62-4526
REW, Joung Yole, 1933- A STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF KOREA, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1919 AND 1931.
The American University, Ph.D., 1962 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF KOREA. WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1919 AND 1931
by
Joung Yole Rew
Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
* of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Area Studies
Signatures of Committee:
Chairman:
(U—R*.
lejUA ■ - rf Date
A!ViED,r.AN UNIVERSITY > ■ fl p f October 3, 1%1 "THtLOlS JUN 5’ 1962 The American University Washington, D. C. '5S? WA3ttlNSI Uft, 0. c.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page PREFACE...... i ▼
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... viii
ABBREVIATION USED IN FOOTNOTES ...... X
Chapter I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE JAPANESE ANNEXATION OF KOREA ...... 1
A. Political History to 1905 ...... 1
Japan's Overseas Expansion Korean Factionalism Cause and Effect of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars
B. From the Protectorate to the Annexation . . IS
The Establishment of the Residency-General and the Residencies The New Agreement of 1907
II. THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF KOREA AND ITS ADMINISTRATION IN THE FIRST DECADE...... 39
A. General Aim and the Policy of Assimilation...... 39
B. Machinery: Central Government...... U9
Administrative System Police and Judicial System The Central Council
C. Machinery: Local Government ...... 68
Province Urban Prefecture, Rural District, and Japanese Municipal Settlement Village
i
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Chapter Page
D. The Bureau of Colonial Affairs, The Oriental Development Company and other Colonial Institutions ...... 87
E. The Administration under the Governors- General, Terauchi and Hasegawa ...... 95
III. REFORMS IN 1919 UNDER THE LIBERAL GOVERNOR- GENERAL SAITO...... 109
A. The Mansei Uprising of March 1, 1919 and its Effect...... 109
B. Reform Measures...... 122
Scope of the Reforms Office of the Governor-General Gendarmerie and Police System The Advisory Councils and Local Governments Non-discrimination between Koreans and Japanese
C. The Problem of Self-Government...... 156
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE SAITO ADMINISTRATION UPON THE LIFE OF THE KOREANS...... 163
A. General Condition ...... 163
B. Educational Reforms and Social Development...... 170
C. Production and T r a d e ...... 198
The Impact of Trade Boom during the World War I. The Effect of the Capital Accumulation in Japan proper The Extensive Rice Production Program
V. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION SINCE 1931 . . . 222
A. Further Reforms in Local System under the Governor-General Ugaki ...... 222
B. The Acceleration of the Assimilation Policy ...... 23 A
ii •V
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C. The Rapid Development of Korean Industry after the Manchurian Incident...... 240
D. The Effect of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Five-Year Industrial Plan...... 253
E. The Effect of Pacific War and the Shift of Korean Status in Administration ...... 259
VI. CONCLUSION...... 263
APPENDIX...... 273
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 294
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE
Numerous books and articles have been published to present
general development of Western colonial government in Asia, however
there are very few works on the Japanese colonial government in the
area. The Japanese colonial government of Korea during the period
between 1910 and 1945, which has been known as the Government-General
of Korea, as well as that of Taiwan, had played a significant part in
furthering the expansion program of the Japanese empire, and moreover
in the rise of Japanese militarism.
Despite its importance, there has never been a compre
hensive study of the Government-General of Korea up to date. It is
an opportune time for the re-evaluation of the Government-General of
Korea and its administration, for it ceased to exist on August 15,
1945. A number of articles on the subject has appeared from time to
time. However, since even these works were done prior to 1945, no
one has analyzed and examined the Government-General of Korea in
its entirety from 1910 to 1945, or determined most significant
development.
After briefly surveying the political developments between
Japan and Korea up to 1910, the author attempts to analyze the
administration and the political structure of the Government-General
of Korea, with emphasis on the period between 1919 and 1931. This
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. appears to be the most interesting period in the author's view,
during which administrative reforms were introduced and industry
began to develop.
The author has endeavored to emphasize the effectiveness
of the political structure and the administration of the Government-
General of Korea as a colonial government per se rather than to
discuss the merits and demerits of the government and its ethical
aspects.
In this study the author has given careful consideration
to the problems regarding, firstly, the impact of the Government-
General of Korea upon the Japanese expansion in Asia in order to
determine whether and to what extent the Government-General of Korea
participated in expanding the Japanese Empire, secondly, the reaction
of the Koreans towards the Government-General of Korea in order to
find out to what extent the Japanization of Korea was possible, and
thirdly, the impact of internal politics of Japan, as well as that
of international affairs, upon the development of the Government-
General, thereby coming not only to a conclusion as to what extent
the internal politics of Japan affected the Japanization of Korea,
but to a conclusion as to what was the international significance
of the occupation of Korea. Besides, materials indicating to*what
extent Japan had politically, as well as materially, benefited by
the annexation and vice versa, were carefully examined. The author
also focussed his attention on whether or not there had been strife
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. between the civil bureaucrats and militarists during the course of
its development.
The author has placed great emphasis on the utilization
of primary sources for this study. There are many documents of
great value, which were made available to the public only recently,
such as Japanese War and Navy documents microfilmed at the Library
of Congress and the documents kept by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Japan until 194-5. He also relied on the Annual Report and the
Statistical Annuals of the Government-General of Korea. There are
the official annual reports published by the Government-General of
Korea in the Japanese language and also in English. The English
version is not a literal translation of the Shisei Nempo, or annual
report in Japanese, and contents and organization of both are differ
ent in some degree. The Japanese version is more in detail and
reliable than the English version. Therefore the author utilized
both materials for this study. He endeavored to pursue this work
by consulting with sources never utilized for this subject befoi*e
and consequently, many formerly undisclosed facts came to light by
utilization of secret official documents, made available recently.
The author desires that this study fills a gap in an
important and much neglected field, particularly the Japanese colonial
government and its policy in the Far East up to 194-5. It is hoped
that this work may be a contribution to further understanding of
Japanese and Korean relations during the period of Japanese rule.
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Further, it is hoped that it might be of some assistance to student
of Far Eastern Government and Politics, as well as to those of
International Affairs.
The author is greatly indebted to Lord Lindsay of Birker,
who is his advisor, Dr. Millidge P. Walker, Dr. Takehiko Yoshihashi,
Dr. Ralph Powell, and Mr. Irving Kramer for their guidance in the
preparation of this dissertation.
Special thanks are due to Mr. Sanford Berman and
Mr. Richard Taliaferro, Jr. for their valuable assistance in proof
reading. Finally I am grateful to my wife who typed this dissertation
and whose faithful support enabled me to complete the dissertation.
vii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES
Page The Administrative Division of Korea as it existed after Annexation...... 69
Schools, Teachers, and Students in Korea in March 1911 . . . 105
Victims and Damage caused by the Uprising ...... 116
Offices and Personnel of the Policy before and after the Reform...... 14-3
Police Expenses during the period between 1918 and 1929 . . 14-6
Composition of Provincial Councils 1920-1930 ...... 14-9
Result of Prefectural Election of 1920 and 1929 ...... 152
Result of Designated Village Elections of 1920 and 1929 ...... 152
The Local Administrative Divisions ( 1 9 3 1 ) ...... 154.
Composition of Korean Police ...... 156
Number of Registered Students 1911, 1919 and 1930...... 184.
Mission Schools, December, 1931 186
Number of Koreans in Chientao and Hunchun Region ...... 194-
Development of the External Trade of Korea, 1926-1931 (in 1,000 yen) ...... 208
Value of Leading Exports in 1929-1931 and Imports of the Same I t e m s ...... 209
Wages in Korea, 1926-1934 (Per day: in y e n ) ...... 210
Occupational Distribution of the Population (in percentages)...... 210
Cultivated Area in Korea in Relation to Total Number of Farm Households and Acreage per Household, 1919-1931. . 213
viii
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Rice Production, Export and Price, and Population in Korea, 1929-1937 217
Per Capita Consumption of Rice in Korea, 1915-1938 (in k o k u ) ...... 218
Average Annual Rice Consumption in Japan Proper, 1928-1932 ( in 1,000 koku)...... 219
Iron-Total: Imports into Korea from Japan, 1928-1936 . . . 24-3
Coal: Exports from Korea to Japan, 1928-194.0...... 24-3
Locomotives and Tenders: Imports into Korea from Japan, 1928-1939 ...... 244
ix
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABBREVIATION USED IN FOOTNOTES
A R = Annual Report on Administration of Chosen (in English).
F A = Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Archives, 1868-194.5.
G C = The Government-General of Chosen.
H Z * Horei Zensho (Collections of Laws and Orders).
Kam.= Kampo (Official Gazette).
P B = Printing Bureau.
S N = Shisei Nempo (Annual Report on Administration) (in Japanese).
T N = Chosen Sotokufu Tokei Nempo (Statistical Annuals of the Government-General of Chosen).
W N = Ministry of War and of Navy, War and Navy Archives, 1868-194-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE JAPANESE ANNEXATION OF KOREA
A. Political History of 1905
Japan's Overseas Expansion:
By 1905, the colonial character of Japan's Far Eastern
policy became evident, although there earlier had been misgivings
raised over her aggressive expansion plans both at home and abroad.
The Japanese skillfully planned their expansion with the object of
maximising the benefits which would accrue either directly or
indirectly to Japan itself.
There were many motives for overseas expansion:^-
military ambition, agrarian unrest, a need for strategic materials,
There are various theories regarding the motives for Japanese imperialism. G. F. Hudson, The Far East in World Politics: A Study in Recent History (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), Pp. 81-82. Prof. Hudson believes two factors dictated Japanese policy with respect to Korea: 1) the fear, analogous to England's traditional over the Low flountries, lest Korea should fall under the control of some more powerful state and become the staging-ground for an attack on Japan, namely the security motive; 2) a strong economic urge to open up the Korean market.
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and the desire to achieve economic self-sufficiency.'*' Japan
lacked many basic materials which are necessary to be a strong
modern nation. The Japanese found them in neighboring lands, and
also they found there colonial posts for ambitious young men,
particularly samurais unsatisfied with the new regime in Japan since
the Meiji Restoration, commands for restive militarists, and markets
for manufactured goods. 2 Japan's overseas expansion was a well planned movement.
It started, as did modern industrialization in Japan, by imitating
the West. Japan could easily acquire territory from defenseless
neighbors; accordingly, Formosa, the Kwantung Leased Territory,
Tatsuo Matsuzawa, "New Chosen," Contemporary Japan. June 1939, p. 4.56. The pacifists in Japan felt that there was no necessi ty to acquire colonial markets since the underdeveloped resources of Japan were then sufficient for her population of about fifty million and Japan's capitalistic industrial system was at that time in its infancy. Moreover, it was known to all that the administration of Korea was an extremely expensive undertaking. 2. Arthur Judson Brown, The Mastery of the Far East: the Story of Korea'8 Transformation and Japan's Rise to Supremacy in the Orient. (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons. 1921). p. 199. The Japanese regarded Dr. H. N. Allen, the American Minister at Seoul, as an obstacle to their plans because he had a kindly feeling for Koreans. Dr. Allen had arrived in Korea in 1885 as a medical mission ary of the American Presbyterian Church, (Korea. Government-General of Chosen. Annual Report on Administration of Chosen. 1933-1934.. Seoul: 1934-), p. 90. Although the Japanese government denied that they had asked for Allen's recall, a hint was doubtless conveyed to Washington, by indirect methods, that the Japanese would be gratified if a change were made in the American Legation at Seoul. The U. S. Government felt that it would be better at that particular juncture to have a minister in Korea not so well known for his friendship with the Koreans. On June 10, 1905, the Honorable Edwin V. Morgan appeared in Seoul, with orders to supersede Allen as American Minister.
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the South Manchurian R. R., and Korea came under Japanese rule
within a decade. Formosa and Korea were prized acquisitions because
of their contribution to Japan’s agricultural deficiencies. Formosa
mainly provided sugar and rice; Korea offered rice. No real attempt
was made to develop industrial resources in either territory until
1930.1
In a History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East. Prof.
Paul H. Clyde tried to justify Japanese conduct in the Far East
during the 1880’s. He maintained that Japan had accepted the
principle of Korean independence and had actually furthered plans
for progress and reform which would have enabled Korea to retain its 2 independence. However, the aggressive, colonialist character of
Japanese policy in Korea had been clearly demonstrated since 1876, 3 the year of the first Treaty of Amity between Korea and Japan.
Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 34. Industrial production in Formosa and Korea in 1930 was 247 million yen and 280 million ybe, respectively. In 1939, it rose to 574 million and 1,498 million yen. According to Banking and Monthly Statistics, the average exchange rate was 49,3839 cents per yen in 1930 and 25.9629 cents per yen in 1939. 2 Prof. J. Treat made a similarly specious judgement. See Payson J. Treat, The Far East (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), Po 293. 3 Dr. Tatsuji Takeuchi asserts in War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York: Doubleday, Doren & C6., Inc., 1935), Pp. 163-164, that sending a secret mission to the Hague Conference only hastened complete Japanese domination over Korea. He mentions that the Japanese cabinet held several meetings on the subject and even decided upon measures to be taken in case the annexation of Korea could not be secured by treaty.
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Prof. Clyde also asserts that a secret mission to the Second Hague
Conference in 1907 which sought international intervention to free
Korea from Japanese control combined with the assassination of
Prince Ito on October 26, 1909 by Mr. Joong Geun Ahn, a Korean,
evoked popular demands for immediate annexation. The Japanese
government, he contends, "unwillingly" acquiesced to these demands.
However, annexation was planned by the Japanese government before
those incidents took place.^ Japan supported Korean independence
only so long as that policy was the best means of preventing rival
powers from controlling Korea and in order to gain a fpothold on
the peninsula. As soon as circumstances permitted, Japan assumed
exclusive control. Since the formal annexation of Korea by Japan
in 1910 Korea increasingly became an integral part of the Japanese 2 Empire through the policy of "Assimilation11.
Korean Factionalism
At the turn of the century Korea was in the early stages
of agricultural development; the more attractive regions were over-
populated by a people with simple standards of living. Destruction
of forests in order to secure wood fuel for heating, coupled with
^Shumpo Ko Tsuishokai (comp.), Ito Hirobumi Den (A Biography of Ito Hirobumi) (Tokyo: Tosei Sha, 1944), Vol." 3, p. 837. 2 Roy H. Akagi, Japan*8 Foreign Relations. 1542-1936: A Short History (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1937), p. 579.
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the practice of hua-dyeun,^ or fire-fields, denuded mountains,
causing floods almost every year. Most parts of Korea are mountain
ous j only the southern and western parts are suitable for agriculture.
Before 1910, Korean society consisted of two distinct classes:
first, the yangbans. or gentry, who ruled and consumed, but who
produced nothing, and second, the common people, often call hain,
who produced everything, but owned nothing. Corruption and avarice
among the yangbans and high Korean officials caused much misery
among the people. Moreover, the very ineptitude of Korean govern
ment reduced the country to a state of inertia for generations, while
Japan, a neighbor, rapidly underwent modernization. At that time,
there was an old saying that if anyone produced or gained something,
it caused his destruction. Corrupt officials confiscated the proper
ty of innocent people without reason, and if anyone showed resent
ment towards the unlawful manner of the officials, he was jailed.
There was no enthusiasm for saving or for capital accumulation, 2 which could cause the destruction of their family. Only bribery
could save one from the cruelty practiced by government officials.
There was a growing tendency among the people to live on the bare
^This system has been employed by many peoples, particular ly in the North. It consists of burning grasses and bushes in the forest area, planting cereals or potatoes for a few seasons, and then moving to another place when soil fertility diminishes. An increase of hwa-dyeun is a sign of deterioration, not of progress.
Issei Ugaki, Ugaki Nikki (Ugaki Dairy) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1954), p. 254.
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subsistance level. While the Korean government took from the people,
through official and unofficial channels, everything that the people
earned over and above a bare subsistence, it provided no protection
to life nor property. There were no educational facilities that
deserved notice. Some foreigners, who had spent a large part of
their life in Korea, described the Korean government of that time
as infected with rottenness to the bones.^ Many farmers from
various localities frequently came to Seoul to appeal to the central
government for recovery of property which had been forcibly taken
from them by local officials. Their efforts were in vain. Mr. Homer
B. Hulbert, a prominent student of Korean history, editor of the
Korea Review, and a man favorably disposed toward Koreans in general,
estimated around 1905 that three Japanese yen per annum, or one
dollar and fifty cents in American gold, could cover all legal taxes
on the average Korean farmer’s house and land. The average income of
the Korean farmer was twenty times that amount. If he were not ex
ploited by a horde of hungry officials and not compelled to support 2 another horde of yangban and idlers, he should have be prosperous.
^Qeorge Kennan, "Korea: A Degenerated State," The Outlook. October 7, 1905, p. 315. Mr. Kennan was very optimistic about the prospects of a Japanese administration in Korea. 2 Kennan, op. cit.. p. 312. In his second article, ("The Korean People: The Product of a Decayed Civilization," The Outlook. October 21, 1905, p. 412), Mr. Kennan quoted Mr. Hulbert to the effect that there was no hope of good .government in Korea by Koreans until the country had secured the benefits of genuine education.
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By 1904, Dr. H. N. Allen, who had observed Korean affairs becoming
worse all the while, came to feel that Korea was beyond salvation.
The people were not ready to govern themselves and the emperor
spent his time playing with gisengs. or dancing girls. He felt
that Korean natural resources and a population with many poten
tialities gave some hope for the future. but only if the govern
ment were changed.^-
Besides official corruption, traditional factionalism
undermined the Korean polity. Throughout Korean history there has
been a tendency for various political factions to rely upon the
support of foreign nations to attain political supremacy over rival
parties, thereby compromising the independence of the country.
Most Korean historians subscribe to the theory that this tendency 2 for Korean factions to seek foreign support sprang from a funda
mental desire to achieve independence from Japan. However, the
tendency intensified the struggle among factions more than it helped
the independence movement. At the end of the nineteenth century
there was a party of reform and two mutually antagonistic parties
of reaction headed by the King's father and the £ueen, respectively.
^Fred Harvey Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allan and Korean-American Relations. 1884-1905 (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), p. 32o. 2 The Koreans' stand, in historical perspective, is comparable to that of the American revolutionaries, who relied on French support for the fight against the British colonial power in America.
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The King stood between the two reactionary parties. The reform
groups called Dong Nip Dang, or Independence Party, was composed
of young liberal elements, while the parties of reaction were known
as Sa Dae Dang, or the pro-foreign power Party, controlled by the
Imperial family and court nobility.^- While China consistently
supported the reactionaries, Japan sided with the party that
promised to serve her interests at the moment, regardless of its
affiliation in the past. Between 1884- and 1894, reformists and
reactionaries alternated in ascendancy, reflecting the rise and 2 fall of the foreign power with which each had become associated.
Several incidents occurred late in the nineteenth century
which renewed and heightened Korea's centuries' old distrust of 3 4 Japan. In 1884, the leader of Dong Nip Dang, Ok Gyun Kim, was
assassinated in Shanghai by Jong Woo Hong, a member of the Reaction
ary Party (controlled by Queen Min) who operated under orders from
the Japanese government. The hostility between Korea and Japan was
^Byeung Do Li, Kuk Sa Dae Gwan (A Survey of Korean History) (Seoul: Bo Moon Gwak, 1955), Pp. 510-511. 2 Paul Butler, "A Korean Survey," International Affairs. July 1946, p. 366. 3 Dong Nip Dang, known also as Gae Hwa Dang, was a progressive party, organized in I884. Its aim was to reform all political insti tutions. 4 For the activity of Kim, see Yoshio Sakatani, Segai Inoue Ko Den (Biography of the Immortal Marquis Inoue) (Tokyo: Naigai Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha, 1934), Vol. 3, Pp. 741-765, and Junichiro Otsu, Dal Nihon Kensei Shi (A Constitutional History of Japan) (Tokyo: Hobun Kan, 1927-1928), Vol. 2, Pp. 704-735.
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explosive. Men of revolutionary spirit such as Ok Gyun Kim, Yung
Shik Hong, and Jae Pill Seu, were aroused by rapid Japanese progress
and felt there was a danger to Korean Independence, sensing that
their homeland might well be invaded by Japan. This fear motivated
them to organize the Dong Nip Dang and to launch a great reform
movement called Kap Shin Yoo Shin Wun Dong,^ or Kap Shin Reform
Movement. The external goal of this movement was the recognition
of Korean independence by foreign nations; the internal goal was 2 the reform of all political institutions. In order to achieve 3 these goals, Dong Nip Dang relied on Japan for assistance. The
Japanese government, however, took advantage of it for Japanese
infiltration into Korea. Consequently, Ok Gyun Kim refused to accept
any assistance from Japan and instead went to China to request help
from that government. For this reason the Japanese government sent
Jong Wu Hong to Shanghai to assassinate Kim. Politicians loyal to
^Ha Gyeung Kim, Han Guk Dong Nip Wun Dong Sa wa Im Si Jeung. Bu (History of Korean Independence Movement and Provisional Government) "(Seoul: Gae Lim Sa, 1946), p. 2. 2 This movement is similar to the "Right Recovery Movement" of National China, following the period of foreign concession-seeking which began in 1927. See Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach’s Modern Far Eastern International Relations (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), Pp. 222-228.
^Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p* 41•
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the King called Dong Nip Dang reactionary. The reformists felt it
was better not to propagate their platform among the people, since
it might disturb the cooperation between government and populace.
They could not, therefore, obtain any strong support among the
people for their movement. Naturally, the Kap Shin movement was
doomed to fail.^
Although by the Treaty of Shimonoseki of April 1895, the
Japanese government forced the Chinese to recognize Korea as a
Sovereign nation, there is much evidence which proves Japan's
intention to annex Korea. For instance, during the Dong Hak Re- 2 bellion in Korea, the Japanese government issued the following
instructions to its legate, Ohtori in Seoul: 1) during the Dong
Hak Revolt, the Japanese legate should help to spread the revolt;
in case any danger occurred to Japanese property and citizens in
Korea, the legate was to wire immediately to Japan; 2) if, under
Kim, op. cit.. p. 7. 2 Dong Hak Revolt: in 1893 Bong Juon Jeun. a member of Dong Hak, or East Learning, led a group of rebels against the Governor of Go Bong County in Jeun La Province in southwestern Korea because of the Governor's exploitation of the inhabitants. This incident spawned rebellion all over the country. The King Ko Jong could not put down the revolt with his army, he requested help from China. Japan in sisted on intervening, as well. Consequently, both countries sent armies to Korea and they remained there. A military clash between them was imminent. This revolt was thus a remote cause of the Sino- Japanese War. Francis Hilary Conroy's The Japanese Seizure of Korea; 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations "(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 19^0), p. 229, characterizes the Dong Hak Rebellion as the Korean equivalent of the Satsuma Rebellion of Japan, the Boxer Movement in China, the Wahabi in Arabia, and perhaps the Mau Mau in Kenya.
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any circumstances the Chinese government sent its troops to Korea,
the Japanese legate was to wire.^
Another incident occurred on August 30, 1895: the murder
of Queen Min, this was a great tragedy for Koreans and deepened
hostility against the Japanese. Queen Min wanted to disband a force
of troops, "Kunrentai", that was commanded by Japanese officers.
She also devised a scheme for consolidating political power by
degrading some Cabinet Ministers and killing others favorable to
Japan. Miura, the Japanese Minister in Seoul, felt that the Queen
would disturb Japanese plans for organizing Korea. Therefore he 2 secretly planned and directed her murder.
Despite the political turmoil, caused by internal cor
ruption and external threat, Ko