Gender and Participatory Democracy
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Argentina's Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies After the Convertibility
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH April Argentina’s Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies after the Convertibility Regime Collapse • ii Contents Introduction 1 1. The Convertibility Regime 2 2. The Post-Convertibility Macroeconomic Regime and Performance 9 2.1 The Main Characteristics of the Economic Recovery 10 2.2 The Evolution of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 16 3. A Macroeconomic Policy Regime with a SCRER as an Intermediate Target 25 3.1 The Orthodox Arguments Against RER Targeting 26 3.2 The Exchange Rate Policy 29 3.3 The Exchange Market and Capital Flows 30 3.4 Monetary Policy 31 Conclusion 35 References 36 Chronological Appendix 39 About the Authors Roberto Frenkel is a senior research associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. and Principal Research Associate at the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES) in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Martín Rapetti is a research assistant at CEDES and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Acknowledgements This paper was written as part of an international research project on Alternatives to Inflation Targeting for Stable and Equitable Growth co-directed by Gerald Epstein, PERI and Erinc Yeldan, Bilkent University. The authors thank the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ford Foundation and UN-DESA for financial support. Additionally, Nelson Barbosa-Filho, Erinc Yeldan and the participants in the workshop on “Alternatives to Inflation Targeting Monetary Policy for Stable and Egalitarian Growth in Developing Countries” held at CEDES in May 13-14, 2005 contributed comments to a previous version of this paper. Finally, the authors thank Julia Frenkel for her collaboration and Erinc Yeldan and an anonymous referee from World Development for their comments and suggestions. -
The Constitutionality of Bank Deposits Pesification, the Massa Case
Law and Business Review of the Americas Volume 14 Number 1 Article 4 2008 Bank Crisis in Argentina: The Constitutionality of Bank Deposits Pesification, the Massa Case Ignacio Hirigoyen Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra Recommended Citation Ignacio Hirigoyen, Bank Crisis in Argentina: The Constitutionality of Bank Deposits Pesification, the Massa Case, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 53 (2008) https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol14/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. BANK CRISIS IN ARGENTINA: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANK DEPOSITS PESIFICATION, THE MASSA CASE Ignacio Hirigoyen* I. INTRODUCTION RGENTINA experienced its biggest bank crisis in history from 2000 to 2002. The financial crisis was so severe that it is re- garded as one of the most severe to ever occur during a peace- time period. At one point during such economic turmoil, Argentina went through five presidents in eight days. The fifth President, Eduardo Duhalde,1 declared a state of economic emergency 2 and made executive decisions, taking economic measures that were the source of much con- troversy and litigation. This paper will address the Massa case,3 which arose out of a challenge to the constitutionality of such executive deci- sions and went all the way through to Argentina's Corte Suprema de Jus- ticia de la Naci6n (Supreme Court). -
De Los Hechos De Diciembre De 2001 a La Masacre Del Puente Pueyrredón
V Jornadas de Sociología de la UNLP. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Departamento de Sociología, La Plata, 2008. De los hechos de diciembre de 2001 a la Masacre del Puente Pueyrredón. Proyectos estratégicos en disputa. Merino, Gabriel. Cita: Merino, Gabriel (2008). De los hechos de diciembre de 2001 a la Masacre del Puente Pueyrredón. Proyectos estratégicos en disputa. V Jornadas de Sociología de la UNLP. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Departamento de Sociología, La Plata. Dirección estable: https://www.aacademica.org/000-096/567 Esta obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons. Para ver una copia de esta licencia, visite https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar. Acta Académica es un proyecto académico sin fines de lucro enmarcado en la iniciativa de acceso abierto. Acta Académica fue creado para facilitar a investigadores de todo el mundo el compartir su producción académica. Para crear un perfil gratuitamente o acceder a otros trabajos visite: https://www.aacademica.org. DE LOS HECHOS DE DICIEMBRE DE 2001 A LA MASACRE DEL PUENTE PUEYRREDÓN. PROYECTOS ESTRATÉGICOS EN DISPUTA. Autor: Lic. Gabriel Merino INTRODUCCIÓN Los hechos ocurrido el 19 y 20 de diciembre y el proceso que deviene hasta el hecho 26 de junio de 2002, donde se produce la “Masacre del Puente Pueyrredón”, refieren a enfrentamientos entre las diferentes clases, fracciones y grupos sociales, que se disputaban el control de la Argentina. Estos proyectos responden a diferentes fracciones de capital1 ya que en el terreno de la realidad ninguna fracción del campo del pueblo, ya sea de pequeños empresarios o de trabajadores, tenía la organización y la fuerza para ser uno de los jugadores centrales de la partida. -
A R G E N T I
JUJUY PARAGUAY SALTA SOUTH FORMOSA Asunción PACIFIC TUCUMÁN CHACO SANTIAGO S OCEAN NE CATAMARCA SIO DEL ESTERO MI CORRIENTES á River an LA RIOJA Par BRAZIL SANTA FE SAN JUAN CÓRDOBA ENTRE RÍOS SAN LUIS URUGUAY MENDOZA Santiago Buenos Aires ARGENTINA Montevideo LA PAMPA BUENOS AIRES CHILE NEUQUÉN RÍO NEGRO SOUTH CHUBUT ATLANTIC OCEAN SANTA CRUZ Islas Malvinas TIERRA DEL FUEGO 0 200 miles david rock RACKING ARGENTINA opular protest erupted on the streets of Argentina through the hot December nights of 2001.1 Crowds from Pthe shanty towns attacked stores and supermarkets; banging their pots and pans, huge demonstrations of mainly middle- class women—cacerolazos—marched on the city centre; the piqueteros, organized groups of the unemployed, threw up road-blocks on high- ways and bridges. Twenty-seven demonstrators died, including five shot down by the police beneath the grand baroque façades of Buenos Aires’ Plaza de Mayo. The trigger for the fury had been the IMF’s suspension of loans to Argentina, on the grounds that President Fernando De la Rúa’s government had failed to meet its conditions on public-spending cuts. There was a run on the banks, as depositors rushed to get their money out and their pesos converted into dollars. De la Rúa’s Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo slapped on a corralito, a ‘little fence’, to limit the amount of cash that could be withdrawn—leaving many people’s savings trapped in failing banks. On December 20, as the protests inten- sified, De la Rúa resigned, his helicopter roaring up over the Rosada palace and the clouds of tear gas below. -
Argentina at the Abyss
ARGENTINA AT THE ABYSS PAUL COONEY1i INDEX I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 1 II. THE STEPS LEADING UP TO THE CRISIS................................................................................................. 1 III. FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS ................................................................................................................... 2 IV. PRIVATIZATIONS........................................................................................................................................ 2 V. TRADE DEFICIT ........................................................................................................................................... 3 VI. FOREIGN DEBT........................................................................................................................................... 3 1. NEOLIBERAL POLICIES DURING THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE 70S................................................. 3 VII. NEOLIBERAL POLICIES UNDER MENEM AND THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ............................. 4 VIII. CONVERTIBILITY AND FINANCIAL REFORMS ......................................................................................5 IX. REFORM OF THE STATE AND PRIVATIZATIONS.................................................................................... 5 X. TRADE LIBERALIZATION ........................................................................................................................... -
THE REFORMS of the NINETIES in ARGENTINA Rodolfo Díaz
The Reforms of the Nineties in Argentina By Rodolfo Diaz WCFIA Fellow - Harvard University THE REFORMS OF THE NINETIES IN ARGENTINA Rodolfo Díaz WCFIA Fellow Harvard University This book is published under the auspices of the Weatherhead Center For International Affairs of Harvard University 2 The Reforms of the Nineties in Argentina By Rodolfo Diaz WCFIA Fellow - Harvard University CONTENTS Introduction THE STARTING POINT (7) 1. The State: the "Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model".2. The Econ- omy: the "Assisted Capitalism". 3. The Means: Inflation. 4. The Ends: Transfers to the Private Sector. 5. The Starting Point: The Collapse of Assisted Capitalism Chapter I: Reforming the Economy I. ECONOMIC REFORM (33) 1. The Collapse of 1989. 2. The "Plan BB”. 3. Contents of the New Law. 4. The Approval. 5. Solutions to Problems. 6. Complementary Measures. 7. Enforcement of Economic Reform. 8. Information flows. 9. Effects. 10. Measuring the Reforms. 11. Two "Paces". II. MONETARY REFORM (61) 1. Crisis and Hyperinflation. 2. The Proposal. 3. Contents of the "Convertibility Law". 4. The Approval. 5. Implementation. 6. The "Impossible Trinity". 7. The Enforcement of Convertibility. 8. The Fixed Exchange Rate. 10. Effects. 11. Inflationary Effects of De- valuation. 12. Elimination of Devaluation as Monetary Policy In- strument. III. FISCAL REFORM (85) 1. Inflation: The Tax of Assisted Capitalism. 2. Fiscal Situation in 1989. 3. The Proposal. 4. Approval: Defeat and Debate. 5. The Contents of Law 24073. 6. Enforcement and Tax Collection. 7. Public Expenditure and Fiscal Deficit. 8. Budgetary Institutions. 9. The Fiscal Solvency Law. Chapter II: Reforming the Society I. EDUCATIONAL REFORM (117) 1. -
The Political Role of the United States in the Argentinean Default
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations | e-ISSN 2238-6912 | ISSN 2238-6262| v.3, n.5, Jan-Jun. 2014 | p.225-243 THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARGENTINEAN DEFAULT Roberto Miranda1 Introduction The objective of this work is to analyze the participation of the United States of America in the restructuring of the Argentinean debt after the December 2001 crisis. Most part of studies and researches on the situation faced by the Latin American country is focused on unraveling the economic causes and mechanisms that led this country to declare the greatest suspension of debt disbursements of its history. There are many points of view and debates based on this focus. In our case, the perspective is different. We consider that the U.S. had much more to do with the Argentinean meltdown and its resolution. During the 1990s, the U.S. had flattered Argentina for its economic conduct inspired by the Washington Consensus. However, this praise fell apart when the American economy entered recession in 2000. Starting from this moment, the discourse and actions, especially after George Walker Bush took office, were centered on leaving Argentina to chance considering the country as the sole responsible for its own financial crisis. In this sense, it was an unfavorable external scenario for Argentina, and its dependence on the U.S. was flagrant. The dependence was so important that when the U.S. administration left its indifference behind and decided to be an active part of the narrowing of the default, playing a strong and plain role of political force, the Latin 1 Member of the National Council of Technical and Scientific Research (Argentina). -
Neoliberal Dystopias: Postmodern Aesthetics and a Modern Ethic in Four Pairs of Plays by Argentine and Irish Playwrights (1990-2003)
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2015 Neoliberal Dystopias: Postmodern Aesthetics and a Modern Ethic in Four Pairs of Plays by Argentine and Irish Playwrights (1990-2003) Noelia Diaz Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/547 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Neoliberal Dystopias: Postmodern Aesthetics and a Modern Ethic in Four Pairs of Plays by Argentine and Irish Playwrights (1990-2003) by Noelia Diaz A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2015 © 2015 NOELIA DIAZ All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature in satisfaction of the Dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ______Dr. Jean Graham-Jones__________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee ______Dr. Giancarlo Lombardi __________________ Date Executive Officer Dr. Clare Carroll Dr. Jerry Carlson Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Neoliberal Dystopias: Postmodern Aesthetics and a Modern Ethic in Four Pairs of Plays by Argentine and Irish Playwrights (1990-2003) by Noelia Diaz Advisor: Jean Graham-Jones This project is an exploration of eight plays, four from Argentina, four from Ireland, comprehending the period between 1990 and 2003. -
Argentina's Economic Crisis: Causes and Cures
ARGENTINA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES Jim Saxton (R-NJ), Vice Chairman Joint Economic Committee United States Congress June 2003 Summary In 1998, Argentina entered what turned out to be a four-year depression, during which its economy shrank 28 percent. Argentina’s experience has been cited as an example of the failure of free markets and fixed exchange rates, among other things. The evidence does not support those views. Rather, bad economic policies converted an ordinary recession into a depression. Three big tax increases in 2000-2001 discouraged growth, and meddling with the monetary system in mid 2001 created fear of currency devaluation. As a result, confidence in Argentina’s government finances evaporated. In a series of blunders that made matters even worse, from December 2001 to early 2002, succeeding governments undermined property rights by freezing bank deposits; defaulting on the government’s foreign debt in a thoughtless manner; ending the Argentine peso’s longstanding link to the dollar; forcibly converting dollar deposits and loans into Argentine pesos at unfavorable rates; and voiding contracts. Achieving sustained long-term economic growth will involve re-establishing respect for property rights. A summary version of this study is available on the Web site of the Vice Chairman’s Office of the Joint Economic Committee. Joint Economic Committee 1537 Longworth House Office Building G-01 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20510 Phone: 202-226-3234 Phone: 202-224-5171 Fax: 202-226-3950 Fax: 202-224-0240 Internet Address: http://www.house.gov/jec/ ARGENTINA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES I. -
Capital Restrictions As an Explanation of Stock Price Distortions During Argentine Financial Collapse: December 2001 – March 2002
Capital Restrictions as an Explanation of Stock Price Distortions during Argentine Financial Collapse: December 2001 – March 2002 Matias Brechner The Leonard N. Stern School of Business Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets Faculty Advisor: David Backus April 1, 2005 I. INTRODUCTION By the last quarter of 2001, Argentina entered into one of the most important financial and economic crises of its history. The crisis was characterized by huge bank deposit withdrawals, a significant decrease in Central Bank reserves, the abandonment of the Argentine peso peg against the dollar, the country’s formal declaration of the largest debt default in history, and a GDP decrease of 4.4% in 2001 and 10.9% in 2002. Paradoxically, in the middle of this financial and economic collapse, the Argentine stock market boomed, shown by an increase in the MERVAL index (local index) of 115% (in Argentine pesos) between the end of November 2001 and the end of March 2002. This was contrary to what happened in other emerging countries’ financial crises, such as Mexico, Malaysia or Korea during the 90’s, whose stock markets declined by roughly 50%. At the beginning of December 2001, before the debt default declaration and devaluation, extensive restrictions on bank deposit withdrawals and international transfers were imposed, in order to stop the severe decline in government reserves and local bank deposits, as well as to prevent a speculative attack to the local currency. This group of restrictions was named the Corralito. Under the Corralito’s restrictions, it was legal to purchase Argentine stocks using frozen bank deposits, including stocks that were cross- listed in international stock markets. -
El Equipo Del Ministerio De Economía (1987- 2007)*
Trayectorias y saberes en la provincia de Buenos Aires: el equipo del ministerio de Economía (1987- 2007)* Trajectories and Knowledge in the Province of Buenos Aires (Argentina):the Team of the Ministry of Economy (1987-2007) Elsa B. Pereyra** Palabras clave Resumen Saber especializado Los estudios sobre el saber especializado y su vinculación con el saber político –dentro de los cuales se destacan los Saber político relacionados con los economistas– han privilegiado la es- cala nacional del análisis. En este trabajo ponemos el foco Elencos ministeriales en la escala subnacional y analizamos las trayectorias y la confi guración del elenco de funcionarios que condujo el Economistas Ministerio de Economía de la provincia de Buenos Aires en- tre 1987 y 2007. Por un lado, consideramos las principales Nivel subnacional fuentes de su formación: los estudios universitarios en la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, y la actividad política en Provincia de Buenos el marco del movimiento de la renovación peronista. Por Aires el otro, reconstruimos los atributos y condiciones que, en *Este artículo recupera algunos aspectos desarrollados en mi trabajo de tesis: “Burocracias especializadas en el nivel subnacional: El equipo del Ministerio de Economía de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (1987-2007)”. Doctorado de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (tesis pendiente de defensa). Una primera versión fue presentada en las VII Jor- nadas de Estudios Políticos organizadas por el Área de Estudios Políticos del Instituto del Desa- rrollo Humano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, en agosto de 2016. Agradezco los comentarios que Victoria Ortiz de Rozas realizó en esa oportunidad. -
Argentina's Financial Crisis
This draft: June 3, 2002 Comments welcome Argentina’s Financial Crisis: ⊗ Floating Money, Sinking Banking Augusto de la Torre World Bank Eduardo Levy Yeyati Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and Sergio L. Schmukler World Bank Abstract This paper argues that the relation between the currency board and the financial system—i.e., the link between money and banking—is essential to understand the 2001-02 Argentine crisis. The establishment of the currency board in 1991 helped develop the Argentine financial system. Despite its strengths, the financial system remained vulnerable to real exchange rate misalignments and fiscal shocks. After 1998, Argentina fell into a currency- growth-debt trap. It tried to break away by focusing on growth, but failed to address the currency and debt components of the trap, dramatically raising uncertainty. This unleashed a depositor run, which lead to the abandonment of the currency board. We argue that an early exit of the currency board into dollarization would have likely prevented the run and substantially lowered the magnitude of the crisis. Dollarization would have preserved property rights and financial intermediation. Moreover, it would not have necessarily implied giving up nominal flexibility altogether, since dollarization could have been followed over time by “pesification at the margin.” JEL classification codes: E44, E58, F31, F33, G28 Keywords: currency crisis; banking crisis; currency regime; currency board; dollarization; floating ⊗ Authors are Senior Financial Sector Advisor, Latin American and the Caribbean Region; Professor; and Senior Economist, Development Research Group, respectively. We are grateful to Paul Levy, Sole Martinez Peria, Guillermo Perry, Andrew Powell, Luis Servén, and Ted Truman for helpful comments.