I S.C.C. File No. 32603 I IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ALBERTA)

BETWEEN: 1

STY LEANNE DUDLEY, Appellant (Respondent) - and -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, Respondent (Appellant)

JWI BOWRON HENRY S. BROWN, Q.C. Alberta Department of Justice Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Criminal Justice Division Barristers & Solicitors Appeals Branch Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street 3rd Floor, 9833 - 109 Street Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3 Edmonton, AB T5K 2E8 Phone: (613) 233-1781 Phone: (780) 422-5402 Fax: (613) 563-9869 Fax: (780) 422-1 106 Email: lienr~.browii@,gowli~igs.com Email: jim.bowron@,gov.ab.ca

Counsel for the Respondent Ottawa Agent for the Respondent

AKRAM ATTIA & DARYL J. ROYER HJXATHER PERKINS-NICVEY Attia Reeves Tensfeldt Snow Barrister & Solicitor Barristers & Solicitors Suite 402,200 Elgin Street #200,10525 Jasper Avenue Ottawa, ON K2P 1L5 Edmonton, AB T5J 124 Tel : (613) 231-1004 Tel: (780)424-3334 Fax: (6 13) 23 1-4760 Fax: (780) 424-4252 Ernail: perkins-mcvey~sylnpatico.ca Email:

Counsel for the Appellant Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the Appellant TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PART I: RESPONDENT'S POSITON ...... 1

PART II: POINTS IN ISSUE ...... 2

PART Ill: ARGUMENT ...... 3

Section 2(1) of the Identification of Criminals Act. RSC 1985. c . 1-1. as amended and s . 453.3 of the Criminal Code. as amended ...... 3 Section 606 (4) Criminal Code .plea to other offence ...... 7 Section 34(1)(c) .Interpretation Act ...... 11 Preliminary Inquiry...... 14 Conclusion...... 14

PART IV: SUBMISSION ON COSTS ...... 16

PART V: ORDER SOUGHT ...... 17

PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 18

PART VII LEGISLATION ...... 19 Page I

PART I: RESPONDENT'S POSITON

OVERVIEW OF THE RESPONDENT'S POSITllON

I As a matter of statutory interpretation, s. 786 (2) applies only to purely summary conviction offences and not to hybrid offences.

2. It appears that those Courts that had considered the effect of a summary Crown election where the lnformation was sworn more than six months following the date of the alleged offence premised their analysis on the assumption that section 786 of the Criminal Code and section 34 of the Interpretation Act did in fact apply to hybrid offences.

3. While the Courts differed on the consequences flowing from such an election, there did not seem to be any discussion as to whether or not the basic premise behind their analysis was correct.

4. As referred to in the Respondent's factum, a straightforward reading of these sections leads to the conclusion that a hybrid lnformation is 'initiated' under Part XVI of the Code rather than under Part XXVll of the Code. (see paragraphs 74-75 of the Respondents' Factum)

5. While the proceedings under which the lnformation goes through the Courts are governed by the Crown election, a summary election does not affect how the proceeding was initiated. Page 2 I I

PART 11: POINTS IN ISSUE

6. The Points in issue and the position of the Respondent

A Whether as a matter of statutory interpretation, s. 786(2) applies only to purely summary conviction offences, or whether it also applies to hybrid offences (where the Crown may elect to proceed by summary conviction or by indictment).

Response: Based on a straightforward reading of section 786, including section 786(2), and considering how the Courts have dealt with the difference in the effect of an election to proceed either summarily or by indictment on a hybrid offence in other related sections of the Criminal Code, it can be concluded that summary election, while changing the process by which the Court deals with the charge, does not change the underlying character of the offence as indictable. Page 3

PART 111: ARGUMENT

7. The Respondent's conclusory statement at paragraph 88 of its factum takes on more significance in light of the question posed by the Court on this matter. That conclusion was stated as:

Hybrid offences are, by definition, a type of offence where the circumstances of the offence have a wide range of facts that will suppott a conviction. The passage of time, by itself, is not necessarily factor which will show that it is not in the public interest to prosecute.

8. However, because of this Court's analysis and decision in R. v, Karpinski (Tab 15, Appellant's materials), Courts since that time have concentrated on the effects of a summary election, rather than asking whether or not the six month limitation period referred to in s. 786 even applied.

9. In analyzing this issue, it is useful to look at other sections of the Code where the issue of the distinction between indictable, hybrid and straight summary conviction offences is discussed.

Section 2 I of the ldentification of Criminals Act, RSC 1985, c. 1-1, as . amendedI and' s. 453.3 of the Criminal Code, as amended

10. The issue of the relationship between summary and indictable offences with respect to hybrid offences was discussed early on in R. v. ~eare~.That case discussed the interaction of the Bail Reform Act, the Criminal Code, and the ldentification of Criminals Act.

Identification of Cri~nilralsAct, RSC 1985 c. 1-1, s. 2 (Tab 12, Respondent's supplementary materials) 'R. v. Beare 1987 CarswellSask 674, [I9891 1 W.W.R. 97, [I9881 2 S.C.R. 387,45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.) (Tab 2, Respondent's supplementary materials) Page 4

I1 The question in Beare (supra) was whether or not a person could be subject to the requirement to provide physical identification details, pursuant to s. 2 of the

ldentification of Criminals Act, when that person had been given an appearance notice

but no charges had yet been formally laid.

12. The Court looked to what was then section 453.3 (3) of the Criminal Code (now

as s. 501 of the Criminal Code). At that time, that provision read as follows:

An appearance notice or promise to appear or a recognizance entered into before an officer in charge may, where the person is alleged to have committed an indictable offence, require the accused to appear at a time and place stated therein for the purpose of the ldentification of Criminals Act, and a person so appearing is deemed, for the QurDoses only of that Act, to be in lawful custodv charued with an indictable offence. (emphasis added)

13. While not dealing specifically with hybrid offences, one of the purposes identified

by the Court for taking fingerprints was to assist the authorities to decide whether to

proceed by summary conviction or indictment. (see paragraphs 13, 22 and 54) It is

clear, in the Respondent's submission, that if at this point the appearance notice,

promise to appear or recognizance was issued respecting a hybrid offence, the offence

was deemed to be indictable.

14. Section 453.3 was amended in the consolidation of the Criminal Code in 1985,

and re-numbered as section 501(3) of the Criminal Code, although retaining the same

wording. Page 5

15. That wording was changed in 1992 in section 69 of the Contraventions A&.

While adding references to s. 50 of the Contraventions Act, that amendment eliminated the phrase9'anda person so appearing is deemed, for the purposes only of that Act, to be in lawful custody charged with an indictable offence." It now reads:

(3) An appearance notice issued by a peace officer or a promise to appear given to, or a recognizance entered into before an officer in charge may require the accused to appear at a time and place stated in it for the purposes of the ldentification of Criminals Act, where the accused is alleged to have committed an indictable offence and, in the case of an offence designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act, the Attorney General of Canada has not elected under section 50 of that Act that the proceeding be dealt with and disposed of as if it had been commenced by filing a ticket.

16. What the amendment did not do was remove the ability to require fingerprints in a hybrid offence where the Crown elected, either at the time of filing the Information or later, to proceed on the matter by summary conviction.

17. The British Columbia Court of Appeal visited this issue in R. v. connors4 In that case the accused had given his fingerprints in 1993 when charged with the hybrid offence of impaired driving. The Court concluded that, pursuant to the provisions of the Interpretation Act, the accused was charged with an indictable offence even though the Crown later elected to proceed in a summary fashion.

18. At paragraph 69 of the decision, Cumming J.A. stated:

1691 Counsel for the Appellant submits that the passage from the headnote to 'R. v. ToorJ(cites omitted) quoted by Seaton J. A. in 'R. v. B.' is correct save for the concluding phrase "until the Crown otherwise electsJJ.At least for the purposes of the ldentification of Criminals Act the term "indictable offenceJJincludes offences which may be prosecuted summarily, but they retain their character as indictable offences no matter

Corzfraventiorrs Act, SC 1992, c. 47, s. 69 (Tab 11, Respondent's supplementary materials) R. v. Corrrzors 1998 Carswelll3C 54,121 C.C.C. (3d) 358, 166 W.A.C. 1, [I9981 8 W.W.R. 421 (B.C.C.A.) (Tab 3, Respondent's Supplementary Materials) Page 6

how the Crown elects. The Crown election has an impact ~rocedurallvon how and in what court the charge proceeds and, as well, on the maximum penalty that may be imposed, but does not change the character of the offence. It remains an indictable offence. I agree. (emphasis added)

19. Cumming J.A. goes on to re-emphasize that interpretation at paragraph 73:

[73] .. . The lnterpretation Act is not substantive legislation. It neither extends nor restricts substantive powers and rights. Rather, the lnterpretation Act merely sets out the rules which govern the drafting and interpretation of statutes. One of those rules is that wherever the phrase "indictable offence" occurs in federal legislation, it shall be read to mean "offence which may be prosecuted by indictmen f", that is: an "offence which is either purely indictable or which the Crown may elect to proceed either by indictment or by summary conviction."

20. Finally, in response to the argument that the fingerprints should be destroyed after the Crown had elected summary conviction, Cumming J.A. stated at paragraph 77: [77] . .. With respect to the second point, as 1 have already indicated in the preceding section of these reasons, a hybrid offence is by virtue of s. 34(1) of the lnterpretation Act an indictable offence regardless of the election of the Crown. The Crown's election affects the procedure which will be used at trial and the penalties which will be available upon conviction, but it does not change the nature of the offence itself. (emphasis added)

21. Both authors of separate opinions in that case supported Cumming J.A.'s conclusion that hybrid offences are indictable offences within the meaning of the Act. (Donald J.A. at paragraph 106 and Newbury J.A. at paragraph I18)

22. It should be noted that the phrase contained in the earlier version of s. 501(3) of the Criminal Code, 'for the purposes only of that Act" was in force with respect to the analysis in Beare (supra) and Connors (supra) That section was amended in 1992, and now reads 'where the accused is alleged to have committed an indictable offence.

Contravetztio~zsAct, SC 1992, c. 47, s. 68 (Tab 10, Respondent's supplementary materials) Page 7

23. The removal of the limiting phrase, "for the purposes only of that Act" should be taken to mean that the decision of the B.C.C.A. in Connors can be extended to interpretations beyond that referred to in that case.

24. A search of Hansard does not show any debate on this particular amendment, and therefore there is no direct indication of a contrary Parliamentary intent. That amendment was contained in Bill C-46 and was assented to on October I5fh, 1992 as the Contraventions Act (supra).

Section 606 (4) Criminal Code - plea to other offence

25. During discussion of this issue at the oral hearing on March 18, questions were raised regarding the interaction of section 606(4) and section 786 (2) of the Criminal Code. Section 606 (4) states:

606 (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, where an accused or defendant pleads not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the offence charged but guilty of any other offence arising out of the same transaction, whether or not it is an included offence, the court may, with the consent of the prosecutor, accept that plea of guilty and if the plea is accepted, the court shall find the accused or defendant not guilty of the offence charged and find him guilty of the offence in respect of which the plea of guilty was accepted and enter those findings in the record of the Court.

26. It should also be noted that the present wording, guilty of any other offence arising out of the same transaction' was added through Bill C-18, later named the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1984, assented to on June 1o", 1984. The previous section was section 534, which did not include that phrase. A review of the Parliamentary debates and the House and Senate Committee hearings respecting this amendment do not show that the addition of this phrase was commented upon as the Bill passed through Parliament. Page 8

27. One of the issues that arose from pleas entered pursuant to this section involved a plea or a finding of guilt to a summary conviction offence where the original offence was a straight indictable offence. In that situation the question arose as to whether an appeal would be to the summary conviction appeal court or to the Court of Appeal.

28. Although not strictly a 606(4) situation, the Manitoba Court of Appeal discussed a similar issue in R. v. ~aworsk?. In that case the accused had been tried in a summary fashion on an indictable offence. The trial court however concluded that the sum of money involved resulted in the offence being a summary conviction offence rather than an indictable one. The accused appealed to the summary conviction court, and the Manitoba Court of Appeal concluded that the appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal. At paragraphs 16 -18, the Court explained:

16. In my opinion, it is not the nature of the conviction but the nature of the proceedings that determines the forum for appeal. 17. The only proceedings before the learned magistrate were under part XVI and consequently, regardless of the nature of the conviction, the appeal was to this court. 18. The finding of the learned Queen's Bench judge would require the County Court judge to hear a trial de novo upon an information charging an indictable offence, a jurisdiction not given to a County Courtjudge.

(see also R. v. ~nowlton~)

29. The issue was more directly dealt with in R. v. ~ains~.In that case, the accused had been charged with the indictable offence of dangerous driving causing death.

R. v. Yaworski 1959 CarswellMan 32,28 W.W.R. 607,3 1 C.R. 55,124 CCC 151 (Man. C.A.) (Tab 7, Respondent's supplementary materials) R. v. Knowlton 1967 CarswellAlta 38,60 W.W.R. 253 (Alta. District Court) (Tab 4, Respondent's Supplementary materials) R. v. Baiizs 2007 CarswellBC 1554,2007 BCSC 957,52 M.V.R. (5th) 158 (BCSC) (Tab 1, Respondent's supplementary materials) Page 9

However, under s. 606(4) a guilty plea was entered to a provincial summary conviction offence. (careless driving)

30. Crown Counsel had suggested that Yaworski (supra) didn't apply and any appeal should be to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court because a plea under 606(4) to a summary conviction appeal offence transformed the indictable proceedings to summary conviction proceedings. (at paragraph 8)

31. The Court disagreed, saying at paragraph 10:

(10) Moreover, it is clear on the language in s. 606(4) that if the judge * hearing the matter accepts the guilty plea to the lesser included or other offence, he or she must find the accused not guilty of the offence charged, which in the present case was an indictable offence. That being so, the court acting under 606(4) must continue to act under the proceedings arising from the offence charged, not under new proceedings arising from the offence pleaded to. In those circumstances, it cannot be arcrued that a plea under 606 (4) to a summary conviction offence transforms the proceedinas into summary conviction pleadinas enaaaina part WWll of the Code relatina to summary conviction appeals. (emphasis added)

32. In R. v. L.auweryssenQthe question was whether or not s. 606(4) allowed a Court to take a plea to a provincial regulatory offence where the charge before the Court was under the Criminal Code. The original charge before the Court was a charge of dangerous driving, and came before a provincial Court judge for plea. On an application for mandamus with certiorari in aid, Sulatycky J, of the Court of Queen's Bench concluded that Parliament had added the word 'defendant' to that section in 1985 and thus intended that a judge could accept a plea to a provincial regulatory offence under s. 606 (4) of the Criminal Code. (at paragraphs 2-3)

R. v. Lauweryssen1992 CarsweltAlta 256,41 M.V.R. (2d) 305 (Alta. Q.B.) (Tab 5, Respondent's supplementary materials) Page 10

33. The Court pointed out that the relevant provisions of the Provincial Offences . Procedure ~ct"were incorporated to allow provincial offenses to be covered by that section. Accordingly, the accused could plead guilty to a summary conviction Provincial offence when facing an offence initiated as an indictable Criminal Code offence.

34. The present relevant section of Alberta's Provincial Offences Procedure Act reads as follows: Application of Criminal Code 3 Except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this Act and subject to the regulations, all provisions of the Criminal Code (Canada), including the provisions in Part XV respecting search warrants, that are applicable in any manner to summary convictions and related proceedinas apply in respect of every matter to which this Act applies (emphasis added)

35. Much of the discussion regarding the purpose of the amendment to section 786 (2) was based on a question similar to '[wlhy would a person consent to the Crown laying a summary conviction offence where without that consent the Information would be time barred?"

36. An answer to that question is found in these cases. In Bains (supra) and Lauweryssen (supra) the conclusion of the Court stating that the appeal should be heard by the Court of Appeal rather than the Summary Conviction Appeal Court also raises other questions. For example, does the maximum fine for the provincial offence bind the superior court dealing when it accepts a plea to a summary conviction/provinciaI offence under s. 606(4), or is the summary conviction/provinciaI offence maximum merely a guideline? Is the conviction recorded on a Criminal Record as a Criminal Code offence, or at all?

--

'O Proviizcial Offences Procedure Act c. P-34, s. 3 (Tab 13, Respondent's supplementary materials) Page I I

37. It is clear, in the Respondent's submission, that it would be to the benefit of the accused if the Crown could lay a summary conviction/provinciaI offence (which in these cases would almost certainly be outside the six month limitation date) so that the accused could then plead to the provincial offence summary offence simpliciter, rather than as an 'other offence' under section 606(4). In these circumstances as well it would appear appropriate to allow the Crown to re-elect to summary procedure from an earlier indictable election for the same reasons.

38. As with the plea to the 'other offence' in 606 (4) both the Crown and accused have to agree on this procedure under section 786(2). That agreement is not required in any other circumstance where the Crown makes its election to proceed either by summary conviction or by indictment.

Section 34(l)(c) - Interpretation Act

39. This subsection was briefly discussed in the Respondent's factum at paragraph

73 (there referred to as s. 786(3)).

40. Based on the cases where the courts have concluded that the character of the offence remains indictable despite the Crown's election to proceed summarily, or where a plea is entered to a summary conviction offence pursuant to s. 606(4), this sub- section becomes more useful.

41 . For ease of reference, that subsection is re-copied here: 34(1) (c) If the offence is one for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment or for which he is punishable on summary conviction, no person shall be considered to have been convicted of an indictable offence by reason only of having been convicted of the offence on summary conviction. Page 12

42. Although it appears on first glance to be directed to hybrid offences, it is the

Respondent's submission that it could also be applied to any situation where the accused is facing an indictable charge but ends up pleading to a charge that is punishable on summary conviction under s. 606(4) or pursuant to a Crown re-election to summary conviction. It is, as referred to in Parliament, a 'safeguarding' provision. (see paragraph 73 of the Respondent's factum)

43. The wording in this subsection is also important in concluding that.an indictable charge retains its character whether or not the Crown elects to proceed summarily initially, re-elects to proceed summarily or an accused pleads guilt to a summary charge under s. 606(4).

44. Ruth Sullivan, in her textbook "Statutory lnterpretationl'" in Chapter 9, entitled

Textual Analysis'discusses two interpretive guides that are applicable here.

45. First, under heading F., she says that 'every word must be given meaning':

Each word is expected to make a distinct and meaningful contribution to the legislative rule or scheme. Since the idea of improper taking of benefit was already covered by other words in the provision, a different function had to be assigned to the word "corruptly". The word had to be given a distinct meaning as close as possible to its ordinary meaning, but one that fit the context and reflected some plausible idea or purpose.

46. Second, under heading G. Ch. 9, at page 185, titled "Same words, same meaning - different words, different meanings" she states:

In light of this principle (from R. v. Zeolkowski [I9891 1 S.C.R. 1378 at 1387), and the legislature's preference for uniform expression, it follows that different words appearing in the same statute should be given a different meaning.

" R. Sullivan, Stattitoiy Iizterpretntioiz (2nd ed.) (Irwin Law Inc, Toronto ON, 2007), Heading F and Heading G (Tab 9, Respondent's supplementary materials) Page 13

47. In section 34(1)(c), the reference to indictable matters is phrased as "prosecuted by indictment', while the reference to summary conviction is phrased as 'punishable on summary conviction. >'The section continues on to say that 'no person shall be considered to have been convicted of an indictable offence by reason only of having been convicted of the offence on summary conviction."

48. On Ms. Sullivan's analysis, there has to be a reason why the phrase 'punishable on summary conviction' rather than 'prosecuted by summary conviction'. That choice of wording in the subsection is best interpreted as confirming that an offence maintains its indictable character but that this section is added to ensure that the deeming provision in subsection (i) will not apply to certain consequences that would usually flow from an indictable conviction. If a summary election negated the 'deeming' provision in s. 34(1) (a), this subsection would not have been needed as a 'safeguarding' provision. (see also Pierre-Andr6 C6t6, The'lnterpretation of Statutes, Third Edition, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2: Uniformity of expression at page 33212)

! 49. This interpretation accords with those cases that have found that the Crown's summary election does not change the nature of the offence, but only affects the penalty range and the procedure by which the matter proceeds through the Court system.

50. Section 34(1) (c) therefore covers a Crown summary election, a re-election and a plea under section 606(4) to a summary conviction offence.

Pierre-Andr6 C6t6, The Interpretation of Statutes, Third Edition, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2: Uniformity of expression at page 332 (Tab 8, Respondent's Supplementary Materials) Page 14 1 I

Preliminary Inquiry

51. In the Respondent's Factum, it had been suggested that the consent of the accused to proceed summarily in 786 (2) might have been enacted to preserve the accused's right to a preliminary inquiry. (at paragraph 89) It is trite law to say that the accused had no such choice where the Crown elects to proceed summarily at the initial appearance.

52. However, this Court has recently ruled in R. v. S.J. LG'~that there is no 'right' to a preliminary inquiry in a prosecution under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, essentially confirming earlier decisions to the same effect in relation to adult proceedings.

53. Therefore, in the Respondent's submission, fairness to the accused is not adversely affected if the six month limitation period contained in section 786 is restricted to straight summary conviction offences.

Conclusion

54. Because the hybrid 'proceeding' was 'instituted' under Part XVI of the Criminal Code, rather than under Part XXVII, a plain reading of that section, in the context of the organization of the Criminal Code, results in the conclusion that the six month limitation period set out in Part XXVll of the Code does not apply to hybrid offences.

55. Beginning with R. v. Karpinski (supra), the courts have dealt with this issue without considering whether or not the six month limitation actually applied to hybrid offences. Thus, in analyzing that decision, various lines of authority developed that resulted in different outcomes when this Crown 'error' on election was made.

l3 R. v. S.J. L-G 2009 CarswellQue 2298,2009 SCC 14 at paras. 21-22 majority decision, para. 89 of dissent (S.C.C.) (Tab 6, Respondent's Supplementary Materials) Page 15

56. These different outcomes resulted in various 'ad hod attempts to resolve the resulting problems. The decisions varied between treating the Crown election as a nullity to a conclusion that the error in election resulted in an unanswerable defence to the charge.

57. If this Honourable Court concludes that the section 786 six month limitation does not apply to hybrid offence none of these 'ad hoc' resolutions will be needed.

58. This conclusion is not simply 'results oriented'. In the Respondent's submission, this conclusion arises logically from a plain reading of the sections of the Criminal Code and Interpretation Act in light of the cases referred to in these Supplementary materials.

59. If the Court instead concludes that s.786 does apply, the Respondent reverts to its argument and Prayer for Relief as set out in its original Factum. Page 16

PART IV: SUBMISSION ON COSTS

60. Not applicable. Page 17

PART V: ORDER SOUGHT

61. The Respondent asks that the appeal be dismissed.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21 st day of April, 2009.

Counsel for the Respondent The Attorney General of Alberta Page 18

PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PARAGRAPH CASE LAW TAB NO. REFERENCE

R. v. Bains 2007 CarswellBC 1554, 2007 BCSC 957, 52 M.V.R. (5th) I58 (BCSC) 1

R. v. Beare 1987 Carswellsask 674, [I9891 1 W.W.R. 97, [I9881 2 S.C.R. 387,45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 2 (S.C.C.)

R. v. Connors 1998 CarswellBC 54, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 358,166 W.A.C. 1, [I9981 8 W.W.R. 421 3 (B.C.C.A.)

R. v. Knowlton I967 CarswellAlta 38, 60 W.W.R. 253 (Alta. District Court) 4

R. v. Lauweryssenl992 CarswellAlta 256,41 M.V.R. (2d) 305 (Alta. Q.B.) 5

R. v. S.J. L-G 2009 CarswellQue 2298,2009 SCC 14 at paras 21-22 majority decision, para 89 of 6 dissent (S.C.C.)

R. v. Yaworski 1959 CarswellMan 32,28 W.W.R. 607,31 C.R. 55, 124 CCC 151 (Man. C.A.) 7 28,30

ARTICLES AND TEXTS TAB NO. REFERENCE

Pierre-Andre C6te, The lnterpretation of Statutes, Third Edition, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2: Uniformity 8 of expression at page 332

R. Sullivan, Statutory lnterpretation (2nd ed .) (Irwin Law Inc, Toronto ON, 2007), Heading F and 9 Heading G Page 19

PART VII LEGISLATION

PARAGRAPH TAB NO. REFERENCE

Contraventions Act, SC 1992, c. 47, s. 68 I0 22

Contraventions Act, SC 1992, c. 47, s. 69 I1 15

Identification of Criminals Act, RSC 1 985 c. 1-1 , s. 2 12 10,11

Provincial Offences Procedure Act c. P-34, s. 3 13 33,34