Limiting Civilian Casualties As Part of a Winning Strategy: the Case of Courageous Restraint

Limiting Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy: The Case of Courageous Restraint

Joseph H. Felter & Jacob N. Shapiro

Abstract: Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws governing their treatment of noncombatants. How much risk to their own forces they must take to limit harm to civilians in the course of military operations, however, is unclear. The principle of proportionality in the law of armed conflict all but necessitates that they make a utilitarian calculation: potential harm to civilians must always be balanced against military value when considering actions that could hurt innocents. In asymmetric conflicts, such as most counterinsurgencies, information flows, collaboration, and ultimately the support of the local population can be key to achieving strategic objectives. Thus, limiting casualties to noncombatants and other actions that alienate the population in these types of conflicts is a key part of a winning strategy. The concept of “courageous restraint” was cre- ated to express this principle to NATO and U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan.

How much risk combat troops must accept in order to avoid harming civilians has long been central to moral and legal arguments about just conduct during war, or jus in bello. In his seminal book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer argues that it is a state’s duty JOSEPH H FELTER . is Senior Re- to accept greater risks for its own military forces as a search Scholar at the Center for International Security and Coop- means to limit harm to noncombatants in the course eration, Research Fellow at the of armed conflict. He provides a vignette from a World Hoover Institution at Stanford Uni- War I British soldier’s memoir for context in support- versity, and Codirector of the Em- ing this assertion. In this particular incident, Walzer pirical Studies of Conflict Project. describes a dilemma faced by British troops as they JACOB N. SHAPIRO is Professor attempt to clear a French town of German soldiers of Politics and International Af- hiding among some of its dwellings. When entering fairs at Princeton University and a home, the British soldiers had the choice of whether Codirector of the Empirical Stud- or not to shout a warning before throwing a grenade ies of Conflict Project. down the cellar stairs. This warning would alert ci- (* See endnotes for complete contributor vilian noncombatants that may be hiding there and biographies.) give them the opportunity to make the British soldiers

44 poised to engage with lethal force aware of tants, just how much risk to their own forc- Joseph H. their presence. Alternatively, however, this es they must take on in the process is nev- Felter & Jacob N. effort to safeguard civilians would also place er completely clear. Indeed, the principle of Shapiro the entering British troops at greater risk proportionality in the law of armed conflict by giving any German soldiers that might all but necessitates that they make a utilitar- also be hiding there the opportunity to at- ian calculation: potential harm to civilians tack first. The soldier who wrote the mem- must always be balanced against military oir admitted that attacking first would have value when considering actions that could felt like murder to him if it resulted in the hurt innocents. And if minimizing civilian death of an innocent French family mem- casualties helps advance strategic goals in ber. According to Walzer’s subsequent anal- certain conflicts, then the standards for pro- ysis, soldiers in such cases are in fact obliged tection might be much higher. to assume increased risk and–in an effort These were the challenges that the Inter- to limit the expected costs in terms of civil- national Security Assistance Force (isaf) ian casualties–issue a verbal warning prior was grappling with in Afghanistan in 2009. to engaging with a grenade.1 Protecting civilian lives had clear military This World War I example rests on a mor- value at a time when isaf and the govern- al argument. From a utilitarian perspective, ment of Afghanistan were competing with however, if the British troops opted to make the Taliban for the allegiance and support themselves safer by throwing the grenade of the population. Standards of action that without warning, it would matter little entailed protections for civilians, which for the ultimate outcome of the conflict. were appropriate for interstate wars, and While the resulting French civilian casual- met requirements under international law ties would be tragic, might weigh heavily on were not necessarily protective enough. the consciences of those responsible, and That observation prompted senior leaders could potentially encourage in-kind retali- within the organization to call for great- ation from the Germans, they would be of er restraint when engaging an enemy that little military consequence. In convention- operated in close proximity to the civilian al interstate conflict, civilian casualties do population. This increased emphasis on little to inhibit the ability of military forc- limiting civilian casualties, what became es to mass firepower on enemy objectives, known as courageous restraint, was deemed seize terrain, and ultimately achieve victo- critical to achieving strategic success. ry at the strategic level. In this essay, we first describe the genesis Asymmetric intrastate conflicts are dif- of courageous restraint in Afghanistan and ferent. In conflicts like those in Afghani- discuss the arguments made for it on moral stan, Colombia, Iraq, Northern Nigeria, Pa- and legal grounds, as well as in terms of the kistan, and the Philippines, to name just a expected impact on the success of isaf’s few, information flows, collaboration, and campaign. We then highlight the challeng- ultimately support of the local population es it faced in execution at the tactical lev- are key to achieving strategic objectives. el. We conclude with a discussion of the Limiting casualties to noncombatants and enduring lessons that can be learned from other actions that alienate the population isaf’s experience implementing coura- have clear military value in such conflicts. geous restraint and its implications for the But while military commanders in all types preparation and execution of future conflict. of war have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws In late spring 2009, nearly a decade after governing their treatment of noncomba- the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan top-

146 (1) Winter 2017 45 The Case of pled the Taliban and drove Al Qaeda from than calling for a troop increase, General Courageous its former safe havens, the United States McChrystal determined that isaf need- Restraint remained at war and, by most measurable ed to fundamentally change how it operat- standards, the war was not going well. Ac- ed in Afghanistan down to the level of how cording to nato/isaf statistics, there was soldiers and small units interacted with a 156 percent increase in attacks on Afghan the populations living where they were de- government infrastructure for the period ployed. Specifically, he was concerned with of January to May 2009 compared with the impact of the mounting civilian casu- January to May 2008; a 152 percent increase alties that isaf was responsible for and his in complex attacks (those involving more command’s relationship with the popula- than one means of attack, such as small tion it was ostensibly deployed to protect. arms plus ied, or more than twenty insur- Reflecting on this assessment, General Mc- gents); and an increase of between 21 and Chrystal recalls, “I quickly came to the con- 78 percent in total attacks across the five clusion–and had been talking about this Regional Commands within Afghanistan.2 for years–if we didn’t change the Afghan Newly elected President Barrack Obama people’s perceptions about our use of pow- considered Afghanistan a war of necessi- er, then we were going to lose them.”4 ty, not of choice like Iraq, but his admin- On July 2, 2009, General McChrystal is- istration, like much of the U.S. public, was sued a revised tactical directive for isaf. not willing to expend American blood and The directive outlined policies for the em- resources indefinitely in pursuit of their ployment of air delivered munitions, indi- campaign’s objectives. rect fires (such as artillery and mortars), In a very visible manifestation of the and other weapon systems, intending to dissatisfaction with the status quo, Secre- reduce isaf-caused civilian casualties and tary of Defense Robert Gates called for the other collateral damage.5 The principles resignation of General David McKiernan, and command intent laid out in this doc- commander of U.S. and Coalition Forces ument would make up the foundation of in Afghanistan, in early May 2009, citing the Commander of International Securi- the need for “fresh thinking” and “fresh ty Assistance Force’s (comisaf) calls for eyes” on Afghanistan.3 Lieutenant Gener- restraint and tactical patience when deter- al Stanley McChrystal, the storied Army mining how much force to employ in cer- Ranger and Special Operations Forces tain battlefield conditions. commander who led the Joint Special Op- The tactical directive remains a classified erations Command (jsoc) from 2004 to document, but portions of it have been re- 2008, was tapped as McKiernan’s replace- leased in an effort to educate a wider audi- ment and leader of the new direction in Af- ence. The carefully worded and personal- ghanistan. Shortly after taking command, ly authored passages provide both insight he called for a comprehensive assessment and clarity on why General McChyrstal, as of isaf’s mission, objectives, and strategy. comisaf, was determined to limit the ci- Based on the findings of the June 2009 vilian casualties caused by isaf and his in- assessment, General McChrystal request- tent for how isaf troops were expected to ed an additional forty thousand troops to exercise the restraint required to achieve “surge” to Afghanistan later that year and these ends. help provide much needed physical secu- This was not a case in which the com- rity to facilitate the broader aspects of a mander was inherently conservative about comprehensive counterinsurgency cam- using force. General McChrystal com- paign plan. Perhaps even more significant manded elite counter-terrorist operatives

46 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences in jsoc at the height of the conflict in Iraq. tion and limits civilian casualties and col- Joseph H. In this role, he maintained a near singular lateral damage. The revised tactical di- Felter & Jacob N. focus on killing and capturing high-value rective and these additional documents Shapiro targets and weakening terrorist networks provided the basis for the concept of cou- through attrition of key leaders and indi- rageous restraint. viduals. But conditions in Afghanistan in comisaf guidance and intent were em- 2009 and his role as the theater commander phatic. isaf soldiers are expected to oper- obliged him to expand, if not shift, his em- ate in ways consistent with protecting the phasis. To ensure that isaf’s tactical and population and limiting civilian casualties. operational actions supported the overar- None of these directives explicitly denied ching strategy he was responsible for pur- isaf soldiers the ability to defend them- suing, he wrote: selves, but they set explicit and implicit ex- We must fight the insurgents, and will use pectations that isaf troops would exercise the tools at our disposal to both defeat the restraint on the battlefield when civilian enemy and protect our forces. We will not lives were potentially in danger. They ac- win based on the number of Taliban killed, knowledged that exercising this restraint but instead on our ability to separate insur- might require commanders and individu- gents from the center of gravity–the peo- al soldiers to accept an increased degree of ple. That means we must respect and pro- risk as part of their effort to reduce casual- tect the population from coercion and vio- ties to the civilian population. lence–and operate in a manner which will There was consensus between the win their support. . . . I recognize that the comisaf and a number of senior leaders carefully controlled and disciplined employ- that soldiers exhibiting courageous re- ment of force entails risk to our troops–and straint should be recognized for their ac- we must work to mitigate that risk wherev- tions. The isaf Counterinsurgency Adviso- er possible. But excessive use of force result- ry and Assistance Team (caat) responsible ing in an alienated population produces far for helping communicate comisaf intent greater risks. We must understand this real- to isaf troops in the field described this ity at every level in our force. I expect lead- interest: “We routinely and systematical- ers at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use ly recognize valor, courage, and effective- of force like close air support (cas) against ness during kinetic combat operations. . . . residential compounds and other locations In a coin [counterinsurgency] campaign, likely to produce civilian casualties in ac- however, it is critical to also recognize that sometimes the most effective bullet is the cordance with this guidance. Commanders 9 must weigh the gain of using cas against bullet not fired.” Nick Carter, a British ma- the cost of civilian casualties, which in the jor general and commander of Regional long run make mission success more diffi- Command South, which included the vol- cult and turn the Afghan people against us.6 atile provinces of both Kandahar and Hel- mand at the time, went as far as advocat- In addition to modifications of the tac- ing for the creation of a medal recognizing tical directive, isaf also issued new coun- isaf soldiers and marines for exercising re- terinsurgency guidance,7 a revision of its straint when appropriate on the battlefield. standard operating procedures (sop) for According to Carter, restraint and tactical the escalation of force,8 and a tactical driv- patience should be viewed as an “act of dis- ing directive, all of which shared a com- cipline and courage not much different than mon theme of directing isaf members to those seen in combat actions.”10 Broader operate in a way that protects the popula- support for establishing a special award for

146 (1) Winter 2017 47 The Case of courageous restraint never gained traction to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, Courageous within isaf, but the increased emphasis by incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil- Restraint the comisaf and senior leaders within the ians and damage to civilian objects. command on reducing civilian casualties 3) Refrain from deciding to launch any at- was palpable and could be felt down to the tack which may be expected to cause inci- lowest echelons in the field. dental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination Why did the comisaf demand that isaf thereof, which would be excessive in rela- troops exercise courageous restraint? For tion to the concrete and direct military ad- one, protecting the population by exercis- vantage anticipated.13 ing restraint in combat and assuming risks to avoid civilian casualties is consistent with Succinctly, failing to distinguish between international law. Additional Protocol I of civilian and military targets is a war crime the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977, as defined under the provisions of Proto- lays out the signatories’ obligations with re- col I. For most of the war, isaf units took spect to protecting victims of internation- great pains to follow the standards of dis- al armed conflicts.11 Article 51, “Protection tinction and proportionality enshrined in of the Civilian Population,” describes types the 1977 Conventions. By mid-2009, howev- of indiscriminate attacks prohibited by the er, a bias toward greater caution and a high treaty, including, for example: threshold of military advantage to justify actions that risked civilian lives was seen as 1) An attack by bombardment by any meth- ensuring compliance with the law of armed ods or means which treats as a single mili- conflict. tary objective a number of clearly separated Beyond the moral and legal incentives and distinct military objectives located in a outlined above, however, exercising re- city, town, village or other area containing straint in asymmetric conflicts can be stra- a similar concentration of civilians or civil- tegic; it has become a key component of ian objects. successful counterinsurgency, such as in 2) An attack which may be expected to cause Afghanistan. Looking back on this time, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil- General McChrystal explained: “So what ians, damage to civilian objects, or a combi- we were trying to do was tell people–and nation thereof, which would be excessive in I was trying to communicate it in a way relation to the concrete and direct military that emphasized that the only thing that advantage anticipated.12 matters here is winning. Now, the only way we win is not by killing more Taliban, but Article 57, “Precautions in Attack,” fur- by convincing people of the efficacy of our ther requires that “in the conduct of mil- strategy, and of our commitment to their itary operations, constant care shall be protection. I still passionately believe that taken to spare the civilian population, ci- this is absolutely the right answer.”14 Gen- vilians and civilian objects.” This article eral McChrystal’s perspective is ground- explicitly mandates that combatants: ed both in concerns about how the Afghan population perceived isaf and in a long 1) Do everything feasible to verify that the tradition of scholarship and practice that objectives to be attacked are neither civil- identified gaining cooperation from non- ians nor civilian objects. combatants as a critical part of winning a 2) Take all feasible precautions in the choice counterinsurgency campaign. Insurgent of means and methods of attack with a view leaders–from Mao Tse-tung (1937) to Che

48 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Guevara (1960) to Marighella (1969)–em- the civilian population. Of note, this Ma- Joseph H. phasize the criticality of earning popular rine unit was among the most successful in Felter & Jacob N. support so as to ensure insurgents can op- the theater at locating ieds and detonating Shapiro erate undetected by government forces. them (so they no longer presented a risk) This view was echoed by a large group of in the months following the crowd inci- Western counterinsurgency theorists who dent, largely owing to the battalion’s abili- fought against communist insurgents in ty to get tips from local Afghans regarding the postcolonial period, including Rog- the locations of these bombs. Thus, as the er Trinquier, Robert Taber, David Galula, unit’s commanders acknowledged, build- David Clutterbuck, E. P. Thompson, and ing a strong relationship with the local Af- Frank Kitson. Recent work by American ghans provided their best protection.15 counterinsurgency practitioners drawing There are many anecdotal accounts of lessons from Vietnam and Iraq, including isaf members attributing the importance Kalev Sepp, David Petraeus, Robert Cassi- of their relationship with the local popula- dy, and H. R. McMaster, emphasize the im- tion with facilitating information sharing portance of earning good will and avoiding and other forms of collaboration to tacti- actions that discourage cooperative non- cal and operational level success. Measur- combatant behavior because civilians can ing attacks that did not occur (dogs that provide valuable intelligence. do not bark) is difficult, but quantitative A compelling example of the tangible re- tools provide some options. By using the turns that can be gained from displaying fine-grained administrative data collect- restraint and tactical patience can be seen ed in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, we in the experience of a U.S. Marine unit op- can assess the impact of inadvertent kill- erating in the Garmsir District of the vola- ings of civilians by both sides, the tragic tile Helmand Province in January 2010. In side-effects of conflict, on subsequent vi- this case, the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines olence and other outcomes. In prior work, were confronted by a large and overtly an- we and our colleagues have found substan- gry crowd of local Afghans enraged by the tial econometric evidence that harming ci- rumor that members of the U.S. military vilians can hurt counterinsurgent efforts. had defaced a Koran. It escalated and the In Iraq, insurgent attacks increased mod- visibly frustrated locals began to throw estly for a one- to two-week period follow- rocks and bricks, many of which struck the ing Coalition-caused civilian casualties; young Marines that had formed a perim- the median Coalition-caused incident led eter surrounded by the rioting Afghans. A to approximately two additional attacks number of Marines suffered concussions over the next two weeks in the average dis- and other serious injuries; however, while trict.16 Moving up to the province level, the justified by their rules of engagement, no next higher geographic unit, the flow of in- Marines responded through an escalation formation to Coalition forces on tip lines of force. Eventually, word that the Koran also dropped following such casualties for burning was in fact a rumor planted by a one-week period. In 2007 and early 2008, the Taliban subdued the crowd and they the median Coalition-caused civilian inci- dispersed without further incident. The dent led to approximately 1.6 fewer tips in courageous restraint exercised by these the following week.17 Afghan public opin- disciplined Marines and their small unit ion in 2012 was significantly more favor- leadership prevented a dangerous situa- able to the Taliban relative to isaf for peo- tion from escalating to something much ple who reported suffering harm from isaf worse and avoided inflicting casualties on operations.18 And in all three cases, the ef-

146 (1) Winter 2017 49 The Case of fects were asymmetric: government forc- tory, a kill-or-be-killed exercise in survival Courageous es and their allies paid a greater penalty for from the perspectives of those closest to the Restraint causing the same level of harm as the Tal- fighting. It was difficult to convince these iban did, though both sides paid a cost for forces that accepting risk in a combat situ- harming civilians in terms of attitudes, in- ation–deliberately jeopardizing the lives formation flow, and subsequent attacks. and safety of one’s own forces–may be the Similar effects on insurgent attacks were optimal response in strategic terms. Neu- seen in Afghanistan. In April 2010, mem- tralizing imminent lethal threats to yourself bers of the isaf caat conducted an em- and fellow comrades using the most effec- pirical study of the impact of civilian ca- tive weapons systems and firepower avail- sualties on future insurgent-initiated vi- able is a near reflexive action for combatants olence. The comprehensive study–later struggling to survive and triumph in the heat briefed to the comisaf and isaf senior of battle with all the fear and visceral emo- leaders–found evidence that civilian tions that accompany it. Exercising restraint deaths caused by isaf led to increased at- may very well be a morally correct and stra- tacks against Coalition Forces that persist- tegic response, but is exceptionally challeng- ed for fourteen weeks. Interestingly, civil- ing to implement for those expected to pay ian casualties increased violence directed the devastating human costs that can result against isaf whether the Taliban or Coa- from showing restraint. lition was responsible for the casualties, A U.S. Army Ranger company command- though the impact was much larger for er described an incident involving another isaf-caused incidents.19 company in his battalion that underscored It is not surprising that civilian casualties the reality troops faced when operating in alienated the population, shifted support compliance with aspects of the tactical di- away from isaf, and contributed to an in- rective: crease in violent attacks directed at coali- They were on target and began taking fire tion forces. And compelling empirical ev- from a two-story compound. One of the idence of this causal relationship further Rangers was seriously wounded. The Pla- validated isaf’s emphasis on restraint. toon maneuvered and suppressed the tar- General McChrystal reflected: “That re- get but based on the thickness of the walls ally affected me. Because I remember the were unable to neutralize the threat. They takeaway from that [caat Civcas Brief] fired 40mm,M 320 rounds, M240L, and mul- was, no matter who causes violence in an tiple M3 Carl Gustaf rounds without any suc- area–you do it or the enemy–it makes the cess.21 They then requested permission to area less secure and less stable over time. utilize a Hellfire (air to ground missile) from Get down the violence, period, and then 20 a support Apache (attack helicopter), and you can start other things.” were denied. They were told to withdraw and return to base. These types of missions Despite the moral, legal, and strategic jus- were the hardest to explain to the guys who tification for courageous restraint, it met sig- were risking all and feeling that they weren’t nificant resistance from many of the indi- always supported based on the need to pre- vidual soldiers and marines in the field who vent the strategic negative.22 were asked to use it, at least as interpreted by their immediate chain of command. Small Another experienced U.S. Army Ranger unit combat in the restive areas of Helmand, commander, deployed to Afghanistan in Kandahar, the Korengal Valley, and other 2010, believed a major aspect driving the hot spots remained, as it has throughout his- Rangers to comply with the directives was

50 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences fear that their actions would be responsible contact with the enemy. Traditionally, Joseph H. for getting their unit in trouble with the se- soldiers were rewarded for aggressive ac- Felter & Jacob N. nior isaf leadership: “We did not want to tions on the battlefield that inflicted -ca Shapiro be responsible for shutting down the Task sualties or damage on the enemy. A U.S. Force [special operations unit]. My Rang- infantry officer serving in Afghanistan at ers understood the importance [of the tacti- the time recounted: “The first tactical di- cal directive], but having been on a few hun- rectives were the hardest to embrace, be- dred raids, I saw that no matter how well we cause we had gone from total freedom of did we were horrible at the io [information maneuver in Iraq and in the early years in operations] fight and that once we left the Afghanistan to a more constrained mo in target anything could be said and a Presi- the later years in Afghanistan. Eventual- dential Inquiry from Karzai typically just ly, we figured out that Afghanistan in the reinforced the negative story.”23 2010s was more politically sensitive, and Civilian casualties were at times difficult we adjusted our attitudes and tactics ac- to avoid in the course of operations, even cordingly.”25 Additionally, the notion that when the restraint and tactical patience restraint on the battlefield should be rec- called for from the updated isaf direc- ognized and rewarded was not consistent tives were followed. A special operations with how soldiers were trained and large- mission in Ghazni province in 2010 rep- ly not how they had operated in previous resents one particularly extreme example. tours to date. Choosing to avoid kinetic The Rangers maneuvering during this raid engagements with the enemy under some came under fire from a compound on the conditions to avoid civilian casualties and target and they responded with well-aimed support strategic objectives is a tough sell fire at the combatants engaging them. In for troops at the tactical level. the course of this engagement, some of General McChrystal described how isaf the small arms rounds fired by the Rang- troops that were able to work closely with ers passed through the torso of the enemy the local population were much more in- combatant and struck a woman behind clined to appreciate the critical importance him not visible to the Rangers. An official of protecting civilians than were those inquiry conducted by the Ranger unit sup- that had little real contact with Afghans: ported the information and images collect- “When these people were in an area for a ed on target. A subsequent Afghan pres- long time, and they got enough interaction idential inquiry, however, concluded in- with the local population so that they could stead that the U.S. military members were see the complexity of that situation, they’re not provoked or in any danger when they the ones who get it.”26 killed multiple women and children and even claimed that there were not any Tal- The command emphasis on reducing ci- iban at the residence where the civilians vilian casualties had a significant impact were killed. This type of misinformation on the number of civilian casualties at- from the Afghan government at that time tributed to progovernment forces. In the was a most frustrating aspect and chal- year following General McChrystal’s com- lenge to the implementation of the tacti- mand directives, there was a 28 percent re- cal directives for isaf forces.24 duction in casualties attributed to Ameri- A significant challenge in garnering sup- can, nato, and Afghan forces; deaths from port for courageous restraint was over- aerial attacks fell by more than one-third.27 coming the inertia and default behavior Figure 1 shows the time-series of com- within the ranks when U.S. forces made bat incidents and two measures of civilian

146 (1) Winter 2017 51 The Case of Figure 1 Courageous Time-Series of Combat Incidents and Two Measures of Civilian Casualties Restraint

Source: Figure generated from data used in Luke N. Condra, Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq,” nber Working Paper #16152 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). Combat incidents data tracked by isaf were extracted from the Combined Information Data Network Exchange database, https://www.issinc.com/cidne/. Civilian casualty incidents were recorded by the isaf Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell.

casualties, as recorded by the isaf Civil- week moving average of insurgent-caused ian Casualty Tracking Cell, from January civilian casualties (killed plus wounded) 2009 through January 2010. The top pan- per combat incident. This is a measure el shows the four-week moving average of of how much risk civilians faced from in- combat incidents per week: combat vio- surgents given the intensity of combat. lence rises throughout summer 2009 and Throughout the period, there were ap- then begins to dip in the fall and into the proximately 0.15 civilian casualties caused winter. The middle panel shows the four- by insurgents per combat incident. The

52 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences bottom panel shows the four-week mov- straint were hopeful that the new comisaf Joseph H. ing average of isaf-caused civilian casual- would revise or even retract some of his Felter & Jacob N. ties (killed plus wounded) per combat in- predecessor’s policies and address a direc- Shapiro cident. This is a measure of how much risk tive that some perceived as overly restrictive civilians faced from isaf given the inten- of their right to defend themselves. A senior sity of combat. Prior to General McChrys- British noncommissioned officer in Sangin, tal’s revised tactical directive, isaf forces Helmand Province, lamented at the time: caused approximately 0.04 civilian casual- “Our hands are tied the way we are asked ties per combat incident. Afterward, that to do courageous restraint. I agree with it number dropped in half, to 0.02. to the extent that previously too many ci- These data highlight two important pat- vilians were killed but we have got people terns. First and foremost, civilians were at shooting us and we are not allowed to shoot much greater risk from insurgents in 2009. back. Courageous restraint is a lot easier to Second, the risk to civilians from isaf-given say than to implement.”29 levels of combat dropped substantially start- General Petraeus literally “wrote the ing in late May 2009, when the comisaf book” on population centric counterin- began emphasizing civilian casualties as a surgency, however, and the emphasis he threat to accomplishing the mission. The placed in principle on limiting civilian ca- courageous restraint concept was clearly sualties reflected more continuities than being adopted by isaf personnel. differences with that of his predecessor.30 But these measures not only protected But the new comisaf appreciated the mis- civilians; the restrictions on the applica- givings voiced from soldiers in the field and tion of firepower protected the Taliban as amplified up the chain of command and, in well. This was likely a contributing factor some cases, all the way to their representa- in the dramatic overall increase in civilian tives in Congress. He was concerned that deaths during the year that courageous re- his predecessor’s policies on tactical level straint was implemented given that the restraint and restrictions on employment large majority of civilian deaths recorded of force had gone too far. He implemented were attributed to actions initiated by the key revisions to the explicit content as well Taliban. Additionally, in some instances, as interpretation of comisaf guidance to the increased restrictions on the use of fire- isaf troops operating in the field.31 power disappointed isaf partners in the Comparing the updated tactical direc- Afghan National Security Force who de- tive that General Petraeus issued in July pended on U.S. firepower as a key combat 2010 with McChrystal’s 2009 version, it multiplier and thus were not always sup- is clear that General Petraeus’s directive portive of isaf units’ decisions to restrict strived to alter the risk relationship/bal- their employment of these resources even ance between Afghan civilians and the U.S. when available.28 military.32 The 2009 directive acknowledged that “the carefully controlled and General David Petraeus took command of disciplined use of force entails risk to our isaf in a subdued ceremony on July 4, 2010, troops”33 and that the imperative to pro- following the abrupt departure of Gener- tect forces may at some level, in some con- al McChrystal in the wake of the publica- ditions, be subordinate to protecting civil- tion of an article in Rolling Stone magazine in ian populations. General Petraeus’s revi- which his subordinates were quoted mak- sion of the tactical directive one year later ing disparaging remarks about senior U.S. explicitly put protection of Afghan civil- political leaders. Critics of courageous re- ians and protection of service members as

146 (1) Winter 2017 53 The Case of equal moral imperatives. Importantly, he have to be interpreted by junior leaders and Courageous adds additional emphasis that no mem- individual soldiers in the context of the sit- Restraint bers of isaf would be denied the right to uation and local conditions at hand. “I can- defend themselves, nor could any subor- not prescribe the appropriate use of force dinate commander make further restric- for every condition that a complex battle- tions to his guidance. field will produce, so I expect our forces to General Petraeus emphasized, howev- internalize and operate in accordance with er, that he expected isaf troops to display my intent. Following this intent requires a what he termed “tactical patience” in their cultural shift within our forces–and com- operations, which was largely consistent plete understanding at every level–down with the intent of courageous restraint. to the most junior soldiers. I expect lead- General Petraeus admonished coalition ers to ensure this is clearly communicated forces in his revised directive: “We must and continually reinforced.”35 When sol- continue–indeed, redouble–our efforts diers, marines, and other combatants are to reduce the loss of innocent civilian life asked why they performed in a certain way to an absolute minimum. Every Afghan ci- in the heat of combat, they are likely to re- vilian death diminishes our cause.”34 Thus, spond: “I did what we were trained to do.” the war effort at isaf continued with a In the stress, uncertainty, and ambiguity of comisaf committed to limiting civilian combat, individuals’ behavior defaults to casualties from isaf operations. While how they were trained. It’s critical to con- courageous restraint du jour left with Gen- tinue to invest in the quality of junior lead- eral McChrystal, the de facto emphasis on ers and training of all combatants and en- being prepared to assume risk to avoid ci- sure that their preparation and training vilian casualties endured and was largely provides a base to draw on when making consistent with the ongoing comprehen- these split-second life and death decisions sive population-centric counterinsurgency both for themselves, the enemy they are strategy pursued. attempting to engage, and the noncombatants potentially caught in the crossfire. Exercising restraint and limiting non- “ combatant casualties is nearly always jus- Right now we’re losing the tactical-level tified on moral grounds and according to fight in the chase for a strategic victory. How the applicable international law and con- long can that be sustained?”36 The exasper- ventions. The aggregate returns on accept- ated U.S. military officer making these re- ing risks at the tactical level, however, vary marks in the spring of 2010 cast doubt on based on the characteristics of the conflict. the tactical restraint and emphasis on re- Enforcing policies that call for discrim- ducing civilian casualties that isaf was inate use of firepower and exercising re- promoting at this time. To him, no strate- straint in its application can be a net gain gic goal was worth, or could survive, contin- for states combating insurgency and oth- ual tactical failure. But asking isaf troops er internal threats. The anticipated gains to embrace and display courageous restraint from such restraint, however, will vary, was made with clear strategic objectives in and developing an appreciation of where mind. Sun Tzu allegedly warned, “Strategy and under what conditions these gains are without tactics is the slowest route to vic- most significant is important to under- tory. Tactics without strategy is the noise stand. General McChrystal, in his 2009 before defeat.”37 This ancient dictum still tactical directive, acknowledges that the applies today in that tactical gains are irrel- document outlined his intent but would evant unless they are accompanied by an

54 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences overarching strategy that links the outcome where information and support from the Joseph H. of individual engagements to achieving a civilian population are critical enablers for Felter & Jacob N. larger political goal. success. Voluntarily displaying such re- Shapiro We recognize that striking the balance straint is a challenging concept to inter- between fostering conditions necessary nalize, however, especially for troops who to make gains at the strategic level and expect to make contact with a deadly ene- achieving tactical objectives, including my and are trained and conditioned to de- force protection, is difficult, and ultimately cisively bring to bear the superior combat believe the answer is conditional. In cases power they possess. The near-term risks of asymmetric counterinsurgency, popular and costs of exercising this restraint are support and willingness to share informa- very clear to soldiers exercising it, where- tion can be significantly impacted by per- as its anticipated strategic benefits in the ceptions and judgments shaped by tactical longer term are far less compelling at the level actions and activities. Thus, tactics tactical level–especially in the heat of the that are effective in the moment of an en- moment in combat. For commanders and gagement, such as the employment of ar- soldiers in the field, the optimal level of re- tillery or large volumes of heavy weapons straint–if any–in a given situation will fire, can undermine overarching strategic vary based on a multitude of dynamic fac- ends in ways not experienced in symmetric tors and conditions. conflict, where support and information Investments in education and training, from the population are less consequen- as well as in quality leadership down to tial. If victory is defined in comprehensive the small unit level, can increase combat- terms, the route to achieve it must reflect ants’ capacity to make decisions tailored to the concerns that courageous restraint was the prevailing tactical and strategic condi- designed and intended to address. tions. In the heat of combat, however, the Protecting the population as a means to decisions that impact the lives of soldiers garner greater popular support and accept- and noncombatants alike and that can in- ing increased risk to forces in order to lim- fluence the strategic direction of a mili- it casualties to noncombatants pays off in tary campaign are complex dilemmas of- some cases under some conditions and less ten only made clear in hindsight, if ever. so in others. Courageous restraint was al- Ultimately, third-party counterinsurgen- ways intended to be interpreted in case- cy campaigns such as the U.S.-led effort in and situation-specific contexts. As General Afghanistan can only be as effective and le- McChrystal acknowledged, “I wrote [the gitimate as the governments they support. tactical directive] not to prescribe tactical Limiting harm to civilians in areas where decisions for sergeants and junior officers government authority is contested is not closest to the fight, but to help them under- only a moral imperative but also an impor- stand the underlying logic of the approach tant component of any comprehensive I was asking them to employ.”38 The po- strategy to achieve victory in these con- tential returns on exercising restraint and flicts. It can provide near-term tactical ad- tactical patience on the battlefield must vantages and buttress efforts to convince be recognized and anticipated by military civilians to support the government. When leaders at the small unit level. the incumbent government is viewed as Measures intended to minimize civil- corrupt, unrepresentative, or otherwise ian casualties such as courageous restraint illegitimate, however, even the most dis- can be a strategic net gain for forces com- criminate military forces of the state and bating insurgencies and in other conflicts its allies will be constrained in their abili-

146 (1) Winter 2017 55 The Case of ty to gain the support from the population es engaged in the complex struggle to com- Courageous needed to roll back insurgent threats, much bat insurgent threats, this is the essence of Restraint less to sustain that support and prevent a the challenge. return to violence. For many military forc-

endnotes * JOSEPH H. FELTER is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Co- operation, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Codirector of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who led the International Security and Assistance Force, Counterinsurgency Advisory and As- sistance Team in Afghanistan. He has published articles in journals such as the Journal of Politi- cal Economy, Journal of Conflict Resolution, American Economic Review, Foreign Policy, and Foreign Affairs. JACOB N. SHAPIRO is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Codirector of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. He is the author of The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (2013) and coauthor of Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq (2016). His research has been published in a vari- ety of academic and policy journals. Shapiro received the 2016 Karl Deutsch Award from isa given to the scholar younger than forty or within ten years of earning a Ph.D. who has made the most significant contribution to the study of international relations. 1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 152–154. 2 International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, Unclassified Metrics (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, May 2009). 3 Ann Scott Tyson, “Gen. David McKiernan Ousted as Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2009/05/11/AR2009051101864.html. 4 Felter telephone interview with General Stanley McChrystal, May 24, 2015. 5 General Stanley McChrystal, Tactical Directive (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, July 6, 2009), http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. 6 Ibid. 7 Stanley A. McChrystal and Michael T. Hall, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, August, 2009), http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official _texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf. 8 For a discussion of isaf sop 373, “Escalation of Force,” see International Security Assistance Force, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, “coin is a Mindset,” COIN Common Sense 1 (1) (February 2010), http://www.rs.nato.int/COIN-publication/feb10.pdf. 9 nato-otan, “Honoring Courageous Restraint,” press release, http://www.rs.nato.int/article/ caat-anaysis-news/honoring-courageous-restraint.html. 10 Sebastian Abbot, “A Medal for ‘Courageous Restraint’? nato Seeks to Avoid Killing Afghan Noncombatants,” Associated Press, May 4, 2010, http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/ 2010/05/a_medal_for_courageous_restrai.html. 11 For excerpts from Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, see International Com- mittee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (ProtocolI ), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc .org/ihl/INTRO/470. For the complete original document, see International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Pro- tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (ProtocolI ) (Geneva: United Nations, June 8, 1977), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html.

56 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 12 International Committee of the Red Cross, Article 51, “Protection of the Civilian Population,” Joseph H. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of In- Felter & ternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750065. Jacob N. Shapiro 13 International Committee of the Red Cross, Article 57 “Precautions in Attack,” Protocol Addi- tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/9ac284404d38 ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c. 14 Felter telephone interview with General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal, May 24, 2015. 15 Comments recorded by Felter following a Command Conference in Afghanistan in March 2010. 16 Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collat- eral Damage,” American Journal of Political Science (56) (1) (2012). The median district in Iraq had about ninety thousand occupants, but most districts with significant violence were larger. 17 Andrew Shaver and Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War,” hicn Working Paper #210 (Brighton, United Kingdom: House- holds in Conflict Network, 2016). 18 Jason Lyall, Kosuke Imai, and Yuki Shiraito, “Coethnic Bias and Wartime Informing,” Amer- ican Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., January 25, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2301467##. 19 Dr. Radha Iyengar, a Princeton-trained economist working at the caat while on leave from the London School of Economics, presented findings from this analysis to General McChrystal, isaf staff, and subordinate units via video teleconference. See Luke N. Condra, Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghan- istan and Iraq,” nber Working Paper #16152 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco- nomic Research, 2010). 20 Felter telephone interview with General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal, May 24, 2015. 21 These weapon systems refer to rapid-fire grenades, heavy machine guns, and a Swedish-made recoilless rifle similar to a bazooka, respectively. 22 Interview between Felter and a U.S. Army major with extensive combat experience with the 75th Ranger Regiment in Iraq and Afghanistan, Stanford, California, June 1, 2015. 23 Interview with sof Major and former Ranger Company Commander, May 28, 2015. 24 Vignette provided by a U.S. Army Ranger officer during an interview with Felter on May 28, 2015. 25 Interview with sof Major, May 28, 2015. 26 Felter telephone interview with General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal, May 24, 2015. 27 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, March 2011), i–1, https://unama.unmissions .org/sites/default/files/engi_version_of_poc_annual_report_2011.pdf. 28 Author discussion with a U.S. Brigade Combat Team (bct) commander regarding the challenges of implementing the isaf tactical directive during a visit to his headquarters in Southern Afghanistan in February 2010. 29 Thomas Harding, “Courageous Restraint Putting Troops Lives at Risk,” The Telegraph, July 6, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7874950/Courageous -restraint-putting-troops-lives-at-risk.html. 30 Then-Lieutenant General Petraeus was a lead author of Field Manual 3-24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. See David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, Coun- terinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department

146 (1) Winter 2017 57 The Case of of the Navy, and United States Marine Corps, December 15, 2006), http://usacac.army.mil/ Courageous cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf. Restraint 31 Felter conversation with General (ret.) David Petraeus, Simi Valley, California, November 7, 2015. 32 Chris Jenks, “Agency of Risk: The Competing Balance Between Protecting Military Forces and the Civilian Population during Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan,” in Coun- terinsurgency Law: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare, ed. William Banks (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2013), 109. 33 McChrystal, Tactical Directive. 34 International Security Assistance Force, “General Petraeus Issues Updated Tactical Directive: Emphasizes ‘Disciplined Use of Force,’” news release, August 4, 2008, accessed at https:// www.dvidshub.net/news/53931/gen-petraeus-issues-updated-tactical-directive-emphasizes -disciplined-use-force. 35 Excerpts from McChrystal, Tactical Directive. 36 C. J. Chivers, “General Faces Unease among His Own Troops, Too,” The New York Times, June 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/asia/23troops.html. 37 This quote is widely attributed to Sun Tzu but is not found in any of his translated works. See Harsh V. Pant, “India’s China Policy: Devoid of a Strategic Framework,” South Asian Survey 12 (2) (September 2005): 290. 38 Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Penguin, 2013), 312.

58 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences