Limiting Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy: The Case of Courageous Restraint Joseph H. Felter & Jacob N. Shapiro Abstract: Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws governing their treatment of noncombatants. How much risk to their own forces they must take to limit harm to civilians in the course of military operations, however, is unclear. The princi- ple of proportionality in the law of armed conflict all but necessitates that they make a utilitarian calcu- lation: potential harm to civilians must always be balanced against military value when considering ac- tions that could hurt innocents. In asymmetric conflicts, such as most counterinsurgencies, information flows, collaboration, and ultimately the support of the local population can be key to achieving strategic objectives. Thus, limiting casualties to noncombatants and other actions that alienate the population in these types of conflicts is a key part of a winning strategy. The concept of “courageous restraint” was cre- ated to express this principle to NATO and U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan. How much risk combat troops must accept in or- der to avoid harming civilians has long been central to moral and legal arguments about just conduct during war, or jus in bello. In his seminal book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer argues that it is a state’s duty JOSEPH H FELTER . is Senior Re- to accept greater risks for its own military forces as a search Scholar at the Center for International Security and Coop- means to limit harm to noncombatants in the course eration, Research Fellow at the of armed conflict. He provides a vignette from a World Hoover Institution at Stanford Uni- War I British soldier’s memoir for context in support- versity, and Codirector of the Em- ing this assertion. In this particular incident, Walzer pirical Studies of Conflict Project. describes a dilemma faced by British troops as they JACOB N. SHAPIRO is Professor attempt to clear a French town of German soldiers of Politics and International Af- hiding among some of its dwellings. When entering fairs at Princeton University and a home, the British soldiers had the choice of whether Codirector of the Empirical Stud- or not to shout a warning before throwing a grenade ies of Conflict Project. down the cellar stairs. This warning would alert ci- (* See endnotes for complete contributor vilian noncombatants that may be hiding there and biographies.) give them the opportunity to make the British soldiers © 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00421 44 poised to engage with lethal force aware of tants, just how much risk to their own forc- Joseph H. their presence. Alternatively, however, this es they must take on in the process is nev- Felter & Jacob N. effort to safeguard civilians would also place er completely clear. Indeed, the principle of Shapiro the entering British troops at greater risk proportionality in the law of armed conflict by giving any German soldiers that might all but necessitates that they make a utilitar- also be hiding there the opportunity to at- ian calculation: potential harm to civilians tack first. The soldier who wrote the mem- must always be balanced against military oir admitted that attacking first would have value when considering actions that could felt like murder to him if it resulted in the hurt innocents. And if minimizing civilian death of an innocent French family mem- casualties helps advance strategic goals in ber. According to Walzer’s subsequent anal- certain conflicts, then the standards for pro- ysis, soldiers in such cases are in fact obliged tection might be much higher. to assume increased risk and–in an effort These were the challenges that the Inter- to limit the expected costs in terms of civil- national Security Assistance Force (isaf) ian casualties–issue a verbal warning prior was grappling with in Afghanistan in 2009. to engaging with a grenade.1 Protecting civilian lives had clear military This World War I example rests on a mor- value at a time when isaf and the govern- al argument. From a utilitarian perspective, ment of Afghanistan were competing with however, if the British troops opted to make the Taliban for the allegiance and support themselves safer by throwing the grenade of the population. Standards of action that without warning, it would matter little entailed protections for civilians, which for the ultimate outcome of the conflict. were appropriate for interstate wars, and While the resulting French civilian casual- met requirements under international law ties would be tragic, might weigh heavily on were not necessarily protective enough. the consciences of those responsible, and That observation prompted senior leaders could potentially encourage in-kind retali- within the organization to call for great- ation from the Germans, they would be of er restraint when engaging an enemy that little military consequence. In convention- operated in close proximity to the civilian al interstate conflict, civilian casualties do population. This increased emphasis on little to inhibit the ability of military forc- limiting civilian casualties, what became es to mass firepower on enemy objectives, known as courageous restraint, was deemed seize terrain, and ultimately achieve victo- critical to achieving strategic success. ry at the strategic level. In this essay, we first describe the genesis Asymmetric intrastate conflicts are dif- of courageous restraint in Afghanistan and ferent. In conflicts like those in Afghani- discuss the arguments made for it on moral stan, Colombia, Iraq, Northern Nigeria, Pa- and legal grounds, as well as in terms of the kistan, and the Philippines, to name just a expected impact on the success of isaf’s few, information flows, collaboration, and campaign. We then highlight the challeng- ultimately support of the local population es it faced in execution at the tactical lev- are key to achieving strategic objectives. el. We conclude with a discussion of the Limiting casualties to noncombatants and enduring lessons that can be learned from other actions that alienate the population isaf’s experience implementing coura- have clear military value in such conflicts. geous restraint and its implications for the But while military commanders in all types preparation and execution of future conflict. of war have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws In late spring 2009, nearly a decade after governing their treatment of noncomba- the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan top- 146 (1) Winter 2017 45 The Case of pled the Taliban and drove Al Qaeda from than calling for a troop increase, General Courageous its former safe havens, the United States McChrystal determined that isaf need- Restraint remained at war and, by most measurable ed to fundamentally change how it operat- standards, the war was not going well. Ac- ed in Afghanistan down to the level of how cording to nato/isaf statistics, there was soldiers and small units interacted with a 156 percent increase in attacks on Afghan the populations living where they were de- government infrastructure for the period ployed. Specifically, he was concerned with of January to May 2009 compared with the impact of the mounting civilian casu- January to May 2008; a 152 percent increase alties that isaf was responsible for and his in complex attacks (those involving more command’s relationship with the popula- than one means of attack, such as small tion it was ostensibly deployed to protect. arms plus ied, or more than twenty insur- Reflecting on this assessment, General Mc- gents); and an increase of between 21 and Chrystal recalls, “I quickly came to the con- 78 percent in total attacks across the five clusion–and had been talking about this Regional Commands within Afghanistan.2 for years–if we didn’t change the Afghan Newly elected President Barrack Obama people’s perceptions about our use of pow- considered Afghanistan a war of necessi- er, then we were going to lose them.”4 ty, not of choice like Iraq, but his admin- On July 2, 2009, General McChrystal is- istration, like much of the U.S. public, was sued a revised tactical directive for isaf. not willing to expend American blood and The directive outlined policies for the em- resources indefinitely in pursuit of their ployment of air delivered munitions, indi- campaign’s objectives. rect fires (such as artillery and mortars), In a very visible manifestation of the and other weapon systems, intending to dissatisfaction with the status quo, Secre- reduce isaf-caused civilian casualties and tary of Defense Robert Gates called for the other collateral damage.5 The principles resignation of General David McKiernan, and command intent laid out in this doc- commander of U.S. and Coalition Forces ument would make up the foundation of in Afghanistan, in early May 2009, citing the Commander of International Securi- the need for “fresh thinking” and “fresh ty Assistance Force’s (comisaf) calls for eyes” on Afghanistan.3 Lieutenant Gener- restraint and tactical patience when deter- al Stanley McChrystal, the storied Army mining how much force to employ in cer- Ranger and Special Operations Forces tain battlefield conditions. commander who led the Joint Special Op- The tactical directive remains a classified erations Command (jsoc) from 2004 to document, but portions of it have been re- 2008, was tapped as McKiernan’s replace- leased in an effort to educate a wider audi- ment and leader of the new direction in Af- ence. The carefully worded and personal- ghanistan. Shortly after taking command, ly authored passages provide both insight he called for a comprehensive assessment and clarity on why General McChyrstal, as of isaf’s mission, objectives, and strategy. comisaf, was determined to limit the ci- Based on the findings of the June 2009 vilian casualties caused by isaf and his in- assessment, General McChrystal request- tent for how isaf troops were expected to ed an additional forty thousand troops to exercise the restraint required to achieve “surge” to Afghanistan later that year and these ends.