YOO, Ki Hong, 1936- A STUDY OF NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISM AS RELATED TO THE RISE OF KIM IL-SONG.
The American University, Ph.D., 1969 Political Science, general
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
@ KI HONG YOO 197 0
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A STUDY OF NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISM AS RELATED TO THE RISE OF KIM IL-SONG
A Dissertation
Presented to
the School of Government and Public Administration
American University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY by JAN 2 7 1970 Ki Hong Yoo
November, 1969
Approved by: Date:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FORWARD
Since 1S53, when tension in Korea was reduced to the point where
the status quo appeared to have been restored, world attention has been
focused on other areus of Hsia. Many in the West had forgotten the
potential threat to peace and order posed by North Korea until the
January 1968 attempt at assassination of President Pak Chong-hi of
South Korea and the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. Actually
these recent incidents are merely widely publicized symptoms of a ten
dency which has characterized North Korean Communism from its inception
and will characterize it for the foreseeable future — an aggressive
drive to reunify Korea under Socialist leadership.
This aggressive drive presents a real threat to South Korea and
to American interests. The threat is more imposing by reason of North
Korea's massive military built-up, the total indoctrination and sys
tematic regimentation of its citizenry, the establishment of an effec
tive chain of command from Kim Il-song downward, and continuing war
talk in P'yong-yang, the capital of North Korea. All of these factors
increase the likelihood of a new Korean war, or rather the resumption
of a conflict that was never really solved. The danger is especially
imminent in the light of the North Korea's growing independence of
China and Russia. For it is possible that a new outbreak of hostilities
could be initiated by North Korea — acting on her own initiative, with
out the restraining influence of China and Russia. Therefore, the study
of North Korea is as important as that of Vietnam, China, and Russia.
One of the main characteristic features of totalitarian states
in our age is one-man dictatorship. Just as Mao Tse-tung in China,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ho Chi-min in North Vietnam, and Fidel Castro in Cuba, rule their
countries with heavy hands, so does Kim Il-song in North Korea. It is
Kim Il-song, who, as the premier, the chairman of the Korean Workers
Party, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the "Korean People's Army,"
controls North Korea with absolute power. The authority of Kim Il-song
emanates not only from his practical power sources but also from the
institutionalized cult of personality. He is idolized as a man of com
passion, the supreme patriot, a national hero, steel-willed Marshall,
and the outstanding leader of the international Communist movement. He
is revered as a theorist of the first rank, who interprets Marxism-Leninism
correctly and gives brilliant guidance to the Korean people. To study
Kim Il-song is to understand North Korean politics, which, in turn, is
to understand much of what North Korea is likely to do in the future.
This dissertation is intended to trace the development of the
North Korean Communists' views of communism, with prime emphasis on what
Kim Il-song has said about North Korean Communism. Although his contri
bution to Marxist philosophy may be insignificant in ".erms of originality,
it is important to see at what point his communism becomes different from
the "classical" tradition, and in what sense he has followed the ideas
and methods of Stalin and Mao.
The study involves mainly historical as well as theoretical con
siderations. Historical analysis is necessary because it is of vital
importance to understand how Marxist ideas in Korea have evolved. At
the same time, it is strongly felt that the study should not be over
burdened with descriptive and historical details without a conceptual
treatment of the subject, for all the relevant subject matter in this
dissertation has to be discussed in the context of what important
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. communist leaders and theorists, especially Kim Il-song, have written
on theoretical issues of Communism. What is needed, in short, is a
conceptual approach to a better understanding of communism in North Korea.
With this in mind, chapters of this dissertation are divided into
three parts. The first chapter deals with the general background of the
traditional Korean ideas and a brief description of the origin and the
development of the Korean Communist Movement. It also examines ideological
differences between Communist and non-Communist national revolutionaries
and ideological similarities and differences among the several Communist
factions in China, Manchuria, Russia, and Korea. The second chapter will
cover briefly major events, political struggles, and political ideas of
the Korean Communists in the early stages of founding Communism in North
Korea. In this process, a major effort will be concentrated on the idea
uf iQulti-class coalition advocated by Kim-Il-song, but consideration
also will be given to some important subsidiary points such as the methods
used by Kim Il-song to consolidate his power base, and the theoretical
basis for his fierce prosecution of the Korean War. In the final chapter,
the primary emphasis is centered on the process of converting persons from
all social classes into communists, and Kim Il-song's leadership style
under his tightly built one-man dictatorship. Special attention will
also be paid to changes effected by the international situation, which
have been arising out of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
In dealing with these comprehensive issues which cover more than
a half-century's history, the study of North Korean Marxism —
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. particularly the study of Kim Il-song, poses a number of difficulties.
First, the scope of research is so vast that the study cannot be
effecti.vely carried out unless a decision is made on selection of the
issues to be dealt with. Here we are confronted with a subjective
decision. The writer must make his own choice.
Second, the extent of the availability of source material is ex
tremely limited, for all communications media in North Korea, as in
the case of any Communist country, are closely controlled by the
government and the Korean Workers Party. Most of the material available
in the United States has been obtained through Japan and Hongkong, and
only a handful of these sources are trustworthy because most of the data
sre published for propaganda purposes. This problem is particularly
acute in dealing with the second chapter of this dissertation which
covers roughly the period between 1945 and 1953.
There are quite a few primary sources available for research rele
vant to the subject of this dissertation. Facing these problems, the
writer relies heavily on the following materials: for the first chapter,
particularly for substantiating historical facts on the development of
the Korean Communist movement, Dr. Suh Dae-sook's book, The Korean
Communist Movement: 1918-1948; the microfilms of the archives of the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept in the Library of Congress;
two books published by Tsuboe Senji in Tokyo; Holcusen no lcaiho junen
(Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), and Chosen
minzoku dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's
Independence Movement).
In the second chapter, the Selected Works of Kim Il-song was a
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major source. It has been published in several different editions, in
Korean and Japanese, each of which has been slightly revised by elimi
nating, replacing, or by modifying certain words and phrases to accomo
date his works to newly developing situations. Although it is not easy
to compare word by word and page by page all editions published so far,
an attempt will be made to single out important changes in later editions
by comparing them with the early ones. And for the final chapter,
North Korean newspapers, Kullocha and Nodong sinmun, and several books,
published by the Korean Workers Party and the Academy of Science, were
used in addition to the English edition of the Selected Works of
Kim Il-song.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
CHAPTER
I. TRADITIONAL KOREAN IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN KOREA IN THE 20TH CENTURY
A. Key Concepts of Korean Confucianism
B. The Revolutionary Search for National Independence
II. KIM IL-SONG'S RISE TO POWER AND THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST, ANTI-FEUDAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
A. Divergent Forces in North Korea and the Early Activities of Kim Il-song after Korea's Emancipation
B. Democratic Reforms
C. Sovietization of Ideology
1) The Question of the Revolutionary Stage in Korea
2) True Revolutionaries and Revolutionary Allies
3) Coalition Tactics and the Fatherland Liberation War
III. ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO SOCIALISM AND ONE MAN DICTATORSHIP IN SOCIALISM
A. Economic Plans and Social Regimentation
1) The Downfall of International Monolithic Communism and Kim Il-song's Neutrality
2) The Three Year and Five Year Plans
3) Cooperativization of Capitalist Trade and Industry
4) Cooperativization of the Peasantry
5) The Ch'ollima Movement
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B. The Triumph of One-Man Dictatorship Under Socialism in North Korea
1) International Polycentrism and Chuch'e in Ideology
2) Party Supremacy and Organizational Control
3) Other Methods of Control
4) The Question of Korean Unification and Socialist Patriotism
IV. SUMMARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
TRADITIONAL KOREAN IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN KOREA IN THE 20TH CENTURY
A. Key Concepts of Korean Confucianism
Although Korea has a distinctive cultural heritage of her own,
Korean civilization has been deeply affected by dynastic changes on
the Chinese mainland. The collapse of the T'ang dynasty in China early
in the tenth century paved the way for the Koryo dynasty of Korea, which
was subjected to the Mongol invasions and subsequent downfall without
any adequate Chinese protection. With the Manchu conquest of the Ming
dynasty in China in the mid-sevenreenth century, the country was once
again overrun by the Manchus, which hastened the decline of the Yi dy
nasty. When the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty became incapable of withstanding
external pressure from world powers at the turn of the present century,
Korea was left alone and fell ptey to the imperial powers of Russia and
Japan. This resulted in anarchy, for Korea was not prepared to conduct
foreign relations nor was she militarily able to resist the foreign
powers. The greatest chaos of all, however, resulted from the decay of
the dynasty itself. A Western correspondent who visited and observed
the King and the government of the Yi dynasty in early 1900 reported that
". . . he (the King) is unconscious as a child, stubborn as a Boer, ignorant as a China-man, and vain as a Hottentot. He has read nothing; and has heard only flattery for forty years. The atmosphere that surrounds him is one of dense ignorance, and con sequently he is as timid as a fallow deer. He is extremely superstitious. . . . He loves his sorceresses, wise-women, and ground-doctors, and consults them con stantly on the affairs of state." 1
1. George Kennan, "Korea: A Degenerate State/’ The Outlook, Vol. 81 No. 6, (October 7, 1905), p. 308.
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With government centered in a weak and incompetent monarch, a
strong aristocracy prevailed and sank its roots deep into the political
and social life of Korea. As a result, bitter conflict developed among
rival factions in a "naked struggle for power," and brought to Korea
"administrative paralysis, bureaucratic inertia, irresponsibility, error 2 and inefficiency," and "crisis government," What one could have expected
from government in this situation was a foregone conclusion:
"It takes from the people, directly and indirectly everything that they earn over and above a bare subsistance; and gives them in return practically nothing. It affords no adequate protection to life or property; it provides no educational facilities that deserve notice; it builds no roads; it does not improve its harbors; .... and it corrupts and demoralizes its subjects by setting them examples 3 of untruthfulness, dishonesty, treachery, cruelty...
This may be an unbalanced description of the Yi dynasty, but it tells a
great deal about the incompetence of the traditional Korean monarchy. In
capable of developing a reasonable diplomatic ploy in playing off Russia
against Japan, devoid of any military preparedness, and torn asunder by
internal corruption and factionalism, the Yi dynasty was faltering and
disintegrating. The doom of the Yi dynasty was spelled by Japan's formal
annexation of Korea as a colony in 1910, which ended the Russo-Japanese
rivalry in Korea.
Weak, corrupt, crumbling and offering no resistance to modernized
Japanese military power, the Yi dynasty, nevertheless, left a unique heritage
Edward W. Wagner, "Some Historical Considerations,” in Seminar: Modernization Process in Korea, Korean Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Autumn 1963), pp. 32-33.
3. George Kennan, "Korea: A Degenerate State," The Outlook, pp.314-315.
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to the Koreans. During the almost five hundred years' reign of the Yi
dynasty, Korean cultural and social patterns became firmly fixed with
one race, one language, and one proud past. This homogeneity of the
Korean people has become a significant factor in the evaluation of any
Korean political problem, whether it is related to the modernization and
independence efforts or to the Korean Communist movement. For this
reason, it is of great importance to single out and probe into certain
of these traditional patterns to consider their impact on Korean moderni
zation and, in particular, the Korean Communist movement, which is the
main concern of this dissertation.
Although the introduction of Confucianism to Korea took place
around 300 A.D., it was the Yi dynasty which adopted it as state doctrine.
Since then, a Korean, unless he is committed to some specific religion,
has associated his ethical or moral base with that of Confucianism.
The Confucian concept of human nature (and history) contains an optimism
similar to that expressed in the concepts about the nature of man by Locke
and Rousseau in the West, for it envisages the glorious past of the Yao
and Shun eras when peace and order prevailed, and when humanity and per
fect virtue were the sole criteria for human behavior. But Confucianism
departs from the Western concept of natural law by conceiving of the
ideal state as it existed under the reigns of sage-kings; as Confucius said:
"What sublime majesty was that of Shun and Yu! The Great Society was theirs, but they were not trammelled by it. How great was Yao as a sovereign! The sublime majesty of him! Only Heaven is great: only Yao copied it. (This spiritual power) going beyond all bounds, so that no man may give a name to it! Sublime majesty, with its sublime achievements of civilization, all glorious to view! " 4
4. E. R. Hughes, Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times, (New York; E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1960), pp. 27-28. Quoted from the Analects: viii, 18 and 19).
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This attitude of looking back upon a past ideal state which had existed
under proper rule and order, had deeply permeated Korean minds. The
"sense of an inexorable wheel of history," as Shannon McCune puts it, 5 has played an especially important role in Korean history. It presupposes
that the ills and evils of the present time are degenerated forms of the
good that existed in older days, and that, therefore, they should be cor
rected. But Confucianism is not a philosophy of will power, advocating
the impossible. It is rather severely proscribed by a sanction called
the "Will of Heaven." When Tze-ful Ching-po informed the Master (Confucius)
that his master (the head of the Chi clan) had been led astray by Kung-po
Liao, and that he was still strong enough to have him executed, Confucius
replied:
"If the Way is to prevail, it is the Will of Heaven. If it is to be discarded, it is the Will of Heaven. Can Kung-po Liao do anything apart from the Will of Heaven?" 6
Mancius, the foremost disciple of Confucius, expounded what was meant by
the 'Will of Heaven' in the following way: "It is something that is done 7 without trying to do so, and is achieved without trying to achieve it."
But the Confucian concept of Heaven does not accept eschatology, as do
other religions. The Confucian attitude toward the supernatural is
basically agnostic. This attitude has existed in Korea side by side
with a belief "in the persistence of the individual after death," an
5. Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm, (Princeton: Toronto, London, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 12.
6. E. R. Hughes, Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times, p. 27. Quoted from the Analects: XIV, 38.
7. Maengja chipchu (Variorum Edition of Mancius), Manchang sang- p'yon, (Seoul: Taecho-sa, 1959), p. 16.
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8 influence of Buddhism. Out of these seemingly conflicting ideas, a
peculiar concept has been developed: a worship of the one Supreme Mind,
Hananim. This supernatural being is believed to have omnipotent power
to decide the fate of individuals and the universe and to decree rewards
and punishments according to the individual deeds in this world. But
further quest of Hananim is not pursued among the Koreans, for it is 9 believed to be beyond the reach of human knowledge.
The Korean people have, inherited this "feeling of apathetic impo
tence and pessimism," strengthened perhaps by their witness to Korean
history" as being shaped largely by the happenings outside the country 10 rather than by indigenous forces." Their political philosophy is
colored by the fatalistic notion of an inevitable law of growth and
decay in the history of Korean civilization. As an old Korean writer
puts it:
". . . The ancient civilization of the Tankun and Kija eras was transformed into that of the Three Kingdoms era, which was, in turn, transformed into that of Koryo era. And the civilization of the Koryo era was transformed into that of the Yi dynasty. . . As mentioned above, if a civilization reaches the climax,
8. Department of the Army, U_.S_. Army Area Handbook for Korea, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 111.
9. The worship of Hananim was consolidated into a native reli gion known as the Ch'ontokyo, or Heavenly Way. According to Henry Chung, "in it are embodied the principles of Christian fellowship, Confucian dignity and Buddhist philosophy." The propagation of this cult was encouraged by the Japanese government "as a counteractive to Christianity, until its membership at the beginning of the Independence Movement of 1919 reached a million and a half." Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921), p. 198.
10. Department of the Army, IJ. S_. Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 9.
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it is obliged to degenerate because of its own 11 decay while a new civilization begins to develop. .
In social life this attitude has been more pronounced by a belief in 12 what is called saju and p'alccha, and the interpretation of dreams.
One example can suffice to illustrate traditional Korean fatalism.
Wolmae, the mother of a female protagonist in the legendary novel,
Spring Fragrance, had a dream in which she saw "a fairy descend riding
on the back of a bluebird," saying that "she was abandoned by the King
of Heaven." On that very same day, Wolmae conceived a child who the
novel states, was born to become Spring Fragrance, and who "was already 13 predestined in that very dream of conception."
Confucian philosophy does not, however, deny free will. Man should
strive for the good in accordance with the principles of In_, Ui^, Ye_, and
Chi, before he awaits the judgment of Heaven. These four principles
are interrelated and logically follow one after the other. In. (benevo
lence) stipulates that man is innately good and benevolent. He instinc
tively rushes forward to save a child crawling toward a well. He will
do so, not because he "may thereon gain the favour of the child's
parents," but because he has an innate feeling of "alarm and distress."
11. ^Lee Ton-hwa, "Saenghwal ui chokon ul ponwirohan Choson ui kaecho saop" ("Reconstruction Work of Korea Based upon the Condition of Life"), Kaepyok. Vol. 15, (September 1, 1921), p. 4.
12. Literally, the saju p'alccha can be translated into "four pillars" and "eight letters," each of which stands for the year, month, date and time in character. The combination of two letters, one from each group respectively is believed to be the sole arbiter of the fate of a man. Chang Dok-sun, "Determinism in Korean Literature," Korea Journal, Vol. 3, No. 5, (May, 1963), p. 25.
13. Ibid., p. 26.
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Man is also endowed with the "feeling of approving and disapproving,"
the principle of knowledge, of Chi. If he does not do what he knows to
be right, he will have the "feeling of shame and dislike," and this is the
the principle of Ui (righteousness). And if he does that which is right,
he is following the principle of Ye_ (propriety), the "feeling of modesty 14 and complaisance."
These moral concepts are best embodied in the one word, lji, which
directs man to fulfill his human obligation before the supernatural
power acts upon him. In defining the term, Lin Yutang contended that:
"In the narrowest sense, it means 'rituals,' 'Propriety,' and just 'good manners'; in an histori cal sense, it means the rationalized system of feudal order; in a philosophic sense, it means an ideal social order with 'everything in its place'; and in a personal sense, it means a pious, religious state of mind, very near to the word 'faith' .... 15
14. Mencius, Book II, Part 1, Chapter VI, in Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India, (New York: The Modern Library, Random House, Inc., 1942), pp. 762-763. Particularly, the principle of Ui_ has deeply affected the Korean mode of thinking by imbuing a sense of justice against all evil forces. Although the term Ui in the abstract is never precisely defined in Confucianism, it is assumed that nature sets certain norms which the positive law must live up to as best it can. These norms are often associated with the traditional forms of behavior and sanctioned by the will of Heaven. Mencius said that: "When right government prevails through the kingdom (prince of) little virtue are submissive to those of great (virtue), and (those of)little worth to (those of) great (virtue). Wien bad government prevails, the small are submissive to the large, and the weak to the strong. Both these cases are (the law of) Heaven. They who accord with Heaven are preserved; they who rebel against Heaven perish." Mencius, Book IV, Part I, Chapter VII, Ibid., p. 767. For further detail, refer to Dept, of Army, U. S_. Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 109.
15. Mencius, Book II, Part 1, Chapter VI, in Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India, p. 811.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Originally, Confucius regarded a correct observance of the rites
as a sign of perfect social order and gave great emphasis to them.
But strict adherence to the rites and ceremonies even when the original
meaning was lost— as often happened in Korea— has produced unjustifiable
formalism. A Western observer of this aspect in Korean Confucianism
pointed out that:
"Truth is not loved for truth's sake, but only in so far as it is necessary for appearances .... The house may be falling into ruins, gates and doors off the hinges, poverty staring in at every chink, and yet, if only sufficient ceremony and commotion is kept up, the owner's position as a man of importance is assured; appearance, not reality, being the aim of life." 16
From an historical and philosophical point of view, Confucianism is
based upon the principles of hierarchy and fixed human relations. From
the humblest man to the Emperor at the top, all human relations are
defined in five sets of rules that require one to observe certain patterns
of conduct. These include filial piety between father and son, loyalty
between king and subject, distinction between husband and wife, proper
order between elder brother and younger brother, and trust between friend 17 and friend. And when every individual in society fulfills his true
obligation, the man, the family, and the nation are expected to enjoy
peace and order. Elbert S. Oliver observes:
16. James S. Gales, Korean Sketches, (New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1898), p. 178 and p. 180.
17. Maengja chipchu (A Variorum Edition of Mancius), Tungraun- lcongjang sangp'yon, p. 17.
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"The natural ordering lays upon man the obligation to be true to 'heaven's will’ or nature, whereby rational propriety will bring universal peace and order. When the husband is truly the husband, when the wife is truly the wife .... then the national and moral order is"established and the calmness of peaceful harmony prevails." 18
Having established human relations in according with the aforementioned
principles, the system produced some characteristic behavior patterns
that are relevant to the study of the thought and behavior of the Korean
nationalists and communists alike. These include absolute loyalty
accompanied by Boun sasang (a sense of returning for the blessings),
the idea of male superiority, contempt for labor, and a strong class
consciousness.
First, following the old Korean saying that "a faithful retainer
will not serve a second master," the loyalty of a subject to his king
was often bound up with the matter of life and death. This is best
illustrated in the poem of S5ng Sam-mun, who died for his defense of
Tanchong when his uncle, Secho, tried to make him abdicate:
"Were you to ask me what would I be in the world that is beyond this, I would be a pine, tough, tall, On the highest peak of Mount Pongnae, And be green, alone, green, When snow stuffs heaven and earth."19
This notion of the virtue of absolute loyalty appears to have developed
in connection with Boun sasang, which conceives of a certain superior
18. Elbert S. Oliver, "Korea and China: The Confusian Pattern," Korean Survey, Vol. 6, Wo. 2, (February, 1957), p. 3.
Korean Report, Vol. I, Wo. 1, (April, 1961), p. 17. Noted and translated by Peter H. Lee.
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entity who dispenses blessings. Therefore, it is the obligation of
the recipient to make return for these blessings. The Boun sasang
is particularly stressed in connection with the duty of filial piety,
for it is felt that one owes what he is to his parents, and he must
repay his debt to them. Usually sons repay their debts to their parents
by supporting them when they become old.
Second, sex segregation had become a part of the general scheme
in which men were the institutionally authorized source of all authority,
while the woman's position was submissive and dependent. The following
passages from the Book of Rites may provide a better understanding of the
woman's position in a traditional Confucian society:
"Men and women do not know each other's name except through a match-maker and should not have social relations or show affection until after marriage presents have been exchanged. . . . Women must cover their faces when they go out .... Boys and girls seven years or older do not sit or eat together. . . ,"20
James S. Gales, observing this aspect in Korea at the end of the nine
teenth century, went so far as to say:
"The wife was not meant to be loved, but simply as an inanimate object to serve her use in supporting one span of the family line from father to son. Planted deep in the mire, she stands bearing her portion of the weight of this ancestral bridge connecting the ages." 21
It was taken for granted that men were superior to women, while women
themselves thought it their virtue to be subservient to men.
20. William Theodore de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, (New York: Columbia University Press', I960) , p. 817. Quoted from Book of Rites, 1; 2U, S: 12, X:51.
21. James S. Gales, Korean Sketches, p. 175.
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Finally, and perhaps most important to the study of communism,
a strong class consciousness should be considered ir connection with
the social structure in traditional Korea, where the distinction between
production and consumption was sharply drawn according to one's social
status. At the top of society were the royal family and Yangban (gentry),
which was followed by Chungin (middle people), Sangin (commoners), and
Ch'onmin (despised or lowborn). The Yangban was composed of civilian
and military officials (though the latter's status was lower than the
former through the Yi dynasty) who ruled and enjoyed status, position,
wealth, and honor in the hereditary manner. The Chungin consisted
mostly of "an hereditary professional group of petty civil and military
officials, accountants, geographers, interpreters, copymen, and law
enforcement officials. The sangin or P'yongmin was comprised of peasants,
fishermen, and merchants. And among the Sangin, a priority order existed
according to their professions, which put the peasants first, artisans
second, and the merchants last. Finally, the Ch'onmin— serfs, slaves,
actors, shamans, kisaeng (female entertainers), butchers and so on — 22 comprised the lowest social class. In a broad sense, Korean society
was largely divided into two classes: the ruler (the Yangban class) and
the ruled, which included the other three social classes. The Yangban
despised labor, especially manual work such as commerce, industry, or
22. Han Woo-keun, "The Stratification of the Yi Dynasty Society and the Process of Its Change," Korean Affairs., Vol. 2, No. 1, 1963, pp. 39-^0*
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23 farming, and considered themselves inherently superior. These
aristocrats usually showed arrogance, snobbery, and an unbridled sense
of pride, but bowed their heads in the presence of their superiors.
A Western observer described the behavior of the Yangban as follows:
"When the Yangban, or man of rank, moved out from the home where he held a petty court . . . he went in state. If too poor to ride he would stride along with such an overpowering air of condescension that the very street seemed honored by having its dust so trampled. He would be in turn most subservient when a fellow Yangban of higher rank appeared, mounted on a donkey. . . ." 2b
Following Confucian teachings, the Yangban valued calm and moderation,
for Confucian society had a moral sanction against those who lost their
recognition as men of propriety. Lest he lose face, a Yangban had to
dispaly all the virtues of "Yangbanness" 5 "... compos-rc. . . mastery
of self, . . . moderation, . . . kindness, , . . scholarly attainments," 25 and " . . .dignity." To a lesser degree, these attitudes of deference
and disparagement and mixed feelings of superiority and inferiority
were copied by the other social classes. A sense of inequality produced
arrogance toward an inferior and subservience and toadyism toward a
23. "The word for labor is 11, and its secondary meanings are damage, loss, evil, misfortune, all of which ideas are associated with, and expressed by, the word," James S. Gales, Korean Sketches, p. ITT.
2h. Horace N. Allen, Things Korean, (New York: F.H. Revell Company, 1908), pp. 80-81 .
25. James S. Gales, Korean Sketches, p. 193.
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superior.
The legal principles of Confucian feudalism were based on a
system of land tenure. Like the medieval feudalism of the West, the
predominant economic, social, and political relations between Yangbans
and the bulk of the peasant population in traditional Korea were centered
around land. The Yangbans were allowed to retain mainly two types of
lands: Kwachon (land given to the high officials during or after their
government services) and Kongsinchon(hereditary land given to meritorious
subjects). Theoretically, all land was owned by the state, and the
government had power of taxation directly over the cultivators. But
in the case of Kwachon and Kongsinchon, the taxing power resided with
the land owners, since their holdings were regarded as private lands.
In time, meritorious subjects and their private estates became so numerous
that this major source of national revenue was threatened, and the
government had to limit the size of Kongsinchon, while Kwachon was 26 restricted only to those who were in active government service.
Despite the similarity to the Western feudal system, the Korean
"Agricultural manor" system, as Lee Sang-paik calls it, did not develop
into independent feudal states, due perhaps to the limited size of the
country that enabled it to maintain a relatively strong central govern
ment. There were no private armies or courts independent of the central
government, and the people inside this domain were still loyal to the
state. But the summerhouses, or arbors, on 'agricultural manors’ served
26. Lee Pyong-to, Kulcsa Taekwan (A Comprehensive Study of the National History), (Seoul: Pomunkak, 1955), pp. 367-368.
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the Yangbans as seasonal resorts and centers of the Confucian civili- 27 zation in Korea. As a result, the Yangbans who owned large estates
had considerable leisure time which they spent enjoying Confucian litera
ture, archery, hunting, various games, and associating with kisaeng
(female entertainers).
On the other hand, the peasant masses toiled for their bare subsis
tence, using primitive agricultural implements and techniques. As the
government was forced to impose more taxes because of its financial
exhaustion, the lives of the peasants became more impoverished day by 28 day.
With this background, Korea entered a new stage: the era of enforced
colonial modernization by the Japanese. Under Japanese rule, the whole
Confucian system was considerably weakened because the force of the Yang
ban, the symbolic class of political power and authority, began to dis
integrate and was gradually removed from the political scene. However,
other characteristic features of Confucianism continued to prevail and
were encouraged by the Japanese because "t..e dual principle of loyalty
to high authority and to the family would work to the benefit of their 29 own administration."
Many changes x^ere brought to Korea after the Japanese came. Factories
and workers began to appear on a small scale in some major cities, but
theii numbers were extremely limited. As of 1911. there were only 252
27. Lee Sang-pailc, Hanlcuk kulcsa: Kunse Chonlcip1 yon (The Korean History: The First Half of the Modern History), (Seoul: Ulyu munhwa-sa, 1962), p. 382.
28. Ch'oe Ho-chin, Kuntae Hankuk kyonp;iesa yonlcu (A Study of the Modern Korean Economic History), (Seoul: TAngkuk munhwasa, 1956), pp.110-111.
29. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 107.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 30 factories and 14,575 workers in Korea. The Japanese improved harbors,
roads, railroads, and communications, and introduced many new ideas and
systems to Korean education, banking, taxation, and other areas that
would work to the advantage of the Japanese. The greatest change, however,
was in the transfer of power from the impotent Confucian court of the Yi
Dynasty to the ambitious colonial Government-General of Chosen, headed
by a governor-general responsible directly to the Japanese Emperor in
Tokyo. It was through this power center that the systematic coloniali-
zation of Korea was effectively carried out by Japanese officials who
harshly suppressed all of the freedoms of the Koreans and who finally
deprived the Koreans of their major means of living, the land itself.
One of the first and most important decrees issued by the Govern
ment-General of Chosen was the land survey law of September, 1910, which
ordered citizens to register all lands with the Land Survey Bureau
and to mark a sign on the lands which would describe the size, acreage,
grade, and other details. Many landowners who did not comply with the
decree simply because L'ney were either ignorant or uninformed lost
their lands, which were confiscated by the Government-General of Chosen.
And most of the lands thus obtained were sold at a cheap price to semi
official land companies, including the giant Tongyang Ch'olcsikhwesa
(The Oriental Colonial Company), and gradually handed over to Japanese
hands. Some Koreans, mostly former Yangbans who apparently
complied with the law or pledged to support the Japanese colonial
policy, were allowed to retain their old lands. The land survey,
30. "Choson hyokmydng" ("The Korean Revolution"), 1st issue, n.d., Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 359 (S. 9.4. 5.1. -3), p. 1255.
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coupled V7ith a new taxing system resulted in the establishment of
a firm landlord-tenant relationshio between some of the old Yangbans 31 and the peasant tillers.
Thus, Korean society was rapidly divided into a few landlords
and a vast numbers of tenant farmers. According to statistics
provided by the Government-General of Chosen, the country in 1914
had 46,754 landlords, 1,063,000 tenant farmers and 1,500,000 32 other independent farmers who worked their own or rented acres.
In many respects, the tenant farmers were in a disadvantageous position
and were exploited by the landlords: a) they paid more than fifty
percent of their total harvest to their landlords by virtue of indivi
dual leases and contracts; b) they were under constant fear that the
landlords would deprive them of their right to till the lands: c) some
times they were utilized as free labor for the landlords: 3) they did
not enjoy security, since they were under strict supervision by Saum
(land supervisors assigned by the landlords), and the tenant farmers
had to pay generous sums to the Saum; and e) despite the tax obligation
of landlords, in many cases the tenant farmers had to pay it. As a
result, it was a common practice for a tenant farmer to pav more than 33 seventy percent of his total harvest to the landlord. The deplorable
31. Yim Kwang-ch'ol, Yicho pongkon sahoesa (History of Feudal Society in Yi Dynasty), (Tokyo: Chungang insweso, 1949), pp. 190-191.
32. Chon Snk-tam, Lee Ki-su, and Kim Han-chu, Hvontae Choson Sahwe kyongjesa (The Social and Economic History of Modern Korea), (Seoul: Kinhak-sa, 1948), p. 75.
33.. Ch'oe Chung-kap, "Kumil Choson ui nojalcwanke!l ("The Capital and Labor Relations of Today's Korea"), Kaepyolc, Vol. 15, (September, 1921), pp. 31-32.
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life of the tenant farmers was described as follows:
"The Korean rural community is really a unique Hell in the world. If there is anyone to be condemned tell him to become a tenant farmer! . . . socially, he is treated as a slave and economically, he lives like a beast." 34
Seeking a better life, a large part of the farm population began to
move into Manchuria, the Russian Maritime province, the Chinese
mainland, Japan, and the United States.
Out of such national backwardness, humiliation, and desti
tution, several political, cultural, and religious leaders sprang
up to awaken the dormant Korean masses. When these leaders, inspired
by the enunciation of the doctrine of self-determination by President
Woodrow Wilson in 1918, proclaimed in Seoul a "Declaration of
Independence," on March 1, 1919, the Korean people quickly responded
to their call, and "spontaneous, peaceful nationwide demonstrations”
took place almost everywhere in Korea. Surprised and alarmed by the
situation, the Japanese police took stern measures against the demonstra
tors, causing heavy casualties. It is reported that among the estimated
370,000 participants in the demonstrations "casualties amounted to 35 6,670 killed, 16,000 wounded, and 19,525 arrested." Since then,
this uprising has been known as "Samil Undong" (March First Movement)
and is commemorated every year in both North and South Korea.
34. Ibid., p . 29.
35. Department of the Army, U. S_. Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 33. For the original document of the "Declaration of Independence", see Lee Pyong-hon, Samil untong pisa, (Secret History of the March First Movement), (Seoul: Sisa sipo-sa, 1959), pp. 69-71.
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B. The Revolutionary Search for National Independence
After the March First Movement, the Korean exiles abroad, who
moved out of the country for economic or political reasons, began
to activate their independence movement, forming revolutionary groups
here and there in Manchuria, the Russian Maritime Province, Japan, the 36 China Mainland, and the United States. Although they shared one
common goal — national independence — their ideological orientation
varied widely for the simple reason that few if any of them had been
exposed to formal ideological discipline, and as a result they did not
have a constructive program for achieving their goal of national inde-- 37 pendence. They sought guidance from any available source. One of
the largest and most significant nationalist groups, centered in Shanghai,
established the Korean Provisional Government at the end of March, 1919,
35. (Con'd) For the English account of its process and impact see Henry Chung, The Case of Korea, pp. 193-230. For the Japanese account of its impact, see Zensei Eisuke, "Chosen no siso undo" ("The Korean Thought Movement"), n.d. , Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 354 (9.4.5.1. - 1), p. 398. The North Korean Communists view the Movement in different way by saying that it was "directly or indirectly inspired" by the October Revolution in Russia. Kim Son-ik, "Siwol hyok- myong kwa Choson" ("The October Revolution and Korea"), T'aip'ung, Vol. 1, No. 15, (November 27, 1948), p. 71. The Communists also insist that the Korean workers played as much important role as the national bourgeoisie did in the Movement. For this view, see Yim Man and Kim Maeng-mo, Samil Undong (March First Movement), (P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp-an- sa, 1963), p. 24 and p. 75. Hereafter, the Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'ansa will be referred as KWP Press (Korean Workers Party Press).
36. For detailed information concerning these revolutionary groups, see Ch'ae Kun-sik, Mujang Tongnip undongpisa, (Secret History of the Armed Independence Movement), (Seoul: the Korean Information Bureau, n.d.), pp. 40-100.
37. New York Tribune, October 24, 1920.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. headed by Western-oriented Syung-man Rhee, Ahn Ch'ang-ho, and
Kim Kyu-silc.
The Korean Provisional Government was a coalition of several
factional parties, which fought each other for political hegemony.
Therefore, it had to go through many difficult moments and was often
on the brink of collapse. But somehow the Provisional government sur
vived until the day of Korean Liberation in 1945, under the brilliant
leadership of Kim Ku, a strong nationalist who did not hesitate to
resort to violence against the Japanese for the cause of the national 38 liberation. The platform of the Provisional government consisted
of four parts that reflected the main policies of this organization:
1) to totally restore the national sovereignty and to establish the
Republic of Korea; 2) to gain equal participation in national politics
through general elections and to establish parity of the fundamental
constitutional rights of the people without discrimination because of
sex, religion, and class; 3) to nationalize the land and large productive
enterprises and "to gain equal educational rights among the people by
putting forward a public-financed compulsory education system that
would ensure the propagation of the fundamental knowledge and essential 39 functions of the people."
38. Kim Ku expressed his political belief in violence in the following words: "I felt that my psychology was gradually changing during my life in prison. It was a change from a soft attitude. . . of Jesus'teachings that had occupied my mind during the last fifteen years to a determination to hate, oppose, and destroy everything Japanese. Kim Ku, Paelcpom Ilchi (Memoirs of Kim Ku) , (Seoul: Choson inswe hwesa, 1947), p. 223
39. Kim Ku, "Chugoku kosen gonen o mukaete kokunaigai no doshidoho ni tsguru no ji" ("An Appeal to the Compatriots Inside and Outside the
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There were two major revolutionary groups in the Russian Mari
time Province which accepted Bolshevism as the main ideological weapon
against Japanese Imperialism. One of these groups, the Han-in Sahoe-
tang (Korean Socialist Party), was headed by Lee Tong-hwi, a prominent
old Korean soldier serving under the Yi dynasty. It was set up at
Khabarovsk in 1918 with support from Kurelcorunofu, a Russian agent 40 of the Third Communist International.
However, Lee Tong-hwi's personal contact with Kurelcorunofu came
to an end when the latter was arrested and executed by the White Guards
in August, 1919. After his death, Lee Tong-hwi went to Shanghai and
briefly joined with the Korean Provisional Government, serving as the 41 premier. But a scandalous incident cost him his political life in
39. (Cont'd) Country on the Fifth Anniversary of the Chinese Anti- Japanese War"), Kwangpok (Restoration), Vol. 1, No. 3, n.d., in Tolclco Geppo, (November, 1941), p. 107.
40. This name is a translated version of the Japanese, and the original name is unknown. Suh Dae-soolc, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 7. This book contains the most extensive details on the Korean Communist movement up to 1945. See also, "Korai lcyosan-to oyobi zen-ro lcyosan-to no bengai" ("Outline of the Korean Communist Party and the All Russian Korean Communist Party") Report of November, 1922, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 721 (S.9.4.5.2 - 30) no pagination.
41. It is reported that Han Hyong-lcwon was sent to Moscow by Lee Tong-hwi for the Comintern aid. Han met Lenin and received 400,000 rubles. On his way to Shanghai, Han transferred the money to Kim Rip, another dispatch of Lee Tong-hwi, who did not return to Shanghai but went to Manchuria and used the money at his pleasure. Kim Ku, Paekpom Ilchi (Memoirs of Kim Ku), pp. 282-283.
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the Government, forcing him to resign as premier. Afterward, Lee Tong-
hwi reactivated his communist zeal, and with his old followers of the
Korean Socialist Party established Koryo Kongsan-tang (Korean Communist
Party) in Shanghai and there came in contact with another Russian agent, 42 Voitinsky.
The second group, around Irkutsk, headed by Kim Ch'ol-hun, Nam
Man-Ch'un, and Oh Ha-muk, came in contact with the Bolsheviks earlier than
the first group, and established a Korean section of the Irkutsk Com
munist Party in early 1918, Later when another Russian agent of the
Communist International B. Z. Shumiatslcy, came to head the Comintern's
Far Eastern Secretariat in Irkutsk, this group secured his support and
renamed the organization Chon-Ro Han-in Kongsan-tang (All-Russian Korean
Communist Party). This group has been known as the Irkutsk faction.
These two Korean-Bolshevilc groups vied with each other for financial
support from the Communist International, and at one time or another
were bitterly engaged in a factional struggle. At one point their
strife turned into an open armed clash. In April, 1922, the Communist
International issued a six-point order directing the two factions to
unite within three months and to move their respective headquarters to
China, and warned it would not give "any financial assistance before 43 the unification." But the coalition between the two factions did
42. This group has been known as the Shanghai faction.
43. Suh Dae-soolc, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, pp. 40-41.
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not materialize, nor did the Communist International show any deep
concern and interest in the Korean Communists. The two factions then
diverted their attention to Korea in an effort to bring their influence
directly into that country.
Among Koreans residing in Japan, there were several small groups
of Communists and Socialists, among which the Pulcsong-hoe (North Star
Association) in Tokyo became the most influential organization of
the Korean Communist movement in Japan. This group began to focus
its attention on Korea, and some of the leaders of the North Star
Association returned home in 1922 for the sake of the Korean Communist
movement.
As a result, there had emerged three different communist groups
in Korea by 1925: The Seoul group (Shanghai faction); the Tuesday
Association (Irkutsk Group); and the North Wind Association (Repre- 44 senting students from Japan). A few months later, the successful
coalition of these groups resulted in the first formation of the Korean
Communist Party in Korea, which was recognized by the Communist Inter
national. The first Korean Communist Party was, at first, organized and
led by Kim Chae-pong, a Communist of the Irkutsk faction. And Pale Hon-
yong was elected as the Chairman of the Koryo Kongsan Ch'ongnyonhoe
(Korean Communist Youth Association), a subsidiary youth organization of
the Party. The Party's goals were succinctly stated by Suh Dae-sook:
44. Ibid., p. 65. See also Suh In-kyun, ChosSn sahwe mini ok undong ui hweko (Recollection of the Korean Socialist and Nationalist Movement), (KyongBong: Ch'ongdu-sa, 1945), p. 11.
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". . . (it was) not only to propagate communism in Korea, but also to abolish the capitalistic system and establish a dictator ship of the proletariat in Korea. The struggle to drive the Japanese out was the initial short- range objective of the party, but the ultimate goals were the triumph of the workers and peasants over the bourgeoisie — Koreans as well as foreigners — and the realization of a classless society in Korea." 45
The communist tones were also strongly reflected in the Party slogans,
which included such catchwords as "Let us support the Chinese
revolution of workers and peasants!," "Let us defend the
Soviet Union!" and "Let us overthrow the Japanese Imperialists 46 and all the feudal forces!" The last catchword is particularly
noteworthy in view of its clear indication that Korea was in the
stage of the "anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution."
Because of continuing friction between several factions
inside the Party and constant police surveillance, the activities
of the newly founded Korean Communist Party were greatly curtailed.
Only a few months after the formation of the Party, the Japanese
police made mass arrests among the factional groups, who charged
each other with being responsible for the arrests. This internecine
strife finally led to the dissolution of the party. In 1927 a
new coalition among the Seoul group, some of the old Shanghai
faction from Manchuria, and the January Association from Japan
established the second Korean Communist Party in Korea. This
45. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 73
46. "Chosen Kyosanto no Sulogan" (The Slogan of the Korean Communist Party), Shlso Geppo, Vol. 4, (July 15, 1931), in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives,, reel 355 (9.4.5.1. - 2), pp. 165-166.
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coalition was known as the Marxist-Leninist (M.L.) group. But
the factional history repeated itself and led to another mass
arrest of thirty-eight members on February, 1928. Likewise, the
third attempt to form the Korean Communist Party suffered the
same fate. The formal existence of the Party came to an end in
1928 when the Communist International withdrew its recognition and 47 the Party could no longer withstand the Japanese suppression.
Most of the remaining Communists were either forced to go under
ground or to flee to Manchuria in hopes of reviving the movement
there. Thereafter, no significant developments of the Korean
communist movement were reported inside Korea. But an anti-
Japanese campaign in China, as well as partisan activities along
the Korean-Manchurian boundary, became active in the early nineteen-
thirties .
In the meantime, as the Chinese Communists began to extend
their anti-Japanese activities to Manchuria around 1930, both
the Chinese and Korean Communists came to realize that it would be
in their mutual interest to form a united front against the
Japanese. According to Suh Dae-sook, there are three accounts
as to how this idea of the Sino-Korean united front originated:
first, "because of the successive failures and the increasing
Japanese terror, both in Korea and Manchuria, the Comintern
assigned the task of re-establishing the KCP (the Korean Communist Party)
47. "Chosen ni okeru shisoundo lcaikan" ("A Summary of the Thought Movement in Korea"), Report of March 1931, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 354 (9.4.5.1. - 1) pp. 490— 496.
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to the CCP (the Chinese Communist Party); second, the Chinese
Communists in Manchuria initiated the idea of a coalition in order
to strengthen their position there; and third, it was the Korean
Communists themselves who initiated the union in -in attempt to
"revive the Korean Communist movement together with the Chinese 48 Communist movement." There is a fourth explanation, given
by a Japanese source, according to which the idea of the Sino-Korean
common front was described as a mutual agreement for mutual
benefits. And this is most likely the case, for the Korean
Communists, who were in a difficult position in exile, viewed the
Chinese Communists in Manchuria as potential allies in a future
struggle against the Japanese. And there was a growing sentiment
among Korean Communists that union with the Chinese Communists would
be in complete accordance with the principle of "one country and 49 one party for the international Communist party." On the
other hand, the Chinese Communists, who were planning nation-wide
violence against the Japanese on May 30, 1930, needed Korean
assistance, for the Korean activities in Manchuria prior to 1930 were
far superior to those of the Chinese Communists. Therefore, the
Chinese Communists suggested that the Korean Communists be allowed
to enter the Chinese Communist Party if they would participate in
the planned riot. The Korean Communists agreed, so the united front
materialized.
48. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, pp.157-159.
49. "Kanto gosanju jiken yosin shukkets su" ("The Preliminary Trial on the May 30th Incident in Kanto Came to an End"), Report of 1930, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 355 (9.4.5.1. - 2),pp.187-188.
50. Loc. cit.
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After the disintegration of the Korean Communist Party in
Korea and the gradual absorption of the Korean Communists in
Manchuria by the Chinese Communists, the main activities of the
Korean revolutionaries were centered in the Yenan area, particularly
after 1937. Factionalism among Korean revolutionaries in China
was as prevalent and bitter as it had been among Communists in
Russia and Korea. One of these factional groups was known as
Hankulc Tongnip-tang (the Korean Independence Party), supported by
Cho So-ang, Kim Ku and Lee Ch'ong-ch1on. Another revolutionary
group was headed by Kim Won -pong, a left-wing nationalist, who
established Choson Minjok Hyong-myong-tang (Korean National
Revolutionary Party) in Nanking in 1935. It had the support of
the Chinese Nationalist government on one hand, and was linked up
with Korean Communists on the other. After the Lukouch'iao Incident
in 1937, the Korean National Revolutionary Party was split over
the strategic issue of fighting the Japanese. Moderate-leftists
(including the leader of that Party, Kim Won-pong) emphasized
a need for military operations in Central China where the Kwo-
mintang forces were prevailing, whereas the extremists, mainly
Communists, favoring Northern China, contended that "North China
was closer to their homeland and that more Koreans were to be found 51 there than in Central China." The Communist leaders,
Ch'oe Ch'ang-ilc and Wang Chi-yon, with a large number of members
of the Korean National Revolutionary Party, retreated to the North
and joined with Mu Chong, another prominent Korean Communist, who,
51. Lee Chong-silc, "Korean Communists and Yenan," China Quarterly, Vol. 9-10, (January-June 1962), p. 183.
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unlike other Communists, had been active among the Chinese Communists
from the early days of their movement and even participated in the
famous long March in 1935. They formed Hwapuk Choson Ch'ongnyon Yonhap-
hoe (The North China Korean Youth Federation) in January, 1941. One
year later, the organization developed into Ilwapuk Choson Tongnip Tong- 52 maeng (North China Korean Independence League) in Shansi Province.
With Kim Tu-pong as its head and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ilc as its vice-president.
Ho Chong-suk and Kim Ch'ang-man also occupied executive committee
memberships. The League had a military arm called Choson Uiyong-kun
(the Korean Volunteer Corps) headed by Mu Chong.- 53 The main ideas of
League were embodied in its ten-point platform: 1) to establish a
democratic government based upon a general election by all people:
2) to ensure freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association,
religion, thought, and of the right to strike; 3) to realize a social
system respecting human rights; 4) to bring about legal, social, and
domestic equality of the sexes: 5) to establish friendly relations with
all countries and races in the world under the principle of freedom:
6) to confiscate all properties and lands in Korea owned by Japanese
Imperialists, and to distribute the lands; 7) to establish an eight-hour
52. They moved the headquarters of the League to Yenan later. For this reason, those who associated with this organization became known later as the Yenan faction.
53. Yun Il-mo, "Tolcnip tongmaeng lcwa Uiyongkun ui T'uchaengsa” ("Fighting History of the Independence League and the Volunteer Corps), Sinch'onji, (March, 1946), pp. 196-201. Those names cited above are closely related to the North Korean politics after 1945. In one time or another, they shared the political power with Kim Il-song.
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working day and guaranteed employment; 8) to abolish compulsory labor
and miscellaneous taxes; 9) to enforce a compulsory education system
at the national expense; and 10) to propagate national culture in order 54 to improve Korean culture. Throughout the program, not a word about
communism or Marxism was mentioned. Nor can one find in this program
features peculiar to communism, except perhaps the sixth plank, which
specified the confiscation of the lands and nationalization of large
enterprises owned by the Japanese Imperialists; however, this was not
unusual, for the same tone was reflected in the Nationalist revolutionary
movement.
Quite apart from all the aforementioned developments in Russia,
China, Japan, and Korea, there were also several Korean revolutionary
groups in Manchuria, among which Chokuk Kwangpok-hoe (the Fatherland
Restoration Association) is the most important because it had a signifi
cant bearing on future developments in Korean politics in the light
of the North Korean allegation that it was created by Kim Il-song, the
present North Korean premier. For this reason, it is necessary to view
briefly the past background and early activities of Kim Il-song.
According to Choson Chungang Yonkam (the Korean Central Yearbook)
published in 1950, Kim Il-song was born to a poor family on April 15,
1912, at Manlcyongdae near P'vongyang. The Yearbook went on to say that:
"General Kim Il-song began to embrace the patriotic will of fighting by following the example of his father, who had given his life to the anti-Japanese national liberation
54. "Kaigai futei Senjin no sakudo jokyo," ("The State of Activities of the Recalcitrant Koreans Abroad"), Tokico Geppo, (November, 1942), p. 62.
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movement, with the anti-Japanese revolutionary thought burning, with the love of his fatherland by mustering his comrades to organize the youth movement. . . ."55
Another North Korean official source says that Kim Il-song, at the
age of fourteen, entered Hwasong School and formed an illegal organi
zation called "T. D." (Down-With-Imperialism Union). In the spring
of 1927, it says, he entered the YuX'/en Middle School in Kirin, where
he began to read The Communist Manifesto, Das Kapital, and other Marxist- 56 Leninist classics and revolutionary works.
A closer analysis of Kim Il-song's early background reveals that
some of the above allegations by the North Koreans are untrue, or, at
least, questionable. First, his name at birth was not Kim Il-song,
but Kim Song-chu. He simply changed his name into Kim Il-snng later 57 for reasons of political expediency. Second, one may assume that
Kim Il-song was born in a middle class or a rich farmer's family because
his father's attendance at the Sungsil Middle School in P'yongyang.
In those days, it was almost impossible for a poor Korean farm boy to
55. Choson Chungang Yonkam (the Korean Central Yearbook), (P'yong— yang: ChosGn Chungang T'ongsin-sa, 1950), p. 187.
56. "Revolutionary Family of Comrade Kim Il-Sung and His Revolutionary Activities in his Early Years," The P'yongyang Times,(Thursday, April 25, 1968). Kim's formal name is spelled as Kim Il-rSung in North Korea, but according to the McCune-Reischauer system for the romanization of Korean, his name will be spelled as Kim Il-song throughout this dissertation.
57. For security reasons, it was not uncommon for many Korean revolutionaries to assume pseudonyms during their anti-Japanese fighting. Many of those revolutionaries particularly loved to adopt the name Kim Il- song, a legendary national hero who had been reportedly engaged in a series of anti-Japanese battles along the Korean-Manchuria border since the early 1920's. For the identity of Kim Il-song, see Suh Dae-soolc, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, pp. 256-261.
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study in another town. According to a Japanese source, Kim Il-song's
father was " a middle-class farmer who supplemented his income by trading 58 in Chinese medicaments." And finally, it is highly doubtful that Kim
Il-song was mature enough at age fourteen to start reading the highly
philosophical Communist classics mentioned above.
Kim il-song's revolutionary record, however, does exist from this
early date. During his school years, Kim Il-song had been active as
the leader of the underground Young Communist League, for which he was 59 arrested and imprisoned for about eight months during 1927 and 1928.
Wien he emerged from prison, Kim Il-song reactivated his Communist zeal
by assuming the secretarial post of "the Communist organization in the
special kirin area of Eastern Manchuria," and it is said that he joined 60 the Chinese Communist Party in 1931. It is unknown whether he ever
graduated from the Yuwen Middle School, but even if he did so, "his
58. Tsuboe Senji, Hokusen no Kaiho Junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), (Tokyo: Niklcan Rodo Tsuhinsha, 1955), p. 17. See also, Kang Young-hoon, "Bibliography: North Korea's Mysterious Kim Il-Sung," Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, March-April, 1964, p. 21. For the South Korean account, see Han Chae-dok, "Kim Il- song non" (A Study on Kim Il-song), Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), (Seoul: Kongsankkwon munje yonkuso, 1968), p. 780.
59. Kang Young-hoon, "Biography: North Korea's Mysterious Kim II Sung," Communist Affairs, p. 22. This source is quoted from Bol'shava Sovestskaya Entsiklopediya (the Large Soviet Encyclopedia), (Moscow: 1953), Vol. 20, p. 625.
60. Loc. clt. See also, Tsuboe Senji, Chosen Minzolcu dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement), (Tokyo: Nikkan rodosha, 1959), p. 128.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 61 formal education ended here, approximately at the tenth grade."
Kim Il-song joined the Chinese Communist Party after most Korean
Communists in Manchuria decided to enter the Party for the purpose of
mutual protection against increased Japanese offensive measures. In
joining the Chinese Communist Party, many Korean Communists agreed to
participate in the May Thirtieth Movement, but Kim Il-song apparently
did not participate in this movement. In his decision to enter the
Chinese Communist Party, he is believed to have been greatly influenced 62 by early decisions of other Korean Communists to join the Party.
Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that if he joined the Chinese
Communist Party after the Japanese began their massive attack on Manchuria,
he had done so because of the pursuing Jananese army.
Kim Il-song's activities after his union with the Chinese Communists,
until early 1935, are obscured by the lack of any available information
except the North Korean allegation that Kim Il-song formed his first
anti-Japanese guerilla force in Antu, Eastern Manchuria, in late 1931;
that by 1933, seven thousand people were supporting his revolutionary
base in Hunch'un; and that Choson inmin hyokmyong-kun (the Korean
People's Revolutionary Army) was created in 1934 under the leadership 63 of Kim Il-song.
61. Suh Dae-soolc, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 263.
62. A North Korean source indicates that Kim Il-song joined the Chinese Communist Party, based upon the principle of "one country and one party for the international Communist party." Yim Ch'un-ch'u, Hangil mujang siki rul hwesang hayo (Recollecting the Times of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle), (P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1960),p.3.
63. Lee Na-yong, Choson minjok haepang t'uiaeng-sa (History of the Struggle for Korean National Emancipation), (.Tokyo: Hakwu sopang, 1960). pp. 342—354.
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The earliest Japanese police record of Kim Il-song's military
activities shows that in May, 1935, he led the Third Regiment, First
Division, of the Second Corps of the Northeast People's Revolutionary 64 Army; however, he commanded only one hundred men. Kim Il-song later
became the Sixth Division Commander under a Chinese Communist corps
commander, Yang Ch'ing-yu. But even as a division commander, Kim Il-song
had only about two hundred men under his leadership.^
Numerical exaggeration reaches its height in North Korean claims that
the Chokulc kwangpok hoe (the Fatherland Restoration Association), created
under the leadership of Kim Il-song in May, 1936, "came to embrace more
than 200,000 members in a few months after its inauguration" throughout 66 northeastern areas of Manchuria and several places in Korea. If the
Association had ever had such a large number of people under its control,
64. The Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was formed in Southern Manchuria in 1933 under the Chinese Communists, with Korean Communists leading small regiments. At about the same time Kim Il-song was reported to have led the Third Regiment, Ch'oe Hyon, the present North Korean Defense Minister, was a regimental commander in the same army. Ch'oe had only forty-five men under his command in 1935. "Showa junenchu Kanto oyobi Setsujojiln getsubetsu hisoku seiryoku shochohyo" (A Monthly Table of the Rise and Fall of the Bandits in the Kanto and the Border Areas During 1935), Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel SP 105 (sp. 205-5), pp. 9367-9413.
65. It is reported that among the two hundred men in the Sixth Division, about half of them were Chinese. At this time Ch'oe Yong-kon (alias Ch'oe Sok-ch'on), the present North Korean President of the Supreme People's Assembly, was the Seventh Division Commander in the same Army and had about one hundred men under his command. Tsuboe Senji, Chosen minzoku dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement), p. 128.
66. Facts About Korea, (P'yongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 28.
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it should have been very popular and familiar to many Koreans, at least
in areas where the branches of the Association were located. Nonetheless,
there were only a few who professed their association with the revolu- 67 tionary organization when Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945.
Two further points should be noted: the North Korean allegations
that the Association was created "in accordance with the decision of the
Communist International on forming an anti-fascist people's front around
the middle of the nineteen-thirties;" and that "the ten-point program of
the Association worked out by Comrade Kim II Sung was the first revolu
tionary program," which is said to have embodied "creative application 68 of Marxism-Leninism to the actual situation of Korea at that time."
After the Korean Communist Party lost the recognition of the Com
munist International and was torn asunder in 1928, most of the Korean
Communists joined foreign communist parties. But there were a few Korean
Communist groups that refused to be integrated with the foreign parties
and continued their independent activities. One of these is known as the
"Initiatory Group," about which very little information is available. It
was this Group that represented the Korean Communist Party when the
Seventh Congress of the Communist International was convened on July 25, 69 1935. At that Congress a resolution was proposed to accept new
67. Pulchan Ch1 ongkam (the North Korean Almanac), p. 766. Kim Il- song was not a stranger to the Japanese police, but among the native Koreans, he was little known until he appeared in P'youngyang after August 1945.
68. Facts About Korea, p. 26.
69. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, pp. 199-
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Communist parties into membership of the Communist International, in
which the Korean Communist Party was not listed. For this reason,
John Washburn assumes that "the Korean Communist Party apparently 70 re-entered the Comintern between 1932 and July, 1935." In any case,
one thing is sure: the Korean representatives to the Congress were
not dispatched from the Fatherland Restoration Association nor is there
any evidence that the Association had any relationship with the Communist 71 International.
The program announced by the Communist International after the Seventh
Congress contains an over-all review of the world situation and gives
the following directions to the communists in each country: In countries
of highly developed capitalism, the appropriate form of revolution
should be direct transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat;
in countries with a medium development of capitalism, where "bourgeois-
democratic reforms have not yet been completed," there should be a
transition to "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry";
and finally, in colonial and semi-colonial countries "with medieval
feudal relationships or "Asiatic mode of production relationships" as
a rule, the revolution would take the form of the "democratic-bourgeois
69. (cont'd) -200. The Congress passed a resolution to promote cooperation with liberal and socialist groups wherever such "Popular Front" alliances could be arranged. The text of the Resolution of the Congress is available in "The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Fight for the Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism," (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, 1935).
70. John N. Washburn, "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, (March, 1950), pp. 61-62. There is a possibility that the Korean representation to the Congress was in the capacity of observers.
71. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 269.
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revolution." It also laid down specific tasks for the communists in the
last category— in colonial and semi-colonial countries— as follows: to
overthrow the foreign imperialism of the feudal rulers and of the land
lord bureaucracy; to establish the democratic dictatorship of the prole
tariat and the peasantry on a Soviet basis; complete national indepen
dence and national unification; cancellation of state debts; nation-^
alization of the large-scale enterprises owned by imperialists; the
confiscation of landlord, church and monastery lands; introduction of the
eight-hour day; and the organization of revolutionary workers' and 72 peasants' armies.
The ten-point program, which was allegedly written by Kim Il-song,
is very similar in tone to the Program of the Communist International.
It clearly stated the need "to overthrow the Japanese imperialist rule,"
to establish the true Korean people's government by general mobilization
of the Korean people," "to confiscate the large scale industries, pro
perties, and lands in the hands of the Japanese," "to eliminate the
feudalistic inequality," "to enforce an eight-hour daily work system,"
and "to organize a revolutionary army." In addition, it emphasized the
"close alliance between the Koreans and the Chinese," and a friendly
relationship with "those people and nations who treat Koreans on equal
footing." And the program also called for freedom of speech, publica
tion, thought, and assembly, equality of sexes, and the abolition of
7?. Program of the Communist International, (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1936), pp. 54-57.
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73 slavish education and compulsory military training.
Despite the similarity of all these features of the program to
those manifested in the program of the Communist International, the
ten-point program did not contain any distinctive marks of communism,
as in the case of the Korean Communist Party program. The ten-point
program of the North China Korean Independence League in later years
reflected almost the same tone as that of the Fatherland Restoration
Association. And even the platform of the Provisional Government in
cluded several similar features of the ten-point program of the Father
land Restoration Association. Why is it, then, that Kim Il-song did
not use more strongly worded expressions in the program, such as
anti-imperialist," "anti-feudal democratic revolution," "communism,"
"proletarian dictatorship," and "workers' and peasants' armies"? The
answer given by Suh Dae-sook is that Kim Il-song was not the author of
the program. According to Suh Dae-sook, the declaration of the Father
land Restoration Association was signed by three Korean revolutionaries;
0 Song-yun is described as having been strongly influenced by the
73. For the complete text of the ten-point program of the Fatherland Restoration Association, see Lee Na-yong, Choson miniok haepang t'ujaeng-sa (History of the Struggle for Korean National Emancipation), p. 372. For the recent North Korean elaboration of the program, see "Carry Out the Ten-Point Program of Kim Il-song," Nodong Sinmun,(January 13, 1968), in Joint Publications Research Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Translations on North Korea, 44,503, pp. 8- 30. Hereafter, the translations on North Korea by the Joint Publications Research Service will be referred as JPRS, and the publication numbers will be added.
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74 Nationalists. On the basis of this verification, it can be safely
assumed that Kim Il-song, an early dropout from school and a guerrilla
fighter, did not have the qualification of assuming any ideological
leadership. He was a good soldier, but not an intellectual.
Kim Il-song's military campaign against the Japanese was climaxed
by his successful raid of June 4, 1937, on Poch'onbo, a Korean border
t o m in the north. Kim Il-song, with eighty men under his direct
command, reportedly attacked the Japanese police station in that town.
Kim Il-song's forces burned the county office, school buildings, post
office and many other facilities. The initial Japanese casualties
were two killed and five injured. But in later pursuit, they killed
seven and injured twelve more. The Japanese called in reinforcements 75 from other towns and finally repelled the attackers. After the
Poch'onbo Incident, Kim's forces continued to attack several villages
in the northeastern border areas. The Japanese police, aware of the
existence of secret root organizations of the Fatherland Restoration
Association, began to arrest suspected guerrilla agents. Between
October and December, 1937, 222 agents were arrested, including Pak . 7 Tal and Pak Kum-ch'ol, who played leading roles in the Korean interior,
74. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 271.
75. Tsuboe Senji, Holcusen no kaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), pp. 22-23.
76. There was a revolutionary organization in Kapsan, called Kapsan Kongjak Wiwonhoe (The Kapsan Operation Committee), which was organized in 1935 under the leadership of Pak Tal and Pak Kum-ch'ol. Wien the Fatherland Restoration Association was founded, this Committee,
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and Kwon Yong-pyok, the agent responsible for guerrilla organizations
under Kim II-song's Sixth Division. Again, during the period between
May and August, 1938, the second mass arrest took place — this time
totaling 279 men — and their guerrilla strongholds were said to have 77 been completely destroyed.
Kim Il-song's guerrilla activities after the mass arrests were
bound to decline. With the sweeping operations waged by the Japanese
forces, Kim Il-song's remaining guerrillas were torn asunder and finally
disappeared from Manchuria by the end of 1941. Kim Il-song's activities
cannot be reliably traced in the period following dissolution of his guer
rilla f o r c e , but there are various unofficial reports, one of which goes
so far as to say that Kim Il-song and his guerrillas joined the Russian
Army in Khabarovsk in 1941, received training, and were sent to the
European Front around the spring of 1942. They engaged in the great
Staxingrad Operation, it goes on, for which Kim Il-song won the Order of
Lenin. The report says further that most of his two hundred men, with
whom Kim Il-song shared his anti-Japanese ordeals during his stay in
Manchuria, died in Stalingrad, and only fifty of them survived to return
76. (Cont'd) with another small revolutionary group, was reorgani zed to form Han-in minjolc haepang tong-maeng (Korean National Emancipation League), and served as the main channel for a netxrork of agents inside Korea. It is for this reason that the group of people who affiliated with the Fatherland Restoration Association and the Korean National Emanci pation League were later called as 'Kapsan' faction.
77. Tsuboe Senji, Hokusen no lcaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), p. 24. It is believed that these two mass arrests marked the end of the activities of the Fatherland Restoration Association.
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78 to North Korea with Kim Il-song. Another report discounts the possi
bility of Kim's participation on the European Front, but agrees that
Kim Il-song joined the Russian Army. The second report also insists
that Kim Il-song became a Russian Communist Party member, and in
this capacity received both political and military training with a 79 special mission prepared for future events. The North Korean
Communists claim that when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on
August 9, 1945, "the Korean People's Revolutionary Army participated 80 in the war shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet Army." Although it
is difficult to determine the truth of these conflicting reports about
the activities of Kim Il-song after 1941, there is agreement on one
point: that Kim Il-song had maintained a strong tie with the Soviet Union
during this period.
78. Ibid., p. 26.
79. Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul lcobal hanta (I Am Indicting Kim Il-s5ng), (Seoul: Naewe munwha, 1965), pp. 106-107. See also, Robert A. Scalapino, "Foreign Policy of North Korea," The China Quarterly, No. 14, (April-June, 1963), p. 44.
80. Facts About Korea, p. 31.
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CHAPTER II
KIM IL-SONG'S RISE TO POWER AND THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST, ANTI-FEUDAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION"
When Korea was politically and militarily subjugated by the
Japanese Empire, Korean civilization became stagnant and was over
shadowed by the rising tide of Japanese militarism. Neglected by the
world powers, devoid of any capable leadership, and oppressed by
superior Japanese military strength, the Koreans were helpless to
avert the national humiliation of serving their Japanese masters. From
the poorest peasant to the richest landlord, from the illiterate to the
scholar, every Korean was forced to act as though the Japanese masters
were "men of gold" and the Korean servants "men of iron," to use Plato's
fable of the metallic origin of men. Everything Japanese was to be
regarded as superior and, therefore, to be emulated and assimilated.
Thus, the Korean language was expunged from official usage, Korean names
were required to be changed into the Japanese pattern, and every Korean
had to worship the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese religion, Shintoism.
For the first time in Korean history, people were also systematically
regimented in military, industrial and social organizations that served
to buttress the Japanese war machine, particularly during the Second
World War. Men were periodically drafted for military service, mining
and factory work. Every citizen was a member of the Kokuminhan, the
smallest governmental unit, organized on a neighborhood basis for
effective governmental control over citizens. Women were mobilized to
form the Aikolcu fujinkai (Patriotic Women's Association) whose members
were mainly engaged in helping send packages of personal items to the
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soldiers at the Front.
Despite all efforts to destroy everything Korean and to assimilate
Korea's traditional civilization to the Japanese, the Koreans had
difficulty in shaping their culture to that of the Japanese and of
adopting new dimensions of organizational life. Compelled by force,
the Koreans had to show external conformity to Japanese demands, but
secretly most of them retained their ora traditions and old attachments.
This is well illustrated by the Japanese linguistic assimilation policy:
as of 1942, "only about twenty percent of twenty-five million Koreans 81 were classified as competent in Japanese. Japanese political and
economic control over the Korean people was very successful. Although
by the end of 1943, 50.2 percent of the total number of officials in the
Government General and its subordinate bodies were Koreans, at the
higher level of officialdom, eighty-six percent of 4,652 officials were 82 Japanese.
From the economic point of view, substantial progress was made
during the Japanese occupation of Korea in mining, metallurgy, hydro
electric power, transportation, and other facilities. But this was in
the interest of the Japanese: nine-tenths of Korean industry was owned
and managed by the Japanese, and Koreans were barred from "full
81.- Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stan ford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966), p. 22. See also Pak Mun-ok, Hanguk chongpuron (A Study on the Korean Government),(Seoul: Pomyongsa, 1963), p. 288.
82. Glenn D. Paige, Ibid., pp. 18-19., and Department of the Army, U.S_. Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 203.
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participation in the industrial development of their country by reserving 83 the managerial and technical posts largely to the Japanese." Glenn
D. Paige has summed up the Korean situation with the following words:
"... when Japan acknowledged defeat in the Pacific war on August 15, 1945, Korea was highly integrated with the Japanese home islands politically and economically, but was less well integrated socially and culturally." 84
It was against this background that the major change in the international
political scene following the Second World War brought to Korea the end
of Japanese control and the beginning of a new national tragedy with the
division of Korea into Northern and Southern zones of occupation —
Soviet troops in the North and American troops in the South. Thus, the
end of the Second World War opened a new era for Koreans — an era of
geographical and political division that shifted the Korean "pattern of
integration," to use Paige's phrase, from Japan toward the Soviet Union
in the North and the United States in the South.
83. Ibid., p. 350.
84. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 23.
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A) Divergent Forces in North Korea and the Early Activities of Kim Il-song after Korea's Emancipation
The Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, brought to Koreans a
mixed feeling of jubilation and confusion — jubilation for their
liberation from the thirty-six years of cruel treatment by the
Japanese, and confusion as a result of the power vacuum created by
the cessation of the Japanese administrative functions. Amid this chaos,
the Russian and American troops began to land in Korea pursuant to a
Potsdam decision for the Japanese surrender to be accepted by Russian
troops north of the 38th parallel and by American troops south of it.
At the same time, Korean revolutionaries in exile were swarming
into the fatherland from Siberia, Manchuria, and China. The pent-up
nationalism of the Koreans added more confusion to the already complex
situation. As a result, self-styled Korean patriots were rampant every
where, and innumerable political parties, large and small, mushroomed
all over the country. Among these were four major forces which can be
identified as significant to the later development of the Korean
Communist movement.
The first of these forces was the indigenous communists, who now
regained their opportunity for legal activities after long hard years
of imprisonment, exile, and underground suffering since 1928, when the
Korean Communist Party was dissolved by Comintern order. The indigenous
communists indulged in factional strife just as they had in the early
days of their activities. On August 16, 1945, the Communist leaders of
the old Seoul faction rallied around Lee Yong5 and organized what 85 they called the Communist Party of Changan. In the meantime, the
85. The name of Changan faction originated in the fact that this group met at the Changan Building in Seoul.
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old Communists of the former Com Group (alias Reconstructionist
faction) consolidated around Pale Hon-yong, one-time leading organi
zer of the Korean Communist Party in the nineteen-twenties and organi
zed the Preparatory Committee for the Reconstruction of the Korean
Communist Party. For a time, these two factions vied with each other
for hegemony over the Communist movement in the South, but finally
the Changan faction was overwhelmed by the dominant influence of the
Reconstructionist group, and the Korean Communist Party reemerged 86 under the leadership of Pale Hon-yong, on September 12, 1945.
Pak Hon-yong had many advantages in assuming leadership of the
Korean communist movement. First of all, his name was well known all
over the country for his assiduous communist activities during the
Japanese Occupation. Therefore, it was not surprising to find his name
reappearing after the Liberation as the national symbol of Korean
communism. Wall posters in Seoul read: "Comrade Pak Hon-yong in 87 underground! Reveal yourself soon and give us direction!" Second
ly, he had many friends and followers under his influence even in North
Korea, such as Hyon Chun-hyok in P'yongyang, Oh Ki-sop, Chong Tal-hon,
86. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 302. In Korean Central Annals (1949 edition, p. 165), the date is listed as September 11, 1945, while Choson haepang ilnyonsa (One Year History of the Korean Liberation) says it is September 15, 1945.
87. Im Hwa, "Pak Hon-yong," Sin Ch'onji (New World), Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1946, p. 23.
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Lee pong-su, and Chu Yong-ha in South Hamkyong Province, Kim Cha-ryong 88 in North Hamkyong Province, and Kim Tok-yong in Hwanghae Province.
And finally, his organizational base was strong because of his political
experience and his former communist party leadership inside Korea.
A l the beginning, Pak Hon-yong covered both North and South Korea
in his organizational work in the belief that there should be only one
communist party in Korea, despite the military demarcation line. But
subsequently he concentrated his main activities against the Nationalists
in the South, paying little attention to the occupying forces and to
what he considered "insignificant" political development in the North.
As the Nationalists consolidated their forces in the following months,
the leftist organizations felt a strong need to unite against the
Nationalists. Thus, on February 16, 1946, a leftist united front was
formed among some forty organizations, including the Korean Communist
Party, Sinmin-tang, Inmin-tang and Korean National Revolutionary Party.
The front became known as a Choson Minchuchuui Minjok Chonson (Korean 89 Democratic People's Front.)
The second political force was the indigenous nationalist group
led by Cho Man-sik, a Christian leader whose popularity was based on his
uncompromising anti-Japanese struggle in Korea. This group organized
88. Kim Ch'ang-sun, "Choson Nodong-tang ui pajaeng" ("The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party"), Chunglcong- lcwon ui Changnae (The Future of the Chinese Communist Bloc), (Seoul: Pommun-sa, 1967), p. 58. See also, Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pulchan siponyonsa (Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), (Seoul: Jimun-lcak, 1961), p. 91.
89. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, pp. 301-307.
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Konkuk Chunpi Wiwon-hoe (The Preparatory Committee for Founding of
a State), wich Cho Man-sik as its. chairman and Hyon Chun-hyok as vice-
chairman. Hy5n was a devoted communist who had been collaborating with
Pak Hon-yong and had been elected as the chairman of the South P'yong-
an Provincial Committee of the Korean Communist Party on August 15, 90 — 1945. It is not known whether Hyon sincerely respected Cho Man-sik
and wanted to work with him for the national cause, or simply joined
hands with Cho as a communist strategem for the transitional period
to the proletarian dictatorship. However, there is a strong probabi
lity in favor of the latter assumption, if one considers Hyon's theory
of the two stage revolution in Korea: Korea was to undergo what is
known as "the bourgeois democratic revolution" prior to any attempt 91 to erect a communist regime.
In any case, Hyon did not have a chance to prove his true inten
tions in this respect, for he was assassinated on September 28, 1945.
The immediate rumor spread that it was a political assassination insti
gated by "the Kim Il-song clique" in order to curb Hyon's rising popula
rity among the P'yongyang citizens. And the Soviet-Korean communists
responded to the event by stopping all traffic between P'yongyang and its
suburbs for five days, on the ground that it was to quarantine citizens
90. Tsuboe Senji, Chosen minzoku dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement), p. 452.
91. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), p. 66.
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92 from a contagious disease. Even though Cho Man-sik had lost his
trusted right arm, he proceeded to form the Korean Democratic Party
(Choson Minchu-tang) in November, 1945.
The third group had been active in the Yenan area in the early
nineteen-forties, working closely with the Chinese Communist leaders
under the name of Choson Tongnip Tong-maeng (the Korean Independence
League), and had served as a political arm of the Korean Volunteers'
Corps led by Mu Chong. By early October, 1945, this Yenan group had
already reached the Apnolc River and was preparing to enter Korea.
Once they crossed the river, the Russian troops stopped them, disarmed
them, and expelled them to Manchuria, and later, allowed them to return 93 in an individual capacity. This Yenan faction regrouped their
former adherents, and in March, 1946, formally organized Sinmin-tang
(the New People's Party) with a literary scholar and Chinese-oriented
nationalist, Kim Tu-pong, as the Party head.
The fourth force is known as "Soviet-Koreans," who were born in
Korea, trained in Russia, and who returned to Korea mostly at the time
92. Tsuboe Senji, Hokusen no kaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), p. 39. Tsuboe's account of this in cident is that Kim Il-song and Kim Ch'aelc were responsible for luring Hyon out,that Chang Si-wu was assigned to be the assassin, and that Kim Yong-pom served as liason. Later, Kim Yong-pom died, allegedly while undergoing an operation for a tumor. Chang Si-wu was also purged by Kim Il-song later.
93. Kim Ch'ang-sun, "Choson Nodong-tang ui p'ajaeng" ("The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party"), p. 53. See also, Han Chae-dolc, Kim Il-song ul kobal hanta (I Am Indicting Kim Il-song), p. 142.
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94 of the Japanese surrender. It was this group that was imported from
outside and put in power by the political manipulations of Soviet
Russia. It is important, therefore, to trace the date of their entrance
into Korea as well as the activities they were engaged in during this
initial stage of political manipulation to obtain power in North Korea.
According to the memoir written by Yim Ch'un-ch'u, one of Kim
Il-song's closest proteges who had been fighting with him during the
guerrilla warfare, "the Korean Revolutionary Army created by the
Communists under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il-song" entered Korea 95 at the time of the Russian troops' occupation of North Korea. This
indicates that Kim Il-song entered Korea with a group of his soldiers,
and that his returning date was almost simultaneous with Russian occu
pation of the Northern part of Korea.
Another source stated that the Russian troops began to land in
Najin and Ch'ongjin harbors between August 12th and 13th of 1945, and
that Kim Il-song infiltrated Korea in early September along with some
three hundred special agents, including thirty-six staff members such 96 as Kim Ch'aek, Kim Ch'an, Ho Ka-ui, Han Il-mu, and Pang Hak-se.
94. The Soviet-Koreans can be largely divided into two categories: One is Kim Il-song's group, which is later known as Kapsan faction, and the other is the rest of the Korean-born Russian citizens. At the be ginning, they cooperated with each other under Russian guardianship. For convenience, the distinction between these groups will be reserved until it becomes necessary in the following chapter to discriminate between them.
95. Yim Ch'un-ch'u, Hangil mujang t'ujaeng sikirul hwesang hayo (Recollecting the Times of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle), p. 305.
96. Tsuboe Senji, Chosen mlnzolcu dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement), p. 452.
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However, an article published in Japan shortly after the Korean War 97 asserts that Kim Il-song entered Korea on August 15, 1945, "in the 98 uniform of a Soviet army major" under his original name, Kim Song-chu.
And this report is the most probable one, since Kim Il-song's first
appearance was reported at the "Tamaya" Restaurant in P'yongyang on the 99 evening of August 27th.
It remains a mystery what he had been doing during the period
between his entrance into Korea and his first appearance at the restau
rant. But subsequent events give rise to the speculation that he had
been engaged in fact-finding activities at the provincial and local
levels and in preparations for setting up a communist party under his
leadership, as he was doing in early September of that year. At one
point, Kim Il-song made it public that he had been traveling incognito
around the country with a definite purpose. "I had been so long in the
hills that I felt it necessary to learn the daily life and problems of
my country," said Kim Il-song. He added that he changed his name "so 100 that peasants would talk to me easily, as to a simple man."
97. Mun Tong-chae, "Kin nichi-sei shogun no profile" ("A Profile of General Kim Il-song"), Minshu Chosen, (Democratic Korea), Vol. 33, No. 986, (July, 1950), p. 97.
98. Robert A, Scalapino, "Foreign Policy of North Korea," The China Quarterly- p. 44. On the Russian Army rank of Kim Il-song, there is a conflicting report that he was a captain. For this account, see U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Technique of Takeover, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1961), Depart ment of State Publication 7118, p. 13.
99. Han Chae-dolc, Kim Il-song ul lcobal hanta (I Am Indicting Kim Il-song), pp. 52-54.
100. Anna Louise Strong, "I Saw the North Koreans," (July 16, 1950), p. 8 . This is a pamphlet that was privately published by Anna Louise Strong in California, after her extensive tour of North Korea in 1947.
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For an unknown reason, Kim Il-song also made a trip to the south
from P'yongyang. After he was reportedly spotted at the Soviet Mili
tary Headquarters in P'yongyang with his thirty other agents in early
September, he was seen in Haechu, the capital city of Hwanghae Province, 101 on September 16. Suh Dae-soolc speculates that it was "because of
his desire to make contact with political groups in Seoul," and that
by then "some of his high-ranking officers" were already in Seoul, 102 "scouting the political conditions in the South." In any case,
Kim Il-song did not go to Seoul, and returned to P'yongyang. On
September 28, Hyon Chun-hyok was assassinated. And thereafter, Kim
Il-song’s political influence rose rapidly. On October 3, Kim Il-song
appeared at the "Welcoming Rally for General Kim Il-song," where he 103 was introduced by Cho Man-sik as a national hero. However, even
after the assassination of Hyon Chun-hyok and the glorification of
of Kim Il-song, the latter could not climb to the top of the political
ladder as he might have wished. The popularity of Cho Man-sik in the
Nationalist faction, and of Kim Tu-pong and Mu Chong in the Yenan
faction, was too much for him to compete against. In this competitive
atmosphere of the tripartite political struggle, the "Pukchoson Odo Tang
Taep'yo mit Yolsongja Taehoe" (Conference of the North Korean Five
Provinces' Party Representatives and Enthusiasts) was summoned in
101. Tsuboe Senji, Chosen minzoku dolcuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement), p. 458.
102. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 318.
103. U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Technique of Takeover, p . 13.
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P'yongyang on October 10, 1945. Although it is unknown in what
capacity Kim Il-song presided at this meeting and who were the other
participants, the purpose of the meeting was clear: to set up a
strong central organization of the Korean Communist Party under the
influence of Kim Il-song.
It was at this meeting that Kim Il-song proposed to set
up the "North Korean Branch Office of the Korean Communist Party" 104 as the central agency of the Communist organization in North Korea.
The proposal was adopted, and at the meeting of the North Korean
Branch Office on October 13, Kim Yong-pom was elected as the head.
He was replaced by Kim Il-song at the Third Enlarged Committee Meeting
of the Party held on December 17, 1945. It has been reported that 105 this meeting proceeded surrounded by "an armed guard of Kim's soldiers."
Kim Il-song's intention of acknowledging the primacy of the Seoul
Communist Headquarters became obvious x^hen he named his organization the
"North Korean Branch Office of the Korean Communist Party," despite its
practical significance as an independent communist party unconnected with
the Korean Communist Party in Seoul headed by Pak Hon-yong. At the
104. Kim Chong-myong, a pro-Communist writer, explains that the meeting was held "because a strong central organization was needed in North Korea to carry out a proper political mission, making use of the advantageous conditions and circumstances of the Russian Army's presence in Korea. . ." Kim Chong-myong, Chosen Shinminshushugi Kakumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution in Korea), (Tokyo: Gogatsu shobo, 1953), p. 175.
105. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p.319. There is no explanation available as to why Kim Il-song did not get the position at the meeting of October 13, and how he obtained it later from Kim Yong-pom.
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beginning, Kim was not fully prepared to justify his independent position
because of the "one country, one party" principle. Thus, in his speech
of July 29, 1946, on the "Conclusion of questions and debates about the
Party foundation," Kim Il-song frankly recognized the Korean Communist
Party in Seoul as the central organization of the Party:
"As a statement on the Party coalition was announced in North Korea on July 29, preparation for the three party coalition started proceeding from August 1. First of all, with the initiative taken by Yo Un-hybng, the chief of the Inmin-tang (People's Party), the three party coalition plan was proposed. And with the support of the Sin- min-tang (New People's Party) and Kongsan-tang chung-ang (The Central Korean Communist Party), a preparatory meeting was organized." 106
Although no material evidence is available to confirm suspicions
of Russian control behind-the-scenes in North Korea, one may safely
assume that there had been a considerable degree of manipulation and
purposive direction of North Korean policies by the Russians. One
of the strongest points to support this hypothesis is the way in which
Kim Il-song managed to obtain power in the midst of confusion in
North Korea at that time.
106. Kim Il-song, "To soritsuni kansuru sitsumon to togini taisuru lcetsuron" ("The Conclusion of the Questions and Discussions on the Foundation of the Party"), (July 29, 1946), Selected Works, (Tokyo: Sannichi shobo, 1952), Vol. 1, p. 94. According to the Korean version of the Selected Works, however, it is listed as the "North Korean Central Bureau of the Korean Communist Party" for the obvious reason of showing that it was a sort of preparatory committee for the future Korean Communist Party without recognizing Pak Hon-yong's Party in Seoul as the central organization. For this account, see Kim Il-song,"Che ich'a taehwe eso chinsulhan saop kyolsan pokoso wa kyollon" ("Balance Sheets and Conclusions Stated at the Second Congress'of the North Korean Workers' Party'"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1954), Vol. II, p. 69. In the 1964 edition of the Selected Works of Kim Il-song, it is listed as "Pukchoson chojilc wiwon hwe" (Organizing Committee of North Korea). For this, see Kim Il-song,"Pukchoson Nodong-tang eso han chungang wiwonhwe saop ch'ongwa polco" ("Comprehensive Report on Projects of the Central Committee Made at the North Korean Labor Party"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1964), Vol. II, p. 152.
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First of all, his identity with the real and the legendary Kim
Il-song was questioned on the ground that his middle name is written,
in a Chinese character; differently from that of the real Kim Il-song^^
though both letters are pronounced the same in Korean; and that he was
too young to have been the legendary Kim Il-song. For the latter, if he
were still alive, would have been quite aged. These facts led many
people to consider him a counterfeit, and this, in turn, made people
sarcastic about him. Han Chae-dok, another close protege of Kim Il-
song until his escape to the Republic of Korea, vividly described
the scene at the Tamaya Restaurant, even remembering the jokes exchanged
among the participants in the 'South P'yongan Province People's
Political Committee' meeting. When Kim Il-song was, for the first
time, introduced to the members of the Committee by the Russian Military
Governor, Romanenko, and wine cups were passed around, one of the
nationalist members at the banquet jokingly stated that:
"We held a memorial service in secret among our colleagues when we were told that General Kim Il-song had passed away ten years ago. But now, we have to take back the memorial service wine we offered, since we witness him alive here."108
The same reaction was echoed in the audience at the "Welcoming Rally
for General Kim Il-song," which was held at the order of the Russian
Occupational Authority.
107. The Chinese character for the real Kim Il-song's middle name allegedly stands for "one," while that of present Kim Il-song signifies "Sun," Pulchan Ch'onglcam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 764.
108. Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul lcobal hanta (I Am Indicting Kim Il-song), p. 58.
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In an effort to prevent further deterioration of the situation
and even to create a new image about him, the Soviet-Korean Communists
started propaganda work by proclaiming his virtues: pictures of
Kim Il-song were displayed everywhere, and claims of his glorious anti- 109 Japanese guerrilla warfare were widely disseminated.
The communist propaganda took advantage of Korean fanaticism at
that time, a psychological effect of the Korean Liberation. Confessing
that "everything that he did was fantastic fanaticism that was not 110 characteristic of his sober mind," Han Chae-dok recalls how he
idolized Kim Il-s5ng. According to his account, it was he himself who
headlined the article on the "Welcoming Rally for General Kim Il-song,"
in which the heroic title of "General" was formally added to Kim Il-song 111 for the first time.
But no effort was more open and positive than the Russian
initiative of promoting the communist positions in the most influential
political organization in North Korea at that time. As soon as the
Soviet-Korean Communists were present in Korea, the Russian Occupation
Authority ordered the "Preparatory Committee for Founding of a State"
109. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 57-58.
110. Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul kobal hanta (I am Indicting Kim Il-song), p. 79.
111. Ibid., pp. 74-76. Yang Ho-min, A South Korean expert on North Korea, quotes a passage from the Korean Modern Revolutionary History published in North Korea, which traces the date when Kim Il-song was endowed with this title far back to the 1930's during his guerrilla fighting. See Yang Ho-min, "Pukhan ui Soviet-hwa" ("The Sovietization of North Korea"), Chungkonglcwon ui changnae (Future of the Chinese Bloc), p. 22f.
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to dissolve. It had been organized by the nationalists and was ex
pected to form a government. Instead, the Russian Occupation
Authority ordered the organization of a "South P'yongan Province
People's Political Committee." In appearance, the membership of this
Committee consisted of sixteen nationalists, but in fact one of the
nationalists was actually a Communist Party member. Therefore, the
actual ratio of the membership between Communists and nationalists was 112 seventeen to fifteen. Furthermore, several of these Communists
turned out to be Russian-educated leaders who refused to support 113 Hyon Chun-hyok and, later, joined with Kim Il-song.
From this, it is obvious that "nominally important positions were
given to men with strong national appeal — but the positions of real
power were filled by followers of Kim Il-song, or trusted Soviet- 114 Koreans. The Nationalist leaders and indigenous communists played
only figurhead roles in this complicated political manuevering. And
behind all these the Russians were undoubtedly holding the strings.
112. The Nationalist members in this Political Committee x^ere: Cho Man-sik, Oh Yun-sSn, Lee Yun-yong, Kim Pyong-yon, No Chin-sol, Kim Ik-chin, Lee Chong-hyon, Kim Pyong-so, Han Kun-cho, Pak Hyon-suk, Cho Myong-silc, Chang Lee-x^ulc, ChOng Ki-su, Ch'oi A-rip, Hong Ki-chu, and Kim Kxtfang-chin. And the Communist members x^ere Hyon Chun-hyok, Kim Yong-pom, Pak Chong-ae, Lee Chu-yon, Chang Si-x^m, Kim Yu-ch'ang, Song Chang-yom, Ho Ui-sun, Chang Chong-silc, Ch'oi Yun-olc, Lee I(x«;an-hyop, Mun T'ai-yong, Lee Song-chin, Han Chae-dok, and two others. It is specially notexrorthy that Kim Il-song and his men did not appear at all in this list. For this name list, see Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul kobal hanta (I am Indicting Kim Il-song), p. 52. 113. Kim Ch'ang-sun, ChosonNodong-tang ui p'ajaeng ("The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party"), p. 52.
114. Cho Soon-song, Korea in World Politics, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 86.
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George McCune described how the Russians carefully managed to keep
themselves in the background:
"The Soviets made a determined effort to see to it that the rank and file of the Korean administration as well as the mass of the people believed that they were responsible for their own government. Control was effected by Russian political officers in the capital and in each province, who rarely appeared before the People's Committees but who exerted control through the ranking members of the Labor Party. Thus, while important decisions in policy were made by the Soviets, the Korean party members appeared to initiate and support such decisions, so that the impression was created that they were Korean in origin and implementation."115
All of these tactics were completely in tune with Stalin's
post-World War takeover process in Eastern Europe. According to Andrew
Gyorgy and George D. Blackwood, it was marked by the following
characteristics:
"With the Red Army standing at the height of its power toward the end of World War II, the 1944-1947 period gave the Kremlin's dictator unparallelled opportunities to extend his Soviet brand of communism from Bulgaria all the way to East Germany, and finally to meet the Western allies at a location of his choice, the battered city of Berlin. Communism has spread in the post-war era not through spontaneous Marxist-type revolts, but either directly by Red Army power (which first "liberated" the countries of Eastern Europe and then settled down to their continued occupation) or . . . by nationally organized military take-overs "from above."116
115. George M. McCune, and Arthur L. Grey, Jr., Korea Today, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 180.
116. Andrew Georgy and George D. Blackwood, Ideologies In World Affairs, (Waltham, Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1967), p. 103. See also, R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Commu- nism:An Introduction,(Hew York: The Macmillan Company, 1951),pp.197-201.
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The case of North Korea falls into the first category: direct
involvement of the Red Army in North Korean Politics.
Why did the Russians choose to support Kim Il-song, relatively
unknown among the Koreans and inexperienced in domestic politics,
despite the presence of seemingly qualified communist leaders in
Korea at that time? There was Pak Hon-yong, a chief organi er of
the Korean Communist Party and loyalty follower of Comintern directives.
Hu Chong was also a recognized leftist leader among the revolutionaries
in China, and his fighting record was outstanding. And even Hyon
Chun-hyok, a scholarly communist, was popular among the Communists in
P'yongnam Province after the Liberation of Korea. But none of these
men was regarded as trustworthy by the Russians, for they were not
Soviet-oriented, and the Russians were not familiar with the true
capacities of these Communist leaders. After the Seventh Congress of
the Comintern in 1935, the Russians had not maintained any contact
with the Korean Communists, which made them "ignorant of the status
of the Korean revolutionary movement." Thus they were "totally un- 117 informed of the status and conditions of the old Korean Communists."
Furthermore, the Russians' suspicions of Pak H5n-yong might have been
117. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Commu... Movement: 1918-1948, p. 326.
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caused by his proposal of cabinet members for the Korean People's
Republic, made shortly after the Liberation. He advocated putting 118 Syungman Rhee in as President and Kim Il-song as Defense Minister.
In the case of Hyon Chun-hyok, it seems obvious that the
Russians were not pleased with his two stage revolutionary theory
and his strategy of closely allying himself with the nationalists,
for they wanted to install in North Korea a communist regime "albeit 119 under the facade of 'New Democracy'."
On the contrary, Kim Il-song gained recognition among the
Russians as a capable young man of "bravery," "brilliance," and 120 "diligence." In addition, be had all the necessary requirements
the Russians wanted: "he was a Communist professing to serve their
interests"; his record of anti-Japanese revolutionary activity
"under the popular pseudonym of Kim Il-song" would be an asset in 121 controlling public opinions; and having been promoted to the
rank of major in the Russian Army during the Second World War, he
would remain loyal to the Russian command.
There is also a possibility that the Russian choice of Kim Il-song
118. Kim Ch'ang-sun, "Choson Nodong-tang ui p'ajaeng" ("The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party"), p. 54. 119. Lee Chong-sik, "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage," North Korea Today, (edited by Robert A. Scalapino), (New York & London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 6
120. Tsuboe Senji, Chosen minzoku dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement), p. 462. The same author describes Kim's character as "open-hearted, gay and cautious." On this account, see Tsuboe Senji, Hokusen no kaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea), p. 19.
121. Suh'Dae-soolc, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p.313.
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was partially due to his youth. He was young enough to carry out with
vigor the paramount task of bringing Korea under the Red banner, and
he was virtually unknown politically. The Russians may have con
sidered his lack of reputation as an asset because he was not identi
fied with any of the communist factional groups which were battling
among themselves in Korea. In this way the Russians could avoid un
necessary political controversies over many issues that they antici- 122 pated in the initial stage of founding a regime friendly to Russia.
Once he had consolidated his power base in the newly organized
party, Kim Il-song proceeded to the second stage: expansion. The
Nationalist opposition to the decision of the December, 1945 Moscow 123 Conference of the Big Three Foreign Ministers provided Kim Il-song
with an opportunity to get rid of Cho Man-sik. He placed him under
house arrest in January, 1946. This discouraged non-communist
Nationalist leaders in their political activities, and as a result, a
large majority of the Korean Democratic Party members began to flee
to the South, moving their Party headquarters to Seoul. But the
Party (KDP) was kept alive in North Korea under the new leadership of
122. Oh Yong-chin, Hana ui chungon (One Testimony), (Seoul: Chungang munhwa-sa, 1952), pp. 145-146.
123. The foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union particpated in this Conference and later agreed to place Korea under a trusteeship for a maximum period of five years. All the nationalists and communists in Korea were opposed to this decision, but the communists changed their attitude later and supported it. For the full text of this Conference, see Kim Young-hum, East Asia's Turbulent Century, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 317.
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Ch'oi Yong-kon. One month later, the North Korean Provisional
People's Committee was established by a collaboration of the three
group leaders: Kim Il-song was elected chairman of the Committee,
Kim Tu-pong occupied the vice-chairmanship, and Ch'oi Yong-kon 124 was assigned to assume the leadership of the Security Bureau.
This was the political basis through which Kim Il-song was able to
launch what he called the "democratic revolution" programs.
B. Democratic Reforms
Before the war, under Japanese rule, the position of the Korean
people, except for a few privileged individuals, had deteriorated
almost to the point of slavery. A large majority of the Korean
farmers were forced to become owner-tenants who owned part and rented 125 part of the land they cultivated, or were outright tenants.
Factory workers labored under inhuman working conditions: low pay
wir’n long working hours, no social security measures, and harsh ex
ploitation of child and women workers. The major industries were
monopolized by a few Japanese and Korean capitalists. And finally,
124. Although Ch'oi Yong-kon was leading the Korean Democratic Party, he was a devoted communist loyal to Kim Il-song. Kang Yang-wuk, another Korean Democratic Party member, was elected as the Secretary of the Committee. In fact, he was the maternal grandfather of Kim Il-song. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 191-192.
125. Specifically, as of 1938, twenty-two percent of the rural people in the North were owner-tenants and forty-five percent were tenants. The average rent was between fifty and sixty percent of the crop. The size of the average land-holding was small: more than half of the owners had less than 2.45 acres (1 chongpo), and ninety percent had less than 12.25 acres. For this, see Focus, Vol. XII, No. 4, (December 1961), p. 4.
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pursuit of intellectual knowledge was extremely limited, suppressed
out of a fear that it would contribute to a national uprising against
the Japanese. For the Koreans there was good reason to believe that
Heaven was nonchalant, and UjL (sense of justice) ruthlessly trampled
down by evil forces. Due to historical inevitability, however,
Bul-ui (sense of injustice) was to be doomed sooner or later, when
the Ui_ would, once again, gain the momentum, correcting the situation.
The most urgent reforms were needed in the tragic conditions of
the Korean peasants, who comprised almost eighty percent of the
population of the country. Like many peasants elsewhere in Asia, the
Korean peasants lived under straw-thatched roofs which often leaked,
and in the winter cold air penetrated the rooms through tattered paper
doors. In the localities which have no forests, the peasants used
straw or leaves for fuel. Starvation during the spring and summer
season was still very common, and the peasants, young and old,
suffered from malnutrition. Such foodstuffs as meat and oils — the
main source of protein — appeared on the family table only on rare
occasions. The normal fare consisted of barley, lckoch'ichang (hot
pepper sauce), and kimch'i (pickle xd.th hot pepper), to which fresh
vegetables and rice were added in autumn. Bath-houses were practically
non-existent. The peasants could rarely afford the money for soap.
Flies, mosquitoes, lice, and other insects infested everything. Skin
diseases, syphilis, epidemics, and malnutrition were common, and few
hospital services were available.
Under these circumstances social reforms had to be the foremost
concern of any political leader. This applied especially to the
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Communists, whose positive commitment was to change a corrupted
society into a paradise on earth, where all these evils would be
eliminated. This was, if anything, the greatest attraction the
Communists could have offered to the starving Korean peasants.
The moment of carrying through the Ui came on March 5, 1946, when
the North Korean Provisional People's Committee proclaimed the ordi
nance on land reform, which went into effect three weeks later.
The first three articles of the Ordinance made clear the purpose and
scope of the Land Reform Program:
Article I. The land reform in North Korea arises from historical and economic necessity. The mission of land reform lies in the abolition of Japanese land ownership by Korean landlords, and of land tenancy, and bestowing the right to exploit the land on those who cultivate. The agricultural system in North Korea shall be founded on individual ownership by farmers who are not shackled to landlords, and in the manage ment of land.
Article II. The land coming into the following categories shall be confiscated and transferred to ownership by farmers: 1) land owned by the Japanese state, Japanese individuals and organizations; 2) land owned by traitors to the Korean people, those who have participated in the political machinery of Japanese imperialism, and also land owned by those who fled from their own districts at the time of the Korean Liberation from Japanese oppression.
Article III. The land in the following categories shall be confiscated and distributed freely for ownership by farmers: 1 ) land owned by Korean landlords in excess of five Chongpo per family; 2) land owned by those who did not cultivate but rented land solely for tenancy; 3) all land, regardless of acreage, which is con tinuously in tenancy; 4) land owned by shrines, temples, and other religious sects [sic] in excess of five Chongpo.
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Article IV. All land confiscated according to Article III shall be permanently distributed to the peasants without compensation.126
During the initial period of the Revolution in Russia, there was
considerable chaos among the peasants who had already partitioned
a substantial part of the land-owners' estates on their own initiative,
well before the Decree on Land of November 8, 1917, was issued.
Rich and poor peasants alike justified the seizure of land from the
large landowners with the slogan of "loot the looters," and even from
those peasants who owned no more than a few acres of land. To avoid
similar chaos, the Communists in North Korea mobilized all levels of
organization under the Party and people's committees, friendly parties
and social organizations, students, peasants, and urban workers, total- 127 ling nearly three million people. In a speech delivered at the sixth
Enlarged Executive Committee of the North Korean Organization Committee
of the Korean Communist Party, Kim II—song reported the process with
the following words:
"The Party strengthened the united front with all the democratic parties and social groups, stimulated them to participate in
126. Pukchoson Popnyongchip (The North Korean Law Collections), (P'yongyang: Kisin—sa, 1947), p. 59. For the English text of the Ordinance up to the third article, see George M. McCune, Korea Today, p. 202.
127. Kim Il-song, "T'ochi kaehyolc ui ch1ongkyolkwa kumhu kwaop" ("The Total Results of the Land Reform and Our Future Tasks") (April 10, 1946), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1963), Vol. I, p. 65.
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this work (land reform), let the poor peasants and tenant farmers organize the local committees and let them play the major role in the execution of the land reform. . . . 128
Out of a fear of provoking the landlords into organizing themselves
for a revolt, detailed instructions were also delivered to the cadres:
"... the cadres were careful not to involve any large number of landlords on any one occasion. Undue agitation of landlords as a class should be avoided. . . Confiscations of land would take place sporadically. . . . Only the properties of the absentee landlords and the large landowners would be confiscated at first . . . ." 129
And finally, the Ordinance was backed by an enforcement power based
upon the "Provisional Law on the Execution of the Land Reform,"
which stipulated that those landlords who did not conform to this
regulation would be regarded as enemies of the people and subject to
a maximum of ten years' imprisonment or a maximum fine of twenty 130 thousand won.
Despite these precautionary measures taken to prevent any
possible chaos arising out of land reform, some unhappy experiences
were reported. According to Kim Il-song, there was a confusion in
defining "pro-Japanese elements." Some people were sympathetic to
the landlords, while others busily engaged in personal revenge. On
the other hand some of the landlords who had been deprived of their
128. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
129. Lee Chong-silc, "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea," North Korea Today, pp. 69-70.
130. Pukchoson Popnyongchip (The North Korean Law Collections), p . 62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 properties resisted to the last, and even some "reactionary elements"
continued their terrorist activities. For instance, the college and high
school students in South Hamkyong Province demonstrated against land reform,
and on one occasion a landlord in North P'yong-an Province attempted to
disrupt the land reform policy after becoming chairman of the Chasong County 131 Farm Worker's Union. As in the case of Russia, there were also many
hired farm hands and poor peasants who joined to expel landlords and to 132 distribute their land and property in an arbitrary manner.
Furthermore, the ownership of the land by the peasants was by no
means a privilege without its price. In a separate ordinance on taxation
in kind, which was proclaimed June 27, 1946, it was specified that farmers
would pay no rent for their land, but would be required to "contribute"
twenty-five percent of their harvest as a tax in kind "to supply food 133 for the urban workers and office workers." This ordinance was subsequent
ly amended in 1947 and 1949 to provide that the tax would be twenty-seven
percent on paddy lands, twenty-three percent on dry lands, and ten percent
on fire fields, lands of poor quality from which grasses and bushes had 134 been burned.
131. Kim Il-song, "T'ochi kaehyok ui ch'ongkyolkwa kumhu kwabp" ("The Total Results of the Land Reform and Our Future Tasks") Selected Works, pp. 67-70.
132. Pukchoson es5 ui t'ochi kaehyok kwa nongch'onkyongni palcchon ui ch'ongmang (The Prospect of the Land Reform and the Rural Administrtive Development), (P'yongyang: Pukcho-son Nodong-tang chungang sonchon songpu, 1948), pp. 38-39.
133. Kim Il-song, "P'al ilo haepang ilchunyon P'yongyangsi kyongch'uk taehwe eso han polco" (A Report Delivered at the P'yongyang Rally Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15, 1946), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1963), Vol. 1, p. 157.
134. For the text of the ordinance, see Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea published in 1951, p. 60.
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In Russia, though the conditions were different, a similar
measure had been taken during the Civil War period which followed
the Revolution, when there arose a need to provide food for the
army and the city proletariat. The result was that the Bolsheviks
had to face the stubborn resistance of the peasants who were then
deprived of their grains by "food battalions" of Red Guards and 135 Cheka employees.
But in North Korea, the peasants in general enjoyed an im
proved economic status compared to the days before the reform, when
they had to pay fifty to sixty percent of their crops to the land
lords. It was a significant improvement in their lot, and they re
mained relatively calm and for the most part welcomed the reform 136 measure.
As a result of the Land Reform, out of the total of 1,000,325
chongpo of arable lands confiscated from the landlord class, 981,390
chongpo were distributed to the peasants — among which 22,387
chongpo were given to the hired farm hands, 603,407 chongpo to the
landless peasants, 345,974 chongpo to the land-poor peasants, and
9,622 chongpo to the landlords who became peasants after they left 137 their land and moved to other counties. This program affected
135. George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 299.
136. Lee Chong-sik, "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea," North Korea Today, p. 72.
137._ Kim Il-song, "Pukchoson Nodong-tang che icha chontang- taehwe eso chinsulhan tangchungang wiwonhwe saop kyolsan poko wa lcyolron" ("Balance Sheets and Conclusions to the Second Congress of the North Korean Workers Party on the Work of the Central Committee), (March 28, 1948), Selected Works, (P'yong-yang: KWP Press, 1954), Vol. II, p. 123.
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over fifty percent of the total cultivated area, and the beneficiaries
of the measure comprised over seventy percent of the total farm 138 households. This is a sharp contrast to the early Bolshevik ex
perience on the land nationalization measure, which eventually ended
private ownership of the soil in Russia after the Communists succeeded
in their Revolution of 1917. The Communists in North Korea hailed
the land reform of 1946 as an example of the "creative application of
Marxism-Leninism" to the peculiar conditions existing in Korea at
that time:
". . . under the Russian conditions that en tailed a tradition of common ownership of land, and thereby did not trouble with land ownership so long as the tilling rights of peasants were guaranteed, land-nationalization became the most proper measure to be taken. In our country, however, where the private ownership of land by peasants had been well developed, it was the peasants' foremost Ttfish to own their own land and to be able to till it as they please, the Party put into action a policy of turning over the land confis cated from the landlords to the peasants for their private ownership." 139
The land reform was followed by a decree on labor, issued on
June 24, 1946, which specified the working conditions of the factory
and office workers. It decreed an eight-hour day as the official
standard (Article I), and stipulated a maximum of six working hours
per day for minors between fourteen and sixteen years of age (Article
III). Labor by minors under fourteen was prohibited (Article IV).
138. Department of the Army, U_.fL Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 382.
139. P'alilo haepang sipochunyon kinyom nonmunchip (A Collection of the Economic Theses for the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15), (P'yongyang~ Kwahakwon kyong-je pophalc yonkuse, 1960), p. 4.
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"In regard to wages two general rules were laid down: (1) equal wages
for equal work, irrespective of age or sex; (2) one and one-half times
the regular rate of payment for all work performed on off-days or legal
holidays." Article VI specified the procedure for wage determination
by stating that "wages in privately owned enterprises and offices
shall be prescribed by collective or labor contracts." Special con
sideration was given to women workers who "shall be given vacation
periods of thirty-five days and twelve days,before and after childbirth
respectively." (Article XIV). And Article XVIII prescribed a com
prehensive "compulsory social insurance" measure, which included"(1)
aid for workers temporarily disabled from work, (2) aid during the
period of vacation due to pregnancy and childbirth, (3) aid for funeral
expenses, (4) annuities for those disabled for work while on duty or 140 from occupational diseases." Thus, at least in theory, the
workers in North Korea were, for the first time in Korean history,
assured not only of improved working conditions, but also of their
human rights. And it was quite natural for the workers to favor the
measures and adopt a feeling of gratitude toward the Communists.
Another victory was claimed by the Communists in their achieve
ment of the nationalization of major industries. Later embodied in
Article 5 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, the Decree issued on August 10, 1946, stipulated that "enter
prises, mines, power stations, railroads, transport, communication, banks,
140. "Pulcchoscn nodongcha mit samuwon e taehan nodong popnyong" ("Labor Law on Workers and Office Employers in North Korea"), Pukchoson Popnyongchip (The North Korean Law Collections), pp. 229-230.
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and commercial as well as cultural establishments owned by the
Japanese government, Japanese citizens, Japanese corporations, and
others who were branded as 'traitors' are to be confiscated without
compensation and nationalized." And under this provision of the
law, 1,034 enterprises and plants in North Korea were brought under 141 national control. This did not mean, however, that every segment
of the economy had been nationalized. Decision Number ninety-one of
the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, dated October 4, 1946,
reserved certain privately-owned sectors of the economy for private
hands. It presupposed the Committee's right to review the decisions
made by the People's Court on the "classification of what constitutes
personal property and personal business," and added that "Korean-
citizen-owned factories, industries, mines, coaling facilities, ware
houses, and commercial houses are not to be included in the 142 nationalization program. "
As we shall later see, the definition of "Korean citizen" re
quired careful analysis, but it is very likely that "a substantial
number of Koreans" lost their "citizenship" for their "reactionary"
and "imperialist" activities, and were excluded from claiming property 143 rights under this decision.
141. Ryu Hun, Study of North Korea, (Seoul: Research Institute of Internal and External Affairs, 1966), p. 185. See also, "Pukchoson imsi inmin wiwonhwe kyolchongso che osip pal-ho" ("Decision Number Fifty-Eight of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee"), (October 4, 1946), Pukchoson Popnyongchip (The North Korean Law Collections), p. 43. 142. George M. McCune, and Arthur L. Grey, Jr., Korea Today, p. 186.
143. Ibid., p. 187.
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And finally, a law on the equality of the sexes was proclaimed
on July 30, 1946, with which traditional sex discrimination was ended.
Article I of this law states that women shall enjoy equal rights with
men in all aspects of life, in the economic, cultural, social and
political spheres. Article II stipulates that women shall have equal
suffrage and eligibility for election with men in local and national
elections. Also, women's equal rights of free marriage were guaranteed
in Article IV. And Article VII prohibited "the inherited feudal insti
tutions," of polygamy and concubine systems that had long infringed 144 upon the human rights of Korean women.
The successful accomplishment of the "democratic revolution" in
North Korea greatly affected the traditional social class structure
(Gentry-Scholars, Peasants, Workers, Merchants pattern), by changing
the Confucian tradition of a social class priority order into one
which placed the working class at the top. In the social priority
order, the peasantry maintained its status as second class, but, in
substance, its economic condition was greatly improved. Women, too,
were freed from the Confucian bondage. The losers in this game
appeared to be the big landlords and the capitalists among the Yangban
(Gentry-Scholars) and Bourgeoisie. But this was only the beginning.
And no one knew that gloomy days were ahead for the winners and the
losers alike.
144. "Pukchoson imsi inmin wiwonhwe kyolchongso che osip- saho" ("Decision Number Fifty-Four of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee"), (July 30, 1946), Pukchoson Popnyongchip (The North Korean Law Collections), p. 301.
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C . Sovietization of Ideology
If one studies the early statements made by North Korean leaders,
he will find phrases paying tribute to the nationalist cause. He may
even get the impression that in North Korea nationalism had always
prevailed over the temporary impact of any other ideology, be it
nationalism or communism. But at the same time, he will notice
paradoxical statements expressing admiration for proletarian inter
nationalism and Russian communism, and he will feel that his first
impression of nationalism was unfounded. This confusing trend is also
readily apparent in many social matters.
The first nationalistic stance is reflected in the speech at the
"Welcoming Rally for General Kim Il-song" when Kim Il-song cried out
for national unity with the following words:
"From now on, the Korean people must unite to establish a new democratic Korea. This great mission cannot be achieved by a party or an in dividual. Let us unite and establish a demo cratic and independent nation. . . the workers, with their labor; the learned, with their lcnowledge; and the rich, with their money." 145
This is very nationalistic in tone, and there is enough reason to
believe that Kim might have been deeply convinced of a need for an
independent Korea which would not repeat the tragic experience of
the Korean subordination to the Japanese imperialists:
"We have a saying that 'a person without a nation is no better than a dog in a mourner's house.' This is very true. The most valuable thing to us
145. Choson Chungang Yonkam (The Korean Central Yearbook), (P'yongyang: Choson Chungang T'ongsin-sa, 1949), p. 63. See also, Han Chae-dolc, Kim Il-s5ng ul kobal hanta (I am Indicting Kim Il-song), p . 67.
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is the fatherland. We were more deeply convinced of this abroad, and have fought for the inde pendence of the fatherland." 146
But no less prominent have been the Soviet-Korean appeals to pro
letarian internationalism:
"It was those Korean Communists who were proletarian internationalists, who fought, until the last, in a struggle for the anti-Japanese national liberation movement. . . . (therefore,) our Party should not tolerate even a small ex pression of narrow-minded nationalism. ..." 147
Ultimately, the call for proletarian internationalism at this stage
was expressed by admiration for the Soviet Union. On May 1, 1946,
Kim Il-song declared that:
"In the Second World War, the Russian military and people's forces played a de cisive role with the allied powers of the United States and Great Britain. That is, they freed mankind from the darkness and chain of Fascism, by defeating Fascist Germany in the West and by destroying Japanese imperialism in the East." 148
146. Kim Il-song, "Sae minchuchu ui kuklca lconsol ul wihan uri ui kwaop" ("Our Task to Build a New Democratic State"), (October 18, 1945), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip Ch'ul- p'an-sa, 1964), Vol. 1, p. 12.
147. Kim Il-song, "Proletaria kukchechuui kich'i e touk ch'ungchik hacha" ("Let Us be More Faithful to the Banners of Inter national Proletarialism), (December 15, 1949), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1954), Vol. II, p. 474.
148. Kim Il-song, "Meidei kinen enzetsu" ("Commemorating Speech of the May Day"), (May 1, 1946), Selected Works, (Tokyo: Sannichi shobo, 1952), Vol. I, p. 28. Professor Yang Ho-min points out that in the Selected Works of Kim Il-song, published as a second edition in 1963 in Korean, the phrase of "peoples of the allied powers in cluding the Soviet Union" is replaced by "Russian Army," and that as a reflection of the de-Stalinization movement, the phrase that adored Stalin is also eliminated. For this account, see Yang Ho-min, Pukhan Ui ideologi wa chongch'i (Ideology and Politics in North Korea), (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1967), p. 69f.
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Another statement issued by Kim Il-song on August 15, 1946, at the
First Anniversary of the Korean Liberation, reveals that Kim corrected
his prior statement made on May 1, 1946, by saying that the Soviet
Union played the decisive role in defeating Fascist Germany and Im
perialist Japan while the allies assisted that effort in a subordinate
role.
"... the world historical victory by the democratic allies in this Second World War was due to the decisive role played by the Russian people and the Soviet Army." 149
Furthermore, the Russian Army was pictured as the guardian of the
"Korean people" against the "colonial policy of U.S. imperialism."
"The Soviet Union. . . has strongly defended the Korean people's rights, Korean democratization and its full independence by exposing and opposing the U„S. colonization policy in Korea." 150
And finally, this upgrading of the Soviet Union led Kim Il-song
to say that:
"The victory of the Russian Army is the victory of Soviet Socialism and of its national institutions that are based upon the principles of equality and mutual assistance among the
149. Kim Il-song, "Hacchi icchigo kaiho itshunen lcinen no tameni" ("For the 1st Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15"), (August 15, 1946), Selected Works (Tokyo: San-nichi shobo, 1952), Vol. I, p. 125.
150. Kim Son-ik. "Siwol hyokmyong kwa Choson" ("October Revolution and Korea"), T 'aip'ung (Typhoon),Vol. I, No. 15, (November 27, 1948), p. 72. This magazine was published in P 'yongyang.
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peoples of its nations. Also, this victory shows clearly how correct. . . the leading role of the Russian Communist Party was." 151
Thus, it is obvious that a strong admiration of Russian Communism was
as prevalent among the Soviet-Koreans as appeals to nationalism. This
cross-fertilization of Korean nationalism and Russian Communism pre
sents some important questions: if they were not in open conflict,
how far could the one interact with the other in a harmonious manner?
And if they were in conflict, which of the two was more pervasive or
deep-seated?
These questions are partially answered by Glenn Paige, who has
carefully investigated the degree of emphasis between these two
ideologies, expressed in the Liberation Day address of August 15, 1946.
According to Paige's account, Kim Il-song referred to the concept of
"minjok" ("nation," with ethnic implications) forty-six times in his
speech, while "he made sixty-five references to the Soviet Union or to 152 the Red Army in the same speech."
The North Koreans' heavy reliance on Soviet method is also
apparent from Paige's references to the educational and cultural trends
in North Korea during the pre-Korean War period. He points out that:
151. Kim Il-song, "P'al ilo haepang ilchunyon P'yongyangsi lcyongch'ulc taehwe eso han pogo" ("A Report Delivered at the P'yongyang Rally Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kuk- rip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), pp. 118-119.
152. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic p. 38.
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. . about 150 Koreans a year were to be sent to the USSR for study. . . . By 1948 the study of Russian had been made compulsory at the middle- school level. . . . Top-level officials in the bureaucracy were expected to be fluent in Russian. . . . Thus by June, 1950, a Soviet-controlled leadership had established its organized rule over North Korea; an army had been created that was advised, trained, and equipped by the USSR and staffed by Soviet- Koreans; the Korean economy had been revived and reoriented from integration with Japan toward inte gration with Russia." 153
At the provincial and local level, branches of the Russo-Korean
Cultural Association were established, through which Russian culture
was introduced to the public. In 1947 alone, 1,913 Russian
pictorial exhibitions and 1,489 Russian movie screenings were held 154 in North Korea.
This obvious trend of integration into the Soviet system can
be and should be explained in full, with careful analysis of North
Korean ideologies that would help supplement the incomplete answers
to the questions raised above.
153. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
154. Suh Kwang-che, Pukchoson kihaeng (Trip to North Korea), second edition, (Tokyo: Tonga T'ongsin-sa, 1948), p. 41.
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1. The Question of the Revolutionary Stage in Korea
According to Marx, capitalism represents the outgrowth of
a mode of production which no longer can be contained within the
system. Thus, bourgeois revolution is a necessary and inevitable
historical process in the transition of a society based on "commodity
production" to Socialism. With the experience of the 1905 Revolution
in Russia, a subtle difference of opinion between Lenin and Trotsky
developed as to the interpretation of the subsequent democratic revolu
tion in Russia. This difference produced Trotsky's "Permanent Revo
lution" theory of proceeding directly to proletarian dictatorship and
socialism, and Lenin's notion of "Uninterrupted Revolution" that ad
vocated a democratic stage of proletarian-peasant dictatorship.
Marx and Engels assumed that there are general features and
patterns applicable to all countries in the process of the transition
from capitalism to socialism. They knew, of course, that not all
societies are alike, that some are profoundly affected by others. In
a letter written in 1877, Marx declared that Russia might have a
better chance to pass directly from feudalism into socialism if 155 Western Europe were transformed to socialism. But he believed
strongly that the proletarian revolution is possible only in those
countries where class consciousness is highly developed among the
industrial workers — a level high enough to enable them to organize
themselves into political movements to conduct the class struggle on
an open and political level, and that Russia could play only a
155. R. N. Carew Hunt, Theory and Practice of Communism, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 130.
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secondary role in this historical transition from capitalism to
socialism. Thus, Marx added an important qualification to the
possible direct transition of Russia from feudalism to socialism —
the necessity to transform Western Europe first. Following their
German mentors, the Russian Marxists also assumed that there are
general features and patterns which Russia would follow as the
West had done. The orthodox Russian Marxist, Plelchanov, taught the
Russians that "Capitalism would eventually evolve a Russian prole
tariat; it was this proletariat, and not the peasantry, xtfhich 156 would ultimately lead the revolution." Russia was already on
the threshold of capitalism and must pass through the whole of that
phase of her development; and she must become a mature industrial
and bourgeois society before she could hope to establish socialism.
This was the position the Russian Mensheviks maintained; namely,
that the time had not yet come, for Russia had not gone through the
bourgeois revolutionary stage.
Unlike the Mensheviks' position which opposed an immediate
proletarian revolution, Lenin insisted in 1905 that the proletariat
would have to push the "bourgeois revolution" through to the end.
This task would have to be carried out, Lenin said, by the proletariat
in alliance with the peasants, which would establish the "revolutionary
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry!":
"We must not be afraid of a complete victory for Social-Democracy in a democratic revolution, jr.^e., of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, for such a victory will enable us to rouse Europe, and the socialist proletariat of Europe, after throwing
156. Ibid., p. 130.
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off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, will in its turn 157 help us to accomplish the socialist revolution. ..."
But the alliance between workers and peasants must be only temporary
and after the bourgeoisie and the feudal classes are overthrown,
the proletariat should control the revolution.
"... the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but for the entire historical period between capitalism and 'classless society,' communism. . . . The transition from capitalism to communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence there will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat." 158
The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is thus a phase of the class
struggle, and this struggle continues between the Communists and
their enemies after the Communist seizure of power. And this clash
between the classes is a continuing process for an indefinite time
to come.
". . . the dictatorship of the proletariat is a persistent struggle — sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative — against the forces and traditions of the old society." 159
157. Vladimir I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," (July, 1905), Selected Works, Vol. I, book 2, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952) p. 86.
158. Vladimir I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," (August-September, 1917), Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1943), Vol. VII, p. 34.
159. Vladimir I. Lenin, "Left-Wing's Communism, an Infantile Disorder," (April 27, 1920), Selected Works, (New York: Inter national Publishers, 1943), Vol. X, p. 84.
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What Lenin believed was no less than the coming revolution in Russia
was bourgeois, but that it should be carried out by the workers and
peasants and that they should rule the bourgeois state. This was a new
doctrine of the "Uninterrupted Revolution," which justified the immediate
transition from a bourgeois revolution to a proletarian revolution. In
reality, however, there has never been either a bourgeois or a proletarian
revolution in Russia. Only a small minority of either class actually
participated in the revolution of March and November, 1917. The March
revolution was not properly bourgeois, for it took place xjith the workers'
revolt. Nor can one say that the November revolution was proletarian 160 because it gave power to the "Bolsheviks and not to the proletariat."
Though it was under different circumstances, there were similar ideo
logical differences among the Korean Communists. Hyon Chun-hyok, like the
Mensheviks in Russia, obviously reasoned that the Korean Liberation would
not properly lead to socialism in the name of the proletariat but only to
what Plelchanov had called a "Peruvian tutelage," during which every effort
should be made to ensure the stability of the bourgeois government until 161 the proletariat gains consciousness and will be ready to assume power.
This was why Hyon wanted to collaborate with the nationalists, leaving 162 the actual business of government to the bourgeois nationalists,
160. John Plamenat z, German Marxism and Russian Communism, (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 236. 161. As was pointed out in the above, this position of Hyon Chun- hyok is not a substantiated fact, but an assumption based upon his advocacy of the two stage revolution in Korea. For further details, see Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage,"North Korea Today»PP-6~7
162. It was not until July, 1917 that the Mensheviks in Russia under stood that it was to their interest to strengthen the governmental autho rity. If the above assumption were the right one, Hyon may be properly said to have been strategically advanced in his position compared to the one employed by the Mensheviks.
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while awaiting the time of the proletarian revolution, when he would
make his power felt. Despite his correct understanding of the
Russian lesson — that Menshevik's refusal to cooperate with a bour
geois government until too late made it easier for revolutionaries
more ambitious than they to seize power — Hyon did not live to see
brighter days that might have put him in a leading position in the
post-war Korean Communist movement in North Korea.
There were radical leftist groups among the Communists, and
their political views were diametrically opposed to the moderate
position held by Hyon Chun-hyok. Chang Si-wu, the exponent of this
group in the North and a long-time political rival of Hyon Chun-hyok,
publicly proclaimed "violence first," and strongly opposed the
united front policy that would include the national bourgeoisie.
Contending that the immediate goal for the Communists was to es
tablish directly the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,
Chang Si-wu, immediately after the Korean Liberation, set up a
separate organization under the name of Choson Kongsan-tang P'yongyang
si tangpu (The P'yongyang City Branch of the Korean Communist Party),
and denounced Hyon Chun-hyok as the "running dog of the Nationalists"
and the "traitor of the Communists." As soon as the "South P'yongan
Province People's Political Committee" was organized on Russian
initiative, however, he allowed his organization to be integrated into 163 that Committee and maintained frequent contacts with Kim Il-song.
Lee Yong and Chong Paik were other leftists whose political in
fluence was mainly limited to the Seoul area before Pale Ilon-yong
163. Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul kobal hanta (I Am Indicting Kim Il-song), pp. 125-126.
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emerged as the Communist leader in the South. They insisted that the
historic mission of the "bourgeois democratic revolution" in Korea
had been carried out to the end with the. defeat of Japanese im- 164 perialism and that, therefore, Korea faced a socialist revolution.
Although it is difficult to evaluate the political views of
Pak Hon-yong because of the scarcity of his writings, it appears that
he did not share Hyon's view of the two-stage revolution in Korea
that would separate the socialist revolution from the bourgeois
revolution. Nor did he accept the political views of Chang Si-wu
and Lee Yong, who advocated direct transition into the socialist
stage. According to Kim Chong-myong, the author of Revolutionary
History of the New Korean Democracy, Pak Hon-yong set forth the
characteristics of the Korean revolution as a "bourgeois democratic
revolution," calling for the construction of a "progressive democracy"
in Korea by purging the remaining forces of Japanese:
"There is no doubt that Korea is in the bourgeois revolutionary stage. There should be a thorough purge against the Japanese imperialists in Korea and an agrarian reform that would confiscate the land of big landlords and distribute it to the peasants. . . . If we can thoroughly purge the re maining elements of the Japanese imperialists, our enemies, the big landlords and the big capitalists are inevitably doomed to fall." 165
164. Kim Chong-myong, Chosen Shinminshushugi Kalcumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution in Korea), p. 175.
165. Ibid., p . 96.
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It would seem that by "bourgeois revolution" Pak Hon-yong meant the
"bourgeois democratic revolution" of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism.
This becomes clearer when he says:
"Although Korea was liberated from Japanese imperialism, the remaining forces of the pro- Japanese and the national traitors are blocking the path of the full independence of Korea after rallying themselves to the American imperialists. At the same time, the feudal forces, the social and material basis (in Korea) became the obstacle in the path to the free development of Korean society. From these points of view, the Korean 'bourgeois democratic revolution' should have been the national revolution externally, and democratic revolution internally." 166
He branded as reactionaries such prominent nationalist leaders in
the South as Syung-man Rhee and Kim Ku, and continued to take an
adamant position against any possible compromise with them. This
was due, perhaps, to the same attitude taken by Syung-man Rhee, who
knew from the beginning that coalition with the Communists would
eventually result in a Communist-dominated government in Korea.
This mutual distrust and uncompromising attitude drove Pak Hon-yong
to enter a coalition front only with the leftists. But Pak made a
grave mistake in his judgment of the situation — one that did not
develop in his favor. Exploiting the geographical location of Seoul,
he concentrated all his political efforts in the South. He mis
calculated further by assuming that Russian occupation in the North
and American occupation in the South were temporary. This led him
to ignore the fact that his true power base should be rooted in the
166. Loc. cit., p. 96.
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167 North, where the Russians were guarding the Communists' interest.
As a Korean expert on Korean Communism tersely puts it, it was a great
irony to witness the vital misjudgments made by both leaders of the
Communists and Nationalists:
. . none of the old Communists revolutionary leaders attempted to xrork with the Russians in the North or even conferred with them; ironically, it was the nationalist leaders led by Cho Man-sik, a deacon of the Presbyterian church, who first greeted the Russians and negotiated the affairs of the northern half of Korea with them, while Pak Hon-ynng, the leader of the old Communists, was busy conferring with General Hodge in the South." 168
Both the Russian Mensheviks and the old Korean Communist leaders
shared a common fundamental mistake. They did not face up to the
important question neglected by Marx and Engels: If societies are not
all alike, is not it necessary to admit that specific peculiarities of
each country may produce a different revolutionary course as well as
different results from an a_ priori pattern laid down by Marx and
Engels? Officially, this question had never come to the surface until 169 after Stalin's death, but it had been already presented, in an
implicit manner, even before the Russian Revolution. In reply to
167. It is doubtful whether Pak Hon-yong could have been successful in North Korea, even if he had concentrated his political activities there from the beginning. His name was little known among the Russians, and it was possible that Kim Il-song had been picked by the Russians, long before the'Korean Liberation, as the future Korean Communist leader.
168. Suh Dae-soolc, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 313.
169. The diversity of conditions in each country had long been
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some of bis radical associates who proposed an international socialist
federation, Lenin wrote in August, 1915:
. . the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with Socialism; second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of Socialism in a single country is impossible. . . . Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of Socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country, taken singly."170
Shortly before his return to Russia in April, 1917, Lenin
analyzed the Russian situation and made it clear that the Bolsheviks
were facing a peculiar condition that demanded from them special
action.
"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution — which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest |trata of the peasantry. This transition is cha racterized, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognized rights (Russia is now the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the
169. (Cont'd) recognized, but it was not until 1953 before an official theory on this matt ter was approved in Russia. For this account, see H. Gordon Skilling, "People's Democracy and the Socialist Revolution: A Case Study in Communist Scholarship," Soviet Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3, (January, 1961), pp. 241-258.
170. Vladimir I. Lenin, "The United States of Europe Slogan," (August 1915), Selected Works, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 416-417.
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other, by the absence of violence in relation to the masses, and, finally, by the unreasoning confidence of the masses in the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and Socialism. This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the special conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life." 171
His analysis of the situation (as of April, 1917) as representing
a transition from the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor segment of the
peasantry, was a theoretical leap from Marx's and the Menshevik
points of view. Yet Lenin, after his return to Russia, quickly
discovered that he and the Bolsheviks were in an advantageous
position to take power, if "they made good use of other people's
mistakes" — specifically the mistakes of the Mensheviks who were
reluctant to take a lead in making a revolution. Furthermore, Lenin
thought that if he and the Bolsheviks took that chance, they would
not be making a "premature" revolution, but would merely be putting
it in the power of Russia, in spite of her backwardness, to profit
from the collapse of world capitalism to be expected in the almost 172 immediate future.
171. Vladimir I. Lenin, "On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," (the "April Theses," April 7, 1917), Selected Works, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 13-17.
172. John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism, p. 213. According to Plamenatz, it was as if Lenin was saying to the Mensheviks: "Russia is not as backward as you think, and there are signs enough for those who can read them that she is quickly growing ripe for socialism; but, in any case, our cause is international, the world proletarian revolution is at hand, and our obvious duty is to prepare for it and to do our best to associate Russia with it."
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Unlike the situation prior to the October Revolution in Russia
that required of the Bolsheviks a violent overthrow of the existing
state power, Korean conditions and circumstances were, from the be
ginning, advantageous to the Soviet-Koreans, who, like the Bolsheviks,
revealed themselves as revolutionary fighters and accepted as valid
all the political goals and means inherited from their Russian
predecessors. Their fighting target no longer was the strong
Japanese Imperialist Army. And even though Cho Man-sik was in
fluential at the time they entered Korea, he had not established a
deep-rooted power base as yet, and was open to attacks from ambitious
power seekers.
In sharp contrast to the situation Pak Hon-yong faced in the
South where he was in American-occupied territory and where pro-
American Korean leaders had begun to emerge as powerful political
forces, the Soviet-Koreans headed by Kim Il-song had as their
guardians the Russian Army.
Under these favorable conditions in the North, the Soviet-Koreans
headed by Kim Il-song could gradually expand their power base through
the systematic elimination of strong political leaders. Once they
had established their power base, theoretical justification was needed
to defend the correctness of their revolutionary line and the
originality of the North Korean Communist Party. According to the
eulogists of Kim Il-song, it was at the Conference of the North Korean
Five Provinces Party Representatives and Enthusiasts, held on October
10, 1945, that the rightist-leftist errors were criticized and
Kim Il-song analyzed the Korean situation and interpreted the
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characteristics of the Korean revolution.
First, the leaders of Chang-an faction in the Korean Communist
Party, such as Lee Yong and Chong Paik, were accused of having
committed leftist errors by defining the task of the Korean revolu
tion to be that of a Socialist revolution — the same kind of denun
ciation made by Lenin against the "Trotskyites" for their errors of
advocating "permanent revolution":
. . their fundamental position was that the characteristics of the Korean revolution at that time were those of the Socialist revolution. Their vital errors were due to their incorrect understanding of the characteristics of the Second World War and of the domestic class relations."173
The leaders of the Chang-an faction were also attacked for their factional
strife with the Pak Hon-yong clique:
". . . factional elements that belonged to the Changan faction, another variety of the M. L. faction, also continued their factional struggle to obtain what they called the hege mony in the Party under the pretense of opposing the Pak Hon- yong clique, and put up the slogan of 'Socialist Revolution' or Simultaneous Execution of the Socialist Revolution and the Bourgeois Revolution. "174
Second, they warned against "Right Wing Liquidationists," who
overlooked the independent class tasks of the proletariat in Korea and
led thus to a formless merging with the general democratic national
movement:
"They insisted on including the big landlords, the pro- Japanese, and the national traitors in the national united front, which was, in reality, tantamount to Syung-man Rhee's unprincipled claim of 'let's unite.'"175
173. Kim Chong-myong, Chosen Shinminshugi Kakumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution in Korea),p. 175. 174. Choson T'ongsa (General History of Korea), (P'yong-yang: Kwahalcwon yoksa yonkuso, 1958), Vol. II, p. 15.
175. Kim Chong-myong, Chosen Shinminshushugi Kakumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution in Korea), p. 176.
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Names of those accused of being "rightists" were not specified,
but there was no question that Hyon Chun-hyok and his followers were
denounced as "rightists" for their cherished political views of 176 "bourgeois revolution."
After pointing out and criticizing the "rightist-leftist" errors,
the Conference decided to define the aims of the Korean revolution
as that of the "bourgeois democratic revolution" for which a thorough
purge of the remaining forces of the Japanese imperialists, the pro-
Japanese, and the national traitors was needed. This was publicly de
clared three days later when Kim Il-song spoke to the provincial
party workers:
"... We are faced with the task of carrying out the 'democratic revolution of anti feudalism and anti-imperialism' and establishing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." 177
176. Kim Ch'ang-sun, "Choson Nodong-tang ui p'ajaeng" ("The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party"), p. 56. Judging from the fact that Kim Il-song and his followers do not mention or criticize specifically Hyon Chun-hyok and Chang Si-wu as rightist and leftist, it is assumed that the Soviet-Koreans may fear a possible suspicion of the public as to the causes of death of Hyon and Chang.
177._ Kim Il-song, "Sae Choson Konsol kwa minjok t'ongil chonson e tae hayo" ("On the Construction of a New Democratic Korea and A National United Front"), (October 13, 1945), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa,_1964), p. 3. In the Japanese version of the Selected Works of Kim Il-song, the phrase, "the democratic revolution of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism," is replaced by the "bourgeois democratic revolution." On this, see Kim Il-song,Selected Works, (Tokyo: Sannichi shobo, 1952), p. 103. It is interesting to note that Kim Il-song, on rare occasions, used the term, "bourgeois democratic revolution," in the Korean version of his early Selected Works. Perhaps this was because he wanted to avoid the term used by Hyon Chun-hyok and Pak Hon-yong before him.
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Otis has created the term "artificial dialectic," wherein once
prevailing orthodoxies become deviations, either to the left or to
178 the right. Kim Il-song's definition of the Korean revolution
as the "democratic revolution of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism"
stood as the self-created synthesis of the two extreme interpretations
of the Korean revolution cited above. In this early stage, the word
"anti-imperialism" was only applied to the Japanese imperialists, the
pro-Japanese, and the national traitors, and did not include the 179 "American imperialists." But it was soon argued that the American
occupation of South Korea was imperialist in design and the term
"American imperialists" should be added to the slogan "Anti-imperialis:
revolution for the national liberation against the pro-Japanese elements
and national traitors." Thus, the Korean revolution, according to the
Soviet-Koreans' account, was meant to have combinedthe characteristics
of anti-feudalism against the capitalists and landlords, and
178. By "artificial dialectic," Otis means that a swing of the pendulum of theory and policy in one direction requires sooner or later a swing back in another direction, and the compounding of the two extremes in a kind of Hegelian synthesis which destroys the original elements in the process of fusing them together. This theory is applica ble to the Communists in general. For this account, see 0. Otis, "Generalissimo Stalin and the Art of Government," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, (January, 1952), pp. 204-211.
179. Kim Chong-myong, Chosen Shinminshushugi Kakumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution in Korea), p. 176.
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anti-imperialism against the pro-Japanese and the pro-Americans in- 180 eluding the "aggressive forces of the American imperialists."
The revolution was successfully carried out in the North to
the extent that feudal forces and the pro-Japanese elements were
swept out through "democratic reforms." But despite their claim
that South Korea is also a part of the "Democratic People's Republic
of Korea," the Soviet-Koreans and their supporters could not take
similar action against those they called "the national traitors" in
the South. They blamed this on the "American imperialists" who were
"occupying Korea by force" and "their Korean running dogs" who were
"defending the old order." The North Korean leaders insisted that
they were only fighting for the national independence and democracy
of Korea, and that the "Korean running dogs" in the South and the
American imperialists were trying to obstruct democratic development
in Korea:
"The American imperialists made the pro- Japanese, the national traitors, feudal lords, and comprador capitalists form reactionary parties and social organizations. They flew Syung-man Rhee to Korea and made him reign as the leader of the pro-American reactionary forces. . . . The Syung-man Rhee cliques, who are in tune with the American imperialists. . . are making all the plots to ob struct the full independence and the democratic development of Korea. . ." 181
180. Choson T'ongsa (General History of Korea), pp. 11-12.
181. Kim Il-song, "P'al ilo haepang ilchunyon P'yongyangsi Icyongch'ulc taehwe eso han pogo" ("A Report Delivered at the P'yongyang Rally Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Libera tion of August 15"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kuk-rip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), Vol. 1, pp. 128-129.
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Based upon this intransigent attitude against the South Korean
political leaders, the Soviet-Koreans demanded the purge of at least
the exclusion of all "national traitors" as a precondition for peace 182 talks with the South Korean government.
All this sounds very much like what Pak Hon-yong said even
earlier than Kim Il-song when the latter manifested his position on
the Korean revolution. It is an historically recognized fact that
the Communist Party under Pak Hon-yong was the central organization
under which the North Korean Communist Party was formed as a branch.
For these reasons, the Pak H5n-yong group was saved from immediate
attack by the Soviet-Koreans, at least before Pak and his followers
joined the North Korean Communist Party in late 1949. It was only
after the Korean truce was signed in August, 1953, that the North
Korean Communists began mass arrests of Pale's faction in the Party,
accusing them of being anti-revolutionary spies responsible for
losing the war. At last, in the winter of 1955, Pak was sentenced to
death. Then the Soviet-Koreans began to defend their originality so
far as the theoretical foundation of the Korean revolution was con
cerned, denying all the identical positions formerly held by Pak Hon-yong:
182. Kim Saia-kyu, Chosen Genttaishi (Modern History of Korea), (Tokyo: Chikuma Sho-bo, 1963), p. 70. As of 1950, shortly before the Korean War, the Enlarged Central Committee of the (North Korean) Democratic National United Front for the Unification of the Father land proposed a peace unification plan in which they specified the leading names of the "national traitors." They were Syung-man Rhee, Lee Pom-sok, Kim Song-su, Sin Song-mo, Cho Pyong-ok, Ch'ae Pyong-dok, Yun Ch'i-yong, and Sin Hung-wu.
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"After the Korean Liberation, the Pale Hon-yong clique described the Com-Group headed by Pale Hon-yong as ' light in darle night and clear water in a muddy stream' in the Korean labor movement. They attempted to obliterate the brilliant fighting record of sound communists headed by Kim Il-song, and sought to falsify history by presenting themselves as the true followers of the orthodox line inherited from the Korean revolutionary tradition. The Pak Hon-yong clique described the American imperialist troops as the liberators of the Korean people, and in this way made it appear that their adversaries (the American imperialist troops) were friends. Moreover, the Pak Hon-yong clique tried to set up a bourgeois democratic system in Korea and were instrumental in handing over our liberated fatherland to the American imperialists by installing the notorious running dog of the American imperialists, Syung-man Rhee, as the president of what they called the People's Republic." 183
In addition, the Soviet-Korean Communists under the leadership of
Kim Il-song had to take up a position that would deny the central
leadership of the Korean Communist Party to Pak Hon-yong, by
emphasizing the part Kim Il-song played when he established the
"democratic base" in North Korea:
"Marshall Kim Il-song proposed to all communists to set up a central leading organization in North Korea...... and to establish a correct political line of the party. But spying agents, Pak Hon-yong and Lee Sung-hyop and their followers, insisted on supporting the 'central organization in Seoul' that had been arbitrarily fabricated in violation of demo cratic principles, and opposed the creation of a central leading organization, refusing to set it up in NOrth Korea." 184
183. Choson T 'ongsa (General History of Korea), p. 14.
184. Ibid., p . 15
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They also claimed that by setting up the "organizational committee"
of the North Korean Communist Party, a new type of Marxist-Leninist
party "under the leadership of sound communists" had been created
in Korea for the first time. And finally, they contended that it
was "Comrade Kim Il-song" who rallied "the revolutionary workers and
working masses" and shattered "every scheme of all hues of factionists 185 to hinder the founding of the Party."
These charges of rightist-leftist factional errors were not
developed on the ideological plane, but were used mainly for
silencing or eliminating Kim Il-song's political foes. They became
a convenient tool for the Soviet-Koreans in getting rid of all the
opponents itfho did not conform to the political principles laid down
by Kim Il-song. Shortly after the amalgamation of the parties took
place, Kim Il-song criticized his opponents with the following words:
"There is no doubt that the Marxists-Leninists are positively involved in carrying out the task of the 'democratic revolution' today and those revolu tionaries who are armed with Marxism-Leninism should play the nuclear role in our Party. But it is a big mistake to think that only those who are adept in Marxism-Leninism can participate in this task and only they can enter the Workers Party. . . . And some insist that Marxism-Leninism should not become the Party's leading principle any more and the Communists should give up their Marxist-Leninist principles since our party has become the Workers' Party. This is the most dangerous rightist view." 186
185. Facts About Korea, p. 35.
186. Kim Il-song, "Pukchoson Nodong-tang ch'angnip taehwe ui ch'onghwa e kwanhayo" ("On the Total Result of the Foundation of the North Korean Workers Party"), (September 9, 1946), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), Vol. I, p. 156.
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As will become clear later, these charges were obviously directed
against what Kim Il-song called "sectionalists," "individual
heroists," and local bossists," among whom Oh Ki-sou, a national
communist, became the main target.
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2. True Revolutionaries and Revolutionary Allies.
It is clear that Kim Il-song ruled out the immediate possibility
of transforming Korean society into socialism. But when he mentioned
the "democratic revolution," it is not clear whether he meant it to
be a "bourgeois revolution," in terms of the Marxist formula, which
underlines the importance of the bourgeois role in that particular
stage of a revolution, or whether he simply referred to Lenin's
"democratic" and "bourgeois" revolution which is led by workers in
alliance with the peasants. If it were the former, the predominant
bourgeois role had to be justified in the same way Marx advised the 187 German Communist League and the workers in 1850. Had it meant
what Lenin indicated, both the bourgeois and the peasants should
have been discredited, except for the special qualification that the
peasants were to be the temporary allies of the workers, but must
always be controlled by the party of the proletariat.
At least during the formative years of the Republic, the main
concern of Kim Il-song and his followers had been to gain support
from the people. Because of the people's distrust of Kim Il-s5ng's
true identity, the unquestioned popularity of other nationalists and
communist leaders, and the national aspirations of Korean unity, the
Soviet-Koreans had to bend to the prevailing situation. They had to
restrain themselves from using unfamiliar terms with the Korean public,
such as "communism" and"dictatorship of the proletariat," while
calling for national unity which would include as many people as
187. Marx said that "the coming revolution in Germany" should be made "by the bourgeoisie with the help of the workers, and should give power to the former." John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism, p. 228.
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possible from all classes. In addition, a new terminology was needed
to gear the aspirations of the people to a new ideology that would in
spire their hopes and dreams for a new Korea. This intention is well
illustrated in Kim Il-song's speech on "Our Task to Build a New
Democratic State." In this speech, he asserted that unity should
come first, through which the difficult task of constructing a nation
of "New Democracy" would be accomplished:
"What should we have to do to accomplish this great task (of building 'New Democracy')? The first thing we must do is to eradicate from the root the factional strife that had been deep-seated throughout our National Liberation Movement. Because of that fac tional strife, Korea was at one time ruined, and for that matter, our Koreans could not fight against the foreign aggressors with unity. We must not repeat this same error in the future. The most important thing to us is unity. All the patriotic and democratic forces must firmly unite together." 188
His avoidance of such terms as "Communism" and "Dictatorship of the
Proletariat" and his continued usage of "Nationalism" and "New
Democracy" often caused confusion among the people and made them be
lieve that Kim Il-song was perhaps a strong nationalist rather than
a communist who would simply follow Russian directives. This is
best illustrated in the Sinuichu Incident. When a revolt broke out
at the end of 1945 in Sinuichu, an industrial town in the Northwestern
corner of the Korean peninsula, Kim Il-song went to the scene in
an effort to pacify the raging crowd that rose up against oppressive
communist measures. He told the thousands of people that the local
188. Kim Il-song, "Sae minchchuui lcukka konsol ul wihan uri ui kwaop" ("Our Task to Build a New Democratic State"), (October 18, 1945), Selected Works (P'yongvang: Kulcrip Ch'ul- pan-sa, 1964), p. 12.
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communists were responsible for the student riot and emphasized New 189 Democracy as the national goal he embraced.
The new "New Democracy" was first used by Mao Tse-tung in 1939 in
the second chapter of his The Chinese Revolution and the CCP, suggesting
that it meant the dictatorship of the united front of all revolutionary
classes. Within one month, Mao wrote another essay, "On New Democracy,"
in which he explained the concept in more detail. In this booklet, he
drew sharp distinctions between the democratic and socialist stages of the
Chinese revolution. The democratic stage, he said, is not democratic in
a general sense, but "a new and specific kind, of a Chinese type— new
democracy," which has the following characteristics:
". . . it is fundamentally still a bourgeois-democratic revolu tion in which the objective requirement is still hasically to clear away the obstacles in the way of capitalist development; neverthe less, this revolution is no longer the old type led solely by the bourgeoisie for the building of capitalist society and a state of the bourgeois dictatorship, but a new type of revolution wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at the setting up of a new democratic society, a new state of the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes."190
189. This is based on an interview with Dr. Cho song-yun, who is presently employed at the Law Division, Library of Congress, in Washington, D. C. Dr. Cho was one of the students who took part in the revolt and vividly recalls what Kim Il-song said at that time. According to his account, most of the audience was deeply impressed with Kim Il-song's speech because they thought the "New Democracy" was something different from communism. See also Lee Chong-sik, "Politics in North Korea," North Korea Today, p. 5.
190. Mao Tse-tung, "On the New Democracy," (January 1940), in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbanlc, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 265. As early as the mid-1920's the Communist leadership examined the basic class structure in the colonies and semi-colonies, and felt a need to form "a bloc of four classes — the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants and the proletariat — against the imperialists and reactionary indigenous classes." Robert C. North, Chinese Communism, (New York & Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 49-50.
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He then pointed out more specifically that multi-class coalition existed
among the working class, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie, and that
any class which opposes imperialism could become their ally.
"Therefore, no matter what the circumstances, the Chinese proletariat, peasantry, intelligentsia, and other petty-bourgeois elements are the main force upon which the fate of China depends. These classes either have awakened or are awakening, and are bound to be the basic parts of the state and government framework in the democratic Republic of China. The democratic Republic of China which we are aiming to construct now can only take the form of dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people, .i.e.. , a new democratic republic. "191
Though Mao Tse-tung did not explicitly include the national bourgeoisie
in this writing, it was mentioned and implied as "a member of the new
'united front,' or 'joint,' dictatorship, as 'the national bourgeoisie. . .
oppressed by imperialism. . . constitutes one of the revolutionary 192 forces.'"
It was 1949 when Mao wrote "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship,"
in which his first explicit reference to the "national bourgeoisie"
appeared as one of the classes of the new democracy:
"Who are the 'people'? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. Under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, these classes unite together to form their own state and elect their own government (so as to) carry out a dictatorship over the lackeys of imperialism— the landlord class, the bureaucratic capitalist class, and the Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen representing these classes. . ."193
191. Mao Tze-tung, "On the New Democracy," Ibid., p. 266.
192. Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 79. Quoted from Mao Tse-tung Hsuan—chi, Vol. II published in the border area of Shansi—Chahar— Hopei in March, 1945. The term, national bourgeoisie, referred to the nationalists who were opposed to imperialism but who were not necessarily Communis t-oriented. 193. Mao Tze-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," (July, 1949), in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbanlc, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 456.
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The keynote of this passage lies in the fact that the "New Democracy"
of Mao Tse-tung stressed Communist leadership of a "joint dictatorship"
of the "people." As early as 1945 a similar tone was voiced by Kim
Il-song in his appeal for the formation of the "Democratic National
United Front," in which the workers, the peasants, the national bour
geoisie, and the "patriotic intellectuals" were all included under the
slogan of building a "New Democratic Korea":
"To oppose the remaining imperialist forces and feudal forces and to carry out the democratic revolution to the end, a peoples' government, a people's democratic republic led by the working class must be established, with the formation of a democratic united front. And the front should include, with the working class as its nucleus, the peasant masses, patriotic intellectuals, and even the national bourgeoisie who have a national conscience." 194
There is a common feature between the two statements of Mao Tse-tung
and Kim Il-song: A united front should be established among all
classes that oppose the imperialist forces and feudal forces. But
unlike Mao Tse-tung in 1949, Kim Il-song placed certain qualifications
on the last two classes of the "people." He accepted the intellectuals
and'".the national bourgeoisie, but insisted that they must be
"patriotic" and possessed of "national conscience." Kim Il-song 195 left in question the prime criterion for determining these abstract terms.
194._ Kim Il-song, "Sae Choson konsol kwa minjolc t'ongil chonson e tae hayo" ("On the Construction of a New Democratic Korea and A National United Front"), Selected Works, p. 8.
195. It may be noteworthy that Pak Hon-yong conceived of this "national conscience" of the national bourgeoisie to mean a sort of proper judgment to pay "appropriate wages" to the workers. For this account, see Kim Chong-inyong, Chosen Shinminshushugi Kakumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution -i-n Korea), pp. 96-97.
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This question foreshadowed the future differences between Kim
Il-song's concept of the "multi-class dictatorship" and that of Mao
Tse-tung. Kim Il-song gradually eliminated or absorbed the intellectuals
and the national bourgeoisie, while Mao Tse-tung insisted that an
alliance with a section of the bourgeoisie, particularly with the
national bourgeoisie, is necessary not only during the democratic
revolution but even during the socialist revolution for "they are not 196 to be counted among the enemy."
As in the case of Mao Tse-tung, Kim Il--song's inclusion of the
national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals in the category of the
"people" is an obvious departure from the Marxist-Leninist formula.
Lenin had never included these two classes in the ranks of the "people."
On the contrary, he took a strong stand against the bourgeoisie both
in theory and practice:
"A Social-Democrat must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage the class struggle for Socialism even against the most democratic and republican bour geoisie. This is beyond doubt. Hence the ab solute necessity of a separate, independent, strictly class party of Social-Democracy. Hence the temporary nature of our tactics of "striking jointly" with the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict watch "over our ally, as over an enemy. ..." 197
196. Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, p. 147 Quoted from Sun Ting-kuo, "A Tremendous Development of the Law of Marxist Dialectics," Che-hsuch Yen-chiu, No. 3, (June 15, 1958), p . 16.
197. Vladimir I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," (July, 1905), Selected Works, Vol. I, book 2, p. 90. Of course, Lenin was not referring specifically to a national bourgeoisie at that time.
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Lenin's warning against the bourgeoisie is based upon its counter
revolutionary nature that betrays the "people" by taking the side
of the enemies:
"We Marxists all know. . . that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, self-seeking and cowardly in its support of the revolution. The bourgeoisie, in the mass, will inevitably turn towards counter revolution, towards the autocracy, against the revolution and against the people, immediately its narrow, selfish interests are met, immediately it 'recoils' from consistent democracy (and it is already recoiling from it!) There remains the 'people', that is, the proletariat and the peasantry; the proletariat alone can be relied on to march to the end, for it is going far beyond the democratic revolution."198
Thus, Lenin's own use of the term "people" included only the "pro
letariat" and the "peasantry." But this was not Lenin's final defini
tion of "people." Designating the peasants as "petty bourgeoisie,"
Lenin rejected the peasantry as a permanent ally of the proletariat.
For Lenin, the peasantry was to be used only to consummate a revolu
tionary seizure of power, after which they were to be discarded by
the proletariat.
"The peasantry includes a great number of semi-proletarian as well as petty-bourgeois elements. This causes it also to be unstable and compels the proletariat to unite in a strictly class party. . . .The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolu tion by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resis- tence of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. . . ."199
In substance, therefore, only the proletariat was the true revolutionary
class which would carry on the historical mission of establishing the
dictatorship of the proletariat, not the dictatorship of the proletariat
and peasantry.
198. Ibid., p. 104.
199. Ibid., p. 104-105.
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As will be clear from the following, however, the real position
of Kim Il-song on class dictatorship was no departure at all from
Lenin's formula. But under the circumstances, Kim Il-song had to
permit the intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and the national bour
geoisie to continue their limited activities, mainly for two reasons.
First, it was not the workers and peasants, but the intellectuals and
the national bourgeoisie who played the leading role in the Korean
independence movement during the Japanese occupation. Without their
help and cooperation, the communists could not expect to produce any
tangible effect on their efforts to expand the Party's influence.
Obviously, the Soviet-Koreans knew this from the beginning. Secondly,
the popularity of the political leaders, mostly intellectuals and
national bourgeoisie, was superior to that of the Communists, for they 200 replaced the old Yangbans in their social status.
Kim Il-song,despite his endorsement of the multi-class dictator
ship ,which would include the national bourgeoisie, hated the bourgeois
class and constantly exposed and stressed the crimes they had
committed in the past:
"The national bourgeoisie are afraid of our struggle against the remnants of Japanese im perialism in the past. It is wrong to insist that we should not expose and criticize their crimes at a time we are calling for the 'United National Front'" 201
200. During the Japanese occupation of Korea, many of the old Yangban class had maintained their social and economic status. But as the new classes, mainly the intellectuals who obtained modern knowledge at schools and the national bourgeoisie who accumulated wealth under the new Japanese economic system, emerged, social status began to change.
201. Kim Il-song, "Sae Choson konsol kwa minjok t'ongil chonson e tae hayo" ("On the Construction of a New Democratic Korea and A National United Front"), Selected Works, pp. 6-7.
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The same is true of his dealing with the intellectuals. Unlike
Lenin's exclusion of the intellectuals from his concept of the "people,"
Kim Il-song, at least in theory, praised and placated the intellectuals.
He included this class in his concept of the "people":
"Since the Korean Liberation (up to date), the Korean intellectuals have made considerable contributions to the constructional work of our nation. . . . Likewise, in North Korea, the abso lute majority of the intellectuals is firmly united around our Party and the People's Committees, and devotedly struggling for the construction of a democratic Korea." 202
But, just as Lenin, Kim Il-song had no faith in the intellectuals because
of their lack of enthusiasm and understanding of the Communist cause.
In 1948, he grimly warned that:
"Among our intellectuals, there are still many who cherish the remaining old ideas of Japanese Imperialism, and do not understand the history and the cultural peculiarity of our country and the direction the progressive people'•in the world are aiming at." 203
In the order of priority among the friendly classes, the national
bourgeoisie was the first to be left out and the intellectuals next,
in contrast to the workers and peasants who were ranked first and second
by Kim Il-song as friendly revolutionary allies whose alliance would
become the basis of the united front.
202. Kim Il-song, "Munhwaindul un munhwa chonson ui t'usa ro tweoya hanta" ("The Cultured Men Should Become the Fighters of the Cultural Front"), (May 24, 1946), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), Vol. I, p. 70.
203. Kim Il-song, "Modun him ul minchukichi ui kanghwa wa choguk ui t'ongil tolcrip ul wihayo" ("To Devote All Efforts for Strengthening the Democratic Base and for Unification and Independence of the Fatherland"), (March 29, 1948), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulpan-sa, 1964), p. 393.
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"If we want firmly to consolidate the united front now, the first thing we have to do is to strengthen the alliance of the workers and the peasants and to win over the widespread peasantry to our side.11 204
Furthermore, he claimed that their alliance ensured the victory of the
democratic revolution:
"The victory of the land reform was ensured by the firm alliance between the workers and the peasants. In the struggle against the landlords, the peasants, with the workers' support, came to have more confidence and demonstrated positive attitudes." 205
Kim Il-song's position on the class coalition thus appeared to be reduced
to the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," .i.e.. , Lenin's
position of 1905. Yet, as Lenin believed that "the alliance between wor
kers and peasants must be only temporary" and "that after the bourgeois 206 revolution the poor peasants must be set against the rich ones," Kim
Il-song also foresaw a struggle in the peasantry among which only what
Lenin called "semi-proletarians" could be counted on as true revolutionary
allies:
204. Kim Il-song, "Sae Choson konsolkwa minjok t'ongil chonson e tae hayo" ("On the Construction of A New Democratic Korea and A National United Front"), Selected Works, p. 8.
205. Kim Il-song, "T'ochi lcaehyok ui ch'onglcyolkwa kumhu kwaop" ("The Total Results of the Land Reform and Our Future Tasks"), Selected Works, pp. 47-48.
206. John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism, p. 234.
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"There is no need to mention that the Party should organize the cells in small and large factories. Likewise, the Party should also pene trate deeply into the poor peasants and the farm hands and start extensively organizing cells among them. It is the most important task before the Party to prepare for the coming fight in near future." 207
The peasants were gradually to be split into "semi-proletariat"
and "petty bourgeoisie," of which the latter might side with the
reactionary forces. But during the incipient stage of democratic
revolution, when it is hard to tell one from the other, the peasants
as a whole would remain the only ally of the proletariat, playing a
secondary role. They were to help carry out the historical mission
of the proletarian dictatorship. This subsidiary role of the peasantry
was clearly indicated by Kim Il-song when he praised the proletarian
class for its contribution to the effective achievement of the democratic
revolution:
"Our Party . . . sent out to the rural areas the workers who are the major force in the con struction of our fatherland and let them help the peasants in their class struggle . . . ." 208
Even though Kim Il-s5ng did not specifically mention the petty
bourgeoisie here, and rarely elsewhere in that part of his Selected
Works covering the early days of his political power, it is clear
that he included this class in the "people":
207. Kim Il-song, "T'ochi kaehyok ui ch1ongkyolkwa kumhu kwaop" ("The Total Results of the Land Reform and Our Future Tasks"), Selected Works, pp. 58-59.
208. Ibid. , p. 54.
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"All the popular masses of the workers, the intellectuals, the peasants, the handicraftsmen, the businessmen, and the merchants — except the pro-Japanese, the national traitors, and the re actionaries — rallied around the people's govern ment and positively took part in the affairs of the people's committees." 209
He even defended free enterprise among the petty bourgeoisie:
"We must ensure free activities of entrepre neurs and merchants and promote the medium and small industries. By so doing, we are able to produce for the consumer goods that are necessary for the life of the people." 210
Despite all this, his avoidance of the term "petty bourgeoisie" during
this period raises a political question: was it because he feared certain
consequences that might undermine the premeditated coalition plan,
including the petty bourgeoisie? There is an indication that Kim Il-
song did not want to identify his Communist Party with the Sinmin-tang
(New People's Party), constituted largely of the petty bourgeoisie. In
the Report made at the Inaugural Congress of the North Korean Workers'
Party in August, 1946, Kim Il-song pointed out that:
"Another serious tendency is that our Party is reportedly being turned into the New People's Party and the petty bourgeoisie .... We must steadily fight against such a tendency to under mine the organizational discipline and unity of thought in our Party and to make it a simple group of the working masses or a friendly organization
209. Kim Il-song, "P'al ilo haepang ilchunyon P'yongyangsi kyongch'uK taehwe eso han pogo" ("A Report Delivered at the P'yongyang Rally Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15"), Selected Works, p. 121.
210. Kim Il-song, "Sae minchchuui kukka konsol ul wihan uri ui kwaop" ("Our Task to Build a New Democratic State"), Selected Works, p. 13.
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of the petty bourgeoisie type." 211
Nor did he wish to alienate this class and antagonize the New People's
Party; he wanted to form a broadly based coalition front that would
draw mass support from the largest portion of the North Korean popula
tion. Keeping this dual purpose in mind, Kim Il-song, while clearly
dividing the line of interest between the two parties, called for their
merger in the interest of the working masses:
"Therefore, the merger between the Communist Party that represented the working class and the New People's Party that stood for the interest of the peasants and intellectuals was proposed. This merger between these two parties indicates the maturing of our country's social development and was fully consistent with the interests of the working masses." 212
Thus,in the final analysis, the proletariat remains the only true
revolutionary class entrusted to lead the Korean Revolution. In one
of his early statements, Kim Il-song clearly stated that:
"Only the working class, which opposed the Japanese Imperialism to the last and fought bravely against it, can and must lead the Korean Revolution." 213
211. Kim Il-song, "Kunro taejung ui t'ongilcchok tang ui ch'angkon ul wihayo" ("For the Establishment of a United Party of the Working Masses"), (August 29, 1946), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), Vol. I, p. 146.
212. Kim Il-song, "Ch'angnip ilchunyon ul majihanun pukchoson Nodong-tang" ("The North Korean Workers Party Observing the First Anniversary of Its Foundation") (August 28, 1947), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), Vol. I, p. 266.
213. Kim Il-song, "Sae Chosen konsol kwa minjok t'ongil chonson e tae hayo" ("On the Construction of a New Democratic Korea and a Nation al United Front"), Selected Works, p. 4.
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This contradictory attitude of calling for the "multi-class dictator
ship" on the one hand and endorsing Lenin's "proletarian dictatorship"
headed by the working class on the other, however, was not unique to
Kim Il-song. The same attitude could be seen in several Eastern European
countries where the post-war Stalinist coalition tactics had been widely 214 accepted during the initial stage of the Communist takeover. There
fore, it may be convenient to analyze the actions taken by Kim Il-song
in this context.
214. For the interplay of "people's democracy" and "dictatorship of the proletariat," see Gordon Skilling, "People's Democracy and the Socialist Revolution: A Case Study in Communist Scholarship," Soviet Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3, (January, 1961), pp. 249-251.
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3. Coalition Tactics and the Fatherland Liberation War.
It has been emphasized by Western scholars that the pattern of
Communism's swift advance into Europe and the political take-over in
many Eastern European countries after the Second World War should be
explained in terms of common features applicable to all. According to
R. N. Carew Hunt, this pattern can be divided into three stages. The
first stage is described as the "genuine coalition government in the
form of a 'Popular,' 'National,' or 'Democratic Front'" within which
a common program is carried out by the constituent parties. The second
stage is depicted as the "bogus" coalition during which the formation
of "stooge parties" and the elimination of the non-Communist leaders
takes place. Characteristic of this stage is the "destruction of the
Peasant Party". And the final stage is referred to as the "monolithic"
stage, when "the 'bogus' coalition becomes a single 'People's Front' 215 under rigid Communist discipline."
There is a close parallel of this pattern in the case of North
Korea. During the period corresponding to the first stage, there was
a brief coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists in the
"South P'yongan Province." After the house arrest of Cho Man-sik, the
North Korean Provisional People's Committee was set up under the
leadership of Kim Il-song in alliance with both indigenous and Yenan
Communists. Then, the Soviet-Koreans openly emerged on the political
215. R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism: An Introduction, p. 200.
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scene and formed the North Korean Democratic National United Front.
The Front consisted of thirteen political and social organizations, inclu
ding the North Korean Communist Party, the New People's Party, the Demo- 216 cratic Party, and the Young Friends of Chondolcyo Party, whose party
heads shared the co-chairmanship of the Front. The Front supported and
helped to carry out the "democratic reforms."
The next step for the Soviet-Koreans was to make an alliance with
the powerful Yenan faction, represented by the New People's Party, in
order to curb the influence of domestic factions headed by Oh Ki-sop 217. and Chong Tal-hyon. This was achieved on August 29, 1946, when the
merger took place between the North Korean Communist Party and the
New People's Party. As a result, the North Korean Workers Party was
created and drew support largely from the workers, peasants, and
216. The Young Friends of Ch'ondokyo Party was founded in February 5, 1946, under the leadership of Chong Tal-hyon.
217. Kim Ch'ang-sun attributes the major reason for this party merger to factional interests rather than ideological necessity. According to his account, the domestic faction and foreign factions did not respect each other, each of which asserted its own past contributions to the cause of national independence. And this encouraged the merger of the two fore ign factions. Kim Ch'ang-sun, "Choson Nodong-tang ui p'ajaeng" ("The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party"), p. 60. Also, see Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 102-103. But Kim Il-sOng claimed that the merger was inevitable be cause the two shared the common objective of struggling for the "urgent needs" of the working masses. Kim Il-song, "Pukchoson Nodong-tang che ich'a chontang taehwe eso chinsulhan tang chungang wiwonhwe saop kyolsan poko wa lcyOlron" ("Balance Sheets and Conclusions to the Second Congress of the North Korean Workers Party on the Work of the Central Committee"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), p. 177. However, Kim Chong-myong explained that the merger was necessary to form a "militant alliance" among the workers, the peasants, and the intellectuals. Kim Chong-myong, Chosen Shinminshushugi Kakumeishi, (History of the New Demo cratic Revolution in Korea), p. 187.
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218 intellectuals. The Party membership reached 366,000. The second
stage was completed.
Apparently Kim Il-song did not obtain what he had hoped to achieve
by this merger: The chairmanship of the newly emerged North Korean
Workers Party went to Kim Tu-pong, and Kim Il-sOng assumed the vice- 219 chairmanship. But this setback did not matter too much to Kim Il-song,
as this was only one step backward for ten steps forward. Instead, there
was enough reason for Kim Il-song to believe that he had gained something
more important. In the eyes of Kim Il-song, the successful achievement
of the "United Front" and the party merger could be regarded as a victory
of Marxism-Leninism, for they were carried out according to what had
been said by Marx, Lenin, and even by Stalin on the idea of strategic
alliances of the proletariat: uniting while fighting. This strategic
alliance was employed by Kim Il-song first in his dealings with the
national bourgeoisie when he made it clear that "we must make it a 220 firm principle to fight against them, while uniting with them."
218. As of December 17, 1945, just eight months before the merger, there were only 4,530 members in the North Korean Communist Party, Kim Il-song, "Choson Kongsan-tang pukchoson chojilc x^iwonhwe che samch'a hwak- tae taehwe pogo" (The Report of the Third Enlarged Meeting of the North Korean Organization Committee of the Korean Communist Party"), (December 17, 1945), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1963), Vol. 1, pp.15-17
219. It is believed that there was an attempt to make Kim Il-song chairman of the Party at the meeting of the party merger. As the atmos phere of the meeting became restless, however, a recess was called on the advice of a Russian Colonel,Ignatiev. Later, at the Plenary session of the meeting, the Soviet-Koreans appeared to have agreed to elect Kim Tu-pong as the chairman. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 99-100.
220. Kim Il-song, "Sae Choson konsDl kwa minjok t'ongil chonsOn e tae hayo" ("On the Construction of a New Democratic Korea and a Nation al United Front:), Selected Works, pp.6-7.
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The logic of this idea of a temporary marriage of convenience points
to one fundamental belief: that the Communist Party alone is the
possessor of truth. This uncompromising attitude was well revealed
from the beginning, when Kim Il-song stated:
"Our Party should not hesitate to make an ally of and work with any party which calls for the unification and independence of our country. But our Communist Party should not follow their tails, and furthermore, there cannot be any absorption of our Party by others. Our Communist Party should always maintain our uniqueness, while working together with them." 221
Kim Il-song persisted in the same attitude even after the party merger,
reiterating the unique mission of the North Korean Workers Party:
"... we must make the allied but non- Party members in social organizations realize that only our Party thoroughly safeguards their class interests and can lead the Korean people to freedom, happiness and national prosperity. . ."222
It is obvious, therefore, that as long as Kim Il-song kept this line of
thought, the party merger with the New People's Party was not meant to
be the creation of a new party synthesizing the North Korean Communist
Party and the New People's Party on an equal basis. In fact, the plat
form adopted for the North Korean Workers Party was another counterpart
of Kim Il-song's Twenty Point Program, for it proposed the nationaliza
tion of properties owned by so-called "national traitors," the insurance
221. Ibid., p . 6.
222. Kim Il-song, "Pukchoson Nodong-tang che ich'a chontang taehwe eso chinsulhan tang chungang wiwonhwe saop lcyolsan poko wa kyolron: ("Balance Sheets and Conclusions to the Second Congress of the North Korean Workers Party on the Work of the Central Committee"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), p. 378.
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of people's rights and freedom of press, publication, assembly and faith,
the principle of land reform or confiscation without compensation and 223 free distribution, the enforcement of an eight-hour work day, and sc on.
Although there was no direct mention of Marxism-Leninism as the guiding
principle of the Party at that time, the wording of "to represent the 224 working masses" in the Party Rules was meant to exclude the petty-
bourgeois element from the party. This was frankly admitted by Kim Il-
song in February, 1959, after Kim Tu-pong and other central Yenan-Korean
figures had been purged:
"... our Workers Party was created by merging the Communist Party and the New People's Party. The New People's Party was a petty- bourgeois party, which can not be viewed as completely approving Communism." 225
224. These Party Rules have been amended twice, first at the Third Party Congress, and second at the Fourth Party Congress. In the Pre face of this revised Party Rules, the following words were inserted: "The Korean Workers Party is the direct successor of the glorious revo lutionary tradition achieved by the Korean Communists in the anti-Japanese armed struggle." For the complete text of this Party Rules, see "The Party Rules of the Korean Workers Party" in Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), pp. 672-678.
225. This was translated by Glenn D. Paige in "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, (edited by A. Doalc Barnett), (New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 233. For the original text, see Kim Il-song, "Choson Nodong-tang chungang wiwOnhwe 1959 nyon iwol chonwon hweui eso han kyollon" ("Concluding Remarks at the February, 1959, Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party"), Selected Works, (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1960), Vol. VI., p. 266.
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All this indicates that, in substance, the New People's Party
was ideologically absorbed by the North Korean Communist Party under
the new name of the North Korean Workers Party.
The perfection of the North Korean Workers Party in the North
frustrated the Communists in the South, particularly Pak Hon-yong,
who had aimed at leadership among the Korean Communists. It was more
frustrating when they were convinced that the American presence in Korea
was not temporary, that their legal activities in the South were becoming
increasingly difficult as the Nationalist forces began to consolidate
their power, and that despite the formation of the coalition front among
the Leftist organizations in the South, they were yet to be unified under
one leadership. All these factors of frustration drove some of the Leftist
leaders to form a unified Communsit organization in the South— the South 226 Korean Communist Party. However, the formation of the South Korean
Communist Party was not the answer to their frustration. The more the
Communists intensified their efforts to create a strong Communist move
ment, the harsher the suppression of the Communists became. In December,
1948, the South Korean Workers Party was outlawed and forced to move
its headquarters to the North. The mass migration of the South Korean
Workers Party members to the North prompted another party merger bet
ween the North Korean Workers Party and the South Korean Workers Party,
226. There was some opposition to the coalition. As the pro-coalition group led by Pak Hon-yong and Ho Hon formed the South Korean Workers Party, the opposition group rallied behind Yo Wun-hyong and formed Sahwe Nodong-tang (the Social Workers Party) in January, 1947. Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948, p. 308.
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and the officially designated Choson Nodong-tang (The Korean Workers
Party) was formed on June 24, 1949. This time, the Party chairmanship
went to Kim Il-song, and Pak H5n-yong and Kim Tu-pong assumed vice
chairmanships. The power consolidation of Kim Il-song in the Korean
Workers Party was consummated. But the Korean Communist Party alone
was not enough. To avoid giving an impression that North Korea was
governed by a one party dictatorship, Kim Il-song needed to create a
'bogus coalition' that would support the Korean Workers Party policies
under the name of representatives of the "people." Thus, on June 25,
1949, "the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" was ins- 227 tailed under rigid Communist control. The final "monolithic" stage
was completed. The merger between the two Workers parties in the North
and South had been achieved because international circumstances dic
tated that, if it were to survive, the South Korean Workers Party would
have to move to the North. The formation of "the Democratic Front
for Unification of the Fatherland" and the creation of the North Korean
Workers Party by merging the North Korean Communist Party and the New
People's Party can be regarded as a conscious effort on the part of
the Soviet-Koreans to emulate the coalition tactics that were first laid
down by Marx, then restated by Lenin, and finally formulated by Stalin
into its most succinct form. In his famous masterpiece on Communist
strategy, "The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolu
tion," Lenin stated:
227. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pulchan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 185-187.
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"A Social-Democrat must never, even for an instant, forget that the proletarian class struggle for socialism against the most demo cratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is inevitable. This is beyond doubt. From this logically follows the abso lute necessity of a separate, independent and strictly class party of Social-Democracy. From this logically follows the provisional character of our tactics to 'strike together' with the bourgeoisie and the duty to carefully watch 'our ally' as if he were an enemy! ..." 228
Stalin summed up the entire principle in the following words:
"This power, the power of one class (the class of the proletarians), can be firmly established and exercised to the full only by means of a special form of alliance between the class of proletarians and the labouring masses of the petty-bourgeois classes, primarily the labouring masses of the peasantry." 229
The Success of coalition tactics, coupled with the organizational
unity in the Party under Kim Il-song's influence, was followed by a
new ambitious undertaking— an attempt to unify Korea, this time by
force. On June 25, 1950, guns were fired across the 38th Parallel, and
new pages of world history were added by the world's involvement in the
Korean War.
The war was the final explosion of the deep antagonism that had
developed over the years between the North and the South. But as to
the question of who was the real culprit in starting the war, there have
been conflicting claims. The North accused the South of responsibility
for the War by deliberately launching an attack first, and vice versa.
228. Vladimir I. Lenin, "The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" (July, 1905), Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1943), Vol. Ill, p. 100.
229. Joseph Stalin, "On the Problems of Leninism" (January 25, 1926), Problems of Leninism, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), p. 160.
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Kim Il-song claimed that it was the Republic of Korea Army which
first started over-all attacks along the 38th Parallel, that the 230 "Republic's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) brave defenders"
repelled the attackers, and that the government of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea ordered the "People's Army" to counter- 231 attack the "armed forces of the enemy." According to Kim Il-song,
the Republic of Korea led by Syung-man Rhee had planned for the War
"for a long time." And as evidence of this war preparation, Kim Il-
song listed the measures taken by the government of the Republic of
Korea against "all democratic parties" in the South, the establishment
of a United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
Army, and an Agreement for Joint Defense and Assistance between the 232 United States and the Republic of Korea. This position is strongly
endorsed by Wilfred G. Burchett, a well-known western Communist jour
nalist who travelled extensively in several communist countries in
Asis. He points out in his recently published book, Again Korea,
that the United States military advisors started "planning and agitating
230. The Republic of Korea was founded in the South on August 15, 1948, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established on September 9, 1948, in the North.
231. "Chonch'e Choson inmindul eke hosohan Choson minchuchuui inmin kongwhakulc naekalc susang Kim Il-song changkun ui pangsong yonsol" ("The Broadcast Speech Appealed to All Korean People by the Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, General Kim Il-song), Inmin (People), Vol. 5, No. 7, (July 1950), p. 3.
232. Haksup chaeryo: che ilho (Study Materials, No. 1), (Chonra namdo, Korea: Propaganda and Agitation Section, South Chonra Provincial Party Headquarters, The Korean Workers Party, n.d.), p. 2. This booklet is assumed to have been published during 1950 when the Chonra Province was under Communist occupation.
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for 'reunification' by armed force." To support this argument, he
quoted a statement of Syung-man Rhee, published in the Seoul Sinmun
on October 8 , 1949, under the headline of "Possible to Occupy P'yong- 233 yang." In addition, Burchett contends that John Foster Dulles'
visit to Korea on June 17, 1950, for "actual operational plans for the
attack to the North," the Tokyo arrivals of the United States Secretary
of War, Louis Johnson, and General Omar Bradley, head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, "to confer with MacArthur" on June 18, and the sub
sequent flight of Secretary Dulles to Tokyo from Korea shortly before
June 25— all are testimony of how "the Dulles-MacArthur-Rhee plan 234 was put into operation."
The Republic of Korea made a similar charge against North Korea
for its sudden attack across the 38th Parallel, saying that the "Korean
People's Army" had attacked across the Parallel, but that the Republic
of Korea Army had bravely resisted the assault and launched a counter- 235 offensive. The Research Institute for Internal and External Affairs
in Seoul describes the major factors that might have prompted the North
Korean attack against the South as follows: the United States Forces
in South Korea were evacuated by June 29, 1949; the announcement of the
Acheson-Line" connecting Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, etc. as the
United States defense line in the Pacific Area; an overwhelming number
of independents were elected to the National Assembly in the South in
233. Wilfred G. Burchett, Again Korea. (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1968), p. 124.
234. Ibid., pp. 127-128.
235. Seoul Sinmun. (June 25, 1950).
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the 1950 election, from which the Communists concluded that the Republic
of Korea Government was lacking the people's confidence; the Soviet
Union successfully tested an atomic bomb in September, 1949; the Korea-
Soviet Economic and Cultural Pact of March, 1949, was in essence a mili
tary agreement; and the Communist Chinese took all the China mainland 236 and Mao set up his own regime on October 1, 1949.
An article published in Hankulc Ilpo argued that it was a calculated,
coordinated attack by the North Koreans prepared and staged in secret,
in cooperation and consultation with the Russians, carrying out the pro
visions of the secret Korea-Soviet Military Pact of 1949: to give
additional Russian assistance in military facilities and weapons to
North Korea, to send 120 special Russian military advisors to North
Korea by May, 1949, and to send Russian materials amounting to one bil- 237 lion won to North Korea.
It may be true that the North Koreans might have viewed Secretary
Dulles' inspection tour along the 38th Parallel as a prelude for aggres
sion against the North. It should also not be overlooked that the
North Koreans might have been provoked by Syung-man Rhee and his generals'
constant threats of armed conquest of the North and their strong appeals 238 for American support. But there are several facts that support the
South Korean contention that it was the North Koreans who made the
236. The Origin of the Korean War, (Seoul: The Research Institute for Internal and External Affairs, 1963), p. 20.
237. "Yukio chonya: (On the Eve of June 25), Hankulc Ilpo,(June 16, 1968).
238. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 715.
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initial attack following a premeditated plan in collaboration with
Soviet Russia. For instance, there is a strong indication that some
leftist Koreans in Japan knew, in advance, of the coming event in Korea.
Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen revealed this assumption:
"Information regarding the planned attack (by North Korea) seems to have reached JCP (Japanese Communist Party) headquarters at least ten weeks before the event. Leaders of the suppressed Korean League (Choryon) and of other left-wing organizations are reported to have gathered secretly somewhere in the China Prefecture 239 early in April to prepare for the expected development."
In the light of North Korea's overwhelming military superiority,
South Korea's lack of military preparation, and the fact that the South
fared so badly at the beginning of the War (Seoul was overrun within a
week), one must conclude that South Korea did not initiate the actual
fighting.
It seems also clear that the North Koreans could not have invaded
the South without Russian foreknowledge and possibly even approval.
This supposition is based upon the following facts:
"First, there was a tight network of Russian advisers and Soviet-Korean officers that stretched from the Defense Ministry in P'yongyang to at least the division level of the Korean People's Army. Second, during April and May, .1950, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with heavy artillery, tanks, and airplanes far superior to those available to the Southern forces. Finally, Soviet authorities maintained close control over the Korean People's Army through monthly allocations of of vital petroleum products. 240
239. Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen, "The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, (December, 1950), p. 353.
240. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 35. See also U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover, p. 113f.
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Although it is possible that Stalin contrived the War and gave the
signal to unleash the North Korean troops to cross the Parallel, there
is no material proof to substantiate this contention. At least in
appearance, however, it looks as if the War was initiated by the North
Koreans because of their strong ideological attachments to the theories
laid down by their Russian Communist masters.
Marx and Engels envisaged socialism as possible only when the
bourgeois regimes are overthrown everywhere. Lenin, too, looked for
revolutions in the West, but gave top priority to the consolidation of
the Bolsheviks' power in Russia. It was Stalin who completely turned
the Marx and Engels thesis upside down and established a new theory
of "Socialism in one country" by insisting that the victory of the
revolution in one country is possible without "the combined action of
the proletarians of all countries." But he never denied the necessity
to extend the victory of the revolution from one country to the other:
"... After consolidating its power and leading the peasantry in its wake the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build up a socialist society. But does this mean that it will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of socialism, jL.cL , does it mean that with the forces of only one country it can finally consolidate socialism and fully guarantee that country against intervention and, consequently, also against restoration? No, it does not. For this victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore, the development and support of revolution in other countries is an essential task of the victorious revolution." 241
241. Joseph Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," Problems of Leninism, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), p. 45.
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Kim Il-song did not cease to claim that Korea was a single state,
saying that "the Korean problem cannot be considered by separating 242 the South from the North." But under the circumstances of pre
vailing "imperialism" in the South and the "favorable conditions created
in the North," he decided to carry out the "democratic revolution" in
the North alone. As he later admitted, however, the Korean revolution
still remains in a state of "democratic revolution of anti-imperialism
and anti-feudalism," when it is viewed from the standpoint of all Korea.
"Thus, in the northern half of the Republic, the task of the 'democratic revolution of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism' was completed and an advanced people's democratic system was established. The people in the northern half have gradually reached the transitional road to Socialism .... But in South Korea, there remains out-dated social and economic contradiction . . . This tells that the revolution in our country is still in a stage of 'democratic revolution of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism' . . . "24.3
Unless this revolution is completed on a national scale including
the South, therefore, "Socialism in one country" cannot be achieved.
There is also reason to believe that Kim Il-song thought that
South Korea was ripe for revolution, as he witnessed the political
turmoil and corruption in the South. At the time one of the Communists
in the North described the South Korean situation as follows:
242. Kim Il-song, "P'al ilo haepang ilchunyon P'yongyangsi kyongch'uk taehwe eso han pogo" ("A Report Delivered at the P'yong- yang Rally Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15"), Selected Works, p. 131.
243. Chogulc ui p 'yonghwa cholc t'ongil ul wihayo (For the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland), (P'yongyang: The Korean Workers Party, 1956), pp. 37-39.
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"... the traitors to the country are completely isolated from the people, and the self-collapse and corruption (of the traitors' regime) are speeding its way . . . ." 244
War was justified if it was for the Socialist cause. As Lenin states:
"We are opposed to imperialist wars for the division of spoils among the capitalists, but we have always declared it to be absurd for the revolutionary proletariat to renounce revolutionary wars that may prove necessary in the interests of socialism." 245
Throughout this chapter, an important question arises in connection
with the actions and ideologies of the Soviet-Koreans, mainly of Kim
Il-song: is it possible to give credit to Kim Il-song's brilliant
leadership and flawless mastery of Communist ideology in view of what
he said and what he did?
There are strong indications that he was a capable leader who over
came many serious obstacles and climbed the long, hard way through
steady effort and effective execution of policies that were apparently
planned in advance. But all this was possible only with strong Russian
patronage. As became clear above, Kim Il-song himself lacked much
educational background. He had never engaged in any theoretical
244. Kim Tu-yong, "Nampuk Choson ui chongch'i chongse wa tangmyon ui minjokcchok kwaop" ("The Political Situation and the Immediate Nation al Task of the South-North Korea"), T 1aip'ung. Vol. 3, No. 1, (May, 1950), p. 8 . There is a strong possibility that this position was strengthened by the exaggerated reports of Pale Hon-yong's faction about the assured victory of armed aggression, on the ground that the malcontented South Korean people would support it. For this account, see Pulchan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 72.
245. Vladimir I. Lenin, "Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers," (April 8 , 1917), Selected Works, (Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U. S. S. R., 1935), Vol. VI, p. 16.
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pursuits, nor had he attempted any significant original writings,
as Mao Tse-tung did.
To start with, he was an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter and
political activist who was, due to the circumstances, driven into
the communist camp and he drifted from Manchuria to Russia. During
the days of his guerrilla activity, it is even doubtful whether Kim
Il-song fully understood the meaning of communism. The ten Point Pro
gram, allegedly the early masterpiece of Kim Il-song, cannot be
properly regarded as a communist program, since there was nothing in
it characteristic of Communism, as distinguished from any similar
program drafted along progressive lines.
However, his tactics and strategics, and all the statements he
made since his appearance on the Korean political scene, demonstrated
surprisingly effective political actions and ideological consistency,
that were in tune with most of the Marxist-Leninist principles. This,
together with the fact that in the initial stage of Kim Il-song's
rise to power the Russians exercised strict control over North Korean
politics, suggests that the basic guidelines for action and ideology
might also have been supplied from outside the Soviet-Korean circle,
undoubtedly from the Kremlin, through the Russian advisors assigned
in P'yongyang. This was not unusual to Kim Il-song, who spent his early
childhood in Korea and was accustomed to expect orders from above. This
is particularly apparent when the relationship between Kim Il-song
and Stalin is taken into consideration. Chosen as a favorite son of
Stalin among the Korean Communists, Kim Il-song revered Stalin as a
father in the Communist family of nations. In addition, Stalin was
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Kim Il-song also described Stalin as a strong patron to whom every
Korean owed the Liberation of Korea and material and military assis
tance when they were needed. It is assumed, therefore, that Kim Il-
song served Stalin with filial piety, loyalty, a sense of obligation
(Poun sasang) to a benefactor, admiration to a war hero, and respect to
a fighter for justice. (Ui).
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO SOCIALISM AND ONE MAN DICTATORSHIP IN SOCIALISM
A. Economic Plans and Social Regimentation
1) The Downfall of Monolithic Communism and Kim Il-song’s Neutrality
By virtue of the three long years of the Korean War, "the land
of the morning calm" (translation from the Chinese characters for
Korea) became completely devastated into mountains of ashes. The
damage North Koreans received during the War was beyond description.
Mountains became barren, rice-paddies and corn-fields turned into deso
late lands, and buildings had been pock-marked by bullets. Everything
was changing, but none of these changes were more conspicuous than the
new faces of 270,000 Chinese troops. With the presence of the Chinese
troops. North Korea entered upon a new phase, that of dominant Chinese
influence in every facet of life. Kim Il-song quoted an old Korean
saying: "Ten years are enough to change mountains and rivers." As a
result of this, there were some changes "in the ideology or manners 24b and customs" among the North Korean Communists.
North Korean relationships with the Chinese Communists can be
traced back to 19^7 , before the two regimes had formally established
their states. According to a reliable report, it was the North Koreans
246. Kim Il-song, "On Some Questions Concerning Party and State Work in the Present Stage of the Socialist Revolution," (April 4, 1955), Selected Works, (P'ydngyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 19b5), Vol. I, p. 29U. Unless specifically indicated, this English edition of the Selected Works, Kim Il-song will'be quoted hereafter.
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who first rendered assistance to the Chinese Communists, who were in
a woeful plight at the time. General Fu Tso-yi, the Nationalist
Chinese commander-in-chief who was holding Hopei Province against
the Communists said:
"My intelligence officers . . . reported that 100,000 Koreans crossed the border in March, 19^7, and such of them as have been captured carried Russian arms. As North Korea is under strict Russian military occupation, it is hardly conceivable that they could have entered Manchuria without Stalin's permission." 247
North Korean formal recognition of the Chinese Communists came- in
October, 1949, as the latter successfully occupied the China Mainland.
During the following month, Kim Il-song visited Peking to celebrate the
foundation of the People's Republic of China, and in December of the
same year ambassadors were exchanged between North Korea and Communist
China. But these were Just normal procedures in establishing good
relations between two countries, and there was nothing in this to 24b presage the future intervention of Communist China in the Korean War.
When the Korean War broke out and the "Korean People's Army" was driven
to the Yalu River by the United Nations Forces, the Chinese Communist
Army entered the Korean War. Though it is difficult to assess directly
what impelled the Chinese Communists to intervene, two motives seem
clear: self-defense and moral responsibility. In his speech for the
247. George Creel, Russia's Race for Asia, (New York: The Bobbs- Merrill Company, Inc., 19^9)3 p. lbl. Reprinted in Congressional Record, in Dedember b, 1947, under the title of "Report on China to Institute of Chinese Culture." p. A4937.
24b. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses^the Yalu— The Decision to Enter the Korean War, (New York: the RAND Corporation, I960).
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first anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, Chou En-lai warned
that:
II The Chinese people definitely cannot tolerate foreign aggression and cannot allow imperialists recklessly to aggress against their own neighbor and disregard the aggression. Whoever might plot to expel China's nearly 500 million people from the United Nations, and whoever would wipe out and des troy the interests of this quarter part of the human race and foolishly think to settle arbitrarily any Eastern question directly related to China, then he will certainly break his head and spill his blood." 2^9 It was obvious that the Chinese Communists felt a great threat from
the sudden thrust of powerful U. S. forces along the Northeastern Chinese
border. Also conceivable was the fact that the Chinese felt a strong
moral responsibility toward the North Koreans, for the former consi
dered the latter as brothers, and that together they were heroes figh
ting a common enemy.
There is no doubt that Chinese military aid to North Korea implan
ted in the North Korean minds a sense of gratitude and Bo-un Sasang
(a sense of return). For -^g Chinese responded to the North Koreans'
call for support when it was desperately needed. The result was a
strong admiration for Chinese Communism, paralleling a continuing
glorification of Soviet Union:
2U9. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China, (.New York and London: (Columbia University Press, 196k), pp. 339-3^0. Quoted from Ren Min Ri Bao (Chinese newspaper), (October 1, 1950).
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"Our literature and art have given an unsatisfactory picture of the Soviet Union as the bulwark of world peace and of the Soviet people as an eternal friend of our people; an incomplete portrayal of the great Chinese People's Volunteers who are valiantly fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People's Army." 250
The year 1953 marked a turning point in North Korean relations
with Red China and the Soviet Union. With Stalin's death, there
came an air of release from arbitrary rule in Russia, which culmi
nated in the advocacy of peaceful coexistence with the West and the
denunciation of "the cult of the individual from the moment the Twen
tieth CPSU Congress in 1950. A series of unprecedented incidents
followed in the Communist bloc after this Congress: The Chinese attacks
on Moscow for its revisionist views, revolts in Poland and Hungary,
and the famous ennnciation of "polycentrism" by Palmiro Togliatti
of the Italian Communist Party. The aftermath of the Twentieth CPSU
Congress also greatly affected Norbh Korean politics. In April, 1950,
two months after the Twentieth CPSU Congress, the Third Party Congress
was held in North Korea. At the meeting the general program for the
Five-Year Plans was approved, and the economic policy line of the
"simultaneous" development of industry and agriculture with emphasis
upon heavy industry and agriculture with emphasis upon heavy industry
was reaffirmed, but no discussion was made in reference to the impli
cations of the Twentieth CPSU Congress. Two months later, Kim Il-song
250. Kim Il-song, "On Some Questions of Our Literature and Art," (June 30, 1951), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. lb5 .
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left North Korea for the Soviet Union and East Europe to seek support
for the Five-Year Plan. During his absence for two months, Pale Ch'ang-
olc, the vice-premier with a Yenan background, reportedly wrote a letter
to Khrushchev complaining about the way Kim Il-song handled the Twen- 251 tieth CPSU Congress.
At the August Plenary Meeting of the Korean Workers Party, which
was called to hear a report on Kim Il-song's trip, an open attack was
launched upon Kim Il-song by Yun Kong-hum, the Minister of Industry,
with support from Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, vice-premier, and Pak Ch'ang-ok,
another vice-premier in the cabinet of Kim Il-song. This open challenge
to Kim Il-song's leadership reportedly reached its climax in an abortive
coup attempted by Lieutenant General Chang P'yong-san, the Fourth Corps 252 Commander of the "Korean People's Army." The points of attack varied
from Kim Il-song's "personality cult" to his economic policy that empha- 253 sized heavy industry and neglected the production of consumer goods.
And as Kim Il-song later conceded there was strong criticism from
251. Lee Tong-chun, Hwansang kwa hyonsil: Naui kongsanchuui kwan (Fantasy and Fact: My Observations of Communism), (Seoul: Tongpang t'ongsin-sa, 1961), p. 187.
252. Chong Ki-won, "The North Korean People, Army and the Party," China Quarterly, No. 14, (April-June, 1953), p. 122.
253. Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik was a leading Yenan-Korean theoretician, while Pak Ch'ang-ok was a well-known Soviet-Korean who had been closely associated with Kim Il-song. For further details on this attacks, see Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 155-157. And for the persons involved in this incidents, see Pukhan Chongkam (the North Korean Almanac), pp. 176-179.
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the Russian leaders of his agricultural policy.
There was little doubt that Kim Il-song, a doctrinaire Stalinist,
viewed all these newly developing trends as dangerous heresies to
Marxism-Leninism and a direct threat to his leadership. Moreover,
it was impossible for him to think about the "de-Stalinization" movement
in Russia, for Kim Il-song adored Stalin as an infallible god-like figure
to whom he owed his political power, policy guidelines, and economic
aid. Despite all these irrelevant and distasteful developments, Kim
Il-song did not immediately change his policy of dependency on Soviet
Russia. Perhaps he believed it safer to maintain a close relationship
with the Russians because they confronted directly "the world's most
powerful enemy", the "American Imperialists" in the South. But Kim
Il-song never again showed the same admiration and respect toward the
new Russian leadership that he had shown toward Stalin. He acted
as a fully grown adult who shared friendship with Russian leaders on
an equal plane. And at times, he even dared to abstain from admiration
of Russia in favor of arousing a new tide of nationalism. In his speech
delivered to the Party propagandists and agitators on December 28, 1955,
Kim Il-song called on communists to establish "Chuch'e", and went on
to say;
254. Kim Il-song later disclosed: "Foreign revisionists— big-power chauvinists and their followers in Korea tried to discredit our Party's policy on agricultural cooperation. They alleged that agricultural cooperation was impossible when socialist industrializa tion had not been realized and modern farm machines were not available, and alleged that the cooperative transformation of agriculture in our country was proceeding too quickly." Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Revo lution in South Korea," (April 14, 1965), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 522.
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"Once I visited a People's Army vacation hostel, where I saw a picture of the Siberian steppe on the Wall. That landscape of the steppe probably pleases the Russians. But the Korean people prefer the beautiful scenes of their own country. There are many beautiful mountains such as Kumgang Mountain and Myohyang Mountain in our country; there are clear streams, the blue sea with its rolling waves and the fields with ripening crops. I noticed in a primary school that all the portraits hanging on the walls were of foreigners such as Mayakovsky, Pushkin, etc., but there were none of Koreans. If we educate our children in this way, how can we expect them to have national pride?" 255
Kim Il-song may have felt that it would be clumsy to express
a sudden change of attitude by discrediting only the Russian influence
in North Korea. If Chuch' .e was to be meaningful, Chinese influence
would also have to be curtailed.
"Whether one uses the right hand or the left, whether one uses a spoon or chopsticks at the table, it does not matter much. Irrespective of the way one eats, the result is the same. What is the need of being particular about 'fashion' in wartime? Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time to work out our own?" 256
It was in this vein that Kim Il-song tried to maintain his neutrality
in the growing ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and Com
munist China during this transitional period. But he could not help
inclining toward China because of their military assistance during
the War and his deep interest and great enthusiasm for Chinese experi
ments in domestic policies. It should be remembered that both North
255. Kim Il-song, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work," (December 28, 1955), Selected Works," Vol. I, pp. 319-320.
256. Ibid. , p. 324.
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Korea and Communist China shared a cultural and racial affinity that
may have generated similar ways of thinking on many crucial issues.
Moreover, both were poor and in similar stages of the Communist
revolution, while the Soviet Union was rich and in an advanced stage
of the revolution. This position of Kim Il-song will be examined more
closely in the following pages.
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2) The Three Year and Five Year Plans
For particular historical reasons the questions of "spontaneity"
and "consciousness" have become a major problem in the development of
Marxist-Leninist thought and action. It is true that in his early
writing Marx indicated that he favored direct and radical action by saying
that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 257 the point, however, is to change it."
Despite the revolutionary aspect of Marx's emphasis on the conscious
efforts to bring about social change, his main postulates are heavily
weighted in support of "determinism", and interpret the evolutionary
process of human history in a mechanistic and predictible manner. Raymond
A. Bauer, Professor of Industrial Psychology at the Harvard Business
School, summed up this trend in Marxism as follows:
"1) Man is a product of his inheritance and his environment; therefore society is responsible for man's character and behavior, rather than man's being responsible for society. 2) All social events are determinately related; therefore, the trend of future events can be predicted. 3) Essentially, the course of events is determined by abstract forces external to man himself, and there is little that he could or should do to direct them. 4) Since all oppressive and repressive institutions are a func tion of conflict in class society, a classless society will speedily do away with repression. 5) . . . a change in the economic base of society will eliminate class divisions. . . 6) Man is inherently good; and once he is freed from the insti tutions of a class society, he will revert spontaneously to rationality and goodness." 258
257. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" (1845), Marx and Engels Selected Works, (Moscow; Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), Vol. II, p. 402.
258. Raymond A. Bauer, "Ideological Revision," The Stalin Revo lution: Fulfillment or Betrayal of Communism? (Edited by Robert V. Daniels), (Englewood, Chicago, Dallas, San Francisco, Atlanta, London, Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1965), p. 23.
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These two mutually exclusive aspects in Marx's theory began to pose a
problem, as Marx's theoretical baton was handed over to interpreters of
Marxism whose individual wills and personalities became more important
than the philosophy itself in shaping the course of history.
Lenin distinguished "revolutionary consciousness" from "spontaneity,"
indicating that the latter was represented by the bourgeois influence:
"... All subservience to the spontaneity of the labour movement, all belittling of the role of 'the conscious element,' . . . means, whether one likes it or not, the growth of influence of boupgeois ideology among the workers. 259
Stalin expanded Lenin's position further on this matter and stressed
the element of "consciousness" in Leninism, linking it to the Party
morale:
"The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertness and the political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable 260 to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat."
This position, known as "dialectical" as opposed to "mechanical," 261 greatly influenced the future of Soviet society. The first chapter
259. Vladimir I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" (1901-02), Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1943), Vol. II, p. 61.
260. Joseph Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," Problems of Leninism, pp. 97-98.
261. According to Raymond.Bauer, the 'mechanistic' conception of history sees "events as proceeding linearly and sees the future as a direct projection of the past," while the 'dialectical' position holds that the evolution of history is "a discontinuous course of development invol ving periods of crisis and revolution. . ." "He also points to the conse quences of victory of the Stalinist 'dialectical' position as follows: 1) "The primarcy of 'teleological' over 'genetic' considerations was established in economic and social planning"; 2) "Dialectical materialism (as opposed to mechanistic materialism) became the aceepted methodology of science"; 3) "Social institutions (some soon, some later) became more tightly integ rated, more explicitly directed toward the service of specific functions." Raymond A. Bauer, "Ideological Revision," The Stalin Revolution; Fulfillment of Betrayal of Communism? p. 24.
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of this dissertation has discussed the traditional Korean view of
history as something close to the mechanistic interpretation; it
combined past experience with the projection of the future.
There is no doubt that Kim Il-song, born a Korean and having
spent his early childhood in Korea, was also deeply immersed in
traditional Korean ideas. But his association with revolutionaries
should have helped shape his character and personality in such a way
as to repudiate some of the traditional values of Korean society.
It also seems clear that his acceptance of Marxism as his life
philosophy further strengthened his rebellious attitude against
the traditional ideas and institutions that he considered feudalistic.
Among other things, Kim was obviously influenced by the deterministic
will power of both revolutionaries and communists who dared to
sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be Ui. He did not
and could not show any significant originality in Marxist-Leninist
theory nor any position independent of Russian influence. It was
only after the failure of his unification effort by force, the
total destruction of the North Korean economy, and the confusion in
Russian leadership following Stalin's death that Kim Il-song felt a
need to assume more active leadership and to lessen dependency on
the Russians. There were two major reasons for the change: First,
Stalin, who played a father's role in his relationship with Kim Il-song,
died, leaving behind disastrous effects in the Korean War. Kim might
have felt he was mature enough to take responsibility, as an eldest son
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in a Korean family would traditionally accept it after his father's
death: and second, his Russian oriented ideological preoccupation,
acquired during his apprenticeship under Stalin, was too strong for
him to divorce himself from the totalitarian Stalinist tradition. The
milder political tone and the lessening of austerity in the Soviet Union
following the death of Stalin were not palatable to Kim Il-song.
Despite his realization of the need for self-reliance, Kim Il-
song 's position was too precarious to take a disobedient line toward
the Soviet Union. He knew that without Russian moral and material support
North Korea could not cope with the most powerful force in the world,
the United States. He was also well aware of the fact that Russia was
the only socialist country that could be expected to provide substantial
material assistance to North Korea for post-war rehabilitation and re
covery.
In this dilemma, Kim Il-song obviously decided to make a compromise:
to remain silent on the new trends in Russia and to accelerate the
application of the Stalinist formula in domestic matters, opposing all
spontaneous movements in favor of "dialectical" positions. It is against
this background that a series of economic plannings were initiated.
The North Korean determination to build Socialism in both North
and South Korea ended with the total destruction of the North Korean
economy. According to an announcement of the Vice-premier of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pak Hon-yong, in April 1954, the
total war damage amounted to twenty billion won in North Korean currency
at that time, which included 8,700 factories and buildings, 600,000
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262 houses, and 5,000 schools. Kim Il-song himself admitted that on
the average, eighteen bombs were dropped on every square kilometer in
North Korea, virtually wiping out many cities and rural areas. With
the total destruction of the "people's economy", he said he did not know 263 how to begin. But soon he found the answer in his determination to
reconstruct the ruined economy to once again provide a revolutionary
base in the North.
In his report at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the
Korean Workers Party on August 5, 1953, Kim Il-song declared that:
"Most important of all for the accomplishment of the unification and independence of our country is to further strengthen the people's democratic system established in the North and consolidate the democratic base politically, economically and militarily, by rallying the patriotic forces of the masses." 264
Ultimately, this meant proceeding with the building of socialism,
even if only in half the country, after the failure to make it "socialism
in One Country":
262. Tsuboe Senji, Holcusen no kaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), p. 112.
263. Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 318. Accor ding to the official report of North Korea, the productivity in heavy industry was reduced by 64%, power industry by 26%, and light industry by 91%, compared to the productivity before the Korean War. ChosSn Chungang Yonkam (The Korean Central Yearbook), (P'yongyang: Choson Chungang T'ongsin-sa, 1954), p. 519.
264. Kim Il-song, "Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," (August 5, 1953), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 167.
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"... we have to further advance the revolution and thoroughly carry out the tasks of building the foundations of socialism in the northern part of the country. Gradual transition to socialism is an inevitable demand of the social and economic development in the North." 265
The theoretical explanation of this course of action was based upon
the fact that the effort of building the foundations of socialism was
a continuing process from the time when North Korea entered the transi
tional period to socialism with the completion of the "anti-imperialist,
anti-feudal democratic revolution," and that conditions were ripe for
this at the end of the Korean War. This was clearly stated by Kim Il-
song :
"The anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution in the North was successfully completed in one to two years after the liberation. Thus North Korea, on the basis of the victory of the democratic revolution, entered a period of gradual transition to socialism. The socialist revolution and socialist construction in North Korea began to get into full stride in the postwar days as subjective and objective
265. Kim Il-song, "Let Us Exert All Our Strength for the Country's Unification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Part of the Country," (April, 1955), Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 238-239. This position was more clearly elaborated in an official textbook of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as follows: "Therefore, (we) cannot stay in one place until the southern half(of Korea) will be liberated. . . nor can we restrain ourselves from the revolution and socio-economic development in the northern half of the country. Only by building socialism in the North and further streng thening the northern half of the country, our revolutionary base, can (we) speed the peaceful unification of fatherland." Haepang hu urinara ui inmin lcyongje palcchSn (Development of Our People's Economy After the Liberation), (P'yongyang: KwahakwSn lcyongje pophak yonguso, 1960), p. 109.
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conditions further matured." 266
Setting the line of "building the foundations of socialism," Kim Il-
song called for "giving priority to the rehabilitation and development
of heavy industry, simultaneously developing light industry and agricul
ture," despite the urgent needs of the homeless, hungry masses. The
logical explanation for this was that priority growth of heavy industry
alone could ensure the laying of "the foundations for future industriali
zation, and to rapidly restore and develop light industry for the sta- 267 bilization of the people's livelihood." And later, this was hailed
as "an example of the creative application of the general principles 268 of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of Korea."
The general outline for the postwar reconstruction of the national
economy was articulated by Kim Il-song in his report at the Sixth Plenum
266. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," Selected Works, p. 512. In his early statement, Kim Il-song specifically pointed out what were those conditions in the following words: "First, we have the valuable experience of rebuilding, during the five years after the August 1 5 .Liberation. . . . We also have a priceless experience acquired to meet the needs of the front. . . during the severe three-year Patriotic War of Liberation. . . . Second, we are rich in resources. All resour ces— ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coal, lumber, etc. — indispensable for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy are in exhaustible. Third, in the struggle for the postwar rehabilitation and development of the national economy, we can count on reliable support and aid from the international democratic camp." Kim Il-song, "Every thing for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 188.
267. Ibid., p. 166.
268. Facts About Korea, pp. 50-51.
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of the Central Committee. According to it, the postwar economic re
covery was to undergo three stages: 1) a preparatory stage for "overall
reconstruction of the national economy ranging from six months to one
year"; 2) a Three Year Plan for the "rehabilitation and development of
the national economy to regain prewar levels in all economic branches;
3) a Five Year Plan "to lay the foundations for industrialization" which 269 would signal the completion of the transitional period to socialism.
After a brief experimental preparatory period, between August, 1953,
and October, 1954, the Three Year Plan was put into effect in November,
1954, and allegedly completed four months ahead of schedule in 1956.
During this period, eighty-one percent of the anticipated capital funds 270 available for industrial reconstruction was invested in heavy industry
such as machine-building, ship-building, mining, power, and chemical
industries. Because of serious damage from bombardment during the War,
redistribution and relocation of industrial facilities were greatly 271 emphasized. For these reasons, an expert on the North Korean eco
nomy went so far as to say that the Three Year Plan was a preparatory
stage for armament. He contended:
269. Kim Il-song, "Everything for the PostwarRehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," Selected Works, pp. 167-168.
270. Kipon konsdlsaop ul wihan uritang ui chongch'aek (Our Party Policy for the Basic Construction Work), (P'yongyang: Choson Nodong- tang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1961), p. 67.
271. Kim Il-song, "Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," Selected Works, p. 169.
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"For manufacturing of arms and ammunition, new factories were needed, and mountain areas were selected as their sites. The emphasis on the minerals for export in mining industry was to import the large-scale modern weaponary, and the planned production of percussion- power and blasting-fuse in the chemical industry was also for armament. . . . Therefore, the guidelines for industrial rehabilitation during this Three Year Plan period should be viewed as closely related to the expansion of armament, not to the priority of heavy industry." 272
Confronting the potential military threat from the South, the
North Koreans had to rebuild their devastated ammunition factories.
But in the light of the war destruction described above, it seems
equally clear that they were not ready yet to fully devote their reha
bilitation effort to military purposes. What they needed most was the
recovery of the means of production and more than seventy-three percent
of the total investment capital available was used for this purpose 273 during this Three Year Plan period.
In undertaking this enormous task, North Korea needed both money
and manpower, and these needs were met through external assistance and
internal squeeze. During this period, North Korea is believed to have
received a total of $558,850,000 from communist countries, which was
tantamount to forty percent of the total North Korean budget in this 274 period. With the cessation of hostilities at the battlefronts,
272. Suh Nam-won, Pukhan ui kyongje ui chongch'aelc kwa saengsan kwanri (North Korean Economic Policy and Production Control), (Seoul: Asia munjae yonguso, 1964), p. 88.
273. Kipon konsolsaop ul wihan uritang ui chSngch' aelc (Our Party Policy for the Basic Construction Work), p. 67.
274. Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 375.
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soldiers were converted into workers, at least temporarily, to help
supplement the manpower shortage in construction projects. Even women
workers were recruited in this campaign. As a result, by the end of 275 1956, 130,000 workers were secured.
With the basic prerequisites for industrial development— funds and
manpower— there is little doubt that North Korea accomplished substantial
gains in industrial recovery during this Three Year Plan. Although it
is entirely possible for them to report false statistics to show
sensational gains, the following report of the North Koreans may be
worth considering:
"By the end of 1956 the gross industrial output value increased 2.8-fold that in 1953, or 1.8-fold that in the pre-war year of 1949. During the Three-Year Plan period, the output of the means of production grew 4-fold and that of consumer goods 2.1-fold. Three hundred twenty large and medium industrial enter prises were restored or newly built." 276
Unlike the considerable success of the Three Year Plan, which was
started under the advantageous conditions of securing massive foreign
aid and international cooperation among the socialist countries, the
Five Year Plan was confronted with several problems from the beginning.
As discussed above, there was strong opposition developed in the Party
against the too ambitious plans Kim Il-song set forth. On one occasion,
this opposition had developed to the extent that the Kim Il-song leader
ship was threatened by an attempted coup d'etat.
275. Kipon konsolsaop ul wihan uritang ui chongch'aek (Our Party Policy for the Basic Construction Work), p. 75.
276. Facts About Korea, pp. 94-95.
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And for obvious reasons that were connected with international
'revisionism', less foreign aid was obtained during the Five Year Plan 277 period. All these facts were frankly conceded by Kim Il-song:
"As is known, the years 1956-1957 were those when modern revisionism emerged on a wide scale in the international communist movement. . . . The anti-Party elements within the Party and their supporters abroad, revisionists— big power chauvinists, lined up as one in opposition to our Party and resorted to subversive activities in an attempt to overthrow the leadership of our Party and Government. On top of this, there were the great difficulties in the field of economic construction. We were short of materials and funds to carry out the enormous Five-Year Plan, and the people's life was still hard." 278
Under these circumstances, the Five Year Plan was launched in 1957 to
carry out the resolutions adopted by the Third Congress of the Korean
Workers Party in April, 1956: reaffirmation of the heavy industry-first
policy and a pledge to develop light industry and agriculture simulta
neously. The basic tasks were "to consolidate further the foundation
of socialist economy and to solve basically the problem of meeting 279 the needs of the population in food, clothing and housing.
It became evident that Kim Il-song's leadership aimed at demon
strating that even under such conditions he could achieve what he wanted—
modernized industrialization of North Korea— without much help from
outside, mainly from the Soviet Union. In addition, it was necessary
277. During the period of the Five Year Plan, North Korea received 399,400,000 dollars from Communist countries. For this account, see Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 375.
278. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Demo cratic People's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," Selected Works, pp. 515-516.
279. Facts About Korea, p. 95.
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for Kim Il-song to tighten up his Party control so as to eliminate
the oppostion and to ward off any possible challenge to his leadership.
With this in mind, Kim Il-song decided to carry through the socializa
tion of the remaining private sectors of the national economy. The
anticipated results were clear: a more severe internal squeeze for
the national capital and a mass drive to secure needed manpower.
In his Theses on the Character and Tasks of Our Revolution, Kim
Il-song advocated what is known as "a mixed economy," as under the 280 Mew Economic Policy in Russia. According to Kim Il-song, the socio
economic sectors in North Korea during the transition period could be
classified into three main categories: 1) the socialist economy,
characterized by state and cooperative economies; 2) the small commo
dity economy, "composed of the private peasant economy,"; 3) the capi
talist sector, which remains in "private capitalist trade and industry 281 in cities and towns and the rich peasant economy in the country side."
He explained each sector in detail by saying:
"The socialist economic sector is composed of state and cooperative economies. . . . At present, the state economy represents some ninety percent of total industrial production and the cooperative economy seven to eight percent... Small commodity production is based on private ownership of the means of production and individual labour. The petty bourgeoisie can be remoulded along socialist lines although they vacillate between socialism and capitalism .... The capitalist sector is composed of private capitalist trade and industry in cities and towns and the rich peasant economy in
280. I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 299.
281. Kim Il-song, "Let Us Exert All Our Strength for the Country's Unification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Part of the Country," Selected Works, pp. 240-241.
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the countryside . . . (which) holds an extremely small proportion compared with the socialist sector." 282
After analyzing the socio-economic composition in the North in these
terms, Kim Il-song concluded that:
"We should expand and strengthen the predominant position of the socialist sector by gradually transforming the small commodity and capitalist sectors along socialist lines in all spheres of the national economy, and should develop the productive forces to lay the material and technical foundations of socialism." 283
There are two objectives implied in these passages: first, the
small commodity and capitalist sectors have to be transformed into the
socialist sector; and second, all of these people, workers, peasants,
petty bourgeoisie, and capitalists alike, should form the "productive
forces" to complete the transitional period to socialism. During
the period of this Five Year Plan, these two objectives were carried
out through compulsory remolding of capitalists and petty bourgeoisie
by eradicating the private enterprise system, massive regimentation
of the peasantry through the collectivization process, and increasing 284 the competitive drive of workers by initiating the Ch'ollima movement.
In this sense, it is proper to say that the major emphasis in the Five
Year Plan was upon the reformation of the relations of production,
282. Loc. cit. For more detailed official account, see Cho Chae- son, Kwatoki e_ issDsg ui Choson Nodong-tang ui lcysngje chongch1 aek (Economic Policy of the Korean Workers Party During the Transition Period), (P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1958), pp. 17-26.
283. Kim Il-song, "Let Us Exert All Our Strength for the Country's Unification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the Nor thern Part of the Country," Selected Works, p. 242.
284. According to the North Korean interpretation of the word "Ch'ollima" it is "a legendary steed which was believed to run 1,000 ri a day." Kim Il-song, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 496.
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while the Three Year Plan placed prime emphasis on the recovery of
the means of production. This was necessary not only for the attain
ment of "socialist construction," but for uniting the masses under
Party leadership and by so doing preventing them from opposing Kim
Il-song1s leadership in North Korea.
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3) Cooperativization of Capitalist Trade and Industry
As mentioned in the above chapter, the "democratic reforms" in
North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il-song were in accordance
with Soviet guidelines. The North Koreans profited from Russia's
experience. During the Russian period of trial and error right after
the October Revolution, the Soviets socialized the national economy but
later promulgated the New Economic Policy to lay the foundation for a
compromise between a socialist and a private economy,. The North Korean
Communists nationalized only major industries owned by the Japanese
government, private Japanese, Japanese corporations, and others who were
branded as "traitors." Some factories and other production facilities
owned by national capitalists were allowed to operate on a capitalistic
basis, giving precedence "to each according to his ability" instead of
the socialists principle of "each according to his needs." As the
following table illustrated, the "capitalist sector" shrank day by day
in proportion to the growth of the socialist economy until the former
became practically non-existent.
Industrial Gross Output and Proportion of Different Economic Sectors (in percentage) 285
1946 1949 1953 1956 1957
Industrial gross output value 100 100 100 100 100 Socialist economics sector 72.4 90.7 96.1 98.0 98.7 Stage Economy 72.4 85.5 86.2 89.9 90.6 Cooperatives - - 5.2 9.9 8.1 8.1 Small commodity economy 4.4 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.5 Private capitalist economy 23.2 7.8 2.9 1.3 0.8
285. This and the following tables are quoted from Choson Chungang Yonkam (The Korean Central Yearbook), (P'yongyang: Choson Chungang T'ong- sinsa, 1958), p. 180 and 207. See also Ryu Hun, Study of North Korea, pp. 261-262.
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Despite the steady decline of the "capitalist sector," its influence
upon the national economy appears to have been enormous, particularly
during the pre-War period.
Proportion of Retail Commodity Circulation of Different Economic Sectors (in percentage)
1946 1949 1953 1956 1957 Total retail commodity Circulation 100 100 100 100 100 State and co-op trade 3.5 56.5 67.5 87.3 87.9 State 0.1 27.9 32.0 53.9 48.8 Cooperative 3.4 28.6 35.5 33.4 39.1 Private trade 96.5 43.5 32.5 12.7 12.1
This is proof that private consumers availed themselves of free markets
to buy better commodities in better condition, even though the government
pressed hard to attract more customers to the state-owned markets. Kim
Il-song acknowledged the grim reality of this trend in the following
words:
"In every respect, our state-owned trade has favourable conditions. Nevertheless, state stores are lagging when compared individually with privately owned shops. This is because of irresponsibility and unfaithfulness on the part of trade personnel. During the war, individual merchants went, by bicycle, cart or on foot, to places forty or fifty ri away, sometimes as far as several hundred ri, to pur chase goods. Moreover, commodities, though small in volume, were nicely arranged in their shops, and trade was carried on in a business-like manner. In contrast, state and consumers' co-operatives stores make little effort to tap the sources of commodities. And in selling goods allocated by the state, the personnel set them out in disorderly fashion, then sit down and wait for customers amid dust and mould." 286
286. Kim Il-song, "Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," Selected Works, p. 198.
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Theoretically, the existence of the "capitalist sector" meant that
in one form or another, social exploitation prevailed due to the con
tradiction of the relations of production; Socialism was distant. On
the practical side, which was perhaps far more important to the commu
nist leaders in this case, it presented a serious question of Party
discipline. After pointing out several shortcomings of state trade and
industry, Kim Il-song continued to warn that:
"Thus, the personnel in state and consumers' co-operative trade prefer to sit idle, and to do the work assigned to them by the state in an easy-going manner, without using their heads. Is this the correct attitude for a person who is truly responsible to the Party and the state for his work?" 287
On another occasion, in 1955, Kim also accused some Party members of
collusion with bourgeois elements:
"...Some Party members do not wage a principled struggle against practices of exploitation, have not rid themselves of the obsolete bourgeois viewpoint towards labour. Some rural Party members have gone so far as to secretly employ hired labour or practise nursery, while some state functiona ries, whose class consciousness is at a low level, are helping the bankrupt middle and small entrepreneurs in the towns to get back on theri feet by granting them business licenses at random on the pretext that it will provide tax revenue, a practice which eventually helps the growth of the exploiting elements." 288
For theoretical and practical reasons, Kim Il-song decided to carry
through his policy of 'transforming' to socialist lines capitalist tra
ders, industrialists, handicraftsmen, and small traders. On December 1,
287. Kim Il-song, Selected Works, p. 199.
288. Kim II—song, "On Improving the Class Education of Party Members," (April 1, 1955), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 263 .
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1957, the Korean Workers Party issued a guideline "On Carrying Out
the Transformation of the Individual Traders and Industrialists,"
according to which the "capitalist sector" was compelled to take part
in two types of cooperatives, production and sale. In the process of
coorperativization, it appears that the participation was not compulsory,
hut the capitalist traders and industrialists were under heavy pressure,
with several restrictions imposed upon them. These included strict
government controls over wages, working hours, and labor conditions of
workers employed in the 'capitalist sector,' strict regulations in
registration and licensing, high taxes, and controls over the supply 289 of raw materials and loans for private enterprises. In any case,
Stalinist-like persecution of this class did not take place. Kim Il-
song exaggerated when he said:
"This policy (transforming on socialist lines capitalist traders and industrialists along with handicraftsmen and small traders) conformed not only to the demands of socialist construction but also to the interests of the entrepreneurs and traders, who, therefore, accepted our Party's policy on cooperation, and the socialist transformation of private trade and industry was completed in a short period after the end of the war." 290
With the completion of cooperativization of the "capitalist
sector," the national bourgeoisie— those who survived the liquidation
of big capitalists in 19^6— was eliminated as a class in Worth Korea.
289. Ryu Hun, Study of North Korea, pp. 263-26h.
290. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," Selected Works, p. 52U.
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This narked an end to the departure from the theory of Lenin who was
"willing to make use of certain Russian capitalists until the Soviet
regime had been strengthened, but, as it turned out, expropriated
capitalist property violently," and it marked an end to the departure
from Communism when Stalin carried out "the total destruction of capi- 291 talists as a class." The only difference that remained was in method,
if the North Korean transformation took place peacefully as Kim Il-song
claims. Hut even if it were true, the peaceful transformation of the
national bourgeoisie is not a unique feature of Kim Il-song's ideology,
The Chinese claim that in was Mao Tse-tung who originated the idea
of the peaceful transition of the bourgeoisie and this claim has been
endorsed by Arthur Cohen:
"The Chinese claim that Mao not only worked out a new method for the "transition to socialism" by peacefully transforming— that is, gradually taking over— capitalist enterprises,, but that the capitalists themselves are being transformed mentally. This mental charge is effected by intensive indoctrination which, differing somewhat from Soviet practices, seeks to effect permanent changes, makes extensive use of group pressures, is applied to non-Party as well as party personnel, and is a very prolonged process. The entire method is uniquely Maoist." 292
291. Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse—tung, p. 136.
292. Ibid., p. 137. Cohen also points out the Eastern European leaders' rejection of the "peaceful transformation" of capitalists.
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4) Cooperativization of the Peasantry
The land reform of 1946 was a great joy to the poverty-stricken
peasants, who had worked long on lands owned by landlords for mere
survival. But soon, the North Korean peasants tended to develop "political
complacency" because the system of private ownership of the land induced 293 "capitalistic thought." Furthermore, as in the case of the existing
private traders and industrialists, private ownership of land by peasants
was not the permanent goal sought by the communists. Someday it had
to be abolished to complete the socialist transformation. The time
came when Kim Il-song announced in his speech at a Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Korean Workers Party on November 3, 1954, that:
"We cannot leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development but should take measures to give it active guidance. Had we worked a bit harder and guided the peasants more actively this year, we could have achieved greater results. If we introduce advanced farming methods and take good care of land now under cultivation, we can gather a good harvest without expanding arable land." 294
Kim Il-song further advanced a theory which justified the need for
collectivization of the peasantry. First, newly emerging rich peasants,
as a result of private land ownership occasioned by the land reform
of 1946, were influenced or at least liable to be influenced by "the
reactionary circles in South Korea and the American imperialists."
This meant the continuation of the class struggle in the countryside,
293. Lee Chong-sik, "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Pea sants in North Korea," North Korea Today, p. 74.
294. Kim Il-song, "On Our Party's Policy for the Further Develop ment of Agriculture," (November 3, 1954), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 214.
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against an element that was undermining the "democratic base" in the
North. Therefore, the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance,
improvement of the livelihood of the laboring peasants, and the
restriction of the rich peasant economy should be carried out so that
"agriculture may also be governed by the laws of social economy."
Second, agriculture, which is predominantly governed by private economy,
should be developed in balance with state-controlled socialist industry.
Third, the idea of organized cooperatives was voluntarily thought out
by peasants themselves in order to overcome the shortage of labor and 295 draft animals in the countryside.
The cooperative movement of agriculture in North Korea was patterned
after the Soviet model. Though there were no collective farms, the
Korean Workers Party had approved state farm programs (Sovkhoz), and
adopted "Khozraschet" and "Edinonachalie" systems, under which state
farms were first created at national or provincial levels. By 1950,
as a preparatory means for collectivization, five machine-hire stations 296 were established. But it was not until Kim Il-song gave special
emphasis to the development of state farms and agricultural co-operatives
at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party
in August, 1953, that this system began to emerge as a part of important
295. Ibid., pp. 220-221.
296. Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), p. 51.
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national policy lines. One year later, after experimenting with
organized co-operatives in some areas, Kim Il-song presented to a
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers ParLy on November
3, 1954, guidelines on the issues concerned in the forms, stages, and
sizes of agricultural co-operatives, which later on were all put into
effect.
According to the recommendations, there were three types of agri
cultural co-operatives. The first of these was called a "bud of
socialism," which was "necessary to convince the peasants of the advan
tages of the co-operative organization of farming." The second was a
"semi-socialist" form of "pooling land and jointly managing the economy,
and getting shares according to the land contributed and the amount
of work done." And the third form was termed a "socialist" type, in
which "all the land and implements of production are placed under common
ownership, and distribution is made only in accordance with the amount
of work done." By equating the Korean second and third forms with
the Soviet "Toz" and "artel," Kim Il-song showed he was following 297 the Soviet pattern of collectivization. Concerning the timing and
methods of collectivization, there seems to have been some opposition
to Kim Il-song's position, which emphasized placing peasants according
to their level of political consciousness. In the same speech, Kim
Il-song warned:
297. Kim Il-song, "On Our Party's Policy for the Further Develop ment of Agriculture," Selected Works, pp. 223-224. See also, Glenn D. Page, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, p. 240.
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"But some comrades consider that in organizing co operatives they must go step by step from the first form to the second and from the second to the third. It would be wrong to think that they must advance like pupils in school who are promoted from the first grade to the second and from the second to the third. The question lies in the degree of awareness and the level of consciousness of the peasants. . . . Another principle we must abide by is to organize co-operatives not all at once, in a rash manner, but gradually in accordance with the degree of preparedness of the peasants." 298
Despite his warnings against collectivization of immature peasants
and a speedy tempo, it proceeded fast, with almost unprecedented
speed. At the beginning stage of 1953, 0.6% of the total arable land
and 1.2% of the farmers were collectivized. The movement was stepped
up after 1954, and by 1956, there were created 15,825 co-operatives
which covered 77.9% of the arable land and 80.9% of the farm households.
As a result, ninety-eight percent of the collective farms became the 299 third type by 1956. And by August of 1958, one-hundred percent of 300 North Korean farmers were absorbed into the co-operative system.
As to the size of co-operatives, Kim Il-song at first advised not
to organize them on too large a scale, but to proceed from "15 or 20
households to 30, 50 or 70," as "conditions mature." For "unless
conditions are ripe for mechanization," he commented, "it is impossible 301 to run large-scale co-operatives in a proper way." in October, 1958,
298. Ibid. , p. 224.
299. Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy in the Democratic People1s Republic of Korea, (P'yong-yang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), p. 39.
300. Ryu Hun, Study of North Korea, p. 253.
301. Kim Il-song, "On Our Party's Policy for the Further Development of Agriculture," Selected Works, p. 225.
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after the completion of co-operativization was announced, Kim Il-song
reported that:
"... our Party decided to merge the agricultural co-operatives into one for each administrative ri and let the ri people's committee chairman concurrently hold the post of chairman of the co-operative. . . . As a result, the 13,309 agricultural co-operatives have been merged into 3,843 and the average size has grown from 80 to some 300 in the number of member households and from 130 jongbo to 500 jongbo in area." 302
In achieving this thoroughly organized collectivization, it was
clear that Kim Il-song pressed particularly hard on middle and rich
peasants to accept his program. He frankly admitted this:
"A particularly important role was played in the deve lopment of the agricultural co-operative movement by the intensive guidance organized once or twice every year from early 1955, in which thousands of central and local functiona ries were mobilized. . . . Our Party, through persistent ex planation, persuasion and object lessons, induced the wavering middle peasants to join the co-operatives and, as regards rich peasants, it strictly limited their exploiting tendency, and embraced in the co-operatives those who were inclined to work honestly and remoulded them into socialist working people, while taking appropriate measures against the handful of those elements who opposed (it). 303
In this process of collectivization, some features can be observed
that have certain similarities and differences with both the Russian
and Chinese patterns. First, North Korean agricultural cooperativization
was carried out after a short emphasis on the productive forces during
the Three Year Plan. North Korea attempted to step forward to a higher
level of collectivized relations of production before she had fully
302. Kim Il-song, " Victory of the Socialist Co-operation of Agriculture and the Future Development of Agriculture in Our Country," (January 5, 1959), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 454.
303. Ibid., pp. 441 and p. 446.
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attainted highly developed productive forces. It is in this regard
that North Koreans later claimed distinctiveness for their creative
action in that "the historical task of cooperativization was proposed
during such a difficult time," which ultimately resulted in the comple- 304 tion of cooperativization even before that of industrialization.
Second, the tempo of cooperativization proceeded at a surprising speed.
This is best illustrated in the following chart that compares the speed
of development in the collectivization process of the Soviet Union and 305 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:
Soviet Union D. P. R. K. Sovkhoz Kolkhoz Semi-Socialist Socialist Years (Number (Second (Third of) Form) Form)
1927 1,400 14,800 1953 4,857 ? 2,176 7,922 1957 5,800 78,900 192 15,840
304. Haepang hu urinara ui inmin kyongje palcchon (Development of Our People's Economy Aftei* the Liberation), p. 108. See also, Kim Sung-chun, Urinara eso ui nongch'on munche haelcyol ui yoksachok (Historical Experience of Solving Rural Problems in Our Country), (P'yongyang: Choson Nodor.g-tang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1965), p. 175. This is not, however, a unique feature of North Korea as the North Koreans claim for Mao Tse-tung as well as Stalin also emphasized the relations of production more than the productive forces. For these, see Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, p. 170., and Joseph Stalin, Econo mic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub lishing House, 1952), p. 9-13.
305. This table is assembled out of two following sources: Kim Kwang-won, "Pukhan nongop hyoptong chohap e kwanhan yongu" ("A Study on the North Korean Agricultural Co-operatives"), Chunggongkwon ui changnae (Future of the Chinese Communist Bloc), p. 164.; and Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 340.
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Third, as Glenn Page has pointed out, the rich peasants, or kulaks
in Russia during the late 1920’s were considered to be "sworn enemies"
of the people and were banned from participation in the collective
farms, but North Korea showed a more tolerant attitude toward Kulaks 306 by accepting all those who were willing to take part in that system.
Unlike the Stalinist formula of ordering "an all out 'offensive against 307 the Kulak'" to smash and eliminate them as a class, Kim Il-song
proudly reported at the Fourth Congress of the Korean Workers Party
that:
"We admitted into the co-operatives all rich peasants who accepted socialist transformation and were willing to work honestly. We took appropriate measures against the handful who sought to hinder the co-operative movement. At the last stage of the movement, when the co-operatives had gained in scope and strength and there were no longer any objects of exploitation in the villages, the majority of rich peasants joined the co-operatives voluntarily." 308
Finally, unlike the "alternative stage-by-stage approach" in 309 China, and the altered character of the Russian collective farms 310 that switched from the "socialist" form to a semi-socialist type,
306. Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, p. 241.
307. I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, p. 320.
308. Kim Il-song, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," (September 11, 1961), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 131--132.
309. Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, p. 240.
310. In its early collectivization process in Russia, "nearly all the farmers' belongings were declared collective property; and the members of the collectives were to receive for their labour no more than workmen's wages." But in the early and middle thirties, Stalin
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the North Korean cooperatives claimed to be socialist from the very 311 beginning. This is well illustrated in the following chart:
Year Semi-Socialist Socialist (%) (%) 1953 1954 21.5 78.5 1955 7.8 92.2 1956 2.5 97.5 1957 1.2 98.8 1958 0 100.0
In substance, however, the North Korean co-operatives share a
close affinity to the Chinese Communes and the Russian Artels. There
is no doubt that in the light of the Chinese Communists' decision to
merge co-operatives in April, 1958, and their subsequent order to
adopt the commune system throughout China, the North Korean leaders
were fascinated by the movement. The North Korean pattern of "the
timing and tempo of collectivization" has a particularly close resem- 312. blance to the one revealed in China. In addition, the co-operative
organization and its function in North Korea closely remind one, in
many aspects, of those in the Chinese communes. Chong-sik Lee, a
Korean scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, summarizes its
310. (Cont'd) made certain concessions to the 'peasants' indi vidualism, and the members of the collectives were allowed to own "privately small plots of land, poultry, and some cattle." I, Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, p. 331.
311. Kim Sung-chun, Urinara eso ui nongch'on munche haelcyol ui yoksachok lcyonghom (Historical Experience of Solving Rural Problems in Our Country), p. 174.
312. Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 62.
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characteristics:
"Just as in the Chinese communes, the organ of the government, ri, was merged with the organization in charge of production, the co-operative becomes at once a basic social unit and a basic organization of state power in that it is designed to integrate rural industry, agriculture, trade, culture and education, and military affairs into a single whole." 313
But apparently, North Korea did not take the extreme stand the Chinese
Communists did. "Neither the establishment of communal housing nor
the 'arming' of the peasants" occurred in North Korea, but there were
"certain military features such as marching to work in formations as 314 martial music was played."
313. Lee Chong-sik, "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea," North Korea Today, p. 77. For the characteristics of Chinese commune system, see United States Congress, "The Commune System and Its Dilemma," U._S. Congressional Record, by John U. McCormack in the House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, (August 3, 1959 to September 3, 1959), in Appendix, Vol. CV, Part 24 (Washington: Govern ment Printing Office, August 6 , 1959), A6779-6780.
314. Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," p. 245.
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5) The Ch'ollima Movement
The Five Year Plan, started under difficult conditions both inter
nally and internationally, did not proceed as smoothly as the previous
Three Year Plan had. Despite the claim that the goal of the Five Year
Plan was completely achieved by the end of 1959, some shortages of
the expected goals were revealed in electric power (93.7% short), steel
(95.3% short), chemical fertilizer (85.4% short), tractor (90.0% short), 315 and textiles (99.4% short). If they had gained anything during the
period of the Five Year Plan, it was the complete socialization of the
last traces of medium traders, small traders, industrialists, and
agricultural co-operatives. The following table illustrates how com
pletely every sector of the North Korean economy was transformed into 316 socialist form by August 1958.
Growth of Socialist Sector in the National Economy
1946 1949 1953 1956 1958 Gross Industrial output value 72 91 96 98 100 Gross agricultural output value — 3 8 74 100
Gross retail sales 4 57 68 87 100
The Ch'ollima movement was started in an effort to help complete
the socialization process in industry. At the December Plenary Meeting
of the Korean Workers Party held in 1956, Kim Il-song put up the slogan,
"Maximum Increase of Production and Frugality!," a revised catchword
315. Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 321.
316. Facts about Korea, p. 96.
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of his early emphasis on a Korean proverb— "Dust collected will make 317 a mountain!" At about the same time as the Chinese Communists
initiated the "Great Leap Forward" movement, the North Korean Ch'ollima
movement also became active. Although North Korea did not go as far
as the Chinese Communists in their "back-yard furnaces" movement, a
close parallel could be observed in their effort to save scraps for
more production. A piece of iron and even a handful of sawdust, as well
as all the waste papers, rubbers, and glasses were collected and sent 318 to the proper organizations for reproduction. It was reported that
the workers at the Ch'ongchin Rubber Plant passed a resolution to
increase the production of rubber-shoes by an additional 250,000 pairs 319 by saving the waste rubber around the factory.
In September, 1958, about half a year after 'a great leap forward'
was called for at the meeting of the National Peoples Congress in
Communist China, Kim Il-song announced two important tasks to be ful
filled for the realization of "socialist industrialization": cultural
revolution and technological revolution. The one was designed to
eradicate "the survivals of old ideas" in the minds of people, to arm
them with "communist ideas," and to remold "their outlook," while the
other was to upgrade the production technique and to develop the national
317. Kim 11-song, "Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," Selected Works, p. 197.
318. Ch'ollima kisu tokpon, (Reader for the Ch'ollima Riders), (P'yongyang: Chile'bptongmaeng ch'ulp'an-sa, 1963), p. 110.
319. On Chae-on, Sahwechuui konsol kwa cholyalc t' uj aeng (The Construction of Socialism and A Struggle for Savings), (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1958), p. 15.
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320 economy still more rapidly. Kim Il-song desired his people to be
both Red and expert, but when a difficult choice arose whether to be
more Red than expert or vice versa, Kim Il-song gave priority to being
a communist first.
In other words, he preferred a man of loyalty who may lack the
education background but works for the Party and the State with deep
devotion rather than a man of science and knowledge whose white collar
instinct of erudition would discourage the devoted efforts of the former—
the truly good citizens. In his September speech, Kim Il-song grimly
warned against the dangerous tendencies of 'passivism and conservatism'
latent among the experts:
"What do the conservatives cling to? First, they cling to mystery. Conservatives insist on mystification in industry, in science, in technology and in all matters concerning .... machinery. . . .Secondly . . . they say: "As for me, I graduated from such and such university in Japan. But what on earth do you know?' And they talk about the 'rated capacity' of Japanese days and try to keep people in check with it. They try to measure our reality from an old ideological standpoint. We should smash such ideas, too." 321
His position of defending workers against the arrogant tendencies of
the learned is further strengthened by his belief that science and
technology are not the monopoly of experts but could be developed through
the worker's innovations in production:
"Still another harmful tendency is that some scientists and technicians look down upon the workers and peasants for being ignorant. Such a view point is entirely wrong.
320. Kim Il-rsong, "Against Passivism and Conservatism in Socialist Construction," (September 16, 1958), Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 392.
321. 'Ibid., p p . 398-399.
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It is not scientific workers, doctors, masters of sciences or college graduates alone who develop science and technology. Everything on earth is made by the workers and peasants. Is there anything in our world that is not made by them?" 322
All these ideas are embodied in the Ch'ollima Movement. The movement
itself was not new, nor the idea of it original. The Stakhanov movement
in Russia during the mid 1930's and the "Great Lean Eorward" movement
in Communist China— just about one year before North Korea started the
Ch'ollima Movement— were also programs designed to raise the standards
of tasks assigned to individual workers or working teams by setting,up
a model for general imitation and competition. The North Korean Ch'ollima
Movement went one step further— creating a new type of man by remolding 323 the outlook of the working masses. An ordinance of the Standing
Committee of the Supreme People's Congress on awarding the Ch'ollima
title stated that the awards would be conferred:
". . .to those reformers who rendered heroic service by carrying through the pioneering role in the collective reformation movement that would create a new type of person who is armed with the glorious revolutionary tradition of the Party, loyal endlessly to the State and the Party, wined out the old institutions, loves to work, and possesses
322. Kim II Song, Selected Works, Pol. I, pp. 400-401.
323. There has been a separate intensive method of indoctrination in Communist China. The Chinese Communists have used a thought reform mechanism, known as the "study" method, which applies group and self- criticism to individual group members. It is also intended to mold a new personality — "'bold', 'selfless', 'disciplined', 'determined', 'loyal', 'sincere'." Robert C. North, Chinese Communism, (New York & Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 195. For further detail on this "study" method, see H. F. Schurmann, "Organization and Response in Communist China," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, (January, 1959).
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communist morals and appearance." 324
What do they mean by the creation of "a new type of man?" The
best answer to this question can be found by examining a slogan which 325 epitomized it: "Work, study and live in a communist manner!" To
work in a communist manner signifies an attitude of "working self-con
sciously, creatively, and seriously, devoting all his knowledge and
energy only for the fatherland and the people without calculating self- 326 interests." To study in a communist manner is to arm oneself with
Marxism-Leninism, "linking it with the glorious revolutionary tradition
of our Party," and to learn the communist ideas through practical 327 experience in collective labor. And finally, living in a communist
manner is to embody communist morals in practical living through con- 328 scious effort and struggle. The man envisaged to be most ideal, there
fore, is expected to think and act as communist morals dictate— ^comba
ting individualism and egoism, always placing the interests of his
324. This passage is auoted from the Ordinance of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "On Confering the Heroic Titles to Those Devoted Reformers Who Rendered Great Services in the Ch'ollima Working Brigade Movement," in Ch'dllima chakbppan undong (The Ch'ollima Working Brigade Movement), (P'ySngyang: Chikop tongmaeng ch'ulp'an-sa, I960), pp. 321-322.
325. Facts About Korea, p. 58.
326. Im Su-ung, Nodong e taehan lcongsanchuuichok t'aeto (The Communistic Attitude on Labor), (P'vSngyang: KWP Press, 1960), p. 53.
327. Ch'ollima Kisu Tokpon, (Reader for the Ch'ollima Riders), p . 53.
328. Ibid., p. 252.
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collective before his personal interests, and being loyal to the Party
and the State. But the possession of good communist morals alone is
not enough. He has to be a positive man of action who would "learn
technology and create new techniques" and who could attain "the knowledge 329 of a college graduate by self-study." In short, the ideal new man
is a man of versatility.
It was Marx and Engels who first felt the need to revive "the ideal
man of the Renaissance of the type of Leonardo or Machiavelli, both
thinker and man of action" bv emancinating oeonle from the chains of
"the stratified industrial society that specialized oeople in occupations
in such a way as to make it impossible for them to develop more than 330 a single aptitude." In this sense, Kim Il-song's effort to create
a new type man with versatility can be viewed as a strict adherence
to the orthodox Marxism taught by Marx and Engels. The only difference
is that while Marx and Engels conceived this need out of a humanistic
motivation, Kim Il-song found it sheer necessity to harness this ideo
logical doctrine in order to raise production standards.
The practical aspect of the Ch'ollima movement, aimed at the
"technological revolution" and production increase was obviously affected
by the frantic pace of the Great Leap Forward movement in Communist China.
Within half a year after a North Korean trade delegation, headed by vice
premier Lee Chu-von, visited Communist China during the first week of
329. Kim Il-song, "On Communist Education," (November 20, 1958), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 423. For the recent account on this point, See "Text of Speech by Kim Il-song," Daily Report, (December 21, 1967), p . 16.
330. Edmund Wilson, To the Finland-Station, (London: Martin Seeker & Warburg Ltd., n.d.), p. 216.
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331 September, 1958, the Ch'ollima movement went into effect officially.
Two months later, Kim Il-song made a three-week tour of China, and on
his return he praised the Great Leap Forward:
"The diligent Chinese people have created miracles in many fields since rejecting superstition and conservatism in science and technology. The Great Leap 'Forward defini tely showed the creative power of 650 million Chinese people who are masters of their own destiny." 332
After that, the Ch'ollima pace was stepped up. To take a few examples:
after May, 1959, when Kim Il-song proposed "a machine tool reproduction"
movement, it became common to reproduce machine tools in every factory, 333 regardless of its nature of production. A Japanese visitor to North
Korea reported that he saw a lathe manufactured at the Hungnam Fertilizer 334 Plant. A report followed on June 4, 1959, to show how a fragile woman
could be reformed into a new type of person and serve as a model for
the future imitation by other workers. It said that:
"Comrade Kim Sun-kil, a member of the Ch'ongsan Farm Co-operative, Kangso County, South P'yongan Province, was so encouraged by the words of Comrade Kim Il-song that
331. ' Nodong Sinmun , (March 9, 1959), According to this report, it is said that the official date of launching the Ch'ollima movement was March 8 , 1959 by the initiation of Cho Chin-won Work Team of the Kangson Steel Mill.
332. Nodong Sinmun, and New China News Agency, (December 11, 1958), Quoted from Roy U. T, Kim, "Sino-North Korean Delations, Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, No.'8 , (August, 1968), p. 714.
333. Suh Nam-won, Pukhan ui kyongj e chongch'aek kwa saengsan lcwanri (North Korean Economic Policy and Production Control), p. 150. The North Koreans have claimed that the drive "resulted in turning out in 1959 more than 3,000 machine tools over and above the plan." For this claim, see Facts About Korea, p. 56.
334. Aklcimoto Hideo, Kitachosen no kiroku--Hocho Icishadan no holcoku (Record of North Korea— Report of the Press Corps Visiting North Korea), (Tokyo: Shin dokusho-sha, 1960), p. 91.
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she carried earth on her head and on her back at the same time in an earth-carrying project. But it was not enough for her, and she also used her skirt in a triple effort to speed the excavation." 335
To save working hours among the women workers, the Pyongyang Textile
Factory initiated "The-Stoo-Eating-Soup" movement to prevent the workers 336 from making frequent trips to the wash-room.
There were certain notable features to this development. First,
the Ch'ollima movement was aimed at remolding man himself, transforming
him into a good communist. And this reformation would enhance one's
consciousness of the need of sacrificing himself for the sake of collective
interests. It was assumed to be possible "to arouse to the most complete
extent the creative power of the masses and bring their enthusiasm, 337 initiative and talent into full play." Second, it was not confined
alone to the industrial field, but permeated every facet of life— agricul
ture, transportation, commerce, education, and cultural activities.
For instance, as of October, 1960, 17,500 people in the teaching pro
fession in North Korea were compelled to participate in the "Teacher's
Group Movement for Winning Chiollima Title," which covered 1,414 schools 33 8 at all levels. Third, it started with individuals but gradually
became a mass movement based on work^tearns. According to a report, the
335. Ryu Hun, Study of North Korea, pp. 269-270.
336. Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 414.
337. Kim Il-song, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," (September 11, 1961), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 164.
338. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), p. 274.
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"Ch'ollima Work Team" title was accorded to over 26,000 teams, which
comprised "98,000 workers, office employees, workers at cooperative 339 farms and students." Thus, it became clear that the pre-Korean war
concept of "people" was slightly modified by a new criterion of loyalty
to the Party policies. This was implied by Kim Il-song in his speech
at the National Congress of Production Innovators on September 16, 1958:
"Non-Party persons, too, should be loyal to the Party, study its policies profoundly and endeavour to carry them through to the end. The Party represents the interests of the working class and the labouring people, and is the vanguard detachment fighting for their happiness. Therefore, to be faithful to the Party and to carry through its poli cies means to fight for their own class and themselves." 340
Again, in his Report to the Fourth Party Congress in 1961, Kim Il-song
made it clear by adding more new qualifications:
"In each period of the development of our revolution, our Party clearly defined the main objects of the dictatorship of the proletariat and pursued a positive policy of boldly drawing in all social strata which can be won over to the side of the revolution, and of actively educating and re moulding them, while isolating the handful of hostile elements."341
These statements are very much like the one made by Mao Tse-tung in
his "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." In
this speech, Mao Tse-tung redefined the "people" at the stage of building
socialism in the following words:
"At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support
339. Ryu Hun, Study _of North Korea, p. 270.
340. Kim Il-song, "Agaist Passivism and Conservatism in Socialist Construction," Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 402.
341. Kim Il-song, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," Selected Works, Vol. II,p.237.
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and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people." 342
For Mao Tse-tung, unlike Kim Il-song, attempted to educate and remold
the people at one time, but eased the tension at appropriate times,
admitting that contradictions could exist among the "people." He
even recognized the tension between the leaders and the led as a normal
process in solving the contradictions in the transitional stage:
"Our People's Government is one that genuinely repre sent the peoDle's interests, it is a government that serves the people. Nevertheless, there are still certain contradic tions among the interests of the collective and the interests of the individual; between democracy and centralism; between the leadership and the led; and the contradiction arising from the bureaucratic style of work of certain government workers in their relations with the masses. All these are also contradictions among the people." 343
For Kim Il-song, it was inconceivable to admit contradictions between
the leaders and the led, for what he valued most was unity, unity not
only in action but also in thought itself.
342. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," (February 27, 1957), Selected Works, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 351.
343. Ibid., pp. 351-352.
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B. The Triumph of One-man Dictatorship under Socialism in North Korea
1) International Polycentrism and Chuch'ae in Ideology
Throughout the whole transitional period to Socialism, North
Korea continued to maintain a neutral policy toward the Soviet Union
and Communist China, with a bias toward the latter in emulating domestic
policies. As the feud between the two communist giants became more
intense in the late 1950's, North Korea could enjoy economic aid from 344 both countries. However, 1961 marked another turning point in North
Korean relations in the growing Sino-Soviet dispute. Following Khru
shchev's criticism of the Albanian leaders for their "cult of personali
ty V at the twenty-second CPSU Congress in October, 1961, the communist
nations were split into pros and cons. At first, the North Koreans
carefully avoided any involvement by restraining themselves from making
their position clear. But later North Korea showed her willingness
to support the cons, headed by the Communist China, by maintaining her
relations with Albania, even after the relation between Russia and
Albania came to an open rupture in December, 1961. Then came the missile
crisis in Cuba in October, 1962. This time, Kim Il-song broke his
delicately-managed neutrality in Sino-Soviet relations by siding with
the Chinese Communists and attacking the "modern revisionists." As
an obvious referei.ce to Khrushchev's Cuban fiasco, an editorial in
Nodong sinmun, "Let's Hold Our Marxist-Leninist Banners High!", asserted:
344. For this account of the Russian and Chinese economic assistance to North Korea, see Choson Chungang Ynnkam (The Korean Central Yearbook), (P'yongang: Choson Chungang T ’ongsin-sa, 1961), pp. 135-136.
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"Peace must be won, not by begging, but through a united and stubborn struggle of the forces for peace and Socialism. It is not easing the international tension to beg for peace to the imperialists. It would rather foster (encourage) the aggressive ambitions of the imperialists and jeopardize peace more." 345
There is no doubt that this manifested long-standing discontents with
the policies of the new Soviet leadership. On the possible motivations
and the result of Kim Il-song's reactions to the Cuban crisis, Roy U.
T. Kim writes that:
"Perhaps Moscow's adventurism and capitulation in the Cuban missile crisis reminded the North Korean leadership of its own frustration and disappointment during the Korean War. After all, North Korea had been the first victim of Moscow's risky undertaking. . . . As Peking gained influence and prestige through Moscow's successive failures, including the Cuban canitulation, P'yongyang came under increasing pressure from Moscow. 346
For the next two years the North Korean attacks upon Moscow continued
more openly. An editorial published in Nodong sinmun, the Party organ,
accused the Russians in the following words:
"Some persons attempt to interfere with the internal affairs of fraternal countries under the pretext of aid, and force their will on the other. . . . It has absolutely nothing to do with proletarian internationalism to only boast of their aid and make use of it as a means of political intervention and economic pressures." 347
345. Nodong Sinmun, (November 17, 1962).
346. Kim Roy U.T., "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, p. 718.
347. Nodong Sinmun, (October 23, 1963). See also, Pukhan isipnyonsa (The Twenty Years' History of North Korea), (Seoul: Kwangmyong inswekong-sa, 1965), p. 144-145.
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The editorial, in its last part, urged the Soviets to engage in self-
criticism:
"Marxism-Leninism and revisionism can never be compro mised, nor are the revolutionary line and that of oppor tunists compatible. . . . It is the duty of a Communist not to keep silence over weak points in his movement, but to criticize them openly so that the party may emerge from the error faster and more perfectly." 348
In inverse proportion to the anti-Soviet feeling among the North
Korean leaders, diplomatic ties between Communist China and North Korea
were strengthened by increasing activities of friendly cooperation between
the two countries. In June, 1963, Ch'oe Yong-kon, the Chairman of the
Supreme People's Assembly of D. P. R. K., visited Mao Tse-tungand Liu
Shao-cli'i in Peking, and issued a joint communique between Ch'oe and
Liu, which affirmed ideological unity against the "modern revisionism."
It declared:
"The result of the Conference between Chairman Ch'oe Yong-kon and President Liu showed once again that Korea (D. P. R. K.) and China (C. C.) share complete agreement on many important issues present in the international situations faced by the parties and governments of the two countries and in the international Communist movement. And both countries are standing in the revolutionary positions to oppose thoroughly imperialism and modern revisionism and to carry through the revolution to the last. ..." 349
As a courtesy to the Ch'oe Yong-kon's visit to Peking, Liu Shao-ch' i
journeyed to P'yongyang in September, 1963, and signed an agreement
to settle the long-standing border issue over Paiktu Mountain, which
separated Manchuria and Korea. Through this agreement, Communist China
348. Nodong Sinmun, Ibid.
349. Choson Chungang Yonkam (The Korean Central Yearbook), (P'yongyang: Korean Central News Agency, 1964), p. 161.
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recognized the southern half of Pailctu Mountain as North Korean 350 territory. The tension between Moscow and P'yongyang was eased as
a result of Khrushchev's downfall in October, 1964. Obviously, the
new leadership in Russia was anxious to unite the split Communist camp
once again, a sign of which was Kosygin's visits to Communist China,
North Vietnam, and North Korea shortly before the opening of the Twenty-
Third CPSU Congress. Kosygin's efforts at detente brought the North
Korean delegation, headed by Ch'oe Yong-kon, to the Congress, which was
boycotted by the Chinese Communists. This is in marked contrast to the
occasion when Noi'th Korea maintained her relations with Albania four
years before, after the latter's expulsion from the Communist common
wealth headed by the Soviet Union. It was clear that the North Koreans'
attendance at the Twenty-Third CPSU Congress may have appeared to be
another swing back to the Soviet Union, departing from the alliance
with China.
"Is this a new change of direction?", Thomas An asks. As far
as he is concerned, it reflects a simple "readjustment of policy inspired
by an altered view of North Korea's national interest" in two major
areas of economic and ideological considerations:
"... North Korea aspires to the classic role of a buffer state between the two major Communist powers, seeking to play Mao off against the Kremlin in order to extract maximum political as well as material concessions from the Soviet leaders. Another factor. . . seems to be an increasing annoyance at Communist China's equivocal attitude towards the war in Viet-Nam— North
350. Arai Seidai, "Kitachosen no naisei to gaikyo" (The Domestic Politics and Diplomacy of North Korea), Kolcusai Mondai, Vol. 88, (July, 1967), p. 22.
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Korea disillusioned. . . . (and) may consider Communist China as a paper dragon." 351
In the eyes of Kim Il-song, it is beneficial to North Korean interests
to maintain good relations both with Russia and Communist China so that
Kim can expect continuing military aid in the face of a powerful enemy
in the South. At the same time, Kim Il-song feels it distasteful to 352 see both Russian "revisionism" and Chinese "dogmatism" influencing
North Korea. In this dilemma, Kim Il-song finally decided that it is
better to live up to his own belief than to sacrifice it for the sake
of material needs. Kim's attraction first toward the Soviet Union and
then China can be likened to the swing of a pendulum which started
slowly oscillating between the Soviet orbit and Communist China's in
the early 1950's. As a result of direct Chinese military aid to North
Korea and because of cultural similarities between the two nations,
the swing of the pendulum was toward China. Around 1965 Kim faced
the dilemma of Russian revisionism as opposed to Chinese dogmatism and
he solved it by enunciating his doctrine of Chuch'e (independence).
The pendulum had come to a full stop. This independent position was
best elaborated by Kim Il-song on his visit to Indonesia in 1965. In
his lecture at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences of Indonesia,
351. Thomas An, "New Winds in P'yongyang?," Problems of Communism, (July and August, 1966), p. 70.
352. Since North Korea seemed to have turned away from Communist China and turned again toward the Soviet Union, the Sino-Korean relations deteriorated, and reached their nadir when anti-Kim Il-song wall posters were found in Peking streets in 1966. North Koreans countered the Chinese Communists by accusing them of committing political intervention in domestic affairs of North Korea. For this account, see Tonga Ilpo, (February, 21 and 23, 1967).
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held on April 14, 1965, Kira Il-song said:
"While resolutely fighting in defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism against revisionism, our Party has had every effort to establish Juche (Chuch'ae) in opposition to dogmatism and flunkeyism. Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-reliance in economy and self-defense in national defense— this is the stand our Party has consistently adhered to."353
This position of Kim Il-song was strengthened and made official with a
forthright declaration of independence in an editorial of Nodong sinmun,
published on August 12, 1966, under the title of Chachusongul onghohacha!
(Let's Defend Our Independency!). It flatly rejected foreign leadership
in North Korean affairs by claiming:
"There can be no superior party or inferior party nor a party that gives guidance and a party that receives guidance. No one country or party can serve as the center of the world revolution or the leading party."354
After the official pronouncement of "polycentrism," the editorial went
on to say that;
"When one loses the faculty of thinking and judging for himself, he cannot distinguish right from wrong. Such people commit /revisionism if others commit revisionism, and if others commit dogmatism, they also commit dogmatism."355 With this declaration, North Korea began to show increasing signs of
independent action. Perhaps North Korea had given up the hope of unity
in the Communist camp— especially for a detente between the Soviet Union
353. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 537.
354. Nodong Sinmun, (August 12, 1966). See also, Time, (August 19, 1966), p. 26.
355. Loc cit.
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and Communist China. Instead, she might have found new vitality in
a number of revolutionary nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
who would share a common understanding of each other's situation, and
thereby express their common belief that they cannot rely on anyone
but themselves in carrying out their revolutions. This common reali
zation of self-consciousness led to strong unity, particularly among
North Korea, Cuba, and North Vietnam. The North Koreans wished to play
a leading role in this third Communist camp. They claimed to be the
"eastern post of the socialist camp" that defended successfully against
imperialist aggression and made "a great contribution to the development . 356 of the international revolutionary movement." This wish dramatizes
an old Korean saying: "Better to be the head of the chicken than the
tail of a cow."
356. Oh Kung-yol, "Invincible Power of the Korean People," Kullocha, (August 1967), in translated version of JPRS: 43,222 (November 3, 1967), p. 53.
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2) Party Supremacy and Organizational Control
According to Marx, Socialism marks a new era when the old order's
productive property, once owned by a single class, belongs to all of
society; when there are no longer employers and employees; and when
cooperation, agreements, and a common purpose replace conflict, anta
gonism, and coercive power. Yet, the dictatorship of the proletariat
is necessary at this stage, Lenin insisted, to ward off capitalist
revanchism and as a means of leading "the enormous mass of the popula
tion" in organizing a socialist economy. For this purpose, "the prole
tariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the 357 organization of violence."
With the Seven Year Plan initiated in 1961, North Korea is said
to have entered "a decisive stage in the building of socialism in the
northern half of the Republic," whose cardinal tasks were set as to
turn the country into "a socialist industrial country with a modern
industry and a developed agriculture," and to improve "the people's
material and cultural standards by effecting technical and cultural 358 revolutions." The Plan foresaw the continuation of the previous
357. Vladimir I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution” (August 1917), Selected Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), Vol. II, part 1, p. 224.
358. Resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee of the W.P.K.," in the Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, (P'yongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House. 1961), p. 349. In a speech at the First Session of the Third Supreme People's Assembly, on October 23, 1962, Kim Il-song clearly indicated that North Korea entered the socialist stage by saying that: "An advanced socialist system free from exploitation and oppression has been established in the northern part of Korea... .With the rapid progress of socialist
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Three Year and Five Year plans— a policy that gave priority to the
"growth of heavy industry while simultaneously developing light industry
and agriculture." But an emphasis was added by stressing a need to 359 develop "science and culture in an all-round way." There is nothing
new in this Seven Year Plan compared with the previous plans; it merely
reaffirmed what had been said before. But there was a difference of
degree in the emphasis of the cultural revolution. Appealing to Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary zeal, it envisaged the "revolutionization" of
the whole society by reorganizing social and political life and indoc
trinating more thoroughly the population of North Korea. At the Fourth
Party Congress in 1961, Kim Il-s5ng made this clear:
"Revolution is a complex and difficult task of remarking nature and society. To accomplish it successfully we must pos sess the weapons and the means for reorganizing life and building it anew as well as the revolutionary will to do so. Marxism-Leninism and scientific knowledge are the powerful revolutionary weapons which clearly light up the road to vic tory and ensure our forward movement in the complicated and arduous struggle." 360
358; (Cont'd). construction, our socialist system is being con solidated and developing with each passing day, displaying ever greater advantages. Kim Il^sbng, "Immediate Tasks of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," (October 23, 1962), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 325.
359, "Resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee of the W.P.K.," in the Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers7 Party of Korea, p. 350.
360. Kim Il-song, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of th Workers' Party of Korea," Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 239.
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In the process of socialist change in the relations of production,
the past step-by-step policies of transforming all the social classes
are intimately related to a new effort to make every component of the
North Korean society a devoted revolutionary. The past, in other words,
projects the present and the future. Furthermore, the transformation
or revolutionization of all the social classes into a socialist outlook
cannot be detached from the organizational and institutional systems
of control that have enabled the North Korean leaders to effectively
achieve their goals.
The Constitution of North Korea proclaims that "the sovereignty of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall be vested in the people."
Theoretically, this means that the people have the power to govern them
selves by exercising their sovereignty through the Supreme People's 361 Assembly and the people's assemblies of various levels. The Consti
tution also stipulates that the Supreme feople's Council, the highest
sovereign organ of the state, shall be elected through free will and
secret balloting, based on the principles of "universal, equal, and 362 direct suffrage," and in turn, the Council shall elect a premier who
shall organize his cabinet. But once decisions and directives arc
promulgated by the cabinet, they shall be "compulsorily executed" in 363 the territory of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. What this
361. Article 2 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pukhan Chongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 666.
362. Article 34 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ibid., p. 667.
363. Article 53 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ibid., p. 668.
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really means is that the selection of government officials is made
from below, while strict obedience to directives from above should be
carried out in a compulsory manner. This is commonly known among the
Communist nations as the principle of "democratic centralism."
An important fact to remember in studying communism is that there
are wide gaps between theory and practice, and these gaps are likely
to make their theories no more than ex-post-facto rationalizations,
since in reality, communist practices have been most undemocratic. Des
pite the stipulation in Article 34 of the Constitution, the North Koreans
have utilized special devices for securing the majority of votes for
Korean Workers Party candidates. The most effective device is the
prevailing single-member constituency system which gives great advantage 364 to the candidates of the Korean Workers Party. In their campaign
process, furthermore, these candidates have strong support from workshops
or from "mobile agitator teams." And they have steady backing by the
press and radio, which constantly reminds the voters of the "virtues 365 and correctness of the Party leadership and superiority of socialism."
It is not surprising, therefore, when a North Korean newspaper praised
the historic victory of the 1962 election of delegates to the Supreme
364. In this system, "well-known party, governmental, and military figures and recipients of various 'hero' awards are automatically assured of nomination." And they are mostly the favorite-sons of the Korean Workers Party. Department of Army, U. S. Army Area Handbook for Korea, p. 277.
365. Loc. cit. , South Korean sources say that voters in North Korea cast their ballots without marking anything when they support the single candidates, while they are required to mark X if they oppose the candidates. This practice has been going on since October 1962, the sources insist, in front of the election supervisors. For this, see Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul lcobal hanta (I am Indicting Kim Il-song), pp. 288-289, and Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 124.
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People's Assembly in the following words:
"One hundred percent of the total eligible voters participated in the election, and one hundred percent voted for the candidates of the Supreme People's Assembly who were registered in each election district." 366
The result was clear. Out of 383 delegates elected in this 1962 election,
"members of the Workers Party won 372 seats, representing an overwhelming 367 majority of 97% in the Assembly.
Second, the delegates of the Supreme People's Assembly are to
be elected for a term of four years, as Article 36 of the Constitution
stipulates. In practice this is not so. There is a lapse of nine years
between the 1948 elections and those of 1957, and a lapse of five years
between those of 1962 and 1967. When the Supreme People's Assembly
is not in session, the Presidium exercises its delegated power. Since
the ordinary session of the Supreme People's Assembly is called twice
a year, except for an extraordinary session which can be convened at
the demand of one third of the delegates or by the Presidium of the 368 Supreme People's Assembly, the real power of the assembly resides in
the hands of the Presidium members. And there is no doubt that these
366. Minchu Choson, (an organ of the Supreme People's Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), (October, 11, 1962). For the ballot method, see Kim Chang-sun, Pukhan siponySnsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), p. 203.
367. Kim Tae—ho, "The Ruling System of North Korean Regime," Korean Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1963, p. 176. As of 1968, it is known that the total number of delegates in the Supreme People's Council is 457.
368. Article 38 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 668.
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369 people are loyal servants of Kim Il-song.
In the top echelon of the executive branch, headed by Premier Kim
Il-song, there are nine vice-premiers (including one first-premier) and
also some thirty or more Ministers and heads of state commissions, who
are mostly members of the Korean Workers' Party. As of November, 1967,
Kim Il-song and seven vice-premiers were all Politbureau members of the
Korean Workers Party, while the remaining two vice-premiers had been
the Central Committee members of the Party since 1964.
The decisions and orders of the cabinet are transmitted to the
lower levels through people's committees in local governments. Accor
ding to the Constitution, the local people's committees at all levels
are to be elected by people's assemblies at corresponding levels, and
the former, the local executive branch, is responsible to the latter,
the corresponding local legislative branch, and people's committees at
higher levels. But they are subject to receive and obey the uniform 370 instructions and directives from the cabinet. In practice, therefore,
it is not difficult to see the precarious nature of the local people's
committees, which do not function as self-governing organs but are strongly
attached to the central government as administrative organs. Since local
369. As of 1968, the key members of the Presidium in what they call the Chairmen Committee of the Presidium are Ch'oe Yong-kon (Vice- chairman of the Korean Workers Party) , Pak Chong-ae (a member of Polit bureau in the Korean Workers Party) , Kang Yang-wuk (Chairman of the North Korean Democratic Party), Lee Yong-ho (a member of Politbureau in the Korean Workers Party), Pak Mun-kyu (a member of the Central Committee in the Korean Workers Party).
370. Article 75 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), pp. 669- 670.
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authority is severely proscribed by the principle of "democratic
centralism," which binds each organ to its superior level of command,
it is not difficult to imagine the kind of complaint Kim Il-song had
in mind in his report at a Plenum of the Central Committee in April,
1955:
"How can bureaucracy, a method of anti-popular rule which, going against the masses and divorced from them, defends the interests of the handful of the ruling class, be compatible with such revolutionary activities? Revolutionary work is for the people and bureaucracy is against the people. Therefore, bureau cracy is against the people. Therefore, bureaucracy is absolutely impermissible in revolutionary work." 371
In an effort to combat bureaucracy on the one hand, and to achieve
ambitious production goals on the other, coupled with bitter memory
of the bold challenge to himself, Kim Il-song decided in 1959 to streng
then Party leadership over local organizations. He made it clear that:
"People's committees at the provincial, city, and county level will perform their duties under the control of their res pective Party executive committees, and all activities within factories will be conducted under the leadership of factory Party committees. The highest organ within a factory is not the factory director but the factory Party committee. The factory director and the Party chairman will act under that committee."372
Then, an intensive and direct Party leadership over matters of general
local administration followed after Kim Il-song, together with the Party's
371. Kim Il-song , "On Eliminating Bureaucracy," (April, 1955), Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 275.
372. Kim Il-song, "Sahwechuui kyongchekonsoleso chekitwenun tangmyonhan myotkachi kwaoptul e taehayo" (On various Present Tasks Raised by Socialist Economic Construction), Selected Works (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1960), Vol. VI, p. 528. This is translated by Glenn D. Paige in his "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, p. 246.
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Central Committee members, personally made a trip to Ch'ongsanri Farm
Co-operative in Kangso County near P'yongyang in January, 1960. Kim
Il-song engaged directly in discussions with local people and functiona
ries and gave on-the-spot guidance to them. This became known as the
"Ch'ongsanri Method," which reportedly established a new system of work
to aid subordinate local organizations and masses by the upper levels
of the Party and state organizations. The main feature of this Method
was well summarized by Kim Il-song:
"The center has come to the aid of the province, and the province to that of the country. Particularly, func tionaries of the country organs, the lowest buiding level of the Party and the state, regularly go down to the ri, which has become the basic production unit in the country side, where they assist in its work in a responsible manner, directly organizing and carrying out Party work and economic work on the spot together with the functionaries of the ri." 373
In December, 1961, Kim Il-song made another trip to a power plant in
Daean, Kangso county, and repeated what he did in Ch'ongsanri. Ever since,
this became known as the "Working System of Daean." In this manner,
the direct leadership of the Central Committee was applied, not only
to agriculture, but to all other production fields as well, and allegedly
brought "a splendid victory of the mass line" mainly for the following
two reasons: first, it is said that by smashing "the outmoded practices
of bureaucracy," the Method became a guiding principle for cementing
"the unity of the Party," and thereby, "a big change has been made in
educating and remoulding the masses with communist ideology and in
373. Kim Il-song, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 235.
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374 uniting them." Second, it helped "launch the Ch'ollima movement 375 effectively through a rationally organized control system," which
would enable the speedy production for goals set to achieve Socialism
in North Korea. On this account, a Korean expert on North Korea writes:
", . . the intensification of political leadership of the Party committee in county, administrative leaderships over enterprises, the improvement of cultural and educational roles in the county people's committees, and rapid improvement of technical and cultural standards as well as the standards of farmer's ideological consciousness, which are based upon the guidance and support of the working class— most of these are the major factors which stimulate the rapid progress of "Ch'ollima Movement' in rural areas, and are playing a great role to that effect." 376
The Method was designed to bring about twin-objectives: ideological
indoctrination and speedy, effective production. Kim Il-song conceded
this by saying:
"The Party closely combined communist education with education in its revolutionary traditions, and exerted its main effort to link up mass education directly with the pro ductive activities of the working people. . . . In this way, a new attitude of living and working in a communist way has begun to take shape among the masses, and the work of educating and remoulding people has gradually been taken over by the masses as their own task." 377
374. Ibid., pp. 236-237.
375. Yoo Wan-shik, "The Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement," Korean Affairs, Vol. II, No. II, 1963, p. 172.
376. Paik Chae-wuk, "Chosen noudoto no senriba undo" (The Ch'ollima Movement of the Korean Workers Party), The Monthly Korean Affairs, Vol. 6 , No. 12, (December, 1966), p. 81.
377. Kim Il-song, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," Selected Works, p. 238.
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In China, local authority is severely delimited by the principle of
"democratic centralism," which binds each organ to its superior level
of command and each party member to an even more rigid obedience to higher
authority. There, too, were attempts at thoroughgoing ideological edu
cation and production increase by organizing the basic local units in
such a way as to remind one of the military system as embodied in Chinese
communes. But local officials in China were allowed considerable lati
tude in the administering of details of programs which were drafted in
only general terms by the center of the Party in Peking. This was clear
when Mao Tse-tung said:
"The co-operative economy must be subject to the unified economic planning of the state, while retaining a certain leeway and independence of action that are not incompatible with the state's unified plan or with its policies, laws and regulations." 373
Since the Ch'ongsan-ri Method was applied to every detailed aspect
of the local daily affairs, it is assumed that there is less latitude
enjoyed by the North Korean local officials and working masses, for they
are placed under strong guidance from the upper levels of the Party and
governmental organizations even on minor details. This was hailed as
"a splendid embodiment of the art of Marxist-Leninist leadership" by
Pak Kum-ch'ol:
"The Chungsan-ri (Ch'ongsan-ri) method is a striking manifestation of the Leninist style of work of discussing with the masses all problems from the trivial ones to those of social significance and of solving problems by calling forth
378. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," (February 27, 1957), Selected Works, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 366.
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the might of the masses. And at the same time it is a splendid embodiment of the art of Marxist-Leninist leader ship of organically combining general guidance with individual guidance." 379
There is no doubt that the autocratic tradition of Korean history helped
influence the establishment of such a system in North Korea, but the
size of the country and population were the major factors that enabled
the center of power to control thoroughly the minor details of the local
administration. Certainly this is an effective system, which makes it
virtually impossible for dissenters to harbor revolutionary ideas against
Kim Il-song's leadership, as was once attempted during the mid 1950's,
not to mention the strictly controlled production and indoctrination
from above.
Though the Party theoretically exists outside the government and
military forces, in reality it functions as the prime force inside them.
The Party is absolutely supreme over all social and political organizations
in North Korea and can influence every detail of private life.
As of 1967, the total North Korean population was estimated to be 380 12,900,000, while the members of the Korean Workers Party amounted 381 to 1,700,000. This ratio of one party member for every eight persons
is one of the highest ever achieved by a communist country. This huge
revolutionary vanguard is under the strict control of Kim Il-song at the
379. "Speech by Comrade Pak Ileum Chul (Pak Kum-ch'ol)," in Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, p. 275.
380. Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 35.
381. Ibid., p. 123.
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apex of the Party pyramid.
As its basic units, the Party has cells in every factory, co-operative,
political, social, educational, and cultural organization, and in the
'People's Army' at all levels and branches where there are more than 382 three Party members. A unit with more than one hundred Party members
and candidate members is to organize the lowest Party committee which 383 performs duties assigned from above.
As in the case of government operation, the Party is run by a strict
adherence to the principle of "democratic centralism." Article 17 of
the Party Rules makes it clear that "every leading organ of the Party
at all levels" from the lowest to the top "shall be elected in a democratic
manner," that the Party members shall obey the Party organization, the
minority the majority, the lower Party organization the higher, and all
the Party organizations the Party Central Committee," and that "the lower
party organizations must carry out the decisions made at the higher Party 384 organizations." According to this principle, local Party branches
choose delegates to county or municipal Party congresses which, in turn,
elect provincial Party congresses. These send delegates to a National
382. Article 56, The Party Rules of the Korean Workers Party, Pukhan Ch'ongkam, ibid., p. 677.
383. Ibid., Article 57 and 61 of the Party Rules of the Korean Workers Party, p. 677.
384. Article 17 of the Korean Workers Party Rules, ibid. , p. 674. The similar tone was reflected by Kim Il-song as early as 1947 : "We should thoroughly establish a principle that the minority be obey to the majority. It is our Party's organizational principle that the Party members should obey to the Party's decision, individuals to the organization, and the minority to the majority." Kim Il-song, "Ch'angnip ilchunyon ul machihanun Pukchoson Nodong-tang," (The North Korean Workers Party Observing the First Anniversary of Its Foundation), August 28, 1947, Selected Works (P'yongyang: Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964), Vol. 1, p. 362.
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Party Congress which then chooses the members of the Central Committee,
the highest leading body of the Party. When the National Party Congress
is not in session, the Central Committee exercises the delegated power
of the Congress. But just as the main power resource in the Supreme
People's Assembly is in the hands of the Presidium, so the seventeen
man Politbureau of the Korean Workers Party constitutes the nucleus of 385 the power center. It directs the entire work of the Party when the
National Party Congress is not in session.
The component membership of the Politbureau reveals certain cha
racteristics that can be compared with Russian and Chinese patterns.
Members of the politbureau first elected at the First Party Congress
of the North Korean Workers Party in 1946 included Kim Tu-pong (Yenan-
Korean), Kim Il-song (Kapsan), Chu Yong-ha (Domestic faction), Ch'oe
Ch'ang-ik (Yenan-Korean), and Ho Ka-i (Soviet-Korean). At the Second
Party Congress held in 1948, two more members were added to the original
five. The new Politbureau members were Kim Ch'aek (Kapsan-faction),
and Pak Il-wu (Yenan-Korean). It was the Third Party Congress in 1956
that brought a dramatic change in teh membership of the Politbureau.
First, the Politbureau was expanded to twelve members. Second, it
created candidate memberships under which four men were enlisted. And
finally, it brought in more new faces behind the scenes who had been
385. A Standing Committee was created in 1966 in the Politbureau which was consisted of Kim Il-song. Ch'oe Yong-kon, Kim II, Pak Kum-ch'ol, Lee Hyo-sun, and Kim Kwang-hyop. Out of the seventeen members of the Politbureau, Pak Kum-ch'ol, Kim Ch'ang-man, and Lee Hyo-sun were purged in 1967. The Politbureau also has twelve candidate members.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192
directly associated with Kim Il-song. Those who were elected as full
members in 1956 included: Kim Il-song (Kapsan faction), Ch'oe Yong-kon
(Kapsan faction), Kim-11 (Kapsan faction), Pak Kum-ch'ol (Kapsan faction),
Kim Ch'ang-man (Yenan-Korean), Lee Hyo-sun (Kapsan faction), Pak Chong-ae
(Soviet-Korean), Kim Kwang-hyop (Yenan-Korean), Chong Il-ryong (Engineer),
Nam II (Soviet-Korean), Lee Chong-olc (Kapsan faction), and Lee Chu-yon
(Domestic faction). In 1966, at the Fourteenth Plenary Session of the
Fourth Party Congress, five more new members were added to the politbureau.
They were: Kim Ik-son (Kapsan faction), Kim Ch'ang-pong (Kapsan faction),
Pak Song-ch'ol (Kapsan faction), Ch'oe Hyon (Kapsan faction), and Lee 386 Yong-ho(Kapsan faction).
In China, most of Mao's original hard core members, who participated
in the Long March in 1935, were, from the beginning of the Republic,
represented in the Politbureau, or more precisely, its seven man Standing
Committee. Under the leadership of Mao, the cohesion of the old revo
lutionaries appears to have been relatively stable and strong except
for three separate incidents, for which Jao Shu-shin, Kao Kang, and
Liu Shao-ch'i were ousted from their respective bases of power.
After the Revolution in Russia, most of the key revolutionary
figures under the leadership of Lenin obtained seats in the Politbureau.
It was only after Stalin ascended to power(after Lenin) that a series
of changes took place in the Russian Politbureau, which moved in the
386. Up to 1956, most of the Kapsan faction were holding key administrative positions in the Party and government. By 1966, Kapsan faction dominated the Politbureau with overwhelming majority. Most of the newly elected members have military backgrounds.
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387 direction of Stalin's one man dictatorship.
Under circumstances totally different from both Chinese and Russian
experience— circumstances that were conditioned by competition for power
in the absence of a central leadership— Kim Il-song had been forced to
compromise with reality. But as his power grew and after the bitter
experience of the plot against his leadership in the mid-1950's, he .
began to bring in more people of his faction to the center of power and
formed a new political elite. In short, in China and Russia, where the
revolutions were fought and victories were achieved through their own
blood, the existing revolutionary elites could become political elites
after the victory, but in North Korea, where the revolution was brought
about with outside help, power was to be fought over a long period of
time by factional coalitions. As a result, the original hard-core
formed during the anti-Japanese guerrilla fighting led by Kim Il-song
could not emerge as the political elite force from the very start.
Unlike the Chinese and Russian monopoly occupation of the Polit-
bureaus by their respective hard-core members, the North Korean Polit
bureau has always reserved some seats for different factions, as a
showcase to demonstrate that politics in North Korea is not a monopoly
of the Kapsan faction.
387. Throughout the civil war, the Politbureau consisted of five men only: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, and Bukharin. Later, Zino viev and Tomsky were added. But most of them were replaced by Stalin when he obtained power. I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, pp. 233-235 and pp. 309-311.
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3. Other Methods of Control
In connection with changing aspects of the power structure in the
Politbureau, it is also significant to probe into an important question:
what happened to those old faces who disappeared from the major political
scene? A simple answer is that most of them were purged. None of the
four Politbureau members elected in 1946 survived purges, and many of
the Central Committee members could not continue to hold their positions
in the Party because their views dissented from Kim Il-song's policies.
In his purge pattern of the top-level opposition, Kim Il-song has
shown certain striking similarities to Stalin's purges. First, as
Stalin did to Trotsky, the death of Hyon Chun-hyok is believed to have
been a political assassination by Kim Il-song's Kapsan faction. Just
as Frunze, Trotsky’s successor in the Commissariat of War, died on 388 Stalin's orders while undergoing a surgical operation, so Kim Yong-
pom and An Kil, the two prominent Soviet-Koreans, died in the same hos- 389 pital in 1947, reportedly on the orders of Kim Il-song.
As indicated in Chapter II above, there was little mercy of any
kind in the purge of South Korean Workers Party bfficials, including
Pak Hon-yong and Lee Sung-hyop. They were both executed. Like Stalin,
Kim Ilr-song also expelled and imprisoned several leading members of
the Party opposition, among them Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak Ch'ang-ok, and
388. Later, Trotsky said that "Stalin got subservient physicians to express an opinion in favor of the operation to the Politbureau. . . ibid., pp. 305-306-
389. Tsuboe Senji, Hokuchosen no lcaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), p. 49.
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_ 390 Yun Kong-hom. If there is any difference between Stalin and Kim
Il-song in their purge patterns, it does not lie in the degree of
toleration, but primarily in the fact that Kim Il-song more often favored
the method of quietly downgrading the accused. Stalin utilized the same
method against Zinoviev in 1926 by deposing and demoting him from the chair- 391 manship of the Communist International, apparently as a sign of
tolerance. To many Koreans, demotion or losing face can mean no less
than death sentences. It is a sign of great contempt, and it is not
hard to see why short-tempered Koreans who lost face in this way would 392 rather commit suicide to assert their innocence.
An example can be cited in the case of Mu Chong and Ho Ka-i. Mu
Chong, who used to boast of his association with Mao Tse-tung in the
Long March of 1935, regarded Kim Il-song as though he were a junior who
lacked the experience and quality necessary to be a national leader.
It was natural, therefore, to assume that there existed animosity between
Kim and Mu. Under the circumstances, Mu was serving as Commander of the
Second Corps of the "Korean People's Army" during the Korean War. Wien
the People's Army was on the run, driven by the U. N. forces, Mu Chong
390. These anti-Kim Il-song leaders of Soviet and Yenan Koreans were only temporarily saved from heavy punishments by the mercy pleas of both P'eng Teh-huai, Vice-Premier of Communist China and Anastas Miko- yan, Vice-Premier of the Soviet Union. Later, they were imprisoned. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (The Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), pp. 155-158.
391. I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, p. 309.
392. The same can be applied to the Chinese. The Chinese say that Kao Kang "expressed his ultimate betrayal of the party by committing suicide." Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, p. 195.
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was ordered to defend P'yongyang. He failed. At the Third Plenary
session of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party held in
December 1950 in Pyolori, he was accused of failure to defend the city,
committing unwarranted murders and disobeying orders. As a result,
he was demoted to a regiment commander in charge of the construction
work of a theater in P'yongyang. Later, at the demand of the Chinese 393 Communists, he was turned over to the Chinese.
The next man to be purged was Ho Ka-i, a prominent Soviet-Korean,
who held the important post of First Secretary of the Korean Workers 394 Party during the first year of the Korean War. Ho too did not main
tain good relations with Kim Il-song, mainly because he showed great
interest in cooperating with the leaders of the South Korean Workers
Party. Making use of his position and experience in the Party, coupled
with his belief that the qualities of the South Korean Workers Party
members were better than those of the North Korean Workers Party Members,
Ho accepted almost a3.1 former members of the South Korean Workers Party
in North Korea into the Korean Workers Party. But it proved to be a
great disaster to Ho Ka-i, because a great number of these former South
Korean Workers Party members deviated en masse from Communism during
the War, and particularly many of those South Koreans who had been
393. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pulchan siponyonsa (Fifteen Years History of North Korea), pp. 121-131.
394. In his early boyhood, Ho Ka-i moved to Russia, took part in the October Revolution, and studied in Moscow. Later he went to Tashkent Republic and became a leader of the Tashkent Communist Party. By 1945, shortly before the end of the Second World War, he was promoted to the Central Secretary of that Party. He entered North Korea in 1946, and served as the head of the Organizational Department of North Korean Communist Party. Tsuboe Senji, Hoksen no kaiho junen (Ten Years History of North Korea Since the Liberation), p. 174.
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395 enlisted in the North Korean Volunteer Army defected to the South.
At this juncture, Kim Il-song made an indirect attack nn Ho Ka-i
in his concluding speech at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee
of the Korean Workers Party in November, 1951:
"The personnel departments are busy filling vacancies. The work of training cadres according to plan and allocating the right cadre to the right post \tfith due consideration of the opinions of subordinates, is not being done satisfactorily. The regulations governing personnel matters must be re-examined and appropriately modified." 396
An open attack on Ho came in 1953 when an emergency session was called
to hear charges that he committed two crimes — non-completion of the
irrigation works in P'yongnam Province of which he was in charge, and
his flight to Northeastern Manchuria in October, 1950, when the North
Korean government had to move to Shinichu. Obviously Ho foresaw his
fate, as he had been witness to the Mu Chong case. He committed suicide.
Since then, his name has been associated with bureaucracy. The above
charges made against him were proved to be false. In 1959, Kim Il-song
stated that:
"Bureaucracy among Party workers also finds expression in their brandishing of the Party's authority. It was Ho Kai Yi, too, who propagated this evil style of work— brandishing of the Party's authority— within the Party." 397
Kim Tu-pong is another purge victim who was accused of involvement
in anti-Party activity by siding with Han Pin and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik.
395. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan siponyonsa (Fifteen Years History of North Korea), pp. 132-133. Pukhan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac), p. 174.
396. Kim Il-song, "On the Improvement of the Party's Organizational Work," (November 2, 1951), Selected Works’, Vol. I, p. 157.
397. Kim Il-song, "On the Method 0f Party Work," (February 26, 1959), Selected*Works, Vol. I, p. 11.
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In March, 1958, Kim Il-song openly disclosed his crimes:
"We worked with Kim D.u Bong (Kim Tu-pong) for ten years. But during those years he nurtured an evil dream. While remaining uncommunicative with us, he ooened up his heart only to Han Bin (Han Pin) and Choe Chang Ik (Ch'oe Ch'ang- ik) . . . .If Kim Du Bong had aver been a Communist, if he had ever been a man who worked for the sake of the Party, how are we to interpret his having been on the most intimate terms with a man hated by the Party? This is the point. Kim Du Bong always thought more of Han Bin's words than of the decisions of our Party." 398
Then, Kim Tu-pong was disgraced by being made a farm worker in Sunan
where he died of illness. The fates of Pak Kum-ch'nl, Kim Ch'ang-man,
and Lee Hyo-sun anpear to be similar, with their sudden downfalls in 1967
for their alleged "anti-Party" activities.
The purge was by no means confined to the upper echelon of the
power structure in North Korea. Various individuals who did not fit
into the concept of "the people" were subjected to severe attack and
purge as "enemies of the people," for their disagreement, indifference,
and disloyalty or for their conscious reactions arising out of their
"hostile class origin." According to Kim Nam-sik, a defector from North
Korea, about one third of North Korean population comes under the category
of "anti-revolutionary elements" who are under constant surveillance
by Party members. These include about two million people who mostly
consist of families of defectors to the South and of those who worked
for anti-Communist organizations; about two hundred thousand people who
are related to the evaders of military service, old landlords, business-
398. Kim Il-song, "For the Successful Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan," (March 6 , 1958), Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 364-365.
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men and entrepreneurs, religious leaders as well as believers, section-
alists and their families, government officials and their families who
served under the Japanese and American occupation, political criminals
and their families, and nationalists of the past; about four hundred
thousand people who went to the North either by defection or kidnapping,
were draftees from the South, or were old members of the South Korean
Workers Party: about four hundred thousand people who include the North
Korean Prisoners of War repatriated to the North and their families;
and another one hundred thousand people who moved around without permis- 399 sion from the government. This may be an exaggerated description
of North Korean totalitarianism, but one thing is certain: despite inces
sant emphasis of North Korean leaders on the importance of "mass line,"
there were innumerable North Koreans who could not be properly called
"citizens" because of their class origins and past backgrounds. Thus,
the original Marxist criteria of classifying "class enemy" in terms of the
means of production was expanded to include more sophisticated categories
such as "state of mind" and "heritage," thereby making it possible for the
North Korean Communists to define the "enemy" in such an elastic and extensive
manner that this threatening term could be applied to any individual who
was considered non-conformist. But gradually the Communists realized
that the exclusion of such a vast number of people from social and
399. Kim Nam-sik, Hyuchonhu ui Pukhan sahwe (The North Korean Society after the Truce), (Seoul: Naewemunche yonlcuso, 1950), Pang In-hu, "Choson Nodong-tang ui kekup chongch'aek (The Class Policy of the Korean Workers Party)," Chungkongkwon ui changnae, p. 93.
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political life would mean a great loss to North Korea by depriving them
of incentive to work and the means of proving their loyalty to North
Korea. Thus, they decided to forget the past records of 'people of
complicated background.' These facts were clearly revealed when Pak
Kum-ch'ol spoke at the Fourth Congress of the Korean Workers Party on
September 12, 1961:
The Party trusted all those people who were loyal to the revolution and were striving to reform themselves, however complicated their origin and environments and their past social and political careers might be. The Party provided them with the opportunities for progress and actively helped them to display their talents and enthusiasm in socialist construction. The Party took a bold step to openly express its trust in those people who had been tried and tested in the practical struggle, writing off from their past career all that could be called in question. These measures taken by the Party encouraged all the people with a complicated career to come out more actively in support of out Party and the socialist system and to display greater enthusiasm and creative initiative in socialist construction." 400
Since then, what they called the "Uncovering Movement" was initiated
everywhere, which was to forget the past crimes of the anti-revolutionary
elements in North Korea. The Movement did not proceed as well as expected,
for there arose a strong backlash from the extreme left elements among 401 the Communists. Yet, with the lapse of time, the appeasement policy
toward "people of complicated background" apparently made some progress.
Four years later, Kim Il-song reported:
400, "Speech by Comrade Pak Keum-c’nul (Pak Kum-ch'ol), "In Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of horea, (P'yongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 278-279.
401. Pang In-hu, "Choson Nodong-tang ui Icekup chongch'aek" (The North Korean Society after the Truce), ChungkonglcwSn ui changnae, p. 94.
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"We boldly trusted and accepted into our ranks even those whose social origin and political and social backgrounds were complicated, and ensured them conditions for working free from worries, provided they now supported our Party and displayed enthusiasm in their work. Life has fully confirmed the correctness of this policy of our Party. By carrying it out we have been to educate and remould the broad masses of people of various strata and are successfully continuing with the work of education and remoulding." 402
So tolerance is shown under certain conditions: they should support
the Party and display enthusiasm in their work. A question of loyalty
thus becomes the main determinant in passing judgment on the "conscious
reactionaries of hostile class origin" and "remoulded" good citizens.
A most effective way of instilling loyalty and responsiveness to
the Party among the masses has been the cult of personality. Surrounded
by myth-makers of the Kapsan faction in the Politbureau and many other
important organizations in and out of the Party, Kim Il-song has been
idolized by the old and new generations alike for his past deeds during
the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. First, there is a strong effort
by myth-makers to identify Kim Il-song with the legendary Kim Il-song
whose heroic deeds are shrouded by many mystic stories. To cite an
example, a eulogist of Kim Il-song in Japan describes the fighting of
I-Iongtusan, Toch'onri, and Leemyongsu between 1936 and 1937 as great
victories of Kim II—song's force, and goes on to say that:
"Since then, the Japanese Imperialists called Marshal Kim Il-song's eminent strategy protean, making an uproar saying that Marshal Kim Il-song uses a land-contraction-magic, and
402. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," (April 14, 1965), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 546-547.
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acknowledged that the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force of Marshal Kim Il-song is the most formidable one i.n the world." 403
Despite the history described in Chapter One of this dissertation, the
Poch'onpo Fight is glorified to the extent that the "Korean People's
Revolutionary Army" is made to appear to have inflicted heavy casual
ties upon its enemies. It is said that out of two thousand men of the
seventy-fourth Regiment in the Japanese Army, which took the counter- 404 offensive, 1,500 were killed or wounded in the fighting.
Kim Il-song is pictured as a man of love who always cares for the
welfare of the people. North Korean Communist writes:
"Bearing in mind Comrade Kim Il-song's teaching that 'just as fish cannot live without water, the guerrillas cannot live without the people,' the anti-Japanese guerrillas respected and loved the people and cherished the happiness of the people more than anything else and translated into action the work method of relying on and fighting for the people." 405
He is also idolized as a symbol of Korean nationalism and communism,
which presented "the most proper and scientific revolutionary line and
direction" based upon Marxism-Leninism, and "personally organized and 406 developed the anti-Japanese armed struggle." Thus, Kim Il-song is
403. Lee Na-yong, Choson minchok haepang t'uchaeng-sa (History of the Struggle for Korean National Emancipation), p. 387.
404. Ibid., p. 387 and 390.
405. Om Ki-hyon, "Loyalty to Kim Il-song Stressed," Kullocha, No. 7, (August 1967). During their revolutionary fightings, the Chinese Communists used almost same catchword: "the soldiers are fish and the people water." For this account, see John KingFairbanlc, The United States and China, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press., 1958), p. 286.
406. Ha Su-hong and Ch'oe Won-kun, "Indomitable Fighting Spirit of the Anti-Japanese Guerrillas," Kullocha, No. 8 , (August 30, 1967), in JPRS: 43419, p. 35.
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. . the unprecedented patriot and a national hero, an ever victorious steel-willed general, one of the outstanding leaders of the international Communist movement and the labor movement, and the great leader of the 40 million Korean people." 407
All these fabrications, exaggerations, and stories are undoubtedly
the products of key members of the Kapsan faction. They are the myth-
makers .
One of the leading proteges of Kim Il-song, Ch'oe Hyon, tells
a story about an amber pipe, which he said he received from Kim Il-song
in the early 1930’s and xdiich is now preserved in the Museum of Struggle
for Liberation. He relates that:
"Although it is no more than a small pipe, it has become a close friend of my heart that kindled my strength and courage about thirty years up to now." 408
Another close protege of Kim Il-song, Ho Pong-hak, glorifies the North
Korean Premier:
". . . he (Kim Il-song) taught us to respect the aged and local customs, help the hard works of the people, incessantly converse with the people, and to do propaganda work to the people. . ." 409
The Cult of personality is extended to include all the people of
the Kapsan faction who were at one time or another associated with Kim
407. "Revolutionary Pride under Kim Il-song's Leadership," Kullocha, (June 30, 1968), in JPRS: 46,377, p. 22.
408. Ch'oe Hyon, "Ichulsuopnun ch'ot sangpong" (The Unforgettable First Meeting), Urinun 5nchena suryongkwa hamkke (We Are Always with Our Chief), (P'yongyang; Minch'ong ch'ul-p' an-sa, 1961), pp. 20-21. Ch'oe Hyon was recently appointed as the Minister of Defense in North Korea.
409. Ho Pong-hak, "Inmin ul salanghanun maumeso" (From the Heart of Loving People), ibid. , pp. 193-194. As of 1966, Ho Pong-hak became the candidate member for the Politbureau of Korean Workers Party.
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Il-song during his guerrilla life. Many stories are told and taught
to a new generation that did not go through the ordeal of the Korean
War, on how anti-Japanese guerrillas demonstrated their spirit of
loyalty and self-sacrifice by defending the "Chief" (Kim Il-song) and
their comrades for the cause of the Korean liberation. A story is
related about "the spirit of sacrifice of Comrade Yi Kwon-hae" who was
fighting with Kim Il-song against the Japanese in 1939.
"..." (Yi Kwon-hae) shielded the latter (Kim Il-song) with his own body from raining enemy shells and thus ensured the latter's safety while sustaining serious wounds himself" 410
Other stories demonstrate the anti-Japanese" revolutionary love for
their comrades." An article in Kullocha describes how the guerrillas
sacrificed themselves for the sake of others:
"Comrade Yi Chun-gun saved a comrade whose life was in danger from the excessive loss of blood by giving him blood for trans fusion by cutting his finger with a hatchet: Comrade Yi Sun-jol, though wounded himself, carried many of his wounded comrades on his back to safety and was finally killed while carrying still another comrade on his back under enemy fire: Comrade 0 Ung- yong, xdiile carrying a knapsack of food for his comrades, never touched it even when he had to eat acorns, and readily sacrificed his own life in order to protect the food he was carrying for his comrades when he was encircled by enemy troops." 411
As Shannon McCune points out, "the 'cult of personality' now decried
in Soviet circles, though not as much so in Communist China, suits Kim 412 Il-song very well" in light of his own efforts to model himself after
410. Om Ki-hyon, "Loyalty to Kim Il-song Stressed," Kullocha, p. 21.
411. Yun Hyong-silc and Pak Hui-son,"Anti-Japanese Guerrillas' Noble Comradeship," Kullocha, No. 12, (December 1967), in JPRS: 45,015 p. 135.
412. Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm, p. 127.
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several features of Maoism.
The object of the personality cult was to ensure the "monolithic
unity" of the Party and the broad masses as one body without permitting
any thinking independent from the Party line. This was succinctly put
by Pak Kum-ch'ol in his speech at the Fourth Congress of the Workers'
Party of Korea in 1961:
"Today the whole Party thinks and acts in the ideas and will of the Party Central Committee, and the entire people march ahead in one body with our Party." 413
Why, then, is it necessary to preserve this ideological unity? Kim Il-
song answered this question as follows:
"Emphasizing training on the heritage of revolution plays an important role in molding the people with a single ideological pattern and in revolutionizing them. The main purpose of unifying our ideology is to keep our revolutionary work. We are anxious to liberate South Korea, unify our fatherland and build Communism. In order to accomplish our objectives, we must equip the entire people with revolutionary ideas by further improving our training on the heritage of revolution." 414
While Kim Il-song and his Kapsan faction are resolved that all Koreans
shall think and act as they wish, they want them to do so with convic
tion. And as a chief instrument to ensure the desired combination of
spontaneity of thought and discipline of deeds, "criticism and self-
criticism" has been called for. Another recent article in Kullocha
asserts that;
"Criticism is a powerful weapon of the ideological struggle that guarantees the political and ideological unity of the
413. Speech by Comrade Pak Kum-ch'ol," Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, p. 268.
414. "Revolutionary Heritage Stressed for Indoctrinating People," Kullocha, No. 6, (July 15, 1967), in JPRS: 42,860, p. 2.
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revolutionary ranks and accelerates the revolutionization of the society's components. . . . The anti-Japanese guerrillas supported Comrade Kim II- song's teaching, and always struggled as a matter of prin ciple against all sorts of negative phenomena that would obstruct the advance of the revolution and weaken the unity and solidarity of the revolutionary ranks." 415
Again, setting up Kim Il-song and anti-Japanese guerrillas as models
to emulate, "criticism and self-criticism" appears to have become the
means for effective indoctrination.
Outside observers can easily detect a similarity between the
thinking of Kim Il-song and his Kapsan people and that of the Chinese
Communists. The heavy emphasis on loyalty, which recalls the old
loyalties of the "five relationships" in Confucian traditions, the
continued glorification of authority in the person of Kim Il-song and
his past comrades despite the de-Stalinization movement in Russia, and
the kind of device used for thought control (criticism and self-
criticism)— all these are certainly in the Maoist strain. If there is
a conspicuous difference between the North Koreans and the Chinese
Communists, it is perhaps the absence of such a constant reminder of the
thoughts of the Chinese people as revealed in the movement of "Let
Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend."
While there was a brief period of attempting liberalization of the hard
line policies and of stimulation of intellectual activities in China,
no signs of such relaxation could be seen in North Korea, where intel
lectual life has been stifled and has shrunk to an extent that it is
415. "Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force," Kullocha, (July 30, 1968), in JPRS: 46,571, p. 26.
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practically non-existent except insofar as it conforms to Communist
policies.
As pointed out above, Lenin had never accepted the intellectuals
as the "people." It was Mao Tse-tung who first conceived of the possible
transformation of the intellectuals into ardent communist revolutionaries,
and in the process of doing so, he even briefly allowed them academic
freedom. Kim Il-song, like Lenin, did not have as much confidence in
the intellectuals as Mao Tse-tung, but was convinced from the beginning
that it was necessary to attempt the transformation of this class. This
attitude of Kim Il-song is well revealed in his lecture in Indonesia
in April, 1965:
"As a matter of course, our old-time intellectuals come mostly from the propertied classes. They served imperialism and the exploiting classes in the past. . . . Taking into full account the important role played by the intellectuals in the construc tion of a new society and the characteristics of our intellectuals, our Party since the early days of the liberation has pursued the policy of accepting them and remolding them into intellectuals serving the working people. . . . Through the persistent educa tion by the Party. . . .our old-time intellectuals have been transformed into excellent socialist intellectuals." 416
Thus, the intellectuals, too, were brought under Party control. For the
North Koreans, the "de-Stalinization" movement in Russia and the "Let
Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom" movement in China were as dangerous as
playing with fire.
416. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic PeoDle's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 534.
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4. The Question of Korean Unification and Socialist Patriotism
In August, 1953, shortly after the Korean truce was signed, Kim
Il-song stated publicly that:
"It is wrong to think, as some comrades do, that war might soon break out again and that peaceful construction should not be undertaken because the armistice does not mean a lasting peace. . . . The point is to consolidate the victory embodied in the armistice, which we have won at enormous sacrifices by going through the tribulations and calamities of war, and to work unremittingly for a lasting peace in Korea and the peaceful unification of the country." 417
What he really meant by the "peaceful unification" of Korea was not
through negotiations in good faith between the North and the South, but
through winning over the masses in the South by showing the superiority
of the socialist system over what he called the "imperialist colonial
status" prevailing in the South. Kim Il-song had good reason to believe
in this, since conditions in the South after the War were such that he
might have seen a possibility to draw the agony-stricken masses to his
side, if he could successfully build up the North Korean economy. This
intention is clearly revealed in his "Theses on the Character and Tasks
of Our Revolution":
"Socialist construction in the North will be a great incentive to the people in the South, especially to the workers, peasants, and the broad strata of petty bourgeoisie, and contribute to forming a united front even with some of the national capitalists in the South." 418
417. Kim Il-song, "Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy," Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 164.
418. Kim Il-song, "Let Us Exert All Our Strength for the Country's Unification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Part of the Country," (April, 1955), Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 239.
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It is also evident that Kim Il-song counted on the new generation
in the South, who, without remembering much of the cruelty inflicted
upon their parents by the North Koreans,during the war, might support
his unification proposal based upon Korean nationalism. Blaming respon
sible officials for their failures to propagandize nationalism, Kim Il-
song pointed out that:
"The Kwangju Student Incident, for example, was a mass struggle in which tens of thousands of Korean youths and students rose against Japanese imperialism. . . . But Syung- man Rhee has been propagandizing this movement in his favour. This has created a false impression that the Communists dis regard national traditions. What a dangerous thing this is! It will be impossible for us to win over the South Korean youth if we go on working in this way." 419
The peace offensive was strengthened when the South Korean govern
ment of Syung-man Rhee was toppled by the Students' Revolution in April,
1960. There is no doubt that Kim Il-song and the North Korean Communists
believed that South Korea was undergoing a social change in accordance
with the "objective law of social development" of Marxism-Leninism.
More accurately, they conceived the situation as the arrival of the
right time for the unification of Korea. In the "Declaration of the
Fourth Congress of the Workers" Party of Korea, the North Korean Com
munists stated that:
"The time nas come when we should put an end to this unbearable situation. The high spirits of the whole nation aspiring after unification have become a powerful torrent which no force can check." 420
419. Kim Il-song, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche," (December 28, 1955), Selected Works , Vol. 1, p. 317.
420. "For the Peaceful Unification of the Country," in Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, p. 382.
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Emphasizing their belief that the only obstacle to the peaceful unifi
cation of Korea was "the U. S. imperialists' occupation of South Korea
and their aggressive policy," they called for a united action to expel
the U. S. forces from Korea:
"All the patriotic forces in North and South Korea should stand together, united as one, to wage a national liberation struggle, force the U. S. imperialists to withdraw from the territory of our country and achieve the unification of the country." 421
But their dream of communist revolution in all Korea did not materialize,
nor had there been any immediate prospect that it would. Once again,
they had to seek a theory to justify their failure to unify Korea on
their own terms. A North Korean theoretician, citing the Marxist-
Leninist theory of "quantitative" and "qualitative" changes in social
development, analyzed the April Revolution in South Korea as belonging
to the stage of the 'quantitative' change where the substance of the
quality inherent in the system in South Korea would continue until a 422 qualitative change would occur by way.of a sudden leap. This implied
a temporary retreat from positive involvement in the situation, while
waiting for the further evolution of the dialectical development in
South Korea. The peace offensive continued. In his letter replying
to the one written by Kim Yong-chung, the President of the Korean
Affairs Institute in Washington, Kim Il-song reiterated:
"As we have always maintained, the unification of the country should and must be realized on the principles, of independence and
421. Ibid., p. 385.
422. Kim Hong-silc, Ch'olhak kaeron (Introduction to Philosophy) (P'yongyang; Kukrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1963), pp. 125-127.
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democracy, in a peaceful way, without any interference from outside. . . . Withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea is the precondition for the solution of the question of unification."423
In the same letter, Kim Il-song also expressed his growing anxiety and
impatience over the widening gap of differences between the North and
the South:
"As the days go by, the gap between the North and the South is further widening in all spheres of political, economic and cultural life, and even the national features common to our people, a homogeneous nation formed through a long history, are gradually becoming differentiated." 424
But it was not long before he changed his attitude. He decided to return
to the pre-Korean War logic by holding that "the immediate task in North
Korea is to build socialism, whereas that in South Korea is to carry 425 out the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution." Laying
down this principle of the Korean Revolution, Kim Il-song specifically
proposed to prepare three major forces for the forthcoming great revo
lutionary event:
"First, to further strengthen our revolutionary base politically, economically and militarily by successfully building socialism in North Korea. Second, to strengthen the revolutionary forces in South Korea by politically awakening and closely uniting the people in South Korea;
423. Kim Il-song, "Reply to the Letter of the President of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington," (January 8 , 1965), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 501.
424. Ibid., p. 499.
425. Kim Il-song, "On the Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Revolution in South Korea," Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 511.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Third, to strengthen the unity of the Korean people with the international revolutionary forces."426
With the increased truce violations along the Demilitarized Zone in
Korea, the 1967 fiscal budget announced at the Seventh Congress of the
Third Supreme People's Assembly showed an intensification of national
defense measures, for which 1,196,560,000 won was authorized— roughly
tantamount to 30.2% of the total national budget. Also it was revealed
that the "People's Army" was under modernization, the whole population
was to be equipped with arms, and the production of the materials 427 necessary for military purposes was to be increased.
Furthermore, Kim Il-song indicated that some form of positive
action to unify the country would occur in the foreseeable future:
"We must accomplish the South Korean revolution, unify the fatherland in our generation, and hand down a unified fatherland to the coming generations. We must quickly make all conditions ripe for the realization of the unification of the fatherland."428
The North Korean belligerency climaxed in the attempt to assassinate
President Pak Chong-hi of South Korea and the seizure of the U. S. S.
Pueblo.
Also, indications are that the North Korean Communists are
proceeding with plans for unification of the country by armed force,
426. Ibid., p. 559.
427. "Rinkoku Kitac'aosen no gento" (Present Situation of Neigh bouring North Korea), Juogoron, (July 1967), p. 42.
428. Text of Speech by Kim Il-song to Fourth Supreme People's Assembly on December 16, 1967, Presenting DPRK Government Political Program, Daily Report, (December 21, 1967), (FB 247/67/51S), p. 12.
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whether Moscow approves or not. At a banquet in May, 1968, for a
visiting high-level Soviet delegation, the North Korean Vice Premier,
Lee Chu-yon, emphasized the North Korean intention to conquer South
Korea in a "revolutionary spirit of independence, self-sustenance and
self-defense in all fields," to which the Soviet Deputy Chairman,
V. N. Novikov, replied that "the Soviet government supported North Korea
on the basis of 'peaceful' reunification." However, Kim Il-song was
quoted to have said that:
"Only by taking up arms can we seize power. . . . In order to seize power we should wage an armed struggle; by staging an election force we cannot attain power."429
The violent tone and belligerent statements of the North Korean
Communists raise a vital question: why do they appear so anxious to
resort to violence, to switch their peace offensive to "armed seizure"
of South Korea?
From an ideological point of view, there is reason enough to believe
that Kim Il-song simply could not wait for the moment of a sudden leap,
through which a qualitative change will take place in a spontaneous
manner. Discouraged by signs of consolidation and permanence in the
South, by the growth of South Korean defense forces, and the growth
of national economy in the South, Kim II—song began to see that the
kind of change he had been expecting in the South has to be brought
about only by conscious effort and practical action. An article in
Kullocha vividly testifies to this:
429. Washington Post, (June 1, 1968), p. Arl3. and Nodong Sinmun, (May 30, 1968). ^ ^
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"The purpose of the Korean revolution lies in bringing into being socialism and communism, the highest ideal of mankind, in Korea. This is an objective law of social development that will unfailingly arrive in our country. But, how and how fast this law is realized is mainly dependent on the conscious activi ties of the communists."430
From the political and military points of view, there are several
factors that appear to have generated such an overtly aggressive policy.
First of all, there is a strong indication that Kim Il-song is obsessed
with fear that the normalization treaty of Korean-Japanese relations
in 1965 would provide a successful device for joint military cooperation
among South Korea, Japan and the United States. After visiting P'yong-
in 1967, Burchett reflected this:
"The 1965 treaty cleared the way for Japanese-ROK military cooperation, in the name of 'joint defense,' for military opera tions such as the 'Three Arrows,' 'Flying Dragon,' 'Running Bull' and other possible variants. . . . Does this not make it un thinkable that the United States would want any new front opened up in Asia?"431
Second, as the correspondent to Seoul for the Washington Post,
Richard Halloran, generalized in his recent article, "North Korea Assault
Foreseen," there are four major elements that partially explain the
militant policy pursued by the North Koreans: "with prospects for peace
in the offing" in Vietnam, which is running counter to his wishes to
see the American forces preoccupied and tied down there, Kim Il-song
is also counting on "strong anti-war sentiment" in the United States,
430. "Let Us Unify the Fatherland within Our Own Generation," Kullocha, (January 30, 1968), in JPRS: 45,204.
431. Wilfred G. Burchett, Again Korea, p. 17. According to Burchett, the joint military operation plans of "Three Arrows" and "Flying Dragon" were respectively drawn up in 1963 and 1964, and the "Running Bull" was worked out in 1965, as preparations for the "Outbreak of war between North and South Korea, on July 19, 196 ." ibid., pp.12-13.
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which may prevent "a decisive American response to any attack he might
undertake”; "The restrained U. S. response to the January 31, 1968,
seizure of the intelligence ship Pueblo is concrete proof," Kim thinks,
that there will be no strong reaction from the United States even if
he instigates limited warfare against the South; and finally,"Kim is
well aware of the growing desire in America to turn away from military
involvement in Asia" for diverting more attentions and resources to the 432 growing domestic problems.
The principal traits in Kim's leadership style grow out of his
personality and experience, for as Burchett deftlv puts it, "every 433 stage of its (DPRK) development bears his strong personal imprint."
Kim Il-song was born as a fighter. Prom his early boyhood, Kim Il-song
was carried away by the momentum of the fighting spirit against the
Japanese. As a determined guerrilla, as a proud Russian Army officer,
and as a respected Marshal and the Commander-in-Chief of the "Korean
People’s Army," his mind has been occupied with growing sentiments
of heroism and victory. He cannot prolong the unification plan, for
his power of restraint cannot bear his patience and hot temper which
constantly drive him to resort to decisive military action. In this
sense, Stuart R. Schram's descriptions of Mao Tse-tung's 'military
romanticism' may well apply to Kim Il-song:
""By this term, I mean to designate not only Mao's fondness for warfare as such, but his tendency to envisage political, economic, and even philosophical problems as forms of combat. . . .
432. Washington Post, (May 20, 1968).
433. Wilred Burchett, Again Korea, p. 92
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He would like to infuse the same qualities of heroism and drama into every aspect of human activity." 434
As a result, the contention that Kim Il-song may, sooner or
later, launch a major offensive— this time, fully on his own initiative
with probable commitments of Russian and Chinese aid— makes the atmos
phere in Korea tense once more, reminding one of the situation in 1950.
However, Kim Il-song does not appear to be as reckless as he was at the
time the Korean War erupted. He must be reasonably certain that he can
win before he will run the risk of another disaster. Thus, he has care
fully built up North Korea's military strength; he has already added enough
airplanes and artillery to give North Korea superiority over the South
in these two important types of armament. But what Kim Il-song is still
counting on is human will— the V7.111 power to fight and die for the
"holy" mission of unifying the fatherland. To inspire his countrymen
to fight, and more importantly, to fight with a conviction that the war
is not only just but a "holy" mission of Korean revolution, it is neces
sary to instill the working masses with a sense of mission. This is
why the new term "socialist patriotism" was created and is fed into the
continually rising inflammatory war talk in P'yongyang. Concerning the
necessity to arm the people with this spirit, a North Korean theoretician
writes:
"(It is necessary) because it plays an important role in the process of formation and consolidation of an outlook on the world for the Communists... it is the essential demand of the
434. Stuart R. Schram, "Maoism: A Symposium," Problems of Communism, Vol. XV, (September-October, 1966), p. 4.
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Socialist system itself. . . . and finally, it becomes the strong driving force for Socialist development. . . ."435
What then, is "socialist patriotism"? Simply stated, it is a combined
set of the ideologies of socialism and patriotism, but it comprises
everything that has been said in this work related to ideological
issues. According to Kim Il-song, "socialist patriotism" is "the
patriotism of workers and the working class for socialism and communism,"
which combines "class consciousness with the consciousness of national 436 independence."
Based upon this definition, "socialist patriotism" is extended
to mean the unification of Korea:
"To liberate South Korea and to unify our fatherland— are our most important tasks, which must be solved by all means. The accomplishment of this objective is the expression of socialist patriotism."437
It further seeks to consolidate the revolutionary base in the North
by tightening the "housekeeping" and further accelerating the national
economy:
"For the workers and toilers to tightly organize the country's housekeeping is a concrete expression of socialist patriotism. By further tightly organizing the country's housekeeping with the ardently loving spirit of the fatherland and the people they must
435. Ch'oe Song-wuk, Uritangui Chuch'esasang kwa sahwechuuichok aekulcchuui (The Idea of Chuch'e and the Socialistic Patriotism in Our Party), (P'yongyang: KWP Press, 1966), pp. 45-47.
436. Han Yong-taik, Hyonchongse wa tangmyon kwache (The Present Situation and the Facing Tasks), (P'yongyang: Inmun kwahalc-sa, 1966), p. 77. This is Kim Il-song's report made at the Representatives' Meeting of IOTP held in October 5, 1966.
437. Min Hun, "Socialist Patriotism Urged among Workers," Kullocha, No. 6, (July 15, 1967), in JPRS: 42,860, p. 24.
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further accelerate the socialist construction in the northern part of the Republic and contribute to the further political, economic, and military consolidation of our revolutionary base."438
"Socialist patriotism" is also described as the basis of Chuch'e,
because "without arming one with the spirit of 'socialist patriotism' 439 Chuch'e cannot be established." Thus, Chuch'e is said to be the most
thorough expression of "Socialist patriotism." But "socialist patriotism"
as an ideological foundation for Chuch'e does not negate the North Korean
position of internationalism:
"Our party's independent position is closely related to the principle of Proletarian Internationalism. We are fully opposed to nationalism and isolationism, because we are internationalist. . . .'socialist patriotism' opposes all sorts of exclusivism including bourgeois nationalism, and it is closely united with Proletarian Internationalism."440
The reasoning is that by being loyal and responsible to his own nation's
revolution, he can contribute to the fight of other peoples of the world 441 for a similar cause.
Most of all, however, "socialist patriotism" finds its ultimate
significance in educating and indoctrinating young revolutionaries in
such a way as to remind one of the loyalty to the state illustrated
by Song Sam-mun:
438. Pyon Song, "The National Economy and Socialist Patriotism," ICullocha, No. 10, .(October 30, 1967) in JPRS: 44,250, p. 59.
439. Ch'oe Song-wulc, Uritangui Chuch'esasang lcwa sahwechuuichok aekukchuui (The Idea of Chuch'e and the Socialistic Patriotism in Our Party), p. 41.
440. Han Yong-taik, Hyonchongse wa tangmyon kwache (The Present Situation and the Facing Tasks), p. 79.
441. Ibid., p. 80.
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"The cultivation of socialist patriotism has particular theoretical and practical significance in raising young students as revolutionary fighters with unlimited loyalty to the Party and its leader, as fervent patriots truly serving the father land and its people, and as sincere communists."442
Almost every week young North Korean commandos, aroused by a sense
of heroism for serving what they call the most noble cause, infiltrate
to the South only to die. But still they come, and destroy themselves
by using grenades to commit suicide in case they are cornered.
442. Min Hun, "Cultivation of Socialist Patriotism," Kyowon Sinmun, (August 16, 1967), in JPRS: 42,856, p. 24.
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CHAPTER IV.
SUMMARY
A specter was haunting the Far East after the Japanese annexation
of Korea— the specter of Korean nationalism. Koreans, who in deep
hibernation had been indulging in the passive, tradition-bound, Confu-
cian way of life, began to rub their bleary eyes and became aware of
the national humiliation forced on their fatherland by the Japanese.
This realization sparked a zeal for recovering national independence.
After the Japanese occupation, some Koreans sought in vain to arouse
nationalism in Korea, others went into exile to Manchuria, the China
Mainland, Siberia, and the United States and there organized revolutionary
groups. The flame of this revolutionary ardor was fanned by two major
winds that swept the area: advocacy of self-determination from the
West and the anti-imperialist preaching of Bolshevism from the East.
A gradual polarization of ideology took place among the Korean revolu
tionaries. The West did not provide any definite program or plan,
in contrast to the Bolsheviks in Moscow who had devised "a belief system,
a road map, a tool kit, and a 'how-to-do-it' instruction book rolled 443 into one." Many Korean revolutionaries, impatient to achieve national
independence, were attracted by friendly Russian assistance, converted
443. Robert C. North, Chinese Communism, p. 48.
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to communism, and thereafter were dependent on Moscow for leadership.
But none of these old communists was able to produce the full fruit
of national independence despite their long and revolutionary labor.
Confucius once said that he had seen rice plants that sprout, but
do not blossom and t!~ose that blossom, but do not bear grains. There
had indeed been several Korean communist revolutionary seeds that sprouted
in foreign and domestic soil but did not blossom, because of factional
strife, lack of funds, and above all, ruthless Japanese repression. A
few endured to blossom, but ever since they had greeted the bright sunshine
of August, 1945, they were gradually being overshadowed by a freshly
growing young communist bloom— Kim Il-song, who ascended to power under
Russian patronage. The continuity of Korean communist leadership from
the past was completely broken with the change of world history— the end
of World War II.
Kim Il-song had started his revolutionary activities in the early
1930's in Manchuria where Bolshevik influence had been predominant. Soon
he joined the Chinese Communist Party with which he fought the Japanee
until he was driven away to Russian soil in the early 1940's. In Russia,
Kim Il-song joined the Russian Army, then returned to Korea with the
Russians shortly after the Korean Liberation.
All these major events, related to Kim ll-song's early activities,
had been brought about by the momentum of circumstance. He was in
Manchuria because his father brought him there. He joined the Chinese
Communist Party for the simple reason that scattered Korean Communist
groups on the run in Manchuria did not have any other alternative. He
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went to Siberia after being pursued by the Japanese Army and police,
forces. In short, Kim Il-song had drifted around in stormy winds
that finally carried him to Russian soil where he was nourished with
rich fertilizer and transplanted back to Korea by the end of the World
War Two. Kim Il-song became a child of fortune while the old Korean
communists became victims of world history. Once again Koreans witnessed
a history that was shaped not by their own forces, but by happenings
outside the country.
Marx and Engels were philosophically oriented revolutionaries who
taught that material condictions determine the life of the people, that
the history of mankind is the history of the class struggle, and that
this struggle would end with the proletarian dictatorship and the
subsequent abolition of the state. Different conditions and circumstances
led some followers of Marx to give a new direction to his principles.
One of the first and most loyal of Marx's disciples was Lenin. He
demonstrated that a Proletarian revolution was possible in an under
developed country like Russia, and that it could be brought about through
violent means led by only a few professional revolutionaries. Lenin's
ideas were incorporated into Marxism, and identified as "Marxism-Leninism."
Though Stalin cannot be ranked with Marx and Lenin as an intellectual,
he provided a new theory of "Socialism in one country," and transformed
Marxist-Leninist theory into totalitarianism by converting the Communist
Party into a powerful bureaucracy, employing brutal methods of purges
and terror, and developing a leadership cult in which his purported
godlike infallibility became an object of worship. A "chain of Marxian
logic" had been developed as follows:
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(according to Marx) justice and truth = the will of the proletariat
(according to Lenin) will of the proletariat = will of the Communist Party
(according to Stalin) will of the Communist Party = will of Stalin Justice and truth == will of Stalin. 444
In Asia, Mao Tse-tung has emerged as another Marxist-Leninist
disciple, who developed the idea of the "people's democratic dictatorship"
and of guerrilla tactics based on a peasant armed struggle— a further
contribution to the revolutionary ideas of M rxism-Leninism.
Kim Il-song cannot be compared with all these communist masters in
the scope of his intellectual sweep. But "to say that he is a poor
philosopher," as Arthur A. Cohen pharaphrased it, "is not to scoff at 445 his achievement, but to see it in a better light." In the process of
exercising power during a quarter of a century, Kim il-song has learned
his lessons and displayed some new ideas, leadership and style. He
was not very original in thought, nor did he depart from the fundamental
principles of Marxism-Leninism. Rather, he attempts, to app].y
these principles to the Korean situation.
In his early stage of consolidating power when he was placed under
absolute obedience to Stalin, Kim Il-song had to carry out the "anti-
feudal, anti-imperialist, democratic revolution" within a general frame
work of Marxism-Leninism, while competing for hegemony with several
444. John H. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern Political Thought, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1950), pp. 513-514.
445. Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, p. 189.
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other communists and nationalist leaders in North Korea. Theoretically,
Kim Il-song was committed to Lenin's "dictatorship of the Proletariat
and the peasantry" in this stage, whereas the situation actually required
a broad coalition among all classes. This seemingly self-contradictory
position was finally reconciled in what is known as the "people's dicta
torship." As a result, the multi-party system, the national front and
the coalition government continued to exist, while the salient fact
remained unchanged: The working class should not share its power with
anybody.
The "people's dictatorship" or the "multi-class dictatorship" of
Kim Il-song was conceived, from the beginning, as a convenient means
of achieving the final goal of the proletarian dictatorship. Actually,
it lr.^ted only a short time during the "democratic reforms" and before
the party merger with the New People's Party. The call for national
unity by Kim Il-song brought about the formation of the North Korean
Democratic National United Front, which encompassed all classes except
the pro-Japanese landlords and capitalists. The "democratic revolution"
was carried out in the name of the "people." Once the task was finished,
Kim Il-song allied himself with the New People's Party, represented by
the intellectuals, petty-bourgeoisie, and the peasants, to curb the
influence of the domestic factions of communists as well as the
remaining national bourgeoisie. After the New People's Party was absorbed
by the Soviet-Koreans, there was not a single united force to cope with
the Soviet-Koreans both inside and outside of party politics. But
"friendly" parties and social organizations have continued to exist under
the auspicies of the Korean Workers Party. This indicates that Kim Il-song
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is likely to continue his policy of multi-class coalition while empha
sizing the essential role of the worker in building Korean communism.
During the next stage, an intensive effort was made to transform
all these classes to Socialism by organizing and regimenting them into
co-operatives. Finally in the present stage of Socialism, all North
Koreans are urged to take part in the "revolutionization" movement of
North Korean society. Stage by stage, Kim Il-song had utilized a
gradualist approach from his earlv power consolidation to the eventual
regimentation of all classes on his own terms. Although the speed
and timing of this regimentation in North Korea differed from that in
Communist China, the fundamental ideas and methods employed by Kim Il-
song on the issue of "class dictatorship" correspond well to the Maoist
formula.
From the standpoint of international politics, Kim Il-song was put
in an awkward position during and after the Korean War. In the process
of swinging back and forth between the Soviet Union and Communist China,
Kim Il-song had learned a lesson which strengthened him in his belief
that he should develop his own position in international politics
independent of Russian and Chinese influence. This he did by positive
affirmation of the importance of national identity— Chuch'e— and by
negative attacks on the two Communist giants, condemning Russian right
revisionism and Chinese left dogmatism. However, he fully realizes
the military and psychological advantages of nuclear weapons, and he
undoubtedly will try to retain the support of one— or possibly both—
of his huge communist neighbours.
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On the issue of war and peace, Kim Il-song has taken no less a
hard line stand than Mao Tse-tung. Based upon the orthodox Marxist-Leninist
teaching that the history of mankind is a history of class struggle between
exploiters and the exploited, Kim Il-song views the world as a vast arena
in which good confronts evei, peace struggles against war, and virtue
battles with sin. North Korea under his leadership incarnates the good,
peace, and virtue, while South Korea and the "imperialist nations headed
by the United States" symbolize evil, war, and sin. He considers the
"democratic revolution" and "socialization" of all the classes in the
North as completely in compliance with the call of TJi, whereas people
in the South where the "anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, democratic
revolution" is badly needed, are pictured as suffering from class exploi
tation. His one-time wish to maintain the equal revolutionary stage
in both North and South Korea by carrying out the "democratic revolution"
in the South even by force, turned into a shattered dream. But this
bitter memory will continue to fester in his mind, and he undoubtedly
will continue to feel a sense of mission to extend his revolution to
South Korea.
Although he bases his belief upon this irreconcilable position,
Kim Il-song's strategy on Korean unification has varied at different
times, raning from a peace offensive to the call for a spontaneous
revolt in the South. But experience had taught Kim Il-song that unless
force is applied, Korean unification cannot be realized. Discouraged
by signs of consolidation and permanence in the South and by the growth
of the South. Korean defense forces, Kim Il-song switched from his merely
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loolcing-on-appxoach to a program of revolutionary guerrilla activities.
His decision to resort to guerrilla warfare was further inspired by the
following factors: the national liberation doctrines of Mao Tse-tung;
the example of Fidel Castro; who, Kim thinks, has successfully defied
the United States; the ability of the North Vietnamese to withstand
military onslaughts greater than those he himself confronted in the Korean
War; and finally, by his own experience in guerrilla warfare against
the Japanese. His tactics may change from time to time, but Kim Il-
song almost assuredly will continue his campaign for reunification.
Firmly entrenched as the absolute dictator of North Korea, he is not
likely to be satisfied with the status quo. If his past is a guide
to his future policy, Kim Il-song can be expected to continue propaganda
and guerrilla attacks against South Korea, and he probably will not pass
up any opportunity he considers favorable to launch open warfare against
the South.
In the hope of achieving his twin ultimate objectives— unification
of Korea and the realization of the Communist Utopia, Kim Il-song has
been counting on the simultaneous development of the productive forces
with the relations of production. But as it turned out, heavy emphasis
was laid on the relations of production except for the short Three Year
Plan which was aimed mainly at postwar reconstruction of the national
economy. Just as Mao Tse-tung did in China, so Kim Il-song attempted
to move to a higher level of collectivized relations of production even
before North Korea had attained any highly developed productive forces.
It is clear that Kim Il-song believed in the possible enhancement of
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the productive forces by remoulding the minds and personalities of
the working masses to such an extent that the desired modifications
in their behaviour will be enforced not only by external but also
by internal sanctions and conformities. This is well illustrated
in the example cited in the third chapter of this dissertation, "a
machine tool reproduction" movement. The productive forces can be
created and further developed, as the reasoning goes, only if conscious
and regimented manpower can be fully mobilized. This belief resulted
in an intensive effort to create a new man, a man of self-conscious,
compassionate, creative, anti-individual, and labor—loving character,
who is ready to sacrifice himself to the great cause of unification and
communization of all Korea.
During his political reign of nearly a quarter of a century,
Kim Il-song has built a powerful totalitarian dictatorial rule that
appears to be no less harsh than that of Stalin and Mao. Kim Il-song,
who bases his principle of political rule upon one man dictatorship,
regards the preservation of unity as the most important matter. This,
he believes, only he can do. Although the organizational control method
and its principles are not unique, North Korea’s geographical size has
made it possible for Kim Il-song to establish a tighter control over
every detailed aspect of local daily affairs. With a record high ratio
of Korean Workers Party members in relation to non-party population,
and with his old comrades of the Kapsan people in every important post in
the Party and government, Kim Il-song has successfully established
one of the most effective organizational chains of command from the top
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229
of the Party to the individual in the rural community.
What Kim Il-song considers most important, however, is control
of the mind, demanding not only external conformity to Party policies
through organizational controls, but internal conformity through thorough
indoctrination. Surrounded by a group of myth-makers, Kim Il-song has
been idolized to the extent that the people of North Korea, especially
the younger generation, are made to believe his identity to be the same
as the legendary Kim Il-song, which, in turn, instills utmost loyalty
and responsiveness to authority in the person of Kim Il-song. In order
to achieve this conformity of thought among the masses, "self-criticism"
and personal inner-struggle are demanded of them as routine practice in
every day life.
As mentioned above, violence is by no means absent from the tech
niques employed by the North Korean Communists. Although considered a
means rather than an end in itself, North Korea, under the leadership
of Kim Il-song, has utilized various violent methods which Include
political assassination, police terror, and purges. Up to the early
1960's, vast numbers of North Koreans were placed under constant sur
veillance for their suspected status as real, imaginary, or potential
foes or reactionaries, and were kept in line indefinitely by sheer
fear of police terror. Anyone considered non-conformist to the Party
and to Kim Il-song was subjected to the purge. When Kim II—song found
that these harsh measures and the exclusion of such vast numbers from
social and political life meant a great loss to his cause, he switched
his policy of terror to that of appeasement. But his does not mean
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230
that he has totally rejected disciplinary punishment of his major
opponents and of non-conformists. Since Kim Il-song, as a self-proclaimed
"loyal" Marxist-Leninist, must always march forward towards an unattain
able millenium — realization of the Communist Utopia in a unified
Korea— the initial enthusiasm among the masses gradually spends itself.
Hence, there is a continuous need to whip or replace weary followers
and doubters by fresh and more vigorous enthusiasts.
To sum up the foregoing analysis, the thought of Kim Il-song may
be viewed as the Marxist-Leninist legacy, heavily inclined towards
Stalinism and Maoism. Particularly, Kim Il-song has revealed strikingly
similar patterns of thought and behavior to Mao Tse-tung, attributable
perhaps to the cultural affinity between the Chinese and the Koreans.
If it seems complicated, this combined and synthesized ideological
mix of Kim Il-song is assumed to be based upon his complex past— his
early anti-Japanese guerrilla activities, his associations with the
Chinese Communist Party and the Russian Army, his ascendancy to power
under Russian guardianship, and the Korean War. All of these factors
strongly influenced his personality and ideas.
According to the Confucian tradition in Korea, the concepts of
equality and freedom are practically outside of reality by reason of
the persistence of a stratified social class system sanctioned by autho
ritarian rules. The Confucian hierachy teaches one to defer to superiors
and binds all human relationships with the five principles of loyalty,
filial piety, distinction, proper order and trust. This fits in well
with an authoritarian rule that imposes order from above— from the Party.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231
The Confucian belief that the correct observance of the rites would
enable man to conduct himself in accordance with universal laws, is
also in tune with the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism that teaches the
transformation of the world into a perfect, strifeless society. These
two factors from the Confucian past— authoritarian rule and the perfec
tionist view, have invariably persisted in the minds of Kim Il-song
and the North Korean Communists.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMARY SOURCES
1. Archival Materials and Yearbooks
"Chosen Kyosanto no Surogan" ("The Slogan of the Korean Communist Party"). Shlzo Geppo, Vol. 4, (July 15, 1931), in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 354 (9.4.5.1. - 1).
Choson Chungang Yonkam (The Korean Central Yearbook). P'yongyang: Choson Chungang T'ongsin-sa, 1949-1964.
"Choson hyokmyong" ("The Korean Revolution"). 1st issue, n.d., Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 359 (S. 9.4.5.1. -3).
"Kanto gosanju jiken yosin shuketsusu" ("The Preliminary Trial on the May 30th Incident in Kanto Came to an End"). Report of 1930, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel S 354 (9.4.5.1. - 2).
"Korai Kyosan-to oyobi zen-Ro Kyosan-to no bengai" ("Outline of the Korean Communist Party and the All Russian Korean Communist Party"). Report of November, 1922, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archieves, reel S. 721 (S. 9.4.5.2. - 30).
Pulchan Ch'ongkam (The North Korean Almanac). Seoul: Kongsankkwon munche yonlcuso, 1968.
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2. Selected Works
Kim Il-song. Selected Works. Tokyo: Sannichi shobo, 1952.
______. Selected Works. P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an sa, 1954.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233
Kim Il-song. Selected Works. P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1960.
Selected Works. P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1963.
Selected Works. P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964
Selected Works. P'yongyang: Kukrip Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1964.
Selected Works. P'yongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965.
Lenin, Vladimir I. Selected Works. New York: International Publishers, 1943.
______. Selected Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952.
_ . Selected Works. Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U. S. S. R., 1935.
Mao TSe-tung. Selected Works. (trans.) in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952.
_ . Selected Works. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. Selected Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955.
3. Books and Documents
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Halcsup chaeryo: che ilho (Study Materials, No. 1). Chonra namdo, Korea: Propaganda and Agitation Section, South Chonra Provincial Party Headquarter^ The Korean Workers Party, n.d.
Han Chae-dolc. Kim Il-song ul lcobal hanta (I Am Indicting Kim Il-song) . Seoul: Naewe munwha-sa, 1965.
Kim Ku. Paekpom Ilchi (Memoirs of Kim Ku). Seoul: Choson inswe hwesa, 1947.
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Maengja chipchu (A Variorum Edition of Mancius). Seoul: Taecho-sa, 1959.
Program of the Communist International. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1936.
Pukchoson Popnyongchip (The North Korean Law Collections). P'yongyang: Kisin-sa, 1947.
The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Fight for the Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism. New York: Workers' Library Publishers, 1935.
Stalin, Joseph. "The Foundations of Leninism," Problems of Leninism. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953.
______. Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953.
Suh Kwang-che. Pukchoson kihaeng (Trip to North Korea). Second edition. Tokyo: Tonga T'ongsin-sa, 1948.
Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Kurea. 1951.
U. S. Department of State. North Korea: A Case Study in the Technique of Takeover. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of State, 1961. Department of State Publication 7118.
4. Articles
"Carry Out the Ten-Point Program of Kim Il-song," Nodong Sinmun, January 13, 1968 in Joint Publications Research Service, U. S. Department of Commerce, Translations on North Korea, 44,503.
"Chonch'e Choson inmindul eke hosohan Choson minchuchuui inmir. kongwhakuk naekak susang Kim Il-song changlcun ui pangsong yonsol" ("The Broad cast Speech Appealed to All Korean People by the Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, General Kim Il-song"), Inmin (People). Vol. 5, No. 7, (July 1950).
"The Commune System and Its Dilemma," U_. _S. Congressional Record, by John W. McCormack in the House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, (August 3, 1959 to September 3, 1959), in Appendix, Vol. CV, Part 24. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, August 6, 1959.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235
"Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force," Kullocha, (July 30, 1968), in Translations on North Korea, JPRS: 46,571.
Ha Su-hong and Ch'oe Won-kun, "Indemitable Fighting Spirit of the Anti- Japanese Guerrillas," Kullocha, (August 30, 1967), in Translations on North Korea, JPRS: 43419.
"Kaigai futei Senjin no sakudo jolcyo," ("The State of Activities of the Recalcitrant Koreans Abroad"), Tokko Geppo, (November, 1942).
Kim Ku. "Chugoku kosen gonen o mukaete kokunaigai no Doshidoho ni tsguru no ji" ("An Appeal to the Compatriots Inside and Outside the Country on the Fifth Anniversary of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War"), Kwang- polc (Restoration), Vol. 1, No. 3, n.d., in Tokko Geppo, (November, 1941).
"Let Us Unify the Fatherland within Our Own Generation," Kullocha, (January 30, 1968), in Translations on North Korea, JPRS: 45,204.
Min Hun. "Cultivation of Socialist Patriotism," Kyowon Sinmun, (August 16, 1967), in Translations on North Korea, JPRS: 42,856.
______. "Socialist Patriotism Urged among Workers," Kullocha, (July 15, 1967), in Translations on North Korea, JPRS: 42,860.
Oh Kung-yol. "Invinsible Power of the Korean People," Kullocha, (August 1967), in Translations on North Korea. JPRS: 43,222.
Om Ki-hyon. "Loyalty to Kim Il-song Stressed," Kullocha, (August 1967), in Translations on North Korea. JPRS: 43,222
Pyon Song. "The National Economy and Socialist Patriotism," Kullocha, (October 30, 1967), in Translations on North Korea. JPRS: 44,250.
"Revolutionary Heritage Stressed for Indoctrinating People," Kullocha, (July 15, 1967), in Translations on North Korea. JPRS: 42,860.
"Revolutionary Pride under Kim Il-song’s Leadership," Kullocha, (June 30, 1968), in Translations on North Korea. JPRS: 46,377.
Strong, Anna Louise. "I Saw the North Koreans," (July 16, 1950). A pamphlet published in California.
"Text of Speech by Kim Il-song to Fourth Supreme People's Assembly on December 16, 1967, Presenting DPRK Government Political Program," Daily Report, (December 21, 1967).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236
Yun Hyong— sik and Pak Hui-son. "Anti-Japanese Guerrillas' Noble Comrade ship," Kullocha, (December 1967), in Translations on North Korea. JPRS: 45,015.
5. Newspapers
Hankuk Ilpo, June 16, 1968.
Minchu Choson, October 11, 1962.
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New York Tribune. October 24, 1920.
Nodong Sinmun, March 9, 1959; November 17, 1962; October 23, 1963; August 12, 1966; May 30, 1968.
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Washington Post, May 20, 1968 and June 1, 1968.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
1. Books
Alckimoto Hideo. Kitachosen no kirolcu— Hocho kishadan no hokoku (Record of North Korea— Report of the Press Corps Visiting North Korea). Tokyo: Shin dokusho-sha, 1960.
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Baykov, Alexander. The Development of the Soviet Economic System. Cambridge: The University Press, 1947.
Burchett, Wilfred G. Again Korea. New York: International Publishers Go., Inc. , 1968.
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Ch'ae Kun-sik. Mujang Tongnip undongpisa (Secret History of the Armed Independence Movement). Seoul: the Korean Information Bureau, n.d.
Cho Chae-son. Kwatoki e_ issoso ui Choson Nodong-tang ui kyongj e chong- ch'aek (Economic Policy of the Korean Workers Party during the Transition Period). P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1958.
Cho Soon-song. Korea in World Politics. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.
Ch'oe Ho-chin. Kuntae Hankuk kyongjesa yonku (A Study of the Modern Korean Economic History). Seoul: Tonglcuk munhwasa, 1956.
Ch'oe Hyon. "Ichulsuopnun ch'ot sangpong" (The Unforgettable First Meeting). Urinun onchena suryongkwa hamkke (We are Always with Our Chief). P'yongyang: Minch'ong ch'ulp'an-sa, 1961.
Ch'oe Song-wuk. Uridangul Chuch'esasang lcwa sahwechuuichok aekukchuui (The Idea of Chuch'e and the Socialistic Patriotism in Our Party). P'yongyang: C'nosSn Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1966.
Choguk ui P 'yonghwa chok t'ongil ul wihayo (For the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland). P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-dang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1956.
Ch'ollima chakoppan undong (The Ch'ollima WorIcing Brigade Movement). P'yongyang: Chilcop tongmaeng ch'ulp'an-sa, 1960.
Ch'ollima kisu tolcpon (Reader for the Ch'ollima Riders). P'yongyang: Chile'optongmaeng ch'ulp'ang-sa, 1963.
Chon Sok-tam, Lee ki-su, and Kim Han-chu. Hyontae Choson Sahwe kyong- jesa(The Social and Economic History of Modern Korea). Seoul: Sin- hak-sa, 1948.
Choson T'ongsa (General History of Korea). P'yongyang: Kwahakwon yoksa yonkuso, 1958.
Chung, Henry. The Case of Korea. New York: Fleming H. Revell Comoany, 1921.
Clubb, Edumund. 20th Century China. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964.
Cohen, Arthur A. The Communism of Mao Tse-tung. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Creel, George. Russia's Race for Asia. New York; The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949.
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Deutscher, I. Stalin: A Political Biography. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1949.
Facts About Korea. P'yongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 196X1
Fairbank, John K.. The United States and China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
Gales, James S. Korean Sketches. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming II. Revell Company, 1898.
Gyorgy, Andrew and Blackwood, George . Ideologies in World Affairs. Waltham, Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1967.
Haepang hu urinara ui inmin kyongj e palcchon (Development of Our People's Economy after the Liberation). P'yongyang: Kwahakwon kyongje pophalc yonguso, 1960.
Hallowell, John II. Main Currents in Modern Political Thought. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1950.
Han Yong-taik. Hvonchongse wa tangmyon kwache (The Present Situation and the Facing Tasks). P'yongyang: Inmunkwahaksa, 1966.
Hughes, E. R. Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1960.
Hunt, R. N. Carew. The Theory and Practice of Communism: An Introduction. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1951.
Im Su-ung. Nodong _e taehan kongsanchuuichok t 'aeto (The Communistic Attitude on Labor). P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1960.
Kim Ch'ang-sun. Pukhan siponyonsa (Fifteen Years' History of North Korea). Seoul: Jimun-kak, 1961.
Kim Chong-myong. Chosen Shinminshushugi Kakumeishi (History of the New Democratic Revolution in Korea). Tokyo: Gogatsu shobo, 1953.
Kim Hong-sik. Ch'olhak kaeron (Introduction to Philosophy). P'yOng- yang: Kulcrip ch'ulp'an-sa, 1963.
Kim Sam-kyu. Chosen Genttaishi (Modern History of Korea). Tokyo: Chikuma Sho-bo, 1963.
Kim Sung-chun. Urinara eso ui nongch'on munche haekyol ui yoksachok kyonghom (Historical Experience of Solving Rural Problems in Our Country). P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1965.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239
Kim Young-hum. East. Asia1 s Turbulent Century. New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, 1966.
Kipon lconsolsaop ul wihan uritang ui chSngch1aek (Our Party Policy for the Basic Construction Work). P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1961.
Lep Na-yong. Choson mini ok haepang t'ujaeng-sa (History of the Struggle for Korean National Emancipation). Tokyo: Hakwu sopang, 1960.
Lee Pyong-hon. Samil untong pisa (Secret History of the March First Movement). Seoul: Sisa sipo-sa, 1959.
Lee Pyong-to. Kuksa taekwan (A Comprehensive Study of the National History). Seoul; Pomunkak, 1955.
Lee Sang-paik. Hankuk kuksa: Kunse Chongkip'yon (The Korean History: The First Half of the Modern History). Seoul: Ulyu munhwa-sa, 1962.
Lee Tong-chun. Hwansang kwa hyonsil: Naui kongsanchuui kwan (Fantasy and Fact: My Observations of Communism). Seoul: Tongpang t'ongsin- sa, 1961.
Lin Yutang. The Wisdom of China and India. New York: The Modern Library, Random House, Inc., 1942.
McCune, George M. and Grey, Arthur L. Jr. Korea Today. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950.
McCune, Shannon. Korea: Land of Broken Calm. Princeton: Toronto, London, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966.
North, Robert C. Chinese Communism. New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.
Oh Yong-chin. Hana ui chungon (One Testimony). Seoul: Chungang munwha-sa, 1952.
Om Chae-on. Sahwechuui konsol kwa chclyak t1ujaeng (The Construction of Socialism -md A Struggle for Savings). P'yongyang: Choson Nodong-tang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1958.
The Origin of the Korean War. Seoul: The Research Institute for Internal and External Affairs, 1963.
Paige, Glenn D. The Korean People's Democratic Republic. Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966.
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Pale Mun-ok. Hankuk Chongburon (A Study on the Korean Government). Seoul: Pomyongsa, 1963.
P 'alilo haepang sipochunyon kinyom nonmunchip (A Collection of the Economic Theses for the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Liberation of August 15). P'yongyang: Kwahakwon kyongje pophak yonguso, 1960.
Rudolph, Philip. North Korea's Political and Economic Structure. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959.
Plamenatz, John. German Marxism and Russian Communism. New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965.
Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. P'yongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957.
Pukchoson eso ui t'ochi kaehyok kwa nongch'onkyongni palcchon ui ch'onmang (The Prospect of the Land Reform and the Rural Adminis trative Development). P'yongyang: Pukchoson Nodong-tang chungang sonchon sondongpu, 1948.
Pukhan isipnyonsa (The Twenty Years History of North Korea). Seoul: Kwangmyong inswekong-sa, 1965.
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Suh Dae-sook. The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
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Suh Nam-son. Pukhan ui kyongje chongch'aek kwa saengsan kwanri (North Korean Economic Policy and Production Control). Seoul: Asia munjae yonguso, 1964.
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Tsuboe Senji. Chosen minzoku dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement). Tokyo: Nikkan rodosha, 1959.
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IJ. S_. Army Area Handbook for Kcrea. Washington, D. C.r U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu— The Decision to Enter the Korean War. New York: The Rand Corporation, 1960.
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Yang Ho-min. Pukhan ui ideologi wa chongch1i (Ideology and Politics in North Korea). Seoul: Korean University Press, 1967.
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2. Articles and Periodicals
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Im Hwa. "Pak Hon-yong," Sin Chonji (New World), Vol. 1, No. 1, (January , 1946).
Kang Yong-hoon. "Biography: North Korea's Mysterious Kim Il-song," Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2,, (March-Anril, 1964).
Kennan George. "Korea: A Degenerate State," The Outlook, Vol. 81, No. 6, (October 7, 1905).
Kim Ch'ang-sun. "Choson Nodong-tang ui Pajaeng" (The Factional Struggle of the Korean Workers Party), Chungkongkwon ui Changnae (The Future of the Chinese Communist Bloc), Seoul: Pommun-sa, (1967).
Kim Son-ik. "Siwol hyokmyong kwa Choson"(October Revolution and Korea), T 1aip'ung (Typhoon), Vol. 1, No. 15, (November 27, 1948).
Kim Tae-ho. "The Ruling System of North Korean Regime," Korean Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1963).
Kim Tu~yong. "Naiiipuk^Ciio’sonui chongch'i chongse wa tangmyon ui minjokcchok kwaop" (The Political Situation and the Immediate National Task of the South-North Korea), T'aip'ung, Vol. 3, No. 1, (May, 1950).
Kim Roy U. T. "Sino-North KoreanRelations," Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 8, (August, 1968).
Korean Report, Vol. 1, No. 1, Noted and translated by Peter H. Lee.
Langer, Paul and Swearingen, Rodger. "The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, (December, 1950).
Lee Chong-sik. "Korean Communists and Yenan," China Quarterly, Vol. 9-10, (January-June, 1962).
_ . "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Peasants in North Korea," North Korea Today, (edited by Robert A. Scalapino), New York & London: Frederick A. Praeger, (1963).
_ . "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage," North Korea Today.
Lee Ton-hwa. "Saenghwal ui chokon ul ponwirohan Chosonui kaecho saop" (Reconstruction Work of Korea Based upon the condition of Life) , Kaepyok, Vol. 15, (September 1, 1921).
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Mun Tong-chae. "Kin nichi-sei shogun no profile" (A Profile of General Kim Il-song), Hinshu Chosen (Democratic Korea), Vol. 33, No. 986, (July, 1950).
Oliver, Elbert S. "Korea and China: The Confusian Pattern," Korean Survey, Vol. 6, No. 2, (February, 1957).
Otis, 0. "Generalissimo Stalin and the Art of Government," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, (January, 1952).
Paige, Glenn D. "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," Communist Strategies in Asia, (edited by A. Doak Barnett), New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, (1966).
Pailc Chae-wulc. "Chosen noudoto no s^uriba undo" (The Ch'ollima Movement of the Korean Workers Party), The Monthly Korean Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 12, (December, 1966).
Pang In-hu. "Choson Nodong-tang ui kekup chongchaek" (The Class Policy of the Korean Workers Party), Chungkongkwon ui changnae.
"Rinkoku Hokuchcsen no gensho" (Present Situation of Neighbouring North Korea), Juogoron, (July 1967).
Scalapino, Robert A. "Foreign Policy of North Korea," The China Quarterly, No. 14, (April-June, 1963).
Schram, Stuart R. "Maoism: A Symposium,"1 Problems of Communism, Vol. 15, (September-October, 1966).
Schurmann, H. F. "Organization and Response in Communist China," The Annals of the American Academy of_ Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, (January, 1959).
Skilling, H. Cordon. "People's Democracy and the Socialist Revolution: A Case Stuuy in Communist Scholarship," Soviet Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, (January, 1961).
Sun Tiag-'kuo. "A Tieii.uiiJoua Dcvelo,>.a~uL of the Law of Marxist Dialectics," Che-hsuch Yen-chin, No. 3, (June 15, 1958).
Wagner, Edward W. "Some Historical Considerations," in Seminar: Modernization Process in Korea, Korean Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Autumn 1963).
Washburn, John N. "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1, (March, 1950).
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Yang Ho-min. "Pukhan ui Soviet-hwa" (The Sovietization of North Korea), Chungkongkwon ui changnae (The Future of the Chinese Bloc) ,
Yoo Wan-shik. "The Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement," Korean Affairs, Vol.. 2, No. 2, (1963).
Yun Il-mo. "Toknip tongmaeng kwa Uiyongkun ui T'uchaeng-sa" (Fighting History of the Independence League and the Volunteer Corps); Sin Ch'onji, (March, 1946).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.