Germany and Britain, 1870 - 1914

Home , Otto Hintze, Perfidious Albion

Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

JÖRN LEONHARD

Construction and Perception of National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870 - 1914

Originalbeitrag erschienen in: The Linacre Journal 67 (2000), S. [45] - 67

The Linacre Journal

A Review of Research in the Humanities

`The Fatal Circle: Nationalism and Ethnic Identity into the 21st Century

The Linacre Journal A Review of Research in the Humanities

The Linacre Journal is an interdisciplinary academic forum for those with an interest in the strength and direction of research in the humanities and social sciences. The Linacre Journal publishes research papers and 'work in progress' from current and former members of the College as well as from other Oxford colleges and the wider academic community. Preference is given to articles in the humanities and social sciences, although contributions from the pure sciences are also welcome provided that the work is accessible to non- specialists.

GENERAL EDITORS (ISSUE 4)

Daniel Gallimore and Dimitrina Mihaylova

The Editors would like to thank Christopher Garner (Nuffield), who conceived the issue's theme, and among college staff Stephen Hague, Dr. Anne Keene, and Emma Clack. They would also like to thank John Carlarne, Jean de Lannoy, Justin Meiland, Elizabeth Zacharias and many other students for their help in this issue's production.

Previous Editors Debbie Gupta and Ian Ochiltree (1997) Joe Luscombe and Christine Parsons (1998) Cecily Crampin and Christine Parsons (1999)

To contribute to future issues, write to The Linacre Journal, Linacre College, Oxford OX1 3JA, or send an e-mail to journal@ linacre.ox.ac.uk.

Back-copies of Issues 1, 2 and 3 (Gilbert Ryle issue) are available from the above address at the reduced price of £6.95 each.

The Linacre Journal is published with the financial assistance of the Governing Body and Common Room of Linacre College. All materials published in The Linacre Journal are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the General Editors or of Linacre College. Published material remains under copyright and cannot be reproduced without permission.

Jam Leonhard

This paper investigates the complex function and mechanism of national stereotypes in developing and expressing national identities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, by examining national images of Germany in Britain and of Britain in Germany from 1870 to the First World War and by taking into consideration different levels of literary, scientific and political discourse.

After discussing the theoretical background of national images, national stereotypes, and the nation as a cultural system, the paper analyses the representation of Germany and Germans in English literature of the period, demonstrating the politicisation of specific cultural sterotypes after 1870. This is followed by an examination of the political and scientific discourses in Britain in which Germany first appeared as a positive model of progress. After 1890, however, the changing political climate led to a new image of Germany as a political and industrial rival.

The comparison with German views of Britain underlines an asymmetrical perception: for German liberals in particular Britain served as a political and constitutional model, but, depending on different political and social groups, negative stereotypes of Britain developed during the 1880s and 1890s. Finally, the radicalisation of national stereotypes during the First World War in Germany and to a

lesser extent also in Britain was based on a specific conception of an apparently unavoidable conflict between antagonistic cultures.

On the basis of this comparative analysis, the paper finally discusses specific functions and mechanisms of national stereotypes for internal nation-building in both countries.

From mild to cold blue eyes: British perceptions of the German between 1870 and 1914

Writing on the period around 1870 and the general image of Germany and Germans in Britain, Frederic William Maitland remarked that it had been common in these days `to paint the German as an unpractical, dreamy, sentimental being, looking out with mild blue eyes into a cloud of music and metaphysics and tobacco smoke' (Maitland 1911: 475). Yet at the same time that Maitland's papers were published in 1911, Katherine Mansfield portrayed Germany and Germans in a completely different way, but again referring to the blue eyes of a German. In her collection In a German Pension, published the same year, she described a German in the short story `Germans at Meat': 'He [Herr Rath] fixed his cold blue eyes upon me with an expression which suggested a thousand premediated invasions' (Mansfield 1964: 10). Rudyard Kipling went even further when, in the same year 1911, he remarked on the occasion of the second Morocco crisis: 'Meanwhile the Teuton has his large cold eye on us and prepares to give us toko when he feels good and ready' (Miillenbrock 1995: 303, 311; Miillenbrock 1964: 98).

Maitland's, Mansfield's and Kipling' s account of the changing blue eyes, from mild to cold, reads like a literary reflection of the major transformation of the image of Germany which took place in Britain during the last third of the 19th century. Whereas Maitland represented a still merely depoliticized view of romantic Germany, Katherine Mansfield's description of 1911 implicitly anticipated her audience's essentially political understanding of `cold blue eyes' as an expression of political aspiration: the German Herr Rath was no longer the dreaming, idealistic, independent, yet slightly odd Professor TeufelsdrOckh of Carlyles's Sartor Resartus (1833/34) (Hollenberg 1974: 166; O'Sullivan 1994; Oergel 1998). Mansfield's use of a distinctly negative connotation reflected a specific expectation of her audience (Weinek 1938; Schultz 1939; Hildebrand 1980; Fischer 1981; Dose 1986; Blaicher 1992). National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 47

National images, national stereotypes, and the nation as a cultural system

This paper examines different perceptions of national images of Germany in Britain and of Britain in Germany in the period between 1870 and 1914 in order to analyse the diversity of national images and their functions and to challenge the often implicitly underlying or explicit view of an inevitable Anglo-German 'antagonism' before 1914. For this analysis it is essential to distinguish between images and perceptions on the one hand and political, socio-economic and cultural realities as objects of perception on the other. On a second level, the specific interrelation between image, object and position and interest of the perceiving institution, be it an individual or a social group, is of prime interest.

Starting with a definition, national stereotypes can be described as those images of a certain temporary constancy and discoursive consistency which are designed so as to understand other nations' particular character in contrast to, that is on the basis of an implicit or explicit comparison with one's own nation (Lippmann 1922; Allport 1954/66; Horkheimer 1963; Jervis 1983; Krakau 1985). The basic premise of this paper is based on to the distinction between individual and collective perceptions. National images/stereotypes form part of the nation as a cultural system (Geertz 1973; White 1975; Duijker/Frijda 1960). This in turn refers to internal nation-building as being determined by such factors as collective memories, traditions, political and social arrangements, value patterns and particular institutions. In order to survive as a nation in a context of potentially antagonistic nations, it is necessary to produce positive meaning of ideas, concepts and interpretations which define each individual's role within the nation's collective. This is the function of myths and symbols and also that of national images/stereotypes: as autostereotypes they are designed to justify the historical and social existence in relation to the own nation or, as heterostereotypes, in relation to external nations' otherness (Krakau 1985: 16).

Politicisation of a cultural stereotype: Germany and Germans in English literature

Maitland's description of the romantic character of Germans stood for an interpretation which had already reduced Germany's complex political reality in the first half of the century to a rather simple national but overall unpolitical image. In the words of Robert Browning, the Germany of the early century was similar to 'a tall, old, quaint irregular town' (Pulzer 1996: 48 The Linacre Journal

235). This image still dominated English literature in the 1870s, as for example in Matthew Arnold's collection of essays Friendships Garland (1866-1870), but it became more and more challenged in the aftermath of the French-Prussian war of 1870/71. The cliché of the barbarious German, which had formed part of the image of the Germans since the middle ages following Tacitus' Germania, was still intact and had also been implicitly included in the Romantic image. Thus Edward Bulwer-Lytton, who knew Germany from many journeys there, portrayed the German cultural nation and the country of Dichter and Denker (`poets and thinkers'). His novel The Parisians (1873) referred to the barbarian but regarded rather the French as the prime example of this national category (Bulwer-Lytton 1889: 278; Miillenbrock 1995: 312).

A different picture emerged, however, from the British press following the events in 1870, especially after the battle of Sedan and the bombardment of Paris by German artillery. A changing paradigm was anticipated in these comments. In his essay on 'France and Germany', John Morley insisted 'that Germany at this moment stands for any barbarous principles; for military power, for aristocracy and feudalism, for divine right, and so on' (Morley 1870: 370). In an even more aggressive tone, Frederic Harrison revoked Tacitus' stereotype of a people of warriors when mentioning German soldiers who had destroyed French villages 'in cold blood' (Harrison 1870: 632). These comments were based on already existing negative stereotypes, which now contributed to a politicised perception of Germany. This was also accompanied by a similar change in political satire: in the Punch of March 1878, Bismarck appeared as a Germanic tribal chief suppressing his inferiors and displaying the `Vae Victis' (`Woe to the losers') as his new political motto. The Fortnightly Review of December 1878 accordingly commented on the Iron Chancellor: 'The German of the primitive time survives in him; or rather, he appears among us like the God Thor of the Scandinavian Olympus, bearing in mind his iron hammer, and unchaining the tempests' (de Laveleye 1878: 786).

The cliche of the barbarous German could easily be put in opposition to the positive concept of British civilisation. On the occasion of the Prussian- German victories in 1870-1 Harrison had commented that 'civilisation is thrown back incalculably' (Harrison 1870: 642). In his article on 'The Effacement of England', published in February 1871 in The Fortnightly Review, he underlined the contrast between Germany's backwardness and her hostility towards progressive civilization with England. His arguments were designed to put England ideologically closer to the West European countries (Miillenbrock 1995: 313-4). The Saturday Review of July 1876 also followed this line, when Germany was portrayed in contrast to Britain, France and National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 49

Italy, which according to this article, possessed established national cultures (Saturday Review, 23rd September 1876; Punch, 31 St January 1885; Miillenbock 1995: 313-4). As a consequence of this polemic, the connotation of German culture in the British press began to change. Whereas the traditional romantic image had focussed on unpolitical features, the politicisation of national images after 1870 led to a revival of already existing stereotypes and a negative connotation of them.

The example of German culture is particularly illustrating in this context. From the point of view of many British contemporaries, German culture could easily be identified with the image of a modern barbarian. Several intellectual movements, especially that of cultural pessimism and the perception of Nietzsche's writings, but also William II's 'Hun' Speech of 1900, the Hunnenrede, contributed to this (Blaicher 1996: 253). The work of H. G. Wells included many of these negative stereotypes, it reflected the change of Germany's romantic image during the last quarter of the 19th century and demonstrated the impact of a changed political climate. In his novel The War of the Worlds of 1898, Wells described a group of invaders, implicitly identified as Germans, as 'intellects vast and cool and unsympathetic' (Wells 1959: 9). Yet in his novel The War in the Air, published ten years later in 1908, the reader was directly confronted with a Germany that was already preparing for an expansionist and aggressive attack. The novel's almost symbolic figure is the Prince Karl Albert, a character obviously influenced by Nietzsche's concept of a new heroic individual. This interpretation of German culture directly corresponded with what the Quarterly Review portrayed as 'The German Peril' in 1908 (Wells 1971: 117-8; 'German Peril' 1908: 264-98; Miillenbrock 1995: 315). Political and cultural images became interrelated signs of a potential continental rival, amd German culture as a negative stereotype became politicised.

Political and scientific discourses in Britain: Germany as a positive model of progress

Describing Anglo-German relations, the Edinburgh Review remarked in 1909 that 'Undoubtedly, one of the chief causes of estrangement is the Englishman's and the German's abysmal ignorance of one another' (`Anglo- German Relations' 1909: 450). In fact there was not the one British view on Germany. Instead a broad spectrum of diverse perceptions of German otherness developed, based upon different images and opinions, depending on social position and political perspective. The political elite's view, that of leading politicians and high civil servants, was not necessarily the same as 50 The Linacre Journal

that of non-official public opinion, as expressed in the mass media of the day, and this was again different from the image held by particular social groups as scientists, industrialists, bankers, or members of the aristocracy.

Corresponding to the changing stereotype of Germany in literature, the `modern' roots of British images of Germany laid in the period following the creation of the Second Empire and were further intensified until 1900, when a specific pattern of characteristics replaced the apolitical image of romantic Germany. Among the British political elites, the opinion oscillated between partnership and rivalry, but until 1914 Germany was primarily regarded as one potentially threatening factors among others. It is true that Germany's decision to build a high sea battle fleet provoked increasing tensions with Britain after 1897, but traditionally Russia and France were regarded, in the words of Foreign Minister Lord Stanley in 1866, as 'the two aggressive powers of the Continent' (Mosse 1958: 249), so that during the 1880s and 1890s Germany was even regarded as one of Britain's potential political partners. The constellation of 1914 was by far not inevitable by that time, a fact further illustrated by the British self-conception as the leading world- power which would abstain from entering any formal alliances. In comparison with the continental countries, leading British politicians did not speak of Britain as a European power at all, as indicated by Disraeli's description of Great Britain as a 'metropolis of a great maritime empire' (Hildebrand 1980: 24). This concept was fundamental in that it explained many British politicians' relative lack of interest in Germany's political and social reality, a constellation which only after 1870 began to change gradually.

The period following the creation of the new Empire witnessed an increasing British interest in Germany, crystallised by the naval antagonism after 1897, Germany's colonial aspirations, and the new German Empire's rising industrial power. A triad of industrial, military and political competition developed which led to a new background of British views of Germany. The aspect of industrial rivalry became obvious when in 1896 Ernest Williams published his book Made in Germany, whose shocking opening was as follows: 'The Industrial Supremacy of Great Britain has been long an axiomatic commonplace; and it is fast turning into a myth ... The industrial glory of England is departing, and England does not know it' (Williams 1896: 1; Wiener 1981; Pollard 1987; Rubinstein 1993). For Williams Germany's image as a leading nation of scientific and industrial progress served as a positive stereotype in order to criticise British backwardness. William's highly influential book reflected a fundamental difference between the two countries: whereas the German government had supported the direct National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 51 cooperation between the rising sciences of the day, especially chemistry and physics, and new industries, enabling Germany to gain a leading position in paint industries and electrical goods industries, such state activities were largely unknown in Britain. Regarding the German government's policy on education and universities, especially the development of advanced Technical Universities, The Daily Telegraph wrote in 1906: 'They have created a colossal trade, much of which might have been ours' (Daily Telegraph, 19th February 1906; Alter 1995: 165). In the field of sciences and university education in general, Germany's model of the use of 'scientific methods' fueled an intensive discussion about 'national effciency' in Britain (Alter 1982: 90-120; Wende 1999). From this point of view, many British observers acknowledged Germany's modernity. In 1911 the Oxford historian A. J. Carlyle praised the German university system: 'The position of the great German nation in philosophy, science and literature was so powerful that the students were bound to study German and go to Germany if they were of any promise' (Times Educational Supplement, 16th June 1911).

The attraction of a German model was also obvious when it came to debates about the introduction of a social insurance system the origin of which had been Bismarck's attempt to weaken the growing socialist party's electoral successes by winning over the workers support. As Peter Hennock has underlined, this system, initiated, implemented and administered by a more and more interventionist German state, was much admired by many British contemporaries. David Lloyd George in 1908 even went to Germany to study the principles and advantages of her social politics (Hennock 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1990). British admiration for sciences, universities and social legislation demonstrated Germany's function as a model, which had not to be copied but at least examined closely. This led to comparisons and often criticism of British structures, but it could also lead to fears of a German competitor who used scientific and industrial progress to prepare a future war. In 1907 the astronomer Norman Lockyer remarked: 'Germany is strengthening its universities just as thoroughly as it is strengthening its Fleet, a reminder that we ought to be able to compete with other nations in the preparation and equipment for industrial progress, as well as for war' (`Reporf : 327; Alter 1995: 166). From a political perspective Winston Churchill highlighted selected aspects of an overall progressive German model when in 1908 he appealed to Prime Minister Asquith:

Germany has managed to establish tolerable basic conditions for her people. She is organised not only for war but for peace. We are organised for nothing except politics. The minister who will apply to this country the successful experience of Germany in social 52 The Linacre Journal

organisation may or may not be supported at the polls, but he will at least have left a memorial ... Thrust a big slice of Bismarckianism over the whole underside of our industrial system, and await the consequences whatever they may be with a good conscience. [Ritter 1983: 161.] In an even more critical tone, the former President of the Royal Society in London, commented retrospectively on the British perception of the German model prior to 1914:

The example of that country [i.e. Germany] was often cited here, and contrasted with the unsympathetic attitude and stingy support of our authorities, much to the surprise and annoyance of the permanent officials of the Treasury, who seemed rather to think that their grants to science were remarkably liberal. [Geikie 1919/20: 196; Alter 1995: 166; Messerschmidt 1955.]

On the level of discussing scientific progress and social reforms the use of a positive stereotype of Germany was far from uncommon. From the British perspective, these positive images stimulated debates about national efficiency. The imperialist Sir Alfred Milner, though representing only a minority, went even so far as to demand, in the words of Salisbury's son, 'a complete change of method in our government from the English system to the German' (Kennedy 1980: 347). However these discourses were limited to a comparatively small academic and political elite and could not dominate the changing image in public opinion. Here the hostile stereotype of a potential German invader came to dominate popular literature, as for example in Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands of 1902, William Le Queux's The Invasion of 1910 of 1906 and The Spies of the Kaiser of 1910 (Pulzer 1996: 239).

The changing climate after 1890: the German rival

Prior to the 1870s, apathy and distance characterised the British political elite's view on Germany. The creation of the Second Empire, although stabilizing the continental constellation by terminating the power vacuum in the middle of the continent, also provoked critical reactions among leading politicians. For Disraeli, the events in 1870 culminated in a 'the German revolution, a greater political event than the French revolution of the last century', a revolution from above with far-reaching consequences for the future balance of power in Europe (Hansard 1871: 81-2). Gladstone openly criticised the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as an open breach of the National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 53 principle of national self-determination: To wrench a million and a quarter of a people from the country to which they have belonged for some two centuries, and carry them over to another country of which they have been the almost hereditary enemies, is a proceeding not to be justified in the eyes of the world and of posterity by any mere assertion of power, without even the attempt to show that security cannot be had by any other process. [Gladstone 1870/1879: 241; Alter 1995:168.]

Gladstone favoured a concept of nation which was based on the criterion of political will not descent. Bismarck on the other hand, believing in natural interests instead of ideologies, deeply mistrusted what he regarded as Gladstone's moralistic policy. British sympathies went out to the humiliated France. The author George Eliot wrote to a German friend: 'I think you misconceive the state of English minds generally at the opening of the War. So far as our observation went, English sympathy was mainly on the German side. It was not till after the battle of Sedan, that there was any widely-spread feeling on behalf of the French.' From this perspective the British diplomat Henry Bulwer Lytton's remark reflected a widely shared view after 1871: `Europe has lost a mistress and got a master' (Morley 1903: 357; Hollenberg 1974: 21; Blaicher 1992: 157; Alter 1995: 169).

Until the 1880s, however, the circumstances of 1870/71 did not bring about an Anglo-German antagonism strong enough to dominate mutual perception. It was rather hoped that the future Emperor, Crown Prince Frederick and his wife Vicky, daughter of Queen Victoria, would stand for a more liberal future. Gladstone remained sceptical, however, and commenting on the creation of the new Empire in 1871 he wrote: 'I am afraid the result will be that Germany, crowned with glory and confident in her strength, will start on her new career to encounter the difficulties of the future without the sympathies of Europe: which in my opinion no nation, not even we in our seagirt spot, can afford to lose' (Kleinknecht 1984: 93). Given the concept of the Pax Britannica, the maintenance of the status quo and the traditional object of a European balance of power, no antagonism could develop as long as Germany regarded herself as a saturated power with no further aspirations. In July 1875, Foreign Minister Lord Derby declared that there were no conflicting interests between Britain and Germany, and in September 1876 the Times described the open future of Anglo-German relations: 'We have no jealousy of the new Empire. Within its own bounds we wish it every success. But we feel that an enormous power for good or evil has risen up somewhat suddenly in the midst of us, and we watch with interest for signs of its 54 The Linacre Journal

character and intentions' (Hildebrand 1970: 227).

The rapid and dramatic change of British perceptions of Germany began in the late 1880s, the background of which laid in a new course of politics, demonstrated by German colonial aspirations, the early death of Frederick III, the new Emperor William II and Bismarck's resignation in 1890, and then continued by the Kruger Depesche of 1896, the start of a naval building programme in 1897, the Daily Telegraph Affair in 1908 and the two Morocco crises. Germany's image in British press and among the political elite now became that of an international parvenu. For Lord Hamilton the years following Bismarck's resignation had marked the beginning of a new era:

From the moment we gave up Heligoland, the whole tone of the German government changed. It became aggressive, hostile and insincere, and from that time up to now I cannot recollect a simple instance in which Germany has behaved to us with either the courtesy or consideration which we undoubtedly received from other big countries in our international dealings ... Germany has suddenly sprung into wealth, and she had all the sensitiveness of the parvenu. [Hamilton 1922: 142.]

For James Garvin, Editor of the journal The Outlook, the German Empire around 1900 was 'no longer the saturated power of Bismarck's post-bellum reassurances'. For him as for many British observers it had become 'an unsated Power', 'a cause of intensifying anxiety and apprehension to all her neighbours' (Garvin 1906: 327; Alter 1995: 170). Foreign Minister Grey remarked in 1906 that 'The economic rivalry (and all that) with Germany do not give much offence to our people and they admire her steady industry and genius for organisation. But they do resent the mischief-making', which Grey attributed to the 'lees left by Bismarck' (Trevelyan 1937: 115).

It was in this context of growing political competition and rivalry that British observers began to focus more on the apparent backwardness of Germany's internal structures. Here culture was no longer associated with a positive image of scientific and industrial progress. The foreign political parvenu's internal order seemed to be founded on a pre-modern constitutional basis. From the perspective of a parliamentarian monarchy in Britain, this criticism seemed to be all the more convincing and fueled the stereotype of Germany's unsuccessful modernisation which could easily be contrasted with the British model as portrayed in the Whig interpretation of history. Germany's obvious industrial success provoked fears if the political system was regarded as an authoritarian one. In 1906 Garvin remarked: National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 55

In Germany ... the people have nothing to do with the conduct of foreign affairs. That is a matter that lies entirely in the hands of the Kaiser and of the Chancellor whom he appoints and dismisses at will. The Reichstag may discuss, but it cannot decide, what is to be Germanys policy towards England or any other country. It exercices no control over the Chancellor, who is the instrument of a personal, dynastic and absolutist policy. Nothing it can say or can do can affect the decisions or modify the course of action determined upon the Emperor and his irresponsible advisers ... Until, therefore, Germany becomes a selfgoverning nation or England relapses into an autocracy, very different values must be attached to the flow of public opinion in the two countries. [Garvin 1906: 81-2; Alter 1995:170-1.]

The outbreak of war in 1914 led to an antagonistic academic discourse, signifying an apparent conflict between distinct cultures, demonstrated by the German 'Manifesto of the 93' and the Declaration 'Why We Are at War. Great Britain's Case', both documents signed by leading academics of both countries (Kellermann 1915: 28, Pulzer 1996: 240). The Oxford theologian L. P. Lacks felt, that 'the age of German footnotes' was over, and the anti- Hegelian L. T. Hobhouse went even further when he underlined the long term continuity of a Hegelian concept of state: 'In the bombing of London I had witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine ... In the Hegelian theory of the god-state, all that I had witnessed lay implicit' (Wallace 1988: 36-7; Hobhouse 1915: 6; Pulzer 1996: 241).

The diversity of British images of Germany before 1914 was accompanied by a dichotomy between two interpretations: whereas a small scientific and political elite focused on Germany's industrial progress as well as on her cultural and social achievements to stimulate a discussion about Britain's national efficiency, an overall negative model of Germany dominated the mass media and increasingly also the political elite after 1900. Such a splintered pattern of stereotypes, with a positive model confined to culture and science, challenges the view of a one-sided and inevitable antagonism.

Asymmetrical perception: Britain as a political model and the development of negative stereotypes in Germany

If one compares British views of Germany with German images of Britain, the asymmetry between the two perceptions is clearly one of the most striking observations. For the German discourses, the image of Britain attracted specific attention in that it made positive and negative projections possible which revealed more about the recipient's uncertainty than about the 56 The Linacre Journal perception's object per se (Hardach 1971; Birke/Kluxen 1983; Wendt 1984; Epkenhans 1994; Kleinknecht 1994). As in the case of the British view of Germany, there was not the one dominating image, but rather a pattern of trends: Anglophobia and Anglophilia often overlapped, according to political positions and interests of perceiving groups (James 1989: 21-5; McClelland 1971: Pts. 2 & 3).

One of the most important examples for an originally positive perception is the meaning of the British model for German liberalism. Already in 1793 and under the impact of the revolutionary events in France, August Ludwig von SchlOzer had underlined the alternative model of organic and peaceful change: 'Reforms, but no revolutions ! Password both of the careful German and the ever complaining but deliberate Briton' (Schltizer 1793: 162-6). In 1823, Alexander von Dusch described the change between government, majority and opposition and explicitly quoted the British example (Dusch 1823: 23). It was no accident that the influential Staatslexikon of the 1840s included a long article on the English Constitution, written by Friedrich Murhard who focused on its evolutionary character. From the point of view of these moderate liberals, the avoidance of violent revolutions and the example of the British limited franchise of 1832 made Britain a much more attractive example than France. Murhard underlined that in England only `persons of the educated class have seats in the House of Commons, in other words, they have to be gentlemen' (Murhard 1837: 147-8). For these liberals, the constitutional monarchy in London embodied a representative constitution which, in their eyes, had been the result of an organic and evolutionary development. Christoph Friedrich Dahlmann, leading representative of north German liberalism, praised the two chamber system in which the House of Lords was bound 'to the preservation of the established by hereditary rank, seniority of family and large estates', whereas the Commons were qualified 'by practical wisdom and experiences in trade to understand the change of times and the necessities of the moment' (Dahlmann 1915: 18; Mommsen 1996: 217-8). Rudolf von Gneist and Robert von Mohl were deeply influenced by the British model, by its tradition of self-government and municipal autonomy (Hahn 1971). These liberals regarded Britain's constitutional system as complete and did not take into consideration the far reaching transformations of the 1830s and 1840s. Here the positive stereotype of Britain served as a projection of Germany's own constitutional future.

One of the earliest examples for a critical perception of Britain in Germany was Hegel who interpreteted social reality under the conditions of early British capitalism. For him the British state was controlled by society in the National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 57 interest of particular industrial groups. This was in clear contrast to Prussia where, in Hegel's view, the government was in the hands of enlightened state civil servants who formed a general estate (allgemeiner Stand) which would be able to implement the idea of an ethical state (ethischer Swat). According to Hegel, objective liberty as the rule of reasonable law in England had been sacrificed for the rule of formal liberty and particular interests (Mommsen 1996: 221). This prejudice was fundamental for the later development of negative stereotypes because it anticipated the image of Britain as a nation of shopkeepers, merchants and puritans, a society dominated by materialism, individual profit and hypocrisy, unable to respond adequately to the masses' interests and historically unable to found the state on an ethical basis.

The period after 1880 proved to be increasingly influenced by this stereotype. Heinrich von Treitschke in 1859 had praised the English model in that it demonstrated 'how today state and society become one', an example for the future development of Germany (Treitschke 1859: 83). But after 1880 and in order to prevent any ideological transfer of British institutions to Germany, he interpreted Britain as a degenerated aristocratic government, although he still identified the aristoracy with wealth and political wisdom. For the intellectual discourse of cultural pessimism in late 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche's perception of Britain was fundamental. He underlined that the British political tradition had been responsible for the general decline of aristocratic virtues and the triumph of egalitarian principles which he saw behind the 'European community' and the 'plebeianism of modern ideas' (Nietzsche: 270; Anderson 1939; Sontag 1938; Mommsen 1996: 222).

In the context of imperialist policies during the 1890s, those prejudices became intensified and popularised. In parts of the German political and cultural elites, a clearly anglophobic trend was underway, directed against apparent superiority and arrogance of the British. Historians and social scientists played an important role in developing this image further, especially in the years around 1900. The idea of Germany's encirclement (Einkreisung) by her neighbouring countries became a dominant paradigm, and British imperialism served as the prime example to justify Britain's negative image (Adler 1897: 22). Especially among the protestant middle classes and fueled by their neo-imperialist ideals, this image found an adequate breeding-ground. The works of Erich Marcks, Max Lenz and Otto Hintze are but prominient examples, interpreting British imperialism as the result of a calculated power policy for the sake of an advantageous position in international trade, but also, as in the case of Hintze, constantly referring to the development of modern political institutions in British history (Hintze 1975: 209-36). Marcks stated in 1903 that the imperialism of the present as a 58 The Linacre Journal

`clash between rival peoples' had forced 'England into the immediate battle. Since then the epoch of liberalism has been replaced by that of imperialism' (Marcks 1903: 291). British cant, derived from a materialist pattern of values, thus became one of the most significant negative stereotypes of the British.

The building of a high sea battle fleet in Germany after 1897, accompanied by popular propaganda by the various nationalistic associations, went hand in hand with an increasingly anglophobic propaganda which were based on ever more simplistic national images. Whereas Carl Peters warned his readers of the 'growth of Englishness (Engliindertum) in the world' and suggested to `take the English colonial and world politics as an example', Friedrich Naumann wrote in March 1900: 'Regarding England's extraordinary and threatening superiority there are only two possibilities: either one gives way or one fights. Our children will fight. If anything is certain in history, it will be the future world war (Weltkrieg), that is the war of those who want to escape from England' (Peters 1897: 385; Heuss 1937: 215). In most of these statements, the prejudices were not at all based on personal experiences of Britain. Instead they were the result of specific projections, which served the function of strengthening the image of the own nation and justifying the own nation's position in what was regarded as a struggle of nation-states for colonies and political reputation. The impact of Social Darwinism on the use national images around 1900 is undeniable, and it was also underlying William II's letter to Queen Victoria in May 1899 when he described the deterioration of Anglo-German relations in the aftermath of the Samoa crisis: The way of treating Germany's feelings and interests has come upon the people like an electric shock, and has evoked the impression that Lord Salisbury cares for us no more than for Portugal, Chile, or the Patagonians, and out of this impression the feeling has risen that Germany was being despised by his Government, and this has stung my subjects to the quick. This fact is looked upon as a taint to the national honour and to their feelings of self-respect. [ 'Letters' 1932: 3771

On the other hand, a minority of leading academics with political influence such as Lujo Brentano, Theodor Mommsen, Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber or journalists as Theodor Wolff and Maximilian Harden - usually coming from a progressive-liberal background - objected this simplistic image of Britain which the Alldeutscher Verband and the Flottenvereine so much popularised. Brentano sought to show in how far social and political reforms in Britain were not simply results of a dominant materialism, but already anticipated future developments which would also become necessary in National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 59

Germany. Mommsen in particular directed his polemic against the aggressively anglophobic rhetoric of the nationalistic associations. As for many liberals, he was sure that Germany would have to repeat Britain's transformation into a parliamentarian system to overcome the political and constitutional inconsistencies as well as the social tensions of the German Empire (Mommsen 1996: 225-6). Even the leader of the Social Democrats, August Bebel, in 1907 declared that if asked 'whether in Germany we should have a monarchy as in England or a republic as in France, I would be probably in favour of England', and Max Weber in his proposals for a reform of the Empire's constitution in 1917/8 referred to the British example of parliamentarian Select Committees (Domann 1974: 201; Schollgen 1999: 143)- Positive or negative images of Britain in Germany around and after 1900 depended on political and social positions. Whereas an Anglophile minority remained strong within parts of the liberal camp, the conservative right, but also many protestant middle class academics which were organised in the new nationalistic associations, became ever more characterised by an aggressively anglophobic attitude, as demonstrated by the remark of the deputy Heydebrand von der Lasa during the Reichstag's debate on the Agadir crisis in November 1911: 'Like a lightning in the night this has demonstrated for the whole German people where the enemy sits' (Mommsen 1996: 228). For these groups Britian was but the incarnation of a modern, egalitarian and materialist society against which Germany had to immunise her state and society. For leading politicians like Kurt Riezler, close political advisor of the chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, the German Empire's difficult position had been caused by western and eastern encirclement and a colonial policy which was carried out too late, so that expansion was no longer possible. The comparison with Britain underlined her weakness: 'England's world politics is not only based on her naval rule but also on two other fundaments: the British cultural connection (Kulturzusammenhang) and the London Stock Market' (Ruedorffer 1914: 95).

From national images to conceptions of the cultural enemy: the radicalisation of stereotypes during the First World War in Germany

The outbreak of the First World War led to a rapid radicalization of the negative stereotypes of Britain while at the same time those groups of society which had focused on progressively liberal social and political elements in Britain became at least temporarily paralysed (Jahr 1994). In his short work on England and Wir (`England and Us'), Wilhelm Dibelius wrote in October 60 The Linacre Journal

1914, that the Germans were 'facing no other of the three or four nations with such anger and contempt as England.' After years of intensive relations in politics, economics and sciences, Dibelius explained Britain's decision to enter the war coalition against Germany with the apparent dominance of imperialists and high finance as opposed to the ordinary British people: 'We are not fighting against the great England which we have learned to love and esteem, but the little England of national arrogance, of low spirit of stingy shopkeepers (niedriger Kramergeist) and puritan hypocrisy'. Though Dibelius held on to the idea of two different nations, his image included the whole spectrum of negative connotations which one could identify with Britain (`Deutsche Vortrage' 1914: 3, 8-9).

Whereas Dibelius still distinguished between these two national images, Werner Sombart and Max Scheler went much further and argued in favour of an explicitly cultural antagonism between the two countries. This was no longer based on the concept of a war between states, but between hostile cultures where no cooperation, transfer or exchange seemed possible. In his book Handler and Heiden: Patriotische Besinnungen, Sombart used the already existing stereotype of stingy British shopkeepers and Germanic heroism, which had become so fundamental during the 1880s and 1890s in the context of cultural pessimism and Social Darwinist discourse. This signified how closely connected auto- and heterostereotypes were, and how they made the transformation of national images into conceptions of enemies possible. For Sombart, the war meant an ultimate and violent conflict between two cultural concepts which were deeply antagonistic. This dichotomy was based on the idea of a materialist, comfort-oriented Western culture on the one hand and a German heroic culture on the other hand, seeking to strengthen each individual's personality by a spirit (Gesinnung) of permanent fight. It was ultimately war itself which in Sombart's eyes revealed this cultural conflict: whereas Britain had always fought with mercenary soldiers and her money, the German soldier of 1914 represented a new european category of human race, a mixture between Goethe's classical and Nietzsche's heroic conception of man. The war seemed to be the ultimate instrument to fight successfully against what Sombart described as the `English disease', the commercialization of all levels of political, social and cultural life (Sombart 1915: 34, 64, 108, 138).

Max Scheler distinguished between specifically utilitarian values of the British which for him were only secondary virtues, derived from dominating materialism, such as usefulness, pragmatism, respectability, discretion, whereas the Germans were characterised by 'all these particularly vital virtues the positive esteem of which describes a warlike people, such as National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 61 courage, love of danger, a sense for the noble and heroic, chivalrousness, loyalty, willingness to make sacrifices, honour and fame' (Mommsen 1996: 229). The academic discourse of 1914 thus contributed to a radicalisation of antagonistic national stereotypes and their transformation into conceptions of a cultural enemy.

Conclusion

National images of Britain and Germany in the period between 1870 and 1914 never simply reflected the complex reality of political, socio-economic or cultural structures in both countries. As stereotypes they were a cognitive instrument to come to terms with the experience of dynamic and radical change in the meaning of states and nations in the second half of the 19th century. Perceptions proved to be asymmetrical in Germany and Britain, they signified different functions of a positive or negative German or British model in the respective discourses. The diversity of images demonstrated the importance of specific social groups or institutions and their motives behind the recourse to stereotypes. Whereas the British view on Germany became politicised only after 1870, the German view on the British model had already been a political one, as demonstrated in pre-march liberalism.

The overall difference is not primarily between German and British images of each other, but the distinction between different discoursive levels in both societies: In the case of the British discussion about national efficiency, Germany served as a positive model. For those German middle class academics who were organized in the nationalistic associations, British imperialism was but an expression of a materialist and egalitarian culture, from which the German nation had to distance itself. The stereotype of `perfidious Albion' thus reflected much about feelings of cultural insecurity and a political inferiority complex, concealed by the projection of an external enemy (Schmidt 1953). Following the political changes of the late 1880s and early 1890s, negative stereotypes of Germany in Britain and of Britain in Germany became more and more simplistic until 1914, dominating the popular image of the two nations and overshadowing if not paralysing opposing views of academic and political elites.

On a more theoretical level, the comparative examination reveals specific functions and mechanisms of national stereotypes: The difference between objective reality and its perception is determined by the perceiving person, group or institution's position in society and particular interest. Positive or negative auto- and hetero-stereotypes are often interrelated; their construction 62 The Linacre Journal often reflects ambiguities and incertainties of particular elements of national identity. That stood behind the meaning of the positive German model for the British debate about national efficiency as well as behind the transformation of antagonistic national images into concepts of cultural enemies in 1914.

On a cognitive level national images can be described as instruments with which a recipient structures a flood of incoming informations and attribute them to already existing stereotypes, underlining the long-term continuity of some of them and the way in which they can be revived under specific historical circumstances. Stereotypes therefore serve the function of stabilising an identity's pattern, especially in periods of rapid or intensified socio-economic and political transformation, as proved by the change of national images of Britain and Germany after the 1890s.

National stereotypes work according to a specific cognitive mechanism: If the informations a recipient receives, coincide with existing images/stereotypes, they will be processed positively. If informations and stereotypes on the other side do not coincide, the process will be negative. In this case informations will be adapted to already existing images/stereotypes. Here stereotypes will work as lenses and filters, selecting suitable information and leaving out unsuitable. In both cases they are fundamental for the construction of reality, which forms the basis for developing opinions, making decisions and implementing actions (Buchanan & Cantril 1972; Boulding 1969; Boulding 1959; Holsti 1962). This process of selection can be fueled by political events, as was demonstrated by the developments after the late 1880s. It led to ever more simplistic images of the other nation in public which did not reflect an objective reality of 'otherness' but which developed their own reality. In the case of Germany and Britain this constellation became the breeding-ground for the concept of culturally antagonistic nations which overshadowed the many positive counter- perceptions of Britain in Germany and of Germany in Britain prior to the outbreak of the First World War.

REFERENCES

Adler, G. Die imperialistische Sozialpolitik: DIsraeli, Napoleon III, Bismarck ['Imperialist social policy: Disraeli, Napoleon and Bismarck']. Tubingen, 1897. Allport, G. W. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA, 1966. 1" ed. 1954. Anderson, P. The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany. Washington, 1939. "Anglo-German Relations." Edinburgh Review 210 (1909). Alter, P. Wissenschaft, Staat, Meizene: Anfange moderner Wissenschaftspolitik in National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 63

Grofibritannien 1850-1920 ['Science, state, and patrons: the beginnings of a politics of science in modem Britain, 1850-1920']. Stuttgart, 1982. ---. "Herausforderer der Weltmacht. Das Deutsche Reich im britischen Urteil." ['Challenge to a world power: the Second German Empire from a British perspective.'] Das deutsche Reich im Urteil der Grofien Meichte und europtiischen Nachbarn. Ed. K. Hildebrand and E. Muller-Luckner. Munich, 1995. 159-78. Birke, A. M. and K. Kluxen (eds.) Viktorianisches England in deutscher Perspektive ['Victorian England from a German perspective']. Munich, 1983. Blaicher, G. Das Deutschlandbild in der englischen Literatur ['Images of Germany in English literature']. Darmstadt, 1992. ---. "Konstanten in der englischen Wahrnehmung Deutschlands." ['Constant factors in English perceptions of Germany']. Deutsch-landbilder in Deinemark und England, in Frankreich und den Niederlanden. Ed. H. Siissmuth. Baden-Baden, 1996. 251-66. Boulding, K. E. The Image, Ann Arbor, MI, 1969. 1 st. ed. 1956. ---. "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (1959): 120-31. Buchanan, W. and H. Cantril. How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion, Urbana, IL, 1972. 1 st. ed. 1953. Bulwer-Lytton, E. The Parisians, vol.ii. London, 1889. Dahlmann, C. F. "Ein Wort iiber Verfassung." ['A word on constitution.'] Kieler Blotter 1 (1915). Daily Telegraph. 19th Feb. 1906. Deutsche Vortrage Hamburger Professoren ['German lectures by professors of Hamburg University'], vol.ii. Hamburg, 1914. Domann, P. Sozialdemokratie und Kaisertum unter Wilhelm II: Die Auseinandersetzung der Panel mit dem monarchischen System, seinen gesellschafts- und veifassungspolitischen Voraussetzungen ['Social democracy and empire under Wilhelm II: conflicts between political parties and monarchy, their social and constitutional preconditions']. Wiesbaden, 1974. Dose, G. "The Soul of Germany: Bemerkungen zum angloamerikanischen Deutschlandbild vor und zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges." ['Notes on Anglo-American images of Germany prior to and at the beginning of the First World War.'] Images of Germany: Anglistik & Englischunterricht 29/30 (1986). Duijker, H.C.J. and N.H. Frijda. National Character and National Stereotypes. Amsterdam, 1960. Dusch, A. von. Ober das Gewissen eines Deputirten oder von dem System der Abstimmung in steindischen Versammlungen ['The deputy's conscience: voting systems in corporative assemblies']. 1823. Epkenhans, M. "Aspekte des deutschen Englandbildes 1800-1914: Vorbild und Rivale." ['Aspects of German images of England, 1800-1914.'] Westfalische Forschungen 44 (1994): 329-42. Fischer, M. S. Nationale Images als Gegenstand Vergleichender Literaturgeschichte ['National images as objects in comparative literary histories' Bonn, 1981. Garvin, J. "The Sentimental Peril in Foreign Policy." The Outlook. 20th Jan. 1906. 64 The Linacre Journal

---. "The Imprisoned Empire." The Outlook. 10th March 1906. Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, 1973. Geikie, A. "Retrospect and Prospect." Nature 104 (1919-20). "The German Peril." The Quarterly Review 209 (1908): 264-98. Gladstone, W. E. "Germany, France, and England." Edinburgh Review 132 (1870). Ibid. Gleanings of Past Years, 1843-1878, vol.iv. London, 1879. Hahn, E. J. C. Rudolf von Gneist, 1815-1895: The Political Ideas of a Prussian Liberal in the Bismarck Period. New Haven, 1971. Hamilton, G. F. Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, vol.ii: 1886-1906. London, 1922. Hansard, House of Commons Debates: 3rd Series, vol.cciv (9th Feb. 1871). Hardach, K. W. "Anglomanie und Anglophobie wahrend der industriellen Revolution in Deutschland" rAnglomania and Anglophobia during the German Industrial Revolution']. Schmollers Jahrbuch 91 (1971): 153-81. Harrison, F. "Bismarckism." The Fortnightly Review 8 (1870): 631-49. Hennock, E. P. "Die Ursprunge der staatlichen Sozialversicherung in Grol3britannien und das deutsche Beispiel 1880-1914" ['The origins of public social insurance in Britain and the German model, 1880-1914']. Die Entstehung des Wohlfahrtsstaates in Grofibritannien und Deutschland 1850-1950. Ed. W. J. Mommsen and W. Mock. Stuttgart, 1982. 92-114. ---. "Arbeiterunfallentschadigung und Arbeiterunfallversicherung: Die britische Sozialreform und das Beispiel Bismarcks" [ 'Workers' accident compensation and insurance: British social reform and the Bismarckian model']. Geschichte und Gesellschaft 11 (1985): 19- 36. ---. British Social Reform and German Precedents: The Case of Social Insurance 1880-1914. Oxford, 1987. ---. "Technological Education in England, 1850-1926: the Uses of a German Model." History of Education 19 (1990): 299-331. Heuss, T. Friedrich Naumann: Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit ['Friedrich Naumann: the man, his work and times' Stuttgart, 1937. Hildebrand, K. "Von der Reichseinigung zur `Krieg-in-Sicht'-Krise. PreuBen-Deutschland als Faktor der britischen AuBenpolitik 1866-1875" ['From national unification to the 'war in sight' crisis: Prussia as a factor in British foreign policy, 1866-75']. Das kaiserliche Deutschland: Politik und Gesellschaft 1870-1918. Ed. M. Stiirmer. Diisseldorf, 1970. ---. "GroEbritannien und die deutsche Reichsgrundung" ['Great Britain and the foundation of the Second German Empire']. Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 6: Europa und die Reichsgriindung. Preufien-Deutschland in der Sicht der grofien europaischen Miichte 1860-1880. Ed. E. Kolb. Munich, 1980. 9-62. Hintze, 0. The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. Ed. Felix Gilbert. New York, 1975. Hobhouse, L. T. The Metaphysical Theory of the State. London, 1915. Hollenberg, G. Englisches Interesse am Kaiserreich: Die Attraktivikit Preufien-Deutschlands fur konservative und liberale Kreise in Grofibritannien 1860-1914 ['British interest in the German Empire: the appeal of Prussia within British Conservative and Liberal circles, 1860-1914 1. Wiesbaden, 1974. Holsti, 0. R. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study." Journal of Conflict National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 65

Resolution 6 (1962): 244-52. Horkheimer, M. Uber das Vorurteil ['Prejudice]. Köln, 1963. Jahr, C. "Das Kramervolk der eitlen Briten: das deutsche Englandfeindbild im Ersten Weltkrieg" ['Skinflint people, vain Britons: German images of the British enemy during the First World War']. Feindbilder in der deutschen Geschichte: Studien zur Vorurteilsgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Ed. C. Jahr, U. Mai and K. Roller. Berlin, 1994. 115-42. James, H. A German Identity 1770-1990. London, 1989. Jervis, R. "Hypotheses on Misperception." Power, Strategy, and Security. Ed. K. Knorr. Princeton, 1983. 152-77. Kellermann, H. Der Krieg der Geister. Eine Auslese deutscher und auslandischer Stimmen zum Weltkriege 1914 ['War of the spirits: a selection of German and foreign comments on the 1914 war']. Weimar, 1915. Kennedy, P. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914. London, 1980. Kleinknecht, T. "Die Grundung des Deutschen Reiches 1870/71 aus der Sicht des britischen Gelehrtenliberalismus" ['The founding of the German Empire, 1870-1, as viewed by British academic liberals']. Das britische Deutschlandbild im Wandel des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Ed. B.-J. Wendt. Bochum, 1984. ---. "England als Modell: Nachahmung - Kritik - Ablehnung" ['England as model: imitation, criticism, rejection']. WesOlische Forschungen 44 (1994): 329-42. Krakau, K. "Einfiihrende Uberlegungen zur Entstehung und Wirkung von Bildern, die sich Nationen von sich und anderen machen" ['Initial thoughts on the origins and influence of national images of self and other']. Deutschland und Amerika: Perzeption und historische Realitat. Ed. W. P. Adams and K. Krakau. Berlin, 1985. 9-18. Laveleye, E. de. "Prince Bismarck." The Fortnightly Review 24 (1878): 765-86. Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series: A Selection from Her Majestys Correspondence and Journals Between the Years 1886 and 1901, vol.iii. Ed. G. Buckle. London, 1932. Lippmann, W. Public Opinion. New York, 1922. McClelland, C. E. The German Historians and England: a Study in Nineteenth-Century Views. Cambridge, 1971. Maitland, F. W. "The Making of the German Civil Code." The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, vol.iii. Ed. H. A. L. Fisher. Cambridge, 1911. Mansfield, K. In a German Pension. Harmondsworth, 1964. Marcks, E. "Die imperialistische Idee in der Gegenwart" ['The Imperialist idea of the present time']. Ibid. Manner und Zeiten, vol.ii. Leipzig, 1911. Messerschmidt, M. Deutschland in englischer Sicht: Die Wandlungen des Deutschlandbildes in der englischen Geschichtsschreibung ['Germany in British perspective: changing images of German in British historiography']. Dusseldorf, 1955. Mommsen, W. J. "Das Englandbild der Deutschen und die britische Sicht seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts" ['German images of England and British perspectives since the end of the 18th century']. Deutschlandbilder in Danemark und England, in Frankreich und den Niederlanden. Ed. H. Stissmuth. Baden-Baden, 1996. 215-34. Morley, J. "France and Germany." The Fortnightly Review 8 (1870): 367-76. ---. The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, vol.ii. London, 1903. 66 The Linacre Journal

Mosse, W. E. The European Powers and the German Question 1848-1871 with special reference to England and Russia. Cambridge, 1958. Miillenbrock, H.-J. Literatur und Zeitgeschichte in England in England zwischen dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und dem Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges ['Literature and contemporary history in Britain between the end of the 19 th century and the outbreak of the First World Wail. Hamburg, 1967. ---. "Trugbilder: Zum Dilemma imagologischer Forschung am Beispiel des englischen Deutschlandbildes 1870-1914" ['Hallucinations: dilemmas in research on national imagery, with a case study on the image of Britain in Germany, 1870-1914']. Anglia 113 (1995): 303-29. Murhard, F. W. A. "Englands Staatsverfassung" ['Britain's state-constitution' ]. Staats-Lexikon oder Enzyklopadie der Staatswissenschaften, vol.v. Ed. C. von Rotteck and C. Welcker. Altona, 1837. 84-171. Nietzsche, F. Werke, vol.ii. Ed. K. Schlechta. Oergel, M. "The Redeeming Teuton: Nineteenth-Century Notions of the Germanic in England and Germany." Imagining Nations. Ed. G. Cubitt. Manchester 1998, 75-91. O'Sullivan, E. "National Stereotypes as Literary Device. Traditions and Uses of Stereotypes of Germans in British and the English in German Children's Literature." As Others See Us: Anglo-German Perceptions. Ed. H. Husemann. Frankfurt am Main, 1994. 81-8. Peters, C. "Was lehrt uns die englische Kolonialpolitik?" (1897) ['What does British colonial policy teach us?']. Gesammelte Schriften, vol.i. Ed. W. Frank. Munich, 1943. Pollard, S. 'Made in Germany' - die Angst vor der deutschen Konkurrenz im spat- viktorianischen England" ['Made in Germany: the fear of German competition in late Victorian England]. Technikgeschichte 54 (1987):183-95. Pulzer, P. "Vorbild, Rivale und Unmensch. Das sich wandelnde Deutschlandbild in England 1815-1945" ['Model, rival and inhuman: the changing image of Germany in Britain, 1815-1945']. Deutschlandbilder in Deinemark und England, in Frankreich und den Niederlanden. Ed. H. Siissmuth. Baden-Baden, 1996. 235-50.

Punch. 31 st Jan. 1885. "Report on the First Annual Conference of the British Science Guild." Nature 75 (1906-7). Ritter, G. A. Sozialversicherung in Deutschland und England: Entstehung und Grundzuge im Vergleich ['Social insurance in Britain and Germany: origins and features in comparison']. Munich, 1983. Rubinstein, W. D. Capitalism, Culture, and Decline in Britain, 1750-1900. London, 1993. Ruedorffer, J. J. [aka K. Riezler]. Grundzuge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart ['Principles of world policy in present times']. Stuttgart, 1914. Saturday Review. 23rd Sept. 1876. SchlOzer, A.-L. Allgemeines StatsRecht und StatsVetfassungsLere ['General state law and constitutional law.' ] Gottingen, 1793. Schollgen, G. "England als Vorbild. Max Weber und die deutsche Verfassungsdiskussion 1917/18" ['Britain as model: Max Weber and German constitutional discourse, 1917/18']. Rivaliteit und Partnerschaft: Studien zu den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im- 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Festschrift fur Anthony J. Nicholls. Ed. G. A. Ritter and P. Wende. Paderborn, 1999. 133-44. National Images: Germany and Britain, 1870-1914 67

Schmidt, H. D. "The Idea and Slogan of 'Perfidious Albion'." Journal of the History of Ideas 14 (1953): 604-16. Schultz, F. Der Deutsche in der englischen Literatur vom Beginn der Romantik bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges ['The German in English literature from the beginning of the Romantic period to the outbreak of the First World Wail. Gottingen, 1939. Sombart, W. Handler und Heiden: Patriotische Besinnungen ['Traders and heroes: patriotic reflections']. Munchen, 1915. Sontag, R. Germany and England: Background of Conflict. New York, 1938. Times Educational Supplement. 16th June 1911. Treitschke, H. Von. Die Gesellschafiswissenschaft: Ein kritischer Versuch (1859) ['A critical essay in social science']. Halle, 1927. Trevelyan, G. M. Grey of Fallodon. Being the Life of Sir Edward Grey afterwards Lord Grey of Fallodon. London, 1937. Wallace, S. War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-1918. Edinburgh, 1988. Weinek, K. Deutschland und der Deutsche im Spiegel der englischen erziihlenden Literatur seit 1830 ['Germany and the German as reflected in English narrative literature]. Halle, 1938. Wells, H. G. The War of the Worlds. Harmondsworth, 1959. ---. The War in the Air and particularly how Mr Bert Smallways Fared while it Lasted. Harmondsworth, 1971. Wende, P. "Perzeption und Transfers. Zur gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung deutscher und britischer Geschichtswissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert" ['Perception and transfers: on mutual perceptions of British and German historiography in the 19th century']. Rivalitat und Partnerschaft. Studien zu den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Festschrift fur Anthony J. Nicholls. Ed. G. A. Ritter and P. Wende. Paderborn, 1999. 13-28. Wendt, B.-J. (ed.) Das britische Deutschlandbild im Wandel des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts ['Changing British images of Germany in the 19 th and 20th centuries']. Bochum, 1984. White, L. A. The Concept of Cultural Systems. New York, 1975. Wiener, M. J. English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1920. Cambridge, 1981. Williams, E. E. Made in Germany. London, 1896.