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Anhangband II Georg Wenzelburger – Haushaltskonsolidierungen und Reformprozesse – Anhangband II Anhangband II (zu Kapitel 5 und Kapitel 6) Interviews im Wortlaut Interviews zur Haushaltskonsolidierung in Schweden: Ingvar Carlsson, Erik Ǻsbrink, Göran Persson, Olof Johansson S.3-53 Interviews zur Haushaltskonsolidierung in Belgien: Philippe Maystadt, Réginald Savage, Philippe Busquin, Jean-Luc Dehaene S.55-112 Interviews zur Haushaltskonsolidierung in Kanada: Jean Chrétien, Jocelyne Bourgon, Paul Martin, Scott Clark, Art Eggleton S.114-166 Interviews zur Haushaltskonsolidierung in Frankreich: Christian Sautter, Jean Arthuis S.168-189 1 Georg Wenzelburger – Haushaltskonsolidierungen und Reformprozesse – Anhangband II Interviews zur Haushaltskonsolidierung in Schweden Interviews: 10.11.2008: Ingvar Carlsson, ehemaliger Premierminister S. 3-14 11.11.2008: Erik Ǻsbrink, ehemaliger Finanzminister S. 15-27 12.11.2008: Göran Persson, ehemaliger Finanz- und Premierminister S. 28-44 13.11.2008: Olof Johansson, ehemaliger Minister und Chef der Centerpartiet S. 45-53 2 Georg Wenzelburger – Haushaltskonsolidierungen und Reformprozesse – Anhangband II 1 Interview Ingvar Carlsson 2 3 Datum: 10.11.2008 4 Zeit: 14:30 Uhr bis 15:30 Uhr 5 Ort: Hurtigs konditori, Drottninggatan 90, Stockholm 6 Interviewpartner: Ingvar Carlsson, Chef der sozialdemokratischen Partei 1986-1996, 7 Reichstagsabgeordneter 1965-96, diverse Ministerposten (Ausbildungsminister, 8 Wohnungsminister, stellv. Premierminister), Premierminister 1986-1991 und 1994-1996. 9 10 11 Frage: What were the most important reasons for the success? 12 13 Ingvar Carlsson: 14 That’s a long story of course. There is a short and a long term alternative. I just mention the 15 long-term explanation that’s going back to the period from 1994 to 1996 when I left. 16 Sweden after some very successful years in the post-war period started to have some 17 problems in the 1970s. Our wage negotiations became more problematic, they had worked 18 wonderfully before. And we had the oil crises. And we didn’t really understand it at that time. 19 We thought that these were problems but soon it will come back to the ordinary nor. Then we 20 lost the election in 1976 and until 79 we still thought that things will be normal again. But we 21 lost 79, with a small margin, but we still lost. And we became aware that there were structural 22 problems in our economy. So I became chairman of a small crisis group (…). So we started 23 with an ambition really to come up with some new ideas. And that was the basis for our 24 economic policy from 1982 on. And there were basically the same problems as we later had 25 in 1994. The unemployment had gone up and the economic growth was not good. We partly 26 solved it by the huge devaluation of the currency. And then it went quite well until 88/89 and 27 then under this pressure of neo-liberalism we had deregulated our capital market. And the 28 central bank said: No problem, it will be very simple. But the results were disastrous because 29 it [the deregulation, d. Verf.] lend to an enormous spending with inflation. And it went 30 exactly in the opposite direction than the central bank has said. (…). But it created enormous 31 problems within the social democratic party and we lost the election. 32 But in the period after 1990, we took some very important structural decisions. That’s why I 33 want to give you this background for the 1990 because some of the results came out from the 34 situation when everybody thought that we were too weak and everybody thought that it was 3 Georg Wenzelburger – Haushaltskonsolidierungen und Reformprozesse – Anhangband II 35 just a matter of time when we would loose the election in 1991. I give you a few examples. 36 We changed the completely our tax system (…). And it was a difficult decision, because it 37 changed some of our basic rules about progressive taxes and so on. The second thing, we 38 announced the membership in the European Union; we decided to build the bridge to 39 Denmark, which we had discussed for almost 30 years; we managed after 20 years to find a 40 new system for our wage negotiations; and as a result of that we managed to stop the inflation 41 – we have had 20 years of too high inflation; we had a three-party-agreement on energy 42 policy; we changed our agricultural policy. I want to mention this, because usually this is 43 forgotten and these were basic changes and difficult political decisions that we took during 44 one year, during 1991. We lost the election, but we had recovered dramatically, we had 45 increased in opinion polls by 10 percent and we had built a platform and we still had 37,5 46 percent of the voters.(…) But that also made it easier for us to come back later. If we had 47 given up, if we had not done these things, we would not have had the political power. 48 Then came the economic crisis in 1992 when Carl Bildt had gone out saying “we have the 49 only way to the future, and this is the best government that Sweden ever had.” And after one 50 year it all crashed. 51 And then I had two ways to act as opposition leader. Either I could have said: That’s up to 52 them, they said they have the only way. But I decided to offer very early help from the 53 opposition and this was again not very easy because I had to persuade my own party in 54 parliament and of course the executive committee. And my argument was: This economic 55 crisis it very serious, it’s a danger for this country. We have to think about the situation when 56 we come back – I felt very sure already that we will win the next election – but we had to 57 think about that we should not take over a country in a too bad shape. Third we would have to 58 think what would be the reaction of ordinary people out in the country with housing problems, 59 unemployment, if they had the feeling that we choose this situation for tactical reasons instead 60 of helping to solve the situation. And forth, I had to – because all these examples I mentioned 61 on political decisions in 1990 and 1991 were taken in cooperation at least with one 62 bourgeoisie party, usually the centre or liberal party – and if I was too tough now they could 63 say the same when we came back and it would not support us. So these were the reasons. 64 And in opinion polls, when we started to negotiate, the polls showed that between 80 to 90 65 percent of the Swedish population supported this and all opinion polls went up very high. So 66 we had the public support. (…). What we succeeded and people have forgotten until now is 67 that we saved our financial system. We did in 1992 and 1993 what so many countries have 68 done today. That was we went in and that was through a kind of a coalition government where 4 Georg Wenzelburger – Haushaltskonsolidierungen und Reformprozesse – Anhangband II 69 the government parties and the social democratic party took with an enormous majority in 70 government the decision that we would save the banks, that we would give guarantees to the 71 peoples saving account. And after that it went quite well. (…) 72 73 You had these crises packages in 1992. Did the Bildt-government invite you to talk about the 74 packages or did you propose to come together… 75 We proposed and Carl Bildt was very much engaged and he didn’t want to but I think that 76 Bengt Westerberg, the leader of the liberal part, pushed him. Because they otherwise had to 77 rely on Ny Demokrati and Bengt Westerberg hated them. So this went on from late summer 78 until when I was in Germany in Berlin then Carl Bildt called me when the interest rate went 79 up to 500 per cent and he asked me to come over. I was there at a congress of the Socialist 80 International. So then I went over and we started to negotiate. 81 82 The right-wing government did try to implement some huge cuts after having agreed to the 83 crises packages with the social democratic party in the budget 94 and the “kompletterings”- 84 budget they proposed more cuts but they didn’t really succeed. What was the role of the social 85 democratic party after the crises packages? 86 Well, we got quite angry because we had come to some agreements, for instance how to use 87 the wage earner funds and also unemployment security. And after the third attack on the 88 Swedish crown, we had to accept a floating currency. Then, as we saw it, they didn’t accept 89 that we had an agreement any longer. But they went on their own. And for instance when it 90 comes to the wage earner funds, they made a completely different construction without 91 consulting us. But then we said: That’s the end of the cooperation. 92 93 And then you started the election campaign? 94 Yes. 95 96 If you think of the election campaign 1994 what were for you the most important issues and 97 how did you manage to get the social democratic party to accept the consolidation 98 programme which was again something really hard to the social democrats? 99 Half increase in taxes, half cutting expenditure. You know, before we presented our 100 programme, we had alone around 50 percent.
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