Judicial Impact Assessment: An Approach Paper India Development Foundation May, 2008 Table of Contents Introduction Page 1 Developing a Methodology for Procedural Law Change Page 11 Developing Methodology for Substantial Law Change Page 26 Further Recommendations Page 44 References Page 55 Introduction Among the most important attributes of the notion of “rule of law” are the procedural and institutional characteristics of a country’s legal system. The benefits of a good judicial system are many, covering economic, political, and social spheres. The importance of the judiciary lies in checking abuses of government power, enforcing property rights, enabling exchanges between private parties, and maintaining public order. A balanced, swift, affordable (accessible), and fair justice delivery system — besides promoting law and order — aids in the development of markets, investment (including foreign direct investment), and affects economic growth positively. Good economic policies need strong and accountable institutions to support and implement them. Strong justice institutions thus form the basis of lasting social order. Court congestion, legal costs, and delays are the problems most often complained about by the public in most countries, and thus often perceived as the most pressing (Buscaglia & Dakolias, 1996; Brookings Institution, 1990). India is not an exception. In India, a lack of judges has generally been cited as the main reason for court congestion and delays. Indeed, the number of judges per capita has been low compared to other countries. For instance, data on 30 selected countries from the World Bank Justice Sector at a Glance database indicate that in 2000 the average number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants was 6.38.1 The corresponding number for India is about 2.7 judges.2 1 The number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants ranged from 0.13 in Canada to 23.21 in the Slovak Republic, not showing significant correlation with GDP per capita. It should be noted, however, that for some of the countries the statistics covered only the federal court system (excluding the state or provincial court systems). 2 The actual number of judges is even lower since the calculation is based on the sanctioned judge strength, not accounting for vacancies. See Hazra and Micevska (2004) for details. Page 1 This perception about inadequate judges in India in turn has been attributed to an insufficient resource allocation to the judiciary by the legislature. Yet the legislature has constantly enacted new laws and that has added to the burden. Moreover, at times, well-motivated statutes can have unintended consequences on the courts’ ability to administer justice, especially on the criminal side. Therefore one needs to asses the problem from the demand side as well, although the proposed solutions are intended from the supply side. What is Judicial Impact Assessment Legislative proposals typically affect court workload either operationally, or through substantively. A third effect can happen through judicial interpretation, but that is clubbed with the second – in substantive law change. The former involves legislation that would directly affect court procedures (e.g., adding or modifying procedures for bringing a person to trial, conducting a trial, sentencing, or appeal); court administration (e.g., altering the responsibilities or number of court personnel); or court financing (e.g., increases or decreases in budget appropriations). Substantive impact, on the other hand, involves the elimination or creation of statutory causes of action. Substantive legislation can also affect court workload if the wording of a statute requires judicial interpretation. Judicial impact in this situation occurs not because of what the legislation says, but because of what it either omits or does not say clearly (Mangum, 1995). Judicial impact assessment is therefore calculating the workload change that the judiciary has to bear due to procedural or substantive law changes and then calculating the expected indicative costs for the same change. Technically, operational impact has the most obvious effect on the courts and is therefore the type of impact most frequently addressed in judicial impact assessments. For substantive law changes it is not always possible to calculate the workload change that the judiciary has to undergo, especially if it involves a completely new area or the economy under goes substantial reforms per se. Page 2 Judicial Impact Assessment in the US Currently the USA undertakes the exercise, although the developments are not shared except the results. The need for pinpointing the sources of the increasing flow of litigation prompted Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, to call for Judicial Impact Statements to assist the Federal Judiciary in "rational planning for the future with regard to the burdens of the courts", in his address on the state of the Judiciary in 1972. The Congressional Budget Act, 1974, established a Congressional Budget Office to estimate the budgetary impact of legislative proposals with a view to assessing whether a proposed legislation is likely to increase or decrease or has no effect on the burden of the courts. In a related development, the National Academy of Sciences established the National Research Council for the purposes of estimating the changes in workloads that the courts would experience with the adoption of new legislation. In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, created by Congress through the Federal Courts Study Act, 1988, recommended that an Office of Judicial Impact Assessment be created in the judicial branch. The American Bar Association also passed a resolution in 1991 calling upon each state legislature and the United States Congress to mandate by legislation the preparation of Judicial System Impact Statements to be attached to each Bill or Resolution that affects the operations of State or Federal courts; and also to establish a mechanism within its budgeting process to prepare Judicial System Impact Statements determining the probable costs and effects of each Bill or Resolution that has an identifiable and measurable effect on the dockets, workloads, efficiency, staff and personnel requirements, operating resources and currently existing material resources of appellate, trial and administrative law courts (Viswanathan, 2002). The first thing that becomes apparent is that after the enactment of the Congressional Budget Act in 1974, which established a Congressional Budget Office to estimate the budgetary impact of legislative proposals, it took the US judiciary 20 years and dedicated offices to get data collection in line with the needs and make preliminary fiscal estimates of judicial impact assessment. Page 3 Moreover, the most comprehensive of the attempts conducted under the auspices of a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reached two conclusions in its 1980 report. It found that, as proposed by Chief Justice Burger, the application of judicial impact assessment to all legislation that might create new cases in the courts was not feasible because the empirical and theoretical tools necessary for such across-the-board forecasts were not available. Importantly, however, the panel also determined that the process did seem feasible “if a more modest view [was] taken” of the goals of judicial impact assessment, employing it only “in selected instances” for specific legislative proposals (Mangum, 1995). Across-the-board judicial impact assessments are thus not tenable. These assessments can be used to forecast largely the judicial impact of procedural changes and selected legislations. The Position in India It is true that every law enacted by Parliament adds to the burden of the State courts and since administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts fall within entry 11A of the concurrent list, the major brunt of the workload is borne by the courts established and maintained by the State Governments. Clause (3) of Article 117 of the Constitution provides that a Bill, which if enacted and brought into operation would involve expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India, shall not be passed by either House of Parliament unless the President has recommended to that House the consideration of the Bill. The rationale for this requirement is that the President must know beforehand the additional financial burden which will be imposed upon the exchequer by virtue of the proposed enactment. In addition to this constitutional safeguard, under the respective provisions of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of Business in the House of the People and the Council of States, every Bill is required to be accompanied by a Financial Memorandum which spells out in detail the recurring and non-recurring expenditure which is Page 4 likely to be incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India if the Bill is enacted into law. If no expenditure is involved from the Consolidated Fund of India, there is no need for a Financial Memorandum to accompany a Bill. Because of this, instances where expenses are to be borne by the State Governments due to the litigation which is likely to arise by virtue of some provisions in the parliamentary enactment, such as the creation of new offences will escape the attention of the lawmakers and the public since they are not expenses incurred out of the Consolidated Fund of India. Even where a recommendation of the President is sought under Clause (3) of Article 117 and a financial memorandum is attached to the Bill, the likely increase in the workload of the courts and the consequent increase in the financial expenditure is not given any importance by the Ministries sponsoring the legislation. Under Clause (3) of Article 207 of the Constitution a similar legal position prevails with respect to Bills introduced in the State Legislatures. Where any authority or agency is created under the proposed legislation, the expenses for its establishment and maintenance are provided for from the budget of the sponsoring Ministry. However, no similar provision is made for the likely impact on the courts due to the enactment of the legislation.