Vasilis Vourkoutiotis. Prisoners of War and the German High Command: The British and American Experience. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. xi + 266 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4039-1169-8.

Reviewed by Paul Boytinck

Published on H-German (June, 2004)

Geneva Convention Vindicated records of the Public Record Ofce (PRO) in Lon‐ What Lord Byron called the brain-splattering, don, the National Archives and Record Adminis‐ throat-cutting art of war received a modest but tration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. and the Na‐ measurable setback with the ratifcation of the tional Archives of (NAC), Ottawa, to docu‐ of 1929, and its provisions for ment the provisions of the German prisoner of the protection of prisoners of war. Vasilis Vourk‐ war guidelines and to gain indirect access to the outiotis believes that the OKW (Oberkommando inspection reports of the International Committee der , or Armed Forces High Command) of the Red Cross. (The International Committee and the German Army adhered to the Geneva fles copies with the nations concerned.) The re‐ Convention of 1929 in the case of American, sult is a specialized monograph which gives an in‐ British and Canadian prisoners of war during dispensable overview of the operation of a prison‐ World War II, but argues that the execution of Al‐ er of war camp that adheres to the Geneva Con‐ lied escapees, the Order and the use vention. of some Allied airmen as human shields, notably The number of prisoners captured refected in Frankfurt am Main, were clear violations engi‐ the fortunes and vagaries of the war. The Ger‐ neered and implemented by Hitler, Göring and mans won the early battles and British prisoners the SS. outnumbered those of their German counterparts The work is solidly based on the archival by a factor of ten to one. In November 1940, the records, and it shuns works of reminiscence, auto‐ Germans held 39,956 British prisoners while the biography and memoirs. The facts have been dili‐ total number of Germans in British captivity was gently researched in the German archives, most a mere 3,594 prisoners. In July 1941, the Germans notably those of the Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv held 50,717 British prisoners but only 5,010 Ger‐ in Freiburg, to verify the German part of the au‐ mans were prisoners in British camps. In Decem‐ thor's case. Vourkoutiotis has also consulted the ber 1942, the Germans held 2,480,974 prisoners of H-Net Reviews all nationalities but rough parity was achieved on were generally located in the eastern districts.to a more narrow sector in July 1944 when the make escape difcult for pilots" (p. 34). When, lat‐ British and Americans held 186,375 Germans and er on in the war, these unfortunates had to be the Germans held 176,688 British and Americans evacuated due to the advance of the Soviet Army, in camps from to occupied Poland. they endured daily marches of between 20 and 25 To deal with these prisoners, the Germans kilometers (12.42 and 15.53 miles) per day. At one were obliged to house them in appropriate struc‐ point in this evacuation late in the war, Hitler di‐ tures. Section 9 of the Convention stipulated that rectly intervened. "On February 14, 1945, in re‐ prisoners could be "interned in any town, fortress sponse to an inquiry concerning British and or other place with fxed limits" (p. 48). They were American prisoners of war who were too ill to not to be exposed to the fre zones or located in march with others being evacuated from the areas subject to bombardment or used as camps at Sagan and Lamsdorf, Hitler personally hostages or human shields to prevent bombard‐ decided, contrary to both the Geneva Convention ment. However, Dr. Alfons Waltzog, in his 1942 and previous ofcial German policy, that they update of German policies concerning Allied pris‐ were not to be left behind. They were to be oners of war, wrote that "areas prone to enemy brought back with the frst available train return‐ air-raids, but not actual zones of fghting by ene‐ ing after delivering supplies to the Front" my armies, were legitimate sites" for the location (emphasis supplied, p. 73). of POW camps (quoted on p. 49). What this gloss Food for the prisoners was always one of the or directive meant in practical terms at the time is major bedeviling issues, and the author makes it unclear. It would seem to indicate that Waltzog's clear that the provision of food was a problem in intention was to fout the Geneva Convention, but both world wars. "The British Manual of Military the author does not pursue the practical or crimi‐ Law and the German Kriegsbrauch [i.e., Kriegs‐ nal repercussions of Waltzog's ruling in detail. In brauch im Landkriege (Manual for War on Land)] any case, Vourkoutiotis does make it perfectly ... took the requirements of the [1907] Hague Con‐ clear that the German High Command did not in‐ vention to mean that the prisoners of war were tend to leave its prisoners at the mercy of the an‐ entitled to the same rations as the Detaining Pow‐ nihilating thunderbolts, or torrents of friendly er's peacetime troops, but neither country actual‐ fre, from the sky. In the OKW or‐ ly gave their prisoners of war these rations. The dered air-raid shelters to be made available to British came close to the required rations before prisoners and further stipulated that these shel‐ cutting them, along with the civilian population's ters were to match those ofered to German civil‐ rations, in January 1916 and again in June 1918. ians wherever possible. The German rations for the prisoners of war were The Germans, who moved their prisoners by signifcantly worse, leading in some cases to near- rail, often put them up in castles, forts, or former starvation and disease among the British prison‐ schools close to a railway line. What was called a ers; almost mirroring the case a quarter of a cen‐ Dulag (Durchgangslager or transit camp) normal‐ tury later, parcels arriving through the intermedi‐ ly consisted of six thousand men but a ary ofces of the International Committee of the (Stammlager or POW camp for soldiers excluding Red Cross made a signifcant diference for the ofcers) included up to ten thousand with a ratio British prisoners, as by 1918, because of the com‐ of one German guard or staf member for every plete British blockade of all items, Germany no seven/ten prisoners. As a precaution, "the perma‐ longer had the resources to meet the needs of its nent camps [for British and American airmen] own armed forces, let alone the prisoners of war" (p. 23). For this reason, the Germans decided to

2 H-Net Reviews supplement their own rations with donations way that they would eventually, and did, strangle from the International Committee of the Red themselves" (p. 187). The number of German dead Cross. In December 1941, the food rations of the is not given, and the Allied unit responsible is not, POWs were reduced by one third; the shortfall of course, identifed. The Germans, however, ex‐ was to be made good by food parcels distributed acted a collective punishment by shackling their by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Canadian and British prisoners. The reprisal ap‐ The author writes that on October 10, 1942, the parently did not lead to Allied deaths, and to bread ration was set at 800 grams (or 28.21 judge by reports of the International Committee ounces) per day while sick prisoners were entitled of the Red Cross on the condition of the 381 mana‐ to 225 grams (or 7.9 ounces) of sugar per week cled prisoners in the ofcers' camp of Ofag VII B and the magnifcent beer ration stood at 3 to 5 Eichstaedt, the ordered reprisal in this camp was liters (or 3.17 and 5.28 quarts) per month. Fur‐ implemented in such a way that "it was an incon‐ thermore, to assure the prisoners that they were venience as it was applied, rather than a serious receiving an adequate food supply "it was stan‐ problem" (p. 180). dard practice to publish a complete menu indicat‐ The one besetting problem with the Geneva ing the calories and rations, thus allowing the Convention is that there is no efective means to Men of Confdence [Vertrauensmaenner, or Camp protect captured troops on the battlefeld as op‐ Representatives] and the Protecting Power dele‐ posed to the rear areas, and that brings us directly gates to compare the prisoners' menu to the of‐ to the Commando Order. The author's discussion cial German rations. Most importantly as regards of Hitler's Commando Order is very brief, and his discipline, all collective disciplinary measures af‐ failure to give a copy of the order in the original fecting food were prohibited by the Geneva Con‐ German along with a translation is an inexplica‐ vention" (p. 55). It was a central and immensely ble omission. He writes, "the Commando Order of important stipulation. It meant that the detaining October 18, 1942, was issued by Hitler in conjunc‐ power could not impose its will or compel obedi‐ tion with the shackling order for Canadian and ence by starvation. other British prisoners of war. After the raid at Although Vourkoutiotis does not raise the Dieppe, by mostly Canadian soldiers and British subject of the normal death rate in the prisoner of , had been repulsed, members of both war camps--it was probably in the range of four the German armed forces and the Todt organiza‐ deaths per thousand per year, as even relatively tion had been found with their arms bound in young men are mortal--he does cover a number of such a way that they would eventually, and did, serious violations of the Geneva Convention in strangle themselves. Further, a British close-quar‐ dispassionate fashion. They include the shackling ters combat manual was purportedly found of prisoners after capture; the Commando Order which instructed commandos to keep prisoners of 1942; the execution of recaptured Allied es‐ alive only insofar as it was expedient.... Hence‐ capees by fring squad; ofcial conniving at the forth, regardless of whether they fought in uni‐ lynching or killing of prisoners by enraged civil‐ form or as spies or franc-tireurs, Allied comman‐ ians; and the attempted use of prisoners as hu‐ dos caught fghting outside major military beach- man shields against air attacks. heads or war zones were to be killed rather than The shackling of prisoners (Germans, British taken prisoner [and the order's implementation] and Canadian) evidently began with the discov‐ ... represented an obvious breach of international ery, after the failure of the 1942 , of law committed by the OKW (not just the Nazi mili‐ German prisoners with "arms bound in such a tary structures), and was easily proven to be a at " (p. 187). It is, of course,

3 H-Net Reviews possible to argue with the judgment that this had escaped their captivity. Dealing with this breach was one committed by the OKW and the problem cost 620,000 lost work hours for the Ger‐ German Army; the order, after all, originated with man economy, in addition to the increased threat Hitler and not the ofcer corps, and it is my belief to the internal security of Germany" (p. 102). The that high and low-ranking ofcers of the OKW reasons for this very high total of escapes by pris‐ who disagreed with the policy in private were oners of war are not explored in more detail. bullied and coerced into giving their assent Whether Hitler knew the details of what he would against their will and better judgment. It should undoubtedly have considered a scandalous state also be added that the killing of prisoners in of afairs is unclear. In any case, he decided to act World War II was by no means a German monop‐ in 1944 and personally gave the order to execute oly. In the research for his book Overlord: D-Day the recaptured escapees from Stalag Luft III and the Battle of Normandy, Max Hastings discov‐ Sagan. (The copy of this order is also not part of ered that "among scores of Allied witnesses inter‐ this book.) "The shooting of the 47 recaptured viewed for this narrative, almost every one had prisoners of the 'Great Escape' from Stalag Luft III direct knowledge or even experience of the shoot‐ Sagan constituted perhaps the single greatest ing of German prisoners during the campaign. In crime against British or American prisoners of the heat of battle, in the wake of seeing comrades war during the war.... As was made clear at the die, many men found it intolerable to send prison‐ Nuremberg Trials, the actual murders of the pris‐ ers to the rear knowing that they would thus sur‐ oners were not carried out by Wehrmacht troops, vive the war, while they themselves seemed to but by the SS, and were conducted further at the have little prospect of doing so. Many British and personal behest of Hitler" (p. 181). It might be American units shot SS prisoners routinely, which added that if the execution of these escapees was explained, as much as the fanatical resistance that intended to serve as a deterrent, it seems to have the [Wafen-] SS so often ofered, why so few ap‐ failed in accomplishing its purpose, and it was peared in POW cages."[1] It would also be very re‐ therefore both criminal and pointless. The fact is vealing to read any reports by the International that the problem of escaping prisoners continued Committee on the condition of American, British to plague the Germans even after this mass execu‐ and Canadian cages and camps tion in 1944. As late as March 1945, General Alfred for German soldiers and their European allies in Jodl sent a jovial memo to military district XIII France during the course of hostilities in 1944-45. (most probably Wehrkreis XIII in Nuremberg), to Many books and even more demotic flms let camp commandants know that even a single concentrate on the sensational theme of escape to escape would cost them their heads. It is, all in all, the exclusion of all other issues. Vourkoutiotis a strange and bafing state of afairs, and the un‐ does not. He remarks that the German use of dogs derlying reasons why so many Allied prisoners to guard prisoners was modifed in 1940, when were at large in Germany during the war years "the previous practice of allowing guard dogs to are never made totally clear in the narrative. run freely between perimeter fences was prohib‐ In the same vein, the author explores the vio‐ ited; from then on, all guard dogs had to be kept lation of the Geneva Convention by German civil‐ on a leash" (p. 50). Later, he gives some really star‐ ians who, enraged or made mad by grief and de‐ tling statistics on the overall number of escapes spair, either killed or connived in the killing of from German custody. From January to Septem‐ some of the unfortunate downed members of the ber 1942, it appears that "1,175 Ofcers (of whom Allied air crew who were shot down over Ger‐ 678 were Russians) and 77,628 noncommissioned many. The total number of these victims, whose ofcers and men (of whom 35,208 were Russians) fate could not materially alter the course of the

4 H-Net Reviews air war in the slightest degree, was thirty-nine killed during these air attacks, but the book does men; and, while Vourkoutiotis tried to get more not anywhere give this total. accurate fgures, he failed to come up with a more The Allied bombing ofensive afected the defnitive total. One of his more interesting explo‐ prisoners indirectly as well as directly. Red Cross rations concerns what he calls Göring's attempt to inspectors who visited Stalag X B Sandbostel in use the prisoners as human shields, and he sug‐ March and April 1945 noted catastrophic condi‐ gests that Frankfurt was the site selected for this tions when many of the 2,143 prisoners were experiment, but the presentation of the sketchy transferred west from camps in the east, and facts of the case does not make for a convincing found that "the recent bombings of Bremen (from argument. While Frankfurt was blasted and where the camp used to receive its bread sup‐ bombed as we know full well, we are not told how plies) meant that there was no more bread avail‐ many of the airmen located in the Frankfurt tran‐ able, and the prisoners were given more potatoes sit camp were killed in the raid or raids.[2] instead" (p. 176). This report does not sound like Vourkoutiotis does not mention it, but it is the depths of deprivation, but we have to imagine highly probable that the greatest cause of excess a group of 2,000 weary and ravenous young men mortality among Allied POWs was the villainy much emaciated by their trek, perhaps by forced called friendly fre. It consisted of high explosives, marches of between 20 and 25 kilometers (12.42 incendiaries and machine-gun belts of ammuni‐ and 15.53 miles) per day. One other proof of the tion delivered by Lancaster bombers, B-17 Flying danger posed by the bombing campaign is that Fortresses, and Mustang fghter bombers, against the Red Cross inspections, which had averaged little or negligible opposition. The Germans, as around one hundred visits per quarter during the previously noted, were not at liberty to expose war, were reduced to nine camp visits during the their prisoners to this bombardment, and they is‐ spring of 1945, when the bomber ofensive was sued rules and regulations about it. The aim was arguably at its most bitterly destructive phase. to provide air raid shelters equivalent to those The 1945 inspections revealed, as we would ex‐ provided to German civilians. Given that an esti‐ pect, a decline in overall conditions: some three of mated 600,000 civilians died in these attacks, the the camps were satisfactory, three were poor and proviso is apt to pall. Other rules applied. The another three dangerously inadequate. What is prisoners were to remain in housing or shelters clear is that by 1945, the visits were few and far during air raids or risk the death penalty for loot‐ between. It had plainly become too dangerous for ing. The guards escorting prisoners during train the Red Cross inspectors to check for dangerous journeys were asked to prepare contingency camp conditions. plans if the train was attacked. Generally, guards The book includes minor errors and omis‐ and prisoners of war were to take the same eva‐ sions. The Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv is said to sive action as the rest of the train, and the guards be located in Freiburg im Bresgau, not Breisgau were to keep the prisoners within their line of (p. 256). The OKH on one occasion appears as the sight during this action, a stipulation that I sus‐ "Oberkommando der Heer" rather than pect was the source of much mirthless laughter "" (p. viii), a minor er‐ among their ranks. "In mid-September 1944, the ror that nevertheless makes a German reader OKW ordered that they be notifed by telex of finch. These are exceptions, not the rule. Hun‐ prisoners of war killed during an air-raid only if dreds of OKW memo titles are meticulously and there were more than seven killed" (p. 161). This correctly transcribed in the notes. Gottlob Berg‐ order surely suggests that the OKW kept an over‐ er's title of Chef des Kriegsgefangenenwesen is all record of the total number of Allied prisoners

5 H-Net Reviews never translated into English as Director of Pris‐ regulations. Specifcally, when Waltzog ruled in oner of War Department in the text as opposed to 1942 that "areas prone to enemy air-raids, but not the notes. The German Vertrauensmann (a man actual zones of fghting by enemy armies, were le‐ who merits or deserves one's trust) is here trans‐ gitimate sites" for the location of POW camps, did lated literally as "Man of Confdence." This trans‐ he discuss this ruling with his Swiss counterparts? lation is too literal and is not good idiomatic Eng‐ And did they concur with his interpretation? And lish; it connotes the villainous "confdence man," if so, on what grounds? These are not academic the total opposite of the trustworthy "Man of Con‐ questions, but matters of life and death. We have fdence." For these reasons, it would probably be it on the authority of R. H. S. Crossman, the cabi‐ better if Vourkoutiotis and others translated Ver‐ net minister in Harold Wilson's government and trauensmann as "Camp Representative" and have Member of Parliament for Coventry (Coventry done with it. The men who flled the position and Dresden are "twinned" cities and Crossman were responsible men with difcult assignments. had many occasions to visit the German city), that Furthermore, some of the ofcials on the German some 25,000 Allied prisoners of war were quar‐ side are not properly identifed. They include Dr. tered in and around Dresden in February 1945. Waltzog, evidently a German lawyer who provid‐ This fact was known in London and Washington ed legal glosses and interpretations of selected before the raid, but the order to attack was given sections of the Geneva Convention, as well as nevertheless.[3] Another source tells us that the Berger, the Chief of the Prisoner of War Depart‐ Dresden attack killed at least seventy-one Allied ment for a number of years. Brief biographical prisoners of war.[4] sketches of both men would have been helpful. Vourkoutiotis, in the one instance where he Then again, is it really true that the Allied prison‐ directly confronts the question of OKW credibility, ers received 28 ounces of bread as part of their observes in passing that the secondary literature diet when the staple of the German diet, from east of biography, reminiscences and memoirs sup‐ to west and north to south, was undoubtedly that ports his conclusions. This observation is largely nutritious carbohydrate, the common potato? And true, but it would have made for a better book if fnally, a thick and impenetrable tangle of text ap‐ he had included some of the major statements pears on pages 31-34. It turns out to be a long list from the reputable secondary sources. David of German POW camps, the sort of thing only an Wild, British Army chaplain, who spent fve years author or archive rat could love. It should have as a prisoner of war in Germany, many of them in been unceremoniously stufed into an appendix. and around Torun, Poland, attests to the truth of The book also raises some curious questions the matter in his admirable memoir: "An impres‐ of substance and procedure. Why should we as‐ sion may be given in these pages that life was not sume that all these OKW rules and regulations all that hard in German captivity. It is true that we were actually followed by harried German camp were fortunate to be prisoners of the German commandants on the ground? The fundamental army. With that strange attachment to what is "ko‐ and most convincing answer to this question is rrekt," they frequently protected us from being surely that was the Protecting Power subjected to the brutality and ruthlessness of the during most of the war, and Swiss roving inspec‐ and the SS, and made a show of conform‐ tors made sure that the provisions of the Geneva ing most of the time to the requirements of the Convention were followed. But it is never quite Geneva Convention."[5] They made, as Wild's made clear by what means the OKW conferred book and this book show all too well, more than a with the Swiss legal representatives when it is‐ show of conforming to the Convention. sued some of its more controversial rulings or

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Notes [1]. Max Hastings, Overlord; D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 211-212. [2]. When he visited the city in 1945, John Dos Passos wrote "Frankfurt resembles a city as much as a pile of bones and a smashed skull on the prairies resembles a prize Hereford steer." Tour of Duty (Boston: Houghton Mifin, 1946), p. 244. [3]. R. H. S. Crossman, "Apocalypse at Dres‐ den," Esquire, 60, no. 5 (November 1963), p. 152. [4]. Dick Sheehy, "Dresden Plus 93 Days," His‐ tory Today, 45, no. 5 (May 1995), p. 6. [5]. David Wild, Prisoner of Hope (Lewes, Sus‐ sex: Book Guild, 1992), pp. 11-12. Copyright (c) 2004 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonproft, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, originat‐ ing list, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For other uses contact the Reviews editori‐ al staf: [email protected].

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Citation: Paul Boytinck. Review of Vourkoutiotis, Vasilis. Prisoners of War and the German High Command: The British and American Experience. H-German, H-Net Reviews. June, 2004.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9431

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