DOCSLIB.ORG

Nber Working Paper Series Factions in Nondemocracies

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nber Working Paper Series Factions in Nondemocracies NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES FACTIONS IN NONDEMOCRACIES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY Patrick Francois Francesco Trebbi Kairong Xiao Working Paper 22775 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22775 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 2016 The authors would like to thank Matilde Bombardini, Wei Cui, Chang Tai Hsieh, Ruixue Jia, Li Hao, Thorsten Rogall, and seminar participants at various institutions for their comments and suggestions. Francesco Trebbi gratefully acknowledges support by the Canadian Institute For Advanced Research and the Social Sciences and Humanites Research Council of Canada. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2016 by Patrick Francois, Francesco Trebbi, and Kairong Xiao. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party Patrick Francois, Francesco Trebbi, and Kairong Xiao NBER Working Paper No. 22775 October 2016 JEL No. P3,P48 ABSTRACT This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the factional arrangements and dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Our empirical analysis ranges from the end of the Deng Xiaoping era to the current Xi Jinping presidency and covers the appointments of both national and provincial officials. We present a set of new empirical regularities within the CCP and a theoretical framework suited to model factional politics within single-party regimes. Patrick Francois Kairong Xiao University of British Columbia Sauder School of Business 6000 Iona Dr. University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C. Canada V6T 1L4 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC and CIFAR V6T 1Z2 Canada [email protected] [email protected] Francesco Trebbi University of British Columbia 6000 Iona Drive Vancouver, BC V6T 1L4 Canada and CIFAR and also NBER [email protected] 1 Introduction Ebcs pUpYr prYsYhts U tbYirYtcWUf UhX YgpcrcWUf UhUfyscs i` tbY chtYrhUf iraUhc- Utcih i` (bchUs pifctcWUf fchWbpch" tbY (bchYsY (igguhcst AUrty (((A) &s tbY rYacgY pUrty i` tbY AYipfYs CYpuVfcW i` (bchU (AC(), tbY ((A cs XY durY UhX XY `UWti tbY VY-Uff UhX YhX-Uff i` pifctcWUf UWtcvcty ch tbY sYWihX fUraYst YWihigy UhX tbY gist pipufius Wiuhtry ch tbY wirfX tiXUy Ebcs gitcvUtYs tbY chtYrYst i` pifctcWUf YWihigcsts ch tbY ((A EbY hihtrUhspUrYht UhX i`tYh ch`irgUf hUturY i` YfctY chtYrUWtcih wctbch U Wiuhtry fUWecha WigpYtctcvY YfYWtcihs UhX wctb U rcWb bcstiry i` ch`irgUf pifct- cWUf diustcha Ugiha `UWtcihUf fYUXYrs rUcsYs `irgcXUVfY iVstUWfYs ti U rcairius pifctcWi-YWihigcW UhUfyscs EbY YWihigcW fctYrUturY ih tbY chtYrhUf iraUhcUtcih (UhX, wY wcff sYY, `UWtcihUf WigpYtctcih) Ut tbY bcabYst fYvYfs i` tbY (bchYsY aivYrhgYht cs fcgctYX AifctcWUf sWcYhtcsts `iWusYX ih (bchU stuXcYs bUvY VYYh girY UttYhtcvY, Vut Ufsi i`tYh girY quUfctUtcvY UhX XYsWrcptcvY, Ut fYUst uhtcf rYWYhtfy EbY ((A rYgUchs tiXUy a secretive, selective organization of about 65 mil- lion members who have positions of inuence in all sectors of Chinese society... (9UtbUh UhX 2cffYy, p) @pYrUtcihs i` tbY AifctVuri UhX tbY bcabYst YWbYfihs i` tbY ((A bUvY VYYh i`tYh XYsWrcVYX Us ipUquY Ut VYst (AyY, ! # )cttgYr, !!# Dbcb, ) &s rYpirtYX ch 9UtbUh ()" Deng built a system of tacit norms by which senior leaders were limited to two terms in o¢ce, mem- bers of the Politburo Standing Committee divided leadership roles among them- selves, and the senior leader made decisions in consultation with other leaders and retired elders. Hctbch tbcs WihtYxt, chtrU-YfctY WigpYtctcih cs YxtrYgYfy bUrX ti UssYss EbY ((A iWcUffy rYdYWts `UWtcihUf YfctY pifctcWs , Vut sWbifUrs schWY 9UtbUh (!) &hX pfUys U WruWcUf rifY ch stYYrcha YWihigcW UWtcvcty ch tbY Wiuhtry DYY 'Uc, 3scYb, UhX Diha () EbY stuXy i` tbY pifctcWUf YWihigy i` (bchU bUs sYvYrUf cgpirtUht YxWYptcihs, Vut i`tYh hit prYWcsYfy `iWusYX ih hUtcihUf YfctY WigpYtctcih AYrscWi, AuYVfctU, UhX DcfvYrgUh () ch tbYcr UhUfyscs i` `UWtcihUf pifctcWs `iWus ih tbY ((A, Ugiha tbYcr vUrcius WUsY stuXcYs 7Yss rYfUtYXfy, wire suWb Us 7c UhX Qbiu () `iWusYs ih tbY prigitcih prifYs i` privchWcUf fYUXYrs UhX si XiYs 5cU, 6uXUgUtsu, UhX DYcg () Hire Vy 7Uu, BcUh, UhX CifUhX () giXYfs tbY priWYss i` rY`irg uhXYr )Yha IcUipcha UhX tbY rY`irg YrU )YsWrcptcvY XcsWusscih gist pYrtchYht ti tbcs pUpYr chWfuXYs 7c (, ) DYvYrUf quUhtctUtcvY YxWYptcihs UrY XcsWussYX ch Dbcb () wctb rYspYWt ti sWbifUrsbcp ch 0Ust &scUh stuXcYs UhX pifctcWUf sWcYhWY, wbcfY fYss rYWYht YxUgpfYs chWfuXY 3uUha (), Dbcb (, )# Dbcb, &Xifpb UhX 7cu () &t tbY tcgY i` wrctcha 'y tbY ((A gYgVYrsbcp bUs ariwh ti 88 :76 gcffcih ''(, 8ihXUy 5UhuUry , " &h YXctircUf ch 8ihXUys Uasbcp hYwspUpYr, EbY AYi- pfYs )Ucfy, sUys WfcquYs UrY Uech ti pUrUsctYs UhX UrY bUrg`uf `ir Vitb tbY Wiuhtry UhX tbY bUvY YgpbUscYX biw tbY `UWtcih chtYhXYX Us pUtrih-WfcYht WfustYrs i` gutuUffy fcheYX iWcUfs rYprYsYhts tbY WirrYWt uhct i` UhUfyscs i` YfctY pifctcWs ch (bchU DchWY 9UtbUh (!), YvcXYhWY suppirtcha tbcs chtYrprYtUtcih bUs Ufsi stYUXcfy UWWugufUtYX (AyY, ! # )cttgYr UhX Hu, !!# 9UtbUh UhX 2cffYy, # Dbcb, # 7c, # 7c, # Dbcb, # 8YyYr, Dbcb, UhX 7YY ) EbY prYsYht pUpYr `iffiws tbcs fchY i` chqucry, Vut wctb spYWcUf UttYhtcih pUcX ti chXcvcXuUf chWYhtcvYs, suppfycha Uh chbYrYhtfy YWihigcW giXYf i` VYbUvcir, wbYrY lower- level o¢cials [...] join factions in order to secure promotions and other regime goods from powerful patrons (Dbcb, , p) UhX wbYrY prigitcih XyhUgcWs tbriuabiut tbY pUrty bcYrUrWby UrY gcWri`iuhXYX UhX WbUrUWtYrcYX & tbYi- rYtcWUf WihtrcVutcih i` tbcs pUpYr cs ch tbY `irgUf giXYf i` `UWtcihUf chtYrUWtcih tbUt wY prYsYht 4h iur giXYf `UWtcihs ipYrUtY wctbch U acvYh pUrty bcYrUrWby @h tbY ihY bUhX, tbY UXvUhtUaY i` `UWtcihs cs tbUt tbYy privcXY suppirt ti tbYcr gYgVYrs ch iVtUchcha prigitcihs up tbY pyrUgcX @h tbY itbYr, `UWtcihs Uffiw tbY UffiWUtcih i` tbUt suppirt ti VY XYWcXYX Vy sYhcir UfcUtYs, wctb tbY pisscVcfcty i` duhcir gYgVYrs VYcha VfiWeYX Vy bcabYr rUheYX Wi`UWtcihUfs eYYh ti UvicX prigitcha WiffYUauYs wbi wcff WigpYtY wctb tbYg `ir `uturY ipYhchas & `UWtcih gYgVYr, tbiuab pitYhtcUffy VYhYtcha `rig Wi`UWtcihUf suppirt, bUs ti VcXY bcs tcgY UhX wUct `ir tbY sYhcirs ch bcs `UWtcih ti Uffiw tbUt suppirt ti gUtYrcUfcY EbY sYhcirs gUeY tbcs XYWcscih VUsYX ih tbYcr iwh WUrYYr iVdYWtcvYs, si tbUt U duhcir gYgVYrs UsWYhXUhWy tbriuab tbY bcYrUrWby cs tYtbYrYX ti tbY rcsY i` tbY rYfYvUht sYhcirs UVivY bcg FhUfcUtYX (hYutrUf) pifctcWcUhs `UWY hi suWb rYstrcWtcihs, UhX tbcs cs wby hYutrUfs WUh Ufsi YgYraY ch YqucfcVrcug Ebiuab tbYy Xi hit Yhdiy `UWtcihUf suppirt, tbYy UrY Ufsi hit rYstrcWtYX ch tbYcr WUpUWcty ti WihtYst ipYhchas bcabYr up EbY UhUfyscs i` tbY Wists UhX VYhYts i` dichcha `UWtcihs cs WigpfcWUtYX Vy tbY XYpYhXYhWY i` prigitcih ippirtuhctcYs ih tbY `UWtcihUf Wigpisctcih i` YvYry fYvYf i` tbY bcYrUrWby Ut Uhy picht ch tcgY Ebcs XYtYrgchYs wbUt echX i` ipYhchas gUy UrcsY UhX wbi cs ch U pisctcih ti VfiWe UXvUhWYgYht Ut Uhy fYvYf, U priVfYg tbUt wY stuXy ch XYtUcf @ur tbYirYtcWUf rYsufts UrY cgpirtUht ch gUtWbcha YgpcrcWUf gigYhts ch tYrgs i` `UWtcihUf Wigpisctcih, prigitcih rUtYs, UhX tbY YYWts i` WbUhaYs ch tbY `UWtcihUf cXYhtcty i` tbY tip fYUXYrsbcp ch (bchU &VsYht bUrX UhX vYrcUVfY ch`irgUtcih, wY rYfy ih tbY YxtUht XcsWusscih i` (bchYsY YfctY pifctcWs ti cXYhtc`y U gchcgUf sYt i` `UWtcihs wctbch tbY ((A 1UWtcihs bUvY bcstircWUffy YgYraYX pYipfY bttp"wwwVVWWighYwsVfias-WbchU-Vfia- wctbch tbY ((A tbriuab WfisY pYrsihUf WihhYWtcihs wctb prigchYht pUtrihs (Ya ch tbY WUsYs i` `irgYr 2YhYrUf DYWrYtUry 5cUha QYgch UhX bcs suWWYssir, 3u 5chtUi) ti gutuUffy `istYr tbY WUrYYr prispYWts i` UfcUtYX WUXrYs, UhX Xi hit hYWYssUrcfy rYprYsYht spYWcW tYrrctircUf ir YWihigcW chtYrYst ariups ()cttgYr, !!) &s wY XcsWuss ch DYWtcihs UhX , tbcs pUpYr wcff fYvYr ihfy tbY gist iVvcius `UWtcihUf fches cXYhtcYX wctbch tbY ((A, fches VUsYX ih UfcUtcih ti tbY (igguhcst Piutb 7YUauY i` (bchU (rYfUtYX ti 2YhYrUf DYWrYtUry 3u 5chtUi) ir ti tbY si-WUffYX DbUhabUc 2Uha (UfcUtYX gist prigchYhtfy wctb 5cUha QYgch UhX fYvYrcha ih tbY spYWcUf stUtus i` DbUhabUc ch (bchYsY pifctcWs) DWbifUrs suWb Us Dbcb, DbUh, UhX 7cu (), Dbcb, &Xifpb, UhX 7cu (), 5cU Yt Uf () bUvY YxpfirYX gYtbiXifiacYs `ir tbY cgputUtcih i` `UWtcihUf fcheUaYs VUsYX ih pfUWY i` Vcrtb, uhcvYrscty tcYs, UhX sbUrYX WUrYYr prifYs HbcfY wY Ufsi `iWus ih systYgUtcW VciarUpbcWUf ch`irgUtcih, wY rYgUch wUry i` pitYhtcUf gcsgYUsurYgYht ch tbY cXYhtcWUtcih i` `UWtcihUf tcYs, Us cs fceYfy `ir `UWtcihUf UfcUtcih VUsYX purYfy ih pfUWY i` Vcrtb ir sbUrYX WUrYYr pUtbs &h cgpirtUht rYUsih `ir tbcs wUrchYss wcff VY YvcXYht ch iur stUtcstcWUf UhUfyscs 'UsYX ih iur `UWtcihUf XYhctcihs UhX wctbch U prixcgUtY sYt i` pUrty iWcUfs i` Ufgist YqucvUfYht rUhe ch tbY sUgY iWY UhX UrYU (Ya tbY hugVYr UhX hugVYr bcabYst rUheYX pUrty gYgVYrs ch U privchWY), wY sbiw tbUt gYgVYrs i` U `UWtcih (fYt us WUff ct B) UrY vcrtuUffy hYvYr pUcrYX wctb gYgVYrs i` tbY sUgY `UWtcih B Ut tbY sUgY iWY @h tbY WihtrUry, tbYy UrY pUcrYX wctb gYgVYrs i` U rcvUf `UWtcih ( R) VYyihX
Load more

Recommended publications
  • China's 2017 Communist Party Leadership Structure & Transition
    China’s 2017 Communist Party Leadership Structure & Transition US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL JUNE 2017 China’s 2017 Communist Party Leadership Structure & Transition June 2017 Executive Summary ● The 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) congress, in fall 2017, is expected to mark the beginning of President Xi Jinping’s second, five-year term as China’s top leader and fill other senior political posts. In the past, some second-term party congresses have signaled leadership succession plans for the next congress. ● The party congress not only chooses top party personnel, but also establishes policy priorities for the subsequent five years. These priorities are condensed into a political report delivered by the party’s incumbent top leader on behalf of the Central Committee. ● Leadership turnover could be significant. If previous party congress norms hold, many key national and provincial party leaders could be replaced for reaching the targeted retirement age of 68. This means five of the seven current Politburo Standing Committee members could retire, leaving only President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang to continue. Additionally, at least 11 of the 25 members of the Politburo are likely to retire, based solely on retirement age. Average turnover in the larger Central Committee has been 60 percent, based on age and other factors. ● Changes to the majority of senior positions within the party and the State Council, China’s cabinet, will be announced on an ongoing basis through the National People’s Congress in March 2018. As part of the transition, many key government officials whose work affects trade and commerce in China will retire or be promoted to new positions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Danger of Deconsolidation Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F
    July 2016, Volume 27, Number 3 $14.00 The Danger of Deconsolidation Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F. Inglehart The Struggle Over Term Limits in Africa Brett L. Carter Janette Yarwood Filip Reyntjens 25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong? Henry E. Hale Suisheng Zhao on Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival Bojan Bugari¡c & Tom Ginsburg on Postcommunist Courts Clive H. Church & Adrian Vatter on Switzerland Daniel O’Maley on the Internet of Things Delegative Democracy Revisited Santiago Anria Catherine Conaghan Frances Hagopian Lindsay Mayka Juan Pablo Luna Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe Zhao.NEW saved by BK on 1/5/16; 6,145 words, including notes; TXT created from NEW by PJC, 3/18/16; MP edits to TXT by PJC, 4/5/16 (6,615 words). AAS saved by BK on 4/7/16; FIN created from AAS by PJC, 4/25/16 (6,608 words). PGS created by BK on 5/10/16. XI JINPING’S MAOIST REVIVAL Suisheng Zhao Suisheng Zhao is professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He is executive director of the univer- sity’s Center for China-U.S. Cooperation and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China. When Xi Jinping became paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2012, some Chinese intellectuals with liberal lean- ings allowed themselves to hope that he would promote the cause of political reform. The most optimistic among them even thought that he might seek to limit the monopoly on power long claimed by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
    [Show full text]
  • China's Communist Party Absorbs More of the State
    March 23, 2018 China’s Communist Party Absorbs More of the State In March 2018, China’s national legislature, the National usual two terms. Xi’s second term in his Party posts is People’s Congress (NPC), approved amendments to scheduled to end in 2022, and his second term as president China’s state constitution, including the elimination of term is scheduled to end in March 2023. limits for the positions of President and Vice President. The NPC also supported the creation of a new anti-graft agency, Many analysts warn that by undermining China’s efforts to approved a reorganization of government agencies, create norms around the orderly transfer of power, the installed a new lineup of state and NPC leaders, and removal of term limits could increase the risk of a future endorsed economic and other targets. On March 21, 2018, destabilizing succession crisis in the world’s second-largest immediately after the NPC session closed, the Communist economy. Some U.S. observers have expressed cautious Party released a document outlining a broad re-organization hope that with the prospect of staying in power indefinitely, of large parts of China’s political system, including the President Xi may feel he has a freer hand to pursue needed Party. The events served to strengthen the position of economic reforms. Others have expressed concern that Xi Communist Party General Secretary and State President Xi could pursue an even more assertive foreign policy. Jinping, to expand the Communist Party of China’s already dominant role in China’s political life, and to give the Party Strengthening the Constitutional Basis for more tools to pursue its nationalist agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • Zhao Leji 赵乐际 Born 1957
    Zhao Leji 赵乐际 Born 1957 Current Positions • Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (2017– present) • Member of the Politburo Standing Committee (2017–present) • Director of the Central Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (2012–present) • Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Party Building Work (2012–present) • Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work (2012–present) • Member of the Politburo (2012–present) • Full member of the Central Committee of the CCP (2002–present) Personal and Professional Background Zhao Leji was born on March 8, 1957, in Xining City, Qinghai Province. His ancestral home is Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, and his parents served as cadres who moved from Xi’an to support frontier work in economically disadvantaged Qinghai. Zhao joined the CCP in 1975. He was a “sent-down youth” at an agricultural commune in Qinghai’s Guide County during the Cultural Revolution (1974–75).i He received an undergraduate degree in philosophy from Peking University in Beijing (1977–80) and was part of the last class comprised of the so-called “worker-peasant-soldier students.” Zhao also attended the graduate program in currency and banking at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1996–98) and the graduate program in politics at the Central Party School (2002–05), both via part-time studies. In the Department of Commerce of the Qinghai provincial government, Zhao served as a communications officer (1975–77) and as a clerk in the political division (1980–82). Between 1980 and 1983, he served in various roles within the Qinghai Provincial Commerce School, namely instructor, Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) secretary, and deputy head of the dean’s office.
    [Show full text]
  • China | Freedom House
    China | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/china A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 0 / 12 A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 There are no direct or competitive elections for national executive leaders. The National People’s Congress (NPC) formally elects the state president for five-year terms and confirms the premier after he is nominated by the president, but both positions are decided in advance at the relevant CCP congress. The CCP’s seven- member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), headed by Xi Jinping in his role as the party’s general secretary, sets government and party policy in practice. Xi also holds the position of state president and serves as chairman of the state and party military commissions. Xi was awarded a second five-year term as general secretary at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, and at the NPC session in March 2018 he was confirmed for a second five-year term as state president. Also at that session, the NPC approved amendments to China’s constitution that abolished the two-term limit for the state presidency and vice presidency. Combined with the absence of another PSC member young enough to serve as Xi’s successor in 2022, the move reinforced predictions that he planned to break with precedent and remain China’s paramount leader for the foreseeable future. A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 The 3,000 NPC members are formally elected for five-year terms by subnational congresses, but in practice all candidates are vetted by the CCP.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of Chinese Capitalism: the Worker, the Factory, and the Future of the World
    Zakir AVSAR 1 1 Haci Bayram Veli University, 06570 Ankara, Turkey; e-mail: [email protected] EURASIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL, Eurasian ERJ, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 87-89, July 2020 Research Journal July 2020 ISSN 2519-2442, KAZAKHSTAN Vol. 2, No. 2 Book Review THE MYTH OF CHINESE CAPITALISM: THE WORKER, THE FACTORY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD Fatih MANGIR 1 1 Selcuk University, 42700 Konya, Turkey; e-mail: [email protected]; ORCID: 0000-0003-1348-7818 Dexter Tiff Roberts.The Myth of Chinese Capitalism: the Worker, the Factory, and the Future of the World. St. Martin’s Press, 2020. pp. 288. BOOK REVIEWS After receiving his bachelor of science from Stanford University and master degree of international relations from Columbia University, Dexter Tiff Roberts is now serving as a fellow at the University of Montana’s Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center. He worked several years as a journalist and a public speaker with several journalist awards including Overseas Press Club awards, the Sid- ney Hillman Foundation prize, Human Rights Press awards, and Society of Pub- lishers in Asia. Earlier in his career, he worked as an author and editor-in-chief for the Bloomberg Businessweek. “The Myth of Chinese Capitalism: The Worker, the Factory, and the Future of the World” was Roberts’ first book published by St. Martin’s Press in March 2020. The author explains the motivations behind the China’s industrial and financial revolution by giving evidences from the people, not numbers. The book starts with the rise of China by the paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, the man who ended the Mao-era communes and opened economy into foreign investors.
    [Show full text]
  • Pursue Greater Unity and Progress News Brief
    VOL.50 ISSUE 3 · 2020 《中国人大》对外版 NPC National People’s Congress of China PURSUE GREATER UNITY AND pROGRESS NEWS BRIEF President Xi Jinping attends a video conference with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres from Beijing on September 23. Liu Weibing 2 NATIONAL PEOPle’s CoNGRESS OF CHINA ISSUE 3 · 2020 3 6 Pursue greater unity and progress Contents UN’s 75th Anniversary CIFTIS: Global Services, Shared Prosperity National Medals and Honorary Titles 6 18 26 Pursue greater unity Global services, shared prosperity President Xi presents medals and progress to COVID-19 fighters 22 9 Shared progress and mutually Special Reports Make the world a better place beneficial cooperation for everyone 24 30 12 Accelerated development of trade in Work together to defeat COVID-19 Xi Jinping meets with UN services benefits the global economy and build a community with a shared Secretary-General António future for mankind Guterres 32 14 Promote peace and development China’s commitment to through parliamentary diplomacy multilateralism illustrated 4 NATIONAL PEOPle’s CoNGRESS OF CHINA 42 The final stretch Accelerated development of trade in 24 services benefits the global economy 36 Top legislator stresses soil protection ISSUE 3 · 2020 Fcous 38 Stop food waste with legislation, 34 crack down on eating shows Top legislature resolves HKSAR Leg- VOL.50 ISSUE 3 September 2020 Co vacancy concern Administrated by General Office of the Standing Poverty Alleviation Committee of National People’s Congress 36 Top legislator stresses soil protection Chief Editor: Wang Yang General Editorial 42 Office Address: 23 Xijiaominxiang, The final stretch Xicheng District, Beijing 37 100805, P.R.China Full implementation wildlife protection Tel: (86-10)5560-4181 law stressed (86-10)6309-8540 E-mail: [email protected] COVER: President Xi Jinping ad- ISSN 1674-3008 dresses a high-level meeting to CN 11-5683/D commemorate the 75th anniversary Price: RMB 35 of the United Nations via video link Edited by The People’s Congresses Journal on September 21.
    [Show full text]
  • A Global Contest for Power and Influence
    CHAPTER 1 U.S.-CHINA GLOBAL COMPETITION SECTION 1: A GLOBAL CONTEST FOR POWER AND INFLUENCE: CHINA’S VIEW OF STRA- TEGIC COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES Key Findings • Beijing has long held the ambition to match the United States as the world’s most powerful and influential nation. Over the past 15 years, as its economic and technological prowess, dip- lomatic influence, and military capabilities have grown, China has turned its focus toward surpassing the United States. Chi- nese leaders have grown increasingly aggressive in their pur- suit of this goal following the 2008 global financial crisis and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping’s ascent to power in 2012. • Chinese leaders regard the United States as China’s primary adversary and as the country most capable of preventing the CCP from achieving its goals. Over the nearly three decades of the post-Cold War era, Beijing has made concerted efforts to diminish the global strength and appeal of the United States. Chinese leaders have become increasingly active in seizing op- portunities to present the CCP’s one-party, authoritarian gover- nance system and values as an alternative model to U.S. global leadership. • China’s approach to competition with the United States is based on the CCP’s view of the United States as a dangerous ideologi- cal opponent that seeks to constrain its rise and undermine the legitimacy of its rule. In recent years, the CCP’s perception of the threat posed by Washington’s championing of liberal demo- cratic ideals has intensified as the Party has reemphasized the ideological basis for its rule.
    [Show full text]
  • Li Zhanshu 栗战书 Born 1950
    Li Zhanshu 栗战书 Born 1950 Current Positions • Member of the Politburo Standing Committee (2017–present) • Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee (2012–present) • Secretary of the Central Work Committee for Organs of the CCP Central Committee (2012–present) • Director of the Office of the National Security Committee (2013–present) • Head of the Central Confidential Commission of the CCP Central Committee (2013–present) • Member of the Politburo (2012–present) • Secretariat member of the Central Committee of the CCP (2012–2017) • Full member of the Central Committee of the CCP (2012–present) Personal and Professional Background Li Zhanshu was born on August 30, 1950, in Pingshan County, Hebei Province. Li was a “sent- down youth” at an agricultural commune in his native county (1968–72).i He joined the CCP in 1975. He studied at the Shijiazhuang Institute of Commerce in Shijiazhuang City, Hebei (1971–72), and received an undergraduate education in politics from Hebei Normal University in Shijiazhuang City (via part-time studies and night school, 1980–83). He also attended the graduate program in business economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1996–98) and received an EMBA from the Harbin Institute of Technology in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province (2005–06), both on a part-time basis. Li began his political career as a clerk and later served as deputy director in the office of the commerce bureau of the Shijiazhuang prefecture government in Hebei (1972–76). He moved on to become a clerk and division head of the information division of the general office of the CCP Committee of Shijiazhuang Prefecture (1976–83).
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
    CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ⃺ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized.
    [Show full text]
  • 7 Civil Liberties: 6 Status: Not Free
    China Population: 1,311,400,000 Capital: Beijing Political Rights: 7 Civil Liberties: 6 Status: Not Free Overview: In response to China’s pressing socioeconomic problems, the leadership team of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2006 continued to promote policies aimed at building a “harmonious society,” balancing economic growth with the provision of public goods such as social welfare and environmental protection. However, concerns over social stability also led to a strengthening of restrictions on the country’s media and the detention of human rights activists, civil rights lawyers, and others the authorities viewed as posing a challenge to the regime. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in mainland China in 1949 after defeating the nationalist Kuomintang forces in the Chinese Civil War. Aiming to strengthen his own position and hasten China’s socialist transformation, Communist leader Mao Zedong oversaw devastating mass- mobilization campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), which resulted in millions of deaths and politicized nearly every aspect of daily life. Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s paramount leader. Over the next two decades, Deng maintained the CCP’s absolute rule in the political sphere while guiding China’s transition from a largely agrarian economy to a rapidly urbanizing, export-driven market economy. The CCP signaled its intent to maintain political stability at all costs with the 1989 massacre of prodemocracy protesters who had gathered in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Following the crackdown, the party tapped Jiang Zemin to replace the relatively moderate Zhao Ziyang as general secretary of the party.
    [Show full text]
  • Setting the Course
    ISSUE 4 · 2017 《中国人大》对外版 NPC National People’s Congress of China SETTING THE COURsE General Secretary Xi Jinping (1st L) and other members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee Li Keqiang (2nd L), Li Zhanshu (3rd L), Wang Yang (4th L), Wang Huning (3rd R), Zhao Leji (2nd R) and Han Zheng (1st R), meet the press after being elected on Octo- ber 25, 2017. Ma Zhancheng SPECIAL REPORT 6 New CPC leadership for new era Contents 19th CPC National Congress Special Report In-depth 28 6 26 President Xi Jinping steers New CPC leadership for new era Top CPC leaders reaffirm mission Chinese economy toward 12 at Party’s birthplace high-quality development Setting the course Focus 20 Embarking on a new journey 32 National memorial ceremony for 24 Nanjing Massacre victims Grand design 4 NATIONAL PeoPle’s CoNgress of ChiNa NPC President Xi Jinping steers Chinese 28 economy toward high-quality development 37 National memorial ceremony for 32 Nanjing Massacre victims Awareness of law aids resolution ISSUE 4 · 2017 36 Legislation Chairman Zhang Dejiang calls for pro- motion of Constitution spirit 44 Encourage and protect fair market 38 competition China’s general provisions of Civil NPC Law take effect General Editorial Office Address: 23 Xijiaominxiang, Xicheng District Beijing 39 100805,P.R.China Tibetan NPC delegation visits Tel: (86-10)6309-8540 Canada, Argentina and US (86-10)8308-3891 E-mail: [email protected] COVER: Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of ISSN 1674-3008 Supervision China (CPC), speaks when meeting the press at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oc- CN 11-5683/D tober 25, 2017.
    [Show full text]