SSR) Efforts in Developing and Transition Countries

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SSR) Efforts in Developing and Transition Countries Inventory of security sector reform (SSR) efforts In developing and transition countries TABLE OF CONTENTS NEAR & MIDDLE EAST ALGERIA .......................................................................................................................................... 2 EGYPT ............................................................................................................................................... 4 JORDAN.............................................................................................................................................. 7 MOROCCO .................................................................................................................................... 11 PALESTINE .................................................................................................................................... 14 SYRIA .............................................................................................................................................. 17 TUNISIA ............................................................................................................................................ 20 YEMEN ........................................................................................................................................... 23 EUROPE TURKEY.......................................................................................................................................... 27 SUB-SAHARA AFRICA ANGOLA ......................................................................................................................................... 31 BENIN ............................................................................................................................................ 33 BURKINA-FASO ............................................................................................................................ 35 BURUNDI ......................................................................................................................................... 39 CAMEROON................................................................................................................................... 42 CHAD ............................................................................................................................................. 45 CONGO (DR) .................................................................................................................................. 48 COTE D’IVOIRE .............................................................................................................................. 52 ERITREA ........................................................................................................................................... 56 ETHIOPIA....................................................................................................................................... 59 GHANA ........................................................................................................................................... 62 GUINEA ............................................................................................................................................ 65 KENYA............................................................................................................................................. 68 LESOTHO ......................................................................................................................................... 71 MADAGASCAR ................................................................................................................................73 MALAWI ......................................................................................................................................... 76 MALI ............................................................................................................................................ 79 MAURITANIA ................................................................................................................................... 81 MOZAMBIQUE.............................................................................................................................. 84 NAMIBIA......................................................................................................................................... 88 NIGER ............................................................................................................................................. 90 NIGERIA ........................................................................................................................................... 92 RWANDA......................................................................................................................................... 95 SENEGAL...................................................................................................................................... 100 SIERRA LEONE........................................................................................................................... 102 SOUTH AFRICA .......................................................................................................................... 105 SUDAN ........................................................................................................................................... 108 TANZANIA ................................................................................................................................... 111 TOGO ........................................................................................................................................... 113 UGANDA ....................................................................................................................................... 115 ZAMBIA......................................................................................................................................... 118 ZIMBABWE .................................................................................................................................. 120 ASIA & OCEANIA AFGHANISTAN ........................................................................................................................... 125 BANGLADESH............................................................................................................................. 128 CAMBODIA .................................................................................................................................. 130 CHINA ........................................................................................................................................... 133 EAST-TIMOR .................................................................................................................................. 136 INDIA ........................................................................................................................................... 138 INDONESIA .................................................................................................................................. 141 IRAN ........................................................................................................................................... 144 LAOS ........................................................................................................................................... 145 MONGOLIA .................................................................................................................................... 146 MYANMAR/BURMA .................................................................................................................. 150 NEPAL ........................................................................................................................................... 151 PAKISTAN .................................................................................................................................... 154 PHILIPINES.................................................................................................................................. 157 SRI LANKA ..................................................................................................................................... 160 THAILAND .................................................................................................................................... 161 VIETNAM...................................................................................................................................... 164 LATIN AMERICA BRAZIL ........................................................................................................................................... 166 BOLIVIA........................................................................................................................................ 168 CHILE ............................................................................................................................................ 170 COLOMBIA..................................................................................................................................... 174 COSTA RICA................................................................................................................................... 177 CUBA ............................................................................................................................................ 179 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC..............................................................................................................
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