people.”2 Nevertheless, Beijing will have to deal with the new Declaration through which the 30 countries of the Alliance, albeit not without difficulty, managed to find a compromised language on how China’s rising military ambitions are challenging NATO and must be addressed. The New York Times has published an interesting analysis that well summarizes the difficulties that the Alliance’s will encounter in putting into practice a strategy towards China, as a regional military alliance of Europe and North America whose main concern remains a newly aggressive Russia — not distant China. Further, NATO member states from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Germany, are concerned that a new concentration on Beijing will divert the Alliance attention and resources from the problem closer to home.3 In addition, it should not be underestimated that “a challenge” has a very different meaning from “threat”. The latter is still used as an exclusive term in reference to Russia, whose “aggressive actions constitute a threat to the Euro-Atlantic security.” By mentioning China in his policy for the first time, NATO also leaves space for win-win cooperation within areas of diplomacy and engagement, where the Alliance vows to maintain “a constructive dialogue with China where possible,” including on the issue of climate change, and calls for China to become more transparent about its military and especially its nuclear capabilities and doctrine.4 Beyond speculations, the new NATO’s policy towards China is “cautious”: while NATO is ready to assess how Beijing diplomatic, military, and economic activities affects the Alliance’s security, there is no intention to deploy in the Asia-pacific. As highlighted by Marta Dassù, Senior Director of European Affairs at The Aspen Institute, in an interview with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “If, however, “ready” means that NATO will engage military in the Asia-Pacific region, this is not the case, the expert argues: “NATO is not turning into a Sino-centric alliance. And Washington is not asking NATO to support the United States militarily in Asia. Joe Biden is suggesting, instead, a new transatlantic bargain: NATO, with renewed American commitment, will focus mainly on Europe and collective defense—and here Russia remains the main military threat for the Alliance. At the same time, European allies will support Washington in containing China, first of all in diplomatic and economic terms”. 5

2. In the aftermath of the NATO and the G7 Summits, China is trying to leverage Europe with a view to competing with the United States. In the aftermath of the NATO and G7 Summits, at a regular press conference, the Chinese spokesperson recalled China’s consistent policy towards Europe, and their strong comprehensive strategic partnership. The spokesperson also expressed China’s support for the European integration, for a united and strong EU playing a bigger role in international affairs.6

1 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1884007.shtml 2 See 1 3 https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/14/world/nato-summit 4 For the first time, NATO sees China’s growing military might as ‘presenting challenges 5 https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/84798 6 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1884007.shtml NOT CLASSIFIED Page 2 of 13 It is no coincidence that such a resolute statement comes after that, at their first EU-US high-level dialogue on China on May 26th, Washington and Brussels confirmed that they see the relationship with China as multifaceted with “elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry” – using the European order, which puts cooperation first. In addition, both sides reiterated points made in a recent G7 statement agreeing on shared concerns over China’s human rights misconduct, disinformation campaigns, actions in the South China Sea and shared support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO.7 It is enough safe to affirm that we will see China trying to leverage Europe from a competitive perspective with the United States in the months to come. In the words of the Chinese spokeperson “As for the US attempt to form small cliques against China with ideology as the yardstick, I'd like to say that China and Europe are two important forces in a multipolar world. We believe the EU will continue to enhance strategic autonomy and won't be hijacked by other country's wrong China policy. “8

3. China’s posture aimed at reshaping the multilateralism has been consistent within the BRICS, the ASEAN and the SCO for the month of June. This month, the BRICS foreign ministers' meeting issued a joint statement on strengthening and reforming the multilateral system. China’s response to this declaration has been supportive and perceived from Beijing has a commitment to reforming multilateralism: in China’s view the statement is not only the outcome of the five countries' concerted efforts and their answer, but also reflects the shared aspiration of most countries and the widespread consensus of the international community.9 Moreover, in June was held the Special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations. On the occasion, Wang Yi said that entering a new historical period, China and ASEAN should focus on the next 30 years to jointly realize, maintain, and develop a road of regional cooperation with East Asian characteristics, build a higher level of China-ASEAN strategic partnership, and build a closer community with a shared future. 10 It is also worth mentioning China’s firm position in occasion of the SCO non-governmental friendship forum opened in Wuhan on June 3. President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the forum, in which he expressed the confidence that would become an important platform for all parties to enhance mutual understanding, deepen friendship and strengthen cooperation.11

4. As the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party approaches, the west is investigating what the next step of President Xi Jinping’s would be for the making of the ‘China dream’ and for achieving ‘national rejuvenation’. At a press conference the Chinese spokesperson, dedicated a long speech at praising the values and greatness of the CCP. Over the past 100 years, the CPC did not simply apply the template envisioned by the writers of Marxist classics, or copy other countries' socialist practices and modernization model, argued the Chinese spokesperson, instead, “it has been enriching and developing Marxism in practice….building socialism with Chinese characteristics….”12 With the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party approaching, it should be in the interest of NATO’s Allies and Partners to examine how the nature of the socialism with Chinese characteristic has developed, how CCP thinks, and to explore how the evolving nature of the Party continues to change in the new age of great power competition.

7 https://merics.org/en/briefing/eu-china-weekly-review-171-format-diplomatic-damage-control-and-eu-us-cooperation 8 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1884007.shtml 9 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1881926.shtml 10 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1882182.shtml 11 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1881482.shtml 12 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1882549.shtml NOT CLASSIFIED Page 3 of 13 An exceptionally good China Brief’s article from the Jamestown Foundation, analyzes the military political work concept, intended as an overarching term that describes all the efforts and activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aimed at managing human capital and influencing the civilian environment to achieve the political and military objectives accorded to it by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Over time, the PLA Political Work Regulations have sought to do the following: reaffirm the Party’s absolute leadership over the military; establish systems and promote increased standardization over time; emphasize the decisive role of the human dimension in warfare; promote increased combat efficiency; respond to changing nature of warfare & incorporate lessons learned from foreign wars. The article’s outcome is illuminating: western analyst and policymakers by wondering how is the PLA’s military political work likely to evolve in an age of great power competition, should anticipate intense competition in the “battle for the narrative”, that would mean to see in China more rapid and complex information campaigns that integrate military, civilian, traditional, and non-traditional media. Such campaigns could coordinate rhetorical statements with other military activities including exercises, PLA involvement with humanitarian assistance, or military diplomacy. China’s recent efforts to shape global narratives surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic may be a sign of what is to come in this arena. In conclusion, the author stresses that the west should prepare for a competition in human capital, seen from Beijing as essential to build a military that is better positioned to conduct joint operations. With this in mind, NATO should expect that the CCP continues to prioritize PLA efforts to develop personnel equipped to meet the demands of modern warfare.13 Equally notable is a MERICS report from June, providing unique insights of the CCP “comprehensive national security concept”. This term was articulated by Xi in 2014, shortly after coming to power, as a new vision of national security, interlinked within the securitization of China’s foreign policy and the integration of development and security. Going into details, the author explains that as the Party refocuses its efforts towards achieving its 2035 and 2049 goals, the securitization of China’s international behavior is only likely to be intensified. The CCP wants to preempt any challenges to the system, whether internal or external, to ensure the long-term survival of its governance model. Underlining the interconnectedness between domestic and international security, the CCP Central Committee has said that the goal of China’s diplomacy is to “actively create a favorable external environment” that can allow China to reach its development goals. The way to achieve this is clear in the party’s mind: create a global national security state that is under the CCP’s absolute control and has access to all the resources it needs to establish China as a global power in the face of Western opposition and other external threats. This is likely to remain the party’s approach to international relations for the foreseeable future, or at least until the party feels safe enough in the international arena.14

Military Domain

5. Malaysia scrambles Hawk 208 aircraft to confront PLAAF squadron over South China Sea On June 4th The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) has scrambled an unspecified number of Hawk 208 light-attack/lead- in trainer aircraft to confront a squadron of 16 People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft over the South China Sea. The encounter took place within the Kota Kinabalu flight information region (FIR), Janes reported. The Chinese aircraft were flying within Malaysia's maritime zone.15

13 Military Political Work at the CCP’s Centennial: https://jamestown.org/program/military-political-work-at-the-ccps- centennial/?mc_cid=97cfb6db4d&mc_eid=c89e788292 14 THE CCP'S NEXT CENTURY, Expanding economic control, digital governance and national security, MERICS, June Report 15 https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china

NOT CLASSIFIED Page 4 of 13 China’s official position regarding the event is that it was a routine training conducted by China's air force over waters to the south of Nansha Islands and that during the training, China's air force strictly complied with international law and did not enter the air space of any other country.16 6. Chinese coast guard ships have been patrolling near the "Senkaku Islands" for 112 days running. They have entered the contiguous zone every day since mid-February, surpassing the previous record of 111 consecutive days from April to August of 2020, Nikkei Asia refers.17 This is the strongest "intervention" by China since the Japanese government "nationalized" the islands in 2012. China’s official response to the event is that The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are inherent Chinese territory, and thus the patrol and law enforcement activities by China Coast Guard in these waters are legitimate and lawful measures to safeguard sovereignty. 18

7. China’s military maneuvers aimed at provoking Taiwan increased. On June 15, a day after US president Joe Biden and other NATO leaders issued the statement condemning China’s “stated ambitions and assertive behavior”, 20 People’s Liberation Army fighter jets, four nuclear-capable H6 bombers and four additional military aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. It was the largest number of planes ever dispatched by the PLA into the zone, with some of them also skirting around the southern tip and east coast of the island before turning back.19 According to Elena Yi-Ching Ho and Malcolm Davis, experts from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) such flights can certainly be interpreted as a form of coercion, to pressure the government in Taipei to accept China’s demands for unification on Beijing’s terms. The experts also provide interesting food for thoughts on China’s plausible military attitude with the approach of the CPC 100th anniversary celebrations on 1 July: they presume that Beijing will ramp up pressure on Taiwan, particularly in grey-zone operations—a coordinated series of actions below the level that would generate a US military response but that would increase pressure on Taipei to bend to Beijing’s demands for unification. At the same time, they hypothesize that it is likely that China will intensify its efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically to accentuate its vulnerability to coercive pressure. Finally, they reckon that China could also attempt to increase pressure against a move towards greater independence in the lead-up to Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election and against any form of external intervention to assist the island.20

8. The US Congressional Research Service “China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” released on June 8 could be a good reference for NATO’s comprehension of China’s military strategy. This report discusses issues related to the PLA, the PLA’s ongoing reform and reorganization efforts, the PLA’s roles in advancing China’s national security interests, major features of China’s strategic outlook, PLA capabilities and modernization, uncertainties related to PLA capabilities, and the resources that fuel PLA modernization. In detail, it provides valuable analysis of China’s own perception of its military posture: China presents it as purely defensive, serving only to protect China’s legitimate sovereign interests. In other words, China calls its national military strategy “active defense,” a concept that prescribes the ways in which Beijing can defend its interests and prevail over a militarily superior adversary. This strategy allows for the use of offensive operational and tactical approaches, and the PLA has and continues to develop capabilities to wage offensive operations across a range of domains.21 It is indeed a valuable resource for NATO’s effort aimed at understanding China’s military and strategy.

16 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1880861.shtml 17 https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Chinese-ships-sail-near-Senkaku-Islands-for-record-112-days-straight 18 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1882549.shtml 19 https://www.ft.com/content/0da3c218-e3e6-402e-b87e-21570bd68ba7 20 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-military-watch-9/ 21 China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) June 4, 2021, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46808.html NOT CLASSIFIED Page 5 of 13 9. A new ASPI report warns that avoiding conflict with China will require a much deeper understanding of how its rulers and military planners view deterrence and coercion. The ASPI report “To deter the PRC” from June 2021, is a brilliant resource for getting know-how of China’s approach to deterrence, whose comprehension is essential to effectively deter the PRC. The main assumptions come from the analysis of an authoritative People’s Liberation Army publication, the 2013 Science of military strategy, which outlines Chinese conceptions of deterrence.22 The authors of the report argue that while the US and its partners and allies may perceive ‘coercion’ as in line with terms such as ‘blackmail’ and ‘manipulation’, and ‘deterrence’ as relaying a softer tone, the PRC doesn’t make that split”.23 Put another way, the report’s insights point to a particular challenge facing Western liberal democracies in considering the prospect of a major military crisis over Taiwan or in the South China Sea in coming years. If deterrence in a traditional sense is the use of a declared or implied threat to prevent an action inimical to the interests of the deterring power, a Chinese approach that is more coercive—forcing an opponent to act according to the interests of the coercing state—would be seen from the West as aggression.24 The report concludes by asserting that there’s a risk that failures in Beijing and Washington to understand each other’s motives and ‘strategic cultures’ could cause the rapid escalation of any future crisis over Taiwan, leading to war by miscalculation.

Technology Domain

10. PLANAF J-15 fighters seen operating from Lingshui Airbase in South China Sea 1st Jun: Chinese state-owned media has released video footage showing People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) J- 15 naval fighter aircraft being operated from an airbase that Janes identified as Lingshui Airbase on Hainan Island in the South China Sea (SCS)25.

11. China's CASIC signs accord with CCCC to expand industrial co-operation 2nd Jun: The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has signed an agreement with the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) to support industrial and technological co-operation, according to a statement from CASIC, one of China's most important developers of advanced weapons and unmanned systems The analysis from Janes underlines that China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–25) calls upon domestic defence industrial enterprises to expand collaboration with both defence and commercial sector companies in the country, with the aim of exploring synergies and efficiencies, and enhancing self-reliance26.

12. The Observer Research Foundation (ORF) has released an interesting report titled “Sino Techno- Nationalism Powers Through with ‘China Manufacturing 2025”. The analysis gives an in deep overview of China Manufacturing 2025 program, whose objectives might be indeed of NATO’s Allies and Partner interest to better understand China. Since assuming office, President Xi Jinping has pushed the ‘China Dream’ plan as an ideal that envisions improving its comprehensive national power by reducing its technological dependence on foreign companies. Under the ‘China Manufacturing 2025’ (CM2025) strategy, the country is endeavoring to achieve self-sufficiency in information technology, robotics, and the manufacturing of sophisticated

22 https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deter-prc 23 https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deter-prc 24 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-military-watch-9/ 25 https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china 26 https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china NOT CLASSIFIED Page 6 of 13 equipment used in areas like railways and medicine. What deserve NATO’s attention is the fact that CM2025 will help meet the CCP’s goals of improving China’s market share in developing countries and pitting Chinese brands against Western ones.27

Regional Assessment

Indo-Pacific

13. China and Indonesia are strengthening their partnership. On June 5, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indonesia's presidential envoy and Coordinator for Cooperation with China co-chaired the inaugural meeting of the China-Indonesia High-level Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing the high-level dialogue cooperation mechanism and another on strengthening maritime cooperation. China has reported how the meeting forged a new platform for and injected new impetus into greater growth in bilateral relations in the post-pandemic era.28 Despite historical frictions in the maritime domain, latest developments strongly indicate that Chinese- Indonesian relations are surprisingly improving. According to some western experts, this could have profound geostrategic significance for the United States and its competition with China in the Indo-Pacific29 : Washington views Indonesia—as an increasingly important economic and security partner willing to stand up to Beijing; China likewise seeks to enhance engagement with Indonesia to have a friend in regional disputes, secure access to Indonesian resources, and perhaps leverage Indonesia as a strategic bulwark against Australia. Jakarta is also a key Asian partner in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is building and investing in infrastructure projects throughout Indonesia. 30 No doubt, monitoring the evolution of the China-Indonesia cooperation will be in the interest of NATO’s Allies and Partners with legacy in the Indo-Pacific.

14. On June 23, China held a virtual conference on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): the “Asia and Pacific High-level Conference on Belt and Road Cooperation”, as a new occasion to show off its “COVID vaccine diplomacy”. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the conference was attended by more than 30 parties, including foreign ministers or economic ministers of relevant countries in Asia-Pacific and representatives of the United Nations and other international organizations. In the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s words, the purpose of this meeting was to build on President Xi Jinping's important initiative to forge new consensus with countries in the Asia-Pacific region on jointly fighting the epidemic and promoting sustainable economic recovery, advance high-quality development of the BRI, and make greater contributions to the building of a community with a shared future for Asia-Pacific region and the entire mankind.31 At the meeting, two new BRI-themed initiatives were launched, focusing on each of these areas. First is the new “Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccines Cooperation,” which will seek to strengthen international cooperation in vaccine research and development, production, and distribution, and improve the accessibility and affordability of vaccines globally, especially in developing countries.32

27 https://www.orfonline.org/research/sino-techno-nationalism-powers-through-with-china-manufacturing-2025/ 28https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1881771.shtml 29 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/07/indonesia-china-jokowi-natuna-sea-military-bri-cooperation-biden-united-states/ 30 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/07/indonesia-china-jokowi-natuna-sea-military-bri-cooperation-biden-united-states/ 31 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1885824.shtml 32 https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/china-holds-slimmed-down-belt-and-road-conference/ NOT CLASSIFIED Page 7 of 13 15. Indo-Pacific partners seek EU security engagement, MERICS reports. The EU and its Indo-Pacific partners have been exploring avenues to boost security cooperation to address China’s growing maritime influence. Firstly, the Japanese defense minister has tried to lobby the EU speaking to the European Parliament subcommittee on security and defense on June 17, by inviting Brussels to boost its military and security involvement in the Indo-Pacific region in attempts to counter expansion of Beijing’s influence in the region. Secondly, between June 18 and 19, the EU (represented by French, Italian and Spanish vessels) and India conducted a joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Aden. While the exercise was part of the anti-piracy Atlanta operation, the two sides also released a statement expressing support for a vision of an Indo-Pacific rooted in “democracy, rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation.” Thirdly, On June 22, the High Representative Josep Borrell released an opinion piece discussing the EU’s strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, ranging from maritime security, through the uphold of the democratic rights in the region, to the ambition to extend the EU’s Critical Maritime Routes project to Indo-Pacific.33 These events come as confirmation that NATO’s European Allies, while not oriented at militarily countering China in the Indo-Pacific, are increasingly raising awareness over Beijing’s assertive behavior in the region. The main issue for NATO would be to see whether the EU Member States and the Indo-Pacific partners will effectively find consensus on cooperating in the security domain. At this stage, in fact, NATO’s EU Countries differ in what their role in Asia is and how they officially want to challenge China in the Pacific. The UK, searching for a new role after the Brexit, deploys naval vessels in the region, where it has historical legacy. Likewise, France, whose Pacific Island territories give it one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world, even sees itself as a resident power. On the other hand, Germany, mindful of the country’s economic interests in China, is reluctant to anger Beijing and is maintaining a more cautious behavior. 34 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what extent Europeans can really commit in the Indo-Pacific: finding a compromise between deterrence and a constructive balance will not be easy for NATO’s EU Members. Finally, the US are still not getting any assurance that its EU Allies will intervene in the event of a security escalation with China in the Indo-Pacific.

Eurasia

16. The China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Dialogue opens food-for-thought on the Afghanistan’s future security nexus in the post-NATO era. The fourth China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Dialogue was held through video link this month. The three countries held an in-depth exchange of views on the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan and trilateral cooperation. Two joint statements were released, one on the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan and another on deepening trilateral cooperation. The dialogue also adopted a list of projects of practical cooperation.35 The Chinese Spokesperson affirmed that China, Afghanistan and Pakistan all aspire to maintain regional peace and stability and that the trilateral Dialogue was meant to provide in-depth exchange of views on the key issues of peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan, trilateral practical cooperation and anti-terrorism security cooperation. 36 Future scenarios of regional cooperation in Afghanistan will pose both ways potential security challenges to NATO. The relations that China is weaving with regional powers in the country pose the Alliance in front of Beijing’s realpolitik at play. China’s major interest of securing economic gains can be achieved by using Afghanistan’s position as a regional connector in either the Belt and Road Initiative or China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In

33 https://merics.org/en/briefing/eu-china-weekly-review-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-indo-pacific-montenegro 34 https://www.ft.com/content/fac21cf6-076d-4c6e-8596-f8c203011a48 35 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1881482.shtml 36 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1880861.shtml NOT CLASSIFIED Page 8 of 13 addition, since 2007 China has been seeking ways to extract Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth, which requires security and transportation infrastructure. 37None of this is possible without a stable Afghanistan, so China is assuring through platform like the trilateral dialogue that the post-US-era evolves at its convenience. NATO should also pay attention to other partnerships that China is strengthening in the region. The China-Russia strategic comprehensive partnership not only will find fertile ground for political outreach in Afghanistan but will also align for security reasons: indeed, the two partners are intent to maintain a presence in Kabul to preventing the potential threats that instability in the country could pose to their national security. 38 Not surprisingly, at one of this month’s regular press conference, commenting China-Russia relations, Beijing stated that the two countries “are united like a mountain, and (their) friendship is unbreakable” , setting an example of a new type of major- country relationship.39 From its side, Moscow is keen to build alliance in the region, particularly with China, as a mean to expand its role of regional hegemon in Afghanistan once the US are gone. Further, it would be in NATO’s interest to monitor the China-Iran partnership. As expert Nilofar Sakhi explains at War on the Rocks “With the US troop withdrawal, Iran will have more direct influence in Afghanistan and will aim to protect its interests by building alliances with regional powers, particularly China and Russia. A deal signed between Iran and China promising $400 billion in Chinese investment is the second Chinese partnership in the region after China’s collaboration with Russia. Though the China-Iran relationship is growing, Beijing will be careful to not allow that partnership to risk its relationships with oil-rich Gulf Arab states.”40 The Alliance should also keep in mind that the China-Iran recent agreements include strengthening military cooperation through intelligence sharing. In the long term, this could be used as a tool to influence Afghan power dynamics against US-western interests in the region.

Africa and Middle East

17. On June 8 , The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has released a special report: “A New Great Game? Situating Africa in China’s Strategic Thinking” aimed at providing a comprehensive assessment of Africa’s strategic importance for China and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.41 The analysis examines in detail how Africa is integral part of President Xi’s grand strategy aimed at reshaping the international liberal system into a Sinocentric order. Put another way, Chinese strategists envisage the continent as an essential piece in an escalating geostrategic contest for global influence between their country and the U.S.-led West: instead of engaging in a head-on confrontation with an overwhelmingly strong adversary such as the United States, China should expand its presence westward to balance against U.S. pressure on its eastern flank and deploy along exterior lines, far from China’s mainland, including on the African continent. China also needs Africa’s natural resources (minerals, oil, agricultural products, etc.). Thus, the ultimate purpose of Beijing’s emerging strategy is not to encourage or support Africa’s development for its own sake but rather to make the continent fit into a new subsystem comprising much of the global South that China aspires to dominate. These findings suggest that contrary to Beijing’s protestations and despite the skepticism of many Western observers, China is in fact preparing to export its model to Africa and perhaps to other parts of the developing world as well. The authors affirm that China has extensively used Africa as a key element of counter-containment strategies and qualify as “non-contact imperialism” Beijing ’s approach to African countries, meaning a policy based on

37 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-russia-china-and-iran-will-shape-afghanistans-future/ 38 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-russia-china-and-iran-will-shape-afghanistans-future/ 39 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1884007.shtml 40 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-russia-china-and-iran-will-shape-afghanistans-future/ 41 https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-new-great-game-situating-africa-in-chinas-strategic-thinking/ NOT CLASSIFIED Page 9 of 13 the partial hegemony that is based of dependencies that could be used either as incentives or as coercive tools, rather than on global dominance. 42 In elaborating its assumptions, the report reviews the main outlook of a series of research projects carried on by Africanists and international relations scholars, that in the authors view give the best available insights to date into the place of Africa in China’s emerging grand strategic vision. China’s interests in Africa are thus divided into three main categories: “core”, “important” and “general” interests. In Africa, China’s core interests are mainly related to the “one China” issue, which, for almost 60 years, has transformed Africa into the “main battlefield for diplomatic competition between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Second, China’s “important” interests in Africa are related to the country’s general development, which allows some latitude for compromise and negotiation. Finally, China’s “general” interests in Africa include everything that has not been mentioned above. Particularly interesting are the observations made by an Africanist in particular, Zhang Chun, the director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. He explains that to what extent Africa will become a strategic fulcrum that China could use to counter foreign encirclement maneuvers, in line with Mao’s Theory of the Three Worlds, will determine how the developing countries will become not just a means to some larger end but Beijing’s “true allies”.43 Moreover, the report investigates another hot issue for NATO: whether Chinese strategists might go as far as using proxy wars in Africa to pull the United States away from the Asia-Pacific theater. The conclusion highlights that for the 21st century Chinese strategist have in mind not Cold War proxy war way of acting, like the Soviet proxy wars during the Cold War period, but to envision a competition on the African continent against their U.S. foe that primarily takes the form of a political and discursive struggle. This would mean, for example, to establish military bases on Africa’s Atlantic coast, that could be considered as useful to deflect U.S. attention away from the Chinese mainland’s immediate periphery. Beijing may hope to “outflank” the United States not necessarily by opening new military fronts but by mobilizing support for its positions in international institutions and gaining endorsements for its distinctive institutions and governing ideology.44 The report goes on by analyzing China’s cooperation with Africa in the fields of security: strengthening security cooperation with African countries will help them build a safe and stable political environment conducive to their socioeconomic development. At the same time, this will help China improve its ability to protect its overseas assets and citizens and accumulate experience and skills in overseas operations. However, the author argues that beyond mentioning security as a domain where China needs to expand its cooperation with African countries, Chinese scholars do not elaborate further on what they think should be done concretely.

18. China remains a marginal player in the Middle East’s arms market, but its presence is steadily growing. According to the Diplomat, data adjourned in June 2021 suggest that we will likely see a shift soon, with the gradual entry of China as a player in the Middle Eastern arms trade. Over the past decade, there has already been enough evidence to suggest that Beijing is working to tap the lucrative defense markets in this region, where it has been trading in military-security sectors since the 1980s and 1990s. China’s footprint in the entire Middle East has been widening rapidly ever since the announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Since then, it has become the largest trading partner and foreign investor for several countries in the region. While for now China’s focus is on clinching major BRI-connected economic investment deals, mainly infrastructure and connectivity projects, Beijing appears to have taken notice of the lucrative defense markets of the Middle East. 45

42 https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-new-great-game-situating-africa-in-chinas-strategic-thinking/ 43 https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-new-great-game-situating-africa-in-chinas-strategic-thinking/ 44 https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-new-great-game-situating-africa-in-chinas-strategic-thinking/ 45 https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/the-middle-east-an-emerging-market-for-chinese-arms-exports/ NOT CLASSIFIED Page 10 of 13 It should be noted that the Middle East’s gradually growing military-security cooperation and arms trade with China coincides with the latter’s rising profile as one of the major international arms exporters. During 2016- 2020 period, China was the world’s fifth largest weapons exporting country, with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria being the largest recipients of its military equipment. As evidence, the Chinese arms companies have been playing instrumental roles not only in the military modernization programs of the Chinese armed forces but also in generating foreign revenues through defense exports.46 In conclusion, deserves special NATO’s attention the increasing arms related export that China has developed with the Persian Gulf countries and to a lower extent with Iran. China and the Persian Gulf countries likely will attempt to focus more on mutual technology transfer and licensed co-production of certain types of weapons systems. Emerging geopolitical scenarios will certainly influence not only China’s Iran and the Wider Middle East policy, but also NATO’s Allies and Partners, whose interests in the region could be a great deal challenged by the increasing China’s military cooperation with the Arab countries. 47 The Atlantic Alliance should bear in mind that, beyond speculations regarding the evolving role of Beijing in the region, the China’s Arab Policy Paper from 2016 argues that China has interest in deepening cooperation on weapons, equipment, and various specialized technologies, and carry out joint military exercises in the Middle East. It is also worth noting for the Alliance, that Beijing will continue to support the development of national defense and military forces of Arab States to maintain peace and security of the region. 48 Therefore, it is enough safe to assume that in the near future, NATO will most likely have to face a growing China’s military-security cooperation with local countries in the Middle East, particularly in the arms deals and in the weapons co-production.

Outlook

19. This month BLUF report has dedicated special attention at assessing Beijing’s reaction to the new NATO’s Statement, where for the first time in its history, the Alliance’s countries have agreed to define China as a systemic challenge to the international order and to the alliance security. Not surprisingly, China has reacted condemning the communique’s definition. Less obvious, however, has been the Chinese decision to boost its reaction with old historical friction, by mentioning the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during a press conference. 20. Further, the assessment shows how China’s strategy towards Europe is part of President Xi’s wider design to counter the US. Therefore, it will be crucial for the Alliance to monitor how the China-Europe relationship evolve and to see how Brussels will concretely approach the new NATO’s official policy on China. The compromise reached with the language of the new Communiqué does not constitute a bulwark against the still very fragmented approach that the European allies have to the Chinese issue. Many Europeans are reluctant to risk their close economic ties with China by criticizing Beijing too harshly: in other words, Europeans recognize that China represents a strategic challenge, but are nonetheless determined to remain engaged in trade and investment with the People’s Republic of China.49 As some experts highlighted, to a large extent, the cautious statement reflects the fact that several European allies are reluctant to enter a confrontational path and do not share the US sense of urgency when it comes to Chinese assertiveness.50 Beijing will indeed benefit most if the European Countries remain fragmented and divided in their approach

46 https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/the-middle-east-an-emerging-market-for-chinese-arms-exports/ 47 https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/the-middle-east-an-emerging-market-for-chinese-arms-exports/ 48 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1331683.shtml 49 https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/84798

NOT CLASSIFIED Page 11 of 13 to China, in a way that the differing views will prevent the Atlantic Alliance from operationalizing an anti-China strategy. 21. Moreover, China’s statements and behavior from this this month in the international fora confirm a diplomatic effort aimed at pursuing the ‘China dream’ and at achieving the ‘national rejuvenation’ through a “rule-setting” attitude. China has shown, once again, its willingness to be influential in the developing world – with the BRICS, certainly in Asia with the SCO and the ASEAN forum - by assuming the role of a supporting partner with respect to it, economically, and for what concern NATO’s sphere of influence also military and in the security domain. Chinese efforts in international organizations confirm that China’s aspires at setting rules and agendas at its convenience. By analyzing several reports published in occasion of the 1oo anniversary of the CPC, is also emerged that the China’s expanded definition of national security has led to a correspondingly greater list of issues that the leadership considers to be core interests, attacks on which trigger a much stronger response from Beijing. NATO’s Allies and Partners must be prepared to deal with a Chinese leadership that will respond forcefully and aggressively to any perceived criticism or attack against its interests, and that is ready to escalate any conflicts if matters of national security are concerned. 51 22. China’s aggressive military posture is confirmed by Chinese aircraft flying within Malaysia's maritime zone and the Chinese coast guard ships patrolling near the Senkaku Islands for 112 days in a row. It is worth mentioning that the February 2021 China Coast Guard Law makes the CCG part of the PLAN, and it is authorized to fire on hostile vessels. It is also important to note the role of the Maritime Militia under the PLAN. Furthermore, the intensification of Beijing’s provocative military maneuvers towards Taiwan reflects growing alarm in Xi’s administration. As Dot. Yun Sun, a China foreign policy expert at the Stimson Center in Washington has declared at the Financial Times, there is a real concern in Beijing that a united front is forming [and] includes many elements that China does not wish to see such as Taiwan, maritime security, and human rights. That’s why we are seeing some unusually harsh responses from Beijing on G7 and NATO.”52 In conclusion, this analysis shows that in the Indo-Pacific China is strengthening its bilateral relations with Indonesia. The United States’ concern is clear: recently Washington has agreed to fund the construction of an Indonesian Coast Guard base in Batan facing the South China Sea to enforce Indonesia’s maritime fisheries. 23. Chinese evolving role in the MENA region has also been at the core of this month’s assessment. NATO should monitor how Beijing will develop multilateral diplomatic cooperation with major local powers in Afghanistan, such as those with Russia, Iran and Pakistan. Military engagement in the Middle East has also revealed interesting assumptions. In the long run, defense industrial cooperation and technology transfers will likely come to form a pivotal component of China-Middle East engagements. Considering the defense industrialization programs underway in some of the Persian Gulf countries, Chinese military technological assistance will increasingly be sought. Further, as China’s reputation as a global arms exporter improves, the Middle Eastern countries will also have an alternative vendor from which to procure arms. This would come much to the dismay of the United States.53 24. In conclusion, the wider Chinese strategy in the African continent has been touched upon. The review of The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)’s report fills the gap of a general lack of knowledge of Beijing’s long-term design for the developing word. For the first time, this report provides insights of the international implications for China’s engagement with Africa and is an absolute must read resource for enhancing NATO’s Allies and Partners awareness of Beijing strategic ambition in the continent. The conclusion highlights that Chinese strategist clearly envisage Africa as a testing ground, a proof of concept, and the “first step leading to a greater community of common destiny” that will link “the China dream with the African

51 THE CCP'S NEXT CENTURY , Expanding economic control, digital governance and national security, MERICS, June Report, https://merics.org/en/report/ccps-next-century-expanding-economic-control-digital-governance-and-national-security 52 https://www.ft.com/content/0da3c218-e3e6-402e-b87e-21570bd68ba7 53 https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/the-middle-east-an-emerging-market-for-chinese-arms-exports/ NOT CLASSIFIED Page 12 of 13 dream, the Arab dream, and even the world dream. Africa is a laboratory in which Chinese strategists think they can test and perfect techniques that, if successful, can then be applied and adopted elsewhere. If they can demonstrate the efficacy of China’s model in Africa, Chinese strategists hope that this model can be spread across the global South, eventually reshaping the world (surprisingly like the PRC’s activities in Africa in the 1960s) 54 In elaborating its future strategies towards the South, NATO should not leave behind these assumptions, nor the fact that President Xi’s “core interests “in Africa is a very key concept for the CCP since the start of the 2000s and earlier that aim at turning Africa into a new subsystem comprising much of the global South that China aspires to dominate. 25. To summarize, the rise of China and the evolving Sino-U.S. great power rivalry will inevitably have a role on NATO’s Allies and Partners future strategic outlook. So will China’s rise on NATO’s 2030 agenda and the upcoming Strategic Concept. NATO SACT will keep monitoring how China will impact NATO’s strategy and military posture through future BLUF assessments.

54 https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-new-great-game-situating-africa-in-chinas-strategic-thinking/ NOT CLASSIFIED Page 13 of 13