Surveying a World of Advanced Threats

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Surveying a World of Advanced Threats Chapter 1 Surveying a World of Advanced Threats In This Chapter ▶ Distinguishing between basic and advanced threats ▶ Recognizing three types of cyberenemies ▶ Counting the cost of data breaches It’s getting rough out there. I’m not kidding. In more than two decades of observing the effects of enterprise and government data breaches, I’ve never seen anything like today’s threat landscape. The sheer number of recent high-profile cyberattacks is staggering. The bad guys clearly have the upper hand, and it seems like there’s nothing that any of us can do about it. Given the efficacy of modern-day threats, today’s informa- tion security professionals are judged not only on how well they can block known threats but also on how quickly they can uncover, identify, and mitigate unknown threats. Unfortunately, too many security professionals lack the tools andCOPYRIGHTED training needed to stay ahead MATERIAL in this cyberarms race. In this chapter, I distinguish between basic and advanced cyberthreats while exploring common variations of advanced threats along the way. I also cite recent data-breach statistics, describe three types of cyberenemies, and review high-profile commercial and government cyberattacks that recently made international headlines. But first, allow me to clarify the differences between basic and advanced threats. 004_9781118658765-ch01.indd4_9781118658765-ch01.indd 3 77/1/13/1/13 112:452:45 PMPM 4 Advanced Threat Detection For Dummies Contrasting Basic and Advanced Threats The following are key characteristics of basic and advanced cyberthreats: ✓ Basic threats are known threats against known operat- ing system (OS) or application-level vulnerabilities. They are commonly detected by traditional signature-based network- and endpoint-security defenses, including intru- sion prevention systems (IPSs), secure web and e-mail gateways, and antivirus platforms. ✓ Advanced threats are unknown threats against unknown OS or application-level vulnerabilities. They can’t be detected by traditional signature-based defenses. Better network security devices can detect unknown threats (or new variants of known threats) that target known vulner- abilities, but I still classify those threats as basic. Obviously, as the name suggests, advanced threats are far more difficult to detect. Traditional security defenses that rely on pattern-matching signatures for detection are useless for detecting advanced threats. Don’t get me wrong — traditional defenses such as firewalls, IPSs, and secure web and e-mail gateways are your front line in a defense-in-depth (layers of security defenses) strategy. But you can’t rely on these tech- nologies exclusively for detecting today’s advanced threats. (Jump to Chapter 2 to find out why.) Before delving into some of the advanced threats that endan- ger today’s organizations, take a few minutes to reacquaint yourself with some basic threats that have been around for years. Basic Threats: Oldies but Baddies The basic cyberattacks described in this section generally don’t pose huge threats to enterprises and government agen- cies because they’re largely mitigated by traditional network 004_9781118658765-ch01.indd4_9781118658765-ch01.indd 4 77/1/13/1/13 112:452:45 PMPM Chapter 1: Surveying a World of Advanced Threats 5 and endpoint security solutions. If you fail to take them seri- ously, however, any of them could be your downfall. Worms, Trojans, and viruses A computer worm is malware that exploits the vulnerabilities of a computer’s OS (typically, Microsoft Windows) to self- propagate via the internal network to which the computer is linked. Worms are dangerous to any network because they can be used to exfiltrate data or otherwise harm computer systems. They also consume large amounts of bandwidth, causing degradations in network performance. Unlike a virus (discussed later in this section), a worm doesn’t attach itself to computer programs or files. A Trojan (or Trojan horse) is malware disguised as a legitimate software application to trick a user into installing it on a com- puter. Unlike computer worms, Trojans can’t propagate to other vulnerable computers on their own. Instead, they join networks of other infected computers (called botnets; see the next section), wait to receive instructions from the attacker, and then transfer stolen information. Trojans are commonly delivered by means of social media and spam e-mails; they may also be disguised as installers for games or applications. A computer virus is malicious code that attaches itself to a program or file so that it can spread from one computer to another, leaving infections as it propagates. Unlike a worm, a virus can’t travel without a human helper — in this case, a user who sends (usually unknowingly) an infected program or file to another user. Spyware and botnets Spyware is a form of malware that covertly aggregates user information without the user’s knowledge and forwards it to the perpetrator via the Internet. Sometimes, spyware is employed for the purpose of advertising (in which case it’s called adware and displays pop-up ads). At other times, it’s used to collect confidential information such as usernames, passwords, and credit-card numbers. Typically, spyware is secretly bundled into shareware or freeware. 004_9781118658765-ch01.indd4_9781118658765-ch01.indd 5 77/1/13/1/13 112:452:45 PMPM 6 Advanced Threat Detection For Dummies A botnet is a group of Internet-connected computers on which malware is running (bots). Bots are often used to commit denial-of-service attacks (attacks that overload a server’s pro- cessing power), relay spam, steal data, and/or download addi- tional malware to the infected host computer. The person who controls a botnet — the bot herder or botmaster — typically uses web servers called command-and- control (CnC) servers. CnC servers have only one job: control- ling bots. Social engineering attacks Social engineering attacks are extremely common, especially the two types discussed in this section: phishing and baiting. As I discuss later in this chapter, these attacks are often incor- porated into advanced threats. Phishing Phishing is an attempt to steal confidential information — usernames, passwords, credit-card numbers, Social Security numbers, and so on — via e-mail by masquerading as a legiti- mate organization. After clicking a seemingly innocent hyper- link in the e-mail, the victim is directed to enter personal information on an imposter website that looks almost identi- cal to the one it’s emulating. Phishing has two common variants: ✓ Spear phishing targets specific people within an organiza- tion, using information about them collected from social media sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. ✓ Whaling is phishing that targets the senior executives of a given organization. Baiting Baiting occurs when a criminal casually drops a USB flash drive or CD-ROM in a public area (perhaps a parking lot or cybercafé) within close proximity of the targeted organiza- tion. The media device is labeled with enticing words such as Product Roadmap or Proprietary & Confidential to spark the finder’s interest. When the victim inserts the device into her computer, it instantly installs malware on the computer. 004_9781118658765-ch01.indd4_9781118658765-ch01.indd 6 77/1/13/1/13 112:452:45 PMPM Chapter 1: Surveying a World of Advanced Threats 7 Buffer overflows and SQL injections These two common techniques exploit vulnerabilities in web applications: ✓ A buffer overflow attack is a painfully common cyber- threat in which a malicious hacker knowingly writes more data into a memory buffer than the buffer is designed to hold. Data subsequently spills into adjacent memory, causing the application to execute unauthor- ized code that may grant the hacker administrative privi- leges or possibly even crash the system. ✓ In an SQL injection attack, the attacker enters SQL state- ments into a web form in an attempt to get the form to pass an unauthorized SQL command to the database. If successful, the attack can give its perpetrator full access to database content such as credit-card numbers, Social Security numbers, and passwords. Advanced Threats: Emerging Dangers Now that you’re up to speed on basic threats, it’s time to explore the advanced threats that are making headlines today. Advanced persistent threats Advanced persistent threats (APTs) — also known as advanced targeted attacks (ATAs) — are sophisticated, multivectored (perpetrated through multiple channels) cyberattacks in which an attacker gains unauthorized network access and stays undetected for a long period. To date, the goal of APTs generally has been data theft, but more extreme conse- quences, including kinetic damage, are possible. APTs target organizations in industries that handle high- value information, such as financial institutions, government agencies and contractors, and companies that have valuable 004_9781118658765-ch01.indd4_9781118658765-ch01.indd 7 77/1/13/1/13 112:452:45 PMPM 8 Advanced Threat Detection For Dummies intellectual property in such sectors as technology, pharma- ceuticals, and energy. To help illustrate the nature of an APT, I break down the com- ponents of the acronym: ✓ Advanced: Attackers use a full spectrum of computer- intrusion technologies and techniques, often exploiting unreported vulnerabilities in OSs and applications. Many of these threats are undetectable by traditional security systems. ✓ Persistent: After a network is breached, the perpetrator operates low and slow to remain undetected. Patience is key as he quietly maps the network and connects to each host (often in the middle of the night) until the ultimate target has been identified. ✓ Threat: The attacker initiates each APT with a specific objective in mind and won’t stop until he achieves that objective. He’s skilled, highly motivated, and well funded. Chapter 2 explores APTs in considerably more detail and also provides an overview of the APT threat life cycle. Zero-day threats A zero-day threat is a cyberattack on an OS or application vulnerability that’s unknown to the general public.
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