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San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace's Motion to File New Contentions Regarding Adequacy of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternat

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San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace's Motion to File New Contentions Regarding Adequacy of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternat UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-275-LR Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant 50-323-LR Units 1 and 2 SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE’S MOTION TO FILE NEW CONTENTIONS REGARDING ADEQUACY OF SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS FOR DIABLO CANYON LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION I. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(c), 2.309(f)(1), and 2.309(f)(2), San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (“SLOMFP”) seeks leave to file two new contentions challenging the adequacy of Pacific Gas & Electric Company’s (“PG&Es”) Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (“SAMA”) Analysis for the proposed renewal of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant (“DCNPP”) operating license to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) implementing regulations.1 In Contention C (Inadequate Consideration of Seismic Risks in SAMA Analysis), SLOMFP contends that PG&E’s SAMA Analysis is inadequate to satisfy NEPA because it proposes to rely on the “results” of PG&E’s recently-submitted and seriously deficient post- Fukushima seismic risk analysis for its evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of measures to mitigate earthquake impacts. Contention C is supported by the attached Declaration of Dr. David D. Jackson, Professor of Geophysics Emeritus at the University of California at Los Angeles (attached). Contention D (Inadequate Discussion of Flooding Risk in SAMA Analysis) asserts that the SAMA Analysis wrongly fails to consider flooding risks to safety equipment 1 The SAMA Analysis is presented in Appendix F to PG&E’s Amended Environmental Report (submitted February 25, 2015) (“ER”). posed by “local intense precipitation” or “LIP flooding events.” These LIP flooding risks were identified in PG&E’s own post-Fukushima flood hazard analysis.2 As discussed below in Section II, SLOMFP’s contentions meet the NRC’s requirements for admissibility of contentions. As further discussed in Section III, SLOMFP also has good cause for filing the contentions after the initial deadline, which passed in 2010. II. CONTENTIONS Contention C. Inadequate Consideration of Seismic Risk in SAMA Analysis 1. Statement of Contention PG&E’s SAMA Analysis (Appendix F of PG&E’s Amended ER) is inadequate to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(ii)(L) because PG&E’s evaluation of potential mitigation measures is not based on a sufficiently rigorous or up-to-date analysis of seismic risks. As a result, PG&E’s evaluation of the comparative costs and benefits of measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of a severe earthquake does not sufficiently credit the cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures. While PG&E claims that the “results and insights” of its 2014 “interim” probabilistic risk analysis (“PRA”) (labeled “DCO3”) are “reasonable for the purposes of a SAMA analysis” (Amended ER at F-34), by PG&E’s own admission, DCO3 is only an “interim” PRA. Id. In addition, it is not sufficiently rigorous or updated to support the SAMA analysis. Nor does PG&E’s promise to “update” the DCO3 with the “results” of its 2015 seismic hazards analysis3 cure the inadequacy of DCO3 to support PG&E’s SAMA Analysis , because 2 Contentions C and D follow two contentions filed by SLOMFP on April 6, 2015: Contention A (Inadequate Consideration of Energy Alternatives) and Contention B (Failure to Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis of Energy Alternatives). 3 PG&E’s 2015 seismic hazards analysis consists of two documents: Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 (“SHS 2 PG&E’s 2015 seismic hazards analysis is also insufficiently rigorous and relies on outdated or unjustified methods and assumptions. Given the inadequacies of PG&E’s seismic hazards analysis, to merely cite its “results” in a revised SAMA Analysis would not be sufficient to ensure the adequacy of the SAMA Analysis to evaluate potential mitigation measures for severe seismic accidents. Instead, PG&E must cure the significant defects in the underlying data and analyses. 2. Statement of Basis for the Contention a. NEPA requirements The “core” requirement of NEPA is that for any federal action with a significant adverse effect on the human environment, federal agencies must prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) which includes a “detailed statement” regarding: (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d 1016, 1020 (2006) (citing Dept. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). NRC regulations also require that an NRC application for operating license renewal must be supported by an environmental report prepared by the applicant (10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)) and a supplemental EIS prepared by the NRC Staff. 10 C.F.R. § 51.95(c). Report”), submitted by letter from Barry S. Allen, PG&E to NRC, re: Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident: Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Mar. 11, 2015); and PG&E’s Seismic Source Characterization for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County, California; report on the results of a SSHAC level 3 study (Rev. A, March 2015) (“SSC Report”). 3 An EIS must provide decision-makers with a reasonable array of alternatives for avoiding or mitigating the environmental impacts of the proposed action. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989)). With respect to renewal of reactor operating licenses, NRC regulations specifically require a discussion of “alternatives to mitigate severe accidents.” 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L), 51.95(c)(2). “Probability figures” used in a SAMA analysis must be adequate to support the reasoned consideration of alternatives. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-17, 56 NRC 1, 7 (2002). In addition, the SAMA Analysis must consider relevant information from outside sources. Id. at 8; Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-11-11, 74 NRC 427, 443 (2011). Finally, an Environmental Report or EIS must address “new and significant information” that was not previously addressed in an EIS for the facility. 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(iv), 51.92(a)(2). b. Inadequacy of DCO3 to support SAMA Analysis PG&E asserts that “the interim results and insights from the DC03 model are reasonable for the purposes of a SAMA analysis” because: At the time of the 2013 Seismic Peer Review, the Turbine Building Shear Wall fragility had been updated based on the latest hazard spectral information, which was updated with the Shoreline Fault. The fragility analysis for other SSCs was based on the LTSP. The LTSP fragility curves are acceptable for use in DC03 because no scaling is necessary for use with the updated hazard spectral information. The LTSP fragility curves are the same shape (+/-1 0°/o) in the period of interest (3-8.5Hz) and there are no components in the PRA model in the 1-3Hz range. In addition, the 2014 Central Coastal California Seismic Imaging Project Report (Reference 53) was a deterministic analysis that did not change the inputs to the seismic PRA. Amended ER at F-34. While PG&E claims to have relied on the “latest hazard spectral information” for its 2013 update to the Turbine Building Shear Wall fragility, that information 4 does not include the 2015 SHS Report or the 2015 SSC Report; and therefore the spectral information is not, in fact, the “latest.” As PG&E implicitly acknowledges, the “latest” consists of the probabilistic seismic hazards assessment prepared by PG&E in response to the NRC’s post-Fukushima Request for Information. PG&E must consider this information and ensure it is adequate to support the SAMA Analysis. Duke Energy Corp., 56 NRC at 7 (requiring adequate probability figures to support a SAMA analysis); Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 74 NRC at 443 (SAMA Analysis must consider relevant information from outside sources); 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(iv), 51.92(a)(2) (Environmental Reports and EISs must address “new and significant information” that was not previously addressed.) c. Inadequacy of seismic hazards assessment “results” to support SAMA analysis The “results” that PG&E proposes to use to update its SAMA Analysis come from a “site-specific probabilistic seismic hazard assessment” that PG&E prepared in response to the NRC’s March 12, 2012 Request for Information, issued pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(f). As described by PG&E: The assessment used an updated seismic source characterization (SSC) model and an updated GMC [ground motion characterization] model as basic inputs. The SSC and GMC studies were undertaken to fulfill the NRC requirement that PG&E conduct a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment using SSHAC [Senior Seismic Hazards Analysis Committee] Level 3 procedures for DCPP, as specified by the NRC (NRC 2012).
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