MERCENARIES, PMCS AND AFRICA

Out of the Empire and into the Cold War

Post-colonial Africa was the major theatre for activity in the twentieth century. This experience was the basis for the modern contempt of and for the bulk of legislation on the subject – as well as a fair bit of popular culture (like Frederick Forsyth’s , or the 1978 film Wild Geese). The very first use of mercenaries in post-war Africa was in the 1950s, when Harry Oppenheimer of De Beers employed Sir Percy Stilltoe to conduct anti-smuggling operations in Sierra Leone – all designed to enforce De Beers’ monopoly over the gemstones.1 The first prominent display of mercenary activity was in the Congo, starting with the Katangese secession attempt in 1961, reaching a highpoint in 1964 with the uprising in the eastern Congo, and petering out with a failed coup in 1967.2 In 1961, Moise Tshombe of Katanga, with the support of the Belgian mining company Union Miniére, recruited mercenaries from South Africa and in an effort to create an effective military for the rebel province. This produced a force of about 200 mercenaries,3 who became known as Les Affreux, or ‘The Dreadful Ones.’4 As Jane’s contributor Al Venter has written,

These first groups of privateers were a recalcitrant, ill-disciplined bunch of ruffians. Racist almost to a man, some believed that having been chosen, as one of them phrased it, ‘to protect Africans from themselves’, that they had license to do as they pleased. Another spate of killings followed…5

There, right at the start of the independence era, was ample reason to believe that mercenaries were vicious, racist, and directly linked to the agents of neo-colonial exploitation. These mercenaries were ousted from the country by forces belonging to

1 O’Brien, K.A. “Private Military Companies and African Security 1990 – 1998” in Musah, A-F, & Fayemi, J.K. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, Pluto Press, London & Sterling, Virginia, 2000, p. 46 2 Meigs, C. The Great Design, Little, Brown and Company, Boston & Toronto, 1964, p. 7 3 Musah, A-F, & Fayemi, J.K. Op. Cit. p. 265 4 Lanning, M.L. Op. Cit. p. 154 5 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 205

23 the newly formed United Nations (which opposed the break-up of the Congo).6 The UN troops first outfought the mercenaries and then offered them free flights out of the country, which they all accepted.7 It would take until January 1963 for Katanga’s hopes of independence to be finally extinguished, and for Moise Tshombe to flee into exile in Spain, but the province’s hired army was gone by 1962.

Tshombe, however, had returned in 1964 to serve as Prime Minister, after he was pardoned by Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese-Seko) and then asked to form a government. The country’s security situation was dire; the rebellion in the eastern Congo “surpassed anything the Congo had experienced before.”8 In response, the Prime Minister repeated his Katangese tactics and recruited mercenaries, including three who would become quite famous – Bob Denard, Mike Hoare9 and Jean Schramme.’10 The hired soldiers were better disciplined and technically much more proficient than the rebels, so they enjoyed military success. At one stage, in November 1964, they fought alongside American and Belgian troops to rescue European prisoners (who were being horribly abused) from Stanleyville – but that was far from their only operation, although it received the overwhelming majority of media attention. Before the Stanleyville Raid they had made substantial advances into rebel territory from the South, and after it they would fight on until December 1965.11 In fact, from April to November 1965, fought with the rebels, who also received Cuban aid. The famous revolutionary was extremely critical of the rebels in

6 Moore, D. “From Conrad to Kabila: The Congo and 'Our' Consciousness” Review of African Political Economy, London, December 1999, Vol. 26, Issue 82, p. 529 7 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 205 8 Meredith, M. Op. Cit. p. 114 9 Mike Hoare had in fact been in the Congo in 1961, as part of a unit called the Fourth Commando, which reportedly fought UN forces and rescued Belgians from rebel forces. See Lanning, M.L. Op. Cit. pp. 154 - 155 10 Musah, A-F, & Fayemi, J.K. Op. Cit. p. 265 These authors, however, make two mistakes in their table of mercenary activity in the Congo. First, a petty error, they describe all the mercenaries in the Congo as belonging to the Fifth Commando, whereas there was also a Sixth Commando led by Bob Denard. Second, they describe the mercenaries’ objective as “To fight patriotic nationalist forces, led by PM ” and the outcome as “Nationalists defeated, Lumumba assassinated, neo-colonialism established.” This is all very clearly marked as occurring in 1964 – 1965. Lumumba, however, was assassinated on the 17th of January 1961. His political opponents, the Belgians and the Americans have all been implicated in the murder, but no mercenaries, and his assassination cannot possibly be described as the outcome of events three to four years after his death. 11 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 209

24 his diary, recording their indiscipline, disinclination to train or fight and depredations on the local population; he concluded that they lacked ‘revolutionary seriousness’.12

These were the achievements of the mercenaries: the rescue of hostages and something approaching victory over the rebels. They also had their failings. First, they were certainly brutal – reportedly, “Anybody even suspected of having been involved with the rebels was ‘taken out’.”13 Second, they may have been disciplined, but not enough to refrain from looting; veterans report raiding banks in captured towns, as well as plundering goods and flying them back to South Africa.14 Third, some of them eventually turned on the state. In 1967, Jean Schramme attempted a coup, and managed to capture the town of Bukavu. He got no further, however, and although his forces managed to hold off the government, and some rebel forces, for four months, they did so without pay or the prospect of victory, and eventually fled into Rwanda.15

Another important scene of mercenary activity that same year was . The Biafran attempt to secede from the federation brought war. This drew classical mercenaries like Ralph Steiner, formerly of the Wehrmacht and the French Foreign Legion, who commanded a force of about 50 mercenaries on the Biafran side.16 There were also hired combatants on the Nigerian side, notably those flying bomber aircraft.17 More unusual were the pilots hired by private parties, especially churches, for “the largest privately organised relief operation in history,”18 to ameliorate the humanitarian catastrophe in Biafra. These pilots can hardly be called mercenaries, although they served in a war zone and were well paid – although contracting to fly in those conditions, where bombers stalked the airfields and pilots were shot down, would probably qualify a modern firm for the PMC label.

Almost a decade later, there would be another prominent display of mercenarism, this time in . When Portugal decided to grant Angola independence in 1975, there

12 Meredith, M. Op. Cit. p. 204 13 Ibid. p. 209 14 Lanning, M.L. Op. Cit. p. 160 15 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 209 16 Ibid. p. 280 17 Ibid. p. 286 18 Meredith, M. Op. Cit. p. 204

25 were three major parties in the country: UNITA under Jonas Savimbi, the FNLA under Holden Roberto and the MPLA under Agostinho Neto. Independence was scheduled for November 1975. Fighting broke out between the three groups in January 1975; by July the MPLA, with Cuban advisers and Russian weapons controlled Luanda.19 The Eastern-bloc involvement drew in the Western-bloc, and the FNLA and UNITA gained a rising amount of support.20 South Africa, in the hopes of blocking what it viewed as communist expansion into Southern Africa, and to win favour from the Americans, agreed to an invasion from South Africa – which, interestingly, was to be camouflaged as a mercenary operation. South African forces had reached Luanda when massive Cuban reinforcements forced it to retreat. American support to the anti-communist forces was strictly covert. Their only response to the Cuban presence, therefore, was to help the FNLA recruit mercenaries.21 These were recruited first in and Portugal, then America and Britain. In fact, a company called Security Advisory Services (not a very subtle attempt to purloin some SAS lustre) was established to perform this task.22 It was the remnants of this force that went on trial in Luanda in 1976, prompting the Diplock Report and confirming the common view of mercenaries as the lowest of the low. This was superpower realpolitik reduced to its most farcical. Henry Kissinger’s cold war calculus said the anti-Marxist forces needed support, and so they received generous funds. These were used to recruit a force that was helpless in the face of Cuban armour, many of whose members were not soldiers, that spent money like water, and whose commander executed several of its own members.23 That was the disastrous and useless mercenary incursion into Angola.

These were the really noticeable, classical mercenary operations that underpinned the standard narrative of dogs of war running riot through Africa in the 1960s and ‘70s.24 There were others too, of course. Ian Smith’s government in recruited

19 They also enjoyed the support of Katangese soldiers-in-exile. 20 Garrick, U. “The shrinking of foreign news” Foreign Affairs, New York, March/April 1997, Vol. 76, Issue 2, p. 2 21 Leffler, M.P. “Inside enemy archives: The Cold War reopened” Foreign Affairs, New York, July/August 1996, Vol. 75, Issue 4, p. 120; Pipes, R. “Reagan was right” Foreign Affairs, New York, May 1995, Vol. 74, Issue 3, p. 200 22 In theory, this company resembled a modern PMC, although it turned out to be a fly-by-night affair, hiring not so much off a scrupulously maintained database as anyone who answered an advert in a newspaper, and providing none of the equipment or medical services promised in its pamphlet. See Burchett, W. & Roebuck, D. Op. Cit. pp. 30 – 33 23 Ibid. pp. 106 – 107 24 Avant, D. “Mercenaries” Foreign Policy, Washington, July/August 2004, Issue 143, p. 20

26 foreigners for its armed forces, in particular from former members of the British and American militaries. (Some estimates have it that of Smith’s 6 000-man army, about 2 000 were from Europe or North America.25 Others put the number of foreigners at about 1 250.26) Whether these were mercenaries or volunteers, however, is not perfectly clear. They would seem to have been paid only the equivalent of their salaries in their home armed forces;27 more importantly, there was a volunteer aspect to their work. No matter how we judge the virtue of the Smith regime, it could be interpreted as having some anti-communist cachet, and defended as such. Hence a former Green Beret, serving in Rhodesia in 1976, could argue, “I consider it my duty to fight in Rhodesia. After Vietnam and Angola we can’t afford to lose any other countries.”28 An undisputed case of mercenarism, by contrast, occurred in 1977, when the Congo veteran Bob Denard attempted a coup in . That coup failed, although another, in the in 1978, succeeded. Denard converted to , ruled through puppets and kept control until 1989. His attempt at a sequel in 1995 was defeated when French forces arrived and arrested him.

Apart from mercenary operations, Africa has a perhaps surprisingly lengthy history of involvement with PMCs. David Stirling’s company WatchGuard, for example, won contracts from various governments (with British links – Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia) to provide security and training in the 1960s and ‘70s. Another Stirling firm, KAS Enterprises, provided anti-poaching operations between 1986 and 1990, with cooperation from an unlikely couple: the South African Defence Force and the World Wildlife Fund.29 The old-established PMC Defence Systems Limited (DSL) provided security for organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations starting in the 1980s. A company called Lonhro set up its own security division, employing companies of Gurkhas, to guard its assets throughout the Mozambiquan civil war. It also appears that some small British firms, Falconstar and Intersec, provided security personnel to African states in the 1980s. But it must be admitted that these firms suffered nothing like the attention directed at proper mercenaries.

25 Lanning, M.L. Op. Cit. p. 166 26 Burchett, W. & Roebuck, D. Op. Cit. p. 139 27 Ibid. p. 106 – 107 28 Ibid. p. 139 29 O’Brien, K.A. Op. Cit. 2000, p. 47

27 THE 1990S

The image of PMCs experienced radical change in the 1990s. The reason for this was fundamentally the exploits of Executive Outcomes, the war-fighting PMC that attracted extraordinary popular, political and academic attention to its activities in war- torn African countries. The company provided services of one kind or another in seven African countries between 1990 and 1998. Some of these were fairly unremarkable, like military training and mine security in Uganda in 1995 and 1996,30 or ‘reconnaissance for De Beers’ in Botswana in 1991.31 But the company’s activities in two countries, Angola and Sierra Leone, were extraordinary.

Executive Outcomes was active in Angola between 1992 and 1996. Its first fully- fledged military operation started in 1993, when UNITA captured the important oil town of Soyo.32 This upset two important groups of actors. The MPLA government had not only lost territory to its old opponent, but was also deprived of its lifeblood oil revenues.33 International oil companies saw their Angolan oil and their whole investment threatened. It was the British oil entrepreneur Tony Buckingham who suggested a mercenary solution, an idea Luanda accepted.34 Enter Executive Outcomes, which succeeded in taking the town, and then in holding it despite very determined rebel counter-attacks. When UNITA withdrew the town was handed over to the Angolan army, who only weeks later would again lose it to UNITA. Nonetheless, EO proved itself in Soyo.35 Luanda learnt that hiring mercenaries could produce results, that EO could fight and win even against resolute and sustained opposition, and that it could bear to take casualties (including three killed).36 The company was rewarded with a contract to train the Angolan army, provide pilots and weapons, and ‘advise’ on the conduct of the war. The value of that deal was, according to an EO spokesperson, $20 million per year, plus $20 million for equipment.37

30 Musah, A-F, & Fayemi, J.K. Op. Cit. p. 273 31 Ibid. p. 269 32 “Politics and Current Affairs” The Economist, London, 29 May 1993, Vol. 327, Issue 7813, p. 4 33 “Angola: Talks end, war goes on” The Economist, London, 29 May 1993, Vol. 327, Issue 7813, p. 45 34 “UNITA resists Government's efforts to reassert authority” http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0503.html, 27 November 1998, p. 1 35 “Angola: No relief” The Economist, London, 18 June 1994, Vol. 331, Issue 7868, p. 51 36 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 310 37 “We're the good guys these days” The Economist, London, 29 July 2005, Vol. 336, Issue 7925, p. 32

28

Executive Outcomes remained in the country until January 1996 (and continued to provide training until January 1997). The key year, however, was 1994. Joint operations by the PMC and the Angolan army produced two triumphs of major strategic significance: in June, they won control over the extremely valuable Cafunfo diamond fields, and in September, they captured Huambo, the second largest city in Angola and UNITA’s ‘capital’.38 After that, Jonas Savimbi sued for peace, and an agreement (the Lusaka Protocol) was signed in November 1994.39 Savimbi only signed the agreement on the condition that EO would leave Angola. They did not leave at once, because, despite the agreement, peace was not certain, but they were gone by December 1995. The peace agreement held until 1998, and Savimbi used the intervening years to replenish his finances and renew his forces.40 Nonetheless, this was a worthy attempt at peace. In 1997, a government of national unity (with UNITA ministers) was formed, and the UN reduced the size of its peacekeeping force from 7 000 to 1 500. Clearly there was some hope for real, inclusive peace, and that was surely founded on the military successes of 1994, which forced Savimbi to negotiate.41 As a postscript, the war that resumed in 1998 would go on for four years.42 It ended when Savimbi was killed in 2002, and UNITA sued for peace only days later.43

Executive Outcomes’ second famous operation took place in Sierra Leone, starting in 1995. The country’s situation was essentially as follows. The long-term President Siaka Stevens retired from office in 1985, having accumulated eighty years of age and a private fortune of $500 million (representing the profits of Sierra Leone’s diamond trade).44 His successor, Joseph Momoh, was equally corrupt, and incompetent to boot. The state’s inevitable bankruptcy meant that it stopped paying teachers and civil

38 Meredith, M. Op. Cit. p. 610 39 “Peace, maybe” The Economist, London, 18 February 1995, Vol. 334, Issue 7902, p. 42 40 “Angola: Another last chance” The Economist, London, 16 December 1995, Vol. 337, Issue 7945, p. 41 41 “Obituary: Jonas Savimbi” The Economist, London, 2 March 2002, Vol. 362, Issue 8262, p. 106 42 Gerhart, G.W. “Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process” Foreign Affairs, New York, July/August 2000, Vol. 79, Issue 4, p. 164; “International: UNITA--down but not out; Angola” The Economist, London, 18 August 2001, Vol. 360, Issue 8235, p. 33 43 “International: Peace at Last?; Angola” The Economist, London, 6 April 2002, Vol. 363, Issue 8267, p. 57; “Leaders: After Savimbi; Angola” The Economist, London, 2 March 2002, Vol. 362, Issue 8262, p. 14 44 Hawthorne, P. “Diamonds in the rough” Time, New York, 6 December 1999, Vol. 154, Issue 23, p. 64

29 servants, resulting in the collapse of government function.45 The ensuing flight of the professional class to the West gutted the society. In 1991, rebels calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by a former Sierra Leone army corporal named Foday Sankoh, entered the country from Liberia.46 By 1994, the rebels controlled the greatest part of Sierra Leone’s mineral wealth: diamonds, bauxite and titanium.47 By 1995 they were positioned to seize Freetown.48 Requests for assistance to the United Nations, the United States and the United Kingdom were all refused.49

Back in 1992, Momoh’s government was overthrown by a body of junior offices, led by a young captain called Valentine Strasser, who, “drove to Freetown to make their grievances known and ended up seizing power.”50 The new rulers inherited a daunting strategic situation. The national army had been kept deliberately weak to prevent it from threatening the government.51 When rebel incursions made a stronger army imperative, it was expanded from 3 000 to 10 000.52 But this prolific recruitment was also indiscriminate: Sierra Leone essentially enrolled the lumpenproletariat, including prisoners, and children.53 Then it failed to provide this force with any sort of adequate pay, equipment, support or honest leadership. Strasser and his colleagues also forgot their own revolutionary resolve. “Suddenly, they had unimpeded access to the diamond fields, to BMWs and Mercedes, and to Siaka Stevens's old presidential palace, which the [National Provisional Ruling Council] boys turned into a private disco where they danced, smoked pot, and snorted cocaine through the night.”54 All the while the rebels came closer to Freetown.55

45 Adebajo, A. & Keen, D. “Banquet for warlords” The World Today, London, July 2000, Vol. 56, Issue 7, p. 8 46 “Sierra Leone” Africa Report, September 1992, Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 7 47 Berkeley, B. “The method and the madness” Mother Jones, San Francisco, July/August 2001, Vol. 26, Issue 4, p. 58 48 “Sierra Leone: Out of the bush” The Economist, London, 6 May 1995, Vol. 335, Issue 7913, p. 41 49 Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. p. 112 50 Meredith, M. Op. Cit. p. 565 51 “Trust Nobody” The Economist, London, 11 February 1995, Vol. 334, Issue 7901, p. 39; Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. p. 111 52 Rubin, E. “An army of one’s own” Harper’s Magazine, New York, February 1997, Vol. 294, Issue 1761, p. 46 53 Fanthorpe, R. “Neither citizen nor subject: ‘Lumpen’ agency and the legacy of native administration in Sierra Leone” African Affairs, July 2001, Vol. 100 No. 400, p. 363 54 Rubin, E. Op. Cit. p. 46 55 “Sierra Leone's war targets civilians, industry, foreigners” Africa Report, New York, March 1995, Vol. 40, Issue 2, p. 5

30 The government recruited its first PMC in 1995, in the shape of a firm called GSG (Gurkha Security Guards), which had experience in providing de-mining operations for the UN and security services for the Lonhro Corporation in Mocambique.56 Freetown also employed an experienced American soldier and mercenary called Bob Mackenzie to command these Gurkhas.57 The PMC was tasked with training a group of Special Forces called the Sierra Leone Command Unit. The grand name, however, concealed a farcical reality. The one hundred and sixty men in the unit were mostly

louts, having been enticed off the streets to the barracks with offers of regular meals, uniforms, weapons and drugs. They were abysmally bad by any standards. Most would fire their weapons on automatic from the hip with not the slightest regard for accuracy, while others removed the wooden stocks from their AKs because they thought it looked ‘cool’. Not one of them could read a map. And as for zeroing a rifle, they didn’t know what [Mackenzie] was talking about… the compasses with which they were issued were worn as decorations around their necks. To top it, just about everybody was smashed from the first muster on because a supply of marijuana came with daily rations. For lunch, they’d also get dollops of the local rotgut, neatly packaged in plastic sachets.58

It transpired that Mackenzie would never make a serious attempt to reform this force, because he was killed by the RUF during a reconnaissance for a suitable site to conduct weapons training.59 That ambush cost GSG several casualties, but they were not deterred by these losses and provided replacements. They refused, however, to exceed the bounds of their contract (to train) and actually fight, despite the demands of

56 Avant, D. Op. Cit. 2005, pp. 85 – 86 57 How did the government escape from its decadent lethargy to hire these forces? Interestingly, the answer probably has to do with foreign interests. It seems the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office passed the idea to the Freetown government. The FCO, in turn, had it from De Beers, who were alarmed by rebel control of Sierra Leone’s diamond mines and the prospect of the diamonds ending up in Libya, which was reportedly aiding the RUF. That, at least, is the theory expounded in Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 372 – 373. The interesting thing is that, as was the case in Angola, the PMC got its introduction from established business interests. This points to corporate connections, of course, and inspires accusations of neo-colonialism. It also shows that companies can prompt innovative responses to security crises when the responsible government is irresolute and/or lacking in capacity. 58 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 373 – 374 59 Francis, D.J. “Mercenary intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing national security or international exploitation?” Third World Quarterly, London, April 1999, Vol. 20, Issue 2, p. 319

31 their government clients.60 “GSG was worried about its reputation among its entire customer base – not just its one customer in Sierra Leone – and was concerned that providing the protection Chairman Strasser wanted would compromise its reputation as a legitimate security firm.”61 (The protection in question was security for the army units in training; the presence of RUF forces in the area – demonstrated by the recent ambush – proved that securing even the immediate territory would mean combat.) Therefore, GSG did not quit the country in fright after it suffered casualties, as has been reported.62 In fact, it was fired because it would only train, not fight.

Strasser’s government found a more belligerent PMC in the shape of Executive Outcomes. The Chairman had read of the firm’s successes in Angola in Newsweek and Soldier of Fortune.63 Sierra Leone could not afford EO out of its current account, but it could raise the funds by taking out a mortgage. A lender duly appeared in the shape of Anthony Buckingham, who had been central to EO’s Angola project. (No doubt he played a prominent role in inspiring Sierra Leone to hire the PMC, in addition to providing the finance.)64 The deal was that Buckingham would be repaid in diamond- mining concessions.65 This demonstrated his strong faith in EO’s efficacy, because the mines in question were in rebel territory, and could only be profitable if they were captured and held.66

Approximately 170 Executive Outcomes personnel flew into Sierra Leone (the majority from Angola) in 1995.67 They took six weeks to find their feet before commencing combat operations, in cooperation with army forces (who remained substantially useless) and the Kamajors (an ethnic group much better organised and disciplined than the national army, whom EO assisted with training and equipment).68 EO found the RUF a radically inferior foe to UNITA. Such was the superiority of their

60 Avant, D. Op. Cit. 2005, p. 85 61 Ibid. p. 96 62 See Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. p. 112 63 Loc. Cit. 64 “Cloak and dagger LTD” Management Today, London, February 1999, p. 64; McClearm, M. “Rock star” Canadian Business, Toronto, 9 June 2003, Vol. 76, Issue 11, p. 39 65 “With friends like these” Canadian Business, Toronto, June 1997, Vol. 70, Issue 7, p. 110 66 Chatterjee, P. “WORLD BANK PONDERS LOAN TO SIERRA LEONE MINE” Inter Press Service, New York, 14 August 1997, p. 1 67 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 385 – 386 68 Ibid. p. 397

32 tactics, discipline and equipment that it took them only nine days to drive the rebels away from Freetown and about 100km back into the jungle (EO had expected that phase of the campaign to last three months);69 thereafter, Executive Outcomes quickly advanced to take the diamond mines at Kono. Then, under a second contract involving a further 200 troops flown in from South Africa, they overran the RUF stronghold in the Kangari Hills and drove the rebels back to the border. “Effectively defeated, the RUF agreed to negotiate with the government for the first time.”70 Towards the end of 1995, Chairman Strasser announced that elections would be held in February 1996.71 In January 1996 the defence chief, Julius Bio, toppled him in a coup.72 (EO did not participate in the coup, but they also did not hinder it; it is generally accepted that the firm preferred Bio to Strasser.) Regardless, the elections occurred as scheduled, and a former UN administrator called Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became president. The RUF resumed offensive operations in October 1996, but were smashed by EO and Kamajor retaliations. In November the RUF signed peace accords with the government. One of their conditions for signing was the departure of Executive Outcomes. (President Kabbah was also pushed to dispense with the firm by the International Monetary Fund, which was concerned about the country’s balance of payments, if not its balance of power.73) EO duly left (although some EO personnel stayed behind as mining guards working for a company called LifeGuard), but departed issuing warnings that the government could not last 100 days without their support. They also offered a 500-man force to provide it with security. They received no response from the government on this proposal, and 95 days later there was no government left to respond. An army coup led by Major Johnny Koroma ousted President Kabbah in May 1997.74 It turned out the plotters had been conniving with the RUF; after the coup, rebels and soldiers flooded into Freetown for an orgy of looting and savagery they called Operation Pay Yourself.75

69 Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. p. 112 70 Ibid. p. 113 71 “Peace, perhaps” The Economist, London, 7 December 1996, Vol. 341, Issue 7995, p. 41 72 “Sierra Leone: Little brother” The Economist, London, 20 January 1996, Vol. 338, Issue 7949, p. 43 73 Rubin, E. Op. Cit. p. 55; In the IMF’s defence, it should be pointed out that EO was being paid with IMF funds, because that was Sierra Leone’s source of foreign currency. 74 Spicer, T. Op. Cit. p. 190 75 Ibid. p. 114; “Bring back the mercenaries” The Spectator, London, 11 December 1999, Vol. 283, Issue 8940, p. 20

33 President Kabbah fled into exile in Guinea. The November peace accords had provided for a UN peacekeeping force, but this never deployed because no one stepped forward with the requisite $47 million. In its place, an ECOMOG force led by Nigeria had entered Sierra Leone.76 When the May coup occurred, this force had control of the airport but not the capital. The Security Council condemned the coup and ECOMOG was tasked with restoring President Kabbah to power.77 That was eventually achieved in March 1998, after one failed attempt, and the involvement of another PMC – Sandline International (resulting in the previously discussed Sandline Affair).78 Sandline’s operations, however, were not nearly as militarily significant as Executive Outcomes’, although it produced a fine political scandal.79 The PMC’s contribution to the war involved a helicopter and 15 people who fought successfully alongside ECOMOG, some training and logistics support, and a shipment of arms intended for the Kamajors that ECOMOG seized at the airport.80 The mercenary-intervention component of Sandline’s plan, termed Project Python, was never implemented.81

The return of President Kabbah in 1998 would not be the end of Sierra Leone’s political troubles.82 In October 1998 a Freetown court found Foday Sankoh guilty of treason, for which he was sentenced to death. Whilst Sankoh launched his appeal, the rebels threatened revenge.83 In January 1999 a reinvigorated RUF launched another savage bid for Freetown, which caused the deaths of 6 000 civilians and almost defeated the ECOMOG forces – which only held out because the RUF withdrew after four days of urban warfare.84 In a desperate bid for peace, President Kabbah offered the RUF a power-sharing deal and full amnesty.85 Sankoh accepted the offer; the

76 “International: Grisly message” The Economist, London, 8 August 1998, Vol. 348, Issue 8080, p. 40 77 “International: Sierra Leone's uncertain path to peace” The Economist, London, 11 December 1999, Vol. 353, Issue 8149, p. 39 78 Lloyd, J. “The making of cruel Britannia” New Statesman, London, 26 June 1998, Vol. 11, Issue 510, p. 8 79 McElvoy, A. “In search of the moral high ground” New Statesman, London, 20 December 1999-3 January 2000, Vol. 12, Issue 586, p. 23 80 Spicer, T. Op. Cit. pp. 196 – 197 81 Ibid. p. 198 82 Ankomah, B. “Sierra Leone: How the ‘good guys’ won” New African, London, July/August 1998, Issue 365, p. 8 83 Fofana, L. “POLITICS-SIERRA LEONE: 'HOUNDS FROM HELL' ON TRIAL FOR WAR CRIMES” Global Information Network, New York, 7 July 2004, p. 1 84 “Another African ‘Peace’” Wall Street Journal, New York, 12 July 1999, p. A.28 85 Tull, D.M. & Mehler, H. “The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa; [1]” African Affairs, London, July 2005, Vol. 104, Issue 416, p. 375

34 agreement was formally signed in Lomé, Togo, in July 1999.86 But even these concessions could not establish peace.87 The RUF retained control over Kono, the sight of Sierra Leone’s great diamond wealth.88 When UNAMSIL, the UN force that replaced ECOMOG, declared its intention to deploy to the diamond fields, the RUF took 500 peacekeepers hostage.89 In response, a crowd of 30 000 people marched to Foday Sankoh’s house in Freetown to demand the release of the peacekeepers. When Sankoh tried to escape, they seized the rebel leader, paraded him naked through the streets and handed him over to the authorities.90 That same month, Britain intervened with a substantial task force, and Britons later took up positions in the central bank, government and police, and set about training the army.91 British and Indian forces launched Operation Kukri, using helicopters to disperse the rebels and rescue the hostages.92 The operation was remarkable because it was a success, and because it demonstrated a real UN willingness to use force.93 UNAMSIL swelled to about 18 000 members, at a cost of $500 million annually;94 at the same time, the RUF, deprived of leadership and facing overwhelming opposition, began to disintegrate.95 In November 2000, a ceasefire was announced and United Nations forces finally occupied the diamond fields. In 2002, President Kabbah declared the war over; on the 30th of December 2005, UNAMSIL announced its mission accomplished and departed,

86 “Foday's homecoming” New African, London, November 1999, Issue 379, p. 46 87 Whitelaw, K. “A painful, ugly peace” US News & World Report, Washington, 19 July 1999, Vol. 127, Issue 3, p. 37; Ellis, S. “How to Rebuild Africa” Foreign Affairs, New York, September/October 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 5, p. 135 88 Birdsall, N., Rodrik, D. & Subramanian, A. “How to Help Poor Countries” Foreign Affairs, New York, July/August 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 4, p. 136 89 Hammer, J. “Sierra Leone's crisis arose from a mix of misjudgments and opportunistic diplomacy; The High Cost Of 'Cheap' Peace; [Atlantic Edition]” Newsweek, New York, 22 May 2000, p. 4 90 Meredith, M. Op. Cit. pp. 570 – 571 91 Ibid. p. 572 92 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 123 93 Dominick, D. “After the Madness” http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,12084,1434844,00.html, 12 march 2005, p.1 94 Corcoran, M. “Gunship for Hire” http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2000/s229144.htm, 28 September 2000, p. 1 95 Penfold, P. “Free again” The World Today, London, April 2002, Vol. 58, Issue 4, p. 16; “Leaders: Soldiers of mercy; Sierra Leone” The Economist, London, 18 May 2002, Vol. 363, Issue 8273, p. 12

35 leaving only enough troops to guard the war crimes tribunal.96 The war had cost approximately 50 000 dead and 20 000 maimed.97

It had other costs, too. When Executive Outcomes arrived in Sierra Leone, the Freetown newspaper Unity Now declared that: “A drowning man doesn't first ask the identity of the man who has come to save him.” But, as Philip Winslow responds, “If he is a leader under siege, he will need to ask the price.”98 The figure usually quoted is $35 million, an amount split over several contracts, starting with a $15 million deal.99 Interestingly, for those who protest that the cost of a PMC is devastating for poor countries, $35 million was just one-third of Sierra Leone’s military budget.100 Furthermore, this must be compared to the sacrifices Freetown was making before EO arrived: by late 1994, the Finance Minister estimate that 70% of state revenues were being spent on the war, and the government was still losing.101 It is also noteworthy that EO was rather pushed-around in financial matters. The company was not paid in November or December 1995, and accepted a reduced payment in January. Ahmed Kabbah was elected in February 1996, and somehow did not even hear about the EO contract until April, when he told the PMC that he could not pay.102 He then talked EO into working through April for free and accepting a further reduced payment starting in May. As if that were not enough, in September, he unilaterally reduced the rate twice.103 In fact, Executive Outcomes only ever received $15.7 million of the $35.3 million it was promised.104 That is still a lot of money for the least-developed country in the world, but it is not nearly so vast a sum as some commentators would have one believe.

96 Hans Nichols “Peacekeepers Leave a Calm Sierra Leone” http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051230/ap_on_re_af/sierra_leone_after_peacekeeping, 30 December 2005, p. 1; “$10 Mill for Sierra Leone Special Court, Far Short” http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0510/S00028.htm, 3 October 2005, p. 1; “Sierra Leone: Country outlook” EIU ViewsWire, New York, 1 December 2005, p. n/a 97 “AS PEACEKEEPERS DEPART SIERRA LEONE, NUMEROUS CHALLENGES REMAIN: UN OFFICIAL” http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/051003_Mwakawago.doc.htm, 3 October 2005, p. 1 98 Winslow, P. “The business of war” MacLean’s, Toronto, 6 November 1995, Vol. 108, Issue 45, p. 36 99 Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. 2003, pp. 114 - 115 100 Shearer, D. “Portrait of a private army” Foreign Policy, Washington, Fall 1998, Issue 112, p. 73 101 Avant, D. Op. Cit. 2005, p. 83 102 Ibid. p. 89 103 Loc. Cit. 104 Ibid. p. 90

36 Interestingly, although Executive Outcomes and Sandline had left Sierra Leone, some of their personnel would return. The most notable of these was the South African helicopter pilot Neall Ellis (nicknamed Nellis), who revisited the country in 1998. Attack helicopters were one of Executive Outcomes’ most effective weapons during their operations in the country, and Nellis provided more of the same service to the Freetown government through the last robust rebel offensives in 1999 and 2000.105 An intercepted rebel radio message captures the usefulness of these operations: “Were it not for the government gunship, the entire RUF command would be sleeping in the capital within three days.”106 Apart from all the solo combat missions, this pilot also supported the ECOMOG forces logistically and militarily and accompanied British forces during Operation Barras (to rescue Britons held hostage by a gang calling itself the ‘West Side Boys’).107 There was another private military supplier in Sierra Leone during this period. The US Government contracted an Oregon-based company called ICI, using Russian helicopters, to re-supply towns and garrisons under siege on behalf of the Sierra Leonean government.108

Angola and Sierra Leone have been the really well publicised sites of PMC/mercenary activity in recent times, but there has also been considerable mercenary freelancing, and some very extensive dealings by PMCs. Ordinary freelance mercenaries have appeared in many African conflicts since the Cold War. An investigation by Ukrainian media in 2002 showed that the supply of mercenaries to the Congo was so extensive that wages had plunged from $5 000 a month to only $900.109 The war in the Congo attracted mercenaries from all over the world: “Serbs, South Africans, Israelis, Croats, Zimbabweans, Germans, French [mostly protégés of Bob Denard] and other nationalities.”110 Probably the most famous were the White Legion, a degenerate band of 300 men hired to fight a war that was already all but lost. Tim Spicer (of Sandline fame) described them in compelling terms: “Mobutu swept the streets of Bosnia – and

105 Loygren, S., Shapiro, J.P., Kaplan, D.E., Schultz, S. & McGraw, D. “An ugly standoff in Sierra Leone” US News and World Report, Washington, 18 January 1999, Vol. 126, Issue 2, p. 10 106 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 57 By way of comparison, the UN operation meant to deploy when EO left was budgeted at $47 million, but the funds were not forthcoming from donors. 107 Ibid. pp. 95 – 96; Kalesnik, F. “Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission, Sierra Leone 2000” The Journal of Military History, Lexington, October 2005, Vol. 69, Issue 4, p. 1264 108 Ibid. pp. 42 – 44 109 Ibid. p. 467 110 Ibid. pp. 150 – 151

37 picked up the garbage. Belgians, and Frenchmen slung out of the Foreign Legion, Serbs, Russians – all were recruited… Every psychotic they could lay their hands on.”111 Their commander was one Colonel Dominic Yugo, allegedly party to a range of atrocities committed in Bosnia in 1995, including the Srebrenica massacre. His past behaviour proved a reliable predictor for his conduct in the Congo. “He [was] accused of having personally executed and tortured dozens of Congolese civilians in Kisangani, whom he suspected of being rebel spies, and in another incident he was seen to shoot and kill two Protestant missionaries holding bibles.”112 The White Legion had no noticeable effect on the war. They arrived in January 1997, and were effectively destroyed eight weeks later whilst attempting to defend Kisangani.113 Their sole legacy is a virtuoso demonstration of mercenarism at its vicious and incompetent worst.

There is also some recent evidence of mercenaries in the employ of UNITA. This includes one especially grisly exhibit – a piece of skull with blond hair, recovered by EO at Soyo.114 In 1997 and 1998, UNITA would also receive support from a number of PMCs (some of them previously unknown). A company called IRIS, “to assist UNITA in its operations, recruited more than 300 personnel, the majority of whom had previously worked for EO.”115 Even if modern PMCs have yet to betray a client for a higher bid from its enemy, it is clear that some PMC personnel are prepared to fight for both sides (with a year or two’s hiatus between operations, thus far).

There were mercenaries on both sides in Sierra Leone, too, paid for with diamonds. These included some East Europeans, Yugoslavians and South Africans – including ones who had earlier served with EO against the RUF in 1995.116 A specific example is the pilot Carl Alberts, described by one writer (in 2000) as “the most dangerous

111 Quoted in Herbst, J. “The Regulation of Private Security Forces” in Stremlau, J. & Mills, G. (eds) Op. Cit. p. 121 112 Musah, A-F “A Country Under Siege: State Decay and Corporate Military Intervention in Sierra Leone” in Musah, A-F, & Fayemi, J.K. Op. Cit. p. 138 113 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. p. 235 114 Ibid. p. 310 115 O’Brien, K.A. “Private Military Companies and African Security 1990 – 1998” Op. Cit. p. 59 116 Ibid. p. 47

38 mercenary today.”117 This individual flew helicopters out of Liberia on behalf of Charles Taylor. His missions included re-supplying the RUF.118

The most recent incidence of mercenary activity was the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea. This attracted a good deal of media attention thanks to the involvement of Margaret Thatcher’s son Mark, and because the scheme was quintessential Frederick Forsyth – an attempt by a small company of mercenaries to seize the government of an oil-rich state.119 But the project was foiled before it even really got going, probably because South African intelligence services learnt of the plot and informed their counterparts in and Equatorial Guinea.120 On the 7th of March 2004, Zimbabwean police arrested 70 men on the military side of Harare’s international airport, and seized,

Their plane, an American Boeing 727, which had been flown in from South Africa, [and] an arsenal of weapons, including 61 AK assault rifles with 45,000 rounds of ammunition, 150 grenades, 20 P.K.M. light machine guns with 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 50 PRM heavy machine guns, and 100 rocket- propelled-grenade launchers with 1,000 rounds.121

At the same time, 15 men, thought to be the advance party, were arrested in Equatorial Guinea.122 Interestingly, the plotters include members of the old 32nd Battalion (whose personnel staffed Executive Outcomes), and Simon Mann, one of EO’s founders.123 The scheme appears to have involved installing the exiled opposition leader Severo Moto as President.124 Mark Thatcher has since agreed to a plea bargain, an agreement defended by the national director of public prosecutions as, “Strategically sound, based

117 Musah, A-F “A Country Under Siege: State Decay and Corporate Military Intervention in Sierra Leone” Op. Cit. p. 273 118 Loc. Cit. 119 “Equatorial Guinea politics: Heavy sentences awarded in coup trial” EIU ViewsWire, New York, 7 March 2005, p.n/a; Walt, V. “MARK THATCHER'S COUP DE GRÂCE” Fortune, New York, 20 September 2004, Vol. 150, Issue 6, p.44 120 Versi, A. “The long road home” African Business, London, July 2005, Issue 311, p. S2 121 Ward, V. “Black Sheep, Big Trouble” Vanity Fair, New York, January 2005, Issue 533, p. 122 122 “International: The fog and dogs of war; Mercenaries in Africa” The Economist, London, 20 March 2004, Vol. 370, Issue 8367, p. 67 123 “Africa: The Mercenaries Must be Stopped!” New African, London, October 2004, Issue 433, p. 56 124 “Exiled Coup leader hides in Croatia after threats” www.businessday.co.za, 28 April 2005, p. 1; Pallister, D. “The Great Game” Harper’s Magazine, New York, August 2005, Vol. 311, Issue 1863,p.24

39 on the exigencies of the case, the prospects of success, cost considerations and the tactical benefit of an early catalyst.”125 The deal is that Thatcher pay a R5 million fine and agrees to testify. This would seem to be a wise move on behalf of the NPA, because it is notoriously difficult to prosecute mercenaries (whose intentions are hard to prove, and whose activities usually occur in foreign countries) without this sort of information.126

Any narrative that portrays mercenaries as transforming into PMCs after the Cold War is, therefore, inaccurate. What happened, in fact, was that ordinary mercenary activity continued much as it had in past decades, whilst some quite rare groups of mercenaries formed PMCs and accepted media attention (of which they received a generous measure). Yet, they were far from the only PMCs in Africa.

In fact, PMCs (in Africa and the rest of the world) range in character from actual war fighters to much more peaceable and non-controversial sorts, involved in activities like de-mining. Of the combatant-for-hire breed, Executive Outcomes and Sandline International have already been covered in some detail. Another interesting example is Sukhoi, the Russian aircraft manufacturer. When Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a vicious border war in 1998 (at the cost of 100 000 lives), the former state bought an air force: Sukhoi provided aircraft (the Su-27, an advanced strike fighter), and about 250 personnel: pilots, mechanics and commanders to plan missions.127 A hastily formed company called Stabilco, whose founders included the aforementioned Neall Ellis, flew helicopter gunships for Mobutu Sese-Seko’s dying regime. (Or, at least, they tried to; the government hired the company, paid them and booked them into a luxurious hotel, but it was extraordinarily indecisive about fighting Kabila’s onrushing forces. The Stabilco staff spent most of their time in the Congo either sitting in the Intercontinental, attempting to get government attention or, in the end, trying to get out of the Congo.128) In 2003, the UK Customs Office and the American FBI investigated a PMC called Northbridge Services Group. The firm was not only apparently

125 Hartley, W. “NPA defends ‘strategic’ deal with Thatcher” www.businessday.co.za/home.aspx?Page=BD4P1236&MenuItem=BD4P1236, 3 October 2005, p. 1 126 “Analysis: Mark Thatcher pleads guilty to criminal charges in alleged coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea” NPR Morning Edition, Washington DC, 13 January 2005, p. 1 127 Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. pp. 11 & 173 128 Venter, A.J. Op. Cit. pp. 225 – 228

40 recruiting mercenaries for the Ivory Coast, for which it was criticised by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, for undermining the peace process; it was also reportedly supporting a Liberian rebel group and planning to kidnap Charles Taylor for trial in Sierra Leone.129 The Sierra Leone Ad Hoc Tribunal was apparently quite happy to hear the case, but lacked the means to fund the arrest, and “privately suggested the U.S. Government might pay for the operation…”130 One extra peace of trouble for the British government, of course, was that it had no regulations to deal with PMCs (and still does not). There are also interesting stories of French use of mercenaries in West Africa – some of them downright absurd. For example, “during the late '90s French mercenaries fought for both parties that were then struggling for control of Congo- Brazzaville, with one mercenary group being ‘approved’ by the Elysée's African cell [the Presidency] while the other was supported by the Quai d'Orsay's [the Foreign Ministry].”131

But these were the most extreme PMCs; there were many others. The well-known American firm MPRI has provided military training to Liberia,132 Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, amongst others.133 It also came very close to training government forces in Angola (being granted with a license), although this was halted by the State Department134 – but there was also trouble, Peter Singer suggests, with MPRI’s reluctance to pay bribes.135 The contract in Equatorial Guinea is especially interesting. There was initial State Department resistance to authorising MPRI to train the forces of a state with that sort of human rights record, but MPRI responded that if it were denied the contract, the job would simply go to a French company.136 It probably used another argument, too, which worked in Croatia. MPRI was training the Croatian forces at the time they were implicated in ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Serbs. Instead of

129 Zagaris, B. “U.S. Investigates Role of Private Military Company in Liberia” International Enforcement Law Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 10, October 2003 130 Loc. Cit. 131 Mason, M. “‘Great Game’ in West Africa” Military Technology, Bonn, 2005, Vol. 29, Issue 2, p. 7 132 In 1995 – see O’Brien, K.A. “Private Military Companies and African Security 1990 – 1998” Op. Cit. p. 62 133 Avant, D. Op. Cit. 2005, pp. 150 & 188 134 Ibid. p. 150 135 Singer, P.W. Op. Cit. p. 131 136 Ibid. p. 132

41 withdrawing, the company argued that it only went to show how much they needed MPRI’s human rights training.137

Israeli PMCs have also featured in Africa (although a new law forbidding security assistance to unstable regimes has restricted this). A good example is the firm Levdan, which in 1994 signed a $50 million contract with the government of Congo- Brazzaville to train the country’s military and the president’s bodyguard.138

Even more recently, two more American firms, DynCorp and PAE (which also worked alongside ICI in Sierra Leone), received contracts from the US Government for work in the Sudan. DynCorp has two tasks: to provide logistical support to the AU mission, and to monitor American funding to a Sudanese rebel group called the National Democratic Alliance (which has received $16 million from the State Department since 2001).139 PAE provides the logistics for a human rights monitoring group.140 DynCorp has also been active in Liberia, where it has a contract to perform two tasks. The first, to disarm 8000 irregular fighters, was completed in August. The second, to train a new army with about 2000 members, is ongoing.141 This is perhaps the most important tale told here, not because it is dramatic or bloody, but because it represents a productive and sustainable role for PMCs in Africa.

137 Avant, D. Op. Cit. 2005, p. 106 138 Vines, A. “Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in Africa” in Mills, G. & Stremlau, J. Op. Cit. p. 76 139 Brown, D. “Washington Using More Private Military Contractors Rather than Military Troops at Overseas Trouble Spots”, transcript available at http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/article_12_7_04_Contractors_transcript.html, 7 December 2004, p. 1 140 Loc. Cit. 141 Towe, A. “War-weary Liberian soldiers seek payoff for laying down arms” www.businessday.co.za, 27 October 2005, p. 1

42