“PARLIAMENT WILL DECIDE”: MACKENZIE KING AND THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1923

MELISSA OUIMETTE

SUBMITTTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

NIPISSING UNIVERSIRTY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES NORTH BAY, ONTARIO

© Melissa Ouimette January 2011

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Abstract:

This paper focuses on William Lyon Mackenzie King’s attitudes towards the subject of foreign affairs at the Imperial Conference of 1923. His perspective on foreign affairs was predicated on the belief that the Parliament of each Dominion should have the right to determine the degree to which its country participated in the foreign ventures of the British Empire. For

Mackenzie King, this position was largely pragmatic because he strongly believed that participation in imperial ventures threatened Canadian national unity, upon which continued growth and prosperity depended. Mackenzie King also felt that the British government’s pursuit of greater centralization in imperial affairs posed a direct threat to Canada’s powers of self- government. He feared that greater centralization in foreign affairs would tie the Dominions to the foreign policies and imperial ventures of the British government, effectively removing the

Dominions from the decision-making process. Accordingly, he believed that in order to be an autonomous country, Canada had to be in control of its relations with the rest of the world.

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Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………… 1

National Unity………………...... 17

Self-Government...... 25

Cultural Connection...... 36

Conclusion…………………………….. 51

Bibliography……………………………. 54

1

Introduction:

William Lyon Mackenzie King became the Prime Minister of Canada on

December 29, 1921. The longest serving Prime Minister in British

Commonwealth history, Mackenzie King was responsible for several developments in Canadian autonomy.1 As the leader of the Liberal Party of

Canada and as the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King had a particular vision for the country. He envisioned in particular a Canada that was unified and autonomous yet still committed to maintaining cultural ties with Britain. Under the leadership of Conservative Prime Ministers Sir Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen, Canada had contributed to the making of imperial foreign policy, though it remained largely dominated by the British government. In effect, the Conservative approach to imperial relations after 1919 was to maintain and continue to support the inter-imperial cooperation established during the First World War. In contrast, Mackenzie King wanted Canada to pursue greater decentralization so that it was no longer entangled in the imperialist ambitions of the British government. In essence Mackenzie King felt that Canada’s position within the

British Empire was inadequate for his vision and needed to evolve. Nonetheless, despite his pursuit of greater autonomy for Canada, Mackenzie King was a firm advocate of Canada’s British connections and wanted to maintain ties with the

Mother Country by creating a sustainable relationship between Britain and its

1Mackenzie King was the Prime Minister of Canada during the Imperial Conference of 1926. It was at this Conference that discussions were continued about granting full political autonomy to Canada and the other Dominions. The result of the efforts of Dominion leaders, including Mackenzie King, was the Balfour Declaration which stated that the Dominions were autonomous communities within the British Empire. This declaration became official in Canada with the ratification of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. Mackenzie King was also the Prime Minister during the Second World War and decided that Canada would declare war on Germany independently from Britain. 2

Dominions. Fundamentally, Mackenzie King believed that in order for the British

Empire to remain intact and to continue to prosper the British government had to allow the Dominions to exert full responsibility for their own affairs, both internally and externally.

This paper focuses on Mackenzie King’s attitudes towards the subject of foreign affairs at the Imperial Conference of 1923. Unimpressed by the status quo, as established by the previous Conservative governments, Mackenzie King adopted a position of non-commitment to the foreign policies of the British government and the British Empire. His perspective on foreign affairs was predicated on the belief that the Parliaments of each Dominion should have the right to determine the degree to which its country participated in the foreign ventures of the British government, if at all. For Mackenzie King, this position was largely pragmatic because he strongly believed that participation in imperial ventures threatened Canadian national unity and that the restoration and preservation of harmony between the French and English populations was the only way to ensure that the country could continue to grow and prosper. He remained dedicated to the idea of national unity throughout his political career, believing that national unity was intimately tied to complete control of foreign affairs.2 Mackenzie King also felt that the British government’s pursuit of greater centralization in imperial affairs posed a direct threat to Canada’s powers of self- government. He feared that British officials were attempting to concentrate

2Mackenzie King felt that the Military Service Act of 1917, an act that legally conscripted Canadian men between the ages of 20 and 35 for military service on the Western Front, had divided the country along linguistic lines. The majority of French Canadians viewed the war as an imperial conflict in which Canada had no part to play. Oppositely, an overwhelming number of English Canadians felt that it was Canada’s duty to help Britain and the Allies win the war. This conflict had lasting effects on the national unity of Canada and Mackenzie King dedicated his political career to its restoration. 3 control over foreign affairs in order to benefit Britain with little or no concern for the well-being of Canada and the other Dominions. Essentially, greater centralization in foreign affairs would tie the Dominions to the foreign policies and imperial ventures of the British government, effectively removing the Dominions from the decision-making process. In Mackenzie King’s view, in order to be autonomous a country had to be in control of its own destiny and in control of its relations with the rest of the world. The Canadian government could no longer rely on the British government to make foreign policy decisions for Canada.

Despite Mackenzie King’s concerns for national unity and a perceived threat to the powers of self-government, Mackenzie King remained dedicated to the idea of the British Empire. He wanted to preserve the cultural connection that had long since been established throughout Canada as well as the rest of the

British Empire. Motivated by national aspirations and the desire to protect

Canada from the menacing and centralizing tendencies of the British government, Mackenzie King refused to commit the people of Canada to future imperial ventures without the consent of the Canadian Parliament, effectively responding to what he believed to be a serious threat to the autonomous aspirations of Canadians. For this reason, the Imperial Conference of 1923 can be seen as a decisive moment in the establishment of Mackenzie King’s position on foreign affairs. The conference marked the beginning of a period of change, when Canada’s powers of self-government came to fuller fruition. Indisputably, under the leadership of Mackenzie King, Canada became a part of the international world by gaining control over its domestic and foreign affairs. 4

On the whole, the literature on the Imperial Conference of 1923 examines the following themes: the focus of several generations of scholars on the extent to which greater autonomy for Canada and the other Dominions from Britain was desirable, the significance of the Imperial Conference of 1923 in the history of inter-imperial relations, and the impact of culture as a category of analysis in

Canadian history. These issues, among others, occupied the minds of Canadian nationalist historians writing from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. However, only a few scholars have examined these topics in the past decade. As a result, there is a compelling need to re-examine both the subject and the sources in order to determine the extent to which the arguments made and/or the themes and questions pursued by previous generations of historians remain valid.

When it comes to Mackenzie King’s achievements with respect to the development of Canadian autonomy, a debate exists among nationalist historians which can be broken down into two schools. The first group, the

Liberal school, praised Mackenzie King and his efforts to distance Canada from the stronghold of imperial policies.3 In view of their predisposition, Liberal historians have seen the outcome of the Imperial Conference of 1923 as being desirable. For example, Robert MacGregor Dawson, Mackenzie King’s official biographer, posits that the events of 1923 were a great success for Mackenzie

King as well as for Canada. Dawson’s 1958 publication entitled William Lyon

Mackenzie King: A Political Biography volume I: 1874-1923 concluded that the

Conference was a decisive one in imperial relations. Mackenzie King was

3B.J.C McKercher, “A Greater and Higher Ideal: Esme Howard, Imperial Unity and Canadian Autonomy in Foreign Policy, 1924-27”. in Power, Personalities and Policies: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt, ed. Michael Graham Fry (London: Frank Cass & CO. Ltd., 1992), 110. 5 successful in expressing his position that the Dominions would not be committed to British foreign policy without the approval of their respective Parliaments.4

Likewise, C.P Stacey’s Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle written in 1976 affirms that the outcomes of Mackenzie King’s actions in 1923 were decisive.

Stacey argues that Mackenzie King won a clear victory for Canada by putting an end to the “project of co-operative unified diplomacy” in 1923.5 Similarly, J.L.

Granatstein and Norman Hillmer’s Empire to Umpire written in 2008 praised the events of 1923 as being both desirable and successful. They argue that

Mackenzie King acted in the best interests of an Anglo-Canadian relationship with a genuine concern for the continuation of a cooperative British Empire.6

Essentially Liberal historians felt that Mackenzie King paved the way for

Canadian self-government because of his reluctance to commit Canada to imperial policies without the consent of Parliament.

Liberal historians have not only concluded that the outcome of the Imperial

Conference of 1923 was desirable but they have also praised the position taken by the Prime Minister while in London. In Mackenzie King and the Atlantic

Triangle, Stacey credits 1923 as being the Conference where Mackenzie King effectively challenged the idea of a common imperial policy and destroyed it by reversing the policies of the Borden and Meighen governments of the past decade.7 As a result, Mackenzie King set Canadian foreign relations on the path to autonomous nationhood. In a similar manner, Ramsay Cook, Dawson, and

4Robert MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography volume I: 1874-1923 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1958), 463. 5C.P. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle (Toronto: Macmillian Company of Canada Limited, 1976), 34. 6Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire (Toronto: Thompson Nelson Limited, 2008), 89. 7Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 33. 6

Phillip Wigley postulate that the Imperial Conference of 1923 was more important to the development of changes in the British-Dominion relationship than was the

Conference of 1926. Cook highlights this point, as do Dawson and Wigley, by saying that 1923 was an important moment in the inter-imperial relations as there was a realization that the proposal for one foreign policy for the Empire, presented at the Imperial Conference of 1921, was no longer workable.8

The second school to which nationalist historians can be categorized is the Conservative school. These historians, foremost among them Donald

Creighton, have tended to disagree with the key elements of the Liberal interpretation, and to downplay Mackenzie King’s role. As a result, this view argues that Canadian independence from Britain conformed to an already existing pattern of British constitutional development which was characterized by a long and steady separation of Dominion and British policies. Therefore events of the 1920s, such as Mackenzie King’s efforts at the Imperial Conference of

1923, in which Canada achieved greater autonomy from Britain were the result of more than a century of effort by a succession of leaders.9 It is important to realize that these historians do not necessarily regard intimate Anglo-Canadian relations as being beneficial to Canada as they too were more concerned with a distinct national identity. However, they do not give Mackenzie King credit for changing inter-imperial relations, as do the Liberal historians, because the Conservative camp believed that the changes were part of a slow process by which Canada

8Ramsay Cook, “J.W. Dafoe at the Imperial Conference, 1923”, The Canadian Historical Review 41, no. 1 (1960): 28., Dawson, pg 479. and Phillip Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British- Canadian Relations, 1917-1926 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 4. 9McKercher, 111. 7 was moving away from economic, military and political ties with Britain. In fact

Thomas Slobodin dedicated a PhD thesis in 1986 to proving that Mackenzie

King’s role in achieving Canadian autonomy throughout his political career was not as clear cut as some nationalist historians have made it out to be. Slobodin argues that historians have given Mackenzie King too much credit and that he

“did not systematically advance Canadian self-government in external affairs” as he has often been given credit for.10 Although Slobodin’s thesis is dedicated to discovering the relationship between national unity and Mackenzie King’s foreign policy, he does provide a critical overview of the Prime Minister’s efforts. He admits that only a few historians have attempted to challenge the conventional wisdom that Mackenzie King successfully pursued a policy of establishing an autonomous status for Canada, as he argued that Mackenzie King’s reluctance to commit Canada to any imperial ventures robbed the Imperial Conference of any real substance.11

As has been previously discussed, Slobodin was not the first among

Canadian historians to come to this conclusion. His work built on conclusions reached by earlier generations of Conservative-minded historians. Firstly, Arthur

Lower and Donald Creighton both devote little space in their respective works,

Colony to Nation: a History of Canada and Canada’s First Century: 1867-1967, to the Conference of 1923. According to these scholars, the Imperial Conference of

1923 was not successful in accomplishing Mackenzie King’s objective of achieving autonomy over Canadian foreign affairs. Lower mentioned the

10Thomas Brent Slobodin, “A Tangled Web: The Relationship between Mackenzie King’s Foreign Policy and National Unity” (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 1986), xi. 11Ibid, 138. 8

Conference in a footnote which read: “The Conference of 1923 agreed that each self-governing state should have the right to negotiate treaties affecting itself, informing the others if the treaty were likely to affect them”.12 Consequently

Lower put more importance on the Imperial Conference of 1926, at which the

Dominions secured de facto autonomy over their external affairs. Similarly,

Creighton acknowledges the Imperial Conference of 1923 but does not give

Mackenzie King credit for the accomplishments that Liberal historians have bestowed on the Prime Minister during this time period. Instead, he argues that

Mackenzie King was too detached from Britain and Europe in general as he was more concerned with the United States and Canada’s relationship with it. 13

Lastly, writing in 1961 W.L. Morton gave credit to two other events for having changed the relationship between Britain and its Dominions. The first event was the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917 which, according to Morton, marked the beginning of the transformation from the British Empire into a Commonwealth.

Secondly, Morton argued that it was not until the Imperial Conference of 1926 that the views Mackenzie King presented in 1923 were recognized thus modifying the relationship between Britain and the Dominions.14 Therefore, according to the Conservative nationalist historians, little could be accomplished by studying Mackenzie King’s role at the Imperial Conference of 1923. However, this paper will argue that the Imperial Conference of 1923 was an integral component of Canada’s quest for autonomy.

12Arthur R.M Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1957), 483. 13Donald Creighton, Canada’s First Century: 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), 183. 14W.L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 53. 9

The second major theme in the historiography of this subject evaluates the motivating factors behind Mackenzie King’s actions in London. Historians from both the Liberal and Conservative schools have laboured to prove that domestic concerns determined the Prime Minister’s approach to Canadian foreign policies.

From this perspective, a principal emphasis in the literature is on the degree to which Mackenzie King felt compelled to pursue a particular policy in order to preserve Canada’s national unity. As a result of the Conscription Crisis in 1917, which left the country divided along linguistic lines, Mackenzie King found it his ultimate priority to enact policies that would be well received in both English and

French Canada. Cohesion among Canadian citizens occupied Mackenzie King’s mind to the point that he has been described as being the “national unity Prime

Minister” because the idea of national unity remained one of the most important motivating factors behind all of his political endeavours including the Imperial

Conference of 1923.15 In his biography of Mackenzie King, Dawson makes use of the Prime Minister’s diaries to highlight Mackenzie King’s concerns about moving too far ahead of Canadian public opinion.16 Mackenzie King wanted control over foreign policy but he did not wish to do so at the cost of rupturing the existing relationship with Britain and angering the people of Canada. Similarly,

Hillmer’s article entitled “O.D. Skelton: Innovating for Independence” written in

2009 argues that Mackenzie King continued to share a sense of attachment to

Britain in his attempts to gain control over Canadian foreign policy. The Prime

Minister felt that Canada could no longer afford to be divided by “the adventures

15John MacFarlane, Ernest Lapointe and Quebec’s Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 3. 16Dawson, 430. 10 of imperial dreams” and prioritized national unity above the maintenance of a

Anglo-Canadian relationship.17 Lastly, writing about Conservative Party support in Canada, John English’s The Decline of Politics gives readers a sense that

Mackenzie King was more concerned with the politics of national unity than his predecessor Sir Robert Borden.18

Clearly, Conservative and Liberal historians saw the motivating factors behind Mackenzie King’s actions in 1923 from two very different perspectives.

For some historians there was no question that Mackenzie King felt a sense of attachment to Britain, while others have argued the opposite. Undoubtedly the conclusions reached by Creighton do not place the Prime Minister’s sense of attachment to Britain in a favourable light. He argues that Mackenzie King had a greater cultural attachment to the United States than he did to the United

Kingdom. According to Creighton, “his long absence from Canada, his almost total absorption in American problems, confirmed his detachment from England and Europe”.19 This reflects the sense of anti-Americanism that tends to permeate the Conservative school of thought of the 1960s and 1970s. However, in recent years Creighton’s conclusion has come under attack by the work of

Hillmer and Granatstein. In Empire to Umpire they argue that “Great Britain was his emotional touchstone. He wished he could emulate the scope and style of

British leaders. He was in awe with the monarchy”.20 After consulting the

17Hillmer “O.D. Skelton: Innovating for Independence”. in Architects and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:1909-2009, ed. Greg Donaghy and Kim Richard Nossal (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 61. 18John, English, The Decline of Politics: The Conservativces and the Party System: 1901-1920, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 6. 19Creighton, 182. 20Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, 82. 11 evidence, Hillmer and Granatstein dropped the anti-American stance and argued that Mackenzie King possessed a strong cultural and sentimental attachment to

Britain despite his fear of the centralizing efforts of the British government. This conviction had already shown through in Granatstein’s earlier work on Mackenzie

King, Mackenzie King: His Life and World, where he declared that the Prime

Minister was a firm and constant devotee to the British connection. In a similar fashion, Stacey also described Mackenzie King as a British, colonial Victorian who was more concerned with Britain than he was with the United States.21 In essence, it seems that earlier generations of Canadian nationalist historians, such as Creighton, were blind to Mackenzie King’s cultural connection to Britain.

However, in recent years the cultural connection, and its importance to Anglo-

Canadian relations, has become the primary focus of a new generation of historians in their examination of Canada’s foreign relations during the interwar period.

The third theme, understanding the cultural aspects of the British-

Canadian relationship, has been embraced by a younger generation of historians. They feel that most Canadian nationalist historians, whether

Conservative or Liberal, have laboured in order to determine the moment at which Canada became a nation, the moment at which the British Empire came to an end. As a result, the Imperial Conference of 1923 has been seen through the lens of these wider debates on Canadian autonomy. Embracing trends in cultural history, the new historiography abandons the question of Canada’s

21Granatstein, Mackenzie King: His Life and World, 109 and Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 23. 12 official status in favour of the broader sentiments and feelings of regular

Canadians. For example, Phillip Buckner has made an attempt to shift the historiography of the British-Canadian relationship away from focussing solely on the political relationship to an examination that includes the cultural connection that persisted between Britain and Canada well into the interwar period. As a result Buckner’s introduction to the anthology Canada and the End of Empire written in 2005, questions the dismantling of the British Empire. He argues that

Canadian historians have continuously written from a nationalist perspective in which the relationship with Britain is based on antagonism and a desire to put an end to an outdated colonial relationship.22 Consequently, Canadian nationalist historians have treated the British Empire as being irrelevant to the development of a Canadian culture. For Buckner, this is a mistake because Canadian history cannot be understood without Britain as it is essential that there is a realization that the British identity was among one of the many forms of Canadian identity.23

Arguing that the interwar years saw no evidence that Canadians wanted to put an end to the imperial relationship, a revision of the evolution of the Anglo-

Canadian relationship is timely according to Buckner.

Likewise, in their anthology Rediscovering the British World, published in

2005, Buckner and R. Douglas Francis tend to focus their attention on similar topics and questions concerning the cultural side of the British-Canadian relationship. In their introduction, Buckner and Francis set out to argue against conclusions that have been reached about the importance of the British Empire

22Phillip Buckner, “Introduction” in Canada and the End of Empire, ed. Phillip Buckner (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 2. 23Ibid, 2. 13 to the individual histories of the Dominions.24 They argue that Canadian historians have attempted to write national histories without including the British component, which has resulted in a skewed and inaccurate picture of Canadian culture. Throughout their book they argue that Canadian history cannot be properly understood without the inclusion of Imperial history because for most of the twentieth century the British Empire did and could act as a unit.25 As a result of this new branch of historiography, a closer look at the events of the Imperial

Conference of 1923, while being mindful of both the political and cultural factors that influenced the actions of the Canadian delegation, would effectively intertwine the conclusions reached by older generations with those of contemporary historians.

Because there has been almost no recent scholarly re-examination of the

Imperial Conferences of the 1920s and Canada's role therein, a re-evaluation of these subjects is timely. Overall, this paper tends to support the position of

Liberal historians when considering Mackenzie King’s cultural affiliation. A close reading of the evidence allows one to conclude that Mackenzie King was not

Americanized, nor was he more concerned with Canada’s relationship with the

United States. In fact, discussions about the United States do not come up in the special diary, written during his trip to London in 1923, as he was far more concerned with Anglo-Canadian relations. The diary makes evident that

Mackenzie King remained preoccupied with the notion of self-government and protecting Canada’s rights as an autonomous nation. He sought to create a

24Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, “Introduction” in Rediscovering the British World, ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (Calagary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 14. 25Ibid,17. 14 sustainable relationship with Britain, one in which Canada could play an autonomous role on the international stage. Similarly, when considering the factors that motivated Mackenzie King’s actions at the Imperial Conference of

1923, this paper defends the conclusions reached by Conservative and Liberal historians that national unity played an important role in Mackenzie King’s decision making process. He wanted to mend the damage done to French-

English relations as a result of the Conscription Crisis during the First World War.

Despite the fact that this paper supports conclusions reached by nationalist historians it does not do so in a whole-hearted fashion. The fact that nationalist historians paid little attention to the cultural connection that existed between Britain and Canada is problematic. By revisiting the evidence, this paper argues that the Anglo-Canadian relationship played an important role in the development of Mackenzie King’s political policies at the Imperial Conference of 1923. Therefore, by examining both the political aspirations as well as the cultural attachments that Mackenzie King had towards the British Empire, a better understanding of the events of the Imperial Conference of 1923 will be achieved. Consequently, this paper will make a significant contribution to the historiography of this topic as it explores the questions of nationalist and contemporary historians in order to understand both the political and cultural implications of the Imperial Conference of 1923.

This paper will reconstruct Mackenzie King’s private thoughts during a crucial period in the formation of his attitudes towards Canada’s place within the

British Empire and its future relations with Britain. Using an empirical approach, 15 which asserts that knowledge arises from evidence gathered via sense experience, the way in which Mackenzie King viewed the evolving Anglo-

Canadian relationship comes to life. Because this paper examines Mackenzie

King’s attitudes towards Canada’s relationship with Britain, with a focus on the creation of foreign policies, an empirical approach which emphasizes the role of experience and evidence in the formation of an argument lends itself to the historical analysis being conducted. The use of primary documents becomes essential in the historians endeavour to interpret the past through the eyes of

Mackenzie King.

One of the most important primary sources used for this paper was

Mackenzie King’s special diary from his trip to London, England to attend the

Imperial and Economic Conferences held from October 1st to November 8th in

1923.26 The diary reveals important details about as well as insight into

Mackenzie King’s private thoughts. As a result, the diary proved to be extremely useful in reconstructing Mackenzie King’s objectives at the Imperial Conference.

When exploring Mackenzie King’s contributions to Canadian autonomy, as a result of his participation at the Imperial Conference of 1923, scholars have overlooked the special diary as a source of evidence, with the exception of

Robert MacGregor Dawson, who consulted the diary extensively for his official biography on Mackenzie King from 1874-1923.27 However, Dawson did not attempt to understand Mackenzie King’s attitudes towards Canada’s changing

26This document is housed in the Library and Archives Canada site, located in Ottawa, Ontario. The document exists in manuscript form (on microfiche) and is only accessible by visiting the location. Despite the fact that Mackenzie King’s diaries are published online, this portion of the diary remains unpublished as it is considered a “special diary”. 27Robert MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography volume I: 1874-1923 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1958). 16 relationship with Britain. Instead he provided an overview of important events in

Mackenzie King’s life. As a result, this paper makes an important contribution to the historiography on Mackenzie King and on the Imperial Conference of 1923 by exploring questions and sources that have been omitted by previous generations of historians. The use of the diary allows for a better understanding of

Mackenzie King’s attitudes towards Britain and its attempts to centralize control over the foreign affairs of the Empire.

Though the diary provides important insights into Mackenzie King’s personal thoughts regarding Canada’s position within the British Empire, one must be mindful of the potential biases that complicate the use of this type of subjective evidence. By relying almost exclusively on the diary, this paper can only reflect the thoughts and attitudes of William Lyon Mackenzie King regarding his efforts to ensure a continued process of decentralization from the British government in foreign affairs. As a result, this paper does not attempt to ascertain facts; instead it focuses on Mackenzie King’s attitudes towards and perception of developments in the foreign affairs of Britain and its Dominions.

The diary has been consulted for the period prior to and subsequent to the

Imperial Conference of 1923 to allow a better understanding of Mackenzie King’s outlook on the future of Canadian foreign relations. Mackenzie King wrote his daily diary entries with his own interests in mind and for this reason he did not want the diary to be published after his death.28 However, as we now know, his

28Mackenzie King dictated his diary entries each night before bed. He would include several details about his day, the people he met, the conversations conducted as well as personal reflections about these events. The diary was written with the objective of keeping a personal diary, for his eyes alone. For the purposes of the Imperial Conference of 1923, Mackenzie King recorded the daily events of the Conference as well as detailed descriptions of each conversation he had with British and Dominion representatives. 17 wishes were ignored and the diary was published shortly after his death. For this reason, the diary is a very valuable source. Nowhere else does Mackenzie King give a more candid and detailed view of his developing ideas on the subject of

Canada’s changing position within the British Empire and its role in the creation of foreign policies than in this diary.

Several other primary sources have been consulted in order to provide the context in which Mackenzie King found himself in 1923. A variety of sources from the collections of the Library and Archives Canada have also been consulted including: letters, memoranda, newspaper articles as well as the official report of the Imperial Conference of 1923. Evidence has also been obtained from the Documents on Canadian External Relations collection as well as from the HANSARD minutes of the House of Commons. These sources were used in order to gauge the opinion of government officials, including Members of

Parliament, as well as to understand the state of Canadian public opinion in order to determine the parameters through which Mackenzie King viewed the importance of Canada’s relationship with Britain and the maintenance thereof.

National Unity

In a country as vast and diverse as Canada it is no wonder that tensions have arisen between the different ethnic and linguistic groups that make up the population. Tensions between Canada’s French and English-speaking populations can be traced back to a time when Canada was little more than a fur- trading colony. As a result, Mackenzie King’s position at the Imperial Conference of 1923 cannot be fully understood without taking into account national unity as a 18 primary concern in Canadian politics. The lessons Mackenzie King took from the experience of the Conscription Crisis of 1917 and subsequent Conservative rule was that following British desires rather than national sentiment led to a divided country that was nearly impossible to govern. Taking that lesson to heart at the Imperial Conference of 1923, Mackenzie King advocated a position that put Canadian interests first, and ties with Britain second.

From 1914-1918 Canada was involved in a global war that required significant contributions from the country, including most importantly the provision of men to fight on the Western Front. The Prime Minster of Canada, Sir Robert

Borden, was burdened with the difficult task of managing Canada’s contributions to the war effort while at the same time attending to matters at home. From the outbreak of the war, there was a lack of consensus within the Canadian public concerning Canada’s participation in the war. For many, including mostly British-

Canadians or Canadians of British descent, the war effort was the country’s number one priority.29 On the other side of the argument there were those who were adamantly opposed to the war, including many inhabitants of the province of Quebec. French Canadians did not feel that Canada had a place in what they considered to be a foreign war and the low number of French Canadian recruits greatly reflected this sentiment.30 Statistics show that by 1917, 37.5% of

Canada’s male British population had enlisted, while only 1.4% of French

Canadians had enlisted.31 As a result, French Canadians represented the lowest

29Terry Copp, “The Military Effort, 1914-1918” in Canada and the First World War, ed. David Mackenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2005), 37. 30 Ibid, 54. 31J.L. Granatstein, “Conscription in the Great War”, in Canada and the First World War, ed. David Mackenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 65. 19 number of volunteers in the “white empire”. This dichotomy had the effect of further straining relations between Canada’s two largest linguistic groups, since it appeared to many Anglo-Canadians that French Canadians were not doing their duty towards the war effort. Despite these tensions, the war pressed on.

Canadian enlistment for battle overseas had been fairly consistent throughout the war but by the spring of 1917 the number of men enlisting dropped significantly.

The downward curve was so drastic that enlistment dropped from 30,000 men per month in January 1916 to approximately 5,000 per month by April 1917.

These numbers were not sufficient enough to keep the four Canadian divisions on the front at full strength. It was estimated that at least 10,000 men were required each month in order to provide the needed reinforcement. 32

Because Dominion governments were reluctant to commit more manpower to the war effort without receiving some input into the direction of war policy in return, Prime Minister Borden was invited to attend the Imperial War

Conference in London England during the spring of 1917. This was a meeting in which the leaders of the British Empire met in order to discuss the successful prosecution of the war.33 David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Britain, had extended the invitation for Borden to attend the conference based on his need for more Canadian soldiers. Lloyd George had commented as early as December

1916 to one of his colleagues that: “We want more men from them. We can hardly ask them to make another great recruiting effort unless it is accompanied

32A.M. Williams, “Conscription, 1917: A Brief for the Defence” Canadian Historical Review 37, no. 4 (1956): 345. 33J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), 60. 20 by an invitation to come over and discuss the situation with us”.34 The result was that Borden was extended the invitation to attend the Imperial War Conference and was subjected to strong pressure while in London. Borden gave way to the pressure. As much as Lloyd George wanted a further commitment of troops from the Dominions, and was willing to involve the Dominions in the making of imperial policy in order to get it, Borden wanted to achieve a measure of involvement for

Canada in imperial policy-making and was willing to commit to providing more troops in order to get it. He returned to Canada in May determined that compulsory military service was the only viable option to meet the commitments that Canada had accepted, both on the Western Front and at the Imperial War

Conference.35

Borden realized that the introduction of compulsory military service was not going to be well received by several segments of the country. As a result, his party attempted to make conscription a national policy and not simply a

Conservative one by offering to form a coalition government with Sir Wilfrid

Laurier’s Liberals.36 In this way, Borden and his advisors believed that French

Canadians would be encouraged to accept the need for conscription and therefore lessen the pressure being placed upon Borden’s Conservative government. Borden was optimistic about the creation of a coalition government and approached Laurier with his proposition, though to Borden’s disappointment

Laurier rejected the offer on June 6, 1917.37 Laurier made it clear that he

34Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, 61. 35Ibid, 63. 36Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1974), 265. 37English, 134. 21 opposed conscription and was unable to join a party whose main platform was a piece of legislation that he did not support. For Laurier, joining a coalition government and supporting conscription meant political death in Quebec and he was not willing to lose the base of his political support.

While several prominent Liberals abandoned the Liberal Party and joined

Borden’s coalition government, William Lyon Mackenzie King remained loyal to the Liberal Leader and supported Laurier’s efforts to oppose the implementation of conscription. Writing in his diary on July 20, 1917 Mackenzie King expressed his revulsion towards Borden’s attempt to bring men of “opposing views” together to impose a policy on an entire country. He felt that there was no regard, on the part of Prime Minister Borden, for the damage this legislation would do in accentuating the existing tensions between the French and English populations.

For Mackenzie King, “national unity was regarded as the first essential” and he could not support the formation of the Union Government (a coalition between supporters of conscription from the Conservative and Liberal parties).38 In spite of Laurier and Mackenzie King’s efforts, the Military Service Act, an act that required all British male subjects resident in Canada from the ages of 20-45 to be liable for military service overseas, became law on August 29, 1917.39

The Conscription Crisis, as it became known, divided the country along linguistic lines. Tensions between French and English Canadians reached new heights. Under the Military Service Act, French Canadians no longer had the

38Mackenzie King Diary, July 20, 1917. Viewed online August 21, 2010. http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02- e.php?&page_id_nbr=6374&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=i962gm3r6dlb33hcf27dm5v9t6 39Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 218. 22 choice of whether or not to serve in the war. As a result, the enactment of conscription was perceived to be a direct attack on French Canadians because of their poor enlistment numbers prior to 1917. Mackenzie King and Laurier remained dedicated in their opposition to conscription and the people of Quebec did not forget their efforts. The events of 1917 had lasting effects on the country as they further divided Canadians along linguistic and political lines. According to Mackenzie King, this episode in Canadian history proved the need for future policies that would encourage a sense of national unity among all Canadians.

Not yet in a position to enact policies that would encourage a sense of unity throughout the country, Mackenzie King continued to work on his dream.

Despite the problems at home, Canada remained dedicated to the war effort until the Allied forces secured a victory. However, even with its significant contributions to the war, Canada’s place in the settling of the conflict was not guaranteed. Borden felt that Canada should be represented at the talks because it had lost more men on the battlefront than some other participant countries had.40 Borden felt that participation in the Peace Conference should be based upon the extent of a country’s contribution to the war effort and therefore Canada had earned it’s own representation, though the British initially felt that it should represent all of the British Empire, including the Dominions. As a result of his persistence, Borden fought for and achieved a place for Canada at international

40Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A Biography vol. II 1914-1937 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 151. 23 conferences. The Paris Peace Conference was held in Paris, France beginning

January 11, 1919 and Canada participated in the settling of war.41

Two years later the Canadian government remained content with its position in foreign affairs. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had allowed the country to have a voice in European affairs and had been perceived as a step in the right direction for the Senior Dominion. Canada had fought for and achieved a place in international conferences as well as having secured a seat in the

League of Nations; effectively granting Canada the international role Borden had been pursuing. By the summer of 1920, Borden was no longer in office and had been replaced by another member of the Conservative Party, Arthur Meighen.

Meighen’s first term in office, from July 1920 until December 29, 1921 did not pass without significance. During the summer of 1921 the Prime Minister attended the Imperial Conference of 1921, a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the British Empire, where discussions were held concerning the affairs of the

Empire at large.42 It was at this conference that Meighen committed Canada to joint consultation in the formation of foreign policy for the British Empire. The representatives of Britain and the Dominions were of a mind that “the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs”.43 The Dominions were to be kept informed about issues of foreign policy and a system of consultation would result so that

41Brown, 153. 42Maurice Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences vol. II, Imperial Conferences Part 1 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1954), 390. 43Ibid, 398. 24 the Empire could emerge with one common foreign policy. However, as is to be further illustrated, this system did not prove to be adequate.

In December of 1921, the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie

King replaced Meighen and the Conservative Party. Mackenzie King was a man of strong convictions and was of the opinion that the current system of consultation for imperial foreign policies was insufficient despite the fact that the

British government continued to insist that the system was workable. Borden and Meighen had shared the belief that participation in the creation of British foreign policy would give Canada a voice in world affairs. Conversely, Mackenzie

King believed that participation in the creation of imperial policy would mean that

Canada would be obligated to follow British policy through to the end, no matter

Canada’s own interests, and would be committed to the consequences thereof.

Mackenzie King remembered all too well the consequences of Canada’s participation in the First World War. The country had been left divided by decisions that reflected the needs of the British government more so than those of the Canadian people at large. For this reason, he did not think that it was in the best interests of his country to be committed to future imperial ventures. With this in mind, he began to work on his position for the Imperial Conference of

1923. According to Mackenzie King, there was a series of events that led him to pursue the only viable option, as he saw it, for Canada: a position in which no commitments would be made until Canada’s Parliament had had the opportunity to discuss and determine Canada’s participation in the foreign affairs of the

British government. By approaching any future foreign commitments in this 25 manner, Mackenzie King felt that each segment of Canadian society, through their respective Members of Parliament, would have the opportunity to voice their concerns before any formal commitments were made. He felt that an approach that attempted to incorporate the greatest number of Canadians would be well received by the citizenry. Therefore, from his perspective, his option was the only option as he attempted to reverse the actions of both Borden and Meighen in order to bolster a sense of national unity across the country.

Self-Government

National unity aside, Mackenzie King was narrowly focused on the preservation of Canada’s powers of self-government. The Prime Minister felt that

Canada had the right to exercise all the necessary functions of governmental power without the intervention of any other authority. As a result, the safeguarding of self-government becomes central to understanding the Prime

Minister’s approach to foreign affairs at the Imperial Conference of 1923.

Mackenzie King fundamentally believed that Canada should have control over both its domestic and foreign policies under the rules of self-government.

According to Mackenzie King, domestic and foreign affairs were interconnected and thus could not be separated from one another. The Dominions were considered to be self-governing and under this principle Mackenzie King felt that a country had the right to make the important decisions, whether foreign or domestic, which reflected its best interests. The Canadian reality, however, was that the British government continued to control Canadian foreign affairs.

Mackenzie King perceived this arrangement to be an infringement upon 26

Canada’s powers of self-government, which, according to him, had always been an important part of the Dominion’s historical development.44

Mackenzie King found fault in the way Canada’s foreign affairs had been conducted after the First World War. He felt that increasingly the actions of the

British government were an encroachment on Canada’s rights as a country.

Canada’s inability to decide its relations with the rest of the world had been solidified by Conservative decisions to support the imperial system of consultation. Evidence to attest to the impracticability of this system, Mackenzie

King believed, could be found in two important international events that occurred prior to the Imperial Conference of 1923. He believed that the Washington

Conference and the Near East Crisis proved the inadequacy of the imperialist system for determining the foreign affairs of the British Empire.

The Washington Conference was held from November 1921 until

February 1922. These meetings resulted in agreements regarding the limitation of naval armaments and in a new convention to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911.45 Mackenzie King had no time to prepare for this conference as he had replaced Arthur Meighen as Head of Government while the Conference was in session. For this reason he did not make an attempt to replace Robert

Borden as the Canadian representative. However, sending Borden as the

Canadian representative was not the root of the controversy in this instance.

Instead, from Mackenzie King’s perspective, the problem sprung from the British

Colonial and Foreign Offices, which had been reluctant to send separate

44Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. Tuesday October 2, 1923 (LAC, MG 26- J 13, manuscript 136). 45Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887-1937 vol. II, Imperial Conferences Part 1, 393. 27 invitations to the conference to the Dominions out of fear that the inclusion of the

Dominions would impede the realization of quick resolutions.46 For Mackenzie

King, this was a step back for the Dominions, and especially for the Senior

Dominion, as it had been invited to participate in the Imperial War Cabinets of

1917 and 1918, had taken part in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and had been promised at the Imperial Conference of 1921 that it would be consulted on all issues pertaining to imperial foreign policies. Mackenzie King felt that the lack of distinct invitations signalled that the British were not committing themselves to the establishment of improved communications in foreign policy by turning back the clock in representation at international conferences and thereby limiting

Canada’s ability to control its own destiny.

Eventually, the Dominions were invited to attend the Washington

Conference as part of the British delegation, following the precedent that was established from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Nonetheless, the

Canadians felt slighted in their status at the conference as a Dominion of the

British Empire and not as a separate delegation. The British government, for its part, felt it had settled the disagreement with Canada by sending an invitation.

Canadian historians, such as Mackenzie King’s biographer Robert MacGregor

Dawson, have argued that Canada was slighted. 47 Others, like British historian

Philip Wigley, have argued that the Dominions attended the Conference independently, which was effectively a new status for them in regards to

46Wigley, 146. 47Dawson, 422. 28 international conferences. 48 What is certain is that Mackenzie King would not agree with Wigley’s interpretation of events, instead seeing the Washington

Conference as one of several instances in which the British government did not wish to actively involve the Dominions in their pursuit of foreign affairs as had been promised in 1921. As a result, a doubt developed in Mackenzie King’s mind about Britain’s sincerity in treating the Dominions as equal partners. This sense of doubt was then added to Mackenzie King’s increasing sense of isolation from European affairs, which had been developing since the end of the First

World War, as well as his growing realization that joint imperial foreign policies were impracticable.49

The second series of events that heightened Mackenzie King’s dissatisfaction with the status quo began in 1922 with the Near East Crisis in

Turkey. The Near East Crisis, otherwise known as the Chanak Crisis, was a conflict resulting from a question of control over the Dardanelles Straits, which was an important maritime link for Britain between the Black and Mediterranean seas.50 In this instance, the British government acted out of self-interest by informing the Dominions of their commitments in Turkey after the fact, thus neglecting to conduct any form of consultation. This is one area in which historical consensus exists as to the way in which the British government handled the situation. The Near East Crisis was mainly a domestic issue for

Britain and that government alone made the decision to intervene in Turkey without prior consultation with the Dominions. In fact, requests for assistance

48Wigley,142. 49Slobodin,131. 50Wigley, 28. 29 were released to the Press before they reached the Dominion Prime Ministers.51

The Foreign Office assumed that the Empire, including Canada, stood as one united force because of the commitment to joint imperial policy made by Meighen and other Dominion leaders at the Imperial Conference of 1921.

Mackenzie King was appalled by the British government’s behaviour. He had not been previously informed of the conflict in Turkey yet was being asked to contribute men to the British cause; this was not cooperative policy in his mind.

Instead, he perceived the British government’s actions as a threat to Canada’s autonomy. In response to the British request for troops, Mackenzie King declared that the Canadian Parliament, conveniently in recess, would decide the degree of Canadian participation in Turkey. As early as October 31, 1922 the

Governor General, Lord Byng of Vimy, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Devonshire, informing him that:

… We deem it advisable to avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to advise his Majesty’s Government that in our opinion the extent to which Canada shall be held to be bound by the proceedings of the conference or by the provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out of the same, must necessarily be a matter for the Parliament of Canada alone to decide and that the plenary rights of our parliament in these particulars must not be held to be abridged or affected by implication or otherwise in virtue of any information which our Government may from time to time receive. 52

It becomes clear that Mackenzie King and the Liberal government were extremely concerned about their involvement in the conflict and attempted to spell out their position regarding the Near East at an early date. Nationalist

51Creighton, 184, Granatstein, Mackenzie King: His Life and World, 111, Morton, 53, Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 32, and Wigley, 162. 52Telegram, Governor General of Canada, Lord Byng of Vimy, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Devonshire, October 31, 1922 (Library and Archives Canada [LAC], MG 26- J 1, microfilm reel 2249, vol. 81). 30 historians, such as Arthur Lower, have interpreted Mackenzie King’s refusal to provide military support as evidence that Canada aspired to achieve greater autonomy in foreign affairs.53 Indeed, Mackenzie King was not satisfied with

Canada’s current system for determining its international commitments. Writing in his diary in preparation for the Imperial Conference of 1923, Mackenzie King reflected upon the incident and said that: “Canada will not countenance being drawn into European politics; they are none of our concern”.54 Evidently,

Mackenzie King felt that his government should have been consulted before the request for military assistance was released to the Press. He also believed that

Canadians would not tolerate this type of commitment in the absence of consultation.55 As a result, the Chanak Crisis proved the inadequacy of the current system that was in place for the Dominions to exercise influence over the creation and implementation of imperial foreign policy. This event also highlighted the lack of will on the part of the British government to keep the

Dominions properly informed thus providing Mackenzie King with a cause to fight for greater decentralization in foreign affairs.

The British government continued to pursue its objective of gaining control over the Dardanelles Straits in Turkey. The end result was the Treaty of

Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923 upon British victory in Turkey. The

Dominions were not invited as separate parties to participate in the drafting of the

53Lower, 483. 54Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. Thursday September 27, 1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 134). 55William Lyon Mackenzie King, “Mackenzie King Diary, April 4, 1922” http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02- e.php?&page_id_nbr=8173&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=p0dot8eca71dj2k1fmiakuqhu1 (accessed May 3, 2010). 31 treaty. This was another area of contention for Mackenzie King. Under the treaty, the Dominions would be expected to uphold an agreement that they had not had the opportunity to discuss beforehand. Mackenzie King went as far as to suggest that the Governor General of Canada propose to the British government the inclusion of a clause in the treaty that would ensure that the Dominions were not bound by the treaty, save for their agreement that the conflict should come to an end.56 As the situation continued to occupy an important place in Mackenzie

King’s mind, the more he became convinced that the British government was attempting to centralize its powers in foreign affairs to their own advantage.

Writing in his diary January 26, 1923, Mackenzie King noted that: “The more one goes into the matter the clearer it becomes that Lloyd George, Churchill and others were out to try an Imperialist game to help the Coalition politically”.57

Having a sense that the British statesmen were only concerned with their own political welfare and in preserving the position of their coalition government,

Mackenzie King continued to pursue a position that would realize Canada’s right to the powers of self-government.

Armed with two examples that, for Mackenzie King, proved the need for changes to the existing system of imperial consultation, he began to prepare for the Imperial Conference of 1923. Although Canada’s right to control its own affairs (both domestic and foreign) were important to Mackenzie King, he was

56William Lyon Mackenzie King, “Mackenzie King Diary, January 1, 1923” http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02- e.php?&page_id_nbr=8388&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=qb0rn7vo9qds6si6hssrefrbf4 (accessed May 3, 2010). 57William Lyon Mackenzie King, “Mackenzie King Diary, January 26, 1923” http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02- e.php?&page_id_nbr=8423&interval=20&&&PHPSESSID=qb0rn7vo9qds6si6hssrefrbf4, (accessed May 3, 2010). 32 careful to ensure that the people of Canada supported his position. In a telegram to Leopold Amery, the British First Lord of the Admiralty, Mackenzie King expressed his concerns about the upcoming conference as far as imperial policies and national unity were concerned. He was concerned that his

Parliament was divided on imperial matters and “knowing the difficulty there is to secure anything like unity of view with respect to the policy to be pursued as regards many matters of domestic concern, I can see, with respect to the sanctioning of matters affecting imperial policy, the great care and caution it will be necessary to exercise at every turn”.58 Mackenzie King was aware that the support of the Canadian Parliament was a critical component in the creation of imperial policies because it was through the Parliament that he could negotiate policies that would appeal to both the French and English populations of the country. Once assured that the majority of his country stood behind him, he could prepare to fight for greater decentralization in Canadian foreign affairs. He expressed hope to Amery that the future lay in the “recognition of an effective cooperation between self-governing and self-controlling units than in any merging or blending of control”.59 Inadvertently, Mackenzie King hoped to create a lasting relationship between Britain and its Dominions that found its solidarity in the ability of each country to determine its own course of action on both a domestic and international level.

Before leaving the country, Mackenzie King arranged a discussion in the

House of Commons to discuss the upcoming conference. Here was an attempt

58Mackenzie King to L.S Amery, Telegram. 232 , July 17, 1923 in Lovell C. Clark ed., D[ocuments on] C[anadian] E[xternal] R[elations] Vol. 3: 1919-1925, 223 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970). 59Ibid. 33 to gauge the degree of support he and his delegates would receive while overseas. On June 29, 1923 the Prime Minister sat down with the representatives of Parliament to address their concerns. James S. Woodsworth, a Member of Parliament from the Labour Party representing Winnipeg Centre, was the first to begin discussions. He believed that changes were in order as “it seems to me the time has come when we shall have to make new precedents, when we shall have to view the situation as it actually is today, and act, having regard to the developments which have taken place in recent years”.60

Woodsworth was addressing the changes that had occurred in the world since the First World War and expressed the view that Canada’s growing involvement in the global community required changes to the current method of dealing with foreign affairs. Despite the need for change, he emphasized the fact that

Canada shared many commonalities and ties with Britain and he wished to call attention to the fact that loyalty did not equate a position of subservience. He gave a sense that there was a divided feeling among the Canadian people and that:

Some people have still the colonial mind. They think of themselves as inferiors. They have what I suppose psycho-analysts would call inferiority complex. I cannot conceive that we can take our real place in the British Empire until we outgrow that and remember that we in Canada are just as fit to discuss the affairs of the Empire as are the people in any other part of the Empire. 61

60Woodsworth, James S. “Supply –Imperial Conference.” In Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. 14th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. CLIX (June 29, 1923) pp. 4650. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1923. 61Ibid, 4651. 34

Woodsworth believed strongly that a position that would allow Canada to have a choice in its foreign affairs should be taken at the Imperial Conference by the

Canadian delegation and that this position would benefit the world at large.

Support for Mackenzie King’s endeavour was not limited to the Labour

Party. Taking the floor second was a Progressive Member of Parliament from

Brandon Manitoba, Mr. Robert Forke, whose main concern was Canada’s position within the world because of its continued subordination within the British

Empire. He indicated that in the world there existed “the general impression that

Canada is little more than a colony of Great Britain”.62 For this Member, greater decentralization from Britain was necessary in order to improve Canada’s position within the international world. Forke, like Mackenzie King, felt that the

Chanak Crisis was an example of the problems involved with the creation of imperial foreign policies:

Lloyd George’s famous telegram with regard to the Chanak Affair brought us very quickly to our senses and made us realize that some day we shall be forced to come to a rapid decision bearing upon the question just what position we occupy in the British Empire.63

Forke concluded his speech by expressing his view of Canadian public opinion: “I think the sentiment that was expressed in a great many quarters by a large number of the people of this Dominion in that connection was that no action should be taken by the government of Canada without the consent of

Parliament”.64 This was a sentiment that reflected Mackenzie King’s belief that

62Forke, Robert. “Supply –Imperial Conference.” In Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. 14th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. CLIX (June 29, 1923) pp. 4654. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1923. 63Ibid, 4654. 64Ibid, 4654. 35 the Parliament of each Dominion should decide the degree of its contribution, or of its exclusion, in international affairs. Forke advised caution and discretion in the delegation’s endeavours as he among many others did not wish to see a

“slackening of the ties that bind us in that Empire” but expected Canada to secure its own position within the global community.65 Unmistakably, the

Progressive member, like Mackenzie King, valued the British connection but believed strongly in an autonomous foreign policy.

Lastly, members from Ontario and Quebec took the floor in order to express both their concerns and expectations for the Imperial Conference delegation. Speaking on behalf of Quebec was Mr. Roch Lanctot, the Liberal

Member from Laprairie-Napierville. His concerns were for the Canadian delegates themselves as he felt that British diplomats had a way of outwitting everyone else and hoped that the Canadians could hold their own against such resourceful men. Despite his concerns, he had confidence in Mackenzie King: “I am led to believe that he is not an Imperialist but has at heart the interest of the

Canadian people”.66 Encouragement for Mackenzie King from the Province of

Quebec boded well for the Prime Minister as his political career relied on its continued support. Mr. William Charles Good, an Independent Progressive

Member of Parliament for Brant, Ontario, was next to comment on issues of international relations and domestic politics. Like the Prime Minister, he was of a mind that the two were closely related, claiming that one must not forget “the

65Lanctot, Roch. “Supply –Imperial Conference.” In Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. 14th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. CLIX (June 29, 1923) pp. 4656. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1923. 66Ibid, 4657. 36 intimate relations that exist between what we might call foreign policy or international relations and the life and welfare of the individual” state.67

This was exactly what the Prime Minister wanted to hear; there was support for the position he was about to take at the Imperial Conference.

The Prime Minister’s sole comment to the crowd was that he was not expecting to change Canada’s relationship with Britain.68 Mackenzie King was not prepared to suggest that Canada remove itself from the British Empire, he believed that Canada should remain a part of the Empire for political and cultural reasons. Instead, Canada needed the ability to choose its foreign ventures to suit the needs of the Canadian people (reflecting its right as a self-governing nation) and not those of the British government. Mackenzie King felt that the

Washington Conference and the Near East Crisis accentuated both the need for change as well as the self-interested pursuits of the British government. Leaving session that day, Mackenzie King was able to prepare to set sail for the Imperial

Conference with an air of confidence knowing that his actions in London had the support of several members of the Canadian Parliament.

Cultural Connection

Not only did Mackenzie King’s position at the Imperial Conference of 1923 incorporate a deep concern for the national unity of his country and a concern for

Canada’s ability to act on behalf of its own interests but it also incorporated his personal sense of identity. There is no doubt that Mackenzie King possessed a

67Good, William Charles. “Supply –Imperial Conference.” In Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. 14th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. CLIX (June 29, 1923) pp. 4659. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1923. 68Ibid, 4661. 37 strong emotional connection to the idea of the British Empire. However, it is important to note that the Prime Minister was a Canadian first and foremost despite the fact that he fostered a sense of belonging to the British Empire as a whole. His actions mirrored this connection as he endeavoured to change

Canada’s ability to control its foreign affairs within these boundaries.

Before setting sail for his trip to London, Mackenzie King made one final visit to the Province of Quebec. Cautiously, in order to avoid controversy, the

Prime Minister devoted much of his speech to domestic questions. He addressed the upcoming Imperial Conference in order to give the people of

Canada a sense of his outlook towards the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the

British Empire. Speaking of Canada’s diversity and the continuous struggle for national unity, Mackenzie King chose his words carefully:

In our soil the enmities of past generations lie buried, the enmities of race which have occasioned war, and the enmities of political hate which have occasioned rebellion, and today we are a united people, seeking first and foremost an enduring unity, not a unity which aims at uniformity but a unity that delights in diversity. Such is the model on which the community of British nations is patterned. Such, I believe, it is the aim of the Imperial Conference to maintain. To that task the representatives of Canada at the forthcoming Conferences can give themselves with a glad heart.69

From his point of view, there was little reason to be concerned. Canada had long proven its ties with Britain, through the generations past, and a continuation of this relationship was to be expected. Mackenzie King made it clear that he was not going to the Conference with the intention of severing Canadian ties with the

British Empire; he was attempting to achieve greater decentralization in foreign

69Canada, “Canada and the Imperial Conference”, September 29, 1923. As found in Mackenzie King’s Manuscripts (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 134). 38 affairs so that Canada would have the ability to decide its future relations within the global community. Mackenzie King left the crowd on a positive note, declaring:

Today it is my privilege to go in the name of the people of Canada without a single grievance and to say that your relations with Britain and all parts of the Empire are of the best, and that we have only most cordial feeling towards all concerned. So long as this happy condition prevails, the friends of Canada and the friends of the British Empire need have no concern for the future or either. To make it prevail at all times must be our supreme endeavour.70

The Prime Minister spoke only of cordial relations between the two countries. His words were an attempt to reassure the Canadian public, and more importantly the people of Quebec, that large scale changes were not to be expected as a result of the Imperial Conference. The Minister of Marines and Fisheries, Ernest

Lapointe, spoke in support of Mackenzie King by stating that Canadians “all desire and hope that Britain and Canada will always be united by bonds of fellowship, cooperation and fraternity”.71 Intent on evolving Canada’s relationship with Britain, Mackenzie King set sail for London, England.

On board the Steamship Montcalm, Mackenzie King was accompanied by several members of the Canadian delegation. One of the most important of these men was Oscar Douglas Skelton. Skelton was the Special Advisor to the Prime

Minister for the purposes of the Imperial Conference of 1923 and made an important contribution to Mackenzie King’s position on foreign affairs. In the meantime he left his duties as a professor of Political Science and Economics and as the Dean of Arts at Queen’s University behind in order to play a direct role

70“Not the Time to Raise new Issues”, Morning Post, September 22, 1923. As found in Mackenzie King’s Manuscripts, (LAC, MG 26, manuscript 134). 71Ibid. 39 in the creation Canadian policy, anticipating that the Conference would have a decisive effect on the progress of imperial history. Skelton felt that having studied Canadian politics for several years it was the time “to utilize this study, to apply these ideas, at the heart of affairs, not indirectly by creating a public opinion but directly as a member of a London delegation and a participant in discussion of the Prime Ministers of the Empire”.72 The Prime Minister and

Skelton wholeheartedly agreed that Canada could no longer afford to be divided along linguistic lines by the aspirations of the British government and that

Canada was entitled to control over its foreign affairs which was a vital component of being a self-governing nation. 73

Mackenzie King was nervous of the daunting task ahead of him and spent most of his voyage attempting to prepare himself both mentally and physically for any of the anticipated challenges of the Conference. In his diary on Thursday

September 27, 1923, the Prime Minister recorded a discussion with Sir Campbell

Stuart74 over a letter the latter had received from the British Prime Minister,

Stanley Baldwin. The letter was further evidence that Baldwin and his government wished to include the Dominions in European policies in order to create a united imperial front for defence purposes. This confirmed Mackenzie

King’s worst fears and he remained adamant about “being prepared to represent

Canada’s viewpoint in conferences and consultation, I shall decline to accept

72Oscar Douglas Skelton Papers. Skelton Diary, July 8, 1923 (LAC, MG 30- D 33, vol. II). 73Hillmer, “O.D Skelton: Innovating for Independence”, 61-62. 74Oxford Dictionary of National Biography vol. 53, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 136-37. According to this source Campbell Arthur Stuart was a managing director at The Times newspaper in London, England in 1923, he also filled a succession of roles in imperial and Commonwealth commitments from 1923-1945. 40 responsibility of determining the foreign policy” of the British government.75

Mackenzie King held the strong conviction that Britain was more than capable of determining its own foreign policy without having to include the Dominions and their governments.

Upon discussing the matter of the British’s centralizing tendencies with

J.W. Dafoe, editor of the Manitoba Free Press, Mackenzie King was handed a document written by Sir Clifford Sifton, the retired Minister of the Interior from

Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s administration. The document was a memorandum on what equality of status meant; Dafoe and Sifton believed that

Mackenzie King should pursue Canadian independence at the Conference. The

Prime Minister graciously accepted the information, promising to “keep it in reserve in the event of finding it necessary to make amendments to unwise resolutions which may be put forward”.76 Mackenzie King’s refusal to present the memorandum at the Imperial Conference is evidence that the Prime Minister was not willing to pursue the hard line being presented by Dafoe and Sifton. He did not want to sever existing ties with the British Empire, but would be willing to consider it if he felt it was necessary in order to acquire Canada’s right to control its own affairs. Mackenzie King perceived the continuation of the British Empire and Canada’s relationship therein as being an important part of his position at the

Conference because the Imperial connection remained an important aspect of

Mackenzie King’s Canadian identity.

75Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. Thursday September 27, 1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 134). 76Ibid. 41

Despite the commotion caused by his travels, the issue of national unity was never far from Mackenzie King’s thoughts. On September 25, 1923 The

Scotsman, a Scottish National newspaper, published an editorial that articulated a sense of hope that Mackenzie King would stop himself from falling victim to the position of greater centralization that would be presented by Baldwin and Lord

Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. However, the newspaper felt that Mackenzie King’s intentions were understandable given

Canada’s political situation. 77 It was no secret that the Canadian Prime

Minister’s position in the government was a precarious one. He commanded only a slender majority in the House of Commons and his political support depended almost entirely on French Canada. Based on his political situation, the editor of The Scotsman felt that Mackenzie King would have to pursue a policy of non-conformity, when dealing with imperial foreign policies, in order to please the province of Quebec.78 The paper also claimed that a “benevolent aloofness” would not get support from the English provinces in Canada. Instead it was anticipated that the outcome of the Imperial Conference of 1923 would shape the lines of linguistic and political divides within the country for years to come. 79 The editorial did little to quiet Mackenzie King’s fears but he remained devoted to his position convinced that greater decentralization in foreign affairs would meet the needs of the people of Canada.

77The Scotsman, “Canada and the Imperial Conference I”, September 25, 1923. As found in Mackenzie King Manuscripts (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript, 135). 78Ibid. 79The Scotsman, September 26, 1923 “Canada and the Imperial Conference II”, September 26, 1923. As found in Mackenzie King Manuscripts (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 135). 42

After a week on board the ship, Mackenzie King arrived at Liverpool on

September 29, 1923. His first meeting was held with Leopold Amery, the British

First Lord of the Admiralty. In this instance, Mackenzie King shocked Amery by speaking so openly against the idea of one imperial policy for foreign affairs and defence. He later recorded in his diary that he told Amery “…it was absurd to expect us to interest the people in matters which were far beyond their concern”.80 Amery was surprised to hear that Canada wished only to be concerned with matters that directly affected it. Still Mackenzie King was careful to articulate the fact that he believed that the things that Britain and Canada held in common were much greater in every way than the things that divided them.

Through cooperation and understanding, he felt that the British government and the Dominions would come to a workable agreement in which each country would have control over its domestic and foreign affairs and still be committed to the idea of the British Empire.

The Imperial Conference of 1923 began on October 1, 1923. The British

Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, was the first to address the Prime Ministers of the British Empire and their delegations.81 He began the Conference with an overview of the British Empire since the last Imperial Conference in 1921 including topics such as relations with France, German reparations, the League of Nations and problems with India, among several other topics. Mackenzie King

80Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. September 30, 1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 135). 81Notable members among the crowd aside from Baldwin and Mackenzie King were: Lord Curzon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Imperial Conference of 1923, the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, J.C. Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, W.T. Cosgrave, President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, Desmond Fitzgerald, Minister of External Affairs of the Irish Free State, W.F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, W.R Warren, Prime Minister of Newfoundland, The Maharajah of Alwar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru of India. Absent from the first day of proceedings was Stanley Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia. 43 was second to speak to the crowd, as the representative of the Senior Dominion.

Finding it difficult to marshal his thoughts, the Canadian Prime Minister expressed a sense of gratitude for being part of the Conference.82 Not wanting to occupy too much time, nor venture into topics upon which he was not yet fully informed, Mackenzie King kept his opening statement short. Reminiscing about the day’s events in his diary, Mackenzie King recalled General Smuts of South

Africa, noting that he was “generally impressed by his words, manner and delivery and especially by his fine spirit”.83 Mackenzie King realized that Smuts was a man worthy of further consideration as he hoped to secure an ally in his attempt to pursue greater decentralization in the control of foreign affairs.

After the first general session, Baldwin invited Mackenzie King to a private session wishing to inform the Canadian Prime Minister of the severity of the situation in Europe. He felt that France’s militarism presented a great threat as it was becoming stronger than Britain, thereby weakening the British position.

Baldwin also inquired about Canada’s position towards imperial foreign policies.

Mackenzie King informed him of the impossibility of Canada taking part in the shaping of British foreign policy: “I pointed out that we were not desirous of shaping all foreign policy; we did wish to have brought to our attention matters which were likely to be of concern to us. Matters affecting the people of Great

Britain should be settled by the people of Great Britain themselves”.84 Baldwin’s concern was that the situation in Europe would worsen and create a serious

82The London Times. “The Imperial Conference: Opening Speeches”, October 2, 1923. As found in Mackenzie King Manuscripts, (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 135). 83Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. Monday October 1, 1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 135). 84Ibid. 44 situation for Britain and its Dominions. On the other hand, Mackenzie King felt that the people of Canada saw the problem as being the opposite: “…what I believed people in Canada were of afraid of was that the desire to take part in foreign policy was largely that of drawing us into European and world politics from which we should be free”.85 Mackenzie King, in other words, feared that

Britain wanted Canadian backing in the event of another European war.

Despite the fact that Baldwin was not impressed with what he was hearing from Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minster felt it was his obligation to hold strong in his position. In his mind he was thinking about the permanency of the British Empire: “I told him that maintenance of the principle of responsible government (a British tradition that Mackenzie King fully embraced) in all relations of the British Empire is the cornerstone of the entire structure”.86

Evidently Mackenzie King remained attached to the idea of the British Empire but felt that greater decentralization in foreign affairs was necessary in order to reflect the individual interests of each part of the Empire. Granting the Dominions control over their own foreign policies would effectively ensure the continuation of the British Empire as each Parliament would have the power to determine its own position within the global community. In this manner, Mackenzie King felt that the Dominions would become allies of the British government, no longer subordinate to its decisions but instead equal partners on all matters.87

Mackenzie King felt that he had no right to commit his country to any ventures

85Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. Monday October 1, 1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 136). 86Ibid. 87Ibid. 45 and would not make empty promises at the Imperial Conference without first having consulted the Canadian Parliament.

Friday October 5, 1923 was the day that Mackenzie King had been waiting for. It was on this day that foreign affairs were discussed in session. Lord

Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed the

Conference that morning with an impressive speech. Reflecting in his diary,

Mackenzie King recorded that Curzon spoke without many notes, his speech a fine intellectual treat as it was a “picture of the greatness of the British not alone in her vast interests and powers throughout the world, but in her sense of trusteeship, alike of her own possessions and the peace and security of the world”.88 Not only did the speech make an impression on the Canadian Prime

Minister it also struck a chord with Skelton. In his diary, he noted Curzon’s

“appreciation of individual character as a determining factor in the making of history” as being singularly keen.89 Not only did Curzon give an impression of the instability in the world, he also gave an overview of the tensions that existed between Britain and France. By the end of the speech Mackenzie King felt

Curzon’s plea “pulling at the strings of need for Empire unity”.90 It is with this sense of need that the day’s proceedings were concluded. The Dominion representatives were to return with their own thoughts on foreign affairs after the weekend.

88Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. October 5,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 137). 89Oscar Douglas Skelton Papers. Skelton Diary, October 5, 1923 (LAC, MG 30 D -33, vol. II). 90Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. October 5,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 137). 46

On the morning of Monday October 8, 1923, Mackenzie King prepared to make the most important speech of his trip to London. He recalled at day’s end that he “went over carefully all that Skelton had written, making some alterations and deletions and arranging the material in the order which seemed to me conveniently to give the effect desired”.91 He wanted to make the speech his own despite the fact that it had been written by Skelton. Mackenzie King spoke for one hour and supplemented Skelton’s work with verbal additions of considerable length. In beginning his speech he made it clear that “the Near East episode and other events of the two years since the last Conference have presented practical tests of the understanding declared to have been reached in

1921” and have proven that the system of consultation was not a practical tool for the creation of foreign policies throughout the Empire.92 Mackenzie King felt that the Empire had grown past the days in which a common foreign policy was applicable. He argued that “given the widely scattered communities within the

British Empire growing steadily in numbers, in intercourse with the world, and in the habit of self-government…it is inevitable that each of these communities should seek to control those foreign affairs which concern it primarily”.93 He also added that in certain areas common interests would arise and that through cooperation and communication these problems could be resolved.

91Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. October 8,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 137). 92O.D. Skelton, “Canada and the Control of Foreign Policy”, undated (LAC, MG 26-J4. microfilm reel C- 2695). 93Dawson, 465. 47

The Canadian Prime Minister did not feel that he was presenting new principles. To his mind, control over one’s foreign policy was a right given under the privileges of self-government. According to the Canadian perspective:

Self-government means the right of each part of the Empire to control its own affairs, whether those affairs are domestic, foreign or both. That is the principle on which this Empire has been maintained, that is its unique and distinctive contribution to the world, that is the principle which had been tested in fire of late years and not found wanting. It cannot now be abandoned.94

Mackenzie King firmly believed that a single, united policy idea would not make for the joint welfare of the British Empire. This system did not offer the

Dominions a position of equality in the creation of foreign policies “if the

Dominions are committed to action by blank cheques, given to the Foreign

Secretary by the Prime Ministers, they have sham control and real responsibility”.95 Instead, Mackenzie King felt that the Dominions should be

“committed to action by their own Parliaments and peoples” which would effectively give them real influence and responsible control.96 In essence,

Canada would not be obligated to take on any new commitments as a result of the Imperial Conference. Mackenzie King refused to commit his country to any imperial ventures unless the Parliament of Canada sanctioned them.

Mackenzie King’s position on foreign policy evoked a reaction from the

King of England, King George V, and the two men met the day after Mackenzie

King’s speech was made. The King was concerned about the Empire, he felt that it was falling apart in a similar fashion that the Greek and Roman Empires

94O.D. Skelton, “Canada and the Control of Foreign Policy”, undated (LAC, MG 26-J4, microfilm reel C- 2695). 95Ibid. 96Ibid. 48 had. Mackenzie King attempted to reassure the King that self-government was what made the British Empire different and lasting and that what he was proposing would not harm the Empire but would instead allow it to continue to grow and prosper. 97 He also reminded the King of his own message to the school children of the British Empire when he described the Empire as a community of free nations. Mackenzie King told King George V that his message

“…gave scope to national aspirations of self-governing dominions and at the same time recognised the community of interest with regard to matters of common concern and where the integrity and honour of the whole were affected”.98 After the conversation had come to an end, Mackenzie King felt that

King George V understood the Canadian position as an effort to prolong the life of the British Empire.99

With discussions about foreign affairs out of the way, for the moment,

Mackenzie King was able to focus his attention elsewhere. One of the most important ceremonies that the Prime Minister took part in during his stay in

London occurred on October 11, 1923. On this day, Mackenzie King was invited to become a member of the Privy Council. He participated in an honorary and traditional ceremony that inducted the Prime Ministers of the British Empire as

Special Privy Councillors for the purposes of their visit. This ceremony, in which

Mackenzie King had to wear a special frock, touched a unique place in the

Anglo-Canadian’s heart as he felt a strong emotional connection to Canada and

97Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. October 9,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 137). 98Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. October 9,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 138). 99Ibid. 49 its imperial history. He noted that he felt “at peace” realizing the historical significance of his presence at 10 Downing Street and Buckingham Palace.100

Coincidently, the ceremony took place on the 24th anniversary of the Boer War, a symbolic day for the British Empire. At no other time did Mackenzie King feel that there was a more heightened sense of belonging to the Empire: “…we all commented on what this signified of the love of the British peoples for freedom and the remarkable character of the British Empire and how those who were not in it found it difficult to understand”.101 Undoubtedly, Mackenzie King was a proud member of the British Empire on this day, as always.

Discussions on foreign policy resumed on Monday November 5, 1923.

Lord Curzon presented his statement on the discussions concerning foreign policy to the group representing the self-governing parts of the British Empire.102

Mackenzie King felt that “it was really an effort to commit the conference to a common foreign policy”. He was not pleased with the contents of Curzon’s speech reflecting that: “I had a most difficult and unpleasant hour or two strongly opposing many of the paragraphs that were inserted”.103 He felt that the course that the British were pursuing would get a strong reaction in Canada, affecting the unity of the country. Mackenzie King was alone in objecting to certain clauses of the foreign policy resolution as they appeared. He felt that it was necessary that he be outspoken in his efforts in order to prevent a serious situation from

100Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. October 11,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 138). 101Ibid. 102The Prime Ministers were to attend a secret session at 3pm to which Baldwin, Curzon, the Duke of Devonshire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Smuts, Mackenzie King, Massey and Bruce were invited.102 The other members from India, Newfoundland and the Irish Free State were excluded from the meeting because they did not possess the full powers of self-government. 103Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. November 5,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 143). 50 developing at home.104 The meeting adjourned without an agreement as to the contents of a written statement on foreign affairs.

Mackenzie King was prepared to work on the statement to ensure that the

Canadian position was clear. He and Skelton felt that the future development of the British Empire should be based upon co-operation among the several governments of Free Nations, and not on the concept of an Imperial Cabinet or

Federation.105 Mackenzie King was first and foremost concerned with safeguarding the supremacy of Parliament in shaping and executing matters of foreign policy. However, Curzon was not willing to accept the changes made by the Canadian delegation to the draft on foreign affairs insisting on including the obligations to Turkey and Egypt to which Mackenzie King was adamantly opposed.106 Canada did not want any obligations without the consent of the

Canadian government and its Parliament as a result of the Imperial Conference.

A policy of non-commitment was to be achieved. At this point General Smuts was recruited in order to meet with Curzon in an attempt to appease both parties.

Smuts was to work on a concluding paragraph that would state that all of the subjects that were discussed at the Conference were subject to the approval of each Parliament and he would also ensure the clauses concerning Turkey and

Egypt were removed.107

104Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. November 5,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 143). 105Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. November 6,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 143). 106Mackenzie King Manuscript, William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary. November 7,1923 (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 143). 107Ibid. 51

Under pressure from both Smuts and Mackenzie King, Curzon finally agreed to change the resolution on foreign affairs. On Thursday November 8,

1923 the report on foreign affairs was accepted without comment. The

Imperialist group was not satisfied, but they would not have been satisfied with anything less than total control being vested in London. The following concluding paragraph was inserted into the resolution as a result of Mackenzie King’s persistent behaviour:

This Conference is of representatives of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy, as recorded above, are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the results of its deliberations will meet with their approval.108

Effectively, Mackenzie King was able to ensure that the Canadian position of non-commitment, without the approval of its Parliament, was included in the final report concerning the discussions on foreign policy. In his mind this was a success regardless of the fact that Canada did not gain complete control over its foreign policies, instead he achieved a degree of decentralization. Regardless, the Prime Minister remained happy with his efforts, he had successfully prevented any commitments in foreign policy from further dividing the people of

Canada.

Conclusion:

At the Imperial Conference of 1923 Mackenzie King remained determined to change Canada’s commitment to imperial foreign policies, while at the same time preserving the broader ties which were integral to the British-Canadian

108Copy of the Official Report of the Imperial Conference of 1923. Undated. As found in Mackenzie King Manuscripts, Mackenzie King Diary, November 8, 1923, (LAC, MG 26-J 13, manuscript 143). 52 relationship. He laboured in order to reverse the commitment to one imperial policy in foreign affairs that had been made by both Borden and Meighen after the First World War. Essentially Mackenzie King’s position on foreign affairs refused to commit Canada to any imperial ventures unless it was sanctioned by the Canadian Parliament. This point of view effectively allowed the Prime

Minister to maintain the support of the province of Quebec, upon which the life of his party depended, as French Canadian public opinion did not see a role for

Canada in another European war. But also, by acknowledging the need for continual consultation where common interests in foreign policy were concerned,

Mackenzie King’s perspective at the Conference loosely satisfied the needs of

Canadian Imperialists who sought to preserve Canada’s role as defender of the

Mother Country. With the intention of pleasing everyone, in the name of national unity, Mackenzie King was successful in changing the degree of Canadian commitment to the foreign affairs of the British government.

As a result, the Imperial Conference of 1923 proved to be an important event in Mackenzie King’s pursuit of national unity as he safeguarded Canada’s right to be a self-governing nation. He managed to gain a degree of control over the foreign affairs of his country by ensuring that the Canadian Parliament would have the power to determine Canadian commitments abroad. The ability to let

Parliament decide the country’s foreign affairs was a way of giving the people of

Canada a voice in determining foreign relations. Mackenzie King hoped that this would help to guarantee a degree of national unity because both English and

French interests would be represented in the House of Commons. The 53

Canadian Prime Minister also felt that greater control by the Dominions over their own foreign affairs would be beneficial to both the Dominions and the British

Empire as a whole. Fundamentally, greater decentralization in the area of foreign policies would allow the Dominions to realize their own destinies by being able to pursue their own objectives within the global community. According to

Mackenzie King, it was on this principle, the powers of self-government, that the

British Empire found its enduring stability. Because Mackenzie King valued

Canada’s cultural connection with Britain he was successful in convincing the

British government that by acknowledging the diverse interests of each of the self-governing Dominions, in their relations with other countries, they would guarantee the continuation of the British Empire.

54

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