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Congressional Record—House H3696 H3696 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE July 20, 2021 1833, the DHS Industrial Control Sys- disrupt, extort, and simply wreak curity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 tems Capabilities Enhancement Act of havoc. These systems underpin the U.S.C. 1501); and’’. 2021. functions and services we rely on for (2) in subsection (c)— As I have said from day one as rank- our day-to-day lives, and the threats (A) in paragraph (5)— (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘and’’ ing member of this committee, we need they face have never been higher. after the semicolon at the end; to continue to bolster cybersecurity Successful disruption of one of these (ii) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as capabilities at CISA to defend our Fed- systems could have dire consequences subparagraph (C); eral networks and the Nation’s critical for public health and safety, public (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (A) infrastructure from cyber threats. confidence, and even the national and the following new subparagraph: The volume of cyberattacks and economic security of the United ‘‘(B) sharing mitigation protocols to ransomware attacks in 2021 alone States. counter cybersecurity vulnerabilities pursu- shows that no one is immune from na- CISA is well-positioned to help own- ant to subsection (n); and’’; and (iv) in subparagraph (C), as so redesig- tion-state cyber actors or cyber crimi- ers and operators better understand nated, by inserting ‘‘and mitigation proto- nals. Cyber threats, particularly risks to operational technology and cols to counter cybersecurity vulnerabilities ransomware, are the preeminent na- work with them to close security gaps. in accordance with subparagraph (B)’’ before tional security threat facing our Na- I again want to congratulate the gen- ‘‘with Federal’’; tion today. From Colonial Pipeline to a tleman from New York (Mr. KATKO), (B) in paragraph (7)(C), by striking ‘‘shar- local water facility in Florida, we have my committee colleague and ranking ing’’ and inserting ‘‘share’’; and witnessed the real-world consequences member, on authoring this bill to cod- (C) in paragraph (9), by inserting ‘‘mitiga- cyberattacks can have on our critical ify the role that CISA plays in leading tion protocols to counter cybersecurity vulnerabilities,’’ after ‘‘measures,’’; infrastructure. Federal efforts to secure industrial (3) in subsection (e)(1)(G), by striking the In the cyberattack against a water control systems. semicolon after ‘‘and’’ at the end; treatment plant in Florida, hackers Enactment of H.R. 1833 will help to (4) by redesignating subsection (o) as sub- were able to gain access to industrial raise our cybersecurity posture across section (p); and control systems, or ICS for short, and the board. (5) by inserting after subsection (n) fol- attempted to alter the mixture of Madam Speaker, I yield back the bal- lowing new subsection: water chemicals to what could have ance of my time. ‘‘(o) PROTOCOLS TO COUNTER CERTAIN CY- been catastrophic fatal levels. BERSECURITY VULNERABILITIES.—The Direc- The SPEAKER pro tempore. The tor may, as appropriate, identify, develop, Cyber incidents are very rarely sec- question is on the motion offered by and disseminate actionable protocols to tor specific. CISA is a central agency the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities to in- that can quickly connect the dots when CLARKE) that the House suspend the formation systems and industrial control a malicious cyber campaign spans mul- rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1833, as systems, including in circumstances in tiple sectors. It is vital that we con- amended. which such vulnerabilities exist because tinue to enhance its visibility across The question was taken. software or hardware is no longer supported by a vendor.’’. the critical infrastructure ecosystem. The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the This bill requires the CISA director SEC. 3. REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being VULNERABILITIES. to maintain capabilities to detect and in the affirmative, the ayes have it. (a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after mitigate threats and vulnerabilities af- Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. the date of the enactment of this Act, the fecting automated control of critical Madam Speaker, on that I demand the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastruc- infrastructure, particularly industrial yeas and nays. ture Security Agency of the Department of control systems. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu- Homeland Security shall submit to the Com- mittee on Homeland Security of the House of This includes maintaining cross-sec- ant to section 3(s) of House Resolution tor incident response capabilities to re- Representatives and the Committee on 8, the yeas and nays are ordered. Homeland Security and Governmental Af- spond to cybersecurity incidents and Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, fur- fairs of the Senate a report on how the Agen- providing cybersecurity technical as- ther proceedings on this motion are cy carries out subsection (n) of section 2209 sistance to stakeholders. postponed. of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to co- ordinate vulnerability disclosures, including We must continue to solidify CISA’s f lead role in protecting our Nation’s disclosures of cybersecurity vulnerabilities critical infrastructure from cyber CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY (as such term is defined in such section), and threats, particularly the industrial REMEDIATION ACT subsection (o) of such section (as added by section 2) to disseminate actionable proto- control systems that underpin vital Ms. CLARKE of New York. Madam cols to mitigate cybersecurity components of our daily lives. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules vulnerabilities to information systems and This bill is one step in the commit- and pass the bill (H.R. 2980) to amend industrial control systems, that includes the tee’s continued efforts to build up the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to following: CISA’s authorities and resources to ef- provide for the remediation of cyberse- (1) A description of the policies and proce- fectively carry out its mission, and it curity vulnerabilities, and for other dures relating to the coordination of vulner- is a resounding statement to have such purposes, as amended. ability disclosures. heavy-hitting, bipartisan support. (2) A description of the levels of activity in The Clerk read the title of the bill. furtherance of such subsections (n) and (o) of Madam Speaker, I urge all Members The text of the bill is as follows: such section 2209. to join me in supporting H.R. 1833, and H.R. 2980 (3) Any plans to make further improve- I reserve the balance of my time. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep- ments to how information provided pursuant Ms. CLARKE of New York. Madam resentatives of the United States of America in to such subsections can be shared (as such Speaker, I have no further speakers, Congress assembled, term is defined in such section 2209) between the Department and industry and other and I am prepared to close after the SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. stakeholders. gentleman from New York closes. I re- This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Cybersecu- (4) Any available information on the de- serve the balance of my time. rity Vulnerability Remediation Act’’. Mr. KATKO. Madam Speaker, I have gree to which such information was acted SEC. 2. CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITIES. upon by industry and other stakeholders. no further speakers. I urge Members to Section 2209 of the Homeland Security Act (5) A description of how privacy and civil support this bill. I yield back the bal- of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 659) is amended— liberties are preserved in the collection, re- ance of my time. (1) in subsection (a)— tention, use, and sharing of vulnerability Ms. CLARKE of New York. Madam (A) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ disclosures. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of after the semicolon at the end; (b) FORM.—The report required under sub- my time to close. (B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as para- section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified I would like to start by thanking the graph (7); and form but may contain a classified annex. (C) by inserting after paragraph (5) the fol- SEC. 4. COMPETITION RELATING TO CYBERSECU- gentleman from New York for his out- lowing new paragraph: RITY VULNERABILITIES. standing leadership in this regard. ‘‘(6) the term ‘cybersecurity vulnerability’ The Under Secretary for Science and Tech- Industrial control systems are a rich has the meaning given the term ‘security nology of the Department of Homeland Secu- target for cyber adversaries looking to vulnerability’ in section 102 of the Cyberse- rity, in consultation with the Director of the VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:06 Jul 21, 2021 Jkt 019060 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K20JY7.039 H20JYPT1 ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with HOUSE July 20, 2021 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H3697 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security GENERAL LEAVE tinuing to work with her and my other Agency of the Department, may establish an Ms. CLARKE of New York. Madam colleagues on the preeminent national incentive-based program that allows indus- Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that security threat facing our Nation try, individuals, academia, and others to all Members may have 5 legislative today. compete in identifying remediation solutions Madam Speaker, I urge Members to for cybersecurity vulnerabilities (as such days to revise and extend their re- term is defined in section 2209 of the Home- marks and to include extraneous mate- join me in supporting H.R. 2980, and I land Security Act of 2002, as amended by sec- rial on this measure. reserve the balance of my time. tion 2) to information systems (as such term The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there Ms. CLARKE of New York. Madam is defined in such section 2209) and industrial objection to the request of the gentle- Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gen- control systems, including supervisory con- woman from New York? tlewoman from Texas (Ms.
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