Geneva Convention Vindicated

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Geneva Convention Vindicated Vasilis Vourkoutiotis. Prisoners of War and the German High Command: The British and American Experience. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. xi + 266 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4039-1169-8. Reviewed by Paul Boytinck Published on H-German (June, 2004) Geneva Convention Vindicated records of the Public Record Office (PRO) in Lon‐ What Lord Byron called the brain-splattering, don, the National Archives and Record Adminis‐ throat-cutting art of war received a modest but tration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. and the Na‐ measurable setback with the ratification of the tional Archives of Canada (NAC), Ottawa, to docu‐ Geneva Convention of 1929, and its provisions for ment the provisions of the German prisoner of the protection of prisoners of war. Vasilis Vourk‐ war guidelines and to gain indirect access to the outiotis believes that the OKW (Oberkommando inspection reports of the International Committee der Wehrmacht, or Armed Forces High Command) of the Red Cross. (The International Committee and the German Army adhered to the Geneva files copies with the nations concerned.) The re‐ Convention of 1929 in the case of American, sult is a specialized monograph which gives an in‐ British and Canadian prisoners of war during dispensable overview of the operation of a prison‐ World War II, but argues that the execution of Al‐ er of war camp that adheres to the Geneva Con‐ lied escapees, the Commando Order and the use vention. of some Allied airmen as human shields, notably The number of prisoners captured reflected in Frankfurt am Main, were clear violations engi‐ the fortunes and vagaries of the war. The Ger‐ neered and implemented by Hitler, Göring and mans won the early battles and British prisoners the SS. outnumbered those of their German counterparts The work is solidly based on the archival by a factor of ten to one. In November 1940, the records, and it shuns works of reminiscence, auto‐ Germans held 39,956 British prisoners while the biography and memoirs. The facts have been dili‐ total number of Germans in British captivity was gently researched in the German archives, most a mere 3,594 prisoners. In July 1941, the Germans notably those of the Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv held 50,717 British prisoners but only 5,010 Ger‐ in Freiburg, to verify the German part of the au‐ mans were prisoners in British camps. In Decem‐ thor's case. Vourkoutiotis has also consulted the ber 1942, the Germans held 2,480,974 prisoners of H-Net Reviews all nationalities but rough parity was achieved on were generally located in the eastern districts.to a more narrow sector in July 1944 when the make escape difficult for pilots" (p. 34). When, lat‐ British and Americans held 186,375 Germans and er on in the war, these unfortunates had to be the Germans held 176,688 British and Americans evacuated due to the advance of the Soviet Army, in camps from Germany to occupied Poland. they endured daily marches of between 20 and 25 To deal with these prisoners, the Germans kilometers (12.42 and 15.53 miles) per day. At one were obliged to house them in appropriate struc‐ point in this evacuation late in the war, Hitler di‐ tures. Section 9 of the Convention stipulated that rectly intervened. "On February 14, 1945, in re‐ prisoners could be "interned in any town, fortress sponse to an inquiry concerning British and or other place with fxed limits" (p. 48). They were American prisoners of war who were too ill to not to be exposed to the fre zones or located in march with others being evacuated from the areas subject to bombardment or used as camps at Sagan and Lamsdorf, Hitler personally hostages or human shields to prevent bombard‐ decided, contrary to both the Geneva Convention ment. However, Dr. Alfons Waltzog, in his 1942 and previous official German policy, that they update of German policies concerning Allied pris‐ were not to be left behind. They were to be oners of war, wrote that "areas prone to enemy brought back with the frst available train return‐ air-raids, but not actual zones of fghting by ene‐ ing after delivering supplies to the Front" my armies, were legitimate sites" for the location (emphasis supplied, p. 73). of POW camps (quoted on p. 49). What this gloss Food for the prisoners was always one of the or directive meant in practical terms at the time is major bedeviling issues, and the author makes it unclear. It would seem to indicate that Waltzog's clear that the provision of food was a problem in intention was to fout the Geneva Convention, but both world wars. "The British Manual of Military the author does not pursue the practical or crimi‐ Law and the German Kriegsbrauch [i.e., Kriegs‐ nal repercussions of Waltzog's ruling in detail. In brauch im Landkriege (Manual for War on Land)] any case, Vourkoutiotis does make it perfectly ... took the requirements of the [1907] Hague Con‐ clear that the German High Command did not in‐ vention to mean that the prisoners of war were tend to leave its prisoners at the mercy of the an‐ entitled to the same rations as the Detaining Pow‐ nihilating thunderbolts, or torrents of friendly er's peacetime troops, but neither country actual‐ fire, from the sky. In October 1942 the OKW or‐ ly gave their prisoners of war these rations. The dered air-raid shelters to be made available to British came close to the required rations before prisoners and further stipulated that these shel‐ cutting them, along with the civilian population's ters were to match those offered to German civil‐ rations, in January 1916 and again in June 1918. ians wherever possible. The German rations for the prisoners of war were The Germans, who moved their prisoners by significantly worse, leading in some cases to near- rail, often put them up in castles, forts, or former starvation and disease among the British prison‐ schools close to a railway line. What was called a ers; almost mirroring the case a quarter of a cen‐ Dulag (Durchgangslager or transit camp) normal‐ tury later, parcels arriving through the intermedi‐ ly consisted of six thousand men but a Stalag ary offices of the International Committee of the (Stammlager or POW camp for soldiers excluding Red Cross made a significant difference for the officers) included up to ten thousand with a ratio British prisoners, as by 1918, because of the com‐ of one German guard or staff member for every plete British blockade of all items, Germany no seven/ten prisoners. As a precaution, "the perma‐ longer had the resources to meet the needs of its nent camps [for British and American airmen] own armed forces, let alone the prisoners of war" (p. 23). For this reason, the Germans decided to 2 H-Net Reviews supplement their own rations with donations way that they would eventually, and did, strangle from the International Committee of the Red themselves" (p. 187). The number of German dead Cross. In December 1941, the food rations of the is not given, and the Allied unit responsible is not, POWs were reduced by one third; the shortfall of course, identified. The Germans, however, ex‐ was to be made good by food parcels distributed acted a collective punishment by shackling their by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Canadian and British prisoners. The reprisal ap‐ The author writes that on October 10, 1942, the parently did not lead to Allied deaths, and to bread ration was set at 800 grams (or 28.21 judge by reports of the International Committee ounces) per day while sick prisoners were entitled of the Red Cross on the condition of the 381 mana‐ to 225 grams (or 7.9 ounces) of sugar per week cled prisoners in the officers' camp of Oflag VII B and the magnificent beer ration stood at 3 to 5 Eichstaedt, the ordered reprisal in this camp was liters (or 3.17 and 5.28 quarts) per month. Fur‐ implemented in such a way that "it was an incon‐ thermore, to assure the prisoners that they were venience as it was applied, rather than a serious receiving an adequate food supply "it was stan‐ problem" (p. 180). dard practice to publish a complete menu indicat‐ The one besetting problem with the Geneva ing the calories and rations, thus allowing the Convention is that there is no effective means to Men of Confidence [Vertrauensmaenner, or Camp protect captured troops on the battlefield as op‐ Representatives] and the Protecting Power dele‐ posed to the rear areas, and that brings us directly gates to compare the prisoners' menu to the offi‐ to the Commando Order. The author's discussion cial German rations. Most importantly as regards of Hitler's Commando Order is very brief, and his discipline, all collective disciplinary measures af‐ failure to give a copy of the order in the original fecting food were prohibited by the Geneva Con‐ German along with a translation is an inexplica‐ vention" (p. 55). It was a central and immensely ble omission. He writes, "the Commando Order of important stipulation. It meant that the detaining October 18, 1942, was issued by Hitler in conjunc‐ power could not impose its will or compel obedi‐ tion with the shackling order for Canadian and ence by starvation. other British prisoners of war. After the raid at Although Vourkoutiotis does not raise the Dieppe, by mostly Canadian soldiers and British subject of the normal death rate in the prisoner of commandos, had been repulsed, members of both war camps--it was probably in the range of four the German armed forces and the Todt organiza‐ deaths per thousand per year, as even relatively tion had been found with their arms bound in young men are mortal--he does cover a number of such a way that they would eventually, and did, serious violations of the Geneva Convention in strangle themselves.
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