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One Year After Pot-Banging Argentines LETTERS Threw out Their President, How Much MJF-16 THE AMERICAS Martha Farmelo is the Institute’s Suzanne Ecke McColl Fellow studying gender issues in Argentina. ICWA One Year After Pot-Banging Argentines LETTERS Threw Out Their President, How Much Since 1925 the Institute of Has Changed? Current World Affairs (the Crane- Rogers Foundation) has provided By Martha Farmelo long-term fellowships to enable JANUARY 27, 2002 outstanding young professionals BUENOS AIRES, Argentina – One year ago last month, Argentina exploded in to live outside the United States protest against prevailing economic policies and massively discredited politicians. and write about international The night of December 20, 2001, in the context of widespread looting and general- areas and issues. An exempt ized outrage against the government’s freezing of bank accounts (el corralito, which operating foundation endowed by translates to little corral or playpen), then-President Fernando de la Rúa appeared the late Charles R. Crane, the on television to announce a state of siege that suspended all constitutional rights Institute is also supported by and guarantees. contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations. Before his brief speech was over, massive, spontaneous groups of furious, pot-banging protestors took to their apartment balconies and began parading through the streets. They didn’t stop until Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo resigned and, less than 24 hours later, de la Rúa did the same. During the looting TRUSTEES and protests, 32 people were killed, seven of them in and around the historic Bryn Barnard Plaza de Mayo adjacent to the executive offices. Many Argentines reported feel- Joseph Battat ing a mix of grief, elation, hope and despair. Mary Lynne Bird Steven Butler On December 21, 2001, I wrote, “Indisputably, the middle-class has, en masse, William F. Foote Kitty Hempstone Pramila Jayapal Peter Bird Martin Ann Mische Dasa Obereigner Paul A. Rahe Chandler Rosenberger Katherine Sreedhar Edmund Sutton Dirk J. Vandewalle HONORARY TRUSTEES David Elliot David Hapgood Pat M. Holt Edwin S. Munger Richard H. Nolte Albert Ravenholt Phillips Talbot Institute of Current World Affairs The Crane-Rogers Foundation Four West Wheelock Street On the first anniversary of the historic uprising of December 20, 2001, demonstrators Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 U.S.A. echoed the slogan that emerged during last year’s protests: Que se vayan todos, roughly “Out with all of them,” meaning all politicians. said ‘Enough!’ The poor have said, ‘We can’t take it any- a euphemism for the fact that they are hungry. Since mid- more.’ What made the events so different and historic is November, the media have carried stories of children the absolute lack of a convoking organization. And rather dying of malnutrition with pictures of skeleton-like little than a military overthrow, the people—el pueblo—have ones weighing less than half what is normal for their ousted their president. It does feel as if Argentina is en- age—all in a country that can produce food for a popula- tering a new era, though it’s hard to predict what exactly tion ten times its own. will change.” Fortunately, recent economic indicators suggest that What is the state of affairs on the first anniversary of the economic freefall may be slowing—without an agree- this momentous uprising? ment desperately sought from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Economic Crisis and Misery Deepened—But the Freefall May be Slowing My partner, economist Alan Cibils says, “Although figures for the third quarter are preliminary, they show In January, 2002, just days after Argentina declared real (after-inflation) growth of 1.5 percent. After four years default on the majority of its international debt, Presi- of recession this is an encouraging sign, especially after dent Eduardo Duhalde announced he would devalue the first quarter growth was down 16.3 percent from last year. peso. This measure marked a dramatic change after ten Exports grew by almost 30 percent during the first five years of a one-to-one peg of the peso to the US dollar and months of the year, although they have since leveled off.” sparked fears of a repeat of the four-digit hyperinflation of 1989. He adds, “Of course these increases in economic ac- tivity have not been sustained enough to indicate that The good news is that annual inflation in 2002 the economy is in recovery. Nonetheless they are encouraging reached “only” 41 percent, which is low given the peso’s signs. Furthermore, Argentina is running large trade and cur- 70-percent drop. Yet some prices rose more quickly than rent account surpluses. Inflation was high in the first months others. Argentines were outraged when the cost of the of the year but is has been brought under control, remark- basic “basket” of goods and services—things like food ably sooner than many people had anticipated.” and soap—rose almost 74 percent. Official unemploy- ment jumped to 22 percent and underemployment (de- Lower inflation is due largely to a more stable ex- fined as part-time employment—even one hour a week— change rate, now at 3.3 pesos to the dollar. On the one- for those who seek full-time work) swelled to 19 percent. year anniversary of the freezing of bank accounts, the government lifted most restrictions on withdrawals and, Not surprisingly, poverty and indigence rose precipi- remarkably, Argentines did not scurry to buy dollars. tously. At mid-year we began to notice handfuls of jug- glers joining the ranks of those begging for money along After a year of unsuccessful negotiations, Argentina the wide 9 de Julio Avenue, adults and kids alike, the signed its fervently-desired agreement with the IMF af- novices practicing on the grassy median. ter all. In November, protecting its slim Central Bank re- serves, it paid only $79 million of an $805 million obliga- Today, greater than half of Argentines are poor. More tion to the World Bank and missed payments on than five million slipped under the poverty line in the December 13 and 16 as well. As a result, the World Bank last 16 months alone. One out of every four are indigent, suspended disbursements of funds on pre-approved loans destined mostly for social programs. Apparently fearful that Argentina might be so bold as to fall into official default with its multilateral lenders, Each Friday this just days after those non-payments, IMF officials made psychoanalyst an unscheduled trip to Buenos Aires to evaluate progress prepares several toward a new agreement. On January 24, 2003, the IMF gallons of rice finally signed an agreement which does nothing more pudding for his than postpone payments coming due through August of assembly’s soup this year. In return, Argentina is required to take mea- kitchen. Each week sures such as further budget cuts, increases in taxes and they serve hot meals utility rates, and initial steps to privatize public banks. to almost 200 garbage pickers and Continual Protests, But the Middle-Class is unemployed Relatively Quiet residents of our middle-class Argentina’s popular movement is broader and stron- neighborhood. ger than a year ago, though still fragmented. Not sur- prisingly, it is stuck predominantly in protest mode and 2 MJF-16 Protestors in front of the Supreme Court in February, 2002. These weekly protests were convoked by the Association of Labor Lawyers and supported across the board by neighborhood assemblies. will probably need several more years to become capable they focus on local projects such as soup kitchens, com- of generating consensus around political, economic and munity centers and support for struggling public hospi- social alternatives. tals, though some hold political events such as a recent debate on alternatives to voting in the upcoming According to the conservative daily La Nación, in the elections. first eight months of Duhalde’s Presidency the govern- ment registered no fewer than 12,766 protests, especially Initial momentum toward a national movement of piquetes, or roadblocks by unemployed workers demand- assemblies petered out, largely due to meddling by left- ing emergency food aid and workfare. Despite frequent wing parties set on co-opting them for their own politi- and even deadly repression, the number of roadblocks cal ends. Still, groups of assemblies are working to create doubled in November. a coordinating body independent of the parties, which would afford them a stronger presence on the political Child psychologist Graciela Santamaría lives in the scene. capital and works in the southern suburbs. “Today I was half-an-hour late getting my daughter to pre-school. Charging that all nine Justices were thoroughly cor- Don’t talk to me about piqueteros. If I see a piquetero I’m rupt, pan-beaters gathered on Thursday afternoons on going to kill him,” she said, shaking her head. the steps of the Supreme Court during the first months of the year to demand their resignations. After a time, In the first weeks of 2002, new organizations called attendance dwindled and the Friday-night marches pe- neighborhood assemblies emerged when groups of hun- tered out as well. Protestors returned to steps of the Su- dreds of citizens put down their saucepans to discuss the preme Court in October when Peronists in Congress were crisis and organize themselves on street corners, around preparing to terminate impeachment proceedings against a monument or in other public spaces. Reflecting wide- the judges, but their numbers were small and their pot- spread revulsion toward political authority, not a single banging nearly inaudible. leadership position was created. As people took turns speaking, they all seemed to address the same, profound Early in the year, banks in the financial district shel- question: “What kind of a country do we want?” tered their exteriors with ugly metal covering to protect them from vigorous beatings with saucepans by furious When the assemblies convened a cacerolazo for Janu- ahorristas (literally “savers,” with money in frozen ac- ary 25, crowds banged their saucepans on street corners counts).
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