It Is My Considered Opinion That It Is of The

CN-

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: VAUGHAN ONLY FROM: AMACHREE, LEOPOLDVILLE DATE: 19 MAY 63 (Sent 1913382; Rovd 19l4l2z) NUMBER: UNNUMBERED It is my considered opinion that it is of the utmost importance that you should visit Leopoldville urgently s« that you., Dorsinville and I, can enquire into and rectify the serious administrative problems which are affecting the entire ONUC operations here. Quite apart from the po«r personal relations of the Chief of Civilian operations and the Chief Administrative Officer, there is evidence of maladministration and disturbing reports of misuse of PX and Commissary facilities. Morale is low and I feel that in order to assist Dorsinville we should now make an effort to eradicate the •bstacles to the smooth functioning of our operations here. I have talked to Dorsinville who agrees with me that your presence is absolutely necessary. I would suggest, f~\ therefore, that you endeavour to take the first flight to . Leopoldville this week. You may perhaps appreciate the serious- ness of the situation if I state that it may be necessary for a recommendation to be made to the Secretary General to change both the Chief of Civilian Operations and the Chief Administrative Officer because from what I have seen here we cannot entrust our operations to ifficers who do not appear to be able to work together and who, as a result of their petty bickerings are jeopardizing the good name of the UN in this country. Please cable back very urgently and let me know when to expect you. Dorsinville would like you to be his guest. End. OUTGOING: CODJL CABLE

NO__DISTRIBUTIQN

DECLASSIFIED » TO: AMAGHREE ONLY F8R ST/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 { IEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: VAUGHAW

DATE: 20 May 1963

NUMBER: UNNUMBERED

Matter raised jour cable 19th being referred to

Secretary-General since he alone makes such decisions.

Distribution: SG (original) Bunche Vaughan (same distribution as Incoming Code cable of 19th) W April 1965

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J6 saisis eeite occasion pour vcms , Monsieur 1© Fr^sid^at, les haut©

le Secretaire g^niral do 1'Organisatd.on des nations Uiaies

cc - S.E. Le Repr^sentanfc Permanent d*Haiti aupr&s des Nations Unies : JSfew York . Draft to "be translated into French

Cable treat Secretary-General to President of Baiti

His Excellency * . Dr. ft-anijois Duvalier President of the Bepublic of Haiti Port -au -Prince. - -- 1 haveTin e aonour to refer, Your Excellency, to ay message of 10 April, which was conveyed to you by the good offices of your Permanent Representative to the United nations. I now send you this message requesting early decision on my original appeal to you only because of the pressure of time in connection with the position in the Congo which must be promptly filled. It is most important for me to be able to proceed on the assumption that the person in question will be available for this post. I would very much hope, therefore, that you could give me your word of consent at the earliest possible moment. Please be assured, Your Excellency, that I approach you now in this -way only because of the very great urgency of this matter. May I take this occasion to again express to you my highest consideration.

U Secretary General 17 April 1963

SG: Amb. Auguste ef Haiti called to say he had received late last night a telegram from his Government indicating that his cables had been received and that a decision would be forthcoming. Message did not make reference to your own cable sent yesterday to Pres. Duvalier. Amb. Auguste wishes to assure you that he has done everything in his power to endorse your request and to obtain a quick reply from his Government. It is his personal feeling that the delay is due to some internal troubles which have developed in the last few- days in Haiti - a military conspiracy against the Government was alleged to have been dis- covered, and there seems to be tension in the country. In all probability the attention of the President and his top-ranking ministers must be devoted to the internal situation. Nevertheless, Amb. Auguste hopes to have a definite reply later today or tomorrow morning.

(copy to Mr. Bunche) Powealand Unofficial translation from French

KCOHING CLSAE CABIE

IQi THE SECfiETAKT-GEMERAL PROMt DR. PHANCOIS DUVALIER, FEE3IDEKT OFTHS REPUBLIC OF HAITI (PORT-AU-FRIHCB) BAlli 17 AmiL

Mr. Secretary-General, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your cable dated 16 April concerning the Organization's desire to utilize in the Congo the services of Ambassador Max Eersinvills,^membe•0 r of the Permanent Mission Of Haiti* I have pleasure in informing you that the Haitian Government readily fives its assent to your choice of Mt. Doreinvillee I sincerely hope that he will accomplish the mission you entrust to hint to your entire satisfaction and that he will show the* same tact and good judgment by which he has already distinguished hiaoelf in the service of the Organisation* I trust that he will, to the utmost of his abilities, help to bring to triumph the ideals of peace and brotherhood of the United Nations in the Congo, whose people ar<» yearning with all their might towards security, progress and the prosperity of all. High consideration.

f Poweeland Unofficial translation from Fr«aeh

PKRKAJ4E>rr KISSKW OF THS RBHffiLIC Cff HAITI TO THE UNITED

Rev York, IS April 1963

Dear Mr,

I have the hoaowr to send you together with this letter a copy of the cabled reply which the Honourable Jfc* Francois Oavalier, President $f til* Repwbllc, has requested we to transHt to Tour Ifctcelleacy. IB of 10 April 1963 TOO eafred U» kindly to authorize Mr. Sfex a. of Haiti to the tftdted Batio»«» to accept the post of of the Onited Katione Sacratanf^Gkmeral in the . I have pleasure In infamlng yow of the grsat gratification of of' th« S«p«,blic in twins abl* to reply favourably to Tour

rccpieet, happy in th* f tct that Haiti can coctribuU, through one of its s«a»? to the great arai historic yfaleh tte .Nations is tha

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Carlet R. AUGUSTE, Aahaas

Hio Excellency U Thant, S«cr«tariH3«neral of tbe UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations,, H.Y, (For use of information media — not an official record) Press Release SG/1465 00/323 19 April 1963

MAX E. DCRSUWILLS APPOIICTED HEW OFFICSR-CT-CEARGE OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN TEE CONGO

Secretary^General U Thant today announced the appointment of Max E, Dorsinville of Haiti to be the Officer-in-Charge of the United nations Operation in the Congo (OMJC) as from 1 May 1963.* In this regard,, it will be recalled that in his message to the fifth annual session of the Economic Commission for Africa (EGA), which opened in Leopoldville on 18 February 1963; the Secretary-General announced that he had in train arrangements which would soon make it possible for Robert K.A. Gardinerf the present Officer- in-Charge of ONUC, to devote his full time and energy to the Economic Commission for Africa and that it was his intention that Mr, Gardiner would assume his functions as Executive Secretary of EGA, on a full time basis, not later than 1 May 1963* Mr. Dorsinville was born at Port-au-Prince on 12 March 1910. He studied at the University of Haiti from which he graduated as Licencie en Ifeoit,** He joined the Haitian Department of External Relations in 1938 and has remained in his country's diplomatic service since that date. He has represented Haiti at most sessions of the General Assembly, where he has been particularly active in the Fourth Committee. He also represented Haiti on the Trusteeship Council from 195^- "to 1959 an(3- was the Council's Vice-Presideut in 1955-56"

and its President in 19590 Mr, Dorsinville has undertaken a number of important missions for the United Nations: he was the Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the former Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British and French administration in 1955; the Chairman of the United llatious Visiting Mission to the former Trust Territories of Somaliland, Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in East Africa in 1957j the United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the elections, in 195^^ ill "the former trust territory of Togoland under French Administration; and, finally, the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruauda-Urundi in 1961-62. Mr. Dorsinville is expected to arrive in Leopoldville by the middle of next week. * <-See Press Release SG/1466; •'•*Law. UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations, N.Y. (For use of information media — not an official record) Press Release BIO/210 19 April 1965 Biographical Note

MAX H. DORSINVILLE OF HAITI

Ambassador Max H. Dorsinville of Haiti, who today was appointed Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), has represented Haiti in the United Nations since the second session of the General Assembly (19^7). He assumes his new duties on 1 May 1965. In December 1953> Mr. Eorsinville was appointed Alternate Representative of Haiti to the United Nations and also Haiti's Representative on the Trusteeship Council. He served as President of the Council in 1959. He was Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the former Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British and French administration (1955); and Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the former Trust Territories of Italian-administered Somaliland, British-administered Tanganyika and Belgian- administered Ruanda --Urundi (1957). In 1958, Mr. Dorsinville served as the United Nations Commissioner supervising the elections held in French-administered Togoland, and in 1961 he was appointed by the General Assembly as Chairman of a three-member United Nations Commission which supervised elections held in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. (it is now two independent States, Burundi and Rwanda.) Mr, Dorsinville was born in Port-au-Prince on 12 March 1910. He received a degree in law in 1931« He entered Haiti's Department cf Foreign Affairs in 1938. In 1939 he was Secretary of Haiti's Delegation to the First Conference of Foreign Ministers, in Panama; served as Assistant Secretary in the Personal Cabinet of Haiti's President (19^0-Ul)j Adviser to the Secretary of State and later Assistant Secretary (January- October 19^1); Under-Secretary of State of the Presidency and Chief of Bureau 19^6).

* #*# 2$ April 1965

% Sear As you are about to depart for ikeopoMvilla w&ere you are to assujse tke position of Officer in-Charge of the United Satioas Operation in the Congo, I extend, to you my best wishes and assure you of aagr full confidence and eujrport. In tbe Coago you are to serve as ioagr representative, aud as such you will have full authority over all aspects of the United Nations Operation tbere, civilian aiai military alike. You will be responsible only to me and will report to ate either directly or through Sr. Balpb *T. Bunche, according to established practice.

Yours sincerely,

ljf S'hairb

His Excellency Mr. kfex. U* Borsinvilie ' J.M.V. LAMBERT/sd -X--703 CL^ - Translated from French

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

Leopoldville, 8 May 1963

Sir, As you will have learnt from my cables on the subject, I arrived in Leopoldville, together with Mr. F.T. Liu, only on 25 April, owing to a forced stop at Lagos, Nigeria, where we spent the night. I was somewhat surprised to learn from Mr. Gardiner that he was leaving the very next day, 26 April, on a few days' visit to certain African countries, and that I would assume my full duties as Head of Mission immediately. The arrangements already made by Mr. Gardiner left me with little hope that he would postpone his journey, and with little time to familiarize myself with the situation as fully as had been originally contemplated in New York. I had therefore to take over direction of the Mission at once, on 26 April, instead of 1 May 1963. Mr. Gardiner, who had welcome me most cordially, officially introduced me to my immediate assistants - General Kebbede, Commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo, Mr. Ahmed, Chief of Civilian Operations and Mr. Twigt, Chief of Administrative Services - in his offices, after receiving a salute from a guard of honour. He will return to Leopoldville on 9 May and will be the guest of honour of the Congolese Government at a reception to be held in the evening of that day. I for my part have planned a reception, again in his honour, for the evening of 10 May, and he will leave for New York on 11 May.

U Thant Se cret ary-Gene ral United Nations New York - 2 -

The visits to the Prime Minister and to the President of the Republic, originally planned for 25 April, had had to be postponed until 26 April, and I paid these visits during the morning, in succession, in company with Mr. Liu. Both visits took place in a cordial atmosphere. Mr. Adoula and the President repeated their desire to rely on the United Nations. The President even stated that, if certain of their desires were not fulfilled, that would be due rather to circumstances, to lack of understanding on the part of certain peoples, than to ill-vail on the part of the Secretary- General. I did not fail to assure them that the Secretary-General, who had a keen sense of the needs of the moment, would not fail to continue his efforts to help them to the greatest possible extent. Both of them mentioned the Minister Bomboko - which was sufficient indication of the value of maintaining contact with this Minister, who remains influential in foreign affairs despite the official change of title. Owing to faulty working of his telephone it was only on 29 April, during my first working meeting with the Prime Minister, that the latter was able to arrange our meeting with Minister Bomboko for the following morning. Since the Prime Minister referred to the many press cables dealing with the question of the reorganization of the ANC, while he was still in the dark pending the receipt of your reply, I made a point of explaining to him the nature of the difficulties you had encountered, which prevented us from taking a unilateral decision that might subject you to criticism by a fair number of Member States. However, having myself been invited to attend two informal meetings of the African group of the Advisory -3 -

(JVl Committee ef the Congo, as Minister Bomboko must have informed him, I again assured him of your wish to find an acceptable solution within the framework of the United Nations. The Prime Minister told me that Minister Bomboko had just informed him of the possibility that, at the Conference of Heads of States at Addis Ababa> the question of a reorganization of the ANC might be raised by Ghana. This gave me the chance to urge him to go there himself and even to take the initiative in the discussions, so as to present the case in the best possible way. The Prime Minister said that he would reflect upon it seriously but that he would not wish to find himself in the same situation as at Belgrade . when he had been accompanied by Vice-Prime^ Minister Gizenga and the Heads of Government^ of the uncommitted States had heard from the Congolese JSfelegation two speeches which had not been exactly in accord. with I do not very clearly grasp the analogy Mkfask the situation which might develop at Addis Ababa not knowing whom the Prime Minister had in mind at that moment for membership of the Congolese ^Delegation. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that you could stop at Leopoldville on the way back from Addis Ababa. To this I replied that, although it would /be very difficult for you to change your time-table and route, I could, if that was really his wish, convey ia it 302: to you. On the next day, 30 April, in accordance with the instructions received, I delivered to the Prime Minister the reply regarding the question of the instruction and reorganization of the Armee Rationale Congolaise. The Prime Minister's reaction was, as already indicated in the relevant telegraphic dispatch, that the Secretary-General must have adopted a negative attitude under pressure from certain countries, but that he, the Prime Minister, would not yield in face of thedr unfriendly and uncomprehending attitude. To the request for agreement to publication of the correppondebe, he replied that domestic public opinion would suffer a severe shock, the consequences of which might be disastrous. He would have to reflect and consult the members of his political cabinet, and must

avoid a rupture between the Congo and the United Nations on this point, I gave the Prime Minister to understand that his forthcoming visit to Lagos provided a good opportunity for discussing^the question of the ANC's ^ not reorganization with a Government whose influence was/to be underestimated. With this the Prime Minister agreed, saying that he had always contemplated continued assistance from Nigeria. a Minister Bomboko with whom I had/conversation after leaving the Prime i Ministersoffices, agreed, despite the challenge he had issued in New York ( ( "fwe might even reconsider the question of our participation in the ') Addis Ababa gonferencef/that the Prime Minister should go to Addis Ababa. He would like to prepare, in advance, a memorandum for the Heads of StateX' stating the Congolese point of view, and even to send emissaries to the i Heads of State^. From that standpoint the Prime Minister$forthcoming visit to Lagos will be of considerable importance. In fact, Minister Bomboko was one of those who, on Sunday 5 May, boarded the aircraft for Lagos together with the Prime Minister. Meanwhile on Thursday 2 May, according to rumors subsequently confirmed, the Prime Minister summoned the representatives of the Governments of the six countries chosen by the Congolese Government and delivered to them letters, ps couched in identical terms, in which, ifter stating the reasons for the demarche and referring to the sovereignty of the Congo, the Itoc. Qfr v «'uvixw*. wJC «-y~ Congolese Government asked/each of them whether it would be prepared to furnish military aid. -6- /

I had an appointment with the Prime Mnister for the same morning, in connection with current business. He told me nothing of his direct demarchej_. On the next day, on the occasion of President Kasa-Vubu's return from Brazzaville, I •was able to obtain confirmation of those demarches. The Italian Ambassador, whom I had ICHSMK in Somalia on the occasion of a visiting mission, spontaneously spoke to me of the demarches, pointing out that there could be no reply from the Italian Government a before its official constitution as ifes result of the recent general elections. I approached the United States Ambassador, who confirmed to me that he too had received the Prime Minister's letter asking for assistance. Eis Government, he told me, would be happier if the United Nations were called upon to play a role in the matter, and if the aid asked for had been more specific - in the shape of finance and transport, for example. However, despite the fact that it had been otherwise, his Government would probably not demur, and affirmative replies might be expected from at least three governments - those of the United States, Belgium and Israel. Ambassador Gullion found some bitter irony in what he described as the "triumphal" return of Belgium to the Congo despite the tremendous mistaken made - as a result of a combination of circumstances which, so far./at least, seemed to militate against participation by the United Nations. The Israel Charge" d'Affaires, for his part, confirmed to me the demarche. The Congolese Government had begun demarches with the Israel Government as sny S*v*w long as 6 or 7 months previously. The latter Government had not wished to rush matters, holding the view that it would be better to have the United Nations "umbrella". The discussions in the Advisory Committee had given - 7 - abundant proof that Israel would never be approved by certain countries, because of their hostility. He thought that his Government would give an affirmative reply. I have had no chance of speaking to the representative of 6anada. A As for the Norwegian representative, since Norway is not represented at Leopoldville it vrould be the Danish representative who would be in charge of Norway

if the reorganization and instruction of the ANC were to take place without ONUC participation, all the efforts we have made and all the sacrifices we have accepted would have been in rain. My general impression is that no one is entirely happy about the situation as it is now developing. I feel that the Prime Minister, while disappointed at not having obtained United Wations^agreement, does not wish to break with the Organization. Mr. Adoula has in fact told me, /*•*> literally, that it is his wish that the United Nations should remain in the Congo for a long time, but he seems deeply to resent the attitude of certain African countries. He has stressed the state of domestic public opinion. I think that this must mean the opinion of certain political circles which I will not venture, for the moment, to analyze. I think that he is having to defend the United Nations, ijjRjin his Cabinet. At the same time he hopes fcr the support of African countries less intransigent than those of the Casablanca group, and seems to count a great deal on

Nigeria, which he is at present visiting. I have ventured to encoursge him to explore the situation ffe-ety at Lagos, referring in that connection to what I understood to be the wish expressed at the two informal meetings of the Advisory Committee which I attended, when the Nigerian representative several times stated his Government's desire to help in finding a satisfactory solution. Finally, I believe that the Prime Minister now wishes to go to Addis Ababa, where he will have the chance of discussing the reorganization of the ANC vdth you and the leaders of the other African countries, possibly in a more receptive atmosphere. — 9 -

The daily reports received from the Provinces regarding acts of c disorder and insubordination clearly show the need to undertake, in the very near future, the training not only of the officers but also of the non-commissioned-officers and the troops. The police mutiny at Leopoldville on Saturday 4 May mi^ht have taken a very ugly turn if the now more disciplined units of the ANC stationed in the ^Capital had not speedily and intelligently obeyed their superiors, Generals Mobutu and Lundula. I sincerely hope that a formula can be found enabling the United KA-V* tt^ i^vjvp^-k K"wa»-»jv Nations to be-pj^doffliaaia^ in this operation. Much will depend on the flexibility of the Congolese Government's attitude towards the admission of African countries vdthin the framework of a military mission. I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Max H. Dorsinville Head of the United Nations Mission in the Congo ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AU CONGO IN THE CONGO

BOTTE POSTALE 7248 LEOPOLDVILLE REPUBUQUE DU CONGO CABLE: ONUC. IBQPOtDVlLLE

LSopoloVille, le 8 mai 1963

Monsieur le Secretaire general,

Comrne vous 1'avez appxis par mes cables y relatifs, je ne suis arriv£ a LJopoldville en compagnie de M. F.T. Liu, que le 25 avril, par suite d'un arrSt force" a Lagos, Nigeria, oCi nous avons passe1 la nuit.

Je ne fus pas peu surpris d'apprendre de M. Gardiner qu'il partait le lendemain meme, le 26, pour une visite de quelques jours dans quelques pays africains, et que j'assumerais mes pleines responsebilitgs de Charge" de Mission imme'diatement. Les disposi- tions deja prises par M. Gardiner me laissaient peu d'espoir de le voir diffSrer son voyage et peu de temps pour me familiariser aussi complitement que preVu originslement a New York. Je dus done sans d€lai prendre la direction de la Mission, le 26 avril gcoule", au lieu du ler mai en cours. M. Gardiner, dont 1'sccaeil avait StS des plus cordiaux, me prSsenta officiellement mes collaborateurs imm^diats, le General Kebbede, Commandant de la Force de I'ONUC, M. Ahmed, Chef des Operations Civiles et M. Twigt, Chef des Services administratifs, en ses bureaux, apres avoir recu le salut d'une garde d'honneur. II reviendra S Liopoldville le 9 et sera 1'hSte d'honneur du gouvernement congolais a une reception dans la soiree du meme jour. J'ai pr^vu de man c&te* une reception taujours en son honneur dans la soiree du 10 et il partira pour New York le 11 cou- rant.

Les visites au Premier Ministre et au President de la Rgpublique, preVues pour le 25 avaient dQ etre reportees au 26 et c'est en compagnie de M. Liu que je les effectuais successivement dans la matine'e. Elles furent toutes deux plac^es sous le signe de la cordialitg. M. Adaula et le President r€iter§rent leur d^sir de s'appuyer sur les Nations Unies. Le President dSclara mime que si

U Thant, Secretaire g€n£ral . Nations Unies NEW YORK - 2 -

certains de leurs voeux ne sont pas realises cela sera dO plutfit aux contingences, & 1*incomprehension de certains, plutdt qu'au mauvais vouloir du Secretaire general. Je ne manquai pas de leur donner 1*assurance que le Secretaire general, qui avait un sens aigu des necessity's de 1'heure, ne manquerait pas de poursuivre ses efforts pour leur venir en aids dans toute la mesure du possible. Tous deux mentionnerent le Ministre Bomboko, ce qui etait une suffisante indication de l'int£r§t qu'il y aurait a maintenir le contact avec celui-ci, qui reste influent dans les affaires gtrangeres en dipit du changement officiel de titre.

OQ & un mauvais fonctionnement de son appareil teliphonique, ce n'est que le 29 avril qu'au cours du premier entretien de travail que j'ai eu avec le Premier Ministre que celui-ci put arranger notre rendez-vous avec le Ministre Bomboko pour le lendemain matin.

Le Premier Ministre ayant fait allusion aux nombreuses dep§ches de presse qui traitaient de la question de la reorganisation de 1'ANC alors qu'il restait dans le noir, dans 1'attente de votre reponse,. jje m'anployai % 1m expliquer la nature des difficultSs que vous aviez rencontr€es et qui ne nous permettaient pas en 1'occurrence de prendre une decision unilaterale, vous exposant a @tre pris a partie par un nombre nan nggligeable des 6tats membres. Cependant, ayant moi-me'roe etS invite1 a assiier a deux seances officieuses du groups africain du CoraitS Consultatif pour le Congo, comrae avait dQ le lui apprendre le Ministre Bomboko, je lui rSiterais 1'assurance de votre desir derenhsrd-er une solution acceptable dans la cadre des Nations Unies.

Le Premier Ministre me dit que le M£nistre Bomboko venait de 1'informer qu'£ la conference des Chefs d'Etat a Addis-Ababa, il se pourrait que la question de le reorganisation de 1'ANC soit soulevSe par le Ghana. Ce fut 1'opportunite pour moi de 1'engager S s'y rendre et meme de prendre 1'initiative de la discussion afin de presenter le cas sous son meilleur jour* Le Premier Ministre dSclara qu'il allait y serieusement re'fle'chir, mais qu'il n'aurait pas voulu se retrouver dans la situation confronted S Belgrade quand, eccompagng du Vice-Premier Ministre Gizenga, les chefs de gouvernement des €tats non-alignes entendirent deux discours de la delegation cangolaise qui n'gtaient pas prScisement en harmonie. - 3 -

Je ne vois pas tres bien 1'analogic de la situation possible 1 Addis-Abeba, ne sachant pas a qui pensait & ce moment la le Premier Ministre pour la composition eVentuelle de la delegation congolaise.

Le Premier Ministre exprime 1'espoir qu'il serait possible que vous vous grrStiez a Leopoldville sur le chemin du retour d'Addis-Abeba* Je ne rnanquai pas de rSpondre qu'alors qu'il vous serait sans doute difficile de modifier votre calendrier et votre itineraire, je pouvais, si c'etait bien la son voeu, faire neanmoins connaitre le souhait qu'il avait exprime.

Le lendemain 30 avril, conformSment aux instructions regues, je remettais au Premier Minisire la rSponse relative a la question de 1'instruction et de la reorganisation de 1'ARmie Nationale Congolaise. La reaction du Premier Ministre fut, comma deja indique dans la d€p§che telggraphique y relative, que le Secretaire general aurait adopts une attitude negative sous la pression de certains pays, mais que lui ne cederait pas devant leur attitude inamicale et peu comprehensive.

A la demande d1accord pour la publication de la correspondence il declara que 1'opinion publique interne recevrait un rude choc dont les consequences pourraient Stre desastreuses. II lui fallait reflechir,cmsulter les membres de son cabinet politique et il riservait sa reponse pour trois heures de 1'apres-midi. Finalement, a 1'heure convenue le Premier Ministre m'a dit qu'il auyait eu a faire un gros effort auprfes de ses collegues pour les amener a considerer froidement la situation. Leurs observations avaient ete rien moins que sympathiques. II etait plus que jamais convaincu que la pubiica- tion de la correspondance devrait 8tre retard^e jusqu'au moment od il jugerait I1opinion publique suffisamment prepar€e, et il me demanda d'attendre son retour de Lagos avant de reprendre ce sujet.

Je renouvelai 1'avis que le dSlai mis I publier la correspondance pourrait e"tre propice a une propaganda insidieuse, S des specu- lations susceptibles da nuire a la cause dans 1'opinion publique Inter- nationale par dSfaut du texte pricis. Le Premier Ministre declara que ce serait regrettable, mais qu'en 1'occurrence il n'avait pas le choix - il devait en premier lieu prendre garde a 1'opinion publique nationale. - 4 -

Je lui renouvelsi votre dgsir de continuer a recher- cher une solution acceptable et, ayant compris, au cour des deux seances officieuses du Comite Con suit at if otj j'eteis present, que le representant de la Nigeria etait anxieux d'Sviter une rupture entre le Congo et 1'QNU sur ce point, je laissai comprendre au Premier Ministre que son prochain voyage a Lagos offrait une bonne opportunity de discuter de la question de la reorganisation de 1'ANC avec un gouvernement dont 1'influence n'etait pas a dedaigner. Le Premier Ministre en a convenu en disant qu'il e vait toujours pensi a une assistance continue de la Nigeria.

Le Ministre Bomboko avec qui j'eus un entretien en quittant les bureaux du Premier Ministre, convint, malgrS le defi qu'il avait lance ci New York (nous pourrions meme reconsiderer notre participation 1 la Conference d'Addis-Abeba) que le Premier Ministre devrzit s'y rendre. II voudrait pr€parer 3 1'avance un memorandum £ 1'intention desChefsd'Etat exposant le point de vue congolais et mime depicher des emisssires aupres de ceux-ci. Le prochain voyage du Premier Ministre 5 Lagos en ce sens sera d'une importance non negli- geable. En fait, le Ministre Bomboko gtait 1'un de ceux qui ont pris, le Oimanche 5 mai, 1'avion 3 destination de Lagos en compagnie du Premier Ministre.

Entretemps, le jeudi 2 mai, selon des rumeurs confirmees par la suite, le Premier Ministre convoquait les reprfisentants des gouvernements des six pays choisis par le. gouvernement congolais et leur remettait. une lettre, couchSe dans des termes identiques, dans laquelle, apres avoir exposS les raisons qui motivaient la demarche et invoquS la souverainetS du Congo, le gouvernement congolais deraan- dait au gouvernement de chacun d'eux s'il serait dispose S fournir une assistance militaire.

J'avais rendez-vous avec le Premier Ministre ce matin-la pour affaires courantes. II ne m'a rien dit des demarches qu'il effectual, t directement. Le lendemain, a 1*occasion du retour du President Kasa-Vubu de Brazzaville, j'eus 1'occasion d'avoir confirmation de ces demarches* L'Ambassadeur d*Italia que j'ai connu en Somalia a 1'occasion d'une mission de visite tn'en parj.a spontanement, en faisant ressortir qu'il ne pouuait pas avoir une reponse du gouvernement italien avant le constitution officielle, suite aux ricentes elections - 5 -

J'abordai 1'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. II me confixma qu'il avait egelement regu la lettre du Premier Ministre demandant I'assistance. Son gouvernement, me dit-il, serait plus heureux si les Nations Unies Staient eppel€es 1 jouer un rQle en 1'occurrence et aussi si 1'aide re'clamee auvait gte" plus specifique, par example, financement et transports* Mais, en dSpit du fait qu'il en avaitfite " autrement, son gouvernement ne reculerait probablement pas et 1'on pouvait s'attendre a une re'ponse affirmative de la part d'au moins trois d'entre eux : U.S.A., Belgique, Israel. L'Ambassadeur Gullion trouva quelque smere ironie au retour qu'il qualifia de "triorapha" de la Belgique au Congo, en dSpit des fautes enormes commises, et ceci par le jeu d'une conjoncture qui semble, tout au moins jusqu'ici, aller a 1'encontre d'une participation des Nations Unies*

Le Charge" d*Affaires d* Israel me confirma de son c8t€ la demarche. Le gouvernement congolais aurait entrepris des demarches aupres du gouvernement israelien depuis de"jS six ou sept mois. Celui- ci n1avait rien voulu precipiter, stimant preferable d*avoir le "para- pluie" de 1'OfJU. Les discussions qui ont eu lieu au Comite* Consultatif ont prouv€ d'abondance qu*Israel ne sera jamais approuve* par certains pays, vu leur hostilite". II croit aussi que son gouvernement repondra per 1'affirmative.

Je n'ai pas eu 1*opportunity de parler au representant du Canada*

Quant a celui de la Norvege, n'existant pas a Lgopoldville, •'est le repr€sentant du Danemark qui serait chargS des affaires de ce pays* Mais, par ignorance ou non, ce n'est pas £ lui que fut remise la not. 8 du gouvernement congolais, mais au reprgsentant de la Belgique pour etre acheminSe. Le repr^sentant du Danemark opina nSanmoins qu'il espgrait que le gouvernement norvegien n'accepterait pas sans la couver- ture des Nations Unies.

En ce qui concerne le representant de la Belgique, bien qu'il m'ait rendu visite dans I'apres-midi mSme du 2, il ne me fit aucune allusion directs S la demarche,mais au cour de 1'e'ntretien, s'enquit de la possibilite d'un rfile a jouer par les Nations Unies si, par exemple, le chef de cette Mission Militaire €tait rattache* a un titre a determiner a 1'ONUC. Je me bornai S lui rSpondre qu'il savait certainement les raisons pour lesquelles la question de 1'entrainement de 1'ANC n'avait pas pu trouver jusqu'ici une solution favorable aux Nations Unies et que j'osais croire que les gouvernements des pays auxquels avait fait appel le gouvernement congolais reflechi- raient mQrement et surtout ne manqueraient pas d'en informer le Secretaire general pour d'eventuels echanges de vues.

Plusieurs representants du garoupe afro-asiatique m'ont fait part de leur profonde preoccupation de la tourhure que prenait cette question. Us craignent que si la reorganisation et I1instruc- tion de 1'ANC se faisaient sans la participation de 1'ONUC, tous les efforts que nous avons faits et tous les sacrifices que nous evons consentis ne deviennent veins.

Man impression g£nerale est que personne n'est tout-a- fait heureux de la situation tells qu'elle se deVeloppe actuellement. II me semble qua le Premier Ministre tout en etant degu de ne pas avoir obtenu 1'accord des Nations Unies ne desire pas rompre avec elle. En fait, M. Adoula m'a dit textuellement que son desir est de voir les Nations Unies rester longtemps au Congo, mais il parait ressen- tir profonde'ment 1'attitude de certains pays africains. II a insists sur 1'etat de 1'opinion publique interne. Je crois qu'il faut 1'inter- prSter comrne signifiant 1*opinion de certains secteurs politicoes que je ne m'aventurerai pas a analyser pour le moment* II me semblejqu'il defend mSme les Nations Unies au sein de son Cabinet. En m§me temps il espare 1'appui des pays africains mains intransigeants que ceux du groups de Casablanca, et paralt compter beaucoup sur le Nigeria ou il est actuellement en visite. Je me suis permis de 1'encourager a explo- rer franchement la situation a Lagos, me rapportant en cela 3 ce que j'ai cru comprendre du desir manifests au cours des deux seances officieuses du Comit€ Consultatif auxquelles j'ai assists et ou le represen- tent nigerien a plusieurs fois dit le desir de son gouvernement d1aider & trouver une solution heureuse.

Enfin, je crois que le Premier Ministre est maintenant desireux de se rendre 3 Addis-Abeba ou il aura 1'opportunity de discuter de la reorganisation de 1'ANC avec vous et les dirigeants des autres pays africains, dans une ambiance peut-8tre plus receptive.

Les rapports quotidians regue-des Provinces et relatifs aux actes de desordre et d'insubordination montrent 3 1'gvidence la necessite d'entreprendre a bref delai 1'entratnement non seulement des officiers mais aussi des cadres inferieurs et de la troupe. La mutinerie des policiers de Liopoldville le samedi 4 mai aurait pu prendre une tres vilaine tournure si les elements maintenant plus disciplines de cette - 7 -

m§me ANC stationne's a la capitale n'avaient pas obii avec rapidite et intelligence 3 leurs supSrieurs, les gSneraux Mobutu et Lundula.

Je souhaite sincerement qu'une forraule puisse etre trouvfie qui permette aux Nations Unies d'avoir la haute main dans cette operation. Beaucoup dependra de 1*attitude de souplesse que pourra eventuellement adopter le gouvernement congolais pour 1*admission de pays africains dans le cadre d'une mission militaire.

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous prier d'agrSer, Monsieur le Secretaire gin^ral, 1*assurance de ma plus haute consi- dgration.

Max H. Dc^sinville Charge^de la Mission des Nations Unies au Congo I J

Dear Ralph, I would have preferred not to have to bother you with personnel problems and would not do so if I did not feel that they may seriously impair tte good functioning of the Mission. In New York the Secretary-General and you had emphasized the necessity for better coordination between the various services. The situation is much more serious than I had anticipated. There exists between Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Twigt an enmity, which, according to the former is shown by all kinds of personal vexations and actions intended to paralyze the civilian operations. I am not yet in a position, after only three weeks, to know where the truth lies. But I have been forced to remember, concerning the alleged personal vexations, that, according to Mr. Twigt, there are regretoaoxe abuses on Mr. Ahmed's part, notably as regards the PX. Mr. Twigt's explanations have seemed worth consideration: certain irregularities have been notiedd in the course of auditing of the PX where certain payments had been made in Congolese currency. This latter point has been admitted by Mr. Ahmed when I asked what all this was about. I then told him that I was sorry, that I would not cancel Mr. Twigt's instructions, that for my part I had conformed to regulations by obtaining books of dollar-coupons since I did not widi to take advantage of special treatment. As far as I am concerned, the question rests there. Concerning the alleged determination on Mr. Twigt's part to paralyze civilian operations, Mr. Ahmed mentioned a number of instances charging that Mr. Twigt is trying to undermine his authority and to turn civilian operations into a joke. I am more than embarrassed by such a situation. Mr. Twigt seems T-o me to be a gentlanen and I recognize that in the case of the PX, taking into account what one hears repeated frequently here, I can hardly doubt that there exists regrettable abuses, although I am not in a position to trace responsibility for them. I have spoken to Liu. He confirmed that ika± the situation is causing much concern at HQ. This very afternoon Lansky and Birckhead came to inform me of their findings during their stay here. I am still under the shock of what I have been told. The rivalry between the vwo Chiefs of section spreads from the bottom to the top of the ixfcfes ladder. TWO camps are at war. There is still more: on the military side the administration would seem to be inexisting and the waste unbelievable. Lansky and Birckhead will soon be back in New York, they will give you a detailed report. Energetic measures must be taken promptly, in order to prevent a scandal which would affect all of us. Another question, more personal in nature, concerns i-ir. Cuperus. le arrived, he informed me, two or three weeks before me to be the principal assistant of Mr. Gardiner or his possible replacement. Since my arrival h£ finds himself relegated to the role of second fiddle, Liu laving accompanied me. I must tell you very frankly that I have very little enthusiasm to see Mr. Cuper^us become my principal assistant. Already when I was JbE Chairman of the Commission for huanda-Urundi I had been xtaagzxac on my guard. Having come from Bukavu, I believe, to Usumbura he wanted to iscsct push us into some joint action or other. For obvious reasons I was convinced that the operations of huanda Urundi and the Gongs should not become contused. I discussed nothing with him but gave instructions that he be discouraged in his efforts. -3- My meeting with Cuperus in Leopoldville has not changed, anything to what had appeared to me of the man's somewhat volatile character. He is not sufficiently level-headed for such a delicate role as that of principal assistance, of 'adviser'. He probauly gave satisfaction during his ear Iyer tour of duty in the Con go 1 I have serious reservations as to his complete understanding of the delicate relations that exist between the U.N. and the Congolese Govt, the latter being ever more jealous of its sovereign rights. I-ir. Gardiner HSKriEKkkxtesxkHiEbgosK has no doubt given you his impressions of Cuperus of which he spontaneously informed me upon my arrival, impressions that seem very close to and tend to strengthen my own reservations. I know that F.T. cannot stay indefinitely. Conscious of this and anxious *o have completely trustworthy collaborators I ask you to please find someone stfrssfi other than Cuperus, completely fluent in French and in whom I can have fiill confidence. F;T. knows the problems in their full complexity, he has the confidence of the Prime Minister, of the President of the Republic, of Bomboko, of IIeo, he also knows a great number of other personalities. It is a winning card with which one \irould part only in the last resort. I must apologize, Ralph, but I could not keep silent any longer. Do remember me to etc..... eoua

2ASH: 2

After careful consideration aad discussioa at this end, 1 feel that it would be better et pressat stage to sead !4teMels!Qrej Deputy Director of Perso-msl, rather tltsa Vatt^isa te e;S3salae problsaas ^cai have rasied ia consultatioa vith you, aad, to report Ijack to sue. MicbeJUaore most prolj^Ij' will leave next Smssday by direct for Lea. OUTGOIMG OJDE CABLE

IMMEDIATE TO: AMftCHEJsE, DOKSINtfJIIB, l&OKJLDVILLE

FKOH:. SECht'lAHY-GJjaHtAl, >^. DATE: 24 May 1963 UKNUMBERED - ALFA

Your Unnumbered of 24 May. Note regret you have expressed at my decision not to send Vaughan at this time. That decision was taken after thorough consideration and discussion here and in light

of all inforirationj, including Amachree's cable oi iy Hay to Vaugtian only,

Dorsinville's strictly personal letter of 14 May to Bunche and information brou^it back by Birckliead and Lansky, Mieheltaore is a senior officer having EQT full confidence and he will report to me. The decisions to be taken to resolve problems to •which you refer will, of course^ be taken by me, irrespective of who would be sent to Leo» CW/nt

2? my 1963

My dear ,&aachree?

I aza sending through Mr. Michetoore a copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Dorsinville which deals tadth the problems to -which you referred in your unnumbered cable of 19 May addressed to Mr* David Vaughaa. With kind regards,

Yottrs sincerely,

0 2bant

Mr. CkJdfrey K* J« toachree OSaaer-Secretary in charge of Congo Civilian Qperations Leopoldville Congo ggf

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Mr. Lemieux ORGANISATION DES NATIONS DNES UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AU CONGO IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTAIJE 7248 l£OPOLDVttLE REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

27 May 1963 Vfr\^ CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Secretary General,

After five weeks of observing the situation here, it may perhaps be possible for me to give you my personal impression, that I trust is objective, as it appears both from an analysis of the reports received from our representatives, as well as from conversations that I have had with Congolese authorities and personalities in various other circles.

I had an occasion to tell the Prime Minister that I felt there had been a deterioration in the discipline of the ANC in Katanga, where, since 3 May, there has been a series of more or less serious incidents, culminating in the murder of Mr. Oendievel, an employee of the Union Hiniere. I told the Prime Minister that nobody wished to see such a situation prolonged indefinitely, because otherwise the indigenous population itself, besides the foreign population, would finally lose all confidence in the capacity of the Government to maintain public order* This would not be in the government's interests and would threaten to delay the economic rehabilitation so necessary to the Congo.

The Prime Minister agreed with this, but at the same time said that the repeated incidents did not occur without a reason and that the cause for them was the fact that the soldiers were subjected to insidious provocations. It was significant, he said, that the incidents were particularly numerous in Katanga and especially in South Katanga. The Prime Minister added, however, that if the military authorities had been guilty of some negligence, or if there had been a weakening in the close relations between ONUC and the representatives of the Central Government in Elisabethville, we should, on both sides, correct this situation

U Thant, Secretary General, United Nations, NEW YORK - 2 -

promptly, because he wished to insist on the faithful implementation of the agreement between us as regards control of the ANC. He suggested that I discuss this matter with Minister Ileo, who was present in the capital at that time.

I found Minister Ileo echoing the arguments voiced by the Prime Minister with regard to provocations on the part of still hostile elements, and added on his part a criticism of the attitude of the ONUC representative and of the Military Command* According to Minister Ileo, ONUC tended too much to question his decisions and to delay or hamper the "ratissage" operations ordered by him for the purpose of recovering the arms and uniforms of the former gendarmes, the enquiries designed to track down mercenaries, and uncover merchandise and foodstuffs hidden away by the merchants for the purpose of turning the population against the Central Government.

Of his own accord Minister Ileo admitted, hew ever, that at least in one instance he had acted deliberately without the knowledge of the UN, having been encouraged to do so, so he said, by the success of several operations of lesser importance. He was referring to searches conducted in the hotels of the city, in the course of which acts of violence were committed by the soldiers.

The position of Minister Ileo weakened noticeably. He ended by agreeing to the need for returning to the spirit and the letter of the agreement in so far as all operations conducted by the ANC were concerned* He undertook to keep ONUC representatives advised of all measures that he felt obliged to take and that would necessitate the use of the military, since the contingent stationed in Katanga remains, until further order, under the control of ONUC, and to furnish copies of all directives signed by him. Minister Ileo however insists on retaining freedom of action by agents of "S0ret6w, because of the urgency with which he is often forced to act. But he agreed to keep ONUC informed with the least possible delays. He agreed that Colonel Boboso would have to return immediately with him to Elisabethville, in order to face the situation resulting from the latest incidents at Jadotville.

In my report of 8 May I stressed that the Congolese Govern- ment was increasingly jealous of the exercise of its sovereignty. This discussion with Minister Ileo was but another illustration of this fact. He did not hide the fact that he had insisted with the Prime Minister - and that he would continue to so insist until - 3 -

given satisfaction - in obtaining two additional ANC battalions to be deployed in certain regions of Katanga, such as Sandoa, Kapanga, etc., where President Tshombe is said to exert a fairly strong influence, in order to strengthen the authority of the Central Government* As I indicated by cable, I told Minister Ileo that, having only recently taken up my post, I needed a little time to study this important question, and I was insistent in requesting him not to make a hasty decision in this matter* I advised prudence in order to avoid giving a basis to the accusation already voiced by Tshombe to the effect that the ANC behave more as occupation troops than as an instru- ment to maintain public order, and show little interest in seeking the friendship of the population.

Of course the attitude of President Tshombe is annoying to say the least: the suspicious trip to Southern Rhodesia, the use of the flag of the former state, the pe rsonal guard, to say nothing of the violent criticisms directed towards the Central Government, and the accusations of bad faith in the implementation of the "Thant Plan".

The Prime Minister, as well as Minister Ileo, did not go so far as to state explicitly just what was the agreed policy of the Central Government in its daily contacts with President Tshombe designed to force him to mend his ways. It is only too evident that the determined objective is to humiliate him. One cannot view as being very courteous the way in which Tshombe was made to understand the unwelcome nature of the visit that he had announced he would make at the head of a delegation of three persons, including two provincial ministers, for the purpose of discussing with the Central Government problems that had remained unresolved after four months of discussions with the Central Government's representative at Elisabethville. He was advised that the Minister of the Interior could not be present to greet him, since he had to leave for a trip in the interior of the country for a period of 15 days.

The Prime Minister had told me that Tshombe was perfectly free to come to Leopoldville at any time but that he felt that it was very discourteous of him to announce by radio that he expected to discuss certain questions, and to give a list of these questions. "Mr. Tshombe", added the Prime Minister, "is a provincial president in the same way as all the other provincial presidents and no more* - 4 -

These gentlemen should in fact occupy themselves more on the spot with the affairs of their provinces, rather than come and waste time at the capital, where they sometimes spend four or five days before I receive them."

Another example of the determination to cut Tshombe down to size is the proposal to create a third province in Katanga, at a time when a movement was getting under way tending to the abrogation of a law that had separated North Katanga from South Katanga* The creation of this third province would be just another means of proving to Tshombe the futility of the dream of ever reconstituting a State of Katanga, and to drive him to the point where he would retire completely from the political scene. Reports from Katanga state that certain Europeans have not yet lost hope in seeing things turn once again in favour of their man. However, there is also the rumour that the proposal to create the new province has been engineered by Tshombe in order to provide himself with a secure stronghold. This idea appears rather surprising, but one never knows !

In the face of a growth in the number of provinces, one can only have misgivings as to what will be the result of this fragmentation of the Congo* Starting with six, we now have some twenty-two provinces, each with a Government, an Assembly, a local administration, all of which, unfortunately, are still only groups of men busy fighting one another without any regard to a sane understanding of the public interest and the destinies of the country.

Some of them, it is true, are concerned with this situation, but I am for the moment unaware of any concern being expressed for the period extending beyond the near future. It is rather curious to note the alarm that has been caused by the announcement of the possible complete withdrawal of the ONUC military force.

The President of the Senate, Isaac Kalonji, is anxious to know whether ONUC will really leave the Congo before the coming legislative elections* Colonel Boboso quietly suggests to me that I act in such a way as to prevent the blue helmets fronbeing withdrawn from Katanga* A European newspaperman asks me what will happen between the time that our troops leave at the end of the year and the time when the Congolese armed forces will be in a position to maintain public order; since, according to him, the minimum period necessary to train them is three years. This is an extremely pertinent question that leaves me perplexed and without a valid answer* - 5 -

Would not the agreement in principle arrived at between the Prime Ministers of the Congo and Nigeria with respect to the generous assonance of the latter country in the training of the Congolese Police, permit a softening of some of the opponents and lead to an acceptance of the aegis of the UN ? In any event the training of the ANC must not be delayed any more since barely seven months remain according to present expectations, before ONUC troops are withdrawn* I cannot stress the urgency of this question too much*

Generally speaking, there is already a tendency to blame the UN for a return-to "chaos", although it is unjust to accuse the organization of remaining indifferent in the face of the delay in the "modernization" and the "re-organization" of the Congolese National Army. Few are those who can or wish to exercise good judgement in this matter* It is so much easier to condemn outright. It is paradoxical that the same people, who are never slow to criticize, do not hesitate to voice their opinion that the UN troops should remain here at least until the end of the year 1964, if not longer. They appear to consider the presence of these troops as the lesser of two evils.

Apart from the argument based on the financial situation that is at present being debated by the General Assembly, I cannot but stress that sooner or later the moment will come when the troops will have to be withdrawn, since the conditions that required their presence no longer exist, and since the National Government is asserting its authority in an increasing manner by the exercise of its sovereign rights.

In this respect I have felt it my duty to tell our own officials and our own experts that a new phase has opened in our relations with the Central Government; that in spite of existing deficencies, that are in fact the reason for our massive presence in the Congo and that will be done away with only gradually, we are no longer in a position where, the legality of the government being challenged, we were forced to initiate certain actions on our own authority. I told them that they would have to understand that the task had become more delicate and that the nature of the relations had changed: we are now no more than advisers. The frustrations will still be inevitable, but the spirit that should continue to animate us would have to be a missionary spirit. - 6 -

I made these several remarks at the end of a meeting of the Consultative Group held under the chairmanship of under- secretary Amachree, in the course of which representatives of the various agencies that participate in the operation related freely, as is proper, their unpleasant experiences and voiced their fears of the Congolese Government possibly taking full charge of certain programmes.

My contacts with the civilian and Congolese authorities, political personalities, diplomatic representatives and personalities in the commercial and industrial fields have become progressively more extensive.

The only conversation of any interest that I have had so far with a member of a political party of the opposition was with Senator Kiwewa, National Secretary of the MNCL, (Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba).

After having expressed to me his gratitude for the prompt manner in which he had been received, he launched a fullscale attack on the Prime Minister. He claimed that the Prime Minister had no firm political doctrine and made up for a lack of support by a regular party, by the practice of corrupting members of parliament, buying them with money furnished by the Americans. In this way, said he, the Prime Minister succeeded to a certain degree in controlling a quorum or lack of quorum in the parliament depending on circumstances.

In conclusion, it would be rash for me to try to give you any assurances as regards the future one way or another with certainty after only one month here. Nevertheless, I preserve a reasoned optimism.

Bearing in mind the alarm caused on 4 May by the mutiny of the Leopoldville Police that was quickly subdued, many persons had misgivings in the face of the departure during these last few days for Europe and the United States of America of General Mobutu followed by the voyage of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister to Addis Ababa. This deprived the country simul- taneously of its highest civilian and military authorities. Nothing particularly objectionable happened, so much so that one person jokingly remarked that these policemen deserved being fired for having shown such a great lack of flair: "they should have waited another two weeks!;"

Max ft. 0orsinyj.la.i3 cc: Dr. Ralph Bunche Officer-in-p^rge, ONUC 31 May 1963

Dear Mr. Borsimrille, I acknowledge and thank you for your very informative letter of 27 May. I find it to fee vesy helpful in filling out the picture of the jorevailing attitudes and atmosphere in the Congo* I am encouraged by your reasoned optimism.

Sincerely yours,

U Thant

Mr. Max E. Dorsinville Officer-in-Charge OHUC Leopoldville Personal and _ Confidential l8

fo : Mr. Wax. H. Borsinville Gfficer~in-Charge, OSSC lyom: Secretary-General

1. I have read the report which Mr. Mtchelmore has given me, following his discussions with you, about the administrative situation ia Leopoldville, I understand that you consider that the circumstances do not require the immediate change of the persons assigned as Chief of Civilian Operations, and Chief Administrative Officer, and that Mr. MLchelmore shares your opinion. I accept this conclusion TJhich, of course, in no way precludes a subsequent reeonKBendstion by you concerning either or both of tfaa posts if it later ajjpears to you that this would be in the interest of the Organisation. Such a proposal might also arise here, in due course, since Mr. !Pwigt's assignment extends only to October 1963* e»& Mr« Ahmed has already served in keopoldville for 2 1/2 years. 2. I "believe it would help to unify your staff, and contribute to s "team spirit**, if you and your principal colleagues (the Force Commander, Chief Administrative Officer, Chief of Civilian Operations, Political Adviser and Legal Adviser) would meet daily to exchange information and to concert activities. I think it is important that these meetings be attended by the principals themselves, when they are in Ijeopoldville. 3. Concerning the PX end ecsmaissary, I have already esqaressed ray 0upport of a strict enforcement of the rules. I believe it will be - a - in our interest to apply these regulations without exception, and I fully endorse this course. k* la a few &8ys> I hope to clarify the organization at Head- quarters, in relation to Congo activities, and to indicate the wa^ in which I tbiak eonaaunieations feetwseaHeadquarter s and Leopoldville should tie conducted. At that time, I will also give yon aiy views on the lines of communieatioa with officials of the Congolese Government.

cc: Mr. Harasimhan Mr. Amachree Mr. Turner Sir Alexander MacFarquhar Mr. Vaughan ^official translation from French

PRESS COHFEREJSB GIVEN BY MR. HOLDSfl ROBERTO President of the Revolutionary Qovsranmt of

Angola in Exile9 on 4 July 1963

Gentleman of the Press, I am always glad to have a chance to asset you, as I am aware of th© part you play in keeping public opinion informed. Thank you for responding to our invitation. Gentlemen? Once again the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldvllle) has shown that its friendship for fighting Algols is more than a token friendship* After baling welcomed our refugees and given hospitality to our arny of liberation, it has now recognised ths BGAE and allowed our troops to parade in its capital city.

These actes which are without precedent in the history of Africa's struggle will certainly have a considerable impact on the evolution of th® Angolan problem. They will strengthen our people's conviction that it is not alone in its fight for freedom,, and that there ar0 brothers who espouse its cause and stand beh-bwl it. !This will undoubtedly intensify our fighting spirit and increase our determination to carry on the struggle until victory is ^rcn* The march-past of our troopa on ths third anniirersary of the Congo's independence will have enabled people to see the true face of fighting Angola* It will have thus destroyed the ragrth Hatetained by Partial that in Angola everything is for the bast in the best of all possible worlds and that our revolution is of little account aid lacks popular support. The attitude of the Republic of the Congo (Isopoldville) towards the Angolan question also shows that African solidarity has now becoma a reality that fflust be reckoned with. - 2 -

Tangible proof of this is afforded by the Congolese Government's decision to provide a baildizjg at Leopoldville - to be known as the "House of African Hationalists" - for African liberation movements., by the contribution wsA® by African coratries to the Fund for the assistance of nationalists, established by the Addis Ababa Conference, aid by the seating at, Dar-~s-Salaara of the Coordinating Committee responsible for distributing this assistance. We are glad that this phase of African solidarity should have begun just whan our struggle is gaining ground. /ft. For tvio years now,, we have hai to fight la particularly circumstances, but neither repression nor torture have undermined our determination or the faith of oar people. Everywhere - in our villages, in our forests, in our countryside and in our jungles * we are fighting inch by inch to recover our national territory. We have left RO stone unturned to ensure that our fight is waged as efficiently and steadfastly as possible. It is in this spirit that we established the Angolan National Liberation Front. Ever since it was constituted we hatre mads it clear that it was not to be a select club. Tcdtsgr,, ones again^ X wish to reaffirm that the doors of the AKIF are wide open to all who wish to speak the same language as us - which nssana le^itirnate violence as long as the Portuguese authorities persist in their obstinacy. While the struggle continues, the unity of Angolan political moveiasnts continues to be of the utmost concern to us» ¥e would like this unity to corns about as the result of the "unifying spirit",, of which our brothers the late Prans Faaon, spoke - the spirit which is bora among those who have shared the same hopes acd faced the aara© dangers. Any other unity, tagso-ed by circumstances or prompted by self-interest or ambition^ 'will fail to atani the test of time*

Since the future of an entire people is at stakea it will be appreciated that we must devise every possible safeguard to ensure that the *ngolan3 are not one day •* during or after their struggle for independence - undermined by the collapse of an illusory unity. What is important now is to intensify the struggle. On behalf of our brethren who fell in combat ^ on behalf of the widows and children they loft behind,, on behalf of the families who are wandering along the paths of axUe9 we renew oar vow to persist in this struggle without pause and without respite until the legitimate aspirations of our people are fulfilled. '/.Tills carrying on the struggle v?e are ready to explore every possibility of a peaceful solution to the Angolan problem v.-ithln the limits imposed by our right to self Determination - a condition that is essential for the restoration of peace. But manoeuvres designed to maintain Portuguese domination over our country by such devious methods as ndnor reforms or disertsdnatory elections«, involving only a small minoritys will not provide any solution to the Aagolsn

This has always been our position. We want ind©pond©ace$ but not just any independence, T?'e want unitys but not just unity of a kind. We shall pursue our goal free from demagogy* We shall spars no effort for the good of our people, wa will lose no opportunity to ead its sufferings.

But w& cannot9 in any circui^tara3es? forsake the principles which have always guided our struggle» That wouH be to batray our martyrss to disregard the ehsrished aspirations of the tegolans and to disovm our people. For t',«5 years these people have listened to us and followed us. We thank them for the -wholehearted confidence they have placed in us* All ow? actions have been and always wiH be governed by awareness of this hsavy responsibility* Strong in car righteousness and the unanimous support of our fighting people, wo are sure that, sooner or later, the caase of Angola will triumph. Unofficial translation froa French

Official annotmcesient made on 29 Jtme 1963 by the Central Government concerning the recognition of the Angolan revolutionary Government ia exile j

"Having ia sdnd the right of self-determination, Being ansdous to help expedite the process of decolonisation throughout the African continent, Wishing to give effect to the recommendations of the Addis Ababa Conference, Being aware of the responsibility which it lias in the matter, by virtue of its geographical situation, Considering that the courageous Angolan people have shorn, in two years of fightiRg, their determination to attain their independence, Observing the persistence of the Portuguese Government in pursuing a policy that has been condemned by the forces of history, world public opinion and the main international forums, Noting that the recent appeal mad© to that Government to reconsider its attitude has gone unheeded, The Republic of the Congo-Leopoldville has decided to recognise de jure the Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile as of today, and to give it all the necessary aid and assistance to ensure the fulfilment of the patriotic and legitimate aspirations of its people.:t Unofficial traa.ala.tloa from Fyench

PRESS CC-KFEUEMCB GIVEN BY MR. HOLDS*! liDBUKTO President of ths Revolutionary Qovamnsnt of Angola in Exile, on 4 July 1%3

Gentl^ssn of tlia P 1 am always glad to have a chance to meet you,, as I an aware of the part you play in keeping public opinion Informed* Thank you foy responding to ous? tevitatioru Gentlemen; Ones again the Republic of the Congo (Laopoldville) has shewn that its friendship for fighting Angola is rnors than a token friendship* After having welcomed cnis? rsfugees and giwn hospitality to our array of liberation, it has now recognised the HGAF* and allowed our troops to parade in its capital city* fhese acts, t^hich are withci& precedent in th© history of Africa's struggle, will certainly hav© a ccnsid@?able iapacfc on the evolution of the Angol&a problem. They wiH strengthen om* peoplef s ccsiviction that it is not alone in its fight for freedom^ and that there are brothers who Qspouso its cause and stand bshiad it* This will tmdcubtedly intansify our fighting spirit and increase our det@:rainatioa to carry on th© struggle xtntil victory is wm* The narch«"past of otir troops on tha third anniveraary of the Congo *s independence will have enabled people to see the true face of fighting Angola* It will have thus dostroyM ths ragrfehmaintaine d by Portugal that in Angola everything is for the best in ths b

tangible proof of this is afforded by the Congolese Governasnt's decision to provid© a bailding at Leopoldvills - to be kncn&i as the "House of 1 African Nationalists' - for African liberation movement s9 by the contribution made by African comtries to the Fund for tha assistance of nationalists, establishes by the Mdis Ababa Conference^ sr.d by the nesting at 7>ar-"3-3alaam of the Co-ordinating Ccrnndttes responsible for distributing this assistance. V.'s are glad, that this phase of African solidarity shenxLd hava begun just when oar struggle is gaiaiag ground »

For two years n

Any other unitys itBp?.-sd by circiiBiatanass or proroted by self -interest or ambition, Kill fail to stars! the test of tiass* Since th© future of an entire people is at stake, It will ba apprasiatod that wa must devisa everj possible safeguard to ensure that the Angolans are not one day - during or after their struggle for independence - [email protected] by the collapse of an illusory unity « -3 -

What is important; noi? is to intensify the struggle*

On behalf of our brethren who fell IB coobat9 on behalf of the widows and children they left bshind, on behalf of the fardlles who are wandering along the paths of exile, us renew our vow to persist in this struggle without pause and without respite until the legitimate aspirations of our people are fulfilled* Vlhil® carrying on the struggle we are r»ady to explors every possibility of a pgaoeftil solution to the Angolan profoleai ithin the limits issposed by our right to self-deterroiKatlon » a condition that is essential for the restoration of peace* But manoeuvres designed to maintain Portuguese domination over our country by such devious methods as minor reforms or diserisainatory elections, involving only a small Edaorlt^-, will not provide any solution to the Angolan

This has always besn ow position. We want independence9 but not just any independence. We want unity} but not just unity of a kind* 1% shall wursust ow goal free from deinagogr. ¥a shall spare no effort for the good of our people, 1*9 will lose no opportunity to end its sufferings*

But we cannot, in any eirctirastazjee3? forsake the principles whioh hava always guided our struggle. That t«>uM bs to betray our martyrs, to disregard the oherished aspirations of the Asgolasis ^ad to disown our psopl©» For two years these peopla have listened to us and followed us* We thank them for the •wholehearted confidence they have placed in us« All actions have bson SB! alwajB win be governed by awareness of this heavy

Strong in our righteousness and the unanimous support of our fighting , w© are sure that, socaer or later, the ca-use of /mgola tdll Unofficial tmnslation frota French

Official announcement made on 29 June 1963 by the Central Government concerning the recognition of the Angolan revolutionary Government in exile :

"Having in slnd the right of self-determination, Being anxious to help expedite the process of decolonisation throughout the African continent, Wishing to give effect to the recommendations of the Addis Ababa Conference, Being aware of the responsibility which it has in the matter, by virtue of its geographical situation, Considering that the courageous Angolan people have shown, in two years of fighting, their determination to attain their independence., Observing th© persistence of the Portuguese Government in pursuing a policy that has been condesaned by the forces of history, world public opinion and the main international forums, looting that the recent appeal made to that Government to reconsider its attitude has gone unheeded, Th© Republic of the Congo-Leopoldville has decided to recognise de Jure the Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile as of today, and to give it all the necessary aid and assistance to ensure the fulfilment of the patriotic and legitimate aspirations of its people*3 Unofficial translation from French

PRESS CONFKHBMCE GI?SM BY HR. H01DEM ROBERTO President of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, on 4 July 1963

Gentlemen of the Presss

I am always glad to have a chance to inset you# as I as aware of the part you play in keeping public opinion informed. Thank you for responding to our invitation. Gentlcmens Once again the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) has shown that its friendship for fighting Angola is more than a token friendship. After having welcomed our refugees and given hospitality to our array of liberation, it has now recognised the HGAE and allowed our troops to parade in its capital city. These actSj which are without precedent in the history of Africans struggle, will certainly have a considerable impact on the evolution of the Angolan problem. They will strengthen our people's conviction that it is not alone in its fight for freedom, and that there are brothers who espouse its cause and stand behind it. This will undoubtedly intensify our fighting spirit and increase our determination to carry on the struggle until victory is won. The march-past of our troops on the third anniversary of the Congo's independence will have enabled people to see the true face of fighting Angola. It will have thus destroyed the agrth maintained by Portugal that in Angola everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds and that our revolution is of little account aid lacks popular support. The attitude of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldvilla) towards the Angolan question also shows that African solidarity has now become a reality that isuat be reckoned with. - 2 -

Tangible proof of this is afforded by the Congolese Government's decision to provide a building at Leopoldville - to be knowi as the "House of African Nationalists" - for African liberation movements,, by the contribution made by African countries to the Fund for the assistance of nationalists, established by the Addis Ababa Conference, and by the meeting at Dar-fts-Salaam of the Co-ordinating Conmttes rasponsible for distributing this assistance, lie are glad that this phase of African solidarity should have begun just when our struggle is gaining ground. < f i. ff" For two years now, we have had to fight in particularly different circumstances, but neither repression nor torture have undermined our determination or the faith of our people. Everywhere - in our villages,, in our forests,, in our countryside and in our jungles * we are fighting inch by inch 'to recover our national territory. We have left no stone unturned to ensure that our fight is waged as efficiently and steadfastly as possible. It is in this spirit that we established the Angolan national Liberation Front. Ever since it was constituted we have nzade it clear that it was not to be a select club. Today, once again, I wish to reaffirm that the doors of the AMIF are wide open to all vsho wish to speak the same language as us - which nseans legitimate violence as long as the Portuguese authorities persist in their obstinacy. Khile the struggle continues, ths unity of Angolan political movements continues to be of the utmost concern to us. We would like this unity to come about as the result of the "unifying spirit", of which our brother, ths late Franz Fanon, spoke - the spirit which is born among those who have shared the same hopes and faced the sam© dangers. Any other unity, imposed by circumstances or prompted by self-interest or anbitionj will fail to stand the test of time. Since the future of an entire people is at stake,, it will be appreciated that v?e must devise every possible safeguard to ensure that the /ingolans are not one day - during or after their struggle for independence - -undermined by the collapse of an illusory unity. What Is important now is to intensify the struggle. On behalf of our brethren who fell in combat«, on behalf of the widows and children they left behind,, on behalf of the families who are wandering along the paths of exiles we renew our vow to persist in this struggle without pa-use and without respite until the legitimate aspirations of our people are fulfilled* While carrying on the straggle we are ready to explore every possibility of a peaceful solution to the Angolan problem .ithin the limits disposed by our right to salf-deteraination - a condition that is essential for the restoration of peace* But manoeuvres designed to maintain Portuguese domination over our country by such devious methods as minor reforms or discriminatory elections, involving only a small minority, will not provide any solution to the Angolan problem^.

This has always been our position. We want indspendences but not just any independence. W© want unity s but not Just unity of a kind, Wo shall pursue our goal free from demagogy. ¥e shall spare no effort for the good of our people, we will lose no opportunity to end its sufferings.

But we cannots in any circumstances,, forsake the principles which have always guided our struggle. That would be to betray our naartyrs, to disregard the cherished aspirations of th© Angolans and to disowi our people. For two years these people have listened to us and followed us. We thank them for the wholehearted confidence they have placed, in us. All our actions have been and always win be governed by awareness of this heavy responsibility* Strong In our righteousness and the unanimous support of our fighting people, we are sure that? sooner or later, the cause of Angola will triiuph. Unofficial translation from French

Offieial announcement made on 29 June 1963 by the Centred Government concerning the recognition of the Angolan revolutionary Govej?ntaent in exile :

"Having in mind the right of self-determination, Being anxious to help expedite the process of decolonisation throughout the African continent, Wishing to give effect to the recommendations of the Addis Ababa Conference, Being aware of the responsibility which it has in the matter, by virtue of its geographical situation, Considering that the courageous Angolan people have showi, in tvno years of fighting, their determination to attain their independence, Observing the persistence of the Portuguese Government in pursuing a policy that has been condemned by the forces of history, world public opinion and the main international forums, Noting that the recent appeal made to that Government to reconsider its attitude has gone unheeded. The Republic of the Congo-Leopoldville has decided to recognize de jure the Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile as of today, and to give it all the necessary aid and assistance to ensure the fulfilment of the patriotic and legitimate aspirations of its people." CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: U Thant Secretary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

This is the letter I talked with you

about sending. We had a meeting with C.V. on details after your departure and tmis is the result.

DATE: FROM: 16 July 63 15 July 1963

!4y dear Mr. Ambassador, The Chief Administrative Officer in his Administrative Beport Ho 71 had requested clarification of certain administrative aspects of the QKUC operation and Headquarters guidance in view of the probable run-down of the Force by 31 December. Upon instructions of the Secretary-general we have held a series of meetings -with those concerned and I would like to give you and the C.A.O. the thinking of Headquarters which might be useful in planning for the eventuality of the withdrawal of all contingents from the Congo before 31 December. More particularly, if the military operation is to be completed within the very limited funds authorised by the General Assembly for this mission* You have been informed, I believe, of the Secretary-General's Provisional plan that reductions of the Force be accomplished along these lines; (a) The Force would be reduced to 7>k9Q (including the Congolese Contingent) by 1 July 1963. (b) Would be reduced to 6,000 by 1 October 1963. (c) The remainder •would depart as quickly as possible thereafter during October and November. (d) No Force would remain after December (except for a snail group which may be required to assist in liquidation).

Aazbassador Max H. Dorsinville Officer-in-Charge -2-

1« Disposal .Policy This will of course be the most complicated area of all. As a general guide j (a) Contingent otmed equipment and amunition should, wherever possible^ be reiaoved with the contingents on departure. (b) Property drawn from U.S. Government or other ^ sources should be returned to them for credit wherever feasible, particularly for unused ifcmas.

£°) Vehicles; In general? vehicles should be disposed of on an "as istt and "where is" basis in the Congo. (d) Ordnance^ Storse ;. Ordnance stores should be properly warehoused in a restricted ausiber of places - perhaps Leopoldville and Elisabethville - for eventual disposal. (e) Ajjatamitiogi This sliculti also be storod in two central places for eventiaal dispoaai to governments, or by other action, (f) TeleOQaaaaiiications.. Eouipment ; Complete inventories should be submitted to Headquarters soonest for possible usage of this equipment in other areas by U.K. and determination that portion to be disposed of. (g) Food; Surpluses should normally be disposed of "as is11 and "where is" in the Congo* (h) Aircraft and. Jjpgeial. EauijaaeBt : Upon receipt of inventories at this Headquarters, we vd.ll advise and arrange for disposal. It is 320st urgent that action be taken to complete all inventories., and your recouaaendations submitted to Headquarters^ taking into account the need to give priority to the requirements Tor civilian operations. 2. FdCoifflasary Facilities (4) There will probably have to be a continuing obligation to provide some consnisaary and. basic PX items for civilian and adaartistrative personnel remaining as part of the Congo fund operations aiter 31 Decesiber 1963 • -3- This operation will have to be completely manned, b,/ civilian personnel on a greatly reduced scale. Luxury or* special order items will have to be eliminated and facilities restricted to the provision, of only essential household, commissary and PX items. {b) Surpluses on hand after 31 December will have to be con- solidated and -warehoused on a temporary basis until proper disposal action can be completed. Staff necessary for this function will have to be extended until complete liquidation is effected. (c) Survey Board action should be taken as soon as possible on surpluses and residual stocks in order that disposal by sale or other recommended action can follow quickly. (d) Security of stocks after 31 December will have to be relegated to Field Service security personnel as required. (e) All charges for personnel retained in connection with disposal of PX and eofiaaissary surpluses should be charged to the EX activity. (f) Ho further disbursements should be made from PX surplus funds or seserves. Such monies should, be iHBaediately credited to the United Hatioris to off-set whatever losses and liquidation costs occur as a result of this close down action. The Unit PXs* should aJLso be immediately advised to distribute as quickly as possible their stocks even at cost to avoid building up cash reserves ija local currency. (g) Immediate plans should be made for the establishment of a PX-Coffiffiissary Cooperative beginning 1 January 1964 to be financed completely on a share cost basis by personnel continuing in the Congo beyond 31 December 1963. Accounta- bility for. this operation will rest completely with the staff and mil not involve the United lotions in any way. (h) Ho assurance $an be given that adequate stocks or particularly choice of brands will b© maintained to uieet all demands botv?eeia now and the end of the year. You are already aware that v?e have taicen drastic action to cancel H&ny requisitions and. in the case of PXj have limited quantities to very minimal amounts. -4-

As © uiatter of policy., with xinor axceptions, no further requisitions should be submitted for items supporting military operations sad a "wear-out" "use-up" 'Snake-do" programme is to be adhered to for these last few months. &e are following through as to transportation and delivery of pending orders and where possible id.ll still take appropriate cancellation action. Requirements for civilian operations concerning the purchasing of stoc^; and issuing of bulk suppliea vd.ll be limited to necessities. Steps should be taken to have this handled and controlled by a few civilian staff, 4. Fy

6. Audit.r.and las^ectioa (a) As they relate to military activities, audit and inspection staff vdJ-L require a loager period but should be reduced as imch as possible and it Is expected, eliminated no later thaa 31 March 196/1-.

(b) Activities relating to equipment3 supplies3 etc. ms^ have to be continued so-rasvihat longer •until perhaps 30 j'une 1964« Every effort should b© made to expedite disposal action •to shorten the terminal date. 7- (&) All acconsaodatioa services relating to military should be discoatitiued no later than 31 December 1963? aad earlier if possible. (b) A siniimm/Ksocisaaa range of apartments in Leopoldville (froia 100 to 150 aparteents) should be set aside for civilian operations aaati administrative overhead require- raents vd.th a aaall unit in charge of it. LocalT;T %yajaspprt (a) Military vehicles should be phased out as soon as practical allomng only a minimum number of cars required for use by civilian operations and on a rigidly controlled basis. (b) Pro vision of spare parts as well as repairs and aainte- n&nce of civilian operations vehicles will hav© to depend on services of local garages or some conanon service arrangements you establish. (c) A niaxlsaaa nuiaber of local vehicles and drivers should be determined for the needs of civilian operations, 'we presently estimate and suggest that 300 vehicles and. 75 local drivers be & target figure.

(a) The cost of eoiamunications aaist be reduced to an absolute

(b) t;ith the departure of the military., we should be able to dispense with 34 hour coverage and revert to normal shifts with one station in Leopold villa and possibly not exceed- ing three or four field stations to cover only inirdjiium needs. Where possiblef every effort must be made to utilise existing facilities at key air fields. 10* Security ive sstirnete that approximately 10 to 15 security personnel will be required to sneet jour minisaaia security needs for offices and ware- houses ^here surplus stocks will be stored. Your earliest evaluation of this estimate will be appreciated to be sure that we do not withdraw the security personnel too soon. 11. Restaurants Legaliesia Restaurant should remain and be run as a cooperative project not involving United Mat ions funds. 12. Aircraft All United Nations owned aircraft should be disposed of end aircraft- required for civilian operations should be on & commercial or charter basis. -6-

Field Offices It is requested that you provide precise proposals as to the number of field offices you expect to retain for civilian operations and advise the maximum number of international and local staff planned for each location* 14. Personnel (a) As stated by the Secretary-General in his recent cable on the subject, ©very opiwrtunity must be taken to reduce the OKUC staff through the non-renewal of mission contracts. To as large an extent as is practicable, this advice supersedes our earlier decision that except in unusual circumstances contracts should not be extended, beyond 31 December 1963. (b) Unfortunately, the non-renewal of contracts will probably not produce the scope of reduction wiiich is necessary and. we must also, taere£ores envisage a certain number of terminations of contracts* These, however, must be geared to the reasons stated in Staff Rule 9*l(b), which provides that the Secretary-General may terminate the appointment of a ataff member udth a fiasd- term appointment on the following grounds: (1) if the necessities of the service require abolition of the post or reduction of the staff j (2) if the services of the individual prove unsatis- factory j (3) if the individual is incapacitated for health reasons; (4) if the staff laember's conduct does not jaeet the highest standards of integrity required by the Charter! (5) it faets anterior to the appointment of the staff member and relevant to his suitability come to lights (6) if such action would be in the interest of gpod administration and is not contested by the staff member (aa "agreed" separation), (•'0 The reason specified in (l) above - redundancy - will presumably be applied most frequently to the OWttC situation. There ai^ht also be a certain number of "agreed" separations (item (6})e -7-

(d) Before deciding to terminate a staff member on grounds of redundancy, we mast be able to certify that he is not to be replaced, either by a new recruit or by the renewal of a eon- tract - tailless in the latter circumstance we can demonstrate, aa substantiated by reports on the relative performances of the staff members concerned, that the terminated staff member is clearly less useful than the person who is to be kept on. If, for instance, the Finance Office were to be reduced by 30$, we •would prefer that staff whose contracts were expiring should go first, but would be prepared to consider a planned programme for the extension of certain contracts and the termination of others, provided we had sound evidence, to be presented in the Administrative Tribunal if necessary, to justify our actions,, (e) Even though replacement posts are involved, ws wold expect that ishiring the run-down period ONUC might rely heavily upon staff detailed from the United fetiona and from the Specialised Agencies. These people are on the whole more experienced and their assignments are more flexible froia an administrative standpoint* As you know, Mr. Carey Seward, who is Chief of isy Field Operations Service, has been designated to replace Mr, fwigt as Chief Administrative Officer and is expected to arrive in Leopoldville by about 1 August,, He has participated fully in the discussions here, is fasailiar isith all phases of our administrative requirements, and has our complete confidence« While the above broadly outlines our objectives and the evaluation here at Headquarters, we must, of course, take fully into account the on-the-spot appraisal of you and the Chief Administrative Officers I will appreciate receiving at your earliest convenience an overall detailed evaluation of the practical application of the pragraana©, and of any suggestions which might expedite its implementation* I have sent a copy of this letter also to Mr. Twigt, Sincerely,

David B. ?aughaa Under-Seeretary Director of General Services

cc: Mr. Amachree Dr. Bunehe Sir Alexander MacFarquhar Mr. Harasimhan Mr. Turner Mr. Seward Mr. Twigt CVH/pbg

26 July 1963

Dear Mr. Dorsinville., I enclose a copy of a letter dated 25 July 1963, addressed to Ma^or-General C. R. Kaldager by the Secretary- General, for your information. With kind regards, Yours sincerely,

C. V. larasimhan Chef de Cabinet

Mr. Max H. Dorsinville Officer-in-Charge ONUC Leopoldville, Congo

cc: Mr. Lemieux GIS/ive

Mr. Max H. Dorsinville ^' 2? ^^ 1963 Officer-in-Charge, CMC

E.J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs Your memorandum of 14 August 1963, concerning Kabare

1. I assume the Gardiner-Adoula agreement is the one reported in G-164 of 1? January 1963, which involved a somewhat different situation,

2. Since Adoula says that he is handling the zaatters I •would be inclined to suggest that we keep out of it for the time being. 3. I note, moreover, that we have no troops in the area, except for 30 Nigerian Police in Bukavu. I would therefore not think it advisable to encourage the Congolese authorities to assiaae that we would assist them in effecting the arrest in circumstances inhere this may result in unrest among the senator's followers. 4. In the areas where the Congolese have taken over reaponsibility for law and order^ they should get used to oxereising it unassisted as far as possible. OIGANISATION DK NATIONS UNEES UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AD CONGO WW IN THE CONGO

BOHE POCTALE IBOPOLPVIUE WJ OCJNGK) OHUC tSCJKUDVtUJB

CONPIIENTIAL

14 August 1963

To: U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York

Prom: Max H. Dorsinville, Officer-in-Charge, ONUC, Leopoldville

Subject: Senator Alexandra KABARE

According to information received from our representative in Bukavu, the Mwami Alexandra Kabare, national senator and traditional head of the Kabare chieftaincy in North TCivuf haa been causing considerable trouble in the area, systematically obstructing the course of justice with .the help of a band of henchmen. His parliamentary immunity has protected him from arrest, and the State Attorney General has requested our confirmation that an agreement reached in January between Mr. Gardiner and Mr. A^oula authorising ONUC intervention in such cases still exists. I have spoken to Mr. Adoula on the subject. His own view is that Kabare la a doubtful element, and he is going to deal with the matter - one possibility being that Kabare be recalled to Leopoldville and kept under house arrest here. Since our conversation, Kabare'a activities have continued, and the provincial president, in consultation with the Attorney General, is now contemplating putting him under house arrest in Kivu. COSPIBTOIAI 6 January 1964

So s U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations From s Max H. Borsinville, Special RepresentatI Subject s Visit to Rwanda and,.Burundi (30 December- 1963 - 5 January

!• I should like to report on my visit to Rwanda and Burundia As instructed, 1 proceeded there in order to assess the situation produced "by a deterioration of relations between these two countries, as reflected in exchanges of messages "between the Secretary-General, the President of the Republic of

Hwanda and the Prime Minister of Burundi (Annexes I9 IX, III and IV). 2« I was aceompajiied on this mission "by Mr. H. Gorge and a secretary, Miss D. Massardier, Mr. J. Lucas, TAB Eesident Representative in Rwanda and Burundi, attended all meetings., Mr. Zuger, ."Deputy President

• o*/ • » • » « »/* 6 «

Representative n was present at the meetings lield in Rwanda* 33atQ_gL.and.. jjlaces of me at iags 30 Seeeraber 1963 » Kigali i President of Rwanda and Government 31 December 1963 » Kigali ; President of Rwanda and Minister of Foreign Affairs

2 January 1964j Bujumbura g Prime Minister of Burundi 3 January 1964» Bajuiabura s Mwami, P'wamfeutsa IT 3 January 1964? Bugum'bura s Minister of Interior and Minister of Social Affairs 4 January 1964 » Bujumbura s Secretary of State to G-eadanaerie (Visit of 'border area near Eayanaa) In add it ion j a muaber of valuable discussions were held both in Kigali and Bujymburas inter alia, with representatives of the diplomatic corps and of the clergy j as well as with M experts,

II fO EWAIM

Hwandsse Government reiterated the stand it had > taken in its message to the Secretary-General (Annex I). 2t was coOTine-ed that the Burundi authorities could liav© easily prevented the incursion of armed refugees

• • »/• • o • « */* ** *• 3 *• into Rwanda on 20/21 Bseeaiber 1963 if they had been willing to do so | they had tolerated and even supported the activities of some agitators in Burundi who incited refugees to return in foree to Rwanda* She Rwandese Government insisted that Burundi take ii.affi3di.ite and effective measures to curtail and control the activities of these a^itatoras and keep a close eye on the refugee camps on its tsrritoryo 4. From ray discussions in Hwan-5a, it became evident that any incursion of refugees .into its territory can have tragic consequences for large nunibers of innocent

largest part of the population of Bvmnda (85 $) "belongs to the Baimtu ethnic group of the Bantu race, She Batutsi group of the tlamitic race constitute the other 14 % (1 f° are Batwa)* for centuries, the Batutsi group waa the ruling class which held the Bahuttt in servitude. The political and social evolution which started, around 19^7 and culminated in the indepead- enoe of this tru.st territory changed the situation drastic- ally. In the elections of I960 and 1961 the Bahutu parties obtained an overwhelming majority. About 130,000 Batutsi left the country as a result and resettled in neighbouring countries (Burundi, Congo, Uganda, Sangaiiyilsa). J?or a detailed account of* this political upheaval, reference is mads to the various reports of the UK Commissions for Rwanda and Burundi (1957 - 1962). About 300,000 Batutsi stayed in Rwanda

* « O/ A 0 • »/» * «,

accepted the mile of tlie Bafmtiu ilie centuries of havs not "besn forgotten "b,y tlie Bahutu and attempt t)j t&e Bsttutsi - whether from iiisMe or outside - to r©etor8 their pessrer a&d rsgiaie, is met 'by a most viol-ant reaction OK the part of the Babutu* Slisrefores even a small-* so ale incursion of Batutsi into Rwanda mc.j lead to v/ratfeful acts: of \fsn-geancje directsd against Hiany zlnnocent Batutai liTlag in Ewaiida* I'his is ?/bst happened cftar tie incursion of 20/fl "D@cem»@r 1963* Shera ie little doubt that Battttsi ware !cill0^ all over the country by infuri Baliutu, fh© mim'ber of victims is net knows but rolialsle sources giTe a figure of at least one thousand, Thousands of Batatsi appear to have fled to Burundi or taikea refuge in missions, It would aeoja that such "brutal repression was not ordered "by tli© GcnrerAinent in Kigalis tlie loeal "prlfeta" an-a%ourg?aes-Srei3'1 wera ratlier ^ivan vjide discretion to .ieal witli wnat was prolsably oonnidora3 to "be a P.arg©-* scale and well-organised attempt by tiie "Satutoi - witliia and without « to chase the Uaiautu from power* Staa 2-Ci^ali GoTeraa*- meat ©o^li not eope with the aitaatioa alone* asaursuioes were giv©n "bj the Prooidsnt at tlia of 31 Dseem'ber that tlio local authorities Irad fee®n to do tliair usiacst to avoid abuses ;?.ad calm the population-*. It is tliU3 of utinoat isipor-tanc^ t'.at ^verj effort T3© raiafie to pi"CT©ai> the rapetitioa of Batutsi incursions into "Rwanda., "both for the preservation of peaceful relations between nei.ghbouring countries and for «**/ *»• • • »/ « humanitarian reasons* 5* fhe Swandesos authorities thems elves do not seem really to fear that Batutsi incursions could lead to tlie downfall of their regime* Observers on the spot however perceive some danger. 2hey point out that the attack of 20/21 December 1963 nearly succeeded^ a Ewandese military camp was overrun^ the army intervened only in extremis, stopping the refugees, some of wliem had firearms and were motorised, only 23 km« from the capital9 Kigalif although it cannot be said that the attack came as a complete surprise to the Rwanda Govenmsnt* It should also foe noted that a"bout IjQQO Batutsi living in Rwanda joined - whether willingly or not * the advancing "Burundi" 'Batutsi, who numbered 200-300, It is also noteworthy that other Batutsi were planning to penetrate into Hwanda at the same tiraej abortive attempts were reported during the second half of December 1963 from Bukava, Goma and OB the Uganda "border* Xf the agitators and activists among the refugees are not watched and cheeked, and if similar Taut better planned incursions are allowed to take places the

Bwandase Government might9 in the opinion of aome observers^ "be in trouble, especially since these "utensurs8* seem to receive financial support from undetermined sources for the purchase of firearms, trucks » jeeps and hiring of ^mercenaries".

* a •/ • a * • • «/** * — 6 «*•

6C Shere seems to "be a consensus in* Bwanda - wh±ohy±3, at 1 a&all explain later? also shared by the Burundi Sovernment - that these agitators are the main cause of the current difficulties* Sh© clergy in Hwanda» for example, is persuaded that the vast majority of Batutst living in Rwanda are content with their fate and want to live peacefully under the iDresent regime, fkejj and above all the Batutsi who resettled in the neighbouring countries} are however an easy prey fo2* agitators who promise them a return to the woleL time"* fh& Bwaadese GoTenrnent gave us a list of such agitators {Aanes ¥), Among them is of course the former Mwami of Bwan * — T •*

E03? had, any comments "been received on a draft extradition agreement submit t@

Ill ?2SXf f © BGBBBHI

8« ®he position of the G-overnn*ent of Burundi is set forth in a report dated 3 January (Annex ?!£)« Shis report was received by me on the ere of 215- departure from Bujumbura, i.e* after my talks with the Mwasai and the SoTersameat; fherein, th© Pa?ime Minister puts the "blam© for the regrettable eirents oil the agitators (page 11s Mll est uii fait Indubitable que cterst a cause d'eux ^poli- tic! ens refugi^Sj exoitateure7 gue ces ^Tsnesaents fa« cheux se sont produits**} and assures us that the Govern- ment will do its utmost to expel the agitators* Sht Prim© Minister gives his word of honour that the leaders of Burundi had had nothing to do with the incident of 20/21 December 1963. Shis report defining Burundi*s

• « »/ A » t

1} See in this connection Heport of US' Coiainisaioa for E^anda/Burundi of 30 August 1961 (A/4856), » • »/ * «

In a&gr event9 it was noted that upon his return from 'fiurope> BttkefeSj (a close follower of Eigsri ¥) who had "been arrested in loYemberj was released after paying a nominal fine* According to weH-iaforsecl observers, the Baiwitu Ministers, including the Prime Minister, are reluctant to differ with the Mwami on refugee policjj since tJh.3 Mwami would suspect them of having republican motives (the Tutsi refugees heing in general foes of the republican regirae of Bwaiida}* ll» HQ lew York will "foe receivings I was informedj a detailed report from US expert P» Plaail on the Conference of ICiserqri srhich ended in total failure on Decem'ber 19*

* » B / « O O * *«/» »• •» 10 •*•

Ho agreement could foe reached "by Rwanda and Burundi o& the distribution of import quotas. As a result the economic and monetary union "between Rwanda and Burundi has "b©es denounced (Annexes ?II1S IX, 2£)« According to the Ul experts attending the Conference, tlie Burundi delegation was manifestly divided, th© Batutsi jaeiaijer© Tseimg the hardliners9 refusing ia particular a OT arbitration originally proposed "bj their Government* One of these hardliners remarked imprudently aiid omi&GUslj to a UI experts B!2li@ failure of the Gonference does act uiatterj things are about to change in Hwandatt. Was h<3 thinlsing of the impending Batutsi attaek on Hwanda (24 hours later) t Ihe US expert thinks so* 12* itn iriew of the serious economic difficulties with Hwanda# there raajr "foe some truth in the contention "bj a, number of trustworthy personalities ia » that Burundi had no interest in making a spselal effort to keep Bwaada out of refugee trouble in

Bscembea?* She situation wa* s different in loirerabers Burundi actsd then in order not to prejudice unnecessarily the outcom* of the Kisen^l Oonferenee*

immediate and eonerote interest taken "by the Secretary-General in the present difficulties between « 4 «/ *. • • ™* 3.1 •»

Hwanda and Burundi has clearly impressed "both countries. As indicated above, Burundirs reaction may allow some optimism* Daring joy discussions with bh

14. As will "be noted on page 11 of the report of 3 January 1964* Burundi complains about the high, number of refugees on its territory* According to the Represent- ative of the High Goramissioner for Refugees in Bujumbura9 there are about 23j000 and a new influx since the December ©vents has swollen their number still mor@*

~~• * 9/0 a* *•<>/*«• — 12 —~~

Originally 9 15s 000 refugees had feeen "allocated* to Burundi, She growth of the refugee population in the centres is creating problems beyond the administrative and financial capacity of the Burundi Govermaento It is doubtful that an appreciable number could "be repatriated voluntarily in the foraseable future. She President of Rwanda informed me that xjrevious appeals had not been successful and the lovetiifoer and December occurrences hair© created a very unfavourable atmosphere for any such scheme. It would therefore sseia that Burundi's burden could only "be alleviated through the resettlement of a given number of refugees elsewhere. Tanganyika has been mentioned most frequently in this context. Some have even advocated a radical solution and suggested that all Batutsi refugees at present in Burundi "be resettled in distant countries,

15* In conclusion, 1 would like to surest that consideration be given to the following actions s 1) Letter of Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Burundi in which he would thank him for the cooperation extended to his special representative and express appreci- ation for the measures the Government ha a promised to take* She Secretary-General would also inform the Prime Minister

* * «/ • a * o«>/•*• —• 13- "• that the question of repatriating or resettling elsewhere refugees now on Burundi territory would "be referred to the High Commissioner for Refugees for thorough, study and further discussion with the Burundi authorities, 2} Letter of Secretary-General to President of Hwanda in which he would - ft©sides expressing appreci- ation for the cooperation received "by his special representative * inform him of Burundi's positive attitude and express the earnest hope that on their part th-3 Kwandes© authorities would do their utmost to calm end £:>aaify the ethnic groups on their territory, who had "been aroused "by the. Kovember/Beceinber 1963 events o 3) She Governments of Gongo (Leopoldville), Uganda and Tanganyika should, through appropriate channels, be informed of Burundi's attitude towards agitators and of the desirability of keeping everywhere an eye on their activities, this in the interest of the refugees themselves, 4) Transmit copy of the report of 3 January 1964 from the Burundi Prime Minister to the High Coiar;dssioaer for Refugees for study and comment. Particular attention should "be paid to the efficient administration ^nd to the proper policing of the large refugee eentreso 5) fhe !MB Representative in Kvvanda/Burundi and the Representative of the High. Commissioner for Refugees,

Bujumbura9 should continue to follow closely th© • ••/ «* • • •»/••« developments and keep Hew York HQ and the High Commissioner for Refugees informed^ in particular in regard to the implementation of the measures Btiruadi promised to tak@«

16* 1 should aot like to end this report without recording the valuable help I received from the !MB Representative in Ewaada and Burundi* le "briefed m@ in an excellent manner and greatly facilitated my task* AM1K

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,@}g doat Sea Itats ...... V1 - ••.", • - 2|- totfrnasi d'a poisson s4oad9 don cle la ' ' • - 10*000 dollara * pQ.000 frs E9Bfl .pour l'*atr*tien de ^ '13 ^."^ *1' *^ fft f^ pts *? fr TT ?3f T~T f'*'1 ^? 1 4il tfrii, J^J^gf J& Vfli« VJ-fc liiyfe, V^fiW-U \*wl!*Wft3 S tUV-fil V*l« -*• V?)> AS «JiJ-i® W'E^-M-^ - 4^000 dollars « 360*000 fra ESB* palemtat pers^anel "Ij**^2**STSfTjt'Tl5S|13• JIV s S>i f"* jS5^^ f^ f-i'y1 "i *V**SS

^P^ La question relative auz r4fuî4a a It^ confine au Riaist^r-e -5ee Affaires Sdoial'dsj ce <£ul a'exclvst cependant paa9 la e^-• j& - ' snce dea autres Siiiistores' pour d-ag questions de leur coiapiteace* Alnî, f le Ki-nistere d» la Saiitjj AgrlcuTt.Aret de l Education Iatioaale9 Intd- riûr, sôoc'ap'snt, par exempl-'e, chiton dans son. dotaaine des cûestionc ."•alsvaat de sss uttributiOiiis, en collaboration avec le Slinist^rs 'ês Affaires SocialGS. Calui-cii^ poor ^"aisoii de sea multiples charges, a ecnfl^ toutes activit^s ralatires aux r^fu^-ids a I8'lastitut du foods MWand fe&mbutBa IT, aânt J;our but essentiel de les jiiiseres huiaaines sous toutes se^ formes, dans lfordr© de

Le Bireotesi* da fOadu Hwamt'utss, IT, a cos,iras rSle ssser- •tiel de t'accuper das ^tiestioas relatives aux r^fugi^s sous toutes *,; f zi'iG , en collaboration dtrolto av«c 1© HiK.ist.ere des Affaires Socials Pour y jarvenir, 11 est aiii^ 'ct'aîes cotte t£ohe, suiTsnt le d^sir du T Maat CosMsiisfsariat le 1*0WI?»1 » aua refigife, par des o-Qimaidiiairos habitant d*uas faôn pexâJient^ avec les r^fugids. Gs -ont eeuz~l^ ^tti diatritmsat d©s rivrea » ' font c--'- tirer# dress eat d©-j raj.ports de touts-a questiDrifj rslativ&T aô: rdf' c;lc§s, en un raot,. appliciuent tonis v-rincipss rcfgle.v. T'ltair-as, oonf ors^'n -.-n t & la volont^ du So we tenement, ajaiit 3a base danti les principes de collaboration ^^roita avec la 10^© et 'dm' B*Svl*

~~Cos GooEassairee ou Chef de Cf3K.tres} oat sur leurs rsotiri.jZ livers s jmgasi.'iiera, Oojasiis, Cluiu,ffeur9 sentiael~~

~~Tous *maSiiilile, iis s>;iati@ane3it 1'ordre, , veil! ant aux •"•elations ^ocialeaj, perstiadaat, oas de-~~

lo ''yi^xsi: ^lii* ulais , er Id cross, dont 2 liors cut 4t€ code's 'a Itl:'i3titu-t diu fond 3 2iiam!JutE;a IV, et ont ^ti rdparti eit'3f€ Isi divers centres ds?j' rlfugiTs, s?uivaat n^cessit^ et importan ce dcs centres . lA-dedans, ao'iife avons, -d©s caaaions pour transports r ies Trn^Sj das jeeps ? d u maiibus, dea asjilJulaiices, ete..» Cbag.ue Che.f de Ca'-.tre *iDt r^sjoil.®^!© de 1* utilisation ratiomielle e '; de de ce

Ii® transport iss vivrea est ass-ur€ Justus fin f^/rier 1964, par I'intersldiaire de I'Tiiatitut du 2*onds B&sai Msrambutsa IV » Ii'. atocfcage* la manip'ulation et la distribution ineozabe au>; geraats dea eoiis le costr'Sle direct dti clief de cen.tr® «

~~Satif raat^riel di%easnirds, Icolea, qui tombe sous la 3 as Minis t&rais intlre^s^.'s, comme dit plus haut, tout l^ts aax centres des rofu^idsj est g^rii pa.r le' 0hef de~~

T __ai3_ lvjai-:da gar ler? arres Jt f t les ^v^neaient - cruel a et sanglants qui ont raTl le Fecs^s du Ruantfa -*". 1961, cle nom'bre'.r? raandais se s-ont r€fugl'â dans las rays lirrt.itropliec;1 notaiaraent et so..-tout au Royai-irae du 3ururu3i* • - 4: - I' operation d *isu taxation «1; <**A3"iTi33trc.tion des re?? oat ^t<4 o-'M.iflges 1 1?, 'librae de?r 3ooI4t£? <*e Crolx Rouge » De -tr?*."ir*e^^ cnt pti "f^r^q&enêr 1.''-- caTip^ de rdfiiîâ, niiise flor- t^nn^ris, h. i'^liisu de •*:••' vit ?e moiv.s-, •?. y la. LijuecTos et c'p' Tatars (Provijicie ^-In^c., Arrcadi •:?.- •:.>•- 1 Trj/u.-.: au .*j4 attaue:r le .|ki3.nda»

i'n-^\ -J*> j3i-#.:.l f-'ViSij'jrV** ^ "^ > ;'-jf ",^ f'tji1 !kf'J ^ 3''* j'"3 -" ."' r/f "'y - '• > ~" -^ ' ' " ' "' '"' "'^ < 't •-' - ' (U "' • *' "* "' )"i •-.? ^ " •' commooEoae leess attaûeaa--;ueyy ddWiie/!"!dvme/!:: ^r-ov-.t,-AX>V'.. ,i,rr 5;;a ;;: lj.iijit^ê, t .-.--.luu CO,;AOo.ô.. .i^£,aa,y: et drt Bugancla,: II j a des ' r«lf u$- •„' i ôi psiJ^; t la rtuij; c..- .pj. '-r^vr - ot ont i.u-e aic.^s Mtn or

~~aa sent &£di®tn!s» "ce .gn.:d; ' .ao't 110"^© Batf-r da'.,.; luao aito&tlou. rittû^ par suite d© ncm^tsux t^Tlneis .ds r^fuîô ^.ui e~~

oxti.iajl, C0a deralsrs tainpe j ;us avo..i^' ..^^ric ^'il y a in 5i;iOii f ra;\tali^re cliarêe d« conâter jt de ..:ouo ^»ae;. rrt^sioi*. icr;t lc Clief d@ &&bin0t I-;.. Hinis^^re >.J.es et le Biract^vtr -1« X*'Inatitut Sceial Fonds wwsuai Kwambutâ IT noue eri ue i:: .,-o.v.- * .- re^du trsvera 1' iramen.se for It ê Iviruuuc- L la ^••.v -.' la rljgio, "e Kurelie et av:.>as cotoye la froutaîere vera le 1, ... ons avciis oons'tat^' -qne iiifiltr&tion contiira&lle de aouveavu. r^fn^l'â ?^:an;t.;ie<. • Cers-ci eatro^t'au Burundi par p^tits iprouâo t'âr pill€s a £;. j.che Si droite daiia le long froirtelier d© la forit. Z.*uc .; : 1'antre ^rciipe q-;e aous avcns pa contactor "(car 1«- autre^ as cache.),!; encore} rioiw A Son 3xoellenc8 l-lorisjirrar lo 3;^rr4taire d'ltat It la fleh&amerle &

~~J*j?.l l^.GTineixr de vcuo fair® parvenir ci-ieg^ous I'expo- 1? -j.t-'^.ti in f^naralo .dans 7". r-^.^lon 3.« TtT^T^nX) ^ la dat® du~~

XI s©ibXI~ r^*:"i-v5 *f?*5 local oCf, c!e? ^'1 ^^^"''ortis* con^he" de la <"ne d«o rîfuife' ©ux--':^;^^ -..'.o ies *il,'faeut-- f?c -I" ?/a,-,..,lii, J- jjsrtir •!.. oat pour un.^ proôrtlî :i.:laij,:.e & ;, î.;n ou l>leaî

Depul.5 -ûelûes jour-, la plup-aft cltj^ ^tut'L,i iaj .alle. .di. r.',-, •;:,:;!;.: ^.^''i;, ûo'lâew f-jnii&b, a^'aai fait 1'pbjat da troa aom-. ••••-•;,;:,: ^'iVrUie--- et -y*^ 1!ostora.lJi%fe-;lGa g^dt-featicua d^ la pLU't -.:cs,j autorit^.; locales, ovvt cornea •£ SL tuii* Ie& soldats at ôliciers uc, .;r 3^ îri.rsx par p6 .'.%'& ^X'ou'aed' vt.-r.., !«* prov A e;i fra^chlss|«u'it la £.•„ .ttere par la fo-?l du StJGS

~~II -jesfel® qua cos~~

_4i ^cpul&'viGJi £ffii;run.r> "i 30. plaint &2fiwi'@fiiOi*it 3© cett© &+', v.fc _•:,•:;...... ive x5 .. :,:.'^reiiS r^fugiê âr ess deraiers ge li-yrent a 1^ iioitbr'i-i,:' v.,1 î^ploi- et rapid-^s eatacact dEuige •

B D'o^.-'u los diras dea deux gkrde-froi-tiare sur "U. rou! '.I, loci •voldat.s Hifav.dnis patroulllent la ec>u'V!" ; . !, [email protected] des tiers nocturnes do;:t le.-- j..r'Vj':.^.til.o.3 r^tosbent ;,.,. soi^i do la population l

Le:; .;oldata jji^cit®-. (12 'ioraî0s) auraient t©nt@ de chir la fro::tiav-d a. r.st teitrdiiij ,.^d' K,'i.;.ite aujc renaeigneseate demandls a ces leui ^Q,T^QB ejtpl.I.'ft'i.cj.it âe I'^'StJ uo trouva.it S. 1 ou 2 kia, UB auraient fait clemi-itour (S. uoter ûlûcun. ellaent •! 1'ASBJ i5.€ se trouvait a

; SAJJJT ilrfife 'd-u Bour^. ot re d@ la coiajsurie de 3U8C!CT$ vaie tentative -3e t-or.tuct >,".reit «tlea do la dite L:.Û;:U a" lea reasei^Remeats auraient £•% et au âtrouillo :d@ mllitairea rwsadais auraiont fraaehl la fro.u' tie cjueliTuea eentainos de metres 'dans la" collide de MUlCHli (!=r en pouranivaat des ,p:empe0 •-:d& re£t%i$s<» •&, po^nlcitlori le cet eridro.it a &t4 terrorlsê j|,:r ce-tfe-0-dp^mticii'du fait ûe lea di*'s solotate leo ont ûasiîaeoacec^îs la potxrsuit^ dee •fugi,4s' et du fait du sjaffi.'cnaen4: dss i; A la sEfcn® '&$• ICS'tHJI'a l«s 'trsTsilieurSj eh jaajoritl ds race QJutsi, log-Is et I&sttllfe sur 1© t^rritoira Su' Burundi 'h IOC ^tr^s de la t'ôntiSrs craigaei'.t fertemeat d$s- reprlsaillea ,1© la pmrt-dafe eoldats iisôdaii's d,'ii "fait Ût les''nouv©a"oa: r^fugils 8© so.it y@"t3!T'3.TlCln@S 2* PX"> !2"iiSJL'1feO: "S^' '1@£DT OSffl1& ^V^CS Iss\i3™ '".-^'t?i i,l

~~i'Oii QU.4fc & Xe S-oiTvsragsssgit Su ^ asul sis a-ans le ooaoours du H-rat Omra.iiasariat d$ 3 , de 1m MgU0 d® la :0roia: Rou^® et da Sou1 rit fin,~~

~~eat~~

pour ,r© •f'O'amsr l@s rms rua:.idai» ... . , . ._. .' ,,; .. . _ i Htta»tl£ peut-il rijf dialer oe d|©I:e des Vlfcgils .î r l@Wf>;.âtrie t,f--,;. i . , s. •-£& noa, ' (tielles soat''^!!1 cotiditioaa ou Lss ârasitiGs pouTa*'it aa,su: e :

' "'•" ' ' 4 mon Biviiv na© st^l®' e^ltrfeicsa ©st pe@@illi; g la plupart dss rlfugi^s V«s«l©nt r®irtrsf p^rs-aan® ai 1© Ba^ ni 1@ Riiaasla nl le H»©-*-S* ou CroSs Boug^,, Ji@ $*@ut f^-lr® fsi.$f_ li, o© droit JsnjSialfeTble* • ^ai 'cdEetfouenf3 last -it© |xr€i5it|iSp sst pour dirs

tions continues et s© esnsoltent foiel-a G@ suje^ le r&pp&rt du ^ CSiof da Cacp se B;»i&id«rt ciu© -7 - , ,r,., - • '.'• .... ;'-.,( ' ' •%".;,• . ='-•-• ' ! eat de maittteair i^Xft^pe dii'baisrp. 'Il 6st plog pour 160 que pour les ordrsa' (p.1!! doit recifeToir du Comtniasiaire

~~:; . II se perm&t'vd;« donnîes:.êsiI4ie3 de route aux r^f u- . tjui s:e rend en t au Ifeiâiqfika Serritor^*' '0~~

f rappant le ua aoiabre d$ r^fugi^s de i de Cankoso de 10 h du ,' ils o:nt d^clar^ qu'lls so i«ead-aieiit a Eigamba. lie qui les appartient ati ncam|^l3|lCJ® Charles,, r^Jugid tt'l!fDO^I76iS(UvlRA}, 2fca la^pectaiat 1$ Trlhieule, lea sau£ fusils., -y-fureat trouv4s ai»si: quruae liste " le grajie.de cbacun daas" le .^G-pdai'JC. ;<3toae d« $es r^fugi^s se spnt , 1,4 autres 'ou' t ' &%& mi0 £ 'la dispositioi''' a de Monsieu' r le

'dhefs'-et de- ni sont s^lari^Q, ^ Camp "tgHB.ir"i . rJMaatais :' chefs'^t bus-o'iiefs de ia ,puis- mandeitt pourqtio-i II est Rc-fu^t4$ et""qu'*il de Kiiera, pulsi un meai>re de Suauaat-Uh4€>n et par :*as drcdt .iff lieu Ce- Bi'aigr. h. sUpprimer curtains an cfisup, ce 'cb.el,dei: camp declare q,u? '^["" <ê si c« ii1:4t8tl^'Jpa^'î» touia--3t&s" ezpuls^s.dtt Burundi,, II : ©se*' dire que\^|||;it- c^;;gm :lea cfest..grioe h ltAm^riqu© .-et :qu^. le BurWcli n^;-\les. aide en ' fciea**'1.'' II tieiiV. les meetings comme tai memtsre 5'un^ parti politiqiie. II s*a|;lt r r > cL ah Oteef" stiff isamiaent malhoiin^te. Depttis 13 mois d -a0^lt dgi aa.$r't- . • il a toiijours -touclie un.6 ration de 10 pergonn^s an' .lieu diS;';4*.... . "ibllt tous les e&0£ & -de ., 'quartiers oat prLs 1* initiative i*augfnenter l$/'a.oml>r0 de refugies sur las fi6hec de 'ratioaa. , fkar^ I'e le 14 •. cottraat, jfai odixstat^ que le aomisre de rlfugfls :; da lOtt unites, ce qui 'ratoenaitt h 12.299 r^fugi^s raîtailHe au £ "de t II,,222..r€fugi4s qui peuplent le caffitp de'ligaiaTaa* " ' . '':'^.\: a p«s» : RubsMa par rapport a l%aar). TTr bon nombr© plus ie .s-entir -stii Samp* • . •• * lea ilc ne veulirrt ' entendre divise**'

~~.^^ ^ * e -~~

~~-» " i~~

- . T * • i de la Sendaxkerie et de, I'Anadie Natioâle.' dea testatiirea dâttaque mnife$t€es dans la region de Kat de Eiruado, Province de Miînca,Bu±tiadi,le Burundi $. $.£p&ob& la $enda,:me:fie et i*lrmi*e"Iiratio3m3.^,m. vue et de ddsarmer lep re'fugie's arises * Bans'oea iat'erV'entl.igpcts,,..' le Twit It attexndre <§tait de fairst renijrer las -iâfugi^s dans iesirs centres:* La i-desion a accompli ca tacfe* et lesr râfjjltats •souhaite's..?!^ ^t$ -.ofetenua, 2*3 l**tideiice f Ctertre les bon d*infoi3m^r iaa^diatement 1«3 et a ; ofeserâteurs.^ Oe qui a de la

~~a fett, la legislation, 10. %>TiV6m^Bieat .da Hanm4t» esi parvenu S, r1 ^cprivrir .des contreTrenaats, eaa Is© le1 boeitS aux' ' arrest atiotiS et a la ''-.- ...:" '• ;': ••"' 49) !i~~

. k ref \zgi4a ' î- ^ partis êjfikvê/ <|* attaq.ua" .le du Snsoida, l*esprit de ûs' ii CtentV« cle Kj.ga~ mba fort aisrteu£# feiee & de» reHaniotis r $e ^tsleiDs tant arec . 1 qu.*aveo la popul^ticm du caap:-t" le c^Ctie . a Xeur0".ohaaipa se manifeate 5 c*est .'airiî fi2,e les promts' qtsi ^tai^f âbetidoim^s, ont 4t£ yoloutîreiseat- a?9;^3?ia e4, l'* social©, HHJLe ;Te^,d" ijui avai't d^â f^'.t see âête pour partis* d^fiiltive- ?.i02it-r a repi-is-'sfes. êtifit^ q.ui conptstaleiit' egj' fsêr social, ego. cultttres de cliai%vs •o;olle'C't;iJ?s,ea Tae de multipliei" des ' lu ' ' "

et par_ ea rs^. o&t 'di@t"ftre prpvaôiireaient â-rdds au Ad , , en- >t*ptid&iS,i-' une solatid^-edûat9» Ajp^^-Bion retour do 'ai -*z TQ&gSLG® 'le risque û'ils a ux' pro jets -coEaianfltat&iêa et- c ' est' coaipromettr.e l^ e somt, A^ ' j Iia est pre^q-ue. ont tie oea petita presets c-oat.-im4utsa.yes en, est axjtueSsaent ' les r^fu&'i&s ne _' £orte d^ la bouolie ^L elle a i®$'i iLst soient ;•' ., " - .v' ":-. •"••' :sV'" ';. ;< •> ,..•>•';.';•"-.~'V£.,<: • "••'•

•, '..' ,-. .:\^;"%iyv& -»,.-.' -..,• .v •'. '' ', •'; » >X-: ••rV4;,,4'*^-K' :->. •>,'••' " : - •* ,^'v;-'-^Vif|ff{-- a;.;.-fv-. ' ^'fr: "^ • '••'$£&•* / •••••*'.•.-.,•-' •i.;,;V •;.-•';-"£ }i&<','•' ->y**s^-..""''vi>Jswyt' f1.?*'?. J - ".'''•SV>:^ V''"> ^ft^^pill'. : /li;?kfi^lt|€|. ( 1^ .1^1. s«rtf^J;;^ ;^^5llAi^'".''"'

~~|fiiifeMi:-:&?oir <^$lw''i|e-^ii4lJ3^J|' ^\^f «^1s3fc'..'>,K, ,.. .. .„'>"' T jfcjt'-1.?'*..; .sffi ...••. fc-'^iT?'- *w~~

|»- a_ia, ] -" Qv&m&.&%3^&r$8i& 199 -aai'âK6t4e du. P. ysj^gidsâ^^l^tr .6^^*^TSI|p^J'^ - J : V 4 Qa*^;;'^^^:*^Âi44 T '*• r' ' f^Ti iiaiJ'''i-ifefilttVJiti' iflt J5^jB^ j^ 27fepr^'S/«ale.'4jfeOfBtJi-. >w ^*L ^,*ti *»_' A, .**«M jk ' fm&. j*. -..«•.*.,e » o^îr-«.*i. J^^Wi _j_e JM . !B|!^%^T' Vl IH rtV\-^X '!tl A* "* . *': " . •'.'.'"•' iv/' '•V''^"^ ; .,>^«%^' - „' 'V v- -v-.. ': -•-(i.'-' ' '^'V;; :'•'•'-••-••'••'.^'ai i|;IiBEye0fix6ii f«f ",pon $&f®e^«;'df 'Centre I'eC'^l^»*s*«^''. r ; n <*tiiti'jj£g. iloteir, ^feaat tciiin^ • gtt*^rfea ; sM •$$&&& • d^! pgambiÎfw:f$f>' 1 ; Etti 'J'. f 1 ^ * 'MA V'iHi «*{ f F AîyluliiiVMl^JiM r't . •' *• i • . . ^_ . ' ' •;'• '•:„,-;'..•.._'.,." ' ''" •;, . " •." • !• x'î--••;.,/.••••-].':. •-' •'• ;' '•• * '••' •• • ••'' . • .1.;.. .^ri&i^'-:*.'-

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V'i ''^P^Â1^ &a^T? \--"^-?*v%?^.iS '•' •• •^..a^^-v.r-:^^•.i'---;uîs;>? -,.--''-^ -. . ; i *fev.fe'iifix» '^-ft-L' •"'.•;;' s.'-'' ~, .ia!''%^f«'f. i^Vj-^fei'i' i ' .(Jliil'l:^.:' -^5F--•;"t,r. îwl®; u<.-v^€ t,.. : "'itf^9îy%;S^- ;' ••;^v:S%f ^ 'fe "bruit' §i$;:^0^^d^tiii**i«-.V'lo*1-^'îii'-rt ^«o^-aA^1 AliV-r^l-Vrt^'4- (3 A-^'wiiMJS &&«mMitA:'4*. ' » 10 -

~~I 'absence oat •" ywtcur de d'etre a-cftev^s et' oar nous eowpris le ; • :' ;fi|fs;-:7«V\;f?-;-\ .' "." :f^ : ' ...f-r;:'~~

que y a dc^; don* ou redsv&aues jacnerefft -des gj&iB. paresis et our cela ila ont Bi&aoio. .d?îdes.j cettJ du Burundi de-s 'ff6tii!r%iS3âs(at0 '4 en founiise^nt une '*ili,'i&i. 'ratîitte'••'$ & ' oti de 1# ' ' d± au@ 0ur le dwe ^ date du, 4 de ie , ©t surto II Traut Edeux

~~Aid^t p^r JLta Chefs det> i de haa?ioote pour *?£*?%nflts* ' sfl&H!L3.vuxlf***W»«*.» M*^Wss »> iis*>v.sw " alloae avoir iate& jplp'" •r'^apla" la iratioii g.ue '¥:~~

~~iuie' . ^~~

~~du Burundi ajfen" ! ^uia 1964» ca* nous esp&lus e la plus de r^colteg ue cette saisoa""car~~

~~j? is Hfci^stre' ,~~

~~? •- '?•;;. ^-> :-"'. ~">v '•^"-- -•' ,, , .;.^-*^.;-,.^,-^| ,..-•, ^~~

~~«M«r>HT'Wwa* -: c) des .r Let-fere & Son Excellence le Erejai«r Mnistre du Souveniemejit '.da Burus^ par le Mlnist^s des 4^a^res Sp$iale$ s~~

~~f j *y.'u~~

~~instruction^ rj»ai l*fcfeeu*-~~

~~, pouir raiaenfer Xee- leura centres et~~

~~Ctoles ies~~

~~IB HIHIS!faS DEIS~~

~~FAUT TAIBS* -~~

~~du pr-ncipe cfitie Is se penchsr deasitg~~

~~^ Cf*aat * dii Bjmm&t aia -'Toit de demander pour Ies instailer ' 5e ruaadais sar da te les.faire' rier leur rt&fcaans toute * eix »oins de urgeh.ce de eosamission~~

~~ObkBalsgariat de^ lotions~~

~~-•VV : i Pour ce ^ul nous concern*^ toat '.06a poaaible pour refcule* tous atatoe^-en 4«Kor«'iitt S'oyavuae? |,1 esrt T^ f ait '1 eat & cause d'etiac U^ car~~

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• " Toil& en r£gtan4 la e Ses f&fugl^s raaiidais û'elle •&« present© au Jloya$aaa du pttis 6ertif ier stor-fetm . la >as; de la volQisti du Bartend 1* ''coirase '±1 ert dôati :dEias le present rapport. .• .- . • vdti's ;iîepicsian't et' ê' vo&s prie,-

~~HcrrAosi~~

~~Pierre~~

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~~M« Oafi*rio ^afall CR.13 (4-59) ROUTJNG -SLIP~~

~~Cornments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: Mr. L. Leraieux~~

~~APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED~~

~~YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE~~

~~NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS~~

~~Lucien - I discussed this situation with the Secretary-General this morning but neglected to leave this copy of my letter to Prime Minister Adoula which should be in your files.~~

~~DATE: 28 Jan. 1964 nets® il§elei>eti0n que wcus saga sussuna~~

~~l*a»»i» ae«pje «le vests.~~

~~da voue i quitter Is Cengo le~~

~~notna~~

~~un IS~~

~~* * * * • *~~

~~Is qui est le faute wets® ca tant~~

~~Is Psaaisr ^nistJESjp les Jl May *"~~

~~Dr; Bundke has copy. The writer worked from Aug^l through Aug., 62 as administrive officer Congo.~~

~~L. Daily Telegraph and Morning Post Friday, 31 May 1963~~

LETTERS TO THE- EDITOR ' \ SQUANDERING BldcKjjjarket and Pilferirfg-Under U.N. IR—At present there is a great would account "for about £500,000 deal of lalkTind also a great per month. . S deal written .concerning the 3. The co^t of repairing property financial state •:..'*>£• the United rented from civilian persons resi- Nations, and many people have dent in the Congo for the uses tried to accoUht for the present of UN personnel, both civilian state of affairs. A short time ago and military, would be absolutely you published two articles con- astronomical, amounting to tens cerning the cost of the Congo of millions. operation (one dealing with the I have myself seen property present state of claims against the damaged beyond repair by certain UN, the other on attempts to military (i.e. removal of all fittings, economise by cutting salaries, &c., pipes, toilet equipment, furniture, of UN officials). floors, doors, and even windows). Asa former official of this organ- I remember particularly the case isation in the Congo I feel that the of a UN soldier being arrested British, public have been very badly by a colonel of different nation- misled concerning doings in the ality, the charge being that he had Congo. removed 289 doors from various I resigned from the United houses, etc. He reported that they Nations owing to their unwilling- were for, making crates to take- ness to curb the massive amount " things" home for his officers. of black-marketeering, pilfering Very many houses and buildings and outright stealing by certain., ,,have, been left .empty shells by UN military persorine:l;..fc:I^ believe; ^military personnel,, and quite unfit that an estimatei^a's^rnade^by' brie' for habitation ever again. of your editoria|,.staff.v.b|,the cost 4. The removal of equipment, of outstanding '" ^claifns^ against furniture, refrigerators, etc., etc., ONUC when the United'., Nations and the theft of cars can easily does eventually leave the country; account for £6m. I have seen this estimate I know was miserably boatloads of these items leaving below the true total. Albertville for Kigoma (Tangan- In my capacity as United Nations yika) en route for Dar-es-Salaam administrative officer' in North . and Bombay. I tried to have one Katanga I was able to observe cer- steamer searched. My efforts to tain of the national contingents check this export of loot were there arid feel that the following frustrated by orders from above. should be made public to the 5. There are so-called " in- people in this country who through quiries " or " courts of justice" the paying of taxes 'are actually held by the United Nations in an contributing to this spree. attempt to apportion blame. Hav. 1. Money drawn on the UN ing attended many of them in an account in Congo francs is used for attempt to stop this grand stealing black-market transactions, doubled process from continuing I can and, converted into hard currency honestly state that they are the for transfer abroad. This means biggest mockery of justice I have that a large proportion of the £3m. ever seen or participated in. Even costs is being piped off monthly by Stalin himself could not have found black-market transactions and the more iflgenious ways of. hiding the UN will do nothing about this truth. . .„ owing to political pressure from 'In wrjti.n^ctp'you I am attempt- New Yorkjafid-lmpre especially bv ing tp.:sbrifi-g to the public notice the Go^rnmeiits-iaf the troops this .j-disgusiting-:, .waste of the tax- .concerned.; ^jS^f: •• '-^u,-.*. •.;>. £ay.er.j^ ij/nipney. '•''.... Cannot Mr, 2. PiX. tt'if'iStaxsfree luxury items Macfryll|ri: put' an : end, to this and such as 'cajneraS.Jvjadios. record- find 'aifipetjteffjuse, for bur money? players, whisky%nd other liquor) '>:•..«. 'Yours'Y'laithfully, is being black-marketed by both DAVID F. RENWICK. civilian and military personnel; this London, S.W»9. ' ,/ ENGLISH TEXT

~~25 January 1964~~

Mr. Prime Minister, As I indicated to you during our meeting last evening, I was most disturbed at your statement to me that you had received no reply to your letter of 13 January, which I had transmitted to the Secretary- General immediately upon receipt from you. I understood you to say that Mr. Dorsinville, in my absence, had only verbally indicated to you that Mr. Ahmed was leaving February 1st and Mr. Osorio-Tafall would arrive the 24th of January, Immediately upon my return last night, I checked with Mr, Dorsinville and found that a written reply was transmitted by messenger to Tour Excellency under date of 16 January, This letter attached the complete text of the reply from the Secretary-General, I am attaching a duplicate of this letter because it is quite possible that in the voluminous correspondence with which your bffice is engaged through some clerical error this particular letter may not have been brought immediately to your personal attention, I do hope,Jour Excellency, that this will clarify the particular point which I can well understand so concerned you. Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

~~David B. Vaughan Under-Secretary Director of General Services His Excellency Mr. Cyrille Adoula Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo Leopoldville Unofficial translation from French~~

~~ROYAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS~~

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Government of the Republic of the Congo and has the honour to refer to the note verbale of 29 April 1963 addressed to the Ambassador of Norway and concerning the possibility of Norway's assisting in the reorganization and modernization of the Congolese National Army. The Government of the Republic of the Congo mil no doubt be aware that Norway has done its best to endeavour to provide firm foundations for the future development of the Republic of the Congo by participating, from the beginning, in the assistance operations carried out by the United Nations in the Congo, both in the military and civilian spheres., As regards the military operation, Norway has contributed both in the matter of personnel and equipment and in the matter of financial support, and the Norwegian Government is willing to continue to provide this assistance until the completion of the United Nations military operation, at the end of the first half of 1964, in accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its eighteenth session. The question of providing additional assistance to the Republic of the Congo in the form of bilateral aid ±H ifes for the purpose of military training has been considered very carefully by the Norwegian authorities, who are well aware of ±ks how important it is for the Congo to find a satisfactory solution to this problem. After investigating the matter at length, however, they find that Norway lacks the necessary personnel to be able to provide such assistance. This personnel problem is, in part, due to the implementation of a new plan for Norway's defence, and to international obligations which Norway has already entered into. Moreover there is quite a shortage of French-speaking personnel. The Norwegian Government therefore deeply regrets that it is unable to comply with the request submitted by the Republic of the Congo for military assistance in addition to that which is being provided through the United Nations.

~~Government of the Republic of the Congo Leopoldville -2-~~

~~The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to convey to the Government of the ^epublic of the Congo the assurances of its highest consideration.~~

Oslo, 13 January 1964 WITHU.N NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY Rift Considered a Danger as Withdrawal Date Nears nth Robert H. Gardiner, Mr. fully completed his assignmen )orsinville's predecessor, who in the Congo and had been re- CLASH assigned as resident representa- iombined great tact with a blunt tive for technical assistance in By J. ANTHONY LUKAS jutspokenness when necessary. Somalia. Special to The New York Times IHffUN. ENYOYSf Mr. Dorsinville, a diplomat Mr. Ahmed completed a three- LEOPOLDVILLE, the Congo, if the old school, is accustomed year tour of duty in the Congo April 5 — .Relations between Continued From Page 1, Col. 1 to making, his points more ta-and . st ayed on several months high United Nations and Con- V.! _ - directly. Mr. Adoula apparent-! lonSer the request of the golese officials have broken pers '^clrdination between the ly interprets this as evasiveness. down in bitterness and mis- UniteCijtations and the Congo-' The last time Mr. Dorsinville mansaiTe sokesman had Ipse e-fi-vernment 'saw Mr. Adoula was late iniman saia- ine spokesman naa understanding. lo^lWact is maintainedjJanuary when he presented the;™ ™£™^" the'cSele For more than two months, betwe&tsecond-level Congolese 'newly arrived force cpin^mander.l^^b^twttntta Congolese Premier Cyrille Adoula. has per- and United Nations officials. Genera Agmyi-Ironsi. Relations;^*" nmentana United Na- sistently refused to receive Max Obserlers warn that contact were already badly strained **) * H. Dorsinville of Haiti, officer I at the tdp must be re-estab-fthat time. Mr. Adoula at first' ndr ee, ctan' f or in charge of the United Nations Ilished sobn to avoid disastrous 'refused to let Mr. Dorsinville, snarls in the coming withdrawal ' accompany the ..general. | Olfc^ffal?s ob operation here. of UnitecfiNations forces. He relented only>after an ap-i "eMMns etween , Mr. Adoula and other lead- Diplomats find the situation peal by 'FT. Liu, the Chinese Nations and thethe, ing Congolese officials have particularly hard to grapple Assistant to Mr. Dorsinvi]le.||ose ow'nment wele openly snubbed Mr. Dorsinville with because it apparently .Throughout February and most! none toojood. at diplomatic receptions. stems mqri from a clash of per-; of March, Mr. Liu was the only, sonalities-than from any dispute | high-level. United Nations of-' Refused to Receive Aide over rpolicy" jficial to see Mr. Adoula. I Until recently Mr. Adoula Observer-- -•'s' believ...... e the. bitter-I Relations between United Na-' also refused to receive Mr. nesxit^oos betweeUCI.VY,CCInI MrirjLJL. Adoul-n.iu-iuioa. anajidu tions and Congoles«-. e military" . Mr. Dorsinville has its origin men have been better. Although! Dorsinville's second in com- Gen r mand, Bibiano Osorio-Tafall of in their relations to S. Habibj ® ^T Mobutu_ and Generaljj Ahmed, fprmer chief of United Aguiyi-Irons' ' ' " i' find it difficult! L, Mexico, who is chief of the Nations -civilian operationisneres here.. I|t° work together, General Mo- .United Nations civil operation Mr. Adbula liked and trustedjbuttrusted' u workd well with brigadier 1I here. Mr. Ahmed, a Pakistanini. MrMr. James Dextraze, the Canadian : He has still not officially Dorsinville, who took up his chief of staff. position here last May 1, quick- ''-'General''Mobut. - - - u is- unwillingl, , .-,1y recognized Mr. Osorio-Tafall as ly found himself at odds with I to admit that he needs help ml resident. representative of the Mr. Ahmed. - j putting down the revolt in Kwilu j United Nations Technical Assis- According to reliable sources, Province. He did not object I tance Board here, although he Mr. Dorsinville objected to the when Brigadier Dextraze ic is now reported prepared to do authority . and personal prerog- quietly helped him supply his if atives tha'yMr. Ahmed had as- troops and evacuate his t so. sumed. H.es'accused Mr. Ahmed wounded. '' Relations have been strained of living:r;too luxuriously and What annoyed him was public 1 between Maj. Gen. Joseph D.of misusing.his authority. announcement by the United :I Mobutu, commander of Congo- Mr. Ahmed, who had been I Nations that such aid was be- E lese armed forces, and Gen. kept on past his tour of duty ing provided. He was also dis- pleased at efforts by the United \ J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi of Ni- by U Thari,t,; : the Secretary Gen-1 'neral, left/' :fpr another post "on Cations to increase its involve- ;i geria, the United Nations force Jan. 31 and?was replaced by Mr. Inient in Kwilu. When the United j i commander. Osorio-Tafall: jNation(Nationss proposeDrouosed to send 20200 c This situation is causing deep There ^h.aye been suggestions Nigerians to Kikwit, General ,f1 concern to Western diplomats that soiri.fgrjit Mr. Adoula's ad- Mobutu angrily . replied that I here because it seriously ham- visers, inCaiv effort to increase there was no need for United their ow^j'jijpuence,- may have Nations troops in Kwilu. Continued on Page 7, Column 3 used theijAJimed affair to sow United Nations troops and distrust b'ejs|een Mr. Adoula and the civilians who support them Mr. Dorsia*file. will leave June 30. From then There of a mistrans- on, the United Nations will lated docurfifenf that aroused Mr. provide essentially the same Adoula's anger. kind of technical assistance here Observer|^php know both that it doels in.many other coun- men well teavSthese misunder- tries, although^on a much larger standing-* -- jj --s- SiilSS.w&c^.-.remforce- _-;_J, ____d j br..y. seal. the differencesj-Jn their tern?; peraments., ' iubcessful' in Post Mr-. Adoula, I'ThT e New York Times ally reserved, NATIONS, N. with men who speak their mind^ 'April 5 — A United Nationg openly and forcefully. He en- (spokesman said today joyed particularly close relation^ 'S. Habib Ahmed had success UN. CONGO CHIEF

~~Move Held Likely as Result NEW YORK TIMES - Tuesday, 7 April of Quarrel With'Adoula~~

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON Special to The New York Times UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., April 6—A well-informed source said today that it was "a good guess" that Max H. Dorsinville would resign as head of the United Nations Congo operation as a result of a quarrel with Cyrille Adoula, the Congolese Premier. Reliable sources confirmed the fact that relations between Mr. Dorsinville, af ormer Hai- tian delegate to the United Nations, and Congolese officials were bas as' reported in a, dispatch to The New York Times from'Leopoldville. Mr. Dorsinville, it was understood, discussed the situation with United Nations authorities during his visit here last month. It was felt that it would be difficult to obtain a replacement in view of the fact that the United Nations Congo force will be withdrawn on June 30. Mr. Dorsinville; re turned to Leo- poldville two weeks ago. After the withdrawal of the force, United Nations activities in the Congo will be confined to providing technical assistance. Mexican Aide to Act Although a spokesman for Secretary General Thant refused to comment, the United Nations announced that Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall. of Mexico, Mr. Dorsimrille's second in command as chief of civilian operations, had been given the 'additional duties of resident representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board. Mr. Osorio-Tafall was in New York last week for consultar tions. His return to Leopoldville was delayed because the Congo- lese Government was at first unwilling to agree to his assum- ing , the technical .assistance post. The Government gave its consent late last week -and the announcement said Mr. Osorior ,Tafall—would arrive iniLeopold- Iville tomorrow. ..'.'..- Last summer the Congolese Government went counter to United Nations policy by asking Israel, Belgium Mid countries to *"-"-~~-:i-----&

ing vide other officials:for^*fire^Congo.' This program is expected to continue under Mr. Osorio Taf all after the withdrawal of the United Nations force. Br, Ealph J. Bunehe, Under-Secretsuy 27 October for Special Political Affairs

~~The~~

~~j'sKeport~~

I return herewith Mr. Dorsinvilie's report translated into English which you sent to me with your memorandum of 29 September 196^. I prestme that this should b© filed in your office. The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents ills compliments to the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations and has the honour to request the assistance of Major-General John Hyg^ former OHUC Air Coissaaiader, in compiling an, efficiency report in respect of Colonel Antonio Pasqaali of the Italian Air Force. The Italian authorities have requested that the United Nations compile a report on Colonel Pasquali who served in the Congo from 9 Movember 1961 to 16 June 1962 as Air Base Cojiassander at N'djili and Chief of the Italian Contingent. Since this officer served under General Ryg it would be greatly appreciated if h® could be requested to sutoit a report on Colonel Pa-squall. The Secretary-General would be grateful to the Permanent Representative of Norway for bringing this matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities of his Government,

~~17 Boeesiber CR.13 ROUTING SLIP~~

~~Comments for the record should not be written on this / slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. T°: U Thant Secretary-General~~

~~APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER 7 AS REQUESTED~~

~~YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE~~

~~NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS~~

~~I send you herewith a Note prepared by the Unit for African Affairs on the situation in the Democratic republic of the Congo.~~

~~DATE: FROM: w•A 15AM V.P. Suslov UNIT FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS 15 January 1965~~

NOTE ON THE SITUATION IN THE DEfeDCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO No. 1 Since the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 30 December 1964* there has been no progress on the promoting of a solution based on an end to foreign interference, cease-fire, withdrawal of mercenaries and national reconciliation through the Organization of African Unity. Mr. Tshombe has repeatedly rejected negotiations with the Committee of National Liberation (C.N.L,). He told a press conference on 6 January: "Certain circles would like my government to negotiate, but negotiate with whom? With those whom the Belgian Foreign Minister has compared with Hitler?" He is also reported to have rejected Belgian-American suggestions for a broadening of his Government as a step toward improvement of relations with African States. Instead of withdrawing the mercenaries, he seems to be recruiting more. Press reports from Johannesburg indicate that he has asked for 300 South African mercenaries by the end of January. -' Another press report indicates that he is considering recruitment of African soldiers discharged as a result of the reduction of French forces in Africa. 2/ On the other hand, he has accused a number of African countries of interference in Congolese affairs: these now include not only Algeria, Ghana and U.A.R., but five of the neighbours of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania), Elections have been postponed to 13-31 March 1965. It would seem significant that the decision was announced after a conference of tribal chiefs which called for a postponement. The tribal chiefs also suggested a declara- tion of state of emergency in several provinces, ostensibly "to permit pre- electoral campaign and organization of general electionsH > and Interior

~~I/ Rand Daily Mail? Johannesburg, 6 January 1965. 2/ Reuters, 6 January 1965* - 2 -~~

Minister Munongo indicated that this would be done. Mr. Tshonibe told the chiefs that they were responsible for the maintenance of law order. -' It would seem that the Leopoldville Government is planning to conduct the elections with the assistance of the chiefs. Such an election may strengthen tribalism and make a political solution more difficult. On the other hand, the leaders of the C.N.L., who have been visiting African capitals, have made it clear that they do not look forward to a "reconciliation" with the Tshombe Government. A spokesman of the C.N.L. was reported to have stated in Brazzaville on 4 January that there could be no reconciliation as long as President Kasavubu and Premier Tshombe remained in power and that "the revolutionary government and the Congolese people will continue to fight until the final victory."-2'/ Mr. Gaston Soumialot said at a press conference in Cairo on 12 January that the withdrawal of all mercenaries and the removal of the Tshombe Government are a condition for the solution to the Congo problem. "3^/ Earlier, on 28 December 1964, Mr. Thomas Kanza indicated in Nairobi that the C.N.L. would accept a cease-fire when all the mercenaries withdraw and the United States halts military intervention in the Congo, and that it would participate in elections provided that they were organized under the supervision of the O.A.U, ™ The C.N.L. has not repudiated this position, but its leaders seem to refer no more to cease-fire but only to the struggle against Mr. Tshombe and colonialism with the backing of other African peoples. Both the Leopoldville Government and the Western press allege that considerable assistance is being supplied across the borders to the C.N.L. forces. I/ Leopoldville and Bukavu broadcasts, 24 and 28 December 1964, A.F.P. 27 December 1964. 2/ A.F.P. 4 January 1965. 2/ TASS, 12 January 1965. /I/ Reuters, 28 December 1964* 5/ Time (15 January 1965) carried a story on assistance through Sudan and Uganda. Its correspondent was then expelled from Uganda, - 3 -

The public positions of the countries involved, and of their supporters among African States, vary somewhat. But it would appear significant that a number of African States do not deny assistance to the C.M.L. and have indicated that a solution requires the removal of Mr. Tshombe from power. Some of the recent statements may be noted: (a) Algeria: President Ben Bella said in an interview with Jeune Afrique (8 January 1965) that by aiding the C.N.L., the Algerians believed that they were "carrying out our duty toward the Congo and towards Africa ... No threat, no pressure will make us give up this duty and turn back." Algeria, he said, would also support a peaceful solution, but this would have to fulfil three conditions: (i) removal of Mr. Tshombe; (ii) acceptance by the insurgents without any pressure or interference; and (iii) formulation of the solution within an African framework through the CvA.U, The Algerian Foreign Minister, in an interview with Revolution Africaine. said that Algeria would abide by the efforts of the O.A.U, and its ad hoc commission. He called for a total cessation of all "imperialistic interference" in Congolese affairs. (b) Ghana; Accra radio, on 7 January 1965, noted that the authority of the Tshombe Government in the Congo is severely limited and posed the question whether it is, in fact, the sole legal authority to negotiate with in the Congo. "The O.A.U. must boldly face up to that question and not be confused by legal obscurity, for, until this point is cleared up and so long as it is held that Tshombe is the sole embodiment of legality in the Congo, there can be no hope of a solution." -4 -

(c) Mali; President Keita said in a New Year's eve broadcast: "Certain African leaders have been supporting the policy of keeping Tshombe in power through U.S. military and financial might ... For the sake of their dignity and that of their people, we ask these leaders not to identify themselves with Tshombe." (d) Uganda - Prime Minister Obote charged at a press conference on 12 January that the mercenaries were ruthlessly "annihilating Africans in the eastern areas of the Congo" and stated that the responsibility for these crimes rests with the United States, which placed Mr. Tshombe in power* -' He announced that the West Nile district, bordering on the Congo,would be declared a refugee area: unauthorized entry would be prohibited, -2'/ The Minister of Interior, Felix Unama, also expressed fear of "virtual annihilation of the Congo's African population." 3^/ (e) U.A.R.; It may be recalled that President Nasser had stated on 23 December 1964 in Port Said: "Would we recognise Tshombe as a representative of the Congolese people? Tshombe is a killer ... We can never recognise him as a Premier who represents the people of the Congo. "We say that Tshombe is but an imperialistic stooge working for the interests of the USA and Belgium in the Congo. Under no circumstances should we accept such an example to succeed in Africa ... They said that we extended help to the people of the Congo. I hereby confirm that we helped the Congolese people and sent them arms, and that we will send them more arms ... You are the people who went through the 1956 aggression. You cannot accept, under any circumstances, that the Congolese people should be exposed to similar aggression, without helping them. "This is our policy which is clear enough and which we declare openly* not hiding the fact that we sent arms to the Congo and saying that we will send more arms to the Congo."

~~I/ TASS, 13 January 1965. 2/ Reuters, 12 January 1965. 3_/ Reuters, 12 January 1965. _» 5 *-~~

The Cairo press has reaffirmed this position. -' These statements, the welcome accorded to C.M.L. representatives in African capitals, and the meeting of Messrs. Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere with Mr. Gbenye would seem to indicate that a number of African States feel (a) that a viable political solution in the Congo requires support to the C.N.L. in order to frustrate any calculations in Leopoldville and in the Western capitals that a military solution is possible; (b) that they would not be influenced in their attitudes by limited concessions such as the broadening of the Tshombe Government. The policies of the east African States seem to have been greatly influenced by the documents published early in November concerning a United States plan to overthrow the Nyerere Government with the assistance of Portugal, the Congolese Governments and South African experts* (The United States has denounced these documents as forgeries). It may be that they feel that the United States will hesitate to support Mr. Tshombe further if she was convinced that this might lead not only to a "Vietnamization" in the Congo but the involvement of a number of African States. In this connexion, it may be relevant that Senator Richard Russell, of Georgia, chairman of the Armed Services Committee said recently: "It would be nothing less than tragedy for us to go and get involved in the Congo as we are in Vietnam, That would be a monument to poor statesmanship." American Negro leaders have already criticized the Stanleyville operation and Mr. James Farmer, leader of the C.O.R.E., now touring east Africa on behalf

I/ e.g. Al Akhbar. 8 January 1965. - 6 - of the Negro leadership Conference, has expressed dissatisfaction with United States policy in the Congo. Although no meeting of the Ad Hoc Commission of the O.A.U. seems to have been scheduled, it is understood that several of the African representatives in New York have during the past few days taken some initiative towards this* The Council of Ministers is due to hold a regular session in Nairobi in February but the date has not been set.