Progress Towards Nuclear Disarmament? RESEARCH PAPER 10/42 15 June 2010

Progress towards nuclear disarmament? RESEARCH PAPER 10/42 15 June 2010 In April 2009 President Obama set out his vision for a world without nuclear weapons, and in doing so laid the groundwork for renewed international efforts to strengthen and advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Over the past year that momentum has translated into the agreement of a successor to the US-Russia START treaty, global commitments to secure highly vulnerable nuclear materials within four years and the establishment, at the May 2010 Review Conference, of an action plan in support of the three main pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Sustaining that momentum in the future, however, has been recognised as a key challenge for the international community. Continued political leadership will be crucial. This paper seeks to examine the prospects for achieving that vision of ‘global zero’. Claire Taylor Recent Research Papers 10/32 Claimant Count Unemployment in the new (2010) Parliamentary 12.04.10 Constituencies 10/33 Members 1979-2010 28.04.10 10/34 Unemployment by Constituency, May 2010 12.05.10 10/35 Economic Indicators, May 2010 13.05.10 10/36 General Election 2010: Preliminary analysis 18.05.10 10/37 Key issues for the new Parliament 2010 18.05.10 10/38 Social Indicators 25.05.10 10/39 Economic Indicators, June 2010 01.06.10 10/40 Sudan: peace or war, unity or secession? 02.06.10 10/41 Identity Documents Bill [Bill 1 of 2010-11] 04.06.10 Research Paper 10/42 Contributing Authors: Ben Smith (Iran), International Affairs and Defence Section Jon Lunn (North Korea), International Affairs and Defence Section This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. We welcome comments on our papers; these should be e-mailed to [email protected]. ISSN 1368-8456 Contents Summary 1 Background 3 1.1 State Possession of Nuclear Weapons 3 NPT Recognised Nuclear Weapon States 3 De Facto Nuclear Weapon States 10 Aspirant Countries – Iran and Syria? 16 Non-Nuclear Weapon States 19 1.2 Nuclear Arms Control Regime 20 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 22 IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 26 1996 Ruling of the International Court of Justice 28 2 Towards Nuclear Disarmament? 29 2.1 START Successor Treaty 31 2.2 US Nuclear Posture Review 36 2.3 Nuclear Security Summit – April 2010 43 Background 43 Summit Outcomes 45 2.4 UK Position 49 Nuclear Policy under the New Coalition Government 53 2.5 Nuclear Modernisation/Renewal 54 US Nuclear Modernisation 55 Russian Nuclear Modernisation 57 UK Trident Replacement Programme 59 China 63 France 65 India and Pakistan 66 3 Achievements of the NPT Review Conference 2010 68 3.1 Key Points of the Final Declaration 69 4 Prospects for Zero 75 4.1 The Next 10 to 15 Years? 78 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 78 Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) 80 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 83 A Global Convention on Nuclear Weapons 87 IAEA Reform 88 5 List of Abbreviations 91 RESEARCH PAPER 10/42 Summary There are five acknowledged nuclear weapon states: the United States, Russia, the UK, France and China. Israel, India and Pakistan are regarded as de facto nuclear weapon states, having developed a nuclear capability since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force. North Korea is acknowledged as being nuclear capable, although it is not recognised as a nuclear weapon state by the international community. It is widely suspected that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme, and that Syria and possibly Burma have nuclear weapons aspirations, all in contravention of their NPT obligations. More than 180 states have also signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and renounced the development of nuclear weapons. In an attempt to reduce the dangers posed by existing nuclear arsenals and prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, the current international nuclear arms control architecture has evolved, broadly speaking, into three main strands: disarmament, non-proliferation and restrictions on the development of new weaponry. Although several treaties and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives have emerged in the last three decades, including the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties between the US and Russia, the cornerstone of that arms control regime has been the NPT. The objective of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-related technology, further the goal of nuclear disarmament, and promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the heart of the treaty is an implicit bargain between the non-nuclear weapon states which are able to access peaceful nuclear technology while pledging to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapon states which are permitted to possess nuclear weapons, but only if they commit themselves to the principles of nuclear arms control and eventual disarmament. A safeguards system under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency is used to verify compliance and to prevent the diversion of fissile material for use in a weapons programme. The credibility of the NPT regime has come under increasing pressure, however, as the non- nuclear weapon states have consistently accused those possessing nuclear weapons of undermining the ‘grand bargain’ and not doing enough to move disarmament forward. More recently, nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have come to be acknowledged as the two greatest threats to international security in the modern age; while the possibility of a ‘nuclear renaissance’ has prompted proliferation concerns as non-nuclear weapon states look increasingly towards nuclear energy to meet both their energy security needs and address the global challenge of climate change. In the last few years the need to strengthen the NPT, and renew global commitments to disarmament and non-proliferation, have therefore gained ground. Indeed, the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons is one that has been widely advocated, most notably by President Obama during a speech in Prague in April 2009. Over the past year significant progress toward achieving that aim has been made: a new START successor treaty has been agreed, although awaits ratification; efforts to address nuclear security have culminated in an agreement to secure vulnerable nuclear materials within four years and in April 2010 the US published its new Nuclear Posture Review which established the US’s nuclear priorities for the next five to ten years. At the same time, however, all of the nuclear weapon states are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes, including the UK’s Trident replacement programme. Analysts have argued that such programmes undermine the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapon states under the NPT, and effectively neutralise the perception that practical progress toward disarmament is actually being made. 1 RESEARCH PAPER 10/42 In May 2010 the eighth NPT Review Conference was held. The majority of observers expressed a sense of optimism about its prospects and the hope that a consensual Final Declaration on how to move the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward could be successfully reached. Reactions to the measures agreed at that Conference have been mixed however. An agreement to progress the 1995 Resolution on establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction free zone in the Middle East was concluded; along with decisions to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, establish the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol as the verification standard, strengthen nuclear security, and adopt multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the failure of the Review Conference to agree specific measures on non-strategic weapons, harsher penalties for those states that contravene their NPT obligations and/or withdraw from the treaty, or a specific timeframe for disarmament negotiations between the nuclear weapon states, was criticised. For the longer term, and setting aside the school of thought which argues that the abolition of nuclear weapons is a futile aspiration given that they cannot be ‘uninvented’, President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons will ultimately be determined by three things: evolving threat perceptions among states (both inside and outside of the NPT framework); continued political will and how the international community responds to the actions of Iran and North Korea and seeks to engage the nuclear capable states outside of the NPT framework. The importance of establishing the right international conditions to allow states to progress beyond their mutual distrust of each other and pursue real disarmament measures, without also prompting a conventional arms race, cannot therefore be overstated. Arguably, a confidence-building agenda should be the first priority going forward, including broader diplomatic efforts to resolve regional security disputes. In relation to nuclear weapons specifically, complete transparency and the development of an international verification and compliance system that is robust, to the point of virtual perfection, is essential if those states in possession of a nuclear capability are to be instilled with the confidence to finally move toward zero, and indeed stay there. The long term prospects for global zero are therefore highly uncertain.

Load more