NORTH DAKOTA NONINTERV~NTIONISTS AND
CORPORATE CULTURE
by
David A. Horowitz
"It required fOUl: ':l€ner.ations and two .... orld wars for the Mlddle W~5t to come to some understanding of what foreign , polic,! is "bout," a politiccd sCl.ent::ist blandly noted in the ,," year 1960. The epoch between 1945 ,,[")ol l'~65 witnessed a near unanimous commitment by American schol,Hs 'lnci intellectuals to the doctrines of internationalism, collective security, and preSidential initiative in foreign affbirs. Resistance to such notions, p,nticularly among Gredt Plains Elepublici.lns, usually found dlo'scription as an irrational remn",nt of a discredited isolJtionist past. Indeed, a persistent spirit of noninterventionism in North Dakota prompted one impa,ient scholar to dismiss the entire state as a "living fossil."
T~o sets of circumstances sInce 1965 have mOdified such precipItous judgments. First, the Vi"tnam War brought respectability to the notion that o'/erseas military commltments might easi 11' be overextended. Second, professionJI historians continued to produc~ ~ell-conceived analyses of the relationship of material concerns to ideology. Some of these efforts focused upon ~!itical culture--:l. conc"pt which took into account the more immediate-polTIlcal "nd 'OconomlC motives for social behavior as ~ell as longstanding ideologi-.al and cultural roots of such activity. Scholar~flip of this nature reinforc'Od the idea that dissid~nt perspecti.ves could bl:! majority Views in particular communItIes. It also pOInted to the logical consistency within any gi'/en "et of ideas. Furthermore, schQlarship on political cultu~e stressed the manner in which groups and movements tended to combine rational self-interest with more elusive sets of allegiances, "motions, and ideals. 2
This paper attempts to pLace the views or North Dakota opponents of Cold War interverltionism in the framework of politi.cal culture: first, 111 the context of immediate political and economic exigenci",s ~ithin North Dakota itself; second, within the legacY of an ideological and cultural progressl'Ji"m that waS the product of the historical experience of the northe(n Great Plains.
North Dakota noninterventionism first surfac""d with the growth of the Nonpartisdn League during World War On"". The N~[. linked a program that sought to organize the marketing needs of independent farmers to ~ deep distrust of banKers, gr~1n trade operators, eastern industrialists, and Wall Str",et diplomats. Both noninterventionist Senators Gerald P. Nye and Lynn Frazier em~rged from the Nonpartisan movement. Both opposed United St~tes membership in the Le~gue of Nations, participation in the World Court, cancell~tion of Allied war debts, and American military involvement in Latin America. 3 •
Jl tVENTIONISTS AND By the 19305 t:le major issue of r,mericCln foreign policy h"d shifted to one of Ion( and pe,',,;e. Governor W, II iam L.,,[]']er, IL'!'URE elected l.ilth Noo[JartiSOrl sUP90rt, temo\'ed the ReseC".,e Officer Training Corps from sL.te c.>lrnpl,ses "mJ opo:;nly i:!rornoted fcd~ral constitutional arnendInellt to requIre a vote or th~ AmericQn people before any declaration of l.iar arising fro~ 'OW 1 tz oveu,eilS milit'3['j difficulties. Meanwhile, Nye ch"ired the influential Sen,lte lovestlgiltlon of th~ m\lrljtlons irldustry a'ld became a key architect o[ neutr~lJty legjsli~tion p~ssed in the , and two ""or ld wars for the mid-1930s. Congressmen William Lcm~c ~nd Usher Burdick jQined erstanding of whilt foreign Nye "nd Fr'lzie( in pressing for the "bolitiQIl of prIvate entist blilndly noted in th~ production of munitions, enactment or strin'l~nt ""ar profits 5 and 1965 ""itnessed iI near taxe5, and :hc: ',,;Olr referendum ·2·nbodio?d 1n th~ LudlG"" choldrs and intellectuills to Amendment. When Langer tdn for F'til;;ier's Senilte seil~ 1n 1':140 I, collective security, and he joined Nye 1n opposing fllrther J~od1fjcatjo" of the ign affairs. Resistilnce to neutraiity laws, expansion of Selective servicee, and lend r Great Plilins Republicans, lea.se. n irrational remnant of a ,deed, a persistent spirit of Both Lang.,r and nurrlJck (;ontinu.,d to espouse ota promp ted one impa lji en t noninterventionism through the Cold War years, frequently e as a "living fossil." vot1ng w1tll a group of Republican nationalists in oppGsing th~ mi Ilt"ry and economic assistance programs of the Truman and nee 1965 have modified such Eisenhower Jdminlstrat1ons. L~nger w~s 0r1e of two Senators to the Vi",tnam rlar brought vote against United States membership H, the United Nations. that overseas military lie vot Although the movement never materialized, its aspirations reflected common views in a state whose resources were developed for outside consumption and profit. Langer's farm pOlicies demonstrated his sensitivity to the North Dakota economy. He favored high agricultural price supports, liberal farm credit, and rural electrification cooperatives. He fought the federal soil bank program in the 1950s because the operation proved of little value to family sized farms. And it was Langer's desire to protect independent North Dakota farmers that prompted his skepticism toward the reciprocal trade agreelfents developed by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Langer joined Senate progressives Robert LaFollette, Jr. and Henrik Shipstead in opposing wartime extension of the reciprocal trade program in 1943. He argued that lowered duties on foreign vegetables and other produce destroyed domestic producers. One example of the consequences was investment by American financial speculators in Cuban vegetable cultivation. Langer's discomfort with reciprocal trade continued during the postwar period. He agreed with Nevada Senator George W. Malone that tariffs offset the cheaper costs of production prevalent in countries not enjoying American-style wage scales. Indiscriminate tariff reduction would mean lower wages in America and transfers of jobs and industry to foreign soil. Langer supported Malone's proposal for a sliding tariff that would reward increased overseas wage standards with lowered American import fees. He also endorsed South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt's call for an investigation ok the effect of reciprocal trade on the parity price of grain. Like the reciprocal trade issue, the whole question of foreign aid had specific implications for North Dakota's independent businesses and farms. Langer opposed the extension of lend-lease in 1945, objecting to the program's transfer of 932 tractors and combineS through North Dakota to Canada. Further incensed by the dispatch of badly needed farm machinery to the Soviet Union, Langer forced a Senate vote on an amendment which would have prohibited American manufacturers from sending agricultural machinery, implements, and equipment to foreign governments. In a similar vein, Langer's opposition to the British Loans of 1946 and 1948 corresponded in part to the Senator's estimation of the economic needs of his own state. North Dakota did not host major industrial conglomerates seeking mass markets overseas. Objecting to the 1946 spending of $4 billion to bolster British purchasinq power, Langer quoted a Brookings Institute study that showed that overseas markets were unnecessary if purchasing power in the United States were sufficiently distributed. Langer preferred to spend the money on medical research, old age pensions. cancellation of all seed and feed loans, farm to market roads, rural electrification, and retirement of the inflation-inducing national debt. Constituent mail seemed to support the Senator's position. "If they can loan billions to Britain why can't they take better care of the dependents of the fallen herOes?" asked an impoverished couple whose two sons had died • 33 erialized, its aspirations in the war. If Horth Dakotans had survived the 3evere winter tate whose resources were of 1946 without being dependent on anyone el se, a Burlington Bod profit. canst i tuent cftfP 1 a i ned to Langer, "why in h--- can't England do the same?" latrated his sensitivity to lred high agr-icultural price Similar arguments surfaced in regard to the European and rural electrification Recovery Bill of 1948--the Harshall Plan. Langer told the al soi 1 bank program in the Senate that raw materials, finished goods, and machinery of little value to family essential for American food production would be diverted to 1ger'. desire to protect Europe at a time when western farmers still were unable to :hat prompted his Skepticism s",cure an adequate supply. ..w'" are strugglinq under the [ee~ents developed by the heaviest tax burden in the history of the world,~ Burdick complained, "and the least this gov",rnment can do is to make "'. essential materials available to those who produce." Lanqer lives Robert LaFollette, Jr. quoted a Senate report on independent business which suggested r wartime extension of th", that shortages arising from foreiqn commitments were resulting l. He argued that lower",d in the imposition of controls at home. The American economy Id other produce destroyed now had to fit into "this new international pattern of e of the consequences was Government-controlled cartel allocation of raw materials and Lal speculators in Cuban markets." Trade policy and domestic allocation of scarce raw discomfort with reciprocal materials, the report noted, were forcing more inv",stment in ar period. He agreed wi th the devl10pment of foreign sources of mat",rials and ! that tariffs offset the products. eva lent in countries not le5. Indiscriminate tariff The Marshall Plan also raised complex issues of inflation in America and transfers of at home. Foreign spending, Burdick insisted, was the Lang",r supported Malone's principal cause of high prices and excessive taxation, lat would reward increased problems which plagued North Dakota small property holders in ed American import fees. He the postwar era. Increased European purchasing power, Burdick Ir lear I Mundt's call for an argued, raised the prices of commodities such as lumber and iproca I trade on the par i ty b",ef in the United States. In a resolution sent directly to Langer, the National I'Issociation of Retail Grocers contended that the nation was dissipating its resources in a futile sue, the whOle question of attempt to bring about economic recovery in Western Europe. ations for North Dakota's The grocers worried about the inflationary effect on food :rns. Langer Opposed the prices and the possible re-imposition of price controls and objecting to the program's rationing. Both Burdick and Langer also pointed out that nee through North Dakota to foreign aid spending forced the federal government to borrow spatch of badly needed farm to finance its European subsidies. 'rhe resulting exodus of ger forced a Senate vote on dollars and ballooning of the national debt further aggravated ~e prohibited American inflation, they contended. At the same time, Langer believed :ural machinery, implements, that foreign aid cut into the selling price of grain and other to. farm commodities by enabling European producers to capture American markets once held by domestic farm",rs. Foreign opposition to the British subsidy programs were siphoning off money l~hat might be going !d in part to the Senator's to North Dakota farmers, Langer thundered. of his own state. North ial conglomerates seeking Langer's constituent mail on the Marshall Plan focused on to th", 1946 spending of $4 the fear that the TrUman administration placed the needs of ling power, Langer quoted a Europeans above Americans. The concern was well-grounded. owed that overseas markets North Dakota's heavi l'i taxed farmers and independent r in the United States were entrepreneurs sold to domestic markets instead of European referred to spend the money consumers. Foreign aid, Which subsidized European consumers ions, cancellation of all at the expense of American taxpayers, may have served the a rnarket roads, rural needs of corporate manufacturers and labor in the urban of the inflation-inducing industrial sector. But it simply worked against North Dakota 1 seemed to support the interests by requiring its taxpayers to subsidize foreign )an billions to Britain why competition. When foreign aid was tied to a reciptocal trade l dependents of the fallen policy, Langer argued, American~ found themselves paying pIe whose two sons had died billions of dollars to develop competitive forces overseas J4 which then were allowed to sell below cost-of-production prices in the beleaguered American market. Americans were using billions in subsidies to keep the domestic price struc ture sound, Langer procl",imed, while continuing to subsidize foreign competition which undermined the American standard of 1 iving. "It simply does not make sense," he concluded. ~anger's answer to the dilemma w"'s that of the traditional isolationist: it w",s time for the United States to get out of Europe. Yet his reasoning was partly economic and tied to the needs of North Dakota constituents. Somehow, the Senator noted in 1954, "we will have to get th~se people off our necks, and their h",nds out of our pockets." J North Dakota resistance to universal milit",ry training also reflected political and economic realities in the state. Langer was famous for his amendments to draft legislation. In 1948 he attempted to embarrass draft advocates with a series of civil rights amendments which would have desegregated the Army and public accommodations in any state training draftees. During 1951 and 1955 Langer introduced amendments to conscript all corporate profits as well as personal income over $25,000 during a draft emergency. Langer equated conscription with autocracy and feared the consequences of militaristic government at home and abroad. But he also realized that many North DaJo;otans were of families that had fled from Germany, Norway, or Russia to escape heavy taxation and military service requirements. These Americans had little use for E:uropean power politics or dynastic rivalries. The people of the northwest, Langer explained in 1945, had come to America to "escape the continuous struggle between peoples who hated each-otherj to live in peace and secu1~ty and to find some measure of opportunity and contentment." Yet Nor th Dakotans had an even more speci f ic reason for hostility to universal mi litary training. In a region with a sparse population, harsh winters, and an unstable agricultural economy, it was hard to maintain an adequate supply of farm labor. The draft took young men just when they were most helpful to a farm operation. As Burdick !.Jointed out, it was the younger men, not the older men used to horse-drawn machinery, who were most experienced in running and servicing power tractors. These young mechanics were precisely the men the Army needed. Many farmers had to cease ope rat ions when their sons were drafted, Burdick expl,dned. "There is no hope for us," a middle-aged couple confided to the congressman during the Korean War. "We know we are not able to do all our farm work alone any more." Langer introduced a bill providing for the temporary deferment of farmers just before the outbreak of the Korean War but .ithdrew it with the start of hostilities. Nevertheless, he and Burdick continued to insist that food production was more important than ammuni~~on or standing armies in preserving peace and world security.~ The roots of North Dakota noninterventionism also may be found within a political culture that first found expression In the Nonp~rtisan League and the progressive politics of LaFollette, Hiram JohnSOn, and William Borah. One facet of that Ideology was a strong American nationalism, one which contrasted the republican virtues of the New World with the corrupt and tyrannical politics of Europe. Langer approvingly • 35 below cost-of-production quoted MLchigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg's tribute to In market. Americans ~e[e rlatiorlalism years after Vandenberg had converted to the p the domestic price struc internationalist cause. "America has separate and different 110 continuing to subsidize standards of life and government," the Michigan Republican had ~d the American standard of \"rritten, "arid it refuses either to merge these advantages in a ~ke sense," he concluded. general averaging of the standards of other lands, or to s that of the traditional eJl;pose them by any untoward degree, to the mandate of massed Dnited States to get out of foreign pressure or duress." Langer spared no language in ly economic and tied to the condemn Noninterventionists saw Great Britain as the most flagrant eltample of decaying European culture. Langer referred to the "age-long hatreds, the social neuroticisms, deep-rooted suspicions, the bloody tyrannies, egoisms, and exploitations which had always characterized the life of Europe." Europe meant militarism, large standing armies, dnd the "curse" of conscription. NO wonder Langer was adamant in his opposition to NATO. President Truman's commitment was the product of secret diplomacy, it constituted a permanent military allianCe, and it inextricably involved the United States in the tangled web of European affairs. The Harshall Plan, Langer wrote to a constituent, was ill-advised because the money would fall into the hands of unreliable Europe~B governments instead of the poor people who really needed it. Langer's noninterventionism was closely tied to the suspicion of Europe long a part of traditional American republican ideology. Another facet of this progressive political culture was Look at ttle head of the American delegation, the wealthy sci-on of the Morgan family, __ Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.--he of the flashing eyes, the shiny teeth and the silver hair and the charming smile. Stettinius comes from a long line of men who have manipulated the destiny of this nation to their own end. These are the mighty men of Wall Street. The men who ride two horses on two sides of the street. They nevIE lose but the publ ic loses no matter what happens. Langer's objections to upper-class diplomacy went beyond the facets of wealth to a sociological critique of the nation's ruling families. The State Department, he insist€d, • 37 emmed partly from the ethnic was dominated by "a cl i.que of appeasement-minded cookie US people of German, Irish, pushers," sons of the rich who did not understand the problems so had roots in the Populist of the masses. Furthermore, the Department employed ~entury that English bankers "diplomatic circumlocution" to distance itself from the ontrolled the processing, American people. The problem, Langer suggested in a 1954 .f American agricultural report on the Mutual Security Act, was that the Department was [dick condemned Britain's "a refuge for career people of the social register." These .ism," they were striking a people, he contended, saw their "highest destiny in thlO Iture. It made no sense to acceptance provided by the BritiSh and French social circles." ,he British When portions of Corrupted by "Europeanism" and "shop-worn social theories," to Britain's efforts to they were more intent on social superiority than diplomacy, ;ary power. As late as 1954 They weh~ "cosmopolites and less American than international o~bination of socialism at toward the interests of their European friends." Langer hoped ational Socialism without that ambassadors and diplomats might be more representa2~ve of the average American, particularly those from the West. reat Britain as the most The class and regional animosities expressed by Langer :uropean culture. Langer figured in the Senator's intense diSlike of Dean Acheson. , the social neuroticisms, Langer was one of six senators to oppose Acheson's nomination 3y tyrannies, egoisms, and as Secretary of State in 1949. In a speecll draft which he character i zed the 1 i fe of never delivered, the North Dakotan castigated the nominee as large standing armies, and an inept blunderer who held an "alien internationalist )nder Langer was adamant in philosophy." Langer caustically described Acheson's career as Truman's commitment was the an attorney associated with the Morgans and DuPonts and constituted a permanent charged him with being one of the architects of Bretton cably involved the united Woods--an "internationalist superscate financial scheme." lean affairs. The Marshall Connecting Acheson's Wall Street orientation to his diplomatic ,t, was ill-advised because role in forcing the Nationalist Chinese to embrace the Ids of unreliable Europe~8 Communists during World War TWO, Langer concluded that ple Who really needed it. "Acheson believes in secret diplomacy, government by indiscretion and a commitment of the United States to interna was closely tied to the tionalist schemes which cannot2Qelp but destroy O'Jr form of of traditional American government and our way of life." acet of this progressive Seated hostility toward Langer distrusted career diplomats in the permanent Langer was a master at bureaucracy who were removed from the voters. The Department :he Foreign Serv Ice and placed too much emphasis on expertise and not enough on common 'd the nomination of James sense, he believed. Likewise, the North Dakotan had little n 1947 because Bruce was a tolerance for academic and technical experts in the federal f a dairy monopoly. Langer bureaucracy. Ouring World War Two he tOok after "academic inst the confirmation of bureaucrats" pushing for re-enactment of the reciprocal trade nius in 1944 because the treaties. First Langer denied 8uch people were experts. Then 18e of Morgan. 11'. a speech he accused them of expropriating the prerogatives of Congress :ioned the relationship of as well as the judicial and administrative functions of government. Government bureaucrats, he charged, ican delegation, the have grand ideas of setting up a world to their own ll.IPily,--1'4r. Edward R. liking. They do not seem to care what it costs the ,Shing eyes, the shiny workers and farmers of America. They have set up I the charming smi leo over the years a secret super government, within the line of men who have government, which has successfUlly pulled the wool 8 nation to their own over the eyes of the people, and these bureaucrats of Wall Street. The no,", feel they control all political parties. They sides of the street. have convinced themselves that they can do as they : loses no matter what please. The administrative bureaucracy, Langer continued, wanted to lass diplomacy went beyond "rule the Nation b~ directlve, decrees, regulations, and ,logical critique of the dictatorial practices." He dismissed them as "wastrels of the e Oepartment, he insisted, people's money who have wormed their way into high places of 38 non-elective government policy-making positions." But in a passage which anticipated the anti-subversion crusades of the postwar period, Langer linked upper-class privilege, internationalism, and violation of the national interest; They h"ve loaded the various divisions of the Federal GOvernment with their sixth \:olumnists, represented by the young callow college grad\Jate fledgings, most of whom never worked a day with their hands, and who do not know what it me"ns to earn an honest dollar by the sweat of your brow. I call upon every farmer to. see how many t'aK dollars he has had to pay for being deceived by these si:rrth COlumnist inter~ltionalists into thinking he is being benefitted. Langer's distrust of the "Economic One Worlders" in the administrative bureaucracy carried over into a concern for the power of the Presidency. Both Burdick and Langer feared that the all-important pOwer over war-making had been usurped through collective security agreements, foreign aid programs, and presidential control over troop deployments. Truman has stated that "he will send troo[)S anywh.. re in this world, where h .. thinks it 1S necessary to send them, regardless of Congress," Burdick COmplained in 1951. Discomfort with presidential power figured strongly in the opposition both North Dakotans expressed over NATO, the Korean War, "secret" presidential treaty making, mutual security agreements, and SEATO. "Who sent our boys to fi.ght in Korea?" Langer aSked in exasperation. "Was any Senator in this body consulted abOut having a war in Korea?" North Dakotans appeared to agree. Stung by the costly draft and an unpopular war, the North Dakota Senate [)assed two resolutions in early 1951 which urged Congress to withdraw all troops from Korea and to insist on conscription of wealth ant time it was necessary to draft men for a military emergency. 5 The nonint.erventionism of Burdick and Langer durin<;l the Cold War era was based on both the constituent needs of North Dakotans and adherence to an historical legacy of Great Plains populism and progressivism. Animosity toward internationalism, Old World COlonialism, aristocracy, expert bureaucracy, presidential prerogative, and military collectivism shaped the noninterventionist view toward the events of the Cold War. This was a viewpoint consistent with the world view of inde[)endent farmers and business people threatened by exterr.al centers of power. Instead of perceiving these developments as the by-products of an emerging corporate society, Burdick and Langer tended to portray them as the extension of the historical privileges of the east coast aristocracy. The vacillation which noninterventionists and Republican nationalists attributed to Cold War policy under Truman and Acheson was in their minds a natural outgrowth of upper-class subversion of the State Department. The diseases of internationalism and colle\:ti.vism, they suggested, were responsible for America's inability to protect its national interests in the Cold War. "Our whole foreign policy," Lan<;ler cried in 1949, "is crumbling around our heads, our most vital interests are being forsaken, our prestige is bein<;l irreparably undermined, our • 39 laking positions." But in a security is increasingly threatened, and our principles have -subversion crusades of the been trampled under foot." At fault was a "super_ I upper-class privilegl?, international ism" that in the case of SEATO, Langer later the national interest: ·""arned, "WO~td immediately drag us into a jungle war 10,000 mll",s away." CUS divisions of the ~ir sixth columnists, During 1948 Langer was the Republican Senator most often llow college graduate voting against his own party (52%). Yet, as he wrote a rer worked a day wi th constituent in 1955, "I have neVer voted with the Democrats an know what it means to foreign policy in my life." Langer's explanation was simple: sweat of your brow. 1 "I usually try to vote the way the people who elected me t~ltee •• see how many tax times would want me to vote and I have followed that policy ~O[ being decei ved by for fourteen years now." 7 The nOiture of the eI~ttionalists into noninterventionism expressed by both Langer and aurdick ~d. suggests that both were able to express the constituent needs and ideological affinities of North Dakotans in the Cold War lnomic One Worlders" in the era. for North Dakotans as well as other Americans of the over into a concern for the period, however, the roots of these affinities were not always dick and Langer feared that clear. r-making had been usurped lents, to reign aid programs, lp deployments. Truman has NOTES lywhere in tp.is world, where ;end them, regardless of n 1951. Discoll'.fort with 1. Charles D. lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressml?n and the 'New ~ly in the opposition both Isolationism,'" Political Science Quarterly, 75 (September 1960), 337; 0, the Korean War, "secret" Selig Adler, Remarks at Foreign PoliCY Session, 1956 Annual Meeting of I security agreements, and American Historical Association, quoted by Robert P. \lilkins, "Senator : in Korea?" Langer asked .in \Ii 1 1 i am Langer and Na tiona 1 Pri ori ties; An Agra ri an Radi ca 1 's V i loW of Nor~!! I this body conscllted about American Foreign Pol icy, 1945-1952," Dakota Quarterly, 42 (Autumn !kotOins appeared to agree. 1974), 590. unpopular war, the North s in early 1951 which urged 2. For e ... amples of scholarship employing the concept of political rom Korea and to insist on cul ture. !iee LeRoy Ashby, The Sperrless Leader: Senator Borah and the was necessary to draft men Progressive Movement ~ the 1920s Urbana:----uilf"versity oflllinoi5"Pre~ 1972}, Oon Kirschner, Ci? and COl,lntry: Rural Responses_ to Urbanization in thE.' 1920s (New York, 19 D), James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism dick and Langer during the and the New Deal: The Growth of the Con!iervadve Coalidon in Congress, constituent needs of North 1913-=T'939TLe... ington-,-Uni versity oTIentucky, 1967). Al an Bri nkl ey, Voi ces 1eal legacy of Great Plains of Protest: Huey lon,' Father Coughlin ~ the Great Depression (New~ n. Animosity toward A1 fred A. Knopf, 1982 , ii"ii"d'Jijstus O. Ooenecke, Not to the sWiTi:: The 01 d allsm, aristocracy, expert ISolationists in the Cold War Era (lewisburg. Pa":':BU"'C'kneTTlJ'iiiwsity Press. 1979J. ------ rogativi!, and military 'entionist view toward the l viewpoint consistent with 3. Robert P. Wilkins, "The Non-Partisan League and Upper Midwl?st [mi!rs and business people Isolationi!ilfl." "-gricultural History, 34 (April 1965), 102-109. See Wayne of power. Instead of S. Cole, Gerald P. Nye and Amedcan Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: s the by-products of an University of MlnneSCltd Press, 1962). lck and Langer tended to e historica I pr i v i leges of 4. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 42-43. Nye was defeated for The vacillation which re-election in the Republican primary of 1944. Milton Young assumed the nationalists attributed to seat in 1945. Although Young followed a mildly internationalist approach ·heson was in their minds a to foreign policy, he joined Langer and Burdict in condemnation of U.S. subversion of the State conduct of the Korean ~ar. internationalism and re6ponsibli! for America's 5. Wilkins, "Senator~il1iamLanger,"43, 44-49; Agnes Gee1an. The interests in the Cold War. [lakota Maverick: The Political life of William ltnger (Fargo: Gee1an, 1ger cried in 1949, "is T9"i"S'T;Glenn H. Smith, Jan ger of Morth Dakota: "- ~ in ISOlationism, vital interests are being 1940-1959 (New York: ar 1andPUb11shing, 1979), TeJ=96:-55-62, 19B-205. ~epa[ably undermined, our See Robert Griffith, "Old Progressives and the Cold War," ,Ioyrnal Q.f 40 American History. 66 (September 1979),334-47 and Doenede, Not to the $\oIift. ---- 6. "Lone Ranger from North Oakota," Economist. 173 (25 December 1954), 1084; "Judiciary's 'Wild Bill.'" lie .... Yor!::. Times Magazine (19 April 1953),20; Wilkins, "Senator William cang~42-43; Radio Address, 16 October 1944, 2, William Lilnger, 1944-47, Papers of jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota, Minnesota Historical Society; Langer manuscript, J September 1943, Folder 3: Speeches, 1949-50, Box 274, Langer Papers, Orin c.. Libby ~1anuscr-ipts Collection, Chester Fritz Library, University of North Odkot<1; "A Col. 11 to Action," Congressional Record, BOth Congress, 1st session, 93, 25 July 194'1, A3904-3905. 7. Ge"lan, O~kota Maverick, 109. B. Langer Sr"IHh m 9. Ibid., lD9, 119; :>mith, Lar,';jer ~ North Dakota, 154-55. 10. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 44; Geelan, Ddkot 11. Hilkins, "Senator \oIi11iam Langer," 45-46: Burdick, "TI1" I\ 12. Burdick to Mrs. C.H. Frissell, 17 July 1951, Folder 44; fconowics: Price Stabilization, 1945-52, Bo:< 6 Burdick Papers; Burdick, "The 11ar5hall Plan," 2; Langer to R.M. Kiefer and att'lchments, 6 February 1948; Folder 1: Marsh'lll Plan/Maternity Bill, 1949-50, Box 262, Langer Papers; Smith, 177-BO. The question of exports, inflation, and agriculture is a complex one. Wtli le Langer complained that European competition depressed domestic grain prices, 5endtor Robert Taft of Ohio told Nebraska livestock dealers that the Harshall Pldn e: IJ. L 334-47 and Ooenecke, Hot to ~ 'leport No. 1799. 83d Cong., 2.d sess.• 1J July 1954.49. The files of Ohio's ~enator John 1'. 8ricker i1111strate another ',jay in which the 11arshall Plan ",arkI'd against small and medium-size business: European recipients I: Economist, 17J (25 lJecember insisted on spending their subsidies on products mdnufactured by the :::!! York Times Magazine (19 April largest American industridl concerns and refused to patronize the smaller ng~42-4J; Radio Address, 16 companies. See E.C.A., 1949. Box 8B. Papers of John 1'. Bricker, lIhio 41, Papers of JeO/ish Community Kistorical Society. For the connection betlo'een noninterventionist thought ota Historical Society; Langer in tile Cold ~ar era and rural and small business hostility to eastern peeclles. 1949-50. Bo:t. 274, Langer finance and corporate dominance see Joan Lee Bryniarski, Against the ~ ection, Chester Fritz Library, Sendte Opposition to the International ist Foreign Pol icy.Q.i Presidl"nts tion," Congressional Recllrc1, 80th Franklin O. Roosevelt and Karry S. Truman. 1943-1 949lPfiJ). dissertation, 3904-3905. - Universi ty of 11aryland, 197~ 14. Smith. Langel' ~ North Dakota. 16-18. 52-54; EMl J. 8reHI", Usher L. BLlrdick ~ ~1id-l'est Isolationism: !l Study.!.!!. Foreign Policy ~I.A. '1943, Folder 14: Speeches JnG (Grand Forlts: UnpLlblished lJissertation. UNO, 1964). 4-5; Smith. •; Langer to Malone, n.d., Folder Langer of North lJakota. 107. '5, Langer Papers; Geelan, Dakota 15. lLJid" ~~O-21; Burdic;k, "The Selective Service Draft." Con']ressiona 1 Record. 82nd Con']., 2nd sess., 93 (27 February 1952). 1561; North Dakota, 154-55. Ilr. and Ilrs, I'{TTi'dlnGruebels to Burdid. 20 JanLlary 1951. attached to Burdick to Gruebe1s. 2.6 Janudry 1951, Folder 15: Foreign Affairs Misc.• ro" 44; Geelan, Dakota Maverick, 1):'1-5H. Ho~ I, Burdick PdperS; r.,ichae1 ;;t. Sponberg. North Dakota and the • 11 Harch 1946 and J. V. Anderson ;':ot"ean I'dI', 1950-1951: A Study in Public Opinl"'i'i"il(Grand FOrrs: '51! Loan, liar-Apr. 1946, Bo;( 144, Unpubli'.ihed r'I.A. dis'.iert~tiQn-;-lJIiTversity of North Dakota. 1969).24; Srnith. Ldnger ~ North Dakot!, .:2. Lan']er, "American Foreign ~ol icy," 1343; Lange-r to R.A. Stenson. ',n 45-46; Burdick, "The ~1arshall 16. Jild it Here," Folder 36: Till;' ~ ,lanudry l~~J, Folder 1: Foreign ~olicy. 1953-54. 80~ 505, Langer Papers. 5, Orin G. libby Manuscripts ersity of North Dakota; Senate 17. Smith, Lange" of North Dak.ota. 99n. 118-28; Extract of ; Struggle for Survival," quoted AdJres'.i .. on the United I'dtions Charter. n.d•• p. J. Folder 16; ~nd leprint for Our O... n Destruction," :;peeclies I\ddress('s, 1947-4::J, 80)( 2n. Langer Papers; fjilkins. "Senator ~i ,.95, 17 February 1949. 1343. lliam Langer," 43-44. 51. Ldllger occ:asl0nally attacked U.S. economic ilnp~rialism. See his d:iset·tiun that the UN Io'ould permit tne ~10rgan 1. 17 July 1951. Folder 44; irltel'e5ts to e~tabl iS~1 banks "in the four corrlers of the earth." in Lang~,'. ~xcerpt Bo~ 6 Burdick Papers; 8urdick. Iii 1 ,i ns, Senateor I,i', 1 iam 43. AI so s .. e a powerful from a fer and attachments. 6 February 19,15 radleo speeCh in Grlffith. Old Progressives." 344-45. On the UN vote. Lan~['r ~ 8i 11, 1949-50. Bo~ 262. Langer teol'! ceonstitlJent that scv.:!n other Senators privately had said tlldt orts, inflation. and agriculture hI" had vllted ri~lit in opposing U.S. memberShip. See Langer to Jane 11ann. 4 ined that European competition Dctol)er 1945. Folder C unitt'd N 21. Langer, "Diploma.tic and Foreign Service," Congressional Record, 43 (1] July 1947), 8691-8704; Smith, Langer £.!.. North Dalwta, 49-50; EJ\tract of Address on United Nations Charter. 2. 22. Sr.1i th, Langer £i North Dakota, 109-110. 44-45; U.S. Congress, S"nate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on H.R. 9(;78. the Mutual Security Act of 1954, Report NO. 1799, Part II, 8Jd Cong., 20 H'SS., 13 July 1954, 47. 49-50. 23. Srr,i tho Langer £i North Dakota, 51-52; Speech draft, l1.d., Fa1 der 5, Speeches, 1949-50, 80)( 274, Langer Papers. 24. Smith, Lange; £.!. North Dakota, 48; Congressional Record, 78Hi Congr., 1st sess., 89, 8 I~ay 1943, 5025. 25. Burdick Press Release, 12 April 1951, Folder 43: Truman's Refusal to Consult Con9ress on Sending Troops O~erseas--UMT, Box 31, Burdick Papers; Langer, Con~ressiondl Record, 81stCon9., 2d ses., 96, 23 September 1950, 15656-7, For a discLlssTOii" 26. "American Foreign Policy," 13~1: Gee1an, Dakota Ma~erid, 120. 27. Langer to D.C. Ridings, 2~ Marc~ 1944, Folder 4: Foreign Aid Speech, 1955-56, Box 533, Langer Papers.