Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death David Randolph Smith
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Schiavo Revisited? the Trs Uggle for Autonomy at the End of Life in Italy Kathy L
Marquette Elder's Advisor Volume 12 Article 3 Issue 2 Spring Schiavo Revisited? The trS uggle for Autonomy at the End of Life in Italy Kathy L. Cerminara Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center Federico Gustavo Pizzetti University of Milan, Italy Watcharin H. Photangtham Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders Part of the Elder Law Commons Repository Citation Cerminara, Kathy L.; Pizzetti, Federico Gustavo; and Photangtham, Watcharin H. (2011) "Schiavo Revisited? The trS uggle for Autonomy at the End of Life in Italy," Marquette Elder's Advisor: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 3. Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders/vol12/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Elder's Advisor by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SCHIAVO REVISITED? THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY AT THE END OF LIFE IN ITALY Kathy L. Cerminara*, Federico Gustavo Pizzetti** & Watcharin H. Photangtham*** Politically strident debates surrounding end-of-life decisionmaking have surfaced once again, this time across the Atlantic in Italy. Eluana Englaro died in 2009 after a prolonged court fight, causing the internationalpress to compare her case to that of Theresa Marie Schiavo, who passed away in 2005 in Florida after nearly This Article's analysis of proposed Italian legislation was current as of August, 2010. Political debate has, however, continued in Italy, so that any legislation eventually passed may differ in important ways from that discussed here. -
County of San Diego Department of the Medical Examiner 2016 Annual
County of San Diego Department of the Medical Examiner 2016 Annual Report Dr. Glenn Wagner Chief Medical Examiner 2016 ANNUAL REPORT SAN DIEGO COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................... 1 OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 5 DEDICATION, MISSION, AND VISION .......................................................................... 7 POPULATION AND GEOGRAPHY OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY ............................................ 9 DEATHS WE INVESTIGATE ....................................................................................... 11 HISTORY ................................................................................................................. 13 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART ........................................................................................ 15 MEDICAL EXAMINER FACILITY ................................................................................. 17 HOURS AND LOCATION ........................................................................................... 19 ACTIVITIES OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER .............................................. 21 INVESTIGATIONS ..................................................................................................... 23 AUTOPSIES ............................................................................................................. 25 EXAMINATION ROOM ............................................................................................ -
Piercing the Veil: the Limits of Brain Death As a Legal Fiction
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 48 2015 Piercing the Veil: The Limits of Brain Death as a Legal Fiction Seema K. Shah Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation Seema K. Shah, Piercing the Veil: The Limits of Brain Death as a Legal Fiction, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 301 (2015). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol48/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PIERCING THE VEIL: THE LIMITS OF BRAIN DEATH AS A LEGAL FICTION Seema K. Shah* Brain death is different from the traditional, biological conception of death. Al- though there is no possibility of a meaningful recovery, considerable scientific evidence shows that neurological and other functions persist in patients accurately diagnosed as brain dead. Elsewhere with others, I have argued that brain death should be understood as an unacknowledged status legal fiction. A legal fiction arises when the law treats something as true, though it is known to be false or not known to be true, for a particular legal purpose (like the fiction that corporations are persons). -
Resolving Disputes Over Life-Sustaining Treatment \I
.. ..: 4 .. NCSC HF 38-27 E87 M Y \\Resolving Disputes Over C,3 Life-Sustaining Treatment \I A Health Care Provider's Guide Thomas L. Hafemeister ani Paula L. Hannaford Wth the Greenwall Coordinating Council National Center for State Courts library National Center for State Courts 300 Newport Ave. WJliamsburg, VA 23 187-8798 0 1996 National Center for State Courts Williamsburg, Virginia Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 96-70341 ISBN 0-89656-167-4 NCSC Publication Number R- 186 Cover design by Judith Ann Sullivan Images 0 1996 PhotoDisc, Inc. This book was prepared under a grant from the Greenwall Foundation. The points of view expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policy of the National Center for State Courts or the Greenwall Foundation, or the opinions of the Greenwall Review Panel members. Comments are welcome and should be sent to the Greenwall Project, National Center for State Courts, 300 Newport Avenue (231851,PO. Box 8798, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798. Greenwall Coordinating Council Hon. Stewart G. Pollock, Chair New Jersey Supreme Court Morristown, New Jersey Hon. Elizabeth B. Lacy, Vice-Chair Virginia Supreme Court Richmond, Virginia Hon. Robert C. Bibb (ret.) Alexander M. Capron, J.D. Deno, Millikan, Dale & Decker Professor of Law & Medicine Everett, Washington University of Southern California Law Center hsAngeles, California Ellen B. Comer, Esq. Ronald E. Cranford, M.D. Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & Kauffman Department of Neurology Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Hennepin County Medical Center Minneapolis, Minnesota Norman Fost, M.D., M.P.H. Hon. Hilda R. Gage Professor Chief Judge, Michigan Circuit Court Pediatrics & History of Medicine Pontiac, Michigan Director, Program in Medical Ethics University of Wisconsin Medical School Joan McIver Gibson, Ph.D. -
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ______
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-20-00002-CV ___________________________ T.L., A MINOR, AND MOTHER, T.L., ON HER BEHALF, Appellants V. COOK CHILDREN’S MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee On Appeal from the 48th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 048-112330-19 Before Gabriel, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Opinion by Justice Birdwell Dissenting Opinion by Justice Gabriel OPINION I. Introduction In 1975, the State Bar of Texas and the Baylor Law Review published a series of articles addressing the advisability of enacting legislation that would permit physicians to engage in “passive euthanasia”1 to assist terminally ill patients to their medically inevitable deaths.2 One of the articles, authored by an accomplished Austin pediatrician, significantly informed the reasoning of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the seminal decision In re Quinlan, wherein that court recognized for the first time in this country a terminally ill patient’s constitutional liberty interest to voluntarily, through a surrogate decision maker, refuse life-sustaining treatment. 355 A.2d 647, 662–64, 668–69 (N.J. 1976) (quoting Karen Teel, M.D., The Physician’s Dilemma: A Doctor’s View: What the Law Should Be, 27 Baylor L. Rev. 6, 8–9 (Winter 1975)). After Quinlan, the advisability and acceptability of such voluntary passive euthanasia were “proposed, debated, and 1“Passive euthanasia is characteristically defined as the act of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in order to allow the death of an individual.” Lori D. Pritchard Clark, RX: Dosage of Legislative Reform to Accommodate Legalized Physician- Assisted Suicide, 23 Cap. -
The Court Upholds a State Law Prohibiting Physician-Assisted Suicide
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 88 Article 3 Issue 3 Spring Spring 1998 The ourC t Upholds A State Law Prohibiting Physician-Assisted Suicide Brett einbF erg Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Brett einbeF rg, The ourC t Upholds A State Law Prohibiting Physician-Assisted Suicide, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 847 (Spring 1998) This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/98/8803-0847 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINALLAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 88, No. 3 Copyrght © 1998 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A. THE COURT UPHOLDS A STATE LAW PROHIBITING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) I. INTRODUCTION In Vacco v. Quill,' the United States Supreme Court ad- dressed whether a terminally ill person has a constitutionally protected right to commit suicide with the assistance of a physi- cian.2 The Court held that state laws prohibiting physician- assisted suicide are constitutionally permissible since they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.3 In making its decision, the Court determined that the right to die with assistance is not a fundamental right.4 The Court -
Evolution of the Law Affecting End-Of-Life Planning
TRUSTS & ESTATES ARTICLE JANUARY 2008 The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Evolution of the Law kAffecting End-of-Life Planning By Graham D. Holding, Christy Eve Reid & Susan I. McCrory Over the last thirty years there have been significant changes to end-of-life-planning. The changes were initiated as a result of “ugly” scenes played out on national television when grieving families were forced to sue health care providers in order to withdraw life-support systems from family members whose medical conditions would never improve. As a result of these lawsuits, Health Care Power of Attorney and Declaration of a Desire for a Natural Death (“Living Will”) statutes were enacted that recognized an individual’s right to control medical decisions, even when the individual lacked the ability to make or communicate those decisions. In 2007 substantial changes were made in North Carolina’s statutory Health Care Power of Attorney form as well as the statutory Living Will form. Although many improvements were made in North Carolina’s statutory forms, for the reasons expressed below we have decided to recommend that, in lieu of the new statutory forms, our clients execute an alternative form that we have drafted combining the health care power of attorney and living will provisions. This alternative combined form appears in the 2007 supplement to the BB&T ESTATE PLANNING FORMS MANUAL and as a PDF document on the Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson website, www.rbh.com, that can be downloaded from the MenuForms page . Historical Background Historically, the presumption in the law favored the continuance of life under all circumstances. -
“Is Cryonics an Ethical Means of Life Extension?” Rebekah Cron University of Exeter 2014
1 “Is Cryonics an Ethical Means of Life Extension?” Rebekah Cron University of Exeter 2014 2 “We all know we must die. But that, say the immortalists, is no longer true… Science has progressed so far that we are morally bound to seek solutions, just as we would be morally bound to prevent a real tsunami if we knew how” - Bryan Appleyard 1 “The moral argument for cryonics is that it's wrong to discontinue care of an unconscious person when they can still be rescued. This is why people who fall unconscious are taken to hospital by ambulance, why they will be maintained for weeks in intensive care if necessary, and why they will still be cared for even if they don't fully awaken after that. It is a moral imperative to care for unconscious people as long as there remains reasonable hope for recovery.” - ALCOR 2 “How many cryonicists does it take to screw in a light bulb? …None – they just sit in the dark and wait for the technology to improve” 3 - Sterling Blake 1 Appleyard 2008. Page 22-23 2 Alcor.org: ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ 2014 3 Blake 1996. Page 72 3 Introduction Biologists have known for some time that certain organisms can survive for sustained time periods in what is essentially a death"like state. The North American Wood Frog, for example, shuts down its entire body system in winter; its heart stops beating and its whole body is frozen, until summer returns; at which point it thaws and ‘comes back to life’ 4. -
1 United States District Court Eastern District Of
Case 2:17-cv-10186-ILRL-MBN Document 30 Filed 07/06/18 Page 1 of 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LUCY CROCKETT CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-10186 LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL SECTION "B"(5) INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, ET AL. ORDER AND REASONS Defendants have filed two motions. The first seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case for failure to state a claim. Rec. Doc. 11. The second seeks, in the alternative, to transfer the above- captioned matter to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 12. After the motions were submitted, Plaintiffs filed two opposition memoranda, which will be considered in the interest of justice. Rec. Docs. 17, 18. For the reasons discussed below, and in further consideration of findings made during hearing with oral argument, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 11) is GRANTED, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to transfer venue (Rec. Doc. 12) is DISMISSED AS MOOT. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Vallory Crockett was an inmate at the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women from 1979 until 1983. See Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 2. In May 1983, Vallory Crockett allegedly escaped from custody and was never apprehended. See id. Because authorities did not mount 1 Case 2:17-cv-10186-ILRL-MBN Document 30 Filed 07/06/18 Page 2 of 8 a rigorous search for Vallory Crockett and returned her belongings to her family the day after she purportedly escaped, Plaintiffs claim that she actually died in custody. -
Causes of Death and Comorbidities in Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19
www.nature.com/scientificreports OPEN Causes of death and comorbidities in hospitalized patients with COVID‑19 Sefer Elezkurtaj1*, Selina Greuel1, Jana Ihlow1, Edward Georg Michaelis1, Philip Bischof1,2, Catarina Alisa Kunze1, Bruno Valentin Sinn1, Manuela Gerhold1, Kathrin Hauptmann1, Barbara Ingold‑Heppner3, Florian Miller4, Hermann Herbst4, Victor Max Corman5,6, Hubert Martin7, Helena Radbruch7, Frank L. Heppner7,8,9 & David Horst1* Infection by the new corona virus strain SARS‑CoV‑2 and its related syndrome COVID‑19 has been associated with more than two million deaths worldwide. Patients of higher age and with preexisting chronic health conditions are at an increased risk of fatal disease outcome. However, detailed information on causes of death and the contribution of pre‑existing health conditions to death yet is missing, which can be reliably established by autopsy only. We performed full body autopsies on 26 patients that had died after SARS‑CoV‑2 infection and COVID‑19 at the Charité University Hospital Berlin, Germany, or at associated teaching hospitals. We systematically evaluated causes of death and pre‑existing health conditions. Additionally, clinical records and death certifcates were evaluated. We report fndings on causes of death and comorbidities of 26 decedents that had clinically presented with severe COVID‑19. We found that septic shock and multi organ failure was the most common immediate cause of death, often due to suppurative pulmonary infection. Respiratory failure due to difuse alveolar damage presented as immediate cause of death in fewer cases. Several comorbidities, such as hypertension, ischemic heart disease, and obesity were present in the vast majority of patients. -
The Time of Death - a Legal, Ethical and Medical Dilemma
The Catholic Lawyer Volume 18 Number 3 Volume 18, Summer 1972, Number 3 Article 7 The Time of Death - A Legal, Ethical and Medical Dilemma John E. Pearson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE TIME OF DEATH-A LEGAL, ETHICAL AND MEDICAL DILEMMA Introduction On December 4, 1967 an amazed world learned that a South African physician, Dr. Christian Barnard, had transplanted the heart of one hopelessly injured patient into the body of another man who was dying of advanced cardiac disease.' This unprecedented operation brought the remarkable advances of medical technology over the pre- vious fifty years into sharp focus. The major medical obstacle to suc- cessful transplants had been the body's production of antibodies which reject the introduction of foreign substances into the system. 2 To fight this rejection process, medical scientists developed a substance known as antilymphocyteglobulin (ALG) .3 This substance performed excel- lently in preventing the rejection process. However, it created a new medical problem: ALG retards the production of lymphocytes which create the rejection process but lymphocytes are necessary to fight off infection in the body. This complication meant that doctors might be successful in preventing rejection of a transplanted vital organ only to 4 lose the patient to infection. -
In Re Quinlan: One Court's Answer to the Problem of Death with Dignity
Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 15 Winter 1-1-1977 In Re Quinlan: One Court'S Answer To The Problem Of Death With Dignity Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation In Re Quinlan: One Court'S Answer To The Problem Of Death With Dignity, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 285 (1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol34/iss1/15 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. IN RE QUINLAN: ONE COURT'S ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY On the night of April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, aged 22, lapsed into a coma from which she still has not emerged.' On Septem- ber 10, 1975, her father applied to the Chancery division of the Supe- rior Court of New Jersey for letters of guardianship with the express power to authorize "the discontinuance of all extraordinary means of sustaining the vital processes of his daughter .. ."I This request was strenuously opposed by Karen's doctors, the hospita in which she was being treated, the county prosecutor, Karen's guardian ad litem, and the state of New Jersey, which had intervened on the basis of a state interest in the preservation of life.3 Bergen County Record, Nov.