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Cyber-Security Threat Characterisation a Rapid Comparative Analysis

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CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public INFRASTRUCTURE AND service of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND TERRORISM AND Browse Reports & Bookstore HOMELAND SECURITY Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Europe View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. EUROPE Cyber-security threat characterisation A rapid comparative analysis Neil Robinson, Luke Gribbon, Veronika Horvath, Kate Robertson Prepared for the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm The research described in this document was prepared for the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm. RAND Europe is an independent, not-for-profit research organisation whose mission is to improve policy and decision making for the public good. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2013 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2013 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 Westbrook Centre, Milton Road, Cambridge CB4 1YG, United Kingdom RAND URL: http://www.rand.org RAND Europe URL: http://www.rand.org/randeurope To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Based on an assignment from the Swedish Cabinet Office and Department of Defence, the National Defence College’s Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) in Stockholm asked RAND Europe to undertake a rapid comparison of states’ characterisation of cyber- security threats. This involved investigating three lines of enquiry related to the integration of cyber-security within broader national and transnational defence and security frameworks. The project was limited both in size and scope and called primarily for desk research. This document is the final deliverable for this study, encompassing results and analysis from desk research, and insights gleaned from previous research on the issue. The first part of the document summarises the findings and provides an overview of the scope and methodology of the research. The second part of the document describes the cyber-security strategies and approaches in ten case studies: Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. At CATS’ request we also have profiled initiatives by NATO and the EU. Based on documentary analysis, stakeholder engagement and previous studies, we include a short chapter on potential policy concerns for Sweden going forward, supplementing the case study analysis. The report will be of interest to practitioners and policymakers in cyber- strategy and policy. RAND Europe is an independent, not-for-profit policy research organisation that aims to improve policy and decision making in the public interest, through research and analysis. RAND Europe’s clients include European governments, institutions, non-governmental organisations and firms with a need for rigorous, independent, multidisciplinary analysis. We would like to thank our Quality Assurance reviewers Charlie Edwards and Dr Emma Disley for their helpful and insightful comments in the preparation of this report. For more information about RAND Europe or this project, please contact: Neil Robinson Research Leader, Defence and Security RAND Europe Westbrook Centre, Milton Road Cambridge CB4 1YG, United Kingdom Tel. +44 (1223) 353 329 Email: [email protected] Web: www.randeurope.org/cyber iii Contents Preface iii Contents iv Executive summary .................................................................................................... vi Findings ..................................................................................................................... vii Going forward .............................................................................................................. x CHAPTER 1. Research outline ............................................................................... 1 1.1 Research question .............................................................................................. 1 1.2 Research aim ..................................................................................................... 1 1.3 Selection of case study countries ........................................................................ 2 1.4 Definition of cyber-security threats .................................................................... 3 1.5 Research methods .............................................................................................. 3 CHAPTER 2. Defining terms ................................................................................. 5 2.1 Definition of threats .......................................................................................... 5 2.2 Actors: national-level stakeholders in cyber-security ........................................... 6 CHAPTER 3. Comparators .................................................................................... 9 3.1 Canada .............................................................................................................. 9 3.2 Denmark ......................................................................................................... 11 3.3 Estonia ............................................................................................................ 13 3.4 Finland ............................................................................................................ 14 3.5 France ............................................................................................................. 16 3.6 Germany ......................................................................................................... 18 3.7 Netherlands ..................................................................................................... 20 3.8 Russian Federation .......................................................................................... 24 3.9 United Kingdom ............................................................................................. 26 3.10 United States of America ................................................................................. 28 3.11 Supranational initiatives .................................................................................. 32 3.12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ................................................. 33 3.13 The European Union ...................................................................................... 35 3.14 Synthesis ......................................................................................................... 40 iv RAND Europe CHAPTER 4. Themes from the roundtable .......................................................... 42 4.1 Themes from the findings ................................................................................ 42 4.2 Shifting models of what constitutes cyber-security ............................................ 43 4.3 Leveraging intelligence ..................................................................................... 44 4.4 Understanding the purpose of the threat assessment ......................................... 45 4.5 What are the strategic assumptions about the threat? ........................................ 45 4.6 Public attribution of adversaries ....................................................................... 45 4.7 A growing focus on public–private partnership ................................................ 45 CHAPTER 5. Conclusions ..................................................................................
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