Volume 6 | Issue 7 | Article ID 2828 | Jul 02, 2008 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus

New Perspectives on Chinese Collaboration

Margherita Zanasi

New Perspectives on Chinese Collaboration the cases discussed by Brook.[3] Finally, this resistentialist narrative has constructed a Margherita Zanasi universal image of collaboration, which tends to reduce various forms of this phenomenon in The question of moral judgment looms large different countries to a common denominator, over every discussion of World War IIobliterating all political, social, and cultural collaboration, at times clouding and distorting differences. our understanding of this complex issue, as Timothy Brook poignantly remarks in his In order to overcome this ideological impasse contribution to this journal’s recent symposium. and gain a more accurate understanding of the This moral question is certainly relevant and circumstances of collaboration, Brook shifts our should not be dismissed, since collaboration attention to the local level and to the early came to be more or less directly associated stages of Japanese occupation, when no with the civic and human rights infringements centralized collaborationist government was perpetrated by the occupying forces.[1] Always yet in place. His intention is to set aside, what complex, this question becomes murkier when he calls “the considerations of national honor linked to the rhetoric of patriotism and to and personal integrity that haunted the postwar political agendas, as is the case with metropolitan politicians.” He wants, instead, to the “resistentialist” postwar narrative that has throw light on practical problems, such as food dominated the debate on collaboration until distribution, that people faced daily under recently.[2] This narrative has mythologized occupation and on the “state-building resistance and enshrined it as the onlycollaborationism” that these problems patriotic, moral, and honorable response to generated. Bringing to light these difficult-to- foreign occupation, gliding over difficult moral classify instances of collaboration—that fall dilemmas raised by some strategies and outside of the meganarrative of postwar practices of resistance. In the process, it has resistentialist patriotism—is a crucial step in polarized the debate on collaboration by gaining a more nuanced understanding of offering only two opposite and monolithically- Chinese collaboration. conceived categories: moral and patriotic resistance versus unethical and treasonous Overcoming the imposed ideological agendas of collaboration. It has therefore left nopostwar resistentialism, however, also requires conceptual tool for gaining a more nuanced that we restore collaboration to its original understanding of behaviors that do not fit this temporal dimension by approaching it as a pre-established and rigid dichotomy, such as process developing by stages, each belonging “nationalist” or “state-building”to different political and historical moments. collaborationism—referring, respectively, to This approach can help us keep wartime attempts at protecting nation and population collaboration and its postwar narrative from the occupying forces and at state building distinct—rather than continuing to use the in the face of the complete and bewildering latter to explain the former. The first was a disappearance of the preexisting order, as in wartime response to crisis that took prewar

1 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF political, social, and cultural frameworks and used them to build creative and improvised solutions to the collapse of the known order. The latter developed at the intersection between the politics of memory and the construction of new sources of political legitimacy in the postwar period that were in turn shaped by new political dynamics that emerged in the wake of the sweeping changes brought about by the war.

Collaboration as an Evolving Process

If we approach World War II collaboration as an evolving process we can distinguish roughly Wang Jingwei in 1941 photograph with Nazis. Wang three main phases. The first phase can be always flew the Nationalist flag and claimed to represent the true embodiment of the party defined as the road to collaboration, during which collaborators framed goals for working They therefore planned to preside over national with the occupying forces. Both in Europe and reconstruction in an occupied country, rather in China, these expectations and goals varied than over a continuing war. They could not widely, going beyond outright self-interest or know with certainty the nature of the future self-preservation (although these wereNazi or Japanese occupation. The continuation certainly important) and including difficult to of the war, for example, strained both classify aims, such as “nationalist” or “state- Germany’s and Japan’s resources, thus building” collaboration. This was a moment of increasing—rather than decreasing, as the two negotiation between collaborators andleaders had expected—their demands on the occupying forces, in which the occupiers, as occupied nations. Local collaborators, as Brook both Brook and Prasenjit Duara illustrate, remarks, worked to rebuild the polity in an created the space—rhetorically, politically, and occupied state. They acted under the administratively—for collaborators toassumption that it was possible to bring some operate.[4] The choices made at this stage normalcy to daily life and rebuild the were based on what appeared to be a set of infrastructure for the local community to viable options at a time when the Allies’ victory function properly. Their local perspective was at best a remote possibility and everything contributed to their acting from the point of about the future appeared murky.view of the “here and now”—rather than trying Collaborators like Pétain and Wangto give primacy to long-term political Jingwei—the main leader of the collaborationist possibilities. The goal of rebuilding the state Reorganized Nationalist Government, or RNG under circumstances of occupation, rather than (1940-1945)—for example, worked on the of collaborating with an enemy during a assumption that the war was lost and some protracted war against fellow citizens, was, kind of peace was soon to follow.[5] therefore, one of the many factors that affected decisions to collaborate at different political levels. The actual experience of collaboration can be regarded as a second phase, when expectations were put to a test and their validity and effectiveness were revealed. Some of the Vichy

2 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF collaborators—Vichy was a complex political to face with ethical questions—if not with wider formation and included diverse groups with issues of national politics, patriotism, and different collaborationist goals, including national identity. They must have asked sympathy with the Third Reich’s political themselves whether it was possible to find a program—must have felt their nationalist reasonable balance between costs expectations and goals slip away as it became (participating, even if marginally, in an clear that they were powerless to resist authoritarian regime) and returns (such as the German’s demands. Vichy attemptedextent to which one could actually protect strenuously to remain autonomous fromnation and people or restore normalcy to the Germany, but this attempt ultimately failed.[6] local community). Above all, many must have Consequently Vichy increasingly slid toward, come to recognize that peace was not going to borrowing Roderick Kedward’s expression, come soon and that the Allies could actually “highly derivative [Nazi-style] solutions.” [7] In win the war. We are therefore faced with the the end, it became clear that the original questions of what kind of readjustment and “nationalist” and “state-building” goals were a political evolutions these new perspectives mirage. triggered individually and within the various collaborationist organizations (national and We still know very little about the Chinese local) and what kind of new ethical issues they collaborationist regimes and the various groups generated. that participated in it. It is clear that the main leaders of the Reformed Government shared The third phase covers the years immediately anti-GMD feelings.[8] On the other hand, many following the end of the war when collaboration of the RNG leaders belonged to the Wang trials enshrined a narrative of resistance and political faction within the GMD, originally collaboration that became hegemonic. This was known as the Reorganization Clique, and a triumphalist victor’s narrative that recast the presumably followed Wang for reasons that narrative of the war from the perspective of the included factional loyalty and shared political Allies’ victory. It also built on years of Allied visions. Other RNG leaders, such as Zhou war propaganda that had simplified the Fohai, were not so closely associated with narrative of war and the political issues it Wang and their motivations remain unclear. In involved. This is not to say that the spite of some important works, the spectrum of resistentialist narrative of collaboration did not collaborationist goals and the internal political contain any truth. It accurately denounced the dynamics of both the Reformed Government authoritarian and brutal nature of the Nazi, and the RNG still remain largely unexplored.[9] Japanese, and collaborationist regimes while It is clear, however, that some of the RNG being reticent about the less than sterling war leaders who held “nationalist collaboration” records of the Allies and the resisters. It goals, saw them slip away. At his trial in avoided, for example, references to German Suzhou (April 6, 1946), Chen Gongbo—the and Japanese violent retaliations triggered by acting chairman of the RNG after Wang’s death resistance or mention of such controversial in November 1944— admitted that he had soon Allied war strategies as firebombing. In Europe come to realize that he had no power of it built on a longtime political struggle against negotiation with the Japanese and therefore he Fascism and authoritarianism (although it could not achieve his original collaborationist tended to identify this struggle and wartime goals.[10] At this stage, confronted with the resistance with the left only, ignoring other brutalities the Japanese perpetrated on their political groups that had also played important fellow citizens, even the local elites motivated roles in both).[11] Above all it resonated in the by more pragmatic goals must have come face frustration and resentment of the brutality the

3 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF occupation generated in the majority of the country had been before the war—and, a priori, population in the occupied areas and gained sanctioned any action toward the Japanese strength on the collaborationist regimes’ failure decided outside of Jiang’s jurisdiction as to maintain autonomy and shield the local illegitimate and treasonous, regardless of its population, a failure, that shifted their role, in intention. As a consequence the prosecution the eyes of most, from protectors todid not even engage Chen’s narrative or try to perpetrators.[12] evaluate whether he had really attempted to save the nation from the Japanese. This resistentialist narrative, above all, looked toward the construction of new sources of A Changed Political Environment political legitimacy for the postwar nation. The trials of the main surviving leaders of the RNG The consolidation of Jiang’s leadership over (in Suzhou from April 1946)—like the trial of Nationalist China well exemplifies the dramatic Pétain in Paris (late July 1945)—were part of a changes the war brought to the Chinese wider process for establishing, retroactively, political landscape. Sources of political the legitimacy of Jiang Jieshi’s leadership (De legitimacy had shifted dramatically and salient Gaulle’s in the case of France) before and prewar political features such as the factional during the war and thus consolidating his struggle over the GMD leadership and warlord position at the head of the postwarpolitics had lost their resonance. Political government. The trials became rituals for strategies based on prewar political repertoires discrediting alternative narratives of war and were therefore discredited. For example, the resistance and reaffirming a unified and linear claim of some RNG leaders that they were one, while erasing the memory of theusing the Japanese invasion to challenge Jiang uncertainties on how to respond to foreign Jieshi’s leadership appeared now particularly occupation that had characterized the early irrelevant. In 1938, Wang Jingwei had evoked stages of the war in both France and China. At Sun Zhongshan's 1920s collaboration with his trial, Chen defended his collaborationist Guangdong warlord Cheng Jiongming to choice on the ground that his motivation was present collaboration as part of a legitimate not to destroy the nation, but to save it—a political strategy to establish GMD rule over defense strategy similar to the “Shield and China. One of his goals, Wang claimed, was to Sword” defense presented, equallybring down Jiang Jieshi and restore Party and unsuccessfully, by Pétain at his Paris trial. country to the correct political legacy left by Chen thus implied that the unsatisfactory result Sun, which he (Wang) embodied and Jiang had of his efforts should not obscure his patriotic betrayed. It is difficult to accurately gauge how intention.[13] Since treason—having acted convincing this argument appeared in against the interest of the nation—was the 1938-1940—the years of negotiations between main charge brought against him, defending Wang and Japan. At that time it would have the nationalist spirit of his choice appeared to already been apparent to many that Japan was him (and to the other RNG leaders who went to no warlord and allying with it could bring far trial in Suzhou) the most important point in his more ominous consequences than Wang’s defense. At Suzhou, however, having acted previous attempts to use warlords for the same against the nation became synonymous with political goal.[14] Rana Mitter’s work on having acted against Jiang. The trials moved Manchuria, however, illustrates that warlord from the assumption that Jiang’s government politics continued to intersect with choices of had all along been the “central” (zhongyang) resistance and collaboration.[15] The Xi’an and legitimate government—forgetting how incident, whose role in Jiang’s decision to resist contested Jiang’s leadership over party and Japan is still largely unclear, also played out at

4 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF the intersection of warlord dynamics with hanjian were punished. Glossing over important internal GMD disagreements (between Jiang differences, media and political leaders in Jieshi and Zhang Xueliang) and national Nationalist China appropriated basic themes of politics.[16] the French resistentialist discourse, reconstructed them into universal tropes that went beyond the undeniable realities of the shared historical experience of occupation, and redeployed them to explain Chinese collaboration and justify its punishment.[18] In this way, Nationalist China could exploit the global visibility of the European collaboration trials to carry out its own political agenda. On the other hand, it contributed to the process of globalization of the discourse on collaboration—by equating China’s and

Jiang Jieshi (left) and Zhang Xueliang at Xi’an France’s war experiences and making Pétain relevant for China—and to the construction of The interplay between warlord-politics, faction- an oversimplified and monolithically conceived struggle, and collaboration/resistance was, image of collaborators that obliterated diversity therefore, a familiar feature of the prewar and local variation. political discourse. The war, however, swept away the warlords—with the exception of some A Comparative Approach border regions—and firmly established Jiang’s leadership. The Cold War furthered this Taking a comparative approach and exploring process by introducing a new polarizing the extent and limit of collaboration as a global political narrative that portrayed a tightly experience is essential for going beyond this unified GMD struggling against an equally oversimplified globalizing narrative and for centralized CCP. Factions, warlords, and proving the impossibility of discussing challenges to Jiang’s political legitimacycollaboration as a universally valid category. As disappeared from Chinese political discourse, both Brook and Duara clearly demonstrate, and could no longer be convincingly deployed collaboration was a creative relationship to explain collaborationist choices. between occupier and occupied and therefore it necessarily developed differently within The postwar political landscape was also different relationship frameworks. The transformed by the process of politicalrelationship between Germany and Vichy, for globalization that brought China into closer example, was significantly different from that alignment with the Allies’ political propaganda between Japan and the Chinese collaborators, and their politics of retribution.[17] Chinese since they grew out of different political collaborators would have certainly met with backgrounds. As Brook remarks, in China, punishment even without the example of the collaboration developed from below while in Western European collaboration trials. These France it developed from above. This meant trials, however, and especially that of Pétain, that in France, the central government did not came to supply the terms of reference for retreat in the face of foreign occupation and Nationalist hanjian (the Chinese termthe Germans were not met with the total commonly used for collaborators) policies, political and administrative vacuum the acted as external sources of politicalJapanese met in China. The French central legitimacy, and helped shape the way that authorities could thus delegate Vichy to work

5 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF out those pacification policies that in China heavily involved in daily operations that became a responsibility of Japanesetouched the lives of the common people, such pacification agents. If we want to push the as grain procurements? And how did these comparison between France and China beyond differences affect popular views of the scope of Brook’s study, however, we need collaboration? to reframe its parameters. Vichy, in fact, only controlled a small portion of French territory, Another difference between France and China the largest portion being directly occupied by lies in their prewar political situations. The the Germans. Would this occupied area, rather Paris trial benefited from the fact that it could than Vichy, constitute a better comparison for look back at the prewar debate on democracy China, or at least for this early collaboration and fascism, even if that debate came to be from below? This question is not easilymisrepresented by the resistentialist answered and its purpose is mostly to reveal narrative.[20] Although the GMD deployed the the difficulty of comparing collaboration in the Western European resistentialist discourse in two countries. Several considerations in fact support of its punishment of hanjian, it was arise. While similar forms of collaboration from itself an authoritarian state that embodied below probably characterized the occupied fascist elements. After the war it had area in France and the early stages of the war immediately resumed the anti-communist in China, the situation under Vichy and the purges that it had initiated in the prewar years, RNG surely differed significantly. The RNG was with open disregard of basic civic and human considerably weaker than Vichy—and the same rights. As a consequence, the GMD used a very is probably also true for the Reformedsimplified version of the resistentialist Government. It appears that the RNG never discourse, focusing almost exclusively on issues developed the ability to extend its direct of nationalism and political loyalty and steering control down to the local level in the same way safely away from anti-fascism.[21] This strategy that Vichy did. Even with respect to food of only evoking selected themes from Allied procurement, in spite of the RNG's attempts to ideology was made possible by the fact that, gain control over the system of “material during the war, the Allies' propaganda had control”, Japan remain deeply involved and still itself relied on a vague depiction of Jiang's directly collected grains in large areas of RNG GMD as one of the paladins of democracy territory.[19] Collaboration from below thus fighting against fascism (an oversimplification probably survived in China even after the that was also extended to the Soviet Union). establishment of centralized collaborationist Jiang had all along relied on the ambiguity of governments. We are then left with thehis international reputation and even in the question of the extent to which the initial postwar period continued to draw legitimacy differences between Vichy and the RNG from his alignment with the Allies, while being influenced long-term collaboration in the two extremely vague about his "democratic" countries. Was the RNG’s weakness a result of tendencies and never directly addressing the the fact that it had to build a newissue of fascism.[22] administrative structure from the top in the 1940s, while Vichy, a relatively seamless The moral judgment on collaboration officially continuation of the prewar government,promoted in postwar Nationalist China was continued to preside over the existingthus constructed at the crossroad between administrative structure? Was the German local nationalist sentiments and a globalizing presence less felt in Vichy France than the political discourse. While ethical considerations Japanese presence in RNG China, where certainly played a more visible role in the Japanese troops remained omnipresent and postwar politics of memory, as also illustrated

6 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF by Heonik Kwon, they were never, in fact, Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History separate from the political terrain. Moral issues and Memory in France Since 1944 (Cambridge, were always present in the ideologies and Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991); Eric rhetoric of both the invaders and theConan and Henry Rousso, Vichy: An Ever- collaborators, as Duara notes. Even at the very Present Past, Contemporary French Culture local level studied by Brook, Japaneseand Society (Hanover: University Press of New pacification agents and local elites who worked England, 1998). with them might have used this ideology simply 3. For a discussion of collaborationist as a convention, but it still posed questions nationalism outside of the debate that concerning the conceptual and legitimizing developed in the 1990s in European history, framework without which any cooperation was see Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied impossible. Even at the personal level, the wartime China” in Timothy Brook and Andre authoritarian and often genocidal policies of Schmid, Nation Work: Asian Elites and National the regimes’ collaborators faced must have Identities (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan required them to rationalize the reasons that Press, 2000); Margherita Zanasi, Saving the made their response acceptable. Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, The terms retroactively imposed on the moral 2006) (chapter 7) and Zanasi, “Globalizing question by the postwar resistentialistHanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World narrative are obviously no longer adequate, as War II Discourse on Collaboration,” The Brook rightly remarks. Restoring an historical American Historical Review 113.3 (June 2008). dimension to the different stages of4. Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and collaboration and using a comparativeAuthenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian approach can contribute to a betterModern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield understanding not just of the original political Publishers, 2003) and his contribution to this landscape of collaboration, but also of the journal symposium. terms in which ethical issues came to be 5. Burrin, “Vichy,” in Pierre Nora ed. Realms of formulated and experienced during the war and Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Vol. 1 the role they played in the original political Conflicts and Divisions (New York, 1998); circumstances of collaboration. Zanasi, “Globalizing Hanjian. 6. Simon Kitson, The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Notes Fighting Espionage in Vichy France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Robert O. 1.The close connection between human rights Paxton, “Vichy vs. the Nazis,” The New York issues and the postwar moral judgment on Review of Books 55.3(March 6, 2008), p. 39-40. collaboration is illustrated by the sudden 7. I refer here to Kedward’s analysis of Vichy, change in French public opinion onwhich, however, can easily be extended to the collaborators. As news of the Holocaust began last years of the RNG. See H. Roderick to emerge in the immediate postwar, the Kedward, “Introduction” In Kedward and number of French who supported severe Austin eds., Vichy France and the Resistance: punishment for collaborators increasedCulture and Ideology, 2-3. dramatically. 8. Brook. “Collaborationist Nationalism.” 2. “Resistentialism” is a term generally used to 9. Brooks, “Collaborationist Nationalism”; characterize the postwar discourse onDuara, Sovereignty and Authenticity; Parks collaboration in France, but is extended here to Coble, Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New include different forms of mythologizing of Order; Hwang Dongyoun, “Wang Jingwei, the resistance in other countries including China. Nanjing government and the problem of

7 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF collaboration,” Thesis (Ph.D.), Duke University, 1 (Nov. 2000): 41-84.; Wang Ke-Wen, 1999. “Collaborators and Capitalists: The Politics of 10. Zanasi, “Globalizing Hanjian”; Chen`Material Control’ in Wartime Shanghai.” Gongbo, “Zibaishu.” Chinese Studies in History 26, no. 1 (Fall 11. Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome. 1992): 42-62; Zanasi, Saving the Nation 12. We know that, for example, the French (chapter 7). For a discussion of the Japanese initially supported Vichy but soon changed role in the direct procurement of grains in the their views as Vichy’s inability to resist German RNG see Yuan Yuquan. “Riben qinlue zhi pressures became apparent. Kedward,paozhe de shangtonghui.” In Shanghai wenshi Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance ziliao xuanji. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 1940-1944, 2-3, and 17; Burrin, France under chubanshe, 1987. the Germans; Pierre Laboire, L’Opinion20. We cannot forget the political importance of Française sous Vichy, 228 on. this aspect of the resistentialist discourse, at 13. Zanasi, “Globalizing Hanjian”; Chenleast in Western Europe (Eastern Europe’s Gongbo, “Zibaishu.” discourse on collaboration assumed different 14. Wang first allied against Jiang Jieshi with dimensions). For a comparison of the politics of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in 1930, only to retribution in Western and Eastern Europe see suffer military defeat at the hands of Jiang. Deák et al., The politics of Retribution in Later, in 1931, he began a difficultEurope. The importance of the resistentialist collaboration with Chen Jitang in Canton. narrative of resistance, collaboration, and anti- 15. Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: authoritarianism is illustrated by the political Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in weight it still exercises, as exemplified by a Modern China (Berkeley, Calif.; London: 1990s Italian political debate, with resonance University of California Press 2000). throughout Western Europe and North 16. In the city of Xi’an in December 1936 America. For that debate see, among others, warlord Zhang Xueliang, at the time a general Norberto Bobbio, Renzo De Felice, and Gian of the GMD army, kidnapped Jiang inEnrico Rusconi, Italiani, Amici Nemici, I libri di cooperation with the Communists and elicited Reset (Milano; Roma: Reset ; Donzelli, 1996); from him the assurance that he would declare Nicola Tranfaglia, Un passato scomodo: war on Japan. What qualifies this incident as an fascismo e postfascismo (Roma: Laterza, 1996); event of “warlord politics” is not simply the fact and Silvana Patriarca, “Italian Neopatriotism: that Zhang Xueliang was a warlord, but that it Debating National Identity in the 1990s,” employed elements of “warlord” political Modern Italy 6, no. 1 (2001): 21-34. dynamics, such as kidnapping and geographical 21. In this sense, the Chinese Communist Party power bases. (CCP)—which vied with the GMD in claiming 17. I borrow this term from Deák István, Jan the politically important legacy of the Tomasz. Gross, and Tony Judt, The Politics of resistance and was therefore constructing its Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its own narrative of war—was better positioned to Aftermath (Princeton, N.J.: Princetondeploy Western European resistentialism, since University Press, 2000). it better resonated with its antifascist 18. For a discussion of aspects of this shared propaganda. However, the CCP’s politically experience see Zanasi, “Globalizing Hanjian.” authoritarian nature and its increasing 19. For a more detailed explanation ofdistancing from the Allies in the postwar years, “material control” in the RNG see Henriot, affected the CCP discourse on collaboration, Christian, “Rice, Power, and People: The leading to the construction of its characteristic Politics of Food Supply in Wartime Shanghai blend of patriotism and socialism. For a (1937-1945).” Twentieth-Century China 26, no. discussion of Communist propaganda and the

8 6 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF construction of its distinctive resistentialist “Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and myth, see Parks Coble, “China at War,the Post-World War II Discourse on 1937-1945: Remembering and Re-remembering Collaboration,” The American Historical Review China’s War of Resistance” Paper presented at 113.3 (June 2008). She contributed this article the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century to Japan Focus. Posted on July 24, 2008.She China Biannual Conference “Chinese Nation, contributed this article to the symposium on Chinese State,” Singapore, June 26-28, 2006)’ collaboration. See in addition the following see also his ”China’s ‘New Remembering’ of articles: the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945,” The China Quarterly 190 (June 2007), pp. 390-410. 1. Timothy Brook, Collaboration in the History 22. This strategy also characterized Jiang’s of Wartime East Asia handling of the Cold War in support of his 2. Prasenjit Duara,Collaboration and the military confrontation with the CCP Politics of the Twentieth Century (1945-1949). References to anti-Communism at 3. Suk-Jung Han,On the Question of this time were sufficient to align him on the Collaboration in South Korea United States side without need to expatiate on 4. Heonik Kwon, Excavating the History of anti-authoritarianism. Collaboration 5. Timothy Brook, Collaboration in the Postwar 6. Margherita Zanasi, New Perspectives on Margherita Zanasi is Associate Professor of Chinese Collaboration Modern Chinese History in the Department of History at Louisiana State University. She is the author of Saving China: Economic Modernity in Republican China (Chicago: Japan Focus anticipates and welcomes University of Chicago Press 2006) and of responses to the symposium.

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