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PODCAST 13 El tema de hoy: “El Corralito” – Crisis económica en Argentina 2001 Por Luis Rojas Con la colaboración de Silvana Suhs desde Buenos Aires www.rojasspanish.com [email protected] Créditos y Notas Texto Hola amigos, bienvenidos otra vez a este podcast de Rojas Spanish Language. Introducción. Avisos: Viaje a Argentina: Buenos Aires y Mendoza. Este viaje se realizará en enero de 2008. Más información en los próximos días en mi sitio web www.rojasspanish.com Este es el mensaje de mi amiga Silvana desde Buenos Aires Hola Luis: Me sorprendió recibir un mail tuyo, ya que siempre me comunico muy bien con Joan por el viaje que ustedes organizaron para el mes de enero, pero al leer tu pedido me gustó la tarea que tenía que emprender y en seguida mi cabeza rebobinó automáticamente y se posicionó en ese momento que tu pides exactamente, y lo primero que se me vino a la cabeza fue esta frase: ¿Cómo lo pasé?, ¿cómo lo transité?: DESPREVENIDA, como a cada ciudadano de Argentina. 1 En noviembre del 2001 estábamos planeando unas mini vacaciones con una amiga, con lo cual decidimos irnos 5 días a una isla de Brasil, y recuerdo en los puestos de diarios y revistas de eses lugar que ya ponían en la primera plana que Argentina transitaba por una crisis y que el dólar iba a aumentar notoriamente, con lo cual nuestros amigos brasileros nos decían: No,… ¡no va a pasar nada! Y cuando llegamos de esas merecidas mini vacaciones, fue que nos agarró desprevenidas, ver día a día cómo las noticias iban empeorando, los bancos cambiaban menos cantidades de dólares y a un precio cada vez más alto (los bancos solo autorizaban vender a las personas US $ 100 por día, y aumentaban 15, 20, 40 centavos por día). Sólo se podía sacar $ 1000 (pesos) diarios de las cuentas corrientes, y después…llegó el momento que no dejaros sacar el dinero de las cuentas de casa cliente del banco, con lo que se convirtió en el llamado y bien conocido mundialmente: “corralito”, y con esto llegó el “cacerolazo”, una manifestación del inconsciente colectivo de la población de salir a las calles a gritar y golpear con las cacerolas de sus casas en contra del gobierno y los bancos. La renuncia del presidente de la nación (Fernando de la Rúa, quien tuvo que salir de la casa de gobierno en helicóptero). Una crisis insostenible económica y social, que hasta el día de la fecha se manifiesta por no tener seguridad y credibilidad en los bancos. Aunque parezca irreal…la muerte de muchas personas mayores, que manifestando a la entrada de los bancos y con gran angustia se descompensaban y fallecían de un paro cardíaco en frente de esa protesta. Y se perdió la frivolidad en la que ficticiamente vivimos durante más de 10 años. En lo respecta a mi historia personal, no te puedo contar mucho, ya que en esa época yo recién empezaba a trabajar y no tenía una cuenta abultada en algún banco como la que tengo hoy en día (mentira… ¡obvio!), peor si me daba mucha lástima ver como el país se derrumbaba económicamente y el llanto de muchas personas que durante toda su vida de trabajo se dedicaron a ahorrar para poder tener una vejez digna, y de un día para otro eso se terminó. 2 La marca que me dejó a mí, es que acá en la Argentina “no” es seguro ni confiable poder dejar tu dinero, tus ahorros, tus ilusiones, tus proyectos, en una cuenta bancaria. Estas situaciones, aunque a ustedes les resulte observar una película de ciencia ficción (dictadura, democracia, cambio de moneda, guerras perdidas, aumento del dólar, corralito, corralón, etc.), aquí son historias que se repiten periódicamente y cíclicamente. Algunos historiadores cuentan que cada 10 años el país cambia, y un proceso como este ocurre. Y así es… Hoy en día te puedo decir que yo como coordinadora y encargada de un consultorio de cirugía plástica, que tengo como tarea comprar los insumos de la misma, me estoy dando cuenta que las cosas comenzaron a aumentar de nuevo, menos los sueldos…todo aumenta, y ya se está diciendo que a mediados del 2008 las cosas van a volver a cambiar en el país. Espero no tener que contar otra historia traumática de mi país y los actores que en ella viven, o sea…cada uno de los ciudadanos que día a día queremos ver crecer el país y las ilusiones que se depositan en cada hogar. Un beso grande. Silvana PD. Abajo te envío varias notas que saqué rescate el corralito, un cronograma de la historia, una nota en inglés, y un poco de humor. Espero que esto sea lo que necesitabas contar, mejor hubiera sido grabarlo en filmadora, ¿no? Ja! Colaborando con las clases de historia de nuestro país, lo que se me vino a la cabeza y quizás puedas trabajar con los alumnos es algo que allá nunca sucedió, y que los puede llegar a sorprender o interesar es el cambio de monedas que tuvo el país a lo largo de la historia: pesos argentinos, pesos ley, australes, (en la época del corralito hubo una moneda no muy legal, llamadas “patacones” y “le cop”, que obviamente no servían como moneda en otros países y hasta en algunos lugares acá no las aceptaban) y por último los pesos. Lamento no tener un billete de casa moneda para poder mostrártelos. 3 Este podcast y su contenido son con fines de educación - This podcast and its content is for educational purposes Copyright © Rojas Spanish Language 2007. All rights reserved NOTAS ADJUNTAS El "Corralito" fue un claro ejemplo de política monetaria en una crisis financiera. La limitación a las extracciones en efectivos, bajo los supuestos del modelo de Freeman (1994), es una de las maneras en las que se evita un pánico bancario. Pero el bajo grado de bancarización de la población, la dificultad de identificación de los tipos de depositantes y los inconvenientes tecnológicos para su funcionamiento, entre otros hechos, restringieron el desempeño de la medida en Argentina Por esto para eliminar el Corralito es necesario sustituir esta política por otra más efectiva dadas las circunstancias de nuestro país o bien eliminar las causas de la crisis bancaria, como la mala supervisión financiera y el excesivo déficit fiscal. EL 3 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2001 SE PROHIBIA EL RETIRO DE AHORROS DE LOS BANCOS A cinco años del "corralito", un sinónimo de infierno financiero La medida originó los cacerolazos y la peor caída libre de la crisis del 2001. DIAS DE FURIA. Protesta de ahorristas frente a un banco blindado, en 2002. Recinto con barrotes para que los niños jueguen adentro". La definición tradicional de "corralito" perdió peso en la memoria colectiva después de la crisis, en favor de "perverso mecanismo bancario, por el cual los ahorristas no podían retirar más que una suma fija", como lo llama el diccionario de argentinismos de un sitio de Internet. En una semana, el 3 de diciembre, se cumplirán cinco años del decreto 1.570 del 2001 que creó el 4 corralito, durante el gobierno de Fernando De la Rua. Fue la respuesta a una caída de 22.000 millones de dólares en los depósitos. Atrapó a las ahorristas que no huyeron a tiempo, por un total de $ 55.000 millones de pesos, y dio origen a los cacerolazos. El corralito se llevó puestos a dos ministros de Economía: Domingo Cavallo, su ideólogo, y Jorge Remes Lenicov, cuando meses después quiso desatar el nudo con bonos compulsivos. Cuentan que lo primero que hizo Roberto Lavagna cuando le pidieron que vuelva de Europa para ser ministro fue llamar a un amigo economista para que le explicara la diferencia entre "corralito" y "corralón", el esquema que estableció la reprogramación definitiva de los plazos fijos. A ese nivel de enredos había llegado la película económica de la crisis. Cinco años después, los economistas parecen haber llegado a algunos consensos sobre el tema: El corralito resultó un boomerang que terminó provocando un efecto contrario al deseado: secó la plaza de efectivo y paralizó las operaciones cotidianas de compra y venta. En la práctica, profundizó la caída en el nivel de actividad, que tocó su piso sobre el final del primer trimestre del 2002. "El corralito fue un equívoco desde el primer día, que demostró que el equipo de Cavallo sabía muy poco de dinámica financiera", dice Eduardo Levy Yeyati, profesor de la Universidad Di Tella. Al final, los afectados salieron más favorecidos que los tenedores de bonos. Quienes pudieron retirar sus dólares con amparos y compraron propiedades o acciones, en particular, terminaron con saldo muy favorable. Tampoco entre los bancos se cumplieron los pronósticos más apocalípticos. Durante 2002 se llegó a dar al sistema financiero por muerto, cuando se proponía como opción realista la "offshorización" (traslado al extranjero) de la banca. El fenómeno del corralito excedió a la Economía y se convirtió en materia de estudio de sociólogos, antropólogos y psicólogos locales y del exterior, que descubrían en el "little fence" (corralito en inglés) y los cacerolazos un laboratorio del comportamiento de los argentinos, y se impresionaban con algunas postales extremas. Como la de la mujer que se quiso prender fuego frente a un banco, o el ahorrista que pasó el verano del 2002 en reposera, malla y ojotas en la puerta de una sucursal del HSBC. El motivo: no podía sacar la plata para irse de vacaciones. CRONOGRAMA DE LA CRISIS HASTA LA FECHA Una trama de enredos 3 de diciembre de 2001: Se conoce el decreto 1.570, de necesidad y urgencia, que crea el corralito.
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