COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE EVENTS RELATING
TO THE RISE OF THE PROTEST MOVEMENTS ON THE
PRAIRIES
by
SONJA PATRICIA SANGUINETTI
B.A. University of British Columbia, 1964
A.THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Political Science
We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April, 1969. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and Study.
I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thes,is for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
Department of Political Science
The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada
Date April 30th, 1969. ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model based on a synthesis of the
four major themes in the standard literature on the rise of the protest movements on the prairies. The themes are a homogeneous population, a quasi-colonial economy, a non-partisan political
system and the depression. They are given as explanations
for the coming to power of the Progressive, Social Credit, and
CCF. parties by the authors of this literature such as Morton,
Sharp, Lipset, and Macpherson.
An examination of the data relating to voter behaviour
and population composition shows this model to be over-simplified.
The imperfections of it are further highlighted by the historical
data which indicate the different patterns of development of the western provinces. The political situation which arose in
Canada after the 1917 election seems to give a much better
indication of how the protest parties were able to achieve success
on the prairies. In other words, both the total Canadian context
and the individual provincial histories must be considered
if one desires to understand the protest movement on the
prairies.
I iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Abstract ii
Table of Contents iii
List of Tables iv
Acknowledgments vi
A. The model of the standard literature on the protest movements 1
B. Historical events of the period covered by the model 12
C. Discussions of the discrepancies between the model and the data 41
D. Bibliography 49 iv
LIST OP TABLES
TABLE PAGE
I Percentage of the Population in Rural Areas... 6
II Per Capita Income on the Prairies 10
III Gains in Population According to Racial
Origin 12
IV Federal Election Results in the Territories... 13
V Federal Election Results in British
Columbia 14
VI Provincial Election Results in Saskatchewan... 16
VII Percentage of the Popular Vote in Provincial
Elections in Saskatchewan 17
VIII Provincial Election Results in Alberta 18
IX Percentage of Popular Vote in Provincial Elections in Alberta 20 X Percentage of Popular Vote in Federal Elections in Saskatchewan..... 21 XI Percentage of Popular Vote in Federal
Elections in Alberta 22
XII Federal Election Results: 1908 and 1911 23
XIII 1917 Election Results 26
XIV Federal Election Results in 1921 28
XV Results of the 1921 Election, Progressive
Support 3 0
XVI Results in Three Federal Elections 34
XVII Percentage of Votes in the 1926 and 1930 Elections 34 XVIII Percentage of Votes in the 193 5 Election 3 5 V .
.LIST OF TABLES (cont'd)
TABLE PAGE
XIX Canadian Export Prices, 1929-33 3 5
XX Yield and Price of Wheat in Saskatchewan for Two Eive Year Periods 39
XXI Percent Votes for Old-line and Third Parties in the West 44
XXII Comparison of Votes and Seats of Conservatives and Third Parties of the Prairies 45 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of
Dr. H.A.C. Cairns in supervising this thesis. K. Ralston read the manuscript and gave important criticisms.
M.H. Sanguinetti gave invaluable assistance and support. There are few Canadian political scientists who would dis• agree with Dawson when he says:
The party system, and particularly the party system under cabinet government, will find the best conditions for its operation where there are only two parties, or at least, two parties sufficiently large to provide as a rule a clear majority in the legislature.1
The acceptance of the two-party .system as the norm for the
English-speaking democracies has led to a concern with the almost pathological state of the Canadian party system: either we suffer from "one-party dominance" or we have a sadly vigorous third party disturbing the body politic. The concern of this paper is with the latter problem: the third parties in Canada.
It is an important area and one which is difficult to treat be• cause it is in that state of limbo which makes it too recent for the historian to feel he can deal with it objectively and too far in the past for the political scientist not to feel vaguely that he is treading on the historian's territory in touching it at all. It is even more difficult to deal with in the Canadian academic context because the Social Credit party has been dealt with by a group of eminent scholars in most of its aspects: background, ideology, social psychology, etc. The CCF. has been
• Dawson, R.M., The Government of Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1959, p. 492. 2
examined by one of the deans of American sociology; how can it be necessary to cover the material again?
9
Even Lipset would be prepared to admit that all social
scientists, no matter how eminent, are the captives of their biases. As one reads the standard literature on the third
parties on the prairies, it becomes evident that the sympathies
of the writers were very important, probably more so than usual,
in arriving at explanations of the events in the prairie
provinces during the 1920's and 3 0's. . . . the subordination of the West, when added to its sharp sectionalism, gives it an incisive and cogent character of its own. This it is which makes it the third of the "decisive areas" of Canadian historical, study. It has no acceptable alternative to working out its own identity in terms of its own historical experience. It must realize its latent nationalism; a nationalism neither racial like the French nor dominant . . . like that of Ontario, but environmental and, because of the diversity of its people, composite. It may, of course, fail . . ., and by the joint process of exploitation and loss of its leaders to the East and the United States, be reduced to a subject people, without character or spirit.^
W.L. Morton, the author of these sentiments is a well-
known scholar of western Canadian history. He has accepted the
'metropolitan' thesis of Canadian interpretive history primarily
because it emphasizes the importance of the eastern Canadian
2. "My reasons for selecting the topic at the time were at least as much political as scholarly." Lipset, S.N. Agrarian Socialism, New York, Anchor Books, 1968, p. XI. 3. Morton, W.L. 'Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian History', in Berger, ed. Approaches to Canadian History, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967, p. 48. 3 centres and stresses the 'hinterland' aspect of the prairies.
His work, stresses the inappropriateness of the 'National
Policy1 for western development and the alienation of the agrarian settlements on the prairies from the values of a society dominated by industrial concerns. As a westerner him• self, Morton is probably more sympathetic to the idea of a unique western culture and, therefore, more sensitive to the efforts of eastern Canadians to impose either their economic or their political ideas on it.
Historical reality gives some reason for this emphasis.
The three prairie provinces were acquired by the Canadian govern• ment for the explicitly mercantilist purpose of providing sources of raw materials and a market for the infant manufacturing industries of central Canada.4 For twenty years, this purpose was thwarted by an economic depression. As a result cf this, immigration from both Europe and the United States dwindled to insignificance. When conditions improved dramatically in the
1890's, the 'National Policy' of protective tariffs and railway monopolies was something of a sacred cow in Canadian politics.
Although dissatisfaction led the farmers to organize, they had only a limited success in getting freight rates reduced and the
4. Morton, W.L. The Progressive Party in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1950, p. 3-4. 4
grain trade regulated.
The distinction between elements of policy which were changeable under western pressure and those which were not goes back to the distinction between the two basic elements of the national policy in so far as it concerned the West. These elements were, first, to encourage the maximum development of the western territories and second, to assure integration of the development into the national economy. Western advice, which appeared to concern western development . . . was often quite acceptable to eastern policy-makers. Western advice which related to the question of national integration however, was seldom found acceptable as it was most likely to be opposed to integration on eastern terms.^
An example of the latter case was the consistent attempt by prairie organizations to have the tariff barriers lowered,
particularly on such items as farm machinery and fertilizer.
Although the protective tariff was the fundamental federal im•
position by which, according to the standard literature, the
farmers felt themselves victimized, they were never able to alter
it. Macpherson sees this as indicative of "how continuously
close to a colonial economic status the Canadian west has been kept." According to Morton the rise of the Progressive and
other farmer parties must be seen against this background of
exploitation.
5. Fowke, V.C. The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957, p. 93. 6. Macpherson, C.B. Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 10. 5
Behind the sectional protest lay not only resentment of the National Policy and its agents the political parties. Behind it lay also the resentment of the inequality of the provinces of the continental West in Confederation. They had been created with limitations imposed for the purposes of the Dominion. They entered Confederation, not as full partners, as sister provinces, but as subordinate communities subject to the land, fiscal, and railway policies of the metropolitan provinces . . . The Progressive Party was a full-blown expression of the West's resentment of its colonial status. 7
Implicit in the sense of grievance at being subordinate was an almost physiocratic belief in the essential value to society of the yeoman farmer as opposed to the urban dweller.^ The leaders of the various farm movements on many occasions made speeches to the effect that the farmer provided the only real monetary value in society and that the financiers and merchants were simply living off the product of his labour. Since the populace on the prairies was almost entirely rural, there were few to dispute this view.
Table I shows the make-up of the population during the period from 1900 to 1940.
7. Morton, Progressives, p. 293-4. 8. Ibid, p. 292. 6
TABLE I
Percentage of the Population in Rural Areas
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941
Manitoba 72.4 56.5 58.8 54.9 55.9
Saskatchewan 84.3 73.3 71.1 68.4 67.0
Alberta 74.6 63.3 62.1 61.9 61.4
As a comparison, in 1941, farmers made up 32 percent of
all gainfully employed people in Alberta (36% in 1921, 32% in
1931) whereas they formed only 11 percent of the population in
Ontario (13% in 1931). Farmers and their unpaid working sons on
the farm in 1941 made up 41 percent of all the gainfully employed
in Alberta (43% in 1921, 42% in 1931), compared with 15 percent
in Ontario.
The outstanding features of the class composition of Alberta, as compared with the more industrial provinces, are (1) that independent commodity producers (farmers and farmers' sons working the family farm . . . .) have been from 1921 until 1941 about 48% of the whole gainfully occupied population while in Ontario they have been from 2 0 to 25 percent, and in Canada about 3 0 percent; (2) in Alberta the industrial and wage earners (that is, other than on farms) have been 41 percent of the whole, in Ontario about 70 percent, in Canada about 60 percent.9
The situation in Saskatchewan was similar, according to
Lipset."*"^ In 1936, 62. 7 percent of the residents were employed
,9. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 15-16. 10. Lipset, S.M., Agrarian Socialism, New York, Anchor Books, 1968. 7 in agriculture, in 1941, the figure was 58.3 percent. The agricultural industry provided 85 percent of the value of all net production in the province. Unlike Manitoba, where Winnipeg dominated the commerce of the province, Saskatchewan had no large urban area.
The lack of powerful urban centres means that the basically rural character of the province dominates its social and political life. The provincial government, the newspapers, and the university must all be oriented toward the farmer. This has made it difficult for professional politicians and urban newspapers to eliminate the group consciousness of the farmer.ii
This 'group consciousness1, or class interest, depending on which author you choose, plus the colonial economy, are given as the reasons in the standard literature for the deviation from the two-party system on the prairies.
The absence of any serious opposition of class interests within the province meant that alternate parties were not needed either to express or to moderate a perennial conflict of interests. There was apparently, therefore, no positive basis for an alternate party system. The quasi-colonial position of the western provinces made it a primary require• ment of their provincial political systems that they should be able to stand up to the national government.... A provincial party system in which each of the alternate parties was a subordinate section of a federal party had nothing to commend it as a weapon against the central government; from this fact, a strong antipathy to the party system appeared in the west soon after the federal parties had managed to establish themselves in provincial politics.12
11. Ibid, p. 50. 12. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 21. 8
For many, the antipathy towards the party system was strengthened by a belief that it was also a corrupt system.
Because both of the major parties in Canada were practicing a type of brokerage politics, in which the interests of various groups and sections of the population were balanced off against each other, the prairie farmer felt that men of principle had no place in them. This, according to Sharp, was part of the reason for the success of the Nonpartisan League in Saskatchewan and
Alberta.
By 1917 many who condemned the party system were seeking political expression in a "natural" or "nonpartisan" movement. The league was quick to point out it was such an organization. Nonpartisans maintained that their program was "the crystallization into political action of an ideal of citizenship which has long been in the process of formation" and deserved the support of all who believed that partyism was doomed.^
The defeat of the Liberals in Alberta and their replacement by a United Farmers government is seen by many authors as further evidence of a lack of partisan tradition on the prairies.
It must be emphasized that throughout both the literature and this paper, partisan has reference to the presence or absence of political parties who had a bloc of support among the electorate. There has been no attempt made to gauge the vigour with which the proponents of these parties entered into any
13. Sharp, P.F. Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1948, p. 80. 9 electoral campaign. The only evidence of "partisanship" or lack of it which is offered is the division of the popular vote.
This measure has been largely ignored by the authors of the standard literature in favour of the seat support which the parties obtained. The obvious one-sided nature of these results led Irving to believe that the election of the Social Credit in
1935 was a natural event given Alberta's political history.
The interviews indicate that in a significant sense the Social Credit movement was also the heir of the pol• itical theory and practice of the U.F.A. Prior to 1935 the political history of Alberta falls into three phases: first, the period of territorial government in which a non-partisan system prevailed; second, the period of Liberal rule from 1905 to 1921, in which the two party system functioned fully only after 1910; third, the period of the U.F.A. revolt against the party system which began in 1921. The operation of democracy in Alberta in terms of the two-party system had therefore been tenuous and uncertain. The traditional national parties had been under criticism even before the province entered Confederation; and after 1905 there is a continuous trad• ition of great dissatisfaction with the conventional party system. The persistent unrest was inspired by the growing belief that existing political parties, dominated by Eastern financial interests or the money power were oblivious to the class interests of farmers.
Because of the dependence of the prairie economy on a single crop, wheat and the price which that crop fetched on the world market, the economic situation is emphasized in all the literature. The'depression of the 1930's, in particular, is stressed as being of utmost importance in understanding .the rise
14. Irving," J.., The Social Credit in Alberta, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1959, p. 230. 10 of both the Social Credit and C.C.F. parties. During those years, a combination of drought, which produced disastrous crop failures, and falling prices, which meant that even good crops paid little, resulted in hardship such as few had ever experienced. Table II shows the decline in per capita income which is a good indication of just how severely the prairies were affected.
TABLE II
Per Capita..Income on the Prairies
1928-29 1933 % decrease $ $
Saskatchewan 478 135 72
Alberta 548 212 61
Manitoba 466 240 49
Only by keeping in mind the background of the "terrible thirties" can one understand the rapid growth of the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan and the continued existence of protest movements in the West. Saskatchewan, a community that had enjoyed year after year of prosperity, was struck with• out warning by a misfortune that lasted for nine years and wiped out the source of income of well to do and poor alike 15 • • * •
The major factor in the psychological appeal of the philosophy of Social Credit was unquestionably the promise it held out for the satisfaction of the primary needs of food, clothing and shelter. In a depressed and debt-ridden province where thousands of people were unemployed and living on relief, and where farmers were forced to sell their produce at such incredibly low levels that they were often on the verge of starvation, the prospect of a basic dividend and a just price had an almost irresistible attraction.1^
15. Lipset, op. cit., p. 118. 16. Irving, op. cit., p. 336. 11
The foregoing synthesis has given an indication of the general tone and the major themes of the standard literature on the protest movements. Certain of these themes arise in the explanations of every author and it is not unfair to generalize to a model based on the four major ideas which seem to dominate all the writing on the period. A schematic diagram will help to show how the four themes interlock.
COLONIAL ECONOMY AGRARIAN + DEPRESSION = PROTEST PARTIES HOMOGENEOUS POPULATION
Whether the author is looking at the rise of the Progressive party, in which case the depression was a short term, post war event, or the coming to power of Social Credit, in which the world-wide financial crisis was a factor, this model has applications to all the standard literature on the period. The important question that remains is: does it have application to the political events which the authors under discussion purport to explain, or does it merely reflect the biases of those authors and their attempt to see reality in terms of a particular theory? An examination of the complex set of political and social factors which led to the rise of protest parties on the prairies set in their historical context may help to answer that 12 question.
B. As has been indicated, the first twenty years after its purchase by the federal government the prairies lay dormant as the result of a financial slump. The return to prosperity coincided with the coming to power of the Laurier Liberal ad• ministration. The population grew rapidly. In the ten year period from 1901 to 1911 the population in Saskatchewan grew from 91,279 to 492,432. This increase included a large number of European immigrants as Table III indicates.
TABLE III . 17 Gains in Population According to Racial Origin 1901 1911
Manitoba
English Speaking 164,239 266,415 European 70,103 130,399
Saskatchewan
English Speaking 40,094 251,010 European 32,413 187,472
Alberta
English Speaking 34,903 192,698 European 23,471 121,861
Naturally, this second group of people had to be assimilated into the Canadian political and social milieu. Naturally, also,
17. Morton, A.S., History of Prairie Settlement, Toronto Macmillan, 1938, p. 127. 13 given the patronage ridden nature of the civil service, Liberal immigration officers guided these European immigrants into the
Liberal party. These "Tammany Hall" tactics did give the
Liberals an edge at election time, but the Conservative party had a good-sized electorate: probably Canadian immigrants who re• tained their old party loyalties. Table IV indicates the electoral results during the Territorial period.
TABLE IV
1 o Federal Election Results in the Territories Liberals Conservatives Year Seats Votes Seats Votes
1896 3 46.0% 1 43.9%
1900 4 55.1% 0 44.9%
1904 7 58.2% 3 41.9%
These elections were fought on the issues of the status of the territories, the railway monopoly and responsible government.
It is interesting to note (Table V) by way of comparison, that
British Columbia had a much less partisan response to similar issues. Although B.C. had a long association with British traditions, until the railway was completed, a marked lack of partisanship seemed to characterize the returns.
18. All elections results from Scarrow, H., Canada Votes, New Orleans, Hauser, 1962, unless otherwise stated. 14
TABLE V-
Federal Election Results in British Columbia
Liberals Conservatives Year Seats Votes Seats Votes
1878 0 0 6 88.8%
1882 0 10.6% 6 82.8%
1887 0 13.1% 6 86.9%
1891 0 28.4% 6 71.6%
The Territorial government was a different matter. Although the members campaigned and were elected under different party banners, the actual affairs of the assembly were conducted in a non-partisan fashion. This was fairly reasonable since the federal government controlled the finances of the Territories leaving little discretion to the assembly in matters of policy.
The only real issue was that of autonomy. It is an historical fact that in the English-speaking countries, in particular, the reaction of the legislative chamber has been to act in a non• partisan fashion when attempting to gain self-government from another authority. The coalition of Brown and Macdonald during the discussions on Confederation is a case in point as is the alliance of the Democrats and Republicans in the Dakotas while 19 campaigning for statehood. It was then, not a unique situation
19. see Lamar, H.R., Dakota Territory, 1861-1889: A Study in Frontier Politics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956. 15 to find Frederick Haultain, a nominal. Conservative, serving as premier of an assembly to which the 1902 elections had returned twelve Liberals, eleven Conservatives, and four independents who were equally divided in their allegiance to the Federal parties.
The only real opposition in the House came from a two-man group of Conservatives led by R.B. Bennett of Calgary who were opposed to the non-partisan system. The Territorial Conservative
Association, agreed in 1903, to fight the next election on party lines as a result of Bennett's campaign. The election took place in 1905, after the two new provinces had been created.
Although Haultain had led a non-partisan 'Provincial Rights' party in Saskatchewan through two elections, he was defeated by the Liberals under Walter Scott.
This was the beginning of a twenty-four year long period
in office for the Saskatchewan Liberals. This electoral
longevity could be attributed to three factors. First, the
Liberal party had a remarkably effective machine for ensuring 21 voter support. By utilizing the patronage possibilities of
the civil service, and in particular the highways department, the party was able to maintain "a majority of the voters in a majority of the constituencies".22 Secondly, the Liberals were
20. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1903. 21. Reid, E.M., 'The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine Before 1929' in Ward & Spafford eds. Politics in Saskatchewan, Don Mills, Longmans, 1968. 22. Ibid, p. 100. 16 always willing to keep abreast of the demands of the organized farmers. Various men who were prominent in the ranks of the
Grain Growers Association became cabinet members including
Motherwell and the premier, Charles Dunning. So strongly did they identify with the farmers, that when a member rose in the legislature specifically as a Farmers representative, Dunning was moved to reply:
When did I cease to be a representative of the Farmers 1 movement in the legislature? When did forty other men sitting around here cease to be representatives of the Farmers' movement in this legislature? The Farmers' movement since the earliest days of the Saskatchewan legislature has been represented in these seats .... If I had not been a leader in the Farmers' movement . . I do not believe it is likely I would have been invited to become a member of this government.23
Certainly, there was a good number of farmers who accepted this statement as a look at Table VI will show.
TABLE VI
Provincial Election Results in Saskatchewan
1905 1908 1912 1917 1921 1925 1929
Liberals 16 27 46 51 45 50 28
Conservatives 9 14 8 7 2 3 24
Progressives 6 6 5
23. quoted in Eager, E., 'The Conservatism of the Saskatchewan Electorate 1, in Ward & Spafford op. cit., p. 8. 24. Ward & Spafford, op. cit., p. 3 04. 17
There were also a goodly number of residents who were not prepared to accept a Liberal government as Table VII, which gives the popular vote, indicates.
TABLE VII
Percentage of the Popular Vote in Provincial Elections in Saskatchewan
1921 1925 1929 1934 1938 1944
Conservatives 37.4 19.0 36.5 26. 7 12.1 10. 7
Liberals 52.2 53.4 46. 7 48.0 45.5 35.4
Progressives 7.5 23.0 6.9
C.C.F. 24.0 18.8 53.1
Social Credit 15. 8
Others 25. 8 3.5 9.1 7.8
A third important factor in the Liberal's ballot box success was their ability to attract support from all segments of the population.
Evidence of this is indicated in the variety of ages, occupations, religions and ethnic groups to be found among Liberal Members of the Legislature since 1905. The C.C.F. appears to have developed this capacity while in power, and today its membership is more heterogeneous than ever before. The result is that Saskatchewan has two integrative parties, where previously it only had one. No better proof exists that Saskatchewan possesses a political system dis• tinct from her neighbour Alberta than this two party system.
25. Smith, David E., 'The Membership of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly: 1905-1966', in Ward & Spafford, p. 204. 18
Why should it be possible to draw such a clear comparison between Alberta and Saskatchewan? Their economies and early history were almost identical. If anything, the Liberals in
Alberta seemed in 1905 to have stronger support than their counterparts in Saskatchewan. The policies of the two govern• ments with regard to the organized farmers were similar. A bill to implement direct legislation, a drive against the 'beef
trust" and a vigorous railroad policy all combined, as Table
VIII shows, to insure electoral support.
TABLE VIII
• .iu 4. 26 Provincial Election Results in Alberta
1905 1909 1913 1917
Liberals 22 37 38 34
Conservatives 2 3 18 19
Others 1 1 5
The vigorous railroad policy was pursued at times without 27 regard for the niceties of political activity. In 1910,
Premier Rutherford was forced to resign as a result of a scandal over the contracts for the Alberta and Great Waterways Railroad.
The crisis split the party into two factions which were barely
26. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, checked against The Canadian Annual Review for the appropriate years. 2 7. see Thomas, L.G. The Liberal Party in Alberta, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1959. 19 reconciled by the appointment of A.L. Sifton as premier.
An indication of the tension remaining was the action of Frank
Oliver in forbidding his federal riding association from assisting in the 1913 provincial election.
The remarkable thing during this period of Liberal dissension was that the Conservative party did not make better use of it.
In the period of greatest disunity, during the railway scandal, they could have combined with dissident Liberals to force an election which might have resulted in a Liberal defeat. However,
Bennett chose not to undertake such a strategy.28 This must have affected the credibility of the Conservatives as a serious contender for office.
During this period, for a number of reasons which will be discussed later, the Farmers' movement gradually developed a political arm. In 1921, a vigorous and enthusiastic group of farmer candidates offered themselves as alternatives to the scandal-ridden, strife-torn Liberal administration. The result was as much a surprise to the United Farmers as it was to anyone else. Although the U.F.A. remained in power for fourteen years, they at no time held an overwhelming majority of the popular support. This, rather than the seat support, must be considered most important when discussing the nature of the political system.
28. Thomas, Liberal Party in Alberta and Watkins, R.B. Bennett, differ in the reasons for Bennett's action: Thomas attributing it to a desire for greater glory and Watkins to indecision about his political career. 20
(see Table IX) .
TABLE IX
Percentage of Popular Vote in Provincial Elections in Alberta^S
1921 1926 1930 1935 1940 1944
Conservatives 11.6 22.9 13.5 6.5
Liberals 33. 8 26.2 24.6 23.1 1.9
U.F.A. 28. 8 40. 5 39.4 11.0 CCF. 11.1 24.9
Social Credit 54.2 42.9 51.9
Others 14.4 45.1 23.2
It is readily apparent that although their early history was identical., Alberta and Saskatchewan developed into distinctive provinces. Their political histories soon diverged. In the one, a well-organized, politically astute party maintained power through a period of considerable upheval. In the other, personality
clashes and scandal were prominent almost from the beginning
and plagued not only the Liberals but the United Farmers as well, near the end of their term of office. On the provincial level,
then, it is not too easy to make generalizations about the
'western political experience'.
The emphasis so far has been on provincial politics as it
29. Alberta's electoral system with multi-member ridings means that these figures, particularly for the 1921 election, cannot be regarded as a completely accurate representation of voter support but only of votes cast. is in the standard literature. It has been shown that generalizations about the prairie provinces in this sphere are very- dubious. An examination of data in the federal sphere will be even more suggestive as regards the unreliability of viewing the
"west" as a monolith.
A full consideration of the federal political scene is also relevant because the grievances which were most important to the farm organizations were those only the federal government could deal with: tariffs, export prices, freight rates, etc.
As was demonstrated in the provincial sphere, the number of seats a party gains is not a true representation of the support which it has among the populace. This is as true in federal politics as Tables X and XI will show.
TABLE X
Percentage of Popular Vote in Federal Elections in Saskatchewan
1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940
Liberals 56.6 59.4 25.9 20.7 41.9 56.8 46.5 40.8 43.0
Conser• vatives 36.8 39.0 74.1 16.7 25.4 27.5 37.6 18.8 14.1
Progress• ives 61.0 31.8 15.6 12.4
C.C.F. 21.3 28.6
Social Credit 17.3 3.3 22
TABLE XI
Percentage of Popular Vote in Federal Elections in Alberta
1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940
Conser• vatives 44.4 42.5 61.0 20.3 31.8 31.5 25.0 19.9 13.0
Liberals 50.2 53.3 35.5 15.8 25.9 24.5 30.0 21.2 37.9
Progress• ives 56.8 31.5 38.7 30.4
Social
Credit 48.2 34.5
Other 5.3 4.1 3.5 10.7 5.7 13.0 13.0
The question remains: why did the third parties gain as much support as they did on the prairies? What were the political facts which caused some westerners to reject the old-line parties?
As has been mentioned, the farmers' movement while busy trying to influence their various provincial governments in matters of social legislation, had come to realize that in econ• omic affairs the federal government was their only source of remedial legislation. In 1910, when both federal party leaders toured the prairie provinces, they were bombarded by requests for lower tariffs on agricultural implements by the various groups of organized farmers. As a result of this agitation as well the overtures by the Taft Administration, the Laurier government 23 negotiated the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States.
It was thought by most observers that this would ensure a
Liberal return to office in the election of 1911. The prophets did not count on the strength of the loyalty issue which the
Conservatives raised almost in desperation at what they, too, thought was a sure vote getter. The foes of Reciprocity talked so much about 'continentalism1 and 'annexation' that the Liberals were not able to get their platform across. There is no doubt that free trade was a popular issue on the prairies but there was by no means a major swing to the Liberals in support of it.
Given that earlier elections had shown a solid bloc of Liberal support, the results of the 1911 election do not vary substantially from previous years as Table XII shows.
TABLE XII
Federal Election Results: 1908 and 1911
1908 Conservatives Liberals
Manitoba 51.5% 45.5%
Saskatchewan 36.8% 56.6%
Alberta 44.4% 50,2%
1911
Manitoba 51.9% 44.8%
Saskatchewan 39.0% 59.4%
Alberta 42.5% 53.3% 24
o n Only eleven constituencies gave what could be considered 31 significantly (ie. over 5%) greater support to their Liberal incumbents or returned Liberals where Conservatives had been sitting. Prince Albert and Brandon both returned Conservatives where Liberals had been incumbent. Although Conservative support increased in the urban areas, such definitely rural ridings (over 88%) as Marquette and Lisgar returned Conservatives with substantial majorities. There were a considerable number of prairie voters who regarded local issues, personalities, or the Conservative platform as more important in making their decision to vote than the supposedly all-important issue of free trade.
Although the 1911 election is generally regarded as being the beginning of voter disenchantment with the old-line parties, the 1917 election had a much more profound effect on the prairie political system. As part of the trend toward growing Canadian autonomy, the government was determined to participate in World
War I as an independent nation. The contributions to the war effort in both men and material which this role entailed were enormous. The voluntary enlistments were far below the number 30. Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Sessional Papers: vol. 43 no. 8 and vol. 46 no. 11., Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1909, 1911. 31. Readers familiar with todays results should remember that al• most all the contests were two-way fights. 32. Winnipeg in 1908 gave 50.1% to the Conservatives and in 1911 gave 55.2%; in Calgary in 1908 the Conservative got 49.7%, while in 1911, the figure was 58.1%; in Edmonton, the incumbent, Oliver had 64.4% in 1908 but only 56.7% in 1911. needed to maintain the Canadian forces up to strength in the face of numerous casualties. It became evident that conscription would be necessary. Borden was aware of the emotional reaction that could be expected if conscription were enforced and was reluctant to tackle the issue on a partisan political basis. His belief that a national government was necessary to administer the country during the war-time crisis was shared by such prom• inent Liberals as John W. Dafoe and Clifford Sifton. A majority of western Liberals were convinced of the value of the Union movement when the Conservatives introduced the war-time franchise act. This removed a large number of their constituents from the electoral lists as 'enemy aliens'. It made Conservative gains highly probable but also made the Liberal party much less vulnerable if it did decide to support conscription. The act was introduced in mid-September and by October 12, a new cabinet divided between Liberals and Conservatives was announced.
The Union government went to the people for a mandate on
December 17, 1917.
The campaign on the prairies had many discordant under• tones. The Liberals did not nominate as many candidates as the
Conservatives but their party organization, because it was so much more efficient, was used. The government forces swept the seats in Saskatchewan where the Liberal party's chief organizer,
J.A. Calder, delivered the whole machine to the Unionist cause. The campaign was of less success in Alberta where the Liberal party was split between the forces of A.L. Sifton who was now in the Unionist cabinet and those of Gross and Oliver who were united to try and hold the West for Laurier. Table XIII shows the results of the election.
TABLE XIII
1917 Election Results Government Opposition Seats % Votes Seats % Votes
Manitoba 14 79.7 1 20.3
Saskatchewan 16 74.1 0 25.9
Alberta 11 61.0 1 35.5
The 1921 election must be considered in light of the conditions which the war-time election had produced. There had probably never been a political and economic situation which was better suited to the rise of a third party. First, the
Conservatives were the party which had governed the country through the war and into the depression which followed. Long absences and indifferent health removed Borden from any position of effective leadership within the party.„ Although policy suffered, many were afraid that his resignation would fatally loosen the ties that bound the coalition cabinet. This tenuous relationship was already disintegrating. Crerar had left the government on the tariff question and had gathered a small opposition group around himself, and Fielding was sitting on the cross-benches, unwilling as yet to rejoin the Liberals. When Borden finally resigned and 27
Meighen assumed the leadership, he took over a crumbling coal•
ition which had little support among the party rank and file.
During the weeks of the election campaign, he was continually
accosted by Conservatives who were sure that Liberal Unionists 33 had received the majority of the patronage posts. The whole party was in bad shape.
They knew that the organization of the Conservative party had collapsed with the establishment of the Union Government, which, quite right, they blamed for that collapse. The organization, after all, had been geared to the proposition that Liberals were mortal enemies who must be beaten and it was not adaptable to the strange situation when some Liberals, for once, were on the right side.34
The Liberal party was, if anything, in worse shape. The
conscription crisis had split the party on all levels. Although
the new leader, Mackenzie King, had little real connection with
either faction since he had been in the United States through most of the war, he had still to unite men who had been bitter
enemies only four years previous.
It is important to remember that the 1917 rupture was not restricted to the party strength as revealed in par• liament and in the popular vote. The continuing Liberals lost an influential section of their newspaper support and their party organization in most English-speaking provinces was split at both the local and the higher levels. Several Liberal-Unionist editors, such as J.W. Dafoe, had shown little restraint in their attitude to Laurier Liberals in 1917, and
33. Graham, R., Arthur Meighen, Toronto, Clarke Irwin, 1963, vol. II, p. 117. 34. Ibid, p. 29. 28
both sides might well feel some embarrassment at the thought of once again becoming friends and partners in a common enterprise .... Civil wars are as destructive for political parties as for nations, and in 1917 the Liberals had gone through a bitter civil war, the cripp• ling effects of which would take many years to overcome.^
With the loyalties of the rank and file workers of both parties strained, it is not surprising that the voters also found themselves in a quandary. When some of the familiar faces from the other parties appeared as candidates for the new farmers' movement, the electors could hardly be faulted for supporting them. The decision of the farmers' groups to move into the political field was certainly not unwise as Table XIV shows.
T7ABLE XIV
Federal Election Results in 1921 Conservatives Liberals Progressives* Labour 0/ 0/ % Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes
Man. 0 24.4 1 10.9 12 43. 7 20.9
Sask. 0 16. 7 1 20. 7 15 61.0
Alta. 0 20.3 0 15.8 11 56. 8 7.0
There were several factors aside from the organizational state of the old-line parties which made political action by the
3 5. Dawson, R. MacGregor, William Lyon Mackenzie King - 1874-23, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 275. 29 farmers at this time successful. The already mentioned physiocratic feelings of farmers had been intensified after the war as more and more men left the farm and went to work in the city. Many blamed the tariff structure for the rising rural depopulation claiming it encouraged industry and enabled it to offer the shorter work week and higher wages which were so attractive to farm youth. As the post war depression deepened and the price of wheat fell from $ 2.32 in 1919 to $.76 in 1921 the conviction grew that unless the farmers themselves were in government no action favourable to their interests could be ex• pected. This cynical attitude toward the old-line parties was exacerbated by the memory of the decision to conscript farm labour although the Unionists had promised the farmers they would be exempt.
The first major chance to test their strength came in the
Ontario provincial election of 1919. The United Farmers of
Ontario contested 56 seats and were elected in 43 giving them, while not a majority, the largest representation in the legis• lature. With the support of the twelve labour members,
E.C. Drury became the new premier.
Agrarian discontent seemed to be sweeping the country and although the centres remained in Ontario and the prairie provinces, the Maritimes and British Columbia were also open to the appeal of the Progressive platform. The federal election of 30
1921 resulted in 65 Progressives being returned, thus forming the second largest group in the House. (Table XV)
TABLE XV
Results of the 1921 Election Progressive Support
P.E.I. N.S. N.B. QUE. ONT. MAN. SASK. ALTA. B.C.
Seats 0 0 1 0 24 12 15 11 2
% of Votes 12.3 12.3 10.4 3.7 27.7 43.7 61.0 56.8 9.0
However, the Progressives elected not to take the position as official opposition which their numbers entitled them to.
They chose instead, to sit as a third party occupying the balance of power. This decision was the result of several factors.
First was the dislike of many farmer candidates for the traditional party with caucus discipline which did not allow for the expression of constituency opinion. Since some of the
Progressives were subject to recall this was an important consideration. The second factor was the underlying support among many members for the Liberal party. Many of them shared the feelings which Dafoe attributed to their leader, Thomas
Crerar, before the Liberal leadership convention.
I infer from Crerar's statement that his hopes are that Fielding will be chosen and that a platform will be drafted so radical that it will drive out of the party all those eastern liberals whom he regards as reaction• aries and at the"same time pick up bodily the farmers' movement in western Canada and in Ontario.^6 36. Cook, R., The Dafoe-Sifton Correspondence 1919-27, Altona, Friesen, 1966, p. 5. 31
Although these factors were not mutually exclusive, they did indicate a basic cleavage within the party which was to plague the Progressives throughout their parliamentary life.
The 'crypto-Liberals' were unwilling to defeat the Liberal party and enable the Conservatives, whom they regarded as the real enemy, to gain power. The more radical agrarians from both Alberta and Ontario maintained a skeptical attitude toward both parties. Since King and the Liberals were aware of the split, it was difficult if not impossible to do any effective bargaining in order to achieve any or all of the Progressive policy.
Fiscal matters were the major concern of the two wings of the Progressives and were to be the major contentious issue between them. The "Manitoba* Progressives or 'liberals in a hurry', naturally considered the Liberal party to have sounder views on tariffs than the protectionist Conservatives and were bound to support them in return for any small concessions. The more radical 'Albertan' wing regarded this as a betrayal of the basic reforms on which the party had stood for election. The vote on the 1922 budget revealed the dilemma in which the party found itself. Although the tariff provisions were far from adequate, and the caucus had decided to vote against the measure, two members bolted to vote with the government. 32
In a minority government situation such as the 1921 election had produced, it was essential for the Progressives to have
tight discipline if they wished to really maintain a balance of power. The latent Liberal loyalties of some members and the rugged independence of others made this impossible. The
situation continued to. deteriorate until, in 1924, a group of
six members dissociated themselves from the Progressive caucus.
They stated in an open letter to Robert Forke, who was then parliamentary leader, that "the present parliamentary organization of the Progressive group tends to perpetuate the type of partyism already described, which we were elected to oppose, and
to hamper us in the advocacy of those principles to which we adhere".
While internal dissension was dissolving Progressive unity, a second factor hastened the process. From the time the
1921 election results were known, Mackenzie King had been attempting to get the Progressives back in the Liberal fold where he felt they belonged. Although his official manouvers failed,
the effects of the parliamentary give-and-take were more telling.
After the 1922 sitting, Dafoe could write to his publisher:
37. Morton, Progressives, p. 196. 33
It appears that during the last session, there was an uncommon amount of fraternizing between the Progressive members and those members of the Liberal party who found themselves more or less in sympathy with the views held by the Progressives. These Liberals, I am told, are more numerous than had been expected:. . . .^®
The first members to return to the Liberal fold were two
Ontario members who did so during 1922. They were followed during
the years by a number of Manitobans including J.F. Johnson who
had served as the Progressive whip. The 192 5 election saw the
Progressives' support cut to 24 members. These were in an even more delicate position. The constitutional crisis exacerbated
the rifts within the Progressive group and gave King the most
effective issue with which to dcaw the remaining crypto-Liberals back to the fold.
Nineteen-twenty-six was thus the crucial year in the debates over Nationalism and Progressivism. In that year, Dafoe and Sifton, like most Westerners, were skillfully forced by Mackenzie King to choose between Progressivism and nationalism. They unhesitatingly chose the latter. As so often, nationalism proved the Achilles heel of reform.^9
The twenty Progressives who were returned in 1926 were but a rump of the party. The farmers' protest seemed to have
died a natural death as the result of improving conditions and
the difficulty of being a third party in a parliamentary system.
The 1930 election brought what could almost be called a return
38. Cook, op. cit., p. 118. 39. Ibid, p. xxii. 34 to normalcy. (see Table XVI)
TABLE XVI
Results in Three Federal Elections
1926 1930 1935 Cons Lib Other Cons Lib Other Cons Lib Other
Man. - 11 6 11 4 2 1 14 2
Sask. - 18 3 8 11 2 1 16 4
Altai 1 3 11 4 3 9 1 1 15
Figures of the percentage of support each party received are even more indicative of the decline of support for the third parties by 1926.
TABLE XVII
Percentage of Votes in the 1926 and 1930 ' Elections
1926 1930 Lib. Cons. Others Lib. Cons. Others
Manitoba 37.9 42.2 19.9 37.2 47.7 15.2
Saskatchewan 56.8 27.5 15.6 46.5 37.6 15.9
Alberta 24.5 31.5 38.7 30.0 33.9 36.1
Five years later, however, as Table XVIII shows, third parties were again receiving a large proportion of the votes cast on the prairies. 35
TABLE XVIII
Percentage of Votes in the 1935 Election
Conservatives Liberals Others
Manitoba . 26.9 40.5 32.6
Saskatchewan 18.8 40.8 40.4
Alberta 16.9 21.2 61.9
The principal reason for this return of third party strength was the depression. This was of particular importance on the prairies because of the severity of conditions. These were the result of two factors: the drop in the price of the crops and the drought conditions which meant that even when the price was fairly high, the yield was so low that the farmers * income did not rise appreciably. Since the prairie provinces were almost totally dependent on export income, Table XIX shows graphically the plight of the inhabitants.
TABLE XIX
Canadian Export Prices, 1929-33 (1929 prices = 100)40
Wheat Cattle 1929 100 100 1930 70 87 1931 44 59 1932 41 46 1933 45 37
40. Report of the Royal Commission of Dominion-Provincial Relations, Ottawa, Queens Printer, 1954, Book I p. 169. 36
As a province, Saskatchewan was probably the hardest
hit area in Canada during the depression. Because it was almost
totally dependent on wheat, the crop failures and low prices were particularly disastrous.
In the other provinces it was mainly a matter of providing food, fuel, clothing and shelter for unemployed wage-earners. In the case of the Saskatchewan wheat farmer the failure of a crop involved not merely the loss of the means of livelihood but also working capital invested in that crop. This working capital had to be made available before there was another chance for the farmer becoming self-supporting. The provision year after year of seed, fodder and supplies to thousands of large-scale farmers entailed a high financial burden.^
As a result, relief expenditures amounted to 60 percent
(compared with 21 percent for the rest of the country) of the
total receipts of the province and its municipalities combined.
Alberta's relief expenditures were approximately equal to
that of the average for all provinces. On a per capita basis
the outlay was the lowest in Canada with the exception of the
Maritimes and Quebec. Alberta's problem was of a different
nature.
Owing to the more recent development of Alberta fixed debt charges were relatively higher than in any other province. In addition, farmers had not had a chance to become as well established. Under these circumstances, the drastic fall in prices of agricultural products produced a relatively greater strain on the farming industry and on governments. Alberta's depression problem was more
41. op. cit., p. 170... one of debt and high overhead costs than one of widespread destitution.4^
The first world war and the 1917 election had resulted
in one crisis in legitimacy for the old-line parties. The
depression resulted in another. The financial crisis which
resulted in sudden and crippling poverty for many farmers was
seriously disturbing in a society which had always stressed
individual effort. As a result, the seeds of distrust of the old parties which ha'd been sown in the '20's bloomed again.
A rejection of existing authority as wholly legitimate will result in individuals banding together to change the rules of the system so that they can gain a share in the control of the state apparatus.43
Although the rise of the CCF. and Social Credit would
seem to offer a perfect opportunity to apply the standard model, the similarities are only on the surface. Again, one must remember the different political situations: the U.F.A.
in Alberta was in the midst of;a scandal; and the different
economic situations which were outlined above.
Albertans, whether farmers or small-town merchants, whether dependent on wheat or cattle, were looking for relief from
the oppressive burden of debt which they wer.e carrying.
42. Ibid, p. 171^ 43,- LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M., 'Origin and Development of Political Parties', in LaPalombara & Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 18. 38
Habituated by thirty years of propaganda by farmers' papers to think of the financier as the villain, a number of people in Alberta were quite willing to aceept Aberhart's analysis of the economic situation which claimed that the banks were cur• tailing credit and creating poverty in the midst of plenty.
Even to those who had scorned the farmers' party, this was an appealing doctrine as it gave an easy explanation of why the value of their crops was so low as to make it worthless to ship to market although the mortgage payments on their farm continued to fall due at the same exorbitant rates of interest. As Hadley
Cantril suggests, a person is susceptible to suggestion when he has no adequate mental context for the interpretation of a given stimulus or event.44 However, aside from offering the basic dividend and 'pumping more credit into the system1,
Aberhart did not propose any major changes in either social or political institutions.
The clever leader will sense the causes of dis• satisfaction, will realize which old loyalties remain unshaken and which are being seriously challenged. He will spread among the confused and eager souls a rational• ization that, from their points of view combines the best of the old and the best of the new . . . .^
Once in office, even the economic reforms were forgotten and the Social Credit government became a very conservative
44. Cantril, Hadley, The Psychology of Social Movements, New York, Wiley and Sons, 1963, p. 64. 45. Ibid, p. 66. administration.
In Saskatchewan, voters were longer in responding to the results of the depression, largely because of the desperate
situation they were in.
Poverty generates, it can be suggested, a high degree of worry about one's future, which detracts from any consideration of long term solutions to one's problems.^
For many years, the farmers were able to concentrate only on survival as yet another drought set in and destroyed not only
the crop for export but also any subsistence farming which might have been taking place. A comparison of crop yields for two five years periods in Table XX shows just how difficult the
situation was.
TABLE XX
Yield and Price of Wheat in Saskatchewan 4 for Two Five Year Periods ^
Yield Price Yield Price Bu. $ Bu $
1922 20.3 .85 1932 13.6 .35 1923 21.3 .65 1933 8.7 .47 1924 10.2 1.21 1934 8.6 .61 1925 18.8 1.25 1935 10.8 .60 1926 16.2 1.08 1936 7. 5 .92 1927 19. 5 .97 1937 2.7 1.05
The farmer had no chance during the five year period from
1932 to 193 7 to recover from the losses of the previous year or
46. Pinard, Maurice, 'Poverty and Political Movements', in Canadian Society, eds. Blishen et. al., Toronto, Macmillan, 1968, 3rd ed., p. 471. 47. Lipset, op. cit., p. 46. 40 to make new investments in worn out machinery and implements.
He was, during that period, partly or wholly dependent on govern• ment help for survival. As"a result, it might be hypothesized that the Saskatchewan resident became more conditioned to pro• grams of governmental control and assistance than elsewhere on the prairies. He was, therefore, more receptive to the programme of the C.C.F. than the average independent producer might have been. The electoral success of the C.C.F., however, was much less spectacular than that of the Social Credit.
. . . the poor, although they may come to form an important element in new political movements and even may come to be disproportionately represented in them, are not their first recruits. If understandably, political movements are often not successful among the rich because they are economically satisfied, it seems, on the other hand, that at first they are not successful either among the poor, because, paradoxically, they are too dis• satisfied. 48
Initially rebuffed by the voters in the 1934 provincial election, some members of the party decided that union with all opposition parties was the only way to beat the Liberal party.
This tactic was no more successful and after the 1940 federal election, when Saskatchewan returned five C.C.F., candidates, it was dropped in favour of straight C.C.F. action. However, the period of coalition had rather softened the edges of the
48. Ibid, p. 462~. 41
socialist platform and by 1944 when they came into office, it
was on more of a programme of provincial sectionalism. As
Lipset suggests:
The agrarian reform tendencies in the Saskatchewan farmers' movement had overwhelmed the original hopes of the small socialist promotion group. The farm leaders wanted immediate economic action and political power and did not care whether or not the goal was socialism.49
Like the Social Credit government in Alberta, the Saskat•
chewan CCF. ers remained well within the Canadian political
norm.
C. The paper so far has presented a model based on the main
themes of various authors in the standard literature on the
prairie protest parties as well as a discussion of the historical
events which this model purports to explain. It must have be•
come clear, however, that the model is deficient in a number
of aspects.
Of the four main segments of the model, three, a quasi-
colonial economy, a homogeneous population, and a non-partisan
tradition are emphasized as being uniquely western experiences.
These experiences would seem to preclude a growth of agrarian
protest in Ontario, the centre of imperialism and partisan
tradition.
49. Lipset, op. cit., p. 142. 42
Although the break-down of the old-line party organizations
at the time, could be used as a valid explanation of the growth
of the Ontario Farmers party, it is inadequate to explain the
growth of the group government, non-partisan section of this party if the aforementioned experiences are the necessary or
even sufficient conditions for such an occurrence. Certainly,
the election of 1919 was fought under the leadership of that
doctrinaire agrarian, J.J. Morrison. Although he declined the premiership in favour of E.C. Drury, a man who favoured a broader based party, Morrison's influence was apparent among the
federal members who were active xn formxng the Gxnger Group.
The success of the farmers' party was of shorter duration in
Ontario, but there is no denying the fact that, of the two
expressly farmer governments elected in Canada, one was not in
the "West".51
It is also difficult, using the model, to explain the
difference in experience between Saskatchewan and Alberta. In
Saskatchewan, whose population has been more homogeneous if
anything than Alberta's, an active two-party system encompassing
the two old-line parties was in force until 1934. After that,
50. Preston Elliott, W.C. Good, and Agnes Macphail. as mentioned in McNaught, K., A Prophet in Politics, Toronto, University Toronto Press, 1967, p. 212. 51. Although Saskatchewan and Manitoba both had governments which were expressly devoted to the farmers' interests, they were not labelled as farmer parties.
i 43 it continued with the CCF. providing the alternative to the
Liberals. To claim, as Lipset does, 52 that the Liberal ability .to satisfy farmer demands was due to a betrayal by
'opportunist' leadership is to deny the 'agrarian class-conscious• ness ' and grass roots political acumen of the farmer which is so much a part of the model. On the other hand, to claim that the Albertan prototype is the product of the aforementioned uniquely western experience is to deny the "western-ness' of the other two prairie provinces. In other words, although the population in the prairie provinces was largely rural, and although a significant number of this was wheat farmers, it cannot be regarded as a totality with a readily identifiable world view.
One is made particularly aware of this fact when consider• ing the voting patterns on the prairies. Much is made of the artificiality of the party system in western Canada. An emphasis is placed on the overwhelming seat strength which one or another party received. Since the rise of these parties is discussed in terms of the popular support which they engendered, it seems not unfair to consider the strength of the old-line parties in
52. Lipset, op. cit., p. 78-9. 44 the same terms. If one considers the number of people who cast votes for a party rather than its electoral successes, the picture changes to reveal a much less one-sided situation.
TABLE XXI
Percent Votes for Old-line and Third Parties in the West old 3rd old 3rd old 3rd old 3rd parties parties parties parties 1925 1926 1930 1935
Man. 61.6 38.4 80.1 19.9 84.9 15.2 67.4 34.6
Sask. 67.3 32.8 84.3 15.6 84.1 15.9 59.6 40.4
Alta. 57.7 42.2 56.0 44.0 63.9 36.1 38.1 61.9
A major factor in the apparent demise of the old-line parties, particularly the Conservatives, was the electoral system. Although it has been generally thought that proportional representation would have been more beneficial to the third parties than the 'first past the post' system, on the prairies the Conservatives would have been the benefactors. The Con• servatives suffered from being a party with a broad base of support as opposed to the tightly knit electorate of the
Progressives and others. Table XXII shows this quite clearly. 45
TABLE XXII
Comparison of Votes and Seats of Conservatives and Third Parties on the Prairies
1921 1925 1926 Seats % Votes Seats % Votes Seats % Votes
Man. Cons. 24.4 7 41.3 0 42.2
Third 12 43. 7 7 27.1 3 15.6
Sask. Cons. 16. 7 0 25.4 0 27.5
Third 15 61.0 6 31.8 11 38. 7
Alta. Cons. 20.3 3 18. 8 31.5
Third 11 56.8 9 31.5 11 38. 7
In 1926 for example, 60,740 votes elected 11 Progressives in Alberta while 49,514 votes elected only 1 conservative. In
Manitoba, in the same year, 22,092 votes "elected 4 Progressives while 83,100 votes failed to elect even a single Conservative.
These figures give further evidence to challenge the myth of the non-partisan tradition which was supposed to have been
so important in the prairie political system. This myth seems
to have arisen largely as a result of the activities of the
Territorial government under Frederick Haultain. The fact that
this governing body chose to operate on a non-partisan basis has already been justified earlier in the paper on the basis of 46 historical precedent and the amount of decision-making power which its constitutional position allowed. It has also been shown that even during the Territorial period, (Table IV), prairie voters maintained a difference of opinion on party loyalties. This was true even though some issues crucial to
Territorial development were under consideration. Also, the
Territories voted later than the rest of the country which should have allowed for a 'band wagon' effect. An even more decisive act on the part of the Saskatchewan voters in demon• strating that they wanted no part of non-partisan government was the defeat of Haultain's Provincial Rights Party in both the 1905 and 1908 elections. No matter how efficient the
Saskatchewan Liberal machine in later years, it could hardly have subverted a whole province full of non-partisan voters in the time available between the granting of autonomy and the electionj
So far, it has been shown that the non-partisan tradition, the idea of a unique western political experience and the demise of the old-line parties have been either mythical or exaggerated.
It remains to emphasize those factors which did help the third parties on the prairies gain their success.
First was the creation of the Union government which dis• rupted the old-line party organizations and confused party loyalties among the voters. The farmer parties were able to 47
achieve more success on the prairies because the candidates who ran on their platform were often the same men who had been 53
active in the old-line parties. When the old organizations
seemed to be foundering, the farmers were able to offer a viable
alternative that was familiar in personnel at least, to the
prairie voter. As the old parties regained their vigour, the
majority of the leaders of the Progressives went back to their
party of origin. Had the depression not intervened, the process might have been a more complete success. Every society has a social stratification system. The dominant motive of social behavior is assumed (whether rightly or wrongly) to be the increased mobility toward the higher ends of the stratification hierarchy. Members of the public join in political groups in order to expand mobility opportunitiinities and, in this respect,make representations to government or to influence or control government in some manner.^4
However, the political crisis of the 1920's had barely
been healed when the depression forced both leaders and voters
into new directions as the old channels of mobilization were
closed by poverty. That there was so little disruption of the
system testified to its inherent strength and to the normality
of the reactions of the prairie voters.
53. eg. Thomas Crerar, Michael Clarke, J.F. Johnstone, etc. 54. Apter, David E., "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, 1958, p. 221. 48
The "western experience then, was not as unique as we have been led to believe. The major factors which affected the political system, the depression, the disruption of the party organizations in 1917, and the distortions of the electoral system were all country-wide phenomena. The reactions to these phenomena were conditioned by the political and social history of each of the three provinces and cannot in any meaningful way be generalized. Although, at times economic factors have caused the three prairie provinces to act in concert, this must not be extended into assumptions of joint political and social experience.
The protest movement on the prairies cannot be understood solely as a regional protest. It must be studied in terms of the total Canadian political context and the reaction to this of the individual provinces. BIBLIOGRAPHY 49
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