A US Strategy for Iran Douglass and Hays Cut Along Dotted Line
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Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, on 15 December 1917. He took flying training at Mather Field, California, getting his com- mission and wings in November 1918. After a tour in the Philippines, he returned to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 with a subsequent assignment in December 1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Retained on the faculty as a bombardment in- structor, Walker became the epitome of the strategic thinkers at the school and coined the revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: “A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown air force attack will constitute an offensive that cannot be stopped.” Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the Air Corps in Washington, DC. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan at- tacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war. In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when air- craft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire. General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicu- ous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force. After you have read this research report, please give us your frank opinion on the contents. All comments—large or small, complimentary or caustic—will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them to AFOPEC/FO, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6006. A US Strategy for Iran Douglass and Hays Cut along dotted line Thank you for your assistance. AIR UNIVERSITY AIR FORCE OFFICER ProfessionaL EDUCATION CENTER AIR FORCE FELLOWS A US Strategy for Iran CHARLES A. DOUGLASS Lieutenant Colonel, USAF MICHAEL D. HAYS Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Walker Paper No. 11 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962 April 2008 Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data Douglass, Charles A. A US strategy for Iran / Charles A. Douglass. Michael D. Hays. p. : cm. – (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 11) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-58566-200-5 1. United States—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran—Foreign relations—United States. 3. Iran—Foreign relations—History. 4. Iran—Strategic aspects. I. Title. II. Hays, Michael D., 1965- III. Series. 327.73055—dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. This Walker Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil. ii Air Force Fellows Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of professional military education at senior service schools. In 2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental educa- tion (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers. The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military am- bassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candi- dates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in spon- soring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant develop- ments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is ex- pected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for research and writing on important national security issues. The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Sec- retary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. On the level of intermediate developmental education, the chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force Legisla- iii AIR FORCE FELLOWS tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows. iv Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . ix ABSTRACT . xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . xv 1 SOLVING IRAN . 1 Note . 3 2 IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS: HISTORIC ROOTS . 5 Ancient Persian Greatness and Cultural Pride . 5 Resentment of Foreign Interference . 7 Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness . 10 Pragmatic National Interest Replaces Revolutionary Ideology . 13 Notes . 17 3 ANALYSIS OF IRAN . 23 Demographics, Politics, and Economics . 24 Internal Dynamics, Personalities, Power Centers, and Factions . 32 Nuclear Desire . 40 Notes . 43 4 US PERCEPTIONS . 49 US Perceptions of Iran Internally . 49 US Perceptions of Iran Externally . 51 Notes . 54 5 REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY . 57 Dual Containment . 57 Post–9/11 Openings . 59 Public Diplomacy and Sanctions . 60 Notes . 65 v CONTENTS Chapter Page 6 STRATEGY GROUNDWORK . 69 Key Assumptions . 69 US Goal Assessment . 70 Centers of Gravity Overview . 71 Planning Mechanics . 72 Notes . 73 7 A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN . 75 Short-Term Strategy . 76 Long-Term Strategy . 89 Notes . 93 8 CONCLUSIONS . 97 Note . 98 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 99 Illustrations Figure 1 Persia’s Achaemenid Empire as of 500 BC . 6 2 Iran’s formal power centers and constitutional structure . 24 3 Current members of the Gulf Cooperation Council . 62 4 Southern tier of the former Soviet Republics . 63 5 World oil reserves as of 2004 . 79 vi Foreword Arguably a top tier concern for American foreign policy for more than a few years, Iran gets the meticulous attention of two distinguished Air Force scholars. Lt Cols Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays are critical of the current American policy toward Iran and tell us why. More importantly, they point to elements necessary for an effective Iranian strategy. Their aim: “to change the fundamental calculus of the Iranian problem” to one beneficial for both Americans and Iranians. Their calculation is based on the need to solve long-standing problems and recognition that a solution involves more than just a prescriptive mixing of incentives, coercion, and the threat of military attack. A long view must recognize the historical pride of the Persian people, their resentment of foreign meddling (es- pecially by the United States), and the vigor of their Shiite reli- gion, but also the endemic pragmatism of their nationalism. In two insightful chapters, the authors review Persian heritage and analyze current Iranian demographics, politics, and economy. Colonels Douglass and Hays examine current US policies and the changing range of recent policies, from containment, to direct dialogue following 9/11, to the current practice of a very public diplomacy with the threat of punitive sanctions. They point out that the United States has not been successful in stopping Iran’s nuclear program, its export of terrorism, nor the general Iranian practice of destabilizing the Middle East. They discuss the mechanics of strategic formulation that takes into account American concerns and the important “centers of gravity” pertinent to Iran. Douglass and Hays conclude their study by introducing in- novative short-term and long-term strategic frameworks based on the assumption that pressure is building for all parties to “do something.” Interestingly, they place employment of Ameri- can military power low on the list of short-term options.