The Dual Role of the Chilean Church

Scholars Crossing Faculty Publications and Presentations Helms School of Government Fall 1988 Pinochet’s Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the Chilean Church Stephen R. Bowers Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons Recommended Citation Bowers, Stephen R., "Pinochet’s Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the Chilean Church" (1988). Faculty Publications and Presentations. 83. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/83 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Vol. ISO, No.2 Fall 1988 51 Pinochet's Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the Chilean Chupch By STEPHEN R. BOWERS successful in manipulating the church in such a Stephen R. BOlVers is an as way as to draw clerical support from an essen sociate professor of political science at James Madison or decades the Catholic church and the Chi tially reluctant church leadership. The best ex University. F lean military embraced common concerns. ample of the regime's skillful handling of the Each was an advocate of stability, law and order, religious community was the visit of Pope John social harmony, and an opponent of radical po Paul II in 1987. Yet, in other instances, the gov litical movements. Their occupation of such ex ernment faced severe criticism from numerous tensive common political, economic, and social church leaders and treated the church as an op ground made them natural allies. However, as ponent, thus intensifying its image as an oppres the church, fearing the stronger attraction of sive regime bent on consistent violation of both the Protestant faith and Marxist-Leninist human rights. At its rhetorical worst, the gov ideology among the country's working class, ernment resorted to accusations such as that of could no longer confine itself to this limited role Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez who sug and became more politically and socially active, gested early in 1988 that the church represented the two allies became opponents. 1 By 1975, the one of the three greatest obstacles to peace in the Catholic church was in the forefront of opposi country." tion to Chile's military government and was be As the process of Chile's democratization has coming the focal point for opposition activities. proceeded, the relationship between the junta Yet, as Chile prepared for its plebiscite in 1988, and the church has become particularly signifi the relationship between the regime and the cant as an indication of the ability of the regime church experienced yet another transformation to work with non-governmental power centers from that of distinct adversaries to one of uneasy in guiding national development along a demo members of a common system, each struggling cratic path. The increasingly violent context of to define the limits of their mutual authority over Chilean politics in 1987 and 1988 has served as different aspects of Chilean society. In the vola a reminder of the difficulties of resolving the tile period preceding the plebiscite, the junta be junta's troubled relationship with the society came increasingly sensitive to clerical intrusions that it must govern both today and, should it win into the political sphere while the church leader the plebiscite, in the future. It is the purpose of ship, more cautious than in the earlier part of the this article to examine the nature of the relation decade and forced into the dual role of both ad ship betwen the regime and the church during vocate and adversary, endeavored to avoid secu this critical period and to evaluate how each in lar manipulation, excessive political activism, stitution has dealt with the strains that have be and the internal dissension that could jeopardize come typical of Ctlilean politics. That evalua the church's institutional framework and inhibit tion may be useful in making projections about the role that it might play after the 5 October the future of Chilean society in the era after the plebiscite. plebiscite. By 1986 the military regime was becoming increasingly cautious in dealing with the na THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT tion's most important social institution. Its over One of the most striking indications of the in all goal was to utilize the Catholic church as an tense strains within Chilean society has been an instrument of regime authority or, failing that, increasing pattern of violence as the country has to contain church opposition to Pinochet's poli moved cautiously toward democratization. cies. In several important respects, the junta was Most frequently associated with the recent wave 52 World Affairs of terror has been the Manuel Rodriguez Patri intensification of international criticism of the otic Front (FPMR), a small group originally be military regime. As a result of the barrage of lieved to have only 1,000 to 2,000 hardcore hostile pronouncements about the government, members and long associated with attacks junta representatives have long been embroiled against electrical, telephone, and transportation in bitter debates with numerous governments systems, foreign-owned banks and mining com and international organizations, disputes likely panies, the U.S. Embassy, and pro-junta news to inhibit the operation of the government papers. By 1986, FPMR activities had expanded should the regime prevail in the plebiscite. The to include not only kidnappings, but also the at U.S. Department of State has been a leading tempt on Augusto Pinochet's life in September.3 critic of junta policies, including the plebiscite In November 1987, a series of terrorist actions that served as the cornerstone of Pinochet's pro against National Electric Power, Inc., appar cess for transition to civilian rule. The official ently the work of the FPMR, left a vast region response to the State Department's negative as from Copiapo to Temuco without electricity sessment of the plebiscite was offered by Admi while simultaneous attacks against the Santiago ral Jose Toribio Merino who, in a statement in bus system resulted in the burning of three December 1987, suggested that it is U. S., not buses. 4 In March 1988, the Chilean attorney Chilean elections, that are open to criticism be general Ambrosio Rodriguez warned that there cause of the low turnout in U.S. presidential would be an increase in terrorist attacks as the elections and the inconvenient hours during date of the plebiscite approached. These under which a person may vote.7 The United Nations takings, he explained, were part of a political added its voice to the chorus of international strategy aimed at inducing a so-called drug ef critics of Pinochet's regime in March 1988, with fect that would prevent people from being fully a resolution condemning the junta for human responsive to political events during that sensi rights violations. Chile's ambassador to the tive period. By the spring, violence intensified United Nations responded to the resolution by as terrorists disabled the Pacifico Steel Enter denouncing it as interference in Chilean internal prise railroad by planting bombs along the rail affairs and suggesting that it was motivated by way line, thus causing panic among the resi "political interests" rather than a concern for hu dents of the Coquimbo region. Strikes against man rights and that the resolution was "invalid Santiago's electrical system became routine, from the beginning because it was drafted by with the result that vast industrial sectors of the such an untrustworthy government-that of city were often without power. Even radio sta Mexico."s Finally, in July 1988, the European tions served as convenient targets of terrorist ac Parliament issued a unanimous resolution call tions. Although FPMR is given credit for most ing upon all Chilean democratic parties to re of these incidents, there were rumors of involve ject Pinochet in the 5 October plebiscite. The ment by the Peruvian terrorist organization spokesman for the Chilean Foreign Ministry Shining Path. As a result, the Carabineros direc promptly denounced the decision as "grotesque" tor general Rodolfo Stange was compelled to is and labeled members of the Parliament "igno sue a public statement in June 1988, in an effort rant" and suffering from a "distorted view of to reduce popular fears of such foreign interven Chilean reality."9 tion. According to Stange, the violent attacks on a Carabineros barracks in May, seen by some as THE CHURCH AS AN ADVOCATE a Shining Path action, was the work of domestic The regime's difficulties with international or "extremists," probably the FPMR, who had ganizations and foreign governments have been promptly fled when the Chilean military came to matched by severe strains in its relationship with the aid of the Carabineros.5 Nevertheless, Chi the church since 1975. Harassment of church lean authorities insisted that there was consider workers and even the deaths of foreign priests in able foreign support for local terrorists and Ad police searches of Santiago's slums were indica Hoc Military Prosecutor Fernando Torres sug tions of open and bitter official hostility toward gested in February 1988 that out of a group of the church. This attitude was dramatically re over 100 cases he had tried, "at least 30 to 40 flected in actions against church organizations percent have been trained in Cuba or the USSR. such as the Vicariate of Solidarity-the Catho They have confessed to this and it is no secret."6 lic church's human rights office.

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