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A History of U.S. Communications Security

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A History of U.S. Communications Security -- ~ A HISTORY or U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (U) (The DaYid G. Boak Lectures) BAl\"DLING INSTRUCI'IO~S ------ 1. This publication consists ol coven and numbered pages 1 to 101 inclusive. Verify presence ol each page upon receipt. 2. Fo.rmal authorization for access to SECRET material is :required for personnel to have access to this publication. ------ E:::== 3. This publication will not be released outside government channels without approval of the Di­ §= rector, National Security Agency. ----- 4. Extracts from this publication may be made for classroom or individual instruction purposes only. Such utracts will be classified SECRET NOFOR..""'l and accounted for locally until de­ stroyed. 5. This publication will not be carried in aircraft for use therein. - --------- ,__-·---·------·.. _.. __ ==-.:. ~-····-r..... ..: ... ::::7:~ ------·-·­____ ,, .. NATIONAL SECURITY IXFORMATIO~ Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions ~ .------­ NATIONAL SECURITY AGE."lCY FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYLA.~D 20755 Revised July 19i3 a..iled bJ Direaor, NSA., panaa•t ID SSA.. ~u.I 123-Z. llelQt ,,_ C--1 l\eele-iftalioa Scbedale el l.uatne Orcler 111SZ Ellempt CateprJ 2.. Deduli...._ da&e cu..c be determiaed. ORIGINAL 1: Reverse (Page 2) Blank .................... _....... ---······-··-----.. .... --·· l .. ..:~·-· -: - . · . ~: .,,.. -,-- ...... '.= ._.. ~ ..· .•. ·. ·..· .._ .... -~.· .. ~'.· · ....· : ..... ~: ': ·.··· ... ·. ·•.. • • . • ' • •• , • •.•• -~~!' .- .!":.· . • :-~ ........ · .. .. .... .. ._. .... .. :· .... : 8E€RB'f N9P9RN INTRODUCTIOS This publication consists of a series of lectures prepared and given to interns and other employees --·- by Mr. David G. Boak in 1966. Mr. Boak is uniquely qualified to discuss the history of U.S. COM­ -- SEC because he bas participated significantly in most aspects of its modem development over the past twenty years. The purpose of these lectures was to present in an informal yet informative manner the funda­ -- mental concepts of Communications Security and to provide an insight into the strenghts and -- weaknesses of selected manual systems, electro-mechanical and electronic crypto-equipments.. ------- --------·,___.. -·---·---·· --· ---.. --··· ---........ -----·· --·--·-· --·---·~----·· -·--·-···.. ·-··· i:::::=.:::: ~: ~ -·-·E.:::::::=::.:: -----·····~--···--·· ORIGINAL 3 Reverse (Page 4) Blank ~~=~~~; =------=.:.=.-:;-...-_:;;._· -··----~--_...;;..:.-__,,_,~...... ""' ... "'...'= ... =....::: ... :::: ...:::: ...:::: ...:::: ....:::: ...:::: ...:::: ...:::: ... ::::_..:::: ...::-:::.-==·=-·=···::::···=-···························- .. ·········--·---···--·-··---··-·····--· - .· I • •• , •, ·., "' • • ' ' ..... .......... .. .. ·.. .. SECRE'f NOPOR:l'i RECORD OF AMENDMENTS i-,.. Identification of By Whom Entered Amendment and Date Entered (Signature; Rank or No. (if any) Rate; Name of Command) -- ' . RECORD OF PAGE CHECKS By Whom Checked By Whom Checked Date Date (Signature; Rank or Rate; (Signature; Rank or Rate; Checked Checked Name of Command) Name of Command) : I . SEeKET ORIGINAL 5 ·~ r SECREI '.N('Jf('JltN I~~ RECORD OF PAGE CHECKS l By Whom Checked By Whom Checked Date Date (Signature; Rank or Rate; (Signature; Rank or Rate; Checked Checked Name of Command) Name of Command) \ I Subject f1RSTLE SECON!: THIRD 1 yoURTl FIFTH: ---- sIXTH sEVEl' EIGH'l NINT1 I I TEN1 .. , 6 SECRET ORIGINAL ----·----- ---- ---·- • TABLE OF C01'"TENTS ---------· ----~: Subj.ct --x;= FIRSTLECTURE.-The Need ror Communications Security -----·--------·---·-·· 'I'lllRI>SECONI> LECTURE.-'l'SECIJCL-7 ~--Codes------·----------------······------------------------------------------------- _________________________________________________________________________ _ 21 ·----·: 33 ----------·-·· -··=--===:---·· FOURTH LECTURE.-One-'Iime Tape Systems -----------------------------------------------------------­ 39 E=? FIF'l'FI LEC'I'l1Rl!:..-IC\1V-26; ICVV-37; CltIB; ICVV-7 ----------------------·---------------------------------- P::------ E:. .: . .-:::f. SIXTH LECTURE.-Multi-Purpose Equipment 53 :=:::::==..:::: SEVENTH ~-Ciphoay Equipment and Other Specialized Systems ------· --------------------------- 57 --.====----··- 73 ----· J!:I(;Jrrll LECTUR.E.-Flops -----------------------------------------------------------------------------­ ---·-··-·------·-· NINm LECTURE.-Scrmgtbsand VVeakneases -------------------·---------------------------------------- 81 -----·-·----·· 89 TEN'I'li LECTURE.-'Tl!:tl4PES'I' -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----· ----·----·· ----·-----··· ---·-·--·---·----· ..........----··--··-····· ---··· ----·····--···········---·-· -----··-·····;:=:;:=: E:::::=.-:::~==-=-~.. -. =!:=::.=.:: =::..:-::::..::.-·-----····· ----··-----···-----· --·------·----···----·--···· ---------· -----·-·---· ----·----··· ----·---··----·· ----·-----·------·· -------------------·---·_____ ... ---·-·----·· -·-----·--·····-·--·-·-·· ----··········-----··-·· I::--r:======:··:::.'"::. =--===...:::::......._ ____ _ t:::=::::-.:: =:···-·····-·· =---·~ ~ ------·· -----·----··c:::-=:: ----··:---:==.- -----·-----··---·-· 1-~ SECRET ORIGINAL 7 Reverse (Page 8) Blank ···--···----·-·······--····· ·----·---.. -·-··· :::~.-....:::=:::~---==::::::: ... :.':f:.::-:=:::_.-;....::.:=--=:==--=====··...:;=::===---====·-·_:___ __..;., .. --··- ·-····.:..·--······-,··--···-··--··-·--·--···--=--.--.-..------------- '• .··: •... ,; .... .·· •. ··• . -------··----· SBGRR :N9P9B:N EO 1. 4. ( c) -·--- ---···-··-­ -·=== --- FIRST LECTURE: Tbe Need for Communications Security --- -----~ I will spend most of this first period belaboring some seemingly obvious points on the need for -- communications security; why we're in this business, and what our objectives really are. It seems =-- obvious that we need to protect our communications because they consistently reveal. our strengths, ---~· weaknesses, disposition, plans, and intentions and if the opposition intercepts them he can exploit -·:=..1'-..= that information by attacking our weak points, avoiding our strengths, countering our plans, and ---------- frustrating our intentions... something he can only do if he has advance knowledge of our.situation. -··--·~:::::::=:.· But there's more to it than that. E"::-=: First, you'll note I said the opposition can do these things if he can intercept our communica­ !:::-::::::::::: tions. Let me first give you some facts about that supposition. You've all seen the security caveats ~====~; asserting that ..the enemy is listening", .. the walls have ears", and the like. One of my irrev~rent ..---- friends, knowing where I work, insists on refening to me as "an electronic spy", and popular pa~r­ ----·...---·--------- __ _. back literature is full of lurid stories about code-breakers and thieves in the night careening to Bu•. -·------·-·--· dapest on the Orient Express with stolen ci hers tattooed somewhere unmentionable. What is the --·.---· actual situatfon? ----= t eir co ection facilities in­ ---· "'"'=cr::u=-=e~::r=ge::--r~n=":l"""'C":a=~s~1~tes=-=--, ~m~o~1.,.,e,,....,,,p~""o""rm,.....,.,s,....,.a_,1,...r-a-n........ -se-a ...... , -a-n....... sa__..,..tellite surveillance; and that --·--·-·-·---· they have an extensive covert collection operation. All in alJ, a truly formidable opponent. So the --· first "if" underlying our argument for the need for COMSEC (Communications Security) is more -··-·--······-· .. -·····-·· than a postulate-a deliberate, large, competent force has been identified whose mission is the exploitation of U.S. communications through their interception and analysis. It is important to understand at the outset why the Soviet Union (as well as all other major countries) is willing to make an investment of this kind. Because, of course, they find it worthwhile. f;;-···--·---· Sometimes, in the security business, you feel like a jackass having run around clutching defense secrets to your bosom only to find a detailed expose in Missiles and Rockets or the Washington Post or find it to be the subject of open conversations at a cocktail pany or a coffee bar. There are, in fact, so many things that we cannot hide in an open society-at least in peace time-that you will some­ times encouter quite serious and thoughtful skepticism on the value or practicability of trying to hide anything ... panicularly if the techniques you apply to hide information-like cryptography --entail money, loss of time, and constraints on action. --··---· What then, is unique about communications intelligence? What does it provide that our moun­ -····--·· tains of literature and news do not similarily reveal? How can it match the output of a bevy of ___ .. __ . professional spies or in-place defectors buying or stealing actual documents, blueprints, plans? ----··----····--··-·· ( ..In-place defector"-a guy with a bona fide job in some place like the Department of Defense, the ···---·-·---­-·--·········· Department of State, this Agency, or in the contractual world who feeds intelligence to a foreign ----··O•••••••H•-••• power.) It turns out that there is something special about communications intelligence, and it provides the justification for our own large espenditures as well as those of other countries: in a nutshell, its special value lies in the fact that this kind of intelligence is generally accurate, reliable, ........ ______ _ authentic, continuous, and most important of all, timely. The more deeply you become familiar :::::::::K:::: with classified governmental operations, the more aware you will become
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