The USS Superior and America's First Arms Race, 1814

WAR OF 1812 MAGAZINE ISSUE 24 NOVEMBER 1815 David W. Carmichael, Superior! The USS Superior and America’s first arms race, 1814; www.SecretArchives.net, 2012; ISBN 978-0-9882705-0-3; 134 pp., notes, index; paperback, US$16.00. Reviewed by Gary M. Gibson The United States Navy’s surprising success during the War of 1812 anchored that service firmly in the hearts and minds of American citizens. Victories on lakes Erie and Champlain and especially those of the frigates Constitution and United States against British frigates on the Atlantic appear in all general histories of the war. Only rarely do those histories discuss in detail the naval activities on Lake Ontario. This omission, as Carmichael accurately describes, is unwarranted. Not only did the most powerful squadron in the U. S. Navy sail from Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario in August 1814, but that squadron included the largest and most powerful warship to see active service in that navy during the War of 1812, the frigate Superior. The decision by Thomas Jefferson’s administration in the summer of 1808 to build the 18-gun brig Oneida at Oswego NY, and the British response in building the 20-gun corvette Royal George, began a naval arms race on Lake Ontario that continued after war began in June 1812 and increased throughout 1813. These earlier efforts by both sides are incompletely summarized by Carmichael. His work, as the title implies, focuses on the American efforts during 1814. Carmichael describes how logistics, finances, smuggling, espionage and recruiting inhibited and complicated the shipbuilding efforts at Sackets Harbor during 1814. He also presents an accurate picture of how unpleasant life was at Sackets Harbor during the war, and the difficulties faced by Commodore Isaac Chauncey and shipwright Henry Eckford in their efforts to obtain and retain command of the lake. The impact of the British raid on Oswego and the subsequent Battle of Sandy Creek on the completion of the frigate Superior is covered in some detail. Carmichael’s work is enhanced by a good choice of quotations from printed primary sources such as Crawford’s volume III of The Naval War of 1812. His narrative is well written and holds the reader’s attention. On the downside, Carmichael’s work is marred by a number of errors of fact. The most apparent is his repeated reference to British Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo as “Admiral Yeo” (7,12,17,31, etc.) In 1814, Yeo was a commodore first class and was entitled to wear the uniform of a rear admiral, be paid as a rear admiral, fly a “broad pendant,” and have an aide similar to an admiral’s flag lieutenant. Commodore, however, was a post, not a rank. Yeo Page 1 WAR OF 1812 MAGAZINE ISSUE 24 NOVEMBER 1815 remained a captain in the Royal Navy and his perquisites as commodore ceased when he relinquished his command in early 1815. Other errors include a reference to 1813’s Battle of Stoney Creek as the “battle of Niagara” (34), the 1807 action on the Atlantic where “HMS Chesapeake fired on USS Leopard” (38), that the British, not Captain Tingey, burned the Washington Navy Yard (39), the British 1814 attack on Plattsburgh being the start of a “campaign to strike deep into the heart of the United States” (110), and perpetuating the “old sow” myth during the first battle of Sackets Harbor (19). Carmichael’s work omits any reference to the second American frigate, Mohawk, built at Sackets Harbor in 1814. The American shipbuilding plans for 1815 are only summarized. The ship-of-the-line New Orleans at Sackets Harbor is mentioned, but her sister ship, the Chippewa, building at nearby Storrs Harbor, is not mentioned at all. Carmichael also confuses building the New Orleans with navy secretary William Jones’ never implemented plans to build three 94-gun ships-of-the-line (111). Carmichael’s work is all text. A map of Lake Ontario, locating the place names referred to in the text, would be helpful to the reader. A bibliography is also absent. While these errors and omissions are not major, they mar the accuracy of the work and reduce its value as a reference source. Carmichael made good use of printed primary sources as well as numerous secondary sources to anchor his text in the historical record. However, by limiting himself mostly to documents in print he also limited the information available to him about such a specialized topic. He apparently made no use of Navy Secretary William Jones’ private letterbook or Isaac Chauncey’s letterbooks. These are available on microfilm and contain relevant material not available in print. Chauncey’s accounts for 1814, available in the records of the Treasury Department, provide many details of the expenditures involved in building the Superior that would have enhanced the narrative. The Journal of James Alison Dudley, one of the Superior’s lieutenants, was also apparently overlooked. Overall, while Carmichael’s work is well written, inexpensive and has value, it is not the complete story of the naval arms race on Lake Ontario conducted before, during and after the War of 1812. It is also not up to the quality of Robert Malcomson’s 1998 Lords of the Lake or his 2001 Warships of the Great Lakes, which remain the standard works on the naval War of 1812 on Lake Ontario. Page 2 .

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