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Neuroscience, Materialism, and the Soul: Limit Questions Jeremy M Neuroscience & Soul Neuroscience, Materialism, and the Soul: Limit Questions Jeremy M. Aymard Department of Biology; College of Arts and Sciences Abilene Christian University In light of recent discoveries in neuroscience linking the mind to physical processes, Christian philosophers have resorted to a more materialistic view of the human person, using neuroscience as support for their view that an immaterial soul does not exist. In this essay, I will point out a major flaw in the logic for defending a materialistic view, argue that either a bipartite or tripartite view of the human person is more aligned with Scripture, and hopefully point towards a more reliable means for attaining truth regarding human nature and the soul. Joel B. Green, a professor at Fuller more toward a materialistic view of the Theological Seminary, makes the claim that human person; these Christian thinkers have “in the case of identifying what it means to attempted to reshape and amend their be human, the biblical scholar is likely to interpretation of Scripture in light of modern side more with the neurobiologist than with findings in neuroscience. the major, well-known voices of the Christian tradition.”1 According to Green Bipartite/Tripartite Views and Dualism and other Christian materialists, as Most lay Christians hold a bipartite neuroscience has advanced in the past few or a tripartite view of the human person, decades, the idea that a separate, immaterial believing that each of us contains some sort entity (such as a spirit or soul) being of immaterial, usually eternal, entity. From a necessary to account for human capacities – secular lens, bipartite and tripartite views are a bipartite or tripartite view – is becoming very similar to dualism, which is a position less and less probable from a scientific that holds that the mind and body are not perspective. Biological processes are identical and that mental phenomena are beginning to give adequate explanations for non-physical.3 Although dualism is human thoughts and behaviors, and as generally considered “out of fashion” in neuroscience advances it may be the case psychology and philosophy,4 the idea is not that someday every mental process will be seen as completely unfeasible today in the traced to a biological one.2 Reaction to this scientific world. Some well-known trend has varied among lay Christians. For neurologists, including Nobel laureates such the most part, Christians still hold onto a as the late Sir John Eccles, have continued bipartite (body and soul) and or a tripartite to defend dualism.5 Even a minority of (mind, body and soul) view, not resorting to secular philosophers believes that resorting materialism. Christian philosophers on this to materialism, although an easier approach, subject (mainly concentrated at Fuller fails to give the complete picture. Theological Seminary) have attempted to There are a variety of ways to divide tackle this issue by rejecting dualism (i.e. predicate dualism, property bipartite/tripartite thinking and leaning much dualism, and substance or Cartesian 1 Jeeves, 2004, p. 182 4 Robinson, 2016 2 Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013 5 Jeeves, 2013, p. 72 3 Guttenplan, 1994 Dialogue & Nexus | Fall 2016-Spring 2017 |Volume 4 1 Neuroscience & Soul dualism) and also a variety of perspectives by other people – the soul – while as to how the immaterial and material demonstrating the physical entity (‘the interact (i.e. interactionism, body’) that is capable of being destroyed by epiphenomenalism, and parallelism). The other people. The last passage uses the term strain of dualism and the variety of ‘dust’ to refer to the body; this is what interaction most synonymous with bipartite returns to the earth in burial, while the and tripartite views are substance ‘spirit’ (a separate entity) returns to God. (Cartesian) dualism and interactionism. A Reading passages like these in plain sense substance dualist is defined as one who strongly suggests an immaterial entity “holds that a normal human being involves contained in each individual. It is also two substances, one a body and the other a suggested in passages like these that this person.”6 Translated to bipartite/tripartite immaterial entity can be in a separate views, this ‘person’ refers to an immortal location than the body. and immaterial soul to Christians. Interactionism is the view that the Dualism in Philosophy immaterial and material causally influence Philosophical arguments for dualism each other; so for the Christian, the soul has can also be translated into arguments for influence over the body and vice versa. bipartite/tripartite views. One argument is called the modal argument. The argument The Lay Christian View – Shaped by can be traced back to Descartes, who claims Scripture that since it is conceivable for the mind to Why do most lay Christians hold a exist apart from the body, one’s mind (or bipartite/tripartite view similar to Cartesian soul, in the case of the Christian) is a thinking? These are a few common biblical different entity than one’s body.7 passages that point to a dualistic view of the Admittedly, the modal argument is human persons, not a particularly robust one; neither are the we are of good courage, and we would other philosophical arguments for dualism. rather be away from the body and at home Complete reducibility of the mind to the with the Lord. (2 Corinthians 5:6 ESV) brain and the rest of the central nervous Do not fear those who kill the body but 8 cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can system has been a recent trend, and destroy both soul and body in hell. (Matthew neuroscience will most likely proceed in this 10:28 ESV) direction, yielding dualism completely And the dust returns to the earth as it was, obsolete from a scientific standpoint. But and the spirit returns to God who gave it. (Ecclesiastes 12:7 ESV) most lay Christians do not use philosophical arguments to guide their faith; Scripture is If one accepts them, these positions make it used as the ultimate source of authority on difficult to refute a bipartite/tripartite view this issue. The Christian philosopher, on the of the human person. In the first passage, other hand, feels compelled to incorporate Paul is explicitly referring to two separate logic and modern scientific/philosophical entities – the person (‘we’) and the body. findings into their biblical criticism, so a This passage is in stark opposition to any disparity has formed between Christians in form of materialism. The second passage the pew and Christian scholars. also seems to suggest an entity untouchable 6 Op. cit. ref. 2 n.p. 8 Op. cit. ref. 2 7 Op. cit. ref. 4 Dialogue & Nexus | Fall 2016-Spring 2017 |Volume 4 2 Neuroscience & Soul The Christian Scholar’s View – Shaped as evidence to support materialistic ideas by Neuroscience since the mind has recently been shown to According to some of today’s most be dependent on the brain. prominent Christian thinkers on this subject, N.T. Wright, in praise of the ideas a serious issue arises for the bipartite/ held by these philosophers, writes in a tripartite thinker – the rise of modern foreword of a collection of Christian neuroscience linking the mind to the brain, materialists’ essays, “The media regularly making obsolete the need for an immaterial report neuroscientific and genetic research entity to allow for consciousness and indicating the interdependence of mind, thoughts. In light of this, these philosophers brain, and body. This outstanding book have resorted to a materialistic (monistic) brings that work into dialogue with profound view of the human body. philosophical analysis and careful attention Nancey Murphy, developed the to relevant biblical texts.”12 philosophy of ‘nonreductive physicalism,’ which maintains a materialistic view of the Limit Questions – Recognizing human body, but claims that humans are not Boundaries completely reducible to their brains. She ties But is the use of neuroscience really the idea of downward causation, a an appropriate means for defending a philosophical concept that mental states materialist view of the human person? For have causal power over biological aspects of someone open to the possibility of a divine the body, into her view to avoid the being (such as a Christian), an appropriate assertion that all human thoughts and approach to the philosophy and practice of behaviors are based solely on science must be taken. One of the best- neurobiological processes.9 Her argument known approaches is called methodological can be summed up in one sentence: “All of naturalism, which is the practice of science the human capacities once attributed to the that limits research to the study of the mind or soul are now being fruitfully studied natural world, leaving supernatural as brain processes – or, more accurately, I phenomena open to possibility but outside should say, processes involving the brain, the scope of science. Several Christian the rest of the nervous system and other scientists and Christian scholars adopt this bodily systems, all interacting with the view. This is opposed to philosophical socio-cultural world.”10 Another Christian naturalism, which states that the natural thinker, Timothy O’Conner, holds a view world is all that exists since any possible called “emergent materialism,” believing supernatural forces have not survived tests that consciousness is an emerging property using the scientific method. Only atheists or of physical aspects of the human body.11 agnostics hold this view since there is no Neither Murphy nor O’Conner possibility of a deity with this worldview. believe in an immaterial soul, but rather hold If methodological naturalism is that one’s conscience is dependent on practiced, neuroscience has no say in physical processes occurring in his or her whether an immaterial soul exists or does body.
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