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Simulating Cyberweapons As Deterrence Against Humanitarian Interventions

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Simulating Cyberweapons As Deterrence Against Humanitarian Interventions Faculty Society and Economics DISCUSSION PAPER THE END OF INTERVENTIONS? Simulating Cyberweapons as Deterrence Against Humanitarian Interventions Christopher Gerritzen No. 6 Discussion Papers in Behavioural Sciences and Economics ISSN 2510-2729 Januar, 2020 Editors Prof. Dr. Thomas Pitz, Hochschule Rhein-Waal, Faculty of Society and Economics, tel.: +49 2821 80673 337, email: [email protected] Prof. Dr. Jörn Sickmann, Hochschule Rhein-Waal, Faculty of Society and Economics, tel.: +49 2821 80673 314, email: [email protected] The discussion papers constitute work in progress. They are circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors. The End of Interventions? Simulating Cyberweapons as Deterrence Against Humanitarian Interventions Christopher Gerritzen Abstract Cyberweapons are frequently discussed in politics, the media, and academic literature when looking at current and future conflict between states or state and non- state actors. It is often thought that cyberweapons – through their deployment in cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism, to name two examples – have the potential to drastically, perhaps even fundamentally, change international relations. A commonly found reasoning for this is the perception of cyberweapons as a tool that will alter the balance of power between states in a way that favors small states and non-state actors due to the vulnerability of high-tech states’ IT systems. This paper will look at one particular scenario in which cyberweapons may have this effect and discuss whether small states can use cyberweapons as deterrence against humanitarian interventions. To answer this question, this paper will first look at the concept of deterrence and deterrence theory. Based on deterrence theory, a simple game of cybered deterrence will be developed taking into account a number of factors. First, the properties of cyberweapons themselves, based on five different cases of cyberattacks and theoretical examinations. Second, whether cyberweapons as deterrence can be credible and the escalation potential that may result from credibility. Third, the history of cyberweapons as a tool in international relations and why military interventions are sometimes stopped before completion. Lastly, the game will be both theoretically analyzed and simulated using reinforcement learning and belief learning. Based on these examinations, the paper will conclude that cyberweapons are at best an unreliable and risky deterrent against military interventions. Keywords: military humanitarian interventions, cyberweapons, cyberdeterrence, cybered deterrence, cross-domain deterrence, simulations, reinforcement learning, belief learning i Acknowledgements This paper was originally written as thesis under the title “Simulating Cyberweapons as Deterrence Against Humanitarian Interventions Using Game Theory and Learning Algorithms – Can Small States use Cyberweapons to Deter Interventions by Powerful, Networked States?” which was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at Hochschule Rhein-Waal in the winter semester of 2018/2019. I am deeply grateful for the helpful support and suggestions of my supervisors during the writing of my thesis. First, Prof. Dr. Thomas Pitz, in particular for supporting the development of the sections relating to the technical and theoretical foundations and simulations of the deterrence game. I also thank him for suggesting the publication of this thesis as discussion paper. Second, Prof. Dr. Alexander Brand, especially for helping with the development of the research question itself to find a focus – humanitarian interventions – in the rather broad topic of cyberweapons as a means of deterrence. I want to thank both very much for their support and for supervising my thesis. ii Table of Contents Abstract......................................................................................................................i Acknowledgements....................................................................................................ii List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................v List of Symbols..........................................................................................................vi List of Figures............................................................................................................viii List of Tables..............................................................................................................ix 1 Introduction.............................................................................................................1 2 Deterrence and Cyberdeterrence.............................................................................3 2.1 The Concept of Deterrence – Rationality and Fear.........................................3 2.1.1 The Deterrence Forecast..........................................................................3 2.1.2 Deterrence and Superiority......................................................................6 2.2 Cyberdeterrence and Cybered Deterrence.......................................................7 2.2.1 Cyberdeterrence.......................................................................................7 2.2.2 Cross-Domain Deterrence.......................................................................8 2.2.3 Cybered Deterrence.................................................................................9 2.2.4 Doctrines of Cybered Deterrence............................................................10 3 Deterrence Theory and Deterrence Games.............................................................13 3.1 Classical and Perfect Deterrence Theory.........................................................13 3.2 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game...................................................17 3.3 Sequential Cybered Deterrence Game.............................................................18 3.4 Defining the Payoffs of the Sequential Cybered Deterrence Game................20 4 Capability (PDT) and Credibility (PDT) of Cybered Deterrence...........................22 4.1 Defining Cyberweapons and Identifying their Capabilities............................23 4.1.1 Attacks on SCADA Systems – Iran, Ukraine, and the Future.................27 4.1.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks and Botnets.................................31 4.1.3 WannaCry and Petya – Ransomware as Cyberweapon?..........................33 4.2 Credibility and Escalation...............................................................................36 4.2.1 The Credibility Problem of Cyberweapons as Deterrent.........................36 4.2.2 Flight or Fight – The Risk of Escalation..................................................39 4.3 Can the Powerful, Networked State be Deterred from Intervening?...............41 4.3.1 Cyberweapons in International Relations – A Success Story?................41 4.3.2 Military Interventions – Is Resistance Futile?.........................................43 iii 4.4 Cybered Deterrence Game..............................................................................45 5 Reinforcement Learning and Belief Learning.........................................................50 6 Simulations of the SCDG and CDG........................................................................54 6.1 Results and Discussion of the CDG Simulations............................................56 6.2 Results and Discussion of the SCDG Simulations..........................................60 7 Conclusion...............................................................................................................63 References..................................................................................................................65 Appendix A Simulation Python Code........................................................................71 A.1 Implementation of Learning Algorithms (experimetrics.py)..........................71 A.2 Configuration File (config.py)........................................................................72 A.3 Sequential Cybered Deterrence Game (seqgame.py).....................................72 A.4 Simulation Series SCDG (simulations_seq_phi-lam-series.py).....................74 A.5 Simulation SCDG (simulations_seq_phi-lam-static.py)................................75 A.6 2x2 Matrix Game (matrixgame.py)................................................................75 A.7 Simulation Series CDG (simulations_matrix_phi-lam-series.py)..................77 A.8 Simulation CDG (simulations_matrix_phi-lam-static.py).............................77 Appendix B Additional Simulation Results and Selected Data Tables......................78 B.1 Data for CDG (RL) A and C (Figure 7 and 8)................................................78 B.2 Data for CDG (BL) A (Figure 9)....................................................................79 B.3 Final Probabilities of State SM Playing R in CDG (ϕ = 0.5; λ = 0.5)............79 B.4 Average S (%) in SCDG Simulations.............................................................80 B.5 Data for SCDG (RL) A and C (Outcome W, Figure 12).................................80 B.6 Data for SCDG (BL) A and C (Outcome W, Figure 13).................................81 B.7 Average T (%) and
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