The Most Common Blunder People Make When the Topic of a Computer Virus Arises Is to Refer to a Worm Or Trojan Horse As a Virus
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Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09
REPORT: SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY SYMANTEC REPORT: Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09 Published October 2009 Confidence in a connected world. White Paper: Symantec Enterprise Security Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09 Contents Introduction . 1 Overview of Rogue Security Software. 2 Risks . 4 Advertising methods . 7 Installation techniques . 9 Legal actions and noteworthy scam convictions . 14 Prevalence of Rogue Security Software . 17 Top reported rogue security software. 17 Additional noteworthy rogue security software samples . 25 Top rogue security software by region . 28 Top rogue security software installation methods . 29 Top rogue security software advertising methods . 30 Analysis of Rogue Security Software Distribution . 32 Analysis of Rogue Security Software Servers . 36 Appendix A: Protection and Mitigation. 45 Appendix B: Methodologies. 48 Credits . 50 Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software July 08 – June 09 Introduction The Symantec Report on Rogue Security Software is an in-depth analysis of rogue security software programs. This includes an overview of how these programs work and how they affect users, including their risk implications, various distribution methods, and innovative attack vectors. It includes a brief discussion of some of the more noteworthy scams, as well as an analysis of the prevalence of rogue security software globally. It also includes a discussion on a number of servers that Symantec observed hosting these misleading applications. Except where otherwise noted, the period of observation for this report was from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009. Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network. -
Rootkit- Rootkits.For.Dummies 2007.Pdf
01_917106 ffirs.qxp 12/21/06 12:04 AM Page i Rootkits FOR DUMmIES‰ 01_917106 ffirs.qxp 12/21/06 12:04 AM Page ii 01_917106 ffirs.qxp 12/21/06 12:04 AM Page iii Rootkits FOR DUMmIES‰ by Larry Stevenson and Nancy Altholz 01_917106 ffirs.qxp 12/21/06 12:04 AM Page iv Rootkits For Dummies® Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc. 111 River Street Hoboken, NJ 07030-5774 www.wiley.com Copyright © 2007 by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana Published simultaneously in Canada No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except as permit- ted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Legal Department, Wiley Publishing, Inc., 10475 Crosspoint Blvd., Indianapolis, IN 46256, (317) 572-3447, fax (317) 572-4355, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions. Trademarks: Wiley, the Wiley Publishing logo, For Dummies, the Dummies Man logo, A Reference for the Rest of Us!, The Dummies Way, Dummies Daily, The Fun and Easy Way, Dummies.com, and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. -
PC Anti-Virus Protection 2011
PC Anti-Virus Protection 2011 12 POPULAR ANTI-VIRUS PROGRAMS COMPARED FOR EFFECTIVENESS Dennis Technology Labs, 03/08/2010 www.DennisTechnologyLabs.com This test aims to compare the effectiveness of the most recent releases of popular anti-virus software1. The products include those from Kaspersky, McAfee, Microsoft, Norton (Symantec) and Trend Micro, as well as free versions from Avast, AVG and Avira. Other products include those from BitDefender, ESET, G-Data and K7. The tests were conducted between 07/07/2010 and 22/07/2010 using the most up to date versions of the software available. A total of 12 products were exposed to genuine internet threats that real customers could have encountered during the test period. Crucially, this exposure was carried out in a realistic way, reflecting a customer’s experience as closely as possible. For example, each test system visited real, infected websites that significant numbers of internet users were encountering at the time of the test. These results reflect what would have happened if those users were using one of the seven products tested. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Q Products that block attacks early tended to protect the system more fully The nature of web-based attacks means that the longer malware has access to a system, the more chances it has of downloading and installing further threats. Products that blocked the malicious and infected websites from the start reduced the risk of compromise by secondary and further downloads. Q 100 per cent protection is rare This test recorded an average protection rate of 87.5 per cent. New threats appear online frequently and it is inevitable that there will be times when specific security products are unable to protect from some of these threats. -
Diapositiva 1
Feliciano Intini Responsabile dei programmi di Sicurezza e Privacy di Microsoft Italia • NonSoloSecurity Blog: http://blogs.technet.com/feliciano_intini • Twitter: http://twitter.com/felicianointini 1. Introduction - Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (SIR) 2. Today‘s Threats - SIR v.8 New Findings – Italy view 3. Advancements in Software Protection and Development 4. What the Users and Industry Can Do The 8th volume of the Security Intelligence Report contains data and intelligence from the past several years, but focuses on the second half of 2009 (2H09) Full document covers Malicious Software & Potentially Unwanted Software Email, Spam & Phishing Threats Focus sections on: Malware and signed code Threat combinations Malicious Web sites Software Vulnerability Exploits Browser-based exploits Office document exploits Drive-by download attacks Security and privacy breaches Software Vulnerability Disclosures Microsoft Security Bulletins Exploitability Index Usage trends for Windows Update and Microsoft Update Microsoft Malware Protection Center (MMPC) Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) Microsoft Security Engineering Center (MSEC) Guidance, advice and strategies Detailed strategies, mitigations and countermeasures Fully revised and updated Guidance on protecting networks, systems and people Microsoft IT ‗real world‘ experience How Microsoft IT secures Microsoft Malware patterns around the world with deep-dive content on 26 countries and regions Data sources Malicious Software and Potentially Unwanted Software MSRT has a user base -
CONTENTS in THIS ISSUE Fighting Malware and Spam
AUGUST 2010 Fighting malware and spam CONTENTS IN THIS ISSUE 2 COMMENT EXPLOIT KITS UNDER SCRUTINY Apple pie order? Mark Davis documents how to create LAMP and WAMP servers and how to approach the study of 3 NEWS exploit kits in a local lab. page 8 VB2010 call for last-minute papers VB seminar DETECTING PHISHING All change Marius Tibeica describes an automated method of detecting phishing at the browser level based on the 3 VIRUS PREVALENCE TABLE tag structure of the HTML. page 11 4 TECHNICAL FEATURE VB100 CERTIFICATION ON Anti-unpacker tricks – part eleven WINDOWS VISTA With another epic haul of 54 8 TUTORIAL products to test this month, the VB Advanced exploit framework lab set-up test team could have done without Aug 2010 the bad behaviour of a number FEATURES of products: terrible product 11 HTML structure-based proactive phishing design, lack of accountability for detection activities, blatant false alarms in major software, numerous 15 What’s the deal with sender authentication? Part 3 problems detecting the WildList set, and some horrendous instability under pressure. Happily, there were also some good performances 21 COMPARATIVE REVIEW to balance things out. John Hawes has the details. Windows Vista Business Edition Service page 21 Pack 2 60 END NOTES & NEWS ISSN 1749-7027 COMMENT ‘Over 40% [of I’d contend that while ‘somewhat vulnerable’ might be about right for systems/application vulnerabilities computer users] and exposure to current malware, the fi gures would be think [that Macs are] more alarming if the survey were more focused on the vulnerability of users rather than systems. -
Surveying a World of Advanced Threats
Chapter 1 Surveying a World of Advanced Threats In This Chapter ▶ Distinguishing between basic and advanced threats ▶ Recognizing three types of cyberenemies ▶ Counting the cost of data breaches It’s getting rough out there. I’m not kidding. In more than two decades of observing the effects of enterprise and government data breaches, I’ve never seen anything like today’s threat landscape. The sheer number of recent high-profile cyberattacks is staggering. The bad guys clearly have the upper hand, and it seems like there’s nothing that any of us can do about it. Given the efficacy of modern-day threats, today’s informa- tion security professionals are judged not only on how well they can block known threats but also on how quickly they can uncover, identify, and mitigate unknown threats. Unfortunately, too many security professionals lack the tools andCOPYRIGHTED training needed to stay ahead MATERIAL in this cyberarms race. In this chapter, I distinguish between basic and advanced cyberthreats while exploring common variations of advanced threats along the way. I also cite recent data-breach statistics, describe three types of cyberenemies, and review high-profile commercial and government cyberattacks that recently made international headlines. But first, allow me to clarify the differences between basic and advanced threats. 004_9781118658765-ch01.indd4_9781118658765-ch01.indd 3 77/1/13/1/13 112:452:45 PMPM 4 Advanced Threat Detection For Dummies Contrasting Basic and Advanced Threats The following are key characteristics of basic and advanced cyberthreats: ✓ Basic threats are known threats against known operat- ing system (OS) or application-level vulnerabilities. -
Trojan White Paper
Trojan White Paper Aelphaeis Mangarae [Igniteds.NET] May 5 th 2006 http://igniteds.net irc.EFnet.org #d-u © Copyright Igniteds Security Community 2006 Igniteds Security Group - Igniteds.NET______________________ Contents [Introduction] [What Is A Trojan?] [Anti-Virus Solutions] - Introduction - How Do AV’s Detect Trojans? - What Is Heuristic Analysis? - What Is A File Packer/Compressor? - Norton Anti-Virus (Symantec) - McAfee Anti-Virus (Network Associates) - Kaspersky Anti-Virus (Kaspersky Labs) - NOD32 (ESET) - Bit Defender - Panda Anti-Virus (Panda Software) [Trojans] - Back Orifice XP - Bifrost - CIA - Lithium - MoSucker - Net Devil - Nuclear RAT - Optix Pro - Poison Ivy - SubSeven - Tequila Bandita - Theef [The Scene] - The Trojan Coder - The Script Kiddie [Trojan Removal] - Detecting A Trojan - General Removal [Methods Of Infection] - IRC - P2P - Instant Messaging - Web Pages - Software Vulnerabilities - Social Engineering Igniteds Security Group - Igniteds.NET______________________ [Trojan Technologies] - Rootkit Technology - Polymorphism - Firewall Bypass - Reverse Connection [Security Tools] - Zone Alarm - Agnitum Outpost Firewall - PsList - PsKill - Registry Commander - X-Netstat [About The Author] [Greetz To] Igniteds Security Group - Igniteds.NET______________________ [Introduction] Many home users are kept in the dark about Trojans, what they are exactly, and the force behind them. The Trojan scene is quite an interesting one, one which I will document in this text, in order to give readers a better understanding of Trojans and the people that create and use them, After all there is more to Trojans than just the Trojans themselves. I will also detail in this text the technologies the latest Trojans incorporate in order to make themselves more stealthy and/or harder to remove. The general purpose of this text is to educate the reader about Trojans, so they can help protect themselves against them, and in the event of infection they may remove them and try and to prevent them from doing any further damage. -
Chapter 3: Viruses, Worms, and Blended Threats
Chapter 3 Chapter 3: Viruses, Worms, and Blended Threats.........................................................................46 Evolution of Viruses and Countermeasures...................................................................................46 The Early Days of Viruses.................................................................................................47 Beyond Annoyance: The Proliferation of Destructive Viruses .........................................48 Wiping Out Hard Drives—CIH Virus ...................................................................48 Virus Programming for the Masses 1: Macro Viruses...........................................48 Virus Programming for the Masses 2: Virus Generators.......................................50 Evolving Threats, Evolving Countermeasures ..................................................................51 Detecting Viruses...................................................................................................51 Radical Evolution—Polymorphic and Metamorphic Viruses ...............................53 Detecting Complex Viruses ...................................................................................55 State of Virus Detection.........................................................................................55 Trends in Virus Evolution..................................................................................................56 Worms and Vulnerabilities ............................................................................................................57 -
Multiple Logs Analysis for Detecting Zero-Day Backdoor Trojans
Cleveland State University EngagedScholarship@CSU ETD Archive 2008 Multiple Logs Analysis for Detecting Zero-Day Backdoor Trojans Sinchai Caravut Cleveland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive Part of the Computer Sciences Commons How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! Recommended Citation Caravut, Sinchai, "Multiple Logs Analysis for Detecting Zero-Day Backdoor Trojans" (2008). ETD Archive. 546. https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/546 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in ETD Archive by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MULTIPLE LOGS ANALYSIS FOR DETECTING ZERO-DAY BACKDOOR TROJANS SINCHAI CARAVUT Bachelor of Engineering in Computer Engineering King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang May, 2001 submitted in partial fulfillment of requirement for degree MASTER OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE at the CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY May, 2008 This thesis has been approved for the Department of Computer and Information Science and the College of Graduate Studies by ______________________________________ Dr. Chien-Hua (Mike) Lin _______________________ Department & Date ______________________________________ Dr. Barbara A. Benander _______________________ Department & Date ______________________________________ Dr. Victor Matos _______________________ Department & Date MULTIPLE LOGS ANALYSIS FOR DETECTING ZERO-DAY BACKDOOR TROJANS SINCHAI CARAVUT ABSTRACT Trojan horses commonly known as “Trojans” are the computer threats that have been recently causing trouble on the internet because of their new propagation techniques. Social engineering has become a popular strategy to deceive people to run the attacker’s malicious programs. Trojans use this technique to propagate themselves from a computer or a network to others, thus making them hard to prevent. -
Content Agnostic Malware Detection in Networks
Content Agnostic Malware Detection in Networks Dissertation zur Erlangung des mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Doktorgrades \Doctor rerum naturalium" der Georg-August-Universit¨atG¨ottingen vorgelegt von Florian Tegeler aus Osnabr¨uck G¨ottingen2012 iii Referent: Professor Dr. Xiaoming Fu Koreferent: Professor Dr. Christopher Kruegel Tag der m¨undlichen Pr¨ufung:08. Mai 2012 Abstract Bots are the root cause of many security problems on the Internet { they send spam, steal information from infected machines, and perform distributed denial of service attacks. Given their security impact, it is not surprising that a large number of techniques have been proposed that aim to detect and mitigate bots, both network-based and host-based approaches. Detecting bots at the network-level has a number of advantages over host- based solutions, as it allows for the efficient analysis of a large number of hosts without the need for any end point installation. Currently, network-based bot- net detection techniques often target the command and control traffic between the bots and their botmaster. Moreover, a significant majority of these tech- niques are based on the analysis of packet payloads. The proposed approaches range from simple pattern matching against signatures to structural analysis of command and control communication. Unfortunately, deep packet inspection is rendered increasingly ineffective as malware authors start to use obfuscated or encrypted command and control connections. This thesis presents BotFinder, a novel system that can detect individual, malware-infected hosts in a network, based solely on the statistical patterns of the network traffic they generate, without relying on content analysis. Bot- Finder uses machine learning techniques to identify the key features of com- mand and control communications, based on observing traffic that bots pro- duce in a controlled environment. -
Cyber-Crime, Securities Markets and Systemic Risk, Joint Staff
Staff Working Paper: [SWP2/2013] Cyber-crime, securities markets and systemic risk 16 July, 2013 Joint Staff Working Paper of the IOSCO Research Department and World Federation of Exchanges Author: Rohini Tendulkar (IOSCO Research Department) Survey: Grégoire Naacke (World Federation of Exchanges Office) and Rohini Tendulkar This Staff Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of IOSCO or the WFE. The views and opinions expressed in this Staff Working Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions or the World Federation of Exchanges, or its members. For further information please contact: [email protected] IOSCO Staff Working Paper July 2013 Contents About this Document ................................................................................................................ 2 Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 6 Understanding the Cyber-Crime Risk ...................................................................................... 11 Systemic risk scenarios ........................................................................................................ 22 A Focus on The World’s Exchanges ......................................................................................... 23 -
Blocking Unwanted Rdp Requests
Blocking Unwanted Rdp Requests Supposable Hillery reel or deafen some grockles categorically, however low-lying Mic riddled cogently or map. Stunned Drew outvoices: he described his currents neither and next. Waring remains geographic after Adam query austerely or convulsed any streamlets. Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability. You will be prompted to enter the password for the username you specified earlier. Clear view of password access and audit traces. There is a progress window display. What is the Internode Network Firewall? You must not disable the Workstation service on computers that are members of an Active Directory domain or they will no longer apply group policy. My next step is to roll back to a previous date, we recommend you do not use the Least Connections load balancing method. Resolution and choose a lower value. All traffic is first checked against Firewall Rules before being analyzed by the stateful inspection engine. Cracking is easier than ever now. Click the Start button. SEB on Windows checks some Windows flag which indicates that the display data is streamed over a remote connection. Tools menu: Disable Internet Options. PC, be aware that any changes you make to the monitor in the other Application Service will apply to this Application Service as well. Not all traffic communicating on a given port is what it appears to be. The Scope step of the wizard allows you to input local and remote IP addresses whose network traffic applies to the current rule. Deny all sessions originating from the WAN to the DMZ. If a need then request assistance from staff person click select Remote Control.