The Spanish Foreign Legion in the Spanish Civil War, 1936

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THE Spanish Foreign Legion

IN THE Spanish Civil War

1936

José E. Álvarez

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI PRESS Columbia Copyright © 2016 by The Curators of the University of Missouri University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65211 Printed and bound in the United States of America All rights reserved. First printing, 2016.

ISBN: 978-0-8262-2083-7 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016937222

This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984.

Typefaces: Sabon and Valentina For Caballero Legionario D. Alejandro Zamacola Monis

Contents

List of Illustrations / ix List of Maps / xi Foreword / xiii Acknowledgments / xix

Introduction / 1 In Spanish Morocco / 13 The Legion Arrives in Andalusia / 27 On the Road to Madrid / 39 Mérida / 61 The Breach of Death: Badajoz / 67 The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe / 83 September 1936 / 93 The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo / 121 From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 / 129 The Madrid Front, November 1936 / 147 The Madrid Front, December 1936 / 173 With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front / 181 With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front / 193 Conclusion / 213

Notes / 219 Bibliography / 275 Index / 283

Illustrations

All photos are courtesy of the Archivo de La Legión

1. Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Castejón / 31 2. Legionnaires in Constantina / 48 3. General Francisco Franco with Colonel Juan Yagüe in Seville / 54 4. Machine-gun squad in Mérida / 64 5. Legionnaires entering Toledo / 124 6. Legionnaires advancing on the Madrid front / 151 7. Legionnaires transported on trucks / 182 8. Sappers and officers of the Third Bandera in Asturias / 195

Maps

All maps are by Chris Robinson

1. Spain Divided, July–August 1936 / 29 2. Advance on Madrid, September–November 1936 / 41 3. Assault on Madrid, November 1936 / 155 4. The Guipúzcoa Front, August–September 1936 / 183 5. The Asturian Front, October–December 1936 / 194

Foreword

“Speak of me as I am. Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice.” Othello’s appeal might well be invoked by the Spanish Foreign Legion, also known as El Tercio. Few military forces have been so comprehen- sively vilified; fewer still have been systematically analyzed. Álvarez thus presents a study unique in English and unusual in Spanish: an account of the Legion’s crucial, indeed decisive, role in the Spanish Civil War. Between July and December 1936 this force of fewer than four thousand men, organized in only six battalions, or banderas, enabled the consolidation of the Nationalist revolt against the Spanish Republic, spearheaded a lightning offensive that secured Nationalist control of half the country, confirmed its exponential superiority as a combat force over the republic’s improvised levies, and established a nearly mythical reputation for ferocity that endures to this day. That is quite a legacy, military and cultural. Álvarez takes an operational perspective to explore the Legion’s underlying realities in two con- texts. The first is from the greater world of politics and political ideology. The Spanish Republic was unusually skilled at demonizing its opponents, and the Spanish Foreign Legion was a nearly perfect target. Created in 1920 as an instrument of empire for deployment in Spanish Morocco, the Legion had always stood apart from the rest of the Spanish Army. It had never been deployed in Spain until 1934, when a leftist-inspired revolution against the newly established republican government led to the dispatch of two of its banderas to the province of Asturias. The legionnaires pacified the region quickly and brutally, leaving behind more than a thousand casualties and an immense destruction of property. They returned to Africa with an evil reputation, reinforced by a government

xiii xiv | Foreword eager to disassociate itself from the unsavory details accompanying its counterinsurgency. When the Legion came to Spain again in 1936, this time as part of the Nationalist revolt, its infamy preceded it—and was reinforced by the relative ease with which the Legion’s banderas eviscerated their opponents. To explain this in terms of inadequate command, training, and discipline was impossible for a republic hanging on almost day by day. Instead the Legion was cast as an alien force: victorious only by systematically violat- ing every rule and convention of warfare. This isolation of the Spanish Foreign Legion was completed by the formation of the republic’s International Brigades. As these rapidly became, for publicity purposes, the heroic focal point of the republic’s military effort, the Legion found a new place as the brigades’ evil counterpart. The process was facilitated by the nearly universal conflation of the Span- ish Foreign Legion with the French Foreign Legion. Both were described as composed of outcasts from the four corners of the globe: mercenary aliens with murky pasts and no futures. This image had little to do in reality with a Spanish Legion that was almost entirely indigenous in composition and whose internal dynamic was as far from the French “legion of the damned” as it was possible to get. But the image contributed heavily to the Republican depiction of the Nationalists as alien—not belonging to the “real” Spain. The image has also survived, particularly in English-language works on the war. If these were the megamyths surrounding the Spanish Foreign Legion, what were the microrealities from the lesser world of barracks and battlefield? The Legion was created when Spain’s military reputation was at its nadir, after a series of unredeemed disasters in Morocco. The Legion’s dynamic was intended to be the exact opposite of a peninsular army that appeared to have forgotten how to fight and was lost to shame and dis- honor. The Legion was tailored to the specific conditions of Morocco, where the Rif War of the early 1920s had evolved at the sharp end into a no-quarter death grapple of raid and reprisal. Strict discipline, pitiless toughness, and ferocity in combat character- ized the Spanish Foreign Legion from its inception, and those qualities were embedded in a cult of elitism. The Legion’s historical aspects evoked the Spanish Army of the early modern era, the formidable tercios (regiments). The Legion’s Catholicism was more an institutional signifier than Foreword | xv a theological conviction. Pay and food in the Legion were significantly better than in either the regular army or most unskilled civilian jobs. The Legion’s ranks in 1936 were filled not by ideologically motivated foes of the republic but by men who joined for the same reasons that elite forces still attract recruits: to escape civilian routines, to serve under authorities one can respect, to test oneself against extreme demands, and, not least, just for the hell of it! Álvarez goes so far as to speak of the Legion’s institutional “necrophilia”: its motto of “Long live death,” its public self-image as the “betrothed of death,” and its signature bugle call, “Legionnaires to fight, legionnaires to die.” The ethos of the Legion strongly resembles that of the matador, to someone outside both of those subcultures: the ultimate contest is not with the bull or another adversary but with the self, culminating in a moment of truth that calls for the ultimate in discipline, training, courage, and will. Violence and brutality were thus central to the Spanish Foreign Le- gion’s culture from its formation, and this fitted admirably into the Na- tionalist policy of pacification by fear and terror. The Legion’s policy toward taking prisoners resembled that of the Japanese Army in China: accepting surrender was a matter of circumstance and convenience. Be- hind the lines, Legion participation in large-scale arrests and mass executions were the norm, frequently justified as reprisals for the behavior of Republican mobs or authorities, but a good deal more systematic. Arrest was accompanied by equally systematic looting. Such plunder had been a recognized perquisite during the Rif War. The Regulares, the Moroccan soldiers recruited by Spain to fight alongside the Legion, were (like their French counterparts) expected to supplement their pay with booty. Nor were the legionnaires behind the Regulares in their treatment of “captives whom their right hand possessed”—that is, any women who took the soldiers’ fancy. The Spanish Foreign Legion, in short and to say the least, did not bear a clean shield. What it did do was apply for the first time a method of making war that has repeatedly redrawn the map of Europe and the world: motorized war. Blitzkrieg is so often linked to mechanization, the large-scale use of armored fighting vehicles, that it becomes easy to overlook the more fundamental role of the internal-combustion engine. The Spanish Army of Africa was anything but a center of modern transport technology. Mules were the basic load bearers in Africa, but xvi | Foreword when deployed to Spain the army faced two fundamental problems: a massive imbalance with the number of adversaries, and a dispropor- tionate amount of ground to secure. The Spanish Republic maintained much of the framework of the peninsular army, supplemented and then swamped by a motley collection of militias whose enthusiasm offered at least the potential of developing combat effectiveness. The Nationalists had the Legion, about the same number of Regulares, and the odds and ends of the peninsular units in southern Spain that had neither remained loyal to the republic nor been disarmed and disbanded. What the Nationalists also possessed was a legacy, earned at a high price in Morocco, of seizing and maintaining the initiative. Franco organized his forces into a varying number of columns, usually built around a bandera of the Legion, a tabor (battalion) of the Regulares, and a battery or so of artillery along with a few engineers from the peninsular army—three or four thousand men, at most, and a few light guns. With a mixed bag of commandeered cars and trucks securing operational mobility, the tactical skill and fighting spirit of the Moroccan troops at the sharp end, and the Legion at the core, the Nationalists conducted a bril- liant campaign of “shock and awe,” shifting forces from one vital sector to another with what to their opponents seemed preternatural quickness and impact. Álvarez brilliantly demonstrates how Nationalist speed and striking power consistently neutralized the republic’s numerical superiority and popular support by controlling the Republican observation-decision- action loop. It was a case study in the principle of quality over quantity that was enunciated in Germany during the 1920s by Hans von Seeckt and applied in developed forms from the Wehrmacht (German Army) blitzkrieg of 1940 to the US crushing of Iraq in 2003. And it almost succeeded. Three things finally blunted the Spanish Foreign Legion’s cutting edge. The first was the shift in operational conditions. The open country of southern Spain gave way to broken and built-up terrain that drew the Legion into the kind of attritional, head-on fighting to which it was ill adapted. The battle for Madrid is the best but far from the only example. In turn, the Legion suffered a level of casualties it could not replace because it remained a volunteer force. An increasing percentage of its replacements were enthusiastically committed to the Nationalist cause, but the training and the experience of the old hands in the hospitals and the cemeteries could not be replaced. Finally, the Republican army bridged, although it never quite closed, the gap in tactical effectiveness that had Foreword | xvii given the Legion so many opportunities in the war’s early months. The Legion remained an elite instrument of war, but it was no longer an instrument of victory. Nevertheless, the Spanish Foreign Legion shaped history to a degree beyond that of any other fighting force of its size—since, perhaps ironi- cally, the days of the conquistadors.

Dennis E. Showalter

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following Spanish military historical institutions (archives) for their assistance in the writing of this book: the Servicio Histórico Militar in Madrid and the Archivo General Militar in Segovia. I am most deeply indebted to the following, also in Spain, for their assistance and friendship: Ramón Candil, Guillermo Rocafort Pérez, Ma- jor Paco Sacristán Romero of the Regulares de Ceuta No. 54, Colonel Miguel Ballenilla y García de Gamarra, Colonel Juan Ignacio Salafranca Álvarez (for the photos, which are courtesy of the Archivo de La Legión), and Néstor Cerdá Cerdá. I would like to especially thank Dr. Shannon E. Fleming in the United States for taking the time to painstakingly look over the manuscript and provide me with invaluable comments and suggestions. In addition, Drs. Stanley G. Payne, Wayne H. Bowen, and R. Geoff Jensen and retired Spanish Army Colonel of Cavalry Antonio J. Candil Muñoz provided me with sound advice and assistance. Special thanks go to my major professor at Florida State University, Dr. Peter P. Garretson, and my old friend, Dr. John P. Dunn, for their advice and encouragement in the completion of this book. Finally, a special nod of thanks goes to my wife, Caroline, for her help with technical issues related to the preparation of this book, and to Chris Robinson for drawing the maps in the book.

xix

The Spanish Foreign Legion in the Spanish Civil War, 1936

Introduction

This book is a narrative history of the decisive role played by the Spanish Foreign Legion—or El Tercio (The Regiment), as it was then known— during the first six months of the Spanish Civil War. The book’s argument is that the deployment of the colonial-based Spanish Army of Africa, particularly its highly professional and battle-tested Foreign Legion and Moroccan Regulares (Moroccan troops commanded by Spanish officers), determined the initial success of the uprising against the Second Spanish Republic in 1936 and, moreover, defined the future course of the war. This deployment was facilitated by the fact that the military and right- wing conspirators were well positioned in Spain’s Moroccan protectorate and thus were able to secure it for their cause in just forty-eight hours. This gave the plotters a safe base of operations that supported the more general uprising, the Alzamiento, on the peninsula. If loyal protectorate military commanders and governmental administrators had been more competent and decisive in their actions when the uprising began, the rebellion in Spanish Morocco might have been confined to a few military installations and crushed. As the government maintained control of most of the navy and air force, it could have responded with effective shelling and bombing of the North African coastal presidios of Melilla, Ceuta, Alhucemas, and Larache. In short, Madrid and Tetuán (the capital of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco), were equally caught off guard by the uprising and were dilatory in responding appropriately to the threat. Had the government moved with alacrity and resolution, the July 1936 rebellion could have ended differently, similar to the attempted putsch by General José Sanjurjo Sacanell in 1932. In addition to the Legion’s military importance to the rebels during the critical first months of the war, the Legion would also come to symbolize

1 2 | Introduction the Nationalist cause in other ways for both its supporters and its enemies. With its fearsome reputation for brutality and savagery gained during the Rif War of 1921–1927 in Morocco and the Asturian uprising of October 1934 in Spain, the Legion, along with the Moroccan Regu- lares, was a powerful propaganda tool used by the Nationalists to intimidate and terrorize its enemies. Furthermore, the Legion played a major role in shaping the political context of Franciso Franco’s ascent to commander in chief (and then dic- tator) and the cultural-social context of Francoist propaganda. But this political and sociocultural effectiveness rested on the battlefield successes of the Legion; without the latter, the former would not have been possible. For this reason, this narrative history of the Legion’s operations is important not only for explaining how the war unfolded during the crucial early months but also for shedding light on other realms. Republican ineffectiveness combined with luck, efficient organization, and the commitment of a number of high-ranking officers, particularly within the ranks of the Legion and the Regulares, ensured the initial success of the uprising in Spanish Morocco. Even more crucial was that the rebels were eventually able to transfer by air and sea a considerable number of well-trained and effective Army of Africa troops to the peninsula in support of their cause. Moreover, General Franco, the cautious but perhaps the most respected and notable military figure in Spain at that point, was able to relocate to rebel-held Tetuán from the Canary Islands to take command of this army. Given his reputation both within and outside Spain, he was able to obtain invaluable aid from the Italians and Germans during the first critical weeks of the rebellion. They would initially provide Franco with aircraft to undertake the troop transfer from Spanish Morocco to Andalusía and later to furnish him with men and materiel to support the Nationalist war effort. In the forefront of Nationalist operations, the Army of Africa moved north from Seville to Madrid in five months, carrying out a strategy of brutal pacification and punishment that sowed fear and terror among the local populations and the Republican defenders. Violence and the use of “white terror,” as General Emilio Mola Vidal called it, was an integral part of the Army of Africa’s modus operandi as it executed repeated acts of brutality and revenge in towns and villages where leftists (e.g., socialists, communists, and anarchists) had earlier perpetrated acts of torture, incarceration, and murder against those associated with right-wing or Introduction | 3 conservative organizations (e.g., monarchists, middle-class citizens, and clerics). Violence and terror on both sides, based on political ideology or identification, was quite intense during the first months of the war. It continued throughout the war and into the early years of the Franco regime. In order to gain a proper perspective on how and why the Spanish For- eign Legion played such a crucial role in General Franco and the Nation- alists’ eventual success in 1939, one must look back to the founding of this elite military organization. Modeled to a large degree on its French predecessor, the Spanish Foreign Legion was created by Lieutenant Colo- nel José Millán Astray, a professional soldier and an africanista (a Span- iard in favor of Morocco’s colonization) to provide disciplined, front-line fighters for Spain’s colonial wars in northern Morocco. The other name for the Legion, El Tercio, was chosen in homage to the supposedly in- vincible Spanish infantry tercios (regiments) of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Legion’s formation was authorized by King Alfonso XIII in Jan- uary 1920, and the unit accepted its first recruits on September 20, its subsequent anniversary day. The Spanish presidio of Ceuta (in Morocco) became its first recruitment center as well as its principal headquarters. Its training base was located at Dar Riffien, approximately four miles outside Ceuta. Whereas the more famous French Foreign Legion exclu- sively recruited foreigners, the Spanish version was made up mostly of Spanish volunteers. By asserting that a well-trained and battle-tested Legion would reduce the need to send more Spanish conscripts to Spanish Morocco, Millán Astray convinced military and governmental officials of the need for this new military organization. It was also Millán Astray who imbued the Legion with his own personal beliefs of honor, obedience, loyalty, and fervent Catholicism. Moreover, his fixations on the Japanese Bushido (warrior) Code and necrophilia were reflected in the Legion’s motto of “Long live death!”, the reference to the “betrothed of death” (what the legionnaires called themselves), and the Legion’s bugle call of “Legion- naires to fight, legionnaires to die.” Millán Astray created an organization known for its strict discipline, ferocity in battle, and heartless brutality, not only toward its opponents but even toward its own enlisted men. The twelve-point Legionnaires’ Creed consisted of the values and ideals of the model legionnaire and 4 | Introduction the rules by which he had to comport himself and live by as a gentleman legionnaire. Millán Astray personally chose the combat veteran Major Francisco Franco Bahamonde to serve as his deputy and to command the Legion’s First Bandera (battalion). Later, after the death in battle on June 5, 1923, of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Valenzuela Urzaiz, the second commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Franco became the Legion’s third commander. And although it was Millán Astray who founded the Legion in 1920, it would be Franco who would reap its benefits in the long run, both in crushing the Asturian rebellion of 1934 and deploying these forces in 1936 at the start of the Civil War and beyond. The Legion was originally composed of three banderas, and each was made up of two rifle companies and one machine-gun company. During the Rif War, against the Riffian leader Mohamed Abd-el-Krim, the Le- gion expanded to eight banderas while adding an additional rifle company to each battalion. The Legion wore a distinctive uniform and was better paid, fed, and trained than the regular Spanish Army troops. The Legion also had the capability to operate either as a separate army on its own or as part of the regular army during major operations.1 At first the Legion accepted a few English-speaking volunteers who had served in World War I, and after the Battle of Annual disaster in the Rif War in 1921—in which an estimated eight thousand Spanish soldiers were killed by the Riffians in the worst colonial military defeat in history—hundreds of Latin Americans joined the Legion’s ranks. Also, because of the economic hardships suffered by Germany in 1923, dozens of jobless Germans joined the Spanish Foreign Legion. Along with the Regulares, the Legion became the shock troops of the Spanish Army during the Rif War, fighting 845 battles and suffering 2,000 dead, 6,096 wounded, and 285 missing. With the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic in April 1931, the new minister of war, Manuel Azaña Díaz, a scholar and an intellec- tual with no actual military experience, moved quickly to reform and reshape the Spanish Army. Azaña’s main goal was to reduce the cost of the military and streamline it while also making it more democratic—an army loyal to the new republic. Structurally, the new army would be more in line with contemporary European armies, especially the French model. Among the many changes Azaña made were the early retirement of thousands of officers; the elimination of the ranks of captain general, Introduction | 5 lieutenant general, and military governor; the halving of the infantry branch from sixteen to eight divisions; similar reductions in the artillery branch; the closing of the General Military Academy at Zaragoza; the ability of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to be promoted to the officer ranks (oficialidad de complemento); the change of the high commissioner position in Spanish Morocco from a military position to a civilian ap- pointee; and the designation of a major general to command the Army of Africa, with brigadier generals in command of units in the eastern (Mel- illa and the Rif) and western (Ceuta and Tetuán) zones of the protectorate. The Legion lost its Seventh and Eighth Banderas and its Squadron of Lancers. The Regulares lost one tabor (battalion) and a cavalry squadron. Azaña’s reforms had a dramatic effect not only on the structure of the Spanish Army but also on its status and on the way the career officers who were not retired or cashiered out of the military looked at the republic. In fact, with the republic’s establishment in 1931, the army, like the rest of the nation, was divided among those who supported the new government, those who opposed it, and those who simply adopted a wait- and-see attitude. Most officers in the Army of Africa adopted the wait-and- see attitude. Their immediate concerns were probably alleviated by the appointment of the head of the Civil Guard, General José Sanjurjo Sacanell, as the protectorate’s acting high commissioner (alto comisario de España) and commander in chief of the armed forces of Morocco (jefe superior de las fuerzas militares de Marruecos). Sanjurjo was a well-known africanista who had previously served as high commissioner during the Miguel Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930). Sanjurjo had facilitated the transition from monarchy to republic when he informed King Alfonso XIII that he no longer had the support of the Civil Guard. Sanjurjo’s first address to the Army of Africa on April 25, 1931, from his headquarters in Tetuán was reassuring both to the nascent republic and to the Army of Africa. His primary emphasis was that the troops should faithfully obey and respect, without reservation, the orders of the national government, which, he noted, represented the national mood. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of discipline and service to the fatherland. He concluded with “Soldiers: Long live Spain!”2 Although there were no “vivas” to the republic, Sanjurjo’s address basically reflected a nonpolitical stance that at this point permeated the entire command structure in the Army of Africa and in the protectorate in general. 6 | Introduction

The day after General Sanjurjo’s address, Colonel Juan Mateo Pérez de Alejo was appointed the new commander of the Legion, replacing Colonel Juan José de Liniers y Muguiro, who retired on April 17, 1931. Until Mateo reported for duty in early May, Lieutenant Colonel Saturni- no González Badía, the commander of what was then called the Second Legion in Ceuta, assumed the interim command of the Spanish Foreign Legion.3 In this capacity, he ordered that the Legion’s letter declaring its loyalty to the new government be read to the assembled companies for three consecutive days. The letter was addressed to the legionnaires and emphasized the apolitical nature of the military, the importance of duty, service to the fatherland, and blind obedience to the national government, which represented the will of the people. It concluded with “Long live Spain! Long live the republic! Long live the Legion!”4 The Cuban-born Mateo took command of the Legion in Ceuta on May 9, 1931. A veteran of the Cuban War of 1898 and the Moroccan Wars, he came to the Legion after serving as the commander of the Infan- try Regiment of Saboya No. 6.5 One of his first official duties was to send the Seventh Bandera (known as Valenzuela) to represent the Legion at the inauguration of the president of the republic, Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, in Madrid on December 14, 1931. Led by Major José Vierna Trapaga, three captains, twelve lieutenants, and six hundred legionnaires of the Seventh Bandera displayed its battle standard and flag through the streets of the capital.6 It was ironic that this bandera would be one of the two eliminated by the new government under the Azaña reforms. In January 1932, based on the minister of war’s mandate, Colonel Ma- teo had to move ahead with the elimination of the two banderas. The re- duction of personnel and the consolidation of units is always a problematic task. The method Mateo chose to accomplish this was to cashier legionnaires who were known to be drunkards, who were quarrelsome, who possessed subversive ideas toward the new regime, or who demonstrated a lack of suitability for military service (i.e., misfits). At the same time, Mateo undertook to make the Legion less informal and more professional. One practice that he eliminated was the tuteo, in which senior-rank officers -ad dressed the soldiers beneath them with the familiar tú instead of the more formal usted. During the Rif War (1920–1927) the Legion had used the tuteo as a way to foster camaraderie and a sense of paternalism toward those of lesser rank. In the more peaceful, professional, and republican era, with the Legion being reorganized, this practice was terminated.7 Introduction | 7

Unfortunately, Mateo’s tenure as commander of the Legion was short- lived. He was assassinated at around nine o’clock in the evening on March 7, 1932, as he arrived at his home in Ceuta accompanied by his son. Ma- teo was shot twice by a disgruntled former Legion sergeant, José Sánchez González, who then shot himself in the head after he was cornered on the roof of a nearby house by legionnaires and fired two shots at them but missed. Both shooter and victim were taken to the hospital, where they died early the next day. The funeral for Mateo on March 8 was a notable event attended by an estimated fifteen thousand mourners. The assassin, Sánchez, had joined the Legion in 1922, served in the Rif War, and retired in 1930 after completing his enlistment. He rejoined the Legion in 1931 and was promoted to the rank of sergeant. However, two months before shooting Colonel Mateo he was cashiered on bad conduct charges for having made allegations of economic malfeasance against three Legion captains.8 In an ironic sense both deaths can be related to the Azaña reforms. These reforms were designed not only to subordinate the armed forces to civilian authority, and to a more limited degree to reform and streamline the military’s structure, but also to promote and reward in particular those army officers who held Republican views or who were at least more amenable and loyal to the republic. Such an agenda created what many in the Spanish Army perceived as a hostile or adversarial environ- ment. The army in particular was perceived as reactionary and possibly untrustworthy, whereas the air force and the navy were seen as more apolitical. As a reaction to the reforms of Azaña’s leftist republican-socialist government, especially the changes instituted in the army and the granting of autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque region, General Sanjurjo, who had initially ensured the loyalty of the Army of Africa, rose up against the government. In what was known as La Sanjurjada, the general, who was now head of the carabineros (customs and frontier guards), and fellow monarchist army officers attempted a pronunciamiento (pronounce- ment) on August 10, 1932, in Seville. With only 5 percent of the army’s officer corps backing the coup, and lacking both organization and secrecy, the uprising failed miserably. Hundreds were tried and sent to prison, and Sanjurjo himself was sentenced to death, but this was later changed to life in prison. In March 1934 he was granted a pardon by the Radical Re- publican government of Alejandro Lerroux and went into exile in Estoril, 8 | Introduction

Portugal. When Sanjurjo attempted to return to Spain to take command of the rebel uprising of July 1936, he was killed in a plane crash. In the elections of November 1933, the Left was split while the Right coalesced around Lerroux’s Radical Republican Party and the Confeder- ación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), led by a young conservative lawyer, José María Gil-Robles. CEDA was a coalition of regional affiliates who were generally conservative, promonarchy, and Catholic. Under the leadership of Lerroux, the new government labored to undo what the previous administration had accomplished vis-à-vis the army and the Church. Lerroux and CEDA were anathema to the socialists, who were still reeling from the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in Janu- ary 1933. The socialists perceived CEDA to be fascists, and the period of 1934–1935 is referred to as the bienio negro (two black years) in Span- ish history. For the socialists the tipping point occurred when Lerroux brought four CEDA members into his cabinet in October 1934. The So- cialist Party called for revolution, and it was answered by the industrial workers in Barcelona and the miners in the coalfields of Asturias. In response to this threat to the republic, Lerroux’s right-of- center government ordered the Third Bandera of the Spanish Foreign Legion to set sail from Melilla in order to put down the antigovernment uprising and general strike in Barcelona. This was accomplished without bloodshed, since the rebellion was over by the time the Third Bandera arrived. However, in Asturias a coalition of anarchists, socialists, and communists, along with thirty thousand miners, occupied the major towns of Gijón and Lugones as well as the capital, Oviedo. The revolutionaries were highly motivated, politicized, and well armed with rifles, machine guns, artillery, and dynamite taken from the national arms factory in Trubia. Minister of War Diego Hidalgo called upon General Franco to coordinate military operations against the rebels. Franco recommended bringing the combat proven Army of Africa to Asturias, where it would operate in conjunction with other units of the Spanish Army converging on the province. The Fifth and Sixth Banderas of the Legion, along with one tabor of Regulares under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe Blanco, traveled by ship from Ceuta. They arrived in mid-October and quickly engaged the rebels in brutal combat, particularly in the major cities of Gijón and Oviedo. Overwhelmed by the sheer force and aggressiveness of the Army of Africa, along with the demoralizing impact of aerial attacks by government aircraft, the rebels agreed on October 18 Introduction | 9 to negotiate terms of surrender with General Eduardo López de Ochoa. The Army of Africa, however, continued its advance deep into the mining districts, eventually capturing the rebel stronghold of Mieres and bringing the conflict to an end. The Asturian campaign left the Spanish Foreign Legion with thirteen dead and forty-six wounded. More shocking for the republic, however, was the fact that more than a thousand civilians had also been killed, both during military operations and the postconflict governmental repression, which included the use of torture carried out by the infamous Major Lisardo Doval y Bravo of the Civil Guard. In addition to the numerous lives lost during this brief military campaign, the destruction of private and public property in Asturias was enormous. It can be argued that the Asturian uprising of October 1934 irrevocably divided the Second Spanish Republic and paved the way for the Civil War. It must be stressed that for various segments of Spanish political opinion, particularly the Left, bringing the Legion and the Regulares to the peninsula in 1934 for use against Spanish civilians was unwarranted and unforgivable. Furthermore, the Asturian uprising and the subsequent repression of leftists galvanized the socialists, who turned away from their moderate leader, Indalecio Prieto, and embraced the more extreme and incendiary Francisco Largo Caballero (known as the “Spanish Lenin”). In addition, Lerroux’s government was discredited and brought down by a series of financial scandals in September 1935. Several months later, Pres- ident Alcalá-Zamora dissolved parliament and called for new elections to take place in February 1936.9 On February 16, after a divisive political campaign, the left-of- center Popular Front coalition (socialists, communists, and left-wing Republi- cans) won control of the Spanish government by a narrow margin. This led to political and social disturbances, including labor strikes, church burnings, and political assassinations, which accelerated the political and ideological polarization of Spanish society. Furthermore, the assassination of the antifascist Lieutenant José Castillo of the Assault Guards in Madrid on July 12 by the fascist Falangist Party and the retaliation murder by Castillo’s comrades of José Calvo Sotelo, the principal rightist leader in parliament, only exacerbated the situation. Among the most ardent opponents of the new Popular Front government were senior officers of the Spanish Army (such as General Mola and General Manuel Goded Llopis), the majority of whom had served 10 | Introduction in Spanish Morocco in either the Legion or the Regulares, or those (like Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe) who were associated with the Falangist Party. Since about 1933 the army, like the rest of the nation, had been divided between those who supported the republic’s initial programs and policies and those who opposed them, or at least espoused fundamental changes to them. This division was reflected in two military organizations: the Unión Militar Española (Spanish Military Union), or UME, and the Unión Mil- itar Republicana Antifascista (Republican Antifascist Military Union), or UMRA. Monarchists, Falangists and conservative officers of all stripes gravitated toward UME, which was basically a right-wing officers’ organization that opposed the republic and consistently plotted against it. Officers who supported the republic joined UMRA, which was formed in 1935 in reaction to UME. Many other officers, such as Franco, kept their own counsel on the sidelines but were genuinely appalled by the republic’s inability to preserve constitutional legalities and to maintain public order. With the increasing breakdown of law and order in the spring and early summer of 1936, as highlighted by the Calvo assassination in Madrid, a group of ten generals and UME members headed by General Mola from his command post in Pamplona conspired to rise up against the Popular Front government, crush leftist and working-class resistance, and establish a military directory under, significantly, the flag of the republic. The plan was for the uprising to take place at five o’clock in the evening on July 17, 1936. In fact, this plan almost succeeded in Melilla, the site of the first uprising. However, Republican forces became suspicious in Melilla, and the rebellion was prematurely triggered at four o’clock by officers and men of the local Legion unit. The rebellion quickly spread to other cities in Spanish Morocco as units of the Legion and the Regulares quickly secured the main protectorate urban centers for the rebels. At the onset of the Civil War, the Spanish Foreign Legion, numbering 3,758 men, was organized into two major units: the First Legion (the First, Second, and Third Banderas), with its headquarters in Taüima, located just outside Melilla in the eastern zone of the protectorate; and the Second Legion (the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Banderas), with its headquarters at Dar Riffien, outside Ceuta in the western zone. At this time, a legion was roughly the numerical size of a regiment, and composed of three infantry battalions (banderas).10 Introduction | 11

Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe, the commander of the Second Legion and one of the principal conspirators in Spanish Morocco, took control of the western zone of the protectorate for the rebels. It was essential to the success of the uprising for the rebels to secure the support and participation of the Army of Africa, which was the best-trained, best-equipped, and most experienced unit in the Spanish Army. On July 19 General Fran- co arrived in Tetuán from his command in the Canary Islands to take charge of the Army of Africa, and Colonel Yagüe was given command of the Legion. For General Franco, the Legion (along with the Regulares) was his “ace in the hole.” Having command of the Army of Africa gave him military power as well as political leverage in dealing with fellow rebel generals—Emilio Mola in Pamplona (north) and Gonzalo Quiepo de Llano in Seville (south)—especially after the death of the designated leader, General Sanjurjo. Not only was the Legion the most professional and experienced military unit in the Spanish Army, it also had access to a tremendous quantity of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition. Moreover, given Franco’s prestige, reputation for effectiveness, and control of the Army of Africa, he became the key rebel leader whom both Germany and Italy chose to back in the conflict. For the uprising to have any hope of success, the Army of Africa had to be transported across the Strait of Gibraltar, a difficult task since the Republican-controlled navy patrolled the strait. At first Spanish, and later German and Italian, transport planes were used to move these troops to the peninsula. On July 20, 1936, the first units, two platoons of the Legion’s Fifth Bandera, were airlifted from Tetuán to Seville to support General Queipo de Llano, who as early as 1933 had moved away from his initial backing of the republic and now supported the uprising. By the end of August the entire Legion and its weapons had been either flown or shipped across the Strait of Gibraltar. The arrival of German and Italian transport planes greatly increased the number of men and supplies that could be flown across the strait. Once in southern Spain, the Legion and the Regulares served as the shock troops for Nationalist columns advancing slowly and methodically toward Madrid. Franco’s chosen strategy was to make his way toward Madrid in a deliberate manner, ensuring that he not only defeated his military opponents but also completely pacified the occupied regions so as not to leave any possibility of resistance to his rear. This strategy was 12 | Introduction anathema to his German allies. who urged him to move as quickly as possible toward the capital even though it meant leaving pockets of resistance in his wake. However, during the colonial wars in Spanish Morocco in the early 1920s, Franco had personally witnessed the aftermath caused by the reckless behavior of General Manuel Silvestre in his effort to occupy the strategic Alhucemas Bay. Silvestre’s hurried occupation of the protectorate’s eastern zone had led to the Battle of Annual disaster in July 1921. This colonial military failure not only claimed the lives of at least eight thousand soldiers, it also was a significant factor in the collapse of the parliamentary regime in 1923. Silvestre’s fatal error in not disarming and eliminating all possible threats to his rear was a mistake Franco was not willing to repeat, regardless of what the Germans advocated. During the crucial year of 1936, the Legion participated in fierce combat with Republican forces, both the regular army and militias, in a number of classic battles. During the bloody battle of the border city of Badajoz in August 1936, for instance, the Legion sustained 285 casualties. Along with the Regulares of Tetuán, the Fifth Bandera was in the vanguard of the Nationalist forces that broke the ten-week siege of the Alcázar of Toledo on September 27. From Toledo the Legion marched toward Madrid, where in October and November it engaged in brutal combat in Casa de Campo, University City, and Carabanchel, a suburb southwest of the city. In September 1936 the Legion began to expand quickly as thousands of volunteers, both Spanish and foreigners, enlisted. First the Legion reactivated the Seventh and Eighth Banderas, then eventually it grew to a total of eighteen banderas, including a tank battalion, an antitank company, and a flamethrower company. For the remainder of the war the Le- gion (with the Regulares) continued to serve as the shock troops for the various Nationalist armies. As testament to the legionnaires’ thirst for combat and aggressiveness on the battlefield during the Civil War, the Legion sustained 37,393 casualties. In Spanish Morocco

On Sunday, July 12, 1936, the Army of Africa assembled on the Llano Amarillo (Yellow Plain) in Ketama, Spanish Morocco, for a massive parade and military review. Ketama is located in a mountainous and for- ested region halfway between the principal Spanish coastal presidios of Ceuta and Melilla. The parade not only capped off the just completed summer maneuvers, it also allowed those in Morocco who were conspir- ing to overthrow the Second Spanish Republic an opportunity to finalize their plans. Among the dignitaries present was the acting high commissioner, Artil- lery Captain Plácido Álvarez Buylla Godino, who was joined by General Manuel Romerales Quinto, the commander of the eastern zone (Melilla); General Agustín Gómez Morato, the commander of the Army of Africa; and adjutants, members of the General Staff, and a few military attachés, mostly French. The parade, comprising eighteen thousand men and their materiel, began at eleven o’clock in the morning and lasted roughly two hours. The units that marched past in review were the six banderas of the Spanish Foreign Legion (then officially known as El Tercio) and the five grupos de Regulares (Moroccan soldiers led by Spanish officers), along with Moroccan police (the Mehal-las), cavalry, artillery, engineers, signals, a quartermaster, medical personnel, motor transportation, and aviation. The dignitaries were greatly impressed with the martial spirit and professionalism of the troops they had reviewed.1 That evening in Pamplona, General Emilio Mola Vidal, the principal conspirator in Spain, sent Captain Gerardo Imaz with a message for the main conspirator in Africa: the veteran africanista and pro-Falangist (fascist party), Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe Blanco. The message called for the Alzamiento (uprising) to take place at dawn on Friday, July 17.

13 14 | In Spanish Morocco

However, this time was later changed through another liaison, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Seguí Almuzara. Yagüe was directed to rise up later in the day so as to prevent the possible intervention in the dark of the government’s air force from bases in Tetuán and Seville.2 The day after the parade, July 13, the course toward the uprising took an unexpected turn when news arrived from the peninsula of the assassination of the monarchist leader José Calvo Sotelo by the Assault Guard in retaliation for the earlier Falangist murder of a fellow Assault Guards- man, Lieutenant José Castillo. This event added justification and urgency to the uprising.3 Although the uprising had been scheduled by General Mola to begin at five o’clock in the evening on Friday, July 17 (the seventeenth hour, in military-style time, on the seventeenth day), the time had to be moved up in Spanish Morocco to four o’clock.4 The plan began to unravel in Melilla when a traitor, a socialist named Alvaro González, pretended to be a Falangist and informed the head of the Republican Union Party (who in turn notified the Socialist Par- ty leader) that something was about to happen. González informed the commander of the eastern zone, the portly General Manuel Romerales Quinto (nicknamed El Gordo, “the fat man”), who sent Lieutenant Juan Zaro and a squad of the Assault Guard, as well as civilian police, to the Comisión de Límites (Map Office), where the plotters had assembled. Earlier that day, at three o’clock, Lieutenant Colonel Maximino Barto- méu y González-Longoria, the former commander of the Third Bandera during the Asturian uprising of October 1934 who had been cashiered by the republic, phoned the Legion’s Lieutenant Julio de la Torre Galán at home, asking him to accompany him to the Map Office. They arrived, armed only with their side arms. Along with the handful of other conspirators, they awaited the arrival of the Assault Guard, which rapidly surrounded the building. A standoff ensued as the Assault Guard, armed with rifles, faced off against those inside the Map Office armed with pistols and hand grenades. When the police approached the front door, Lieutenant Colonel Darío Gazapo Valdés, a Falangist, asked them what they wanted. They indicated that they had orders to search the premises for arms and to arrest those inside. Gazapo told them that the building was a military in- stallation and that they had no authority to proceed. According to his later testimony of events, Lieutenant de la Torre phoned the Legion outpost In Spanish Morocco | 15 next door and told Sergeant Sousa to come over immediately with some legionnaires because they were in great danger. The squad of legionnaires arrived only to find themselves surrounded by the Assault Guard. After a few minutes of confusion and indecision, de la Torre came out the door and ordered the legionnaires to load and aim their weapons at the Assault Guard. With rifles aimed at the Assault Guard and de la Torre pointing his pistol at Lieutenant Zaro, an Assault Guardsman dropped his weapon, and he was quickly followed by his comrades. At four o’clock, in the patio of the Map Office in Melilla, the Spanish Civil War—or the War of Liberation or the Crusade, as the Nationalists called it—had begun.5 Lieutenant Colonel Seguí now headed for Romerales’s office, where a fierce debate was taking place over what to do: resign or resist. Prime Min- ister Santiago Casares Quiroga had phoned from Madrid and ordered Romerales to immediately arrest Seguí and Gazapo. General Romerales searched in vain for any military units in the region that would come to his aid but found none. By this time, the Legion and the Regulares in Villa Alhucemas—the former Villa Sanjurjo, about sixty miles west of Melilla, under the command of Colonel Juan Bautista Sánchez González—had secured that region for the rebels. In addition, a group of legionnaires and Regulares boarded the steamer Monte Toro in Alhucemas and headed for Melilla, arriving the following day (July 18). The subsequent arrival in Melilla of a platoon of Regulares (No. 5 from Alhucemas) and legionnaires from the First Bandera allowed the rebels to quickly begin patrolling the streets and engaging those who resisted. Romerales’s decision on what to do next was quickly made for him by Seguí, who entered his office, pistol in hand, and took him into custody. The rebellious officers declared a state of war, took over the -ma jor military installations, and arrested, in the name of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde, who was in the Canary Islands at the time, those perceived to be enemies of the rebellion (e.g., trade unionists, Freemasons, and Republicans). General Romerales, Captain José Bermúdez Reina (the air force commander in Melilla), and the mayor of Melilla were shot, and martial law was declared. What had transpired in Melilla would serve as the model for other cities in Spanish Morocco.6 From Melilla, Seguí phoned Colonel Eduardo Sáenz de Buruaga y Polanco and Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe, the leaders of the rebellion in Tetuán and Ceuta, respectively, with the news. Segui also telegraphed 16 | In Spanish Morocco

Franco, who was then in Las Palmas attending the funeral of General Amado Balmes Alonso, who had been accidentally shot dead during target practice.7 The rebels moved with alacrity and resolve. From Madrid, Prime Minister Casares frantically phoned General Gómez Morato, the commander of the Army of Africa in Larache at the time, wanting to know what was going on in Melilla. The general, who was unaware of events, was told of the rebellion. He quickly flew to the airfield in Taüima and then drove the short distance to Melilla to personally investigate. Upon arriving in Melilla, he was promptly arrested and thrown in jail. Unlike the fate of General Romerales, Gómez’s life was spared, and he was initially sentenced to thirty years in prison for not supporting the rebellion. Two Legion colonels were relieved of their commands at the start of the rebellion. Both the Legion inspector, Colonel Luis Molina Galano, and the commanding officer of the First Legion, Colonel Luis Blanco Novo, were dismissed and arrested. Blanco Novo was imprisoned in the Mount Hacho Prison in Ceuta until May 4, 1937, when he declared his fondness for the “glorious national movement” and asked to be allowed to serve in the Nationalist army. His petition was granted, and in 1938 he was commanding the Second Brigade of the Seventy-Fourth Division on the Ebro front. However, he was relieved of command when his superior officer declared that he was unfit to command such a unit. Molina was not as fortunate as Blanco and was shot on July 26, 1936.8 On July 17, 1936, the six banderas of the Legion were deployed (with their leaders) as follows: In the eastern zone, the First (Major José Álva- rez Entrena) was in Taüima, the principal base; the Second (Major Luis Carbonell Ocariz) was in Targuist; and the Third (Major Ricardo Alonso Vega) was in Villa Sanjurjo (Alhucemas Bay). In the western zone, the Fourth (Major José Vierna Trápaga) was in Dar Riffien (outside Ceuta and the principal base of the Legion); the Fifth (Major Antonio Castejón Espinosa) was in Zoco Arbaa de Beni Hassan;, and the Sixth (Major Pe- dro Pimentel Zayas) was in Xaüen.9 The Fifth Bandera was the first to react to the news traveling by truck from Zoco Arbaa toward the capital, Tetuán, at ten o’clock at night on July 17 with the objective of securing the airfield. In Tetuán, Colonel Carlos Asensio Cabanillas of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1), Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza (ex-military attaché in Berlin), and Colonel Eduardo Sáenz de Buruaga (the main conspirator in Tetuán) had already risen up In Spanish Morocco | 17 against the republic. Sáenz telephoned the acting high commissioner, Captain Álvarez Buylla, and insisted that he resign. Protected by a handful of loyal officers, Álvarez phoned Casares, who told him to resist and that the air force and the fleet would come to his aid the following day. By this time the Fifth Bandera had arrived in Tetuán proper and began digging in around the plaza. The high commissioner received a phone call from the air force’s Major Ricardo de la Puente Bahamonde, Franco’s first cousin, who was at Tetuán’s Sania Ramel airfield, declaring his and his squadron’s loyalty to the republic.10 Except for the high commissioner’s residence and the airfield, the city was under the control of the rebels. Like the situation in Melilla, all leftist opposition had been quickly and easily crushed. The following day (July 18) at sunrise, the High Commissioner surrendered. The government’s ineffectual response to the uprising in Spanish Morocco on the afternoon of July 18 was to send bombers from Seville to attack Tetuán and three destroyers from Cartagena to shell Melilla. The aerial attack killed about a dozen Moroccan civilians and damaged a few mosques.11 On July 19 Franco and Colonel Juan Beigbeder, the latter using his previous friendship with the indigenous political elites, met with the caliph, Mulay Hassan Ben Medí, and the grand vizier of Tetuán, Ahmad Ganmia, and secured their cooperation. Furthermore, Moroccan troops (i.e., the Regulares) could be counted on to fight in the Civil War. For his cooperation, the grand vizier was awarded the Laureate Cross of St. Fer- dinand, Spain’s highest decoration for valor. María Rosa de Madariaga wrote that ten years after the 1926 surrender of the Riffian leader Mo- hamed Abd-el-Krim, many Moroccans who had fought alongside him against Spain were now more than willing to fight alongside Franco and the Nationalists. As one Moroccan soldier put it, “In the army they fed us and paid us.” Sebastian Balfour wrote that economics was the main motivator and that in addition to their pay Moroccan soldiers received bonuses in the form of “weapons, sugar, oil, and bread for the recruit’s family.” Furthermore, the new high commissioner, General Luis Orgaz y Yoldi, gave Riffian leaders the impression that the Nationalists were willing to extend autonomy to their region in the hope of winning them over to the rebels’ side and encourage recruitment.12 With Melilla and Tetuán under rebel control, the next city to fall was Ceuta, which was quickly taken by Yagüe and the Fourth Bandera, based 18 | In Spanish Morocco in nearby Dar Riffien. There the legionnaires boarded trucks at nine o’clock at night on July 18 and drove the short distance to Ceuta, where they disembarked and marched toward the high ground, in and around the Regulares’ barracks. Encountering no resistance, since Ceuta was a military presidio, it was secured by eleven o’clock. However, a Republican warship shelled Ceuta on July 20 from 1:40 to 2:30 p.m. and again on July 25 from 6:40 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. In the latter attack, Ceuta’s coastal batteries returned fire, but two of their men were killed, six were gravely wounded, and nine were lightly wounded. In addition, at the Mount Hacho fortress, a sergeant and a corporal were killed, and two men were seriously wounded.13 The uprising met some stiff resistance from leftists in the Atlantic port city of Larache. There the revolt began at two o’clock in the morning on July 18, and it took two thousand of the Regulares from nearby garri- sons, along with soldiers from within the city, to secure it for the rebels. When the battle was over, two rebel officers and five Assault Guardsmen were dead. Others who supported the republic were arrested, were shot, or fled for their lives. An example of the latter was Colonel Luis Romero Bassart of the Regulares of Larache No. 4, who opposed the uprising in Larache; he escaped to French Morocco and then to the peninsula.14 The last bandera in the western zone to move into action was the Sixth Bandera, which was posted in Xaüen. On the afternoon of July 17 its commanding officer, Major Pedro Pimentel Zayas, received the news of the rebellion in Melilla and Ceuta. He began the long march back toward Ceuta, arriving in Dar Riffien the following day.15 On July 19, around seven o’clock in the morning, Franco arrived at Sa- nia Ramel airfield from Las Palmas, Canary Islands and took command of the Army of Africa for the Nationalists. To the Legion, Franco was a living legend, revered (or feared) by the rank and file for his service with this unit from 1920 to 1926. After meeting with Moroccan government officials, Franco visited the Legion’s main encampment of Dar Riffien, where he reviewed the Sixth Bandera. That evening Franco ordered that troops be rapidly shipped to the peninsula in order to fortify the rebels’ tenuous position there. A small force of the Regulares was transported from Ceuta across the Strait of Gibral- tar in two separate embarkations, the first aboard the destroyer Churruca and the steamer Ciudad de Ceuta, and the second aboard the merchant- man Cabo Espartel, escorted by the gunboat Dato. This transfer of In Spanish Morocco | 19 troops from Morocco to the peninsula was to be followed by a second transfer, composed of the Fourth Bandera, which was already assembled on the pier in Ceuta prepared to board the Ciudad de Ceuta. The Fourth Bandera remained stranded on the pier all day July 19, however, because the rebel high command considered any further sea travel too risky. After the transport of the Regulares to Algeciras, a city held by the rebels, the Churruca proceeded to Cádiz, where its crew rose up against its pro-Nationalist officers and declared its loyalty to the republic. This meant that for the time being, any further attempts to ferry troops from Spanish Morocco to the peninsula were not possible because the Strait of Gibraltar was now patrolled by the Republican-controlled fleet.16 In the protectorate’s eastern zone the First Bandera, which had been the first to arrive in Melilla from its base in Taüima, now turned over its security duties in the city to the Second and Third Banderas and prepared to embark on the Vicente Puchol. The sea crossing to the peninsula was scrapped when it was deemed too dangerous. The First Bandera disembarked and climbed aboard trucks to make the journey to Ceuta, spending the night of July 19 in Bab-Tazza and arriving in Dar Riffien at midday the next day. On the morning of July 22 General Franco pas- sionately addressed the unit he had once commanded in the field. He was introduced by Yagüe, who said, “Here you have them as you left them. Magnificent as far as the impossible. You, Franco, who so many times led them to victory, lead them once again for the honor of Spain.”17 With the Republican navy controlling the Strait of Gibraltar, the only way for the rebels to transfer troops to the peninsula was by air. In Seville General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, the inspector general of the carabineros (customs and frontier guards), had seized Tablada airfield outside the city. Tablada airfield would become the terminus for Franco’s “air bridge” from Spanish Morocco. Control of Andalusia was crucial for Franco’s war plans; thus, transporting the Army of Africa quickly and safely was necessary for success. Franco wanted to get to the peninsula with his Army of Africa as soon as possible in order to counterbalance General Mola’s military and political influence on the course of the uprising with his army in the north. Meanwhile, impatiently waiting in Es- toril, Portugal, was General José Sanjurjo Sacanell, the senior general in the conspiracy and the man chosen to head the Nationalists.18 On July 20 twenty legionnaires from the Seventeenth Company of the Fifth Bandera, commanded by Lieutenant Francisco Gassol Ruiz, became 20 | In Spanish Morocco the first men in any military unit in history to be airlifted from one con- tinent to another. The airlifts from Tetuán to the peninsula continued, with sixteen men per plane on seven planes that made three or four flights per day. The planes, which had been damaged by their Republican pilots and NCOs, were quickly repaired by skilled ground crews. Later more airplanes became available, including three Fokker trimotors that had been based in Cabo Juby (Spanish Sahara) but had been ordered to fly back to Madrid by the government. One of the pilots decided to join the uprising and landed in Tetuán, while the other two landed in Seville on their way to Madrid and were captured by the rebels.19 Within three days, 250 men of the Fifth Bandera had been ferried across the Strait of Gibraltar and placed under the command of General Queipo de Llano.20 As soon as the first soldiers arrived in Seville from Morocco, General Queipo de Llano loaded them onto trucks and repeatedly drove them around the city in order to give the citizenry the impression that there were more of them than there truly were. In fact, the airlift was not moving men across the strait fast enough, and those who were airlifted could travel with only their personal weapons. On July 25 the Eighteenth Company of the Fifth Bandera began making its way across the strait aboard a few fishing feluccas. They set sail at two o’clock in the morning loaded with officers, other men, weapons, and other equipment. They left Ceuta headed for Cádiz, traveling at about five miles per hour. The greatest moment of excitement for the convoy was when the looming hulk of the Republicans’ Dreadnought battleship Jaime I was spotted in the distance, escorted by three submarines, sweeping the surface of the sea with its huge searchlights. Using fog for cover, the convoy successfully evaded the Loyalist ships and safely reached Cádiz and then headed for Tarifa.21 The airlift received a tremendous boost when first German and then Italian aircraft began arriving in Morocco (on July 28 and July 30, respectively). The German planes were Lufthansa Junkers Ju-52s, and the nine Italian planes were Savoia-Marchetti S-M 81s, both bomber/transport trimotors. The Germans sent twenty Ju-52s to Morocco along with five Heinkel He-51 fighters (biplanes) for their protection; eleven Junkers were sent by ship, whereas the other nine, camouflaged as Lufthansa pas- senger planes, flew from Dessau, Germany, to Tetuán.22 The Nationalists first approached the Italians for airplanes before reaching out to the Germans. Since 1932, monarchists had been in contact with Fascist Italy for military aid in the event of a revolution against In Spanish Morocco | 21 the Second Spanish Republic. On July 20 the monarchist Marqués de Luca de Tena flew from Biarritz, France, to Rome, and two days later he met with the Italian foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano. Franco requested a dozen new transport planes, but the Italian government was unmoved, since it was in the dark about what was happening in Spain. For the time being, the Italians were not prepared to acquiesce to the Na- tionalists’ plea for aircraft. On July 24 Mola again reached out to the Italians by sending Alfonsine monarchist Antonio Goicoechea Cosculluela and two associates to Rome to ask for aircraft as well as ammunition. Benito Mussolini remained un- decided for nearly a week but finally granted Franco’s request after Hitler agreed to do so. The Legion’s Captain Luis Bolín was one of the Spaniards who dealt with Count Ciano on behalf of the rebels and Franco. After the deal was made, Bolín took off in one of the twelve S-M 81 bombers from an airbase in Cagliari, Sardinia, to Melilla. Of the twelve planes that took off, three never made it because they ran out of fuel as a result of being overloaded and running into stiff headwinds; one landed safely in Oran, Algeria, but the other two crashed, one in the Mediterranean Sea and the other outside Melilla, killing their crews. The Italian crews of the nine bombers were enlisted in the Spanish Foreign Legion, issued uniforms, and given a pistol, some Spanish money, identity papers, and ID tags. For the first time in its history, the Spanish Foreign Legion had something resembling an air force.23 Hitler was in Bayreuth enjoying the Wagner festival on July 25, 1936, when he met with Franco’s representatives who were seeking transport aircraft. There was a historical relationship between some of the rebellious Spaniards and Nazi Germany going back to the early 1930s. The chosen leader of the uprising, General José Sanjurjo, visited Berlin on March 12, 1936, accompanied by Colonel Juan Beigbeder, who had served as Spain’s military attaché to Germany from 1926 to early 1935. In addition, there were German businessmen and Nazi Party members living in Spanish Morocco who were very helpful in facilitating the ac- quisition of transport aircraft. An important player in bringing the two sides together was Major Karl-Erich Kühlenthal of the Abwehr (German military intelligence), who had a relationship with Franco and Beigbeder going back to 1928. However, it was Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess who made the pivotal phone call to Bayreuth that brought Hitler and Franco’s emissaries 22 | In Spanish Morocco together. After deciding to give Franco the aircraft he requested (which later came to include weapons), Hitler consulted with his war minister, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, as well as Luftwaffe (air force) head Field Marshal Hermann Göring and naval commander Karl Coupette. Von Blomberg was in favor from the start, but Göring was lukewarm on the idea until the possibility of moving an entire army from Moroc- co to Spain by air piqued his interest and made him more amenable to the proposition.24 Ultimately, when Hitler agreed to provide Franco with the planes, this made Franco the top rebel general, surpassing Mola and Queipo de Llano; as Angel Viñas and Carlos Collado Seidel wrote, “The Führer met Franco’s wishes and in so doing contributed to transforming a failed military coup into a bloody civil war. Franco’s stature rose to unexpected heights.”25 On July 27 the Fourth Bandera began to be airlifted by platoons from Tetuán to Seville, and within a few days the entire battalion was reunited and in the field. On August 4 the Sixth Bandera was likewise airlifted from Tetuán, with some companies landing in Jerez de la Frontera and others in Granada. Now the entire Second Legion—the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Banderas—had been airlifted Before the arrival of the German and Italian aircraft, Franco had assembled a small but very effective air force of his own under the leadership of the founder of the Spanish Air Force, General Alfredo Kindelán y Duany. The rebel air force was composed of a few Dornier “Wal” flying boats, eight Breguet 19 light bombers, and two Hispano-Nieuport 52 fighters. The main role of the air force was to escort the airlift of troops from Morocco while also harassing the now poorly led Republican navy that was patrolling the strait.26 The crowning achievement for the rebels during the earliest days of the uprising was the so-called Victory Convoy, which took place on August 5 (the Virgin of Africa Day—Ceuta’s patron saint) in response to Mola’s desperate plea to send reinforcements immediately. Ignoring the advice of his naval advisors, as well as Yagüe, that it was too dangerous, Franco went ahead with plans to move the entire First Bandera, the complete staff of the First Legion, and all its equipment and munitions. The obstinate Franco is quoted as saying, “I have to get across, and I will get across.”27 He decided on a daylight crossing in order to use his air force to attack the Republican fleet, knowing that without their officers, the ship’s crews lacked discipline and technical competence. Also realizing that the In Spanish Morocco | 23

Republican fleet would be intimated by German warships (e.g., the pocket battleships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer) patrolling the Moroccan coast, Franco gave the order for the operation to begin.28 The flotilla of transport ships included the steamersCiudad de Algeci- ras and Ciudad de Ceuta, the freighter Arango, and the tugboat Benot. The warships present were the gunboat Dato and the coastguard cutter Kert, and sailing from Algeciras was Torpedo Boat No. 19. The operation began in the morning with an attack by the Nationalists’ air force against Republican ships patrolling the strait. One casualty of the air attack was the Republican destroyer Lepanto, which was permitted by the British to come into Gibraltar just long enough to unload its dead and wounded. Earlier, General Kindelán from Algeciras had requested that the British deny the Lepanto entry to Gibraltar. After the air assault, the troop-carrying ships set out from Ceuta early in the morning but were forced to turn back because of heavy fog. They resumed the convoy in the afternoon, sailing in single file at the speed of the slowest ships. Under the constant protection of the gunboat Dato, the convoy, ferrying three thousand men, nearly made it to Algeciras without major incident. However, about five miles from the Spanish coast a Republican destroyer, the Alcalá Galiano, which had sailed from Tarifa, steamed straight toward the lead ship in the convoy, the Ciudad de Algeci- ras, which was carrying the bulk of the First Bandera. The Dato speeded up to meet the much larger and faster Alcalá Galiano and engaged it in unequal combat. The Arango opened up on the destroyer with machine- gun and rifle fire at a distance of about eleven hundred yards. The combination of a few well-placed shots from the Dato and some bombs from Nationalist planes, forced the destroyer to break off the thirty-minute engagement and steam away. The entire convoy, with the exception of the tugboat Benot, which had to return to Ceuta because of heavy seas, made it safely to Algeciras. With this expedition the Army of Africa now had eight thousand men and their equipment in Andalusia. Franco himself watched the crossing of the convoy from the Hermitage of San Antonio del Tojal (established in 1593) on Mount Hacho, one of the Pillars of Hercules, the promontories that flank the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar.29 The Victory Convoy was a great propaganda coup for the rebels and a humiliation for the republic. After the Victory Convoy, two-thirds of the Legion, approximately twenty-eight hundred men, had made the crossing, with only the Second 24 | In Spanish Morocco and Third Banderas remaining in Morocco. From July 17 to 27 the Sec- ond Bandera had participated in securing Melilla for the uprising. On the 27th the legionnaires boarded trucks that followed the First Bandera from the eastern zone to the western zone. Leaving Melilla, they stopped for the night in Axdir, Abd-el- Krim’s Riffian capital, and then proceeded on to Tetuán. On August 1 they moved from Tetuán to Ceuta in order to prepare for transport to the peninsula. They watched the First Bandera board the fleet of ships on August 5, which took them across the strait, but were greatly disappointed when their turn to cross was canceled for being too dangerous. The legionnaires returned to Tetuán, and finally, on August 10, they boarded aircraft for the journey across the strait. The Fourth and Four- teenth Companies landed in Jerez de la Frontera, and the Fifth and Sixth Companies landed in Seville, where the entire bandera reunited. Only the Tigers of Buharrat, the Third Bandera, remained in Morocco. Like the Second Bandera, the Third Bandera had moved from the interior (Villa Sanjurjo) toward Melilla at the start of the uprising. Finally, on August 16 the orders came for the bandera to depart Melilla for Tetuán. Three days later, on August 19, it began the journey across the strait by airplane, traveling by platoons. With the transfer of the Third Bandera from Morocco to the peninsula, the entire Spanish Foreign Le- gion was now in the front lines of the Spanish Civil War.30 In Blood of Spain, Ronald Fraser wrote that in the first two months of the uprising, the rebels had ferried “just under 14,000 troops, eleven field batteries, and 500 tons of war materiel” from Spanish Morocco to the peninsula. He also says that if it had not been for the German and Italian planes, the transfer of the Army of Africa from Spanish Morocco to the peninsula would have taken nine months to accomplish.31 The successful “air bridge” carried out by the Nationalists using Ger- man and Italian aircraft in the summer of 1936 allowed Franco to transport the Army of Africa to the peninsula and thus prevented the uprising from collapsing, and it arguably set a precedent for future airlifts in military history. In 1936 Hermann Göring was intrigued by the idea of moving and supplying a large number of troops and materiel by air, and he later used this technique during the Demyansk Pocket (February–May 1942) on the Russian front, when about one hundred thousand German soldiers were surrounded and trapped by a Red Army force four times that size. Airlift was used again by the Germans during the battle for Stalingrad, In Spanish Morocco | 25 but without sufficient aircraft it failed to properly supply the Sixth Army. The United States used airlift successfully in flying “the Hump” (India to China) during the China-Burma-India campaign in World War II and in the Berlin Airlift of 1948–1949.

The Legion Arrives in Andalusia

We have so far looked at the events that transpired in Spanish Morocco from the start of the uprising in mid-July 1936 to the arrival of the six banderas of the Spanish Foreign Legion and the Moroccan Regulares in southern Spain by mid-August. It was in Andalusia, Seville, and Cádiz that the Legion would have its first effect on what was to become a very bloody three-year war. As is usually the case in civil wars, at the start of the rebellion the population split three ways: some supported the rebellion, others opposed it, and the rest remained impartial and/or indifferent, quietly waiting to see what the outcome would be. Would the rebels prevail, or would the armed forces of the government, those still loyal to the Second Spanish Republic, crush the rebellion with alacrity and resolution? At the onset the government was unsure of itself, vacillating on what course of action to take. The majority of senior military commanders remained loyal to the government and constitution of the republic, while a smaller number, mostly junior and middle rank, were easily won over to the rebels’ cause. The Popular Front government was led by President Manuel Azaña Díaz (May 10, 1936, to March 3, 1939) and Prime Minister Santiago Casares Quiroga (May 13 to July 18, 1936), who was soon replaced by Di- ego Martínez Barrio for one day (July 19) and then by José Giral Pereira (July 20 to September 14, 1936). The government had to walk a political tightrope so as not to alienate or worry the military and the police, who feared an armed and undisciplined mob of workers. Most of the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard (paramilitary police forces), however, remained loyal to the government, especially in the major cities.1 Trade unionists demanded to be given weapons to arm their militiamen, but their request was rejected by the Casares government, which

27 28 | The Legion Arrives in Andalusia was concerned about empowering them and creating a rival military force. And even though the government was hesitant to act, the rebels (who called themselves the Nationalists) were in similar straits. They had planned on a quick takeover of power through a military uprising, followed by the establishment of a military dictatorship like that of Gen- eral Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923. The exiled General José Sanjurjo Sacanell would serve as the new head of state. The Nationalists’ plans changed dramatically when Sanjurjo died in a plane crash while returning from Portugal on July 20. Also thwarting their plans for a quick victory was the tenacious resistance of the working class, especially trade unionists. They had fought very hard for the reforms that the Second Republic had achieved and were not willing to give them up without a fight. In the major industrial cities of Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia), the workers, men and women, stood in solidarity with the government, ready to defend it with their very lives. All they demanded were the weapons: rifles with bolts.2 They eventually got them from Prime Minister Giral and effectively put them to use in forcing the bloody surrender of the rebels (two thousand military men and about five hundred monarchists and Falangists) on July 20 in Madrid’s Montaña Barracks, which was under the command of General Joaquín Fanjul Goni and Colonel Francisco Serra, and the Atarazanas and San Andrés Barracks in Barcelona on July 20–21.3 With the failure of the Alzamiento, the three-year Civil War began leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the virtual destruction of the nation.4 The first legionnaires to arrive in Seville (at Tablada airfield) on July 20 were the administration staff and two platoons of the Seventeenth Com- pany of the Fifth Bandera, under the command of Lieutenant Francisco Gassol Ruiz and Lieutenant Urrutia on July 20. The legionnaires in Se- ville quickly grew to 250 men and played a pivotal role in helping Gen- eral Gonzalo Queipo de Llano capture the city for the rebels. When the uprising began on July 18, he quickly surrounded himself with the Civil Guard, about fifty Falangists, and fifty members of the Carlist militia (known as the Requetés), to capture the center of the city, the civil government headquarters, and, most important of all, Radio Seville. Control of the radio station allowed General Queipo de Llano to declare that the entire city was under his control and that the uprising had triumphed in the city, even though the working-class neighborhoods of La Macarena and Triana had not been occupied by the rebels; instead, union members there had gathered up some weapons and organized themselves. The Legion Arrives in Andalusia | 29

BAY OF BISCAY San Sebastián FRANCE La Coruña Santander Gijón Oviedo Bilbao ANDORRA León Vitoria Huesca Lérida Barcelona Valladolid Zaragoza Tarragona Salamanca Segovia L Minorca Ávila Guadalajara A MADRID Teruel Majorca

G Toledo U Valencia Cáceres

T Ibiza

R Mérida Badajoz

O Alicante Murcia

P MEDITERRANEAN Córdoba Cartagena SEA Sevilla Huelva Granada Almería Malaga Cádiz ALGERIA Spain Divided, Ceuta ATLANTIC Alhucemas July–August 1936 Larache Tétuan Melilla Nationalist zone OCEAN SPANISH MOROCCO Republican zone 050 100 Kilometers FRENCH MOROCCO 050 100 Miles

Spain Divided, July–August 1936

The radio station’s microphone became Queipo de Llano’s most potent weapon, which he skillfully used to psychologically intimidate and threaten the populace with blood-chilling harangues about what the Army of Africa was going to do to those who resisted. The memory of what the Army of Africa (the Legion and the Regulares) had done in Asturias in October 1934 to crush the miners’ revolt was still fresh in the minds of the people, especially the Left.5 The fearsome and bloodthirsty reputation of the Army of Africa was something that Queipo de Llano continually spoke about, especially about what the Moors (the Moroccan mercenary troops) would do to their enemies.6 A fascinating first-person account of the first days of the rebel seizure of Seville by Queipo de Llano and the Nationalists is found in Robert Payne’s The Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939. Payne quotes one of Queipo de Llano’s associates at the time (but who later defected to the Loyal- ists), Antonio Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro. He described in great 30 | The Legion Arrives in Andalusia detail the takeover of Seville by the rebels on July 18: “During the following days, the situation was very confused. The rebels were in possession of the centre of the city. Queipo de Llano was unable to take the outer districts, even with cannons and machine-guns at his disposal, until the arrival of the Moors and the Foreign Legion. These came from Africa in airplanes which landed in Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz).”7 When the Spanish Foreign Legion first arrived in Andalusia, its military units operated in platoon-size units, which later became companies, which in turn became battalions, and eventually led to the creation of columns and included other military units. Depending on the objective, the mission in the province was to occupy, “liberate,” or conquer a town or village. For the Fifth Bandera, it all began on July 20 when its first elements arrived in Seville without incident. Lieutenant Gassol led his platoon into the Triana neighborhood on a reconnaissance mission, and the men later spent the night in the barracks of the Infantry Regiment of Granada No. 6. The following day, July 21, the command staff and two platoons of the Fifth Bandera, led by its commanding officer, Major Antonio Castejón Espinosa, went on the offensive, entering the Triana neighborhood and detaining the “Marxist elements” sheltered there. That afternoon the same Legion units—transported by trucks and accompanied by artillery, the Requetés, the Civil Guard, and the Assault Guard, all under the command of Major Castejón—entered Alcalá de Guadaíra, a town situated about six miles southeast of Seville. The town was taken; right-wing prisoners were freed, numerous Marxists were detained, and a large quantity of weapons and ammunition was captured. The legionnaires remained in the town until the following day.8 A much more exciting account of what transpired in Alcalá de Guadaíra than the one furnished in the Legion’s official diary is provided by Cándido G. Ortiz de Villajos in De Sevilla a Madrid. The Civil Guardsmen had been trapped in their barracks, and the city jail was full of law enforcement personnel arrested by the local Marxist committee. To take the town, Caste- jón’s men fired two cannons at the “Reds” and were able to break the siege of the Civil Guard’s barracks. The Civil Guards joined Castejón’s men, and they proceeded to storm the city jail. Unable to breach the fortified front door of the jail, they assaulted the jail’s walls, using ladders, and were successful. The Marxist committee then proceeded to make its last stand in the City Hall building. The attackers used cannon and rifle fire to wear down those inside the building until legionnaires were able to enter and The Legion Arrives in Andalusia | 31

Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Castejón fight the Marxists in man-to-man combat. All the leaders were killed, and Castejón’s column returned to Seville around eleven o’clock that night.9 Although the official histories of the Legion cover the military actions of the Fifth Bandera in and around Seville in July 1936, they do not mention the harsh and brutal methods employed by the legionnaires against their perceived enemies.10 These sources stick to the facts of the day’s military operations, detailing who was in command, the units and weapons involved, the place being attacked, what was accomplished, and the number of casualties suffered. Cándido Ortiz de Villajos is again a source for the other side of the story—the ugly and brutal side. Ortiz, who wrote for the newspaper ABC 32 | The Legion Arrives in Andalusia

(Seville), interviewed Major Castejón about what took place on July 21 in Triana and in other Andalusian towns. Castejón was extremely candid when he told Ortiz de Villajos that when his forces entered Triana they were out for blood. Castejón said that Castilla Street was littered with the corpses of individuals who had been known for their right-wing tenden- cies and that the Marxists had left these dead with signs upon their chests that read: “Por fascistas” (for being fascists). Furthermore, the “Reds” forced their fellow citizens to move about and participate in that “carnival of blood and horror.” Castejón then told the journalist that “he limited himself to leaving across the body of each person murdered, the cadaver of one of the murderers, in the form of a cross.”11 On July 22, the day’s mission called for the occupation of the Sevillian neighborhoods of La Macarena and San Julián, both well fortified by leftist militias. The workers had erected barricades and defensive positions in the maze of alleys and side streets that made up La Macarena. Once again accompanied by the Requetés, Falangists, fifty Civil Guardsmen, an armored car, and two cannons, Major Castejón led his one hundred legionnaires in a frontal assault via the neighborhood’s main thoroughfare, San Luis Street. A few days earlier, rebel cavalry units had tried to take the neighborhood but had been repelled with casualties by the determined workers. A Civil Guard lieutenant had opined that it would require at least seven hundred men to take La Macarena. The workers had also declared that defending San Luis Street would be a matter of life or death. The attack began with a coup de main at the chief entrance to San Luis Street, the elaborate and imposing Macarena Arch. At first Major Castejón ordered that the two cannons be aimed toward the historic arch, but then he reconsidered in order to prevent its destruction and quickly called for the two guns to be placed in front of it instead. Castejón later recalled that the street was ablaze with gunfire, with leftist workers firing from behind barricades and from street corners, balconies, and rooftops. When he gave the order to attack, Castejón stated that his legionnaires displayed, for the first time in the campaign, their characteristic spirit of blind obedience and martial tenacity. They were formed into two sections and moved down the sidewalks, returning fire to those shooting at them from windows and balconies. The barricades were neutralized with hand grenades, and the defenders finished off with bayonets. The operation was quick and effective, San Luis Street was occupied, and the threat to Seville ended. The neighborhood’s entire revolutionary committee, including its The Legion Arrives in Andalusia | 33 chief, known as Palatín, was killed in the operation. The Fifth Bandera suffered two killed and twelve wounded.12 Antonio Bahamonde gave the following stark and sobering account of the Army of Africa’s operations in and around Seville to Robert Payne:

San Julián, San Bernardo, La Macarema, El Pumarejo, Triana, all the districts, with almost no arms, made a heroic defence. They had to be taken one by one. The Moors, employed as shock troops, entered hurling hand- grenades. In San Julián, the slaughter was tremendous. The rebels forced all the men whom they found in the houses to come into the street, and there, without ascertaining whether they had taken any part in the fight, they killed them. The lower part of Triana was shot to pieces by cannons on the opposite side of the [Guadalquivir] river. The Moors, with savage ferocity, and in obedience to terrible orders which it seems incredible could have been given by Spanish soldiers against their own brothers, entered the houses from which they supposed that shots had come and killed with knives all the inhabitants, excepting not even the women and children. The Moors and the Foreign Legion, by right of conquest, looted the dwelling of the hum- ble workmen, who lacked direction and sufficient arms for their defence.13 From his headquarters in Seville, General Queipo de Llano used his microphone on Radio Seville to terrify those who opposed him by de- scribing in graphic detail what the Moroccans would do, especially to women, when they captured a town. Information about what had happened in Seville began to filter out to other Republican-held towns and villages. It was certain that those who resisted his forces would be merci- lessly punished and/or summarily shot. After the attack on La Macarena, the Fifth Bandera spent July 23 resting; on the same day the four companies of the battalion were united, with the arrival of Lieutenant Alfonso Cerón Gil’s platoon in Seville from Morocco. From July 24 to 31, the Fifth Bandera went on the offensive once again under Major Castejón as part of a column that included the bandera’s command staff, one of its four companies, artillery, the Requetés, the Assault Guard, and the Civil Guard. Sometimes a day’s mission required only one of the bandera’s companies to accomplish it, and trucks were used to move the legionnaires from one small town to another. Manuel Sánchez del Arco, a reporter for ABC in Seville, wrote about the occupation of Casariche on July 31 and described how a fancy (Fiat) 34 | The Legion Arrives in Andalusia

Balilla SE–17 111 automobile, with four young men inside wearing leftist militia uniforms and Civil Guard leather gear (i.e., belts, suspenders, and cartridge boxes), fell into the hands of the Nationalists and had the “rule of war” applied to them. He also reported that in the neighborhood of Herrera, the column halted and began shelling the village. An infantry assault was launched, and a mopping-up (limpieza) operation was carried out. The homes of alleged communists were set ablaze, and members of the leftist leadership committee, which had taken refuge in the cemetery, were detained and most assuredly executed.14 All the towns that were taken the last week in July were captured with relative ease by Nationalist forces, with the exception of Utrera on July 26. It fell to the Nineteenth Company of the Fifth Bandera to spearhead the attack against the well-defended town. The Nineteenth Company was led by a Rif War veteran, Captain Carlos Tiede Zeden. Tiede was born in Prussia on October 23, 1892, and served in the German Army during World War I, receiving the Iron Cross twice for valor. He joined the Spanish Foreign Legion on June 27, 1921, with the rank of alférez (subaltern) and distinguished himself in numerous engagements, even being cited by General Francisco Franco in a battle report. Tiede rose through the ranks to command the Nineteenth Company of the Fifth Bandera when it arrived in Seville. On September 16, 1936, he was awarded the Individual Military Medal, Spain’s second- highest decoration for valor (equivalent to the US Army’s Distinguished Service Cross). As soon as the Nineteenth Company arrived in Utrera, the legionnaires were met with intense gunfire coming from the well-entrenched occu- pants, who had erected barricades. Employing an armored car and a pair of 75-millimeter guns, the legionnaires began their advance with the Third Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant León, leading the attack. The assault was repelled by the defenders. After more than an hour of gunfire being exchanged, Captain Tiede ordered that the town be surrounded and all exits covered. For the next two hours the legionnaires successfully fought their way toward the barracks of the Civil Guard and were able to free several officers and enlisted men held captive. Hundreds of Republi- cans tried to flee the town by using the main road that led to Jerez de la Frontera, but they were murderously mowed down by the Legion’s machine guns. With resistance greatly weakened, the legionnaires entered the heart of the town by side streets leading to the plaza in front of City Hall, the nucleus of the defenders, of whom 146 were found dead.15 The Legion Arrives in Andalusia | 35

On July 26, by order of General Franco, the Seventh and Eighth Banderas were reconstituted for service, effective in September. Both banderas, along with the Squadron of Lancers, were disbanded by the Second Republic in 1932. The Seventh Bandera (Valenzuela) included the Twenty-Fifth through Twenty-Eighth Companies; it was formed in Tala- vera de la Reina on September 21, 1936, and placed under the command of Major Siro Alonso Rodríguez. The Eighth Bandera (Colón) included the Twenty-Ninth through Thirty-Second Companies; it was formed in Taüima (Melilla, Spanish Morocco) and commanded by Captain Manuel Sánchez Ocaña y Elio. Increasing the size of the Legion by two banderas necessitated the immediate promotion of 8 senior sergeants, 8 sergeants, 58 corporals, and 138 legionaries. Furthermore, wages were increased for corporals and legionnaires.16 Thus far, in and around the Nationalist-held city of Seville, it was the Fifth Bandera that had represented the Legion in Andalusia and allowed the uprising to establish a crucial foothold in metropolitan Spain. Gener- al Queipo de Llano’s hold on the city at the onset was quite tenuous, and through his masterful use of intimidation and bluff, along with the martial professionalism of the Fifth Bandera, he was able to secure an entry point for subsequent multiple airlifts of legionnaires and the Regulares from Tetuán. With Franco still in Tetuán and General Mola in northern Spain (Burgos), it was Queipo de Llano, for the time being, who provided the leadership for the rebels in the south. After the Fifth Bandera’s transfer from Tetuán to metropolitan Spain, it was the turn of the Fourth Bandera to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. Starting on July 27, having been relieved in Ceuta by the First Bandera, the Fourth Bandera began crossing over by plane. At four o’clock in the morning, two platoons from the Tenth Company boarded the trimotor planes in Tetuán that had been trucked in from Riffien and flew to- Se ville’s Tablada airfield. Another platoon from the Tenth Company followed, taking off at seven o’clock in the evening. The next day, July 28, the bandera’s command staff boarded planes in Tetuán at 10:30 a.m. and arrived in Seville at 12:30 p.m.; another platoon of the same company arrived at 3:30 p.m. As soon as the Fourth Bandera arrived in Seville, it joined with other Nationalist forces and boarded a military train for Huelva. This column was composed of one hundred men from the Tenth and Eleventh Compa- nies companies and the bandera’s command staff. The column’s first stop was in Palma del Condado, where it was joined by an additional squad 36 | The Legion Arrives in Andalusia

(about seventeen men) from the Eleventh Company. In Palma del Conda- do the men were informed that the carabarineros in San Juan del Puerto had not joined the uprising but had remained loyal to the republic. As the Legion units approached San Juan del Puerto, the carabineros were ordered to surrender, and they complied without incident. The column, under the command of the Fourth Bandera’s Major José Vierna Trápaga, arrived in Huelva at seven o’clock in the morning on July 28. Huelva had been secured the night before for the Nationalists by the Civil Guard, the Assault Guard, and a company from the Regiment of Granada. Major Vierna was ordered to assume responsibility for running the civil government for the town and its surrounding province. He quickly declared that a state of war existed and posted available soldiers to provide security. The column in Huelva now ventured into the surrounding areas in order to occupy and pacify the nearby villages. New town councils were established in these communities, and administrative posts were filled with men who were considered trustworthy supporters of the uprising.17 The Fourth Bandera spent July 30 providing security for Huelva and its environs, and Major Vierna turned over his administration of the province to the commander of the Civil Guard, Manuel de Haro. The same morning, the Eleventh Company formed part of a column under the command of Major José Gutiérrez Pérez that headed for the nearby village of Cantillana and arrived at about ten o’clock. In the vanguard of this column, the legionnaires of the Eleventh Company rapidly and effectively terminated the villagers’ desultory resistance. This was not particularly difficult, since the villagers were armed only with shotguns loaded with birdshot. There were no casualties among the legionnaires, and the conquered village was searched house by house for those deemed to be subversives and/or loyal to the government; they were arrested, and a pro-Nationalist civil government was set up. With Cantillana secured, the column proceeded to Tocina, reaching that village around five o’clock in the evening. The road leading to the entrance of the town was obstructed by ditches or trenches, which made entry difficult for the attackers. Less than a mile from the town’s entrance, the column’s vanguard was forced to deploy into smaller fighting units. The residents of Tocina put up a spirited defense, using rifles and pistols in the hope of holding off the attackers, who had to resort to using hand grenades and machine guns to finally defeat them. The town was The Legion Arrives in Andalusia | 37 occupied one hour after the initial attack, and law enforcement officials who had been held captive were freed from jail. With the day’s operation completed, the men returned to Seville without suffering a single casualty. In Seville, the entire Fourth Bandera was now reunited.18 On July 31 the Sixteenth Company of the Fourth Bandera traveled in requisitioned trucks serving as the vanguard for a column composed of the Civil Guard, the Requetés, Falangists, and artillerymen in a mopping- up operation to dislodge the Loyalists (those who did not support the uprising) from Puebla de Cazalla. Encountering minimal resistance, the legionnaires quickly took control of the town. With Puebla de Cazalla “liberated,” the column moved on to easily take the village of Coronil as well as farms situated between Coronil and Seville. Later that day the column returned to Seville, where the entire Fourth Bandera was reunited and spent the night in the National Palace of Exposition.19 The Legion’s martial professionalism and fighting capabilities had been clearly demonstrated since its arrival from Spanish Morocco. More- over, its capacity to act ruthlessly against leftists by applying the “rule of law” toward them in the areas they occupied was also clearly confirmed. From July 21 to the end of the month, the Fifth Bandera occupied the following towns to the north and south of Seville: San Juan de Aznal- faranche, Alcalá de Guadaira, Santiponce, La Algaba, Alcalá del Rio, Morón, Utrera, Carmona, Ecija, Aguadulce, Estepa, Lora del Río, Puente Genil, La Ronda, and Osuna. Meanwhile, the Fourth Bandera took part in the final pacification of Seville and the occupation of Huelva, Cantil- lana, and Cazalla.20

On the Road to Madrid

With Seville and its environs secured and pacified, the Nationalists now began operations toward their ultimate goal: Madrid.1 The best troops from Africa were organized into the Madrid Column under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe Blanco.2 On the way to Madrid, the Nationalists decided that the column should forgo the more direct route via Despañaperros and take a route farther to the west (closer to Portugal) before heading northeast to Madrid via Talavera de la Reina. In this manner the column’s left flank would be protected by the natural topography while scarce resources and personnel would also be economized. On August 1, from his headquarters in Tetuán, General Francisco Fran- co issued his first operational orders, which created two agrupaciones (battle groups), one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio Cabanillas, a man who had distinguished himself with the Regulares, and the other by Major Antonio Castejón Espinosa of the Spanish Foreign Legion. These two battle groups of the Madrid Column were arrayed as follows: Agrupación Asensio:

• Second Tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán No. 1 • Fourth Bandera of the Tercio • 1 75-millimeter battery • 1 company of Sappers, with • bridging equipment • fortification materiel • horse-borne radio equipment • quartermaster and medical services

39 40 | On the Road to Madrid

Agrupación Castejón:

• Second Tabor of the Regulares of Ceuta No. 3 • Fifth Bandera of the Tercio • 1 75-millimeter battery • 1 munitions column • 1 signals platoon • Quartermaster and medical services3

Spain was backward and antiquated vis-à- vis the other major Europe- an powers when it came to modern weaponry and military equipment. Before the start of the Civil War, Spain’s last major martial conflict had been the Rif War against Moroccan tribesmen led by Mohamed Abd-el- Krim. The bulk of the weapons, from small arms to field artillery, used in that conflict were still to be found in the inventory of the army, both on the peninsula and in Morocco in 1936. Since the Army of Africa (the Legion and the Regulares) was the elite military unit of the Spanish Army, it possessed not only the newest weapons but also the most ambitious and well-trained officers. When the Army of Africa arrived on the peninsula by air and by sea, it was relatively well equipped with small arms and ready for combat. The infantry units of the Legion and the Regulares were supported by the artillery (Schneider 70-millimeter, Schneider 75-millimeter, and Schneider or Vickers 105-millimeter guns) and other support services (e.g., engi- neering, signals, quartermaster, and medical) from General Queipo de Llano’s Second Army. In addition, limited air support was provided for the advancing columns, first from Spanish aircraft and later by the arrival of more modern airplanes from Germany and Italy. Usually opposing this professional army were poorly armed, poorly trained, and poorly led militiamen, along with a relatively few loyal professional soldiers and security personnel. At first, most militiamen and most members of leftist trade unions were armed with hunting shotguns, edged weapons, axes or clubs, and a few rifles and pistols.4 In addition to lacking adequate weapons and military training, these militiamen lacked discipline and command and control from the War Ministry in Madrid. Unable to meet the African troops in open terrain in Andalusia and Extremadura, where they would be easily outflanked and outmaneuvered, they opted for defending towns and villages—that is, engaging in urban warfare. As we have seen so far, in some villages On the Road to Madrid | 41

Alcorcón Brunete MADRID Móstoles Getafe Talavera Maqueda de la Reina s Seseña Rio Tagu Toledo Esquivias Navalmoral Torrijos Illescas Cáceres de la Mata SIERRA DE L na GUADALUPE dia ua A o G Mérida Ri G Don Benito Badajoz U Almendralejo ir T iv Villafranca de los Barros u Zafra Los Santos de Maimona lq

R a d Fuente a Llerena u O de Cantos A G Monesterio R E N io

P M O Santa Olalla R A R del Cala E R S I El Ronquillo Córdoba

Huelva Sevilla Alcalá de Guadaíra

Granada

Advance on Madrid, Jeréz de la Frontera September–November 1936 Cádiz Army of Africa ATLANTIC 025 50 Kilometers OCEAN 025 50 Miles

Advance on Madrid, September–November 1936 the militiamen put up a spirited defense, using barricades, churches, and government buildings for cover, whereas in other villages their defense was almost nonexistent. The professionalism, military discipline, and firepower of the African soldiers proved too much for the militiamen to overcome, even though on some occasions the latter outnumbered the former. The same tactics that had proved successful during the Rif War, such as small-unit maneuver (employing platoons and companies), envelopment, and artillery and air support, were now being employed 42 | On the Road to Madrid on the peninsula. Spanish militiamen had replaced the Riffians of ten years earlier.5 The modus operandi of these Nationalist flying columns was quite simple. With the Regulares and the legionnaires alternating in the vanguard, the column traveled up the road in trucks from one village to the next. Its guns were pulled by trucks or in some cases by horses, especially smaller field pieces like the Schneider 70-millimeter gun, which could be broken down into five parts and carried by pack animals. If resistance were encountered, aerial bombardment (S-M 81s and Ju-52s with Italian and German crews, respectively) were called for, and the guns rolled into place. Strong points (e.g., buildings and defensive works) were shelled into rubble before a frontal assault by the African units. In other combat scenarios, as in more open terrain, the legionnaires would march down the road while the Regulares advanced along its flanks, commanding the high ground and thus protecting the column. It was not uncommon for the Regulares to be the first to enter a village in order to exploit their fearsome and brutal reputation—a case of psychological warfare. It was less than two years since the Asturian uprising (October 1934) had taken place, and the stories, many of them greatly exaggerated by the Left, of what the Army of Africa had done to the Asturians were still fresh in the popular psyche. If the town or village surrendered peacefully, as occurred in most cases during the first weeks of the war, this was usually signified by the hanging of white flags or bedsheets and the opening of all doors and windows. The attacking troops would then fan out to secure the village while its inhabitants begged for mercy. Those considered enemies, or opponents of the rebellion, would then be rounded up for arrest and/or possible execution. Village inhabitants usually had much more to fear from accompanying Falangist and Carlist militias carrying out politically motivated reprisals and retribution than they did from the African troops, who were under military command. At this point in the campaign, the African troops killed their enemies in battle as well as those who had caused them casualties and then quickly moved on. The primary goal of these columns was to advance as rapidly as possible, link up with General Emilio Mola’s army coming from the north, and then capture Madrid. Once a town or village had been conquered or occupied, the new military authority would impose the following rules and regulations, which were posted for all to see: those who have weapons secreted in their homes, refuse to work, or strike will face summary justice and be shot.6 On the Road to Madrid | 43

In Andalusia, August began with the Fifth Bandera, under the command of Major Castejón, in the town of Puente Genil. Informed that the Republicans had dug in in front of the town, the Nineteenth Company was ordered to carry out a flanking maneuver that would allow the men to attack from the rear. The defenders retreated headlong to Puente Ge- nil, and the legionnaires were able to secure the bridge spanning the Genil River. Later Castejón led the bandera into the town and took it. At four o’clock in the afternoon the bandera began its return to Seville, arriving at midnight and bedding down for the night in the Palace of Exposition.7 The Fourth Bandera, commanded by Major José Vierna Trápaga, also passed inspection on August 1. It formed part of a column composed of a platoon from the Eleventh Company and two platoons from the Six- teenth Company under the command of Captain Rafael González Pérez- Caballero and Lieutenants Francisco Marmol Arrabal, Eduardo Artigas, and Fernando Rodrigo Cifuentes. Artillery support was provided by a mountain battery under the command of a captain. Major Vierna was in overall command of the column, which boarded trucks in Seville at 6:30 a.m. and headed for the village of Tocina, where the mission was to reestablish normality in the village. Once this was accomplished and a security service was organized (usually Falangist militiamen), the column returned to Seville, where it spent the night.8 A pernicious custom and tradition brought by the Army of Africa to Andalusia was unbridled looting and pillaging. As the legionnaires had done during the Rif War and in Asturias in 1934, they stole everything they could get their hands on from homes and shops, especially if it was portable and of high monetary value, regardless of whether the property belonged to leftists or rightists. Of particular interest were radios, clocks, wristwatches, jewelry, typewriters, furniture, and clothing. These items were later sold along the way or (in the case of the Regulares) sent back to the men’s villages in Morocco. Soldiers have certainly been looting and pillaging for centuries, and this was considered acceptable in Arab warfare as well, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, where tribesmen fought for booty, the spoils of war. After World War II, Nazi Germany was looted by the Soviet Union and the Allies. According to Antony Beevor, “Officers organized the despatch of theregulares ’ booty back to their families in Morocco because it helped in recruiting.”9 Since their arrival, the Fourth and Fifth Banderas continally carried out military operations in and around Seville as part of various columns, along with the Regulares and other peninsular troops, regular forces (the 44 | On the Road to Madrid

Civil Guard and the Assault Guard) and irregular rightist militias (the Requetés and Falangists). August turned out to be a very busy month, with some of the fiercest combat in the war so far. On August 2 the Fourth Bandera joined the Agrupación Asensio and departed Seville at eight o’clock in the evening in automobiles and trucks, including fuel trucks furnished by General Queipo de Llano. The convoy headed first for the village of El Ronquillo, with the final destination -be ing Zafra and the ancient Roman town of Mérida, founded in 26 BCE. The column was halted about four miles outside El Ronquillo and was forced to spend the night there because the Republicans had blown up the bridge required to proceed farther.10 On the same day, the Fifth Bandera was in Seville, resting, washing up, and cleaning their weapons. At 6:30 p.m. the bandera was reviewed by “His Excellency, General of the Second Division, Don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano,” who publicly congratulated the bandera. This was followed by a march past the general while receiving the cheers and affection of the crowd. The bandera spent the night in the capital city.11 At this point the Sixth Bandera, under the command of Major Pedro Pimentel Zayas, made the crossing from Spanish Morocco. The bandera had been stationed in Ceuta, providing vigilance and security for the city. On August 1–2 the bandera returned from Ceuta to its base in Riffien and from there moved by train to Tetuán’s airfield, where it bivouacked for the night. On August 3 the Twenty-First Company, under the command of Cap- tain Francisco Javier Arbat Gil, boarded the trimotor planes headed for Granada’s Armilla airfield. Upon its arrival it was pressed into immediate service as part of a column led by the commander of the Assault Guards. This column headed for the nearby village of Bracana with the Twenty- First Company in the vanguard. At the crossroads of Bracana the column received heavy gunfire from the villagers; it took a frontal assault to dislodge the defenders from their positions and force them to flee. During the most heated part of the battle, Captain Arbat, Lieutenant Martinho Rosario, and five legionnaires were wounded. Several trucks were captured, along with cars loaded with ammunition.12 Also on August 3 the Fourth Bandera journeyed by truck to Santa Olal- la del Cala and arrived at about 10:30 that night. The village was captured with minimal resistance, and the bandera spent the night there. Shortly after arriving in Santa Olalla de Cala, Lieutenant Colonel Asensio was On the Road to Madrid | 45 notified that a Republican column composed of twenty trucks was headed toward his position from Monesterio. He ordered the column’s vanguard to advance about four miles north toward Monesterio to prevent a surprise attack. Two clashes took place between the African troops and the poorly armed militiamen near the village of Venta del Culebrín with predictable results: fourteen militiamen were killed, one was wounded, and the rest fled in complete disarray.13 On the same day, the Fifth Bandera was still resting in Seville until eight o’clock that night, when, as part of the Agrupación Castejón, it boarded “more than one hundred trucks and many automobiles,” according to an ABC correspondent.14 It later departed María Luisa Park as had the Agrupación Asensio. The village of El Ronquillo was taken without incident—white rags were flying from the balconies—by the Fifth Bande- ra, which spent the night there.15 The Twenty-Second Company of the Seventh Bandera boarded trimotor planes in Tetuán on August 4, flew across the Strait of Gibraltar, and landed in Jerez de la Frontera, where it boarded a train for Seville. There Major Pimentel was reunited with his bandera, except for the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Companies, which remained in Tetuán awaiting transport and making preparations for the following day’s operations.16 The Twenty-Fourth arrived on August 6, and the Twenty-Third arrived on August 7. Now the entire Sixth Bandera was in Andalusia. The Fifth Bandera was also in action on August 4. At dawn Major Castejón divided his forces into two columns: the first was composed of the Second Tabor of the Regulares of Ceuta No. 3, an artillery platoon, a bridging platoon, and an armored car headed for Monesterio; the second column was composed of the Fifth Bandera, an artillery platoon, and a bridging platoon. About six miles outside Santa Olalla del Cala, 110 Civil Guardsmen who had fled from the Badajoz Command in Llerena joined Castejón’s second column, augmenting its fighting capability. Both columns had the Regulares in their vanguard. At about seven o’clock that night the bandera set out for Llerena and arrived at five o’clock the next morning. Thebandera quickly made contact with the Republicans, who resisted vigorously from inside the church and City Hall. The Regulares laid siege to the town’s plaza and quickly captured it except for the church and City Hall. Some Republican militiamen barricaded themselves in one of the church’s towers. The legionnaires advanced across the plaza, hurling numerous hand grenades at the 46 | On the Road to Madrid defenders who were barricaded in the City Hall building. Accompanied by blistering rifle fire and ultimately employing the bayonet, all the City Hall defenders perished. The church tower defenders threw dynamite bombs down on the legionnaires. Castejón, in turn, blasted open some of the doors of the church with his cannons. It took a frontal assault, along with dynamite and setting the church on fire, to ultimately dislodge the determined defenders, who suffered 150 dead, the majority killed in the inferno and the destruction of the church. Six surviving militiamen were taken prisoner, and war materiel and a large quantity of dynamite were captured. Two legionnaires were wounded in the battle. With Llerena pacified, Castejón’s group continued its march toward Monesterio, where the two battle groups, Castejón’s and Asensio’s, united.17 Francisco Espinosa describes that prior to Castejón’s entering Llerena, more than one hundred Civil Guardsmen and their officers, led by the wily Lieutenant Antonio Miranda Vega, fooled Llerena’s civil authorities by declaring their loyalty to the Republic and a willingness to take on Castejón’s column outside the village on the main road. The Civ- il Guardsmen, along with Llerena’s mayor in command of a group of about fifteen militiamen, set out for Puente de la Ribera in order to blow up the bridge. When they arrived at the bridge, however, instead of demolishing it, Lieutenant Miranda disarmed the militiamen and marched them down the main road toward Castejón’s column. Contact with the advancing column was made around midafternoon. Llerena’s mayor was able to escape capture and make his way back to the village, but the rest of the militiamen were not so fortunate: Castejón had them all shot by the end of the day. Espinosa also tells of the very brief exchange that took place outside Llerena between day laborer Ramón Franco Escudero (known as Bo- quineto) and one of Castejón’s armored vehicles, most probably a Bil- bao-1932. The intrepid but ignorant peasant tried to stop the lead vehicle by shooting it with an old pump-action shotgun. Needless to say, a projectile fired from the vehicle dispatched Boquineto.18 At dawn on the same day (August 4), the Fourth Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Asensio’s group, left Santa Olalla del Cala aboard trucks headed for Monesterio on the road to Badajoz. About four miles outside Monesterio, the “point” of the column’s vanguard, the Second On the Road to Madrid | 47

Tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán No. 1 made contact with the Repub- licans arrayed across the road and in Monesterio’s neighborhood of El Real de la Jara. From 300 to 400 militiamen had journeyed from Badajoz by truck and were now prepared to defend Monesterio. The militiamen again were no match for the seasoned Regulares, which killed thirty-four of them with only three of their own being wounded. With the Republicans quickly neutralized, the column continued its advance. The Fourth Bandera’s Eleventh Company was ordered to deploy along the left flank of the road in order to avoid the Republicans firing from houses located at the entrance to the village. The houses were cleared, the Republicans were put to flight, and the village was occupied around midday. A large quantity of automatic weapons and ammunition was captured, and the column spent the night in Monesterio.19 Major Pimentel, along with the Twenty-Second Company of the Sixth Bandera, formed the vanguard for a column that set out from Seville for Puente de Genil and Montilla on August 5. Along the way they encountered pockets of resistance that they easily defeated as they passed through the villages of Carmona and Ecija. Meanwhile, the Twenty-First Company of the Sixth Bandera, based in Granada under the command of Lieutenant Barrachina, accomplished its assigned mission, which was the capture of Ventas and Chimenea. At dusk on the same day, the command staff of the Sixth Bandera arrived in Seville and joined Pimentel’s column. Along with other units, another agrupación was formed under the command of the venerable africanista General José Enrique Varela Iglesias. The group marched out from Puente de Genil, passed through Montilla and Aguilar de la Fron- tera, and occupied Castro del Río and its neighboring villages. Breaking away from Varela’s group, the bandera’s command staff, led by Lieutenant Juan Salguero Infantes, joined Major Buiza’s column and participated in the occupation of Constantina, Castilblanco, and El Pedroso. With the day’s objectives successfully completed, they returned to Seville for the night.20 The Fourth Bandera had a full day on August 5. As part of Asensio’s column, the legionnaires began their march at three o’clock in the morning, arriving at Fuente de Cantos at seven. At the very front of the column was the Tenth Company, which easily entered the village. The village had been mostly abandoned, however, after a Nationalist air attack the previous day that had left three dead and one wounded. Asensio left the 48 | On the Road to Madrid

Legionnaires in Constantina village’s occupation to the Civil Guard while his column continued its march toward Los Santos de Maimona.21 There was a reason for Fuente de Cantos’s relative desolation: it was the first town on the route between Seville and Madrid where atrocities had taken place against its rightist citizens. Fuente de Cantos’s right-wing citizens began to be arrested July 18–19 and were eventually massacred by groups of armed outsiders. These leftist marauders began their grisly activities on July 18 as they traveled from village to village seeking out those they perceived to be enemies of the republic or supporters of the uprising. Those arrested (the number varies depending on the source) were divided into two groups: the first, which numbered about twelve, was taken to the Republican Union prison; the second, about fifty-six citizens, was sent directly from City Hall to the church’s sacristy at one o’clock in the afternoon on July 19. The sacristy, with its doors and windows sealed, had previously been doused with gasoline and oil. The church was surrounded by men armed with shotguns and with their faces covered. Around 3:30 p.m. the church bells began their death toll. Then the building was set on fire and the shooting began. Between the shooting and the On the Road to Madrid | 49 blazing inferno, twelve victims were murdered: eight of them charred, three shot, and one who escaped the blaze only to die when he jumped into a well while being pursued by his tormenters. The literature does not detail what happened to the other forty-four captives.22 About three miles from Los Santos de Maimona, the column encountered tough resistance from the Loyalist forces that had come down from Badajoz aboard thirty trucks. Under the command of Colonel Ildefonso Puigdendolas Ponce de León, the Loyalists were deployed along a nearly two-mile front in the olive groves and a hill facing and flanking the bandera. Employing artillery, machine guns, and rifles, the defenders strongly resisted the advances of the Seville column, starting at around one o’clock in the afternoon. The commander of the Fourth Bandera, Major Vierna, ordered two platoons from the Tenth Company to take a vineyard and some houses from where the Republicans were tenaciously harassing the attackers. At the same time, the Sixteenth Company, which had deployed along the left flank, was determined to end this engagement but was instantly met with murderous machine-gun fire. Thebandera’s machine guns were set up in a coppice to the left of the main road. Lieutenant Pío Verdú Verdú of the Sixteenth Company was killed while setting up the machine guns. The intense firefight continued, forcing the commander of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Asensio, to order that the defenders be pinned down from the front while a tabor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1) carried out an enveloping maneuver along the right flank in order to command the high ground above the village. The Fourth Bandera was directed to take the rocky hills situated on the left flank. The Sixteenth Company launched an infantry assault under the cover of two machine guns of the Twelfth Company and two platoons of the Tenth Company with the aim of clearing the hills from where the defenders were firing feverishly at the column. The tide of battle turned when Asensio called for an air strike, which took place at about 4:30 p.m. From Seville’s Tablada airfield, several Nationalist planes bombed and strafed Colonel Puigdendolas’s troops. The combination of the aerial attack and Asensio’s African troops’ determined assault with hand grenades forced the defenders to quit their fighting positions and flee in a disorganized fashion while suffering numerous casualties. At six o’clock the Regulares entered the village followed by the Eleventh and Twelfth Companies and the bandera’s command staff. The Tenth and Sixteenth Companies remained behind, 50 | On the Road to Madrid securing the positions just taken from the Republicans. Security within the village was assigned to militia forces under the command of Nation- alist army officers. A new twist to this day’s operation was that once the village had been captured and was in Nationalist hands, Republican airplanes arrived and began to bomb it, causing a few casualties among the legionnaires. After the battle, Colonel Puigdendolas notified the War Ministry in Madrid from Badajoz about the battle for Los Santos de Maimona, his disadvantage in artillery and mortars, and his retreat to Badajoz without losing any men or materiel. His forces now consisted of about 850 men (500 militiamen, 250 regular army infantrymen, and 100 carabineros) with one cannon and four machine guns. He acknowledged that twelve men had been wounded in the battle and that he was preparing for the defense of Badajoz.23 While the Fourth Bandera was engaged in a hard-fought battle with the Republicans on August 5 in Los Santos de Maimona, the Fifth Bandera was having an easy time that day marching toward Monesterio and occupying it without incident. However, as Castejón’s column marched from Llerena to Monesterio, it began to be harassed daily by the Republican air force, experiencing bombardment as it moved from one town to another.24 By August 4–5, the Nationalist air force began to ramp up its operations in Andulusia and Extremadura in support of Franco’s northward- moving columns. Operating from Tablada airfield in Seville, Nationalist pilots went on the offensive. On August 4 a Nationalist DC-2 attacked Badajoz while the planes that had been involved in the airlift from Africa, Junker 52s and Fokker VIIs, were reassigned from a transport role to a bomber/transport role. Three squadrons of Ju-52s were formed at Tabla- da, the first organized with nine of the twenty aircraft that had previously been used in the airlift.25 In the Granada sector, the Sixth Bandera was growing stronger every day as the Twenty-Fourth Company, recently arrived from Tetuán, joined the Twenty-First Company on August 6. The following day the last remaining company of the Sixth Bandera, the Twenty-Third, disembarked from Africa. The companies of the Sixth Bandera were distributed between General Varela’s column and another column commanded by Ma- jor Buiza that operated in the environs of Granada. The latter column carried out a reconnaissance operation aimed at the village of Huejar de la Sierra and its surroundings in a radius of eight and a half miles toward Guadix. Huejar de la Sierra was captured with all of the surrounding On the Road to Madrid | 51 area five miles deep, and the heights overlooking the village were secured, thus denying the Republicans the possibility of attacking the village. In this action Captain Alejandro Alonso de Castañeda distinguished himself. Subsequently, the various companies of the Sixth Bandera, in the vanguard of other columns, carried out offensive operations along the main road to Málaga and the road that unites Moraleda de Zafayona with Bracana and Tocón.26 On August 6, the Fourth and Fifth Banderas continued operations in their respective sectors as part of Yagüe’s Madrid Column. The Fourth Bandera remained in Los Santos de Maimona, establishing normality in the village and providing necessary services, while a platoon from the Seventeenth Company of the Fifth Bandera set out in two vehicles from Monesterio for the nearby village of Calera de León; the village was occupied without resistance, and the legionnaires returned to Monesterio for the night. A major part of establishing “normality” in an occupied village was the registration and arrest of those who were believed to be enemies, those opposed to the uprising, or those who had caused harm or death to rightists.27 The First Bandera arrived in Seville on August 6, having been part of the Victory Convoy, and was quickly sent into combat. It participated in the occupation of Lora del Río as well as other villages in the province. The Second Company of the bandera was assigned to Major Buiza’s column and played a major role in the conquest of Constantina on August 9. With these operations successfully completed, the First Bandera returned to Seville and became part of the agrupación of Lieutenant Colo- nel “Heli” Tella, the commander of the First Legion.28 Franco arrives in Seville The situation in Andalusia, as well as the course of the war and beyond, changed dramatically when General Francisco Franco arrived in Seville from Tetuán on August 7 to take personal command of the Army of Af- rica. Franco had earlier traveled from Tetuán to Seville for consultations with Queipo de Llano and other Nationalist generals. The first trip took place on July 27–28, and the second on August 2–3. At the July 28 meeting, Major Generals Franco and Queipo de Llano met with Brigadier Generals Luis Orgaz y Yoldi and José Varela Iglesias in Queipo de Llano’s headquarters in Seville. According to Néstor Cerdá Cerdá, it was decided that Varela “should have tactical command of all columns operating under the control of 52 | On the Road to Madrid

Seville headquarters and ordered to repel Republican attempts to retake Córdoba.” In addition, Francisco Espinosa notes that the purpose of Franco’s trip to Seville on August 2 was to assert his power and crucial position in the uprising to Queipo de Llano and set him straight. Franco was resentful and angry that Queipo de Llano had boasted that he had secured Seville with only “fifteen soldiers” and that the African troops sent by Franco were on Queipo de Llano’s turf and he (Queipo de Llano) could therefore employ them as he pleased, regardless of the casualties. It was very doubtful that Queipo de Llano would have been able to secure Seville, Cádiz, and Huelva for the Nationalists without Franco’s African troops. A week later, Franco transferred his headquarter from Tetuán to Seville.29 General Orgaz, an africanista and a former commander of the Reg- ulares during the Rif War, remained in Tetuán as the Nationalist high commissioner and military commander in chief. Before Franco’s arrival in metropolitan Spain, the two principal generals in charge of the Al- zamiento were Emilio Mola in the north and Queipo de Llano in the south. With the untimely death of the preselected Nationalist leader, General José Sanjurjo, as well as the capture and subsequent executions of two principal conspiratorial generals, Joaquín Fanjul Goni in Madrid and Manuel Goded Llopis in Barcelona, the field was now open for a new leader. By late July and early August, Spain was clearly divided into two armed camps: one held by the Republican Loyalists and the other by the Nation- alist rebels. In Andalusia, the Nationalists held the major cities of Seville, with its Tablada airfield, and Cádiz, with its deepwater port—both essential for receiving troops and materiel from Spanish Morocco. Other important cities taken by the Nationalists in Andalusia were Algeciras, La Línea, Jaén, Huelva, Córdoba, and Granada. As we have seen so far, first from Seville and later from Granada, flying columns containing the Army of Africa were able to advance from town to town and village to village routing out leftist elements. In many of these villages, leftist workers’ militias, the majority members of the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Traba- jo (CNT), took over and tried to defend their villages for the republic. Sometimes they murdered priests, burned churches, and destroyed church property. Landowners, members of the middle class, and right-wing sympathizers were murdered or held hostage. The strategy of the Nation- alists was to conquer and occupy these villages, disarm the militiamen, On the Road to Madrid | 53 seize weapons, and arrest and/or execute those who were perceived as enemies or potential enemies.30 This was basically a strategy of limpiar (cleanse) and castigar (punish). In the northern part of Spain General Mola, along with Generals Mi- guel Cabanellas Ferrer and Andrés Saliquet Zumeta, had secured the provinces of Navarre (Pamplona), Castilla-León, Logroño and Soria as well as the cities of Huesca, Vitoria, Ávila, Segovia, Valladolid, half of Aragón (Zaragoza), and most of Galicia for the Nationalists. The republic still controlled Madrid, Cataluñua (Barcelona), Valencia, the Levant, Bilbao, the Basque country, and most of La Mancha.31 In addition, a provisional Nationalist government, the Junta Nacio- nal de Defensa (National Defense Council), was established in Burgos on July 23 and headed by General Cabanellas. The most senior general involved in the uprising and the acting commander of the Fifth Division in Zaragoza, Cabanellas had joined the Nationalists on July 19. The purpose of the junta, which claimed to have assumed all the powers of the state, was to provide a military and civilian administrative organization for the rebels. The junta lasted from July 23 to October 1, 1936 and was composed of Generals Cabanellas, Saliquet, Mola, Queipo de Llano, Franco (who became a full member on August 3), Orgaz, Miguel Ponte y Manso de Zúñiga, and Fidel Dávila Arrondo, along with Colonels Federico Mon- taner Canet and Fernando Moreno Calderón. Brigadier General Mola, the real power in the north, allowed Major General Cabanellas to serve as president of the junta as a way to placate him and bring him on board. In one of its first decrees, the council declared that there were two rebel armies and that General Mola commanded the Army of the North while General Franco commanded the Army of the South, which included Spanish Morocco.32 In Andalusia, the veteran cavalry officer, General Queipo de Llano, had been supplanted by the wily and politically ambitious General Franco. Franco’s command of the Army of Africa and his political and economic connections with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were all crucial if the Nationalists hoped to emerge victorious from what was quickly becom- ing a brutal and prolonged civil war.33 Franco established his headquarters in an opulent palatial estate in Seville, the palace of the Marquesa de Yanduri, and set up his general staff. This included two aides-de-camp, his cousin and former Legion officer Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo (known as Pacón), artillery officer 54 | On the Road to Madrid

General Francisco Franco with Colonel Juan Yagüe in Seville

Major Carlos Díaz Varela, Colonel Martín Moreno, General Alfredo Kindelán of the air force, and Legion founder General José Millán Astray, now of the Press and Propaganda Bureau.34 The Nationalists’ advance toward Madrid by way of Extremadura (Mérida, Cáceres, and Badajoz) kicked into high gear after Franco’s arrival in Seville. For the three flying columns (Asensio’s, Castejón’s, and Tella’s) to continue to proceed with the alacrity that was necessary to reach Madrid and hook up with Mola’s forces coming from the north, Franco needed to bring over to the peninsula the remainder of the Army of Africa. The Second Bandera had hoped to cross the Strait of Gibraltar behind the First Bandera, which arrived on August 5 as part of the Victo- ry Convoy, but it was not to be. For the time being, the Second Bandera was stranded in Ceuta. However, that changed when it was ordered to set out for Tetuán in preparation for departure by air. The airlift began on August 10, with the Fourth and Fourteenth Companies setting off for Jerez de la Frontera On the Road to Madrid | 55 and the Fifth and Sixth Companies for Seville, where the entire bandera would reunite. With the departure of the Second Bandera, only the Third Bandera remained in the protectorate.35 Being in Seville also gave Franco the ability to closely oversee the utilization of his battle-hardened legionnaires and Regulares. Since the arrival in Seville of the first units of the Fifth Bandera, the Legion and the Regu- lares had served as Queipo de Llano’s shock troops and the vanguard of his columns in securing Seville and its environs. As the “tip of the spear,” they had suffered heavy casualties, something that caused Franco great concern. He did not want them to be unnecessarily wasted; he wanted to reserve them for major operations such as the thrust toward Mérida and Badajoz and eventually the capture of Madrid. In a July 22 communiqué, Franco admonished Queipo de Llano concerning the use of these troops: “It is important that you economize the shock troops as much as possible, reserve them for future actions, they shall not be left inactive without being employed thoroughly, avoid attrition. In actions against towns with buildings the employment of artillery fire is indispensible, great morale effect, saves many casualties.”36 After the conquest of Los Santos de Maimona on August 5, National- ist columns continued pressing their advance toward the major town of Mérida. Once it was obvious that Mérida, the largest and most important Republican-held town to be threatened since the Madrid Column left Seville, would be the next goal of the Nationalists, the government in Madrid began to panic. From the town of Zafra, located west of the main road and southwest of Los Santos de Maimona, the government was warned that if Mérida fell, the next town to be attacked would be the ancient Roman town of Cáceres, founded in 34 BCE. The reason Cáceres was so important to both sides of the conflict was that if it fell to Yagüe’s Madrid Column, Franco’s forces from the south would be able to link up with Mola’s forces in the north. The Nationalists would thus be united in western Spain. As early as August 5, government officials in both Mérida and Badajoz were desperately requesting Republican reinforcements from Madrid, especially aircraft to bomb rebel strongholds and artillery (as well as mortars and machine guns) for the defense of their respective towns.37 On August 7 the First, Fourth, and Fifth Banderas were once again in action with their respective columns. Asensio’s column, with the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1) in the vanguard, departed Los Santos de Maimona for Almendralejo. On the way there the column had 56 | On the Road to Madrid to pass through Villafranca de los Barros. Around three o’clock in the morning, the column neared the village only to be met with gunfire from the power station. Asensio ordered that hand grenades as well as a few cannon rounds be lobbed at the defenders. An infantry assault by the Regulares and the legionnaires captured the village’s power station. Asensio, fearing an attack from the village, waited for sunrise and then began to deploy so as to encircle the significant number of Republican forces within the village. However, the villagers were able to escape en- trapment and flee toward Almendralejo. The militiamen in the village had incarcerated more than one hundred rightists, about sixty in the jail and another fifty-four in the church. When they heard the cannons, before making their escape they set the church on fire and took a couple of shots at it. However, the prisoners were able to escape the burning church, with only minor injuries. The Fourth Bandera, as part of Asensio’s column, did not enter Villa- franca because it was more interested in moving on toward Almendralejo, so entering and securing the village was left to the Fifth Bandera, which was then one day behind. During its stop in Villafranca, the column was intensely bombarded by a Republican air force trimotor. Renewing the march, the column was able to advance to within three miles of Almen- dralejo, where it came into contact with its defenders. Again the Republi- can air force dropped bombs on the attacking column.38 Undeterred, the attack on Almendralejo proceeded, the Fourth Bande- ra and the Second Tabor leading the charge. Almendralejo’s streets and plazas were cleared of the Republicans as the attackers carried out an effective mopping-up operation. The only remaining point of resistance came from the solidly constructed and hard-to- reach parish church, the largest and strongest building in the town. About fifty militiamen had barricaded themselves inside the church, whose ground floor they had been using as a parking garage. Consequently, the Eleventh Company surrounded the church and secured it for the night. The following day, August 8, the situation was the same. Lacking smoke bombs to drive the militiamen out of the church, Asensio ordered that the church be torched, hoping that the vehicles stored within would either explode or produce noxious gases. The fire was set using straw and sulfur, which produced toxic fumes that reached all the way into the choir room. This forced the militiamen into the church’s tower and belfry, from where they continued to throw bombs and fire their rifles on the attackers On the Road to Madrid | 57 below. Asensio’s men bombed the roof of the church’s tower and shelled the tower with cannon fire, but to no avail.39 While the Fourth Bandera was having a rough time in Almendralejo on August 7–8, the Fifth Bandera, following closely behind Asensio’s column, set out from Monesterio for Zafra at three o’clock in the morning on August 7. Major Castejón ordered his artillery to begin shelling the village at five o’clock in preparation for his infantry’s entry. His cannons shelled the church and the railway, preventing a train from leaving. The legionnaires entered the village at 6:30 a.m. and found it decorated with white flags; thus they encountered no resistance, except for a sole defender, who was immediately eliminated.40 The citizens who remained cheered the legionnaires. Prisoners were freed from the jail and City Hall. Before proceeding to Los Santos de Maimona at 4:30 p.m., Castejón collected a “war tax” or “liberation tax” from Zafra’s citizens. This was basically a bill for services rendered: freeing the town from the Republi- cans. In addition, he left behind a platoon each from the Regulares, the Legion, and the Civil Guard to provide security.41 As was the norm in these mopping-up and punishment-and-retribution operations, once the village was secured Castejón compiled a list of names of leftists, with the help of rightists in City Hall. Some citizens were given arms while others were disarmed. When he left Zafra, Caste- jón took with him about fifty men whose hands were bound and who had found no one in Zafra to protect them or vouch for them. At certain in- tervals along the way to Los Santos de Maimona, Castejón ordered seven of them at a time to be taken out of the column and shot.42 Since arriving in the peninsula on August 5 as part of the Victory Con- voy, the First Bandera reached Seville on August 6 and captured Lora del Río on August 7 and Constantina on August 8. With the advance slowed down on the road to Mérida, the First Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella’s column, was sent to reinforce the other two. It arrived in Almendralejo on August 10 and relieved the Fourth Bandera, which for the past two days had been providing security on the road to Mérida as well as securing the church in Almendralejo. Now it was time for the First Company of the First Bandera, along with the Eleventh Company of the Fourth Bandera, to eliminate the threat from the Almendralejo defenders’ redoubt in the church’s tower. From the top floor and belfry of the tower the militiamen resisted, using rifles and hand grenades to impede movement on the main streets of the 58 | On the Road to Madrid village. Lieutenant of Engineers Luis Ripoll López, attached to the First Bandera, and a few volunteers fought their way into the ground floor and choir room of the church at seven o’clock at night, where they were able to place a TNT charge on the stairs that led to the tower and detonate it. This explosion caused part of the staircase to collapse, leaving the militiamen cut off in the tower. With the stairs demolished and the defenders trapped without hope of escape, some opted to hurl themselves out the windows of the tower. All defenders were either killed by the legionnaires or jumped to their deaths onto the streets below. For his actions that day, Lieutenant Ripoll was awarded the Laureate Cross of St. Ferdinand on February 28, 1945.43 The fight for Almendralejo was one of the nastiest and bitterest so far in the southern campaign. As in Llerena and Fuente de Cantos, leftist militiamen in Almendralejo had been extremely brutal toward those of the Right after the start of the uprising on July 18. When the Nationalists arrived in Almendralejo, the militiamen rounded up all their prisoners— from the jail, the municipal slaughterhouse, and the San Juan de Dios Hospital, a total of 177 captives. Then they doused them with a flamma- ble liquid and began to shoot them; 28 were killed instantly, and the rest received gunshot wounds of various degrees of severity. It was after this macabre scenario that Asensio launched his attack against the town, first with aerial bombardment and artillery shelling and then with an infantry assault by the Regulares and the Legion. The intention was to encircle the town and prevent the escape of its defenders. At this time government aircraft arrived and began to bomb Asensio’s forces, causing more than twenty casualties. Slowly and methodically, the attackers were able to eliminate all resistance coming from buildings well defended by obstinate militiamen who knew what fate awaited them if they were captured. In order to use his elite shock troops as efficiently as possible, General Franco had ordered that buildings, regardless of whether they were civilian or religious, be razed with cannon fire or set on fire. Later, according to Francoist propaganda, the destruction of these buildings and churches would be blamed on the actions of the “Red horde.” This was the mind- set behind the decision to detonate TNT in the church in Almendralejo. According to Franciso Espinosa, once shelling the church with cannon fire had proved to be ineffective, Asensio opted to burn the church down On the Road to Madrid | 59 because, he believed, the “Reds” had already desecrated it by turning it into a garage.44 While the First and Fourth Banderas were tied up in Almendralejo, the Fifth Bandera continued its operations on the main road toward Mérida. On August 8, the Seventeenth Company, along with a company of the Regulares and a machine-gun platoon from the Twentieth Machine-Gun Company, marched from Los Santos de Maimona to Villafranca de los Barros under the command of a “Captain Meléndez.” Villafranca de los Barros was occupied without incident and the group returned to Los San- tos de Maimona, joining the rest of the bandera for the night.45 The following day, August 9, the Fifth Bandera remained in Los Santos de Maimona, providing security for the village until it began the march toward Almendralejo.46 It was very typical for Asensio’s and Castejón’s columns to travel long distances at night aboard motor vehicles. There were at least three reasons for this: the hot daytime temperatures of Extremadura in August, an almost zero chance that the Republican air force would bomb and/or strafe the column as it traveled in a convoy on a major highway, and the ability to arrive at the next targeted village early the following morning ready for battle. The Fifth Bandera passed through the recently captured Almendralejo on August 10 and arrived in the village of Torremegia at eight o’clock in the morning. After a brief cannonade, the village was occupied without incident. Castejón’s column rapidly continued the march toward Mérida, stopping almost four miles outside the town. The bandera was ordered to protect two batteries, which began to shell the town. That evening, the bandera provided security and bivouacked in preparation for the following day’s assault on the town.47

Mérida

Mérida was a major communications intersection on the Seville- Mérida highway that snaked northward to the east of the Portuguese border. From Mérida, General Francisco Franco’s column could move west toward Badajoz or northeast toward Madrid. The Nationalists were cognizant of the fact that Republican resistance was stiffening as they moved closer to Mérida and eventually to Cáceres. Franco’s response was to combine Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio’s column and Major An- tonio Castejón’s column into one, under the command of the former, with Lieutentant Colonel Heli Tella’s column in reserve to provide reinforcement for the larger one. By uniting the two principal columns, Fran- co was able to double the firepower and the offensive fighting capability of his forces. In preparation for capturing the major towns of Mérida and Bada- joz, Franco responded to Asensio’s request for more powerful artillery with greater range and for close air support for the upcoming attacks on defended population centers. Franco responded by sending Asen- sio 105-millimeter mountain guns to augment his 70-millimeter and 75-millimeter field pieces, along with three hundred rounds for each gun in the 105-millimeter battery. A radio transmission truck was also sent. Franco ordered Nationalist forces in Cáceres to move south against Méri- da to assist with the attack and told Asensio to notify his headquarters about the day and approximate time he was going to attack so that the promised air support could be furnished.1 Before the attack on Mérida, Franco fortified the column with more munitions and artillery and promised two Ju-52s for air support. At the same time, he asked General Emilio Mola to carry out offensive operations in the province of Ávila in order to disrupt the possibility of

61 62 | Mérida

Republican reinforcements coming down the Plasencia-Cáceres- Mérida corridor. Since Asensio would need all his Army of Africa troops for the attack on Mérida, Franco ordered that security in the recently captured villages be turned over to peninsular army troops, the Civil Guard, and rightist militia groups. Tella’s column, which was reinforcing the main column commanded by Asensio, was composed of the First Bandera of the Spanish Foreign Legion under the command of Major José Álvarez Entrena, the First Ta- bor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1), a Civil Guard platoon, artillery, and other soldiers.2 While Franco’s columns were moving toward Méri- da, General José Varela’s forces were defending the city of Córdoba and preventing the forces of Republican General José Miaja Menant from capturing the city of Seville by advancing down the Guadalquivir River Valley.3 Mérida was situated on the northern bank of the Guadiana River, which meant that the Madrid Column had to ford the river. Instead of crossing the river opposite the town, the column crossed it to the southeast, near the villages of Alange and La Zarza. The hope was that crossing the river at these locations would be easier because of a weaker flow. Setting out from Almendralejo on August 11, 1936, the column, with the Fourth Bandera in the vanguard, neutralized all points of Republican resistance in the villages. However, after the capture of Alange and La Zarza it was determined that the Guadiana’s flow there was too strong, so the decision was made to return to the main road and take Mérida head-on. Once in view of Mérida, the column prepared to cross the Roman Bridge (completed during the reign of the Spanish-born Roman emperor Trajan, 98–117 CE), which spanned the Guadiana River. Suddenly the column came under an intense bombing attack by Republican aircraft. This aerial attack had the effect of emboldening the town’s defenders, who launched a spirited counterattack, which momentarily disconcerted the Nationalists. With the Fourth Bandera in the center, Mérida’s defenders attacked along both flanks, but especially along the right flank from the opposite side of the river. With great celerity, the Sixteenth Company deployed along a plain, harrying the Republicans while also trying to impede the movement of a train traveling from Mérida to La Zarza. This was accomplished with great effort and caused numerous Republican casualties. Overcoming the first line of defense, the attackers pressed their assault until they reached the intersection of the Seville-Badajoz highway, where Mérida | 63 they situated the column’s artillery on a hill that looked down on Mérida. For the next two hours the column’s artillery and Mérida’s artillery (two guns) engaged in a fierce battery duel. Infantry units, covered by their respective heavy weapons’ fire, fought each other between the 875-yard-long Roman Bridge and the railroad bridge. The former had been mined with explosive charges, which (fortunately for the attackers) were not detonated. A bold and skillful maneuver by a company from the Fifth Bandera secured the Roman Bridge and prevented it from being blown up. The legionnaires now reached the first houses of the town. Moving house-to-house, the Legion set up its machine guns to provide fire support for its advancing infantry. Once an objective was taken, the machine gun would be moved up quickly to that place, and the exercise would begin anew. The most stubborn resistance was encountered from within a bar, where nearly seventy “Reds” furiously defended their position with rifle fire and hand grenades; they were all killed in the clash. After many hours of bitter combat that conquered numerous redoubts (composed of sandbags, barbed-wire entanglements, piles of bricks, roof tiles, lumber, and other construction materials), Mérida was finally captured by seven o’clock in the evening on August 11. With the capture of Mérida the city jail was opened, and rightist prisoners were set free. After space had run out in the city jail, a chapel had been converted into a jail for women, and more than eighty women of all ages had been confined there; they too were freed. After the day’s action, the Fourth Bandera spent the night in the town’s artillery barracks. The battle for Mérida signified the first time that Nationalist artillery and airpower (e.g., three S-M 81 “Pipistrello” bomber/transports flown by the Italian Aviation Legion) had provided defensive protection for the attacking troops and thus made the capture of the town possible. Before this the Nationalists had used artillery and airpower only offensively, to attack and capture towns and villages.4 The Fifth Bandera was also on the move on August 11. At five o’clock in the morning the Nineteenth Company began to march in the vanguard of the column whose destination was Mérida. The march was uneventful until the soldiers reached the village of Calamonte, situated to the west of the main road; its defenders opened fire on the column from well- entrenched positions inside olive groves to the side of the road. The skirmish ended when the legionnaires assaulted the defenders’ trenches. The Fifth Bandera continued the march toward Mérida, where it linked up with the Fourth Bandera to take the town. A great quantity of materiel 64 | Mérida

Machine-gun squad in Mérida was seized, and many prisoners were taken. Yet hundreds of defenders were able to escape to Badajoz. As was usually the case, those prisoners who were deemed suspicious were shot.5 However, the day had been costly for the Fifth Bandera: two corporals and several legionnaires from the Nineteenth Company and a corporal from the Twentieth Company had been wounded; the Seventeenth Company suffered the most casualties, with four legionnaires killed and Lieutenant Alfonso Cerón Gil, the company leader, a sergeant, and six corporals wounded.6 The capture of Mérida on August 11 allowed the Nationalist Army of the North (General Mola) and Army of the South (General Franco) to have contact with each other, which was essential for future operations. Furthermore, no longer would the Nationalists need Portugal as a way to clandestinely transport weapons and munitions from Franco’s well-provisioned army in the south to Mola’s depleted army in the north. Since the start of the uprising, the Portuguese government had supported the Nationalist cause and cooperated fully, allowing the Nationalist soldiers to use Portuguese territory and airfields. Later the capture of Badajoz would secure for the Nationalists the border between Spain and Portugal, Franco’s left flank, and bring the two allies closer together.7 Mérida | 65

US Army Colonel Stephen Fuqua, serving as the US military attaché in Madrid at the time, wrote the following about the significance and consequences of the Nationalists’ capture of Mérida:

The consolidation of the rebel holdings in the South and North, through the complete occupation by General Franco’s troops of the Sevilla-Merida corridor, was the greatest blow delivered to the government’s cause since the beginning of the revolt. This occupation permitted the capture of Badajoz and gave free access to the friendly borders of Portugal. Besides, it has given an opportunity for a united rebel command to move eastward and which is now advancing against Santa Olalla with its first objective the securing of Maqueda and the gaining of the road 90 kms. north of Avila. The success of this movement will make possible a united battle front with the forces occupying the Guadarrama and Somosierra passes. When this has been attained, the rebels will then be in a position to make a combined offensive against Madrid, utilizing one or more of their positions for secondary or holding attacks and launching from another their main drive against the capital.8 The Republican government in Madrid was not willing to accept the loss of Mérida and quickly set out to recapture it. Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella, with the First Bandera and the battalion of Cáceres, was charged with defending Mérida. The government’s response was to send bombers from Madrid, which caused little damage. On August 11 a column composed of the Civil Guard, the Assault Guard, and militiamen joined forces with other combatants who came from Badajoz to attack the city. The Republican attack failed, and Mérida remained firmly in Na- tionalist hands.9 So far the Nationalists coming from the south had been unstoppable, and the government in Madrid began to seriously worry about the speed with which the Nationalists were advancing. After Mérida, the Madrid Column came together with the consolidation of Agrupación Asensio, Agrupación Castejón, and Agrupación Tella. The battle-hardened Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe took overall command of the columns, and on August 12 he transferred his headquarters from Los Santos de Maimona to Mérida. Now Badajoz was about to experience the wrath of the Army of Africa, which culminated in one of the most memorable events of the Spanish Civil War.10 The Marqués de Nervión, as quoted by Cándido Ortiz, recounted his observations during the Nationalists’ drive from Seville through 66 | Mérida

Extremadura. While traveling from Mérida to Badajoz, he described that preceding Yagüe’s columns were military engineers who were tasked with repairing culverts and bridges destroyed by retreating militiamen. Trav- eling by car, he left Lobón and headed for Talavera la Real, about twelve miles outside Badajoz. The leftist leadership of the town had been able to escape just five minutes earlier, taking twenty rightist hostages with them. Barely two-thirds of a mile from Talavera la Real, the hostages were murdered after having their hands cut off. The sight of that pile of mutilated corpses was horrific. However, it did serve as a new incentive for the Nationalist forces to make sure that the “monsters” responsible for this would be properly punished. Retribution for acts like this came swiftly when Franco’s forces “liberated” a town. Paul Preston notes that after Puebla de la Calzada was taken by the Na- tionalists, Falangist militias carried out punitive operations, including the shooting of twenty-nine men and one woman. Moreover, female trade unionists and the wives of leftists were publicly humiliated by having their heads shaved and being forced to drink castor oil.11 The Breach of Death Badajoz

In preparation for the attack on Badajoz, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s Madrid Column had a total of forty-five hundred men divided into three battle groups, or agrupaciones. They were as follows:

1. Agrupación Asensio. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio, this included the Fourth Bandera, led by Major José Vierna, and the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1), led by Major Antonio del Oro. 2. Agrupación Tella. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella, this included the First Bandera, led by Major José Álvarez Entre- na, and the First Tabor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1) led by Major Serrano Montaner. 3. Agrupación Castejón. Led by Major Antonio Castejón, this included the Fifth Bandera, led by Captain Carlos Tiede, and the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Ceuta No. 3), led by Ma- jor Amador de Los Ríos.

In addition to these infantry units, Yagüe’s column included two artillery batteries (with 70-, 75-, and 105-millimeter guns), engineers (sappers, signals, and motor transport), a quartermaster corps, medical services, and two armored cars.1 On August 12, 1936, Franco finalized his instructions to Yagüe on how the battle should be fought and on the importance of keeping casualties low. In order for Franco’s directives to be accomplished, it was critical that Yagüe’s forces encircle towns and villages and undertake no frontal assault on buildings but rather shell them, set them on fire, or breach their walls and isolate the resisters. This would reduce the number of

67 68 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz

Nationalist casualties and frighten the enemy by military canons and an opening to fight “with automatic weapons [waiting] in ambush.”2 Before setting out for Badajoz, Yagüe addressed the forces under his command with the following words:

Commanders, officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men of the Madrid Column: The command that has been conferred on me fills me with satisfaction and joy, but it places upon my shoulders a great responsibility, and I must put to use all my faculties. Nothing shall stop me. Before me is Madrid; we have to conquer it rapidly. SPAIN ORDERS IT! Madrid Column. FORWARD!—without thinking of fatigue or of dan- gers. The Fatherland needs it. Our honor demands it.3 The Madrid Column began its march toward Badajoz under the cover of darkness on August 13 with the Fourth Bandera in the vanguard. Awaiting the men in Badajoz were Republican troops and armed militiamen determined to defend the town, even though they were well aware that the Nationalists had been unstoppable since leaving Seville and that Madrid would be of no significant help. They were isolated from the capital and basically on their own. Nevertheless, the Republicans were in a defensive position within the walled city of Badajoz and protected by a series of small fortifications outside the town’s massive walls. Yagüe’s forces, meanwhile, lacked sufficient artillery pieces and could count on only scarce aerial support from Nationalist bombers. Badajoz would have to be taken either by a lengthy siege or by a quicker but costlier infantry assault.4 Also on August 13, a Nationalist plane flew over Badajoz and dropped thousands of leaflets signed by Franco, warning of dreadful consequences if the residents resisted his forces. In it he warned the people of Bada- joz as follows:

Your resistance will be pointless, and the punishment that you will receive will be proportionate. If you want to avoid useless bloodshed, capture the ringleaders and hand them over to our forces. . . . Our triumph is guaran- teed, and to save Spain we will destroy any obstacles in our way. [There] is still time for you to mend your ways: tomorrow it will be too late.5 Located on the left bank of the Guadiana River and settled by the Ro- mans during the Second Punic War (218–210 BCE), Badajoz was later occupied by the Visigoths and then by the Muslims during the Middle Ages. The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 69

By the early thirteenth century it was back in the hands of the Christians as part of the Reconquista. Badajoz gained famed during the Napole- onic Wars (1803–1815), when in the spring of 1812 the future Duke of Wellington (Arthur Wellesley) and his Anglo-Portuguese army launched an attack on Badajoz, which was defended by French imperial troops under the command of General Armand Philippon. What began as a siege turned into an infantry assault after Badajoz’s defenses were breached by heavy howitzers. Wellington’s forces poured into the town on April 6 and took it at the cost of more than thirty-five hundred casualties. For the next two days the victors took their revenge on the vanquished, a foreshadow of what was to come in August 1936.6 Defending Badajoz were roughly four thousand militiamen, two companies of carabineros and the Infantry Regiment of Castilla No. 3 under the command of Colonel Ildefonso Puigdendolas. They were armed with artillery and twelve machine guns that had been placed on the city’s high walls and crenellations, the cathedral’s tower, and passageways leading to the urban center. In addition, the defenders possessed ample dynamite. At approximately three o’clock in the afternoon on August 12, the various elements of the attacking column, now about four miles from Bada- joz, prepared to move against their assigned targets. The Fourth Bandera set out from Mérida at three o’clock in the morning on August 13 and occupied Talavera la Real along the way; in Badajoz it was supposed to seize the San Roque neighborhood and the Trinity Gate. The Fifth Bande- ra began its march at around one o’clock in the morning, passing through Lobón and Talevera la Real without incident and joining up with a tabor of the Regulares. These combined units were to take up positions in front of the Menacho Barracks, a priority target.7 Yagüe contacted the “chief of the national government” (as he referred to General Franco), asking for air support during the battle for Badajoz. He told Franco that beginning at five o’clock in the morning he would need Nationalist aircraft support overhead in order to panic the Republican defenders. Furthermore, he knew that there were four government aircraft based at Don Benito airfield and asked Franco to order bombing missions at six o’clock in the morning and four o’clock in the afternnon over Badajoz. Referring to Franco at this time (August 1936) as the head of the national government was a bit presumptuous and premature, for Franco would not be appointed head of state and commander in chief until October. Yet having known Franco for two 70 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz decades, Yagüe clearly must have believed that he would sooner or later be elevated to that position.8 The air battle for Badajoz began on August 13 with a Breguet plane from Tablada airfield flying reconnaissance missions over Badajoz, -em ploying an improvised airfield in Mérida as a forward operating base. These reconnaissance operations turned into bombing missions with Breguet 19s and Ju-52s dropping their deadly cargo on the town. Mean- while, a squadron of Ju-52s flew reconnaissance over Guadalupe and Na- valmoral, both situated northeast of Mérida. This mission was probably carried out in order to ascertain whether the Republican government was sending reinforcements to Badajoz from Don Benito. August 13, 1936, also saw the commander of the Army of the North, General Mola, fly to Seville to meet with Generals Franco and Queipo de Llano to discuss strategy. According to José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, Mola did not see Badajoz as a valid military objective on the route to Madrid. To take Badajoz, the column had to drive westward toward the Portuguese border and away from a more direct route to Madrid. Mola was opposed to this undertaking and bluntly communicated this to Fran- co. Mola wanted to move as quickly as possible toward Madrid so as to deny the government the time and opportunity to prepare or strengthen the city’s defenses. Franco was not about to leave Loyalist forces in his rear as he advanced toward Madrid, however. So to make certain that this did not happen and to secure the Portuguese border, Franco rejected Mola’s advice and pressed on with the Badajoz attack before progressing toward the capital. A similar situation arose a few weeks later when Franco decided, against Yagüe’s advice, to deviate from the attack on Madrid and relieve the Re- publican siege of the Alcázar in Toledo. This move may have cost Franco the capture of Madrid before the International Brigades arrived in Sep- tember and thus the opportunity to have ended the war in 1936.9 The siege of Badajoz thus proceeded as planned. The Fourth advanced slowly in echelon toward the San Roque neighborhood, which lay just outside the city’s walls, and the Trinity Gate, where it came under attack from the plaza. Gradually the legionnaires were able to gain control of the neighborhood while also gaining a foothold from which to launch a further assault close to the city’s formidable walls. With the San Roque neighborhood secured, the legionnaires of the Fourth Bandera spent the night in place in preparation for the following day’s advance into the city. Asensio’s men were now situated across from the Trinity Gate. The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 71

Meanwhile, outside the city the Fifth Bandera met intense rifle fire coming from the walls surrounding the plaza. Two legionnaires from the Eighteenth Company were wounded in the exchange. The primary objectives for Castejón were the forts of La Picuriña and Pardarelas and the more significant Menacho Barracks, which were taken by late afternoon by the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Ceuta No. 3). The Republican commanders and officers who were captured in the Menacho Barracks were summarily shot without justifiable cause. By sundown several houses were occupied in the outskirts of the city, and that is where the bandera spent the night. By 9:30 p.m. the attackers, numbering twenty-five hundred men, were now about three hundred feet from the city’s walls and set to assault the wall the next day.10 By dawn the next day (August 14), the various units involved in the assault of Badajoz had determined which targets they would attack. It was decided that the city would be penetrated through gaps that had been made in the wall three years earlier to expand the city. The attack would be carried out under constant air support. From the Menacho Barracks, the men of the Fifth Bandera tried to force their way into the city through the Pilar Gate but were denied access by the obstinate defenders.11 Intense machine gun and rifle fire was coming from the Cuartel de La Bomba cavalry barracks about 650 feet away. The legionnaires were forced to hunker down in nearby houses, use mattresses and sandbags to cover windows and doors, and wait for their artillery and planes to shell and bomb the cavalry barracks, hoping to break the defenders’ resistance. At 10:30 a.m. the Fifth Bandera was able to enter the city through the Pilar Gate; the wall had been breached on the southern side. A storm of high explosives forced some of the Republican officers and men defending the cavalry barracks to cross over to the Nationalists at approximately eleven o’clock. Militiamen, more politicized and radicalized than the regular army, replaced those who had defected, but they in turn were now subjected to what had driven the others to abandon their barracks, and they too would shortly be defeated. Meanwhile, Asensio divided his forces, with the Fourth Bandera prepared to enter Badajoz through the Trinity Gate and the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1) advancing along the edge of the wall, hoping to capture the castle and thus weaken the defenders’ resolve.12 The final assault by Castejón’s Fifth Bandera came at about noon, when the defenders’ resistance began to waver under the relentless onslaught of 72 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz the bandera’s machine guns. Seizing the moment, Lieutenant Francisco de Miguel Clemente, commanding the Eighteenth Company, launched an all-out bayonet attack on the cavalry barracks. With Lieutenant Francisco de Miguel Clemente leading the charge, the legionnaires’ bold and audacious move caught the militiamen completely by surprise— inflicting numerous casualties, taking a number of prisoners, and capturing a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. The battle for Badajoz continued after the fall of the cavalry barracks, with firefights taking place on the streets as well as at the post office (which was personally defended by Colonel Puigdendolas) and other buildings. The López de Ayala Theater was set afire by the attackers so as to drive out or incinerate its defenders. For his actions in the storming of the cavalry barracks, Lieutenant de Miguel was awarded the Laureate Cross of St. Ferdinand.13 For the Fourth Bandera, the battle began with a brief artillery barrage, followed by the advance of the Sixteenth Company (commanded by a Captain Pérez-Caballero) in the vanguard, along with the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Cetua No. 3) under the command of Major Serrano. The Regulares deployed to the right of the Sixteenth Company, and the Tenth Company joined the Sixteenth Company from the left. Alerted by the attackers’ movements, the defenders opened heavy fire with machine guns and mortars, making it nearly impossible to advance through the San Roque neighborhood since the streets were enfiladed. The attackers were able to reach some houses at the foot of the walls by employing fire and movement as well as support from Nationalist aircraft and fire from the Twelfth Company. The Eleventh Company, which marched at the rear of the bandera, sent two of its platoons to the right of the Madrid Road, where they occupied a few of the outlying houses of the neighborhood and became the attacking force’s reserves.14 It was by the Trinity Gate that a gap, approximately eleven yards wide, would forever go down in Legion history as the “breach of death.” The final assault on Badajoz through the Trinity Gate came at 2:30 p.m., when the Fourth Bandera was ordered to attack with its companies broken up into more maneuverable squad-size units, solely under the protection of its machine guns and an armored car. Captain Pérez-Caballero told his men to fix bayonets; the bugle sounded its call for attack, and the Six- teenth Company (about ninety men) threw itself at an opening in the Trinity Gate that was enfiladed by murderous machine-gun fire that impeded advancement. The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 73

The armored car was able to draw fire away from the attackers, which in turn allowed the Second and Third Platoons to cross the dried-up riverbed of the Rivilla River. The legionnaires lobbed hand grenades, creating a smoke screen that allowed them to get closer to the breach in the wall. However, very few were able to make it through the breach because the defenders’ machine guns were mowing them down in series. As the bodies of the fallen began to pile up, those who followed used their comrade’s corpses and wounded bodies as a parapet to continue the fight. The Twelfth Machine-Gun Company, commanded by Captain Francis- co Sáinz Trápaga, provided fire support with its two machine guns, which had the effect of reducing the defenders’ fire. Although the legionnaires were suffering massive casualties, their relentless attack began to weaken the will of the defenders. Moving by squad and by individual, the Six- teenth Company was able to slowly make its way across the breach, where they were able to locate strategic points from which to shower hand grenades upon the defenders. The Sixteenth Company’s standard bearer was shot down while screaming, “Long live death!”; other legionnaires fell all around him. The area in and around the breach had become a virtual inferno of death and suffering. Following Captain Pérez-Caballero, now with a corporal and only fourteen legionnaires remaining from his Sixteenth Company (about eighty had already fallen), was the bandera’s command staff (led by Ma- jor Vierna) and the Tenth and Eleventh Companies, which were both also decimated by this time. The Twelfth Company set up its machine guns and opened fire on the defenders’ redoubts while providing cover fire for the other rifle companies. Hurling hand grenades at the defenders’ parapets and trenches while simultaneously shooting and bayoneting with blind ferocity, the legionnaires eliminated one obstacle after another until they reached the bullring (Plaza de Toros), the Fourth Bandera’s final objective. In the center of the city the fight continued to be fierce and bloody, with no quarter given by the legionnaires and the Regulares. From the tower of the cathedral, the last stronghold of the defenders, the legionnaires were being shot to pieces by machine guns. In order to silence those machine guns, the cathedral had to be taken by assault. This was accomplished by pouring machine-gun fire on the cathedral while a cannon was wheeled in to blow open the main doors and high-explosive rounds began to detonate inside. Finally, the First Platoon was able to enter the building and eliminate the militiamen within, including some standing on the altar’s steps. 74 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz

Upon reaching City Hall, Captain Pérez-Caballero sent the following terse message to Yagüe: “Have crossed the breach. I have fourteen men. I do not need reinforcements.” The Tenth and Eleventh Companies poured through the breach, followed by other Nationalist forces, which battled street by street until the cease-fire was declared at four o’clock in the afternoon. The city of Badajoz was strewn with the bodies of a thousand men. Yagüe’s column suffered 185 casualties, and 106 of these were from the Fourth Bandera. After the battle was over, the Fourth Bandera remained in the city, providing “vigilance and security,” and settled in for the night.15 On August 15 Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe arrived at City Hall Plaza and stood before the cathedral and addressed his legionnaires. On the flag of the Fourth Bandera he placed a ribbon with the words Brecha de Badajoz (Breach of Badajoz) to commemorate the bandera’s capture of the city. The wounded and those still standing—filthy and disheveled, covered in blood and sweat, yet defiant and firm—heard the following from their commander:

Legionnaires: You deserve this victory because before those who only know how to hate, you know how to love, sing, and laugh. There far away is Madrid, legionnaires, and there we will all arrive, for guiding our path in the fight will be those who shall return to life after having fallen here fighting for Spain. Legionnaires of the 16th Company: of which few are left and how proud I am of you! Cry out with me: Long live Spain! Long live the republic! Long live the army!16 The battle of Badajoz will be remembered not only for the Spanish Foreign Legion’s fanatical assault through the “breach of death” but also for the looting and harsh repression that followed. As soon as the fighting was over, the looting and pillaging commenced. The legionnaires and the Regulares were equal opportunity looters, grabbing anything of value from citizens from both sides of the political spectrum. Antony Beevor quoted a Nationalist officer as saying that the looting of Nation- alist property was a “war tax they pay for salvation” and that “the legionnaires did not burden themselves with the often useless impedimenta which the Moors collected. They simply examined the mouths of the dead and smashed out any gold-capped teeth with their rifle butts.”17 Those who had defended Badajoz and survived the battle were quickly rounded up and placed under arrest, taken to the bullring to be processed, and ultimately executed. According to former Spanish Army Colonel The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 75

Antonio J. Candil Muñoz, a distinction was made between those who had served in the Republican army and those who were militiamen or leftist civilians. In an interview, Candil told me that his father, Ramón Candil, then a seventeen-year-old private serving in the Infantry Regi- ment of Castille No. 3, was captured by legionnaires and taken to the bullring along with dozens of others, their fate uncertain. Fortunately for Candil, Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe had supposedly given the order that those in uniform be spared; those not in army uniform were eventually shot, including his childhood friend, who was not a professional soldier.18 The primary accounts of what transpired in Badajoz after the Nation- alists’ victory (what came to be known as the Massacre of Badajoz) came from two French journalists and the Portuguese reporter Mario Neves of the newspaper Diario de Lisboa. US newspaperman Jay Allen of the Chi- cago Tribune also wrote about what he saw in Badajoz, but his version was written nine days after the city was captured by the Nationalists.19 The primary massacre resulted when Yagüe ordered that hundreds of militiamen and carabineros be shot in the bullring. The Civil Guard and Falangist militiamen carried out the postbattle executions in Badajoz, because the Legion and the Regulares had already moved on. Machine guns were set up, and groups of prisoners were gunned down en masse. Badajoz’s bullring had been turned into an abattoir. Not only were those who were captured in the city executed, even militiamen who had fled to Portugal were returned by the Portuguese government and brought back to Badajoz in trucks to be shot.20 It is noteworthy that Franco ordered Yagüe to keep the Moroccans from emasculating the corpses of those they had killed. It was customary for Moroccans to castrate the corpses of their enemies after battle; this practice was commonplace during the Moroccan Wars.21 The executions in Badajoz lasted about ten days (August 14–24), and the story of the shootings quickly became known. Leading Nationalists (e.g., Franco’s press secretary, Captain Luis Antonio Bolín, and General Queipo de Llano) tried at first to deny the story or at least downplay the number of victims. One man who refused to go along with this cover-up was Yagüe himself, who very bluntly and honestly told John T. Whitaker of the New York Herald Tribune the following: “Of course we shot them. What do you expect? Was I supposed to take four thousand Reds with me as my column advanced, racing against time? Was I expected to turn them loose in my rear and let them make Badajoz red again?”22 76 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz

Hugh Thomas is undoubtedly correct when he asserts, “The exact number of those killed [in Badajoz] will probably never be known.” Thomas believed that it was fewer than the eighteen hundred recorded by Jay Allen of the Chicago Tribune. One of the biggest concerns after any mass shooting is what to do with the corpses. In this case, like many others, the method chosen for disposal was incineration. According to eyewitness Mario Neves, the stench was unbearable as the bodies of thirty militiamen at a time took their turn in the fire. Nearby, the bodies of twenty-three legionnaires gunned down at the breach in the Trinity Gate awaited burial.23 In retaliation for what the Nationalists had done in Badajoz, the Re- publicans, especially in Madrid and Barcelona, increased their summary executions of those perceived to be pro-Nationalist. Political prisoners and members of the clergy were tortured and shot.24 So too were Fa- langists, members of right-wing groups, monarchists, and conservatives. In Madrid, for example, those thought to be sympathetic to the rebels were shot by the dozen on a daily basis.25 Franco and the Nationalists’ move to capture Badajoz—thus eliminating a possible threat in their rear or left flank, as well as sealing off the border with Portugal—had cost them valuable time in their drive toward Madrid. This delay slowed them down by a week. It took that long for the two columns (Asensio’s and Castejón’s) to get organized and advance the seventy-six miles from Mérida to Badajoz and back while also capturing and securing the city. Moreover, the column’s digression to Badajoz bought valuable time for the Republican government to plan and carry out counterattacks, as they did at Navalmoral on August 22 and 24.26 While the Fourth and Fifth Banderas captured the city of Badajoz, the First Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella’s Column, was tasked with defending Mérida from a Republican motorized column determined to regain the city. The column approached Mérida in two con- voys, each composed of five units. These forces were especially selected for this operation and included Civil and Assault Guardsmen accompanied by a group of journalists. Representing the government was the leftist politician Margarita Nelken. At around nine o’clock in the morning on August 14, the battle began with the Republican air force carrying out an intense bombing attack. The terrain outside the city was defended by a battalion of the Argel Regiment. The government’s attack was so violent that Tella ordered the commander The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 77 of the First Bandera, Major José Álvarez Entrena, to abandon his command post and proceed immediately toward the outskirts of the city on its northern flank while gathering up as many soldiers as he could find along the way in order to reinforce the Argel Regiment, which was now under heavy attack. Major Álvarez, along with two lieutenants, one commanding a rifle platoon and the other a machine gun platoon, climbed aboard trucks and quickly drove off toward a farm (known as Granja Gir- bal) where the battle was heating up. Álvarez simultaneously ordered his adjutant to sound the call to arms and rapidly lead the bandera to where the Argel Regiment was under attack. The defenders were arrayed along a nearly four-mile front stretching from the railway station to the river. The battle reached its climax at eleven o’clock in the morning as the attackers sought an opening through which to make their assault. Em- ploying large numbers of men to advance their field guns and with a tank leading the way, the attackers were able to set up one of their batteries a mere 650 yards from the defenders’ front line. Under heavy Republican fire, Álvarez deployed his two platoons to the right of the main road. Immediately the rest of the bandera was deployed. As the day progressed, the Republicans were unable to make headway in reaching the bullring, their main objective. With a combination of skill and maneuverability, the legionnaires were able to systematically cut off and encircle the attackers, who were compelled to break off the engagement at five o’clock that afternoon. The attackers left behind a great number of dead and wounded, the latter taken as prisoners along with equipment and the tank. Having failed to capture Mérida, the attackers continued their aerial bombardment of the city for some time. Ordered to withdraw from the front, the bandera returned to Mérida and prepared for nightfall duties.27 After the capture of Badajoz, Franco decided to replace the flag of the Second Republic (red, gold, and purple) with that of the Spanish monarchy (red, gold, and red) as the official rebel flag. This was done at Franco’s headquarters in Seville and in the Plaza Nueva. The new flag was raised with Franco, Queipo de Llano, and the Legion’s founder, General José Millán Astray, present. Franco and Millán Astray were monarchists, but Queipo de Llano was not. Neither were the other members of Franco’s General Staff, Generals Miguel Cabanellas (the leader of the Junta de Defensa Nacional), and Emilio Mola. Nevertheless, Franco, as usual, got his way.28 78 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz

So far the rebellion in the south had involved the movements of four banderas: the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. The first three formed part of the three columns (Agrupaciones Asensio, Castejón, and Tella) that Franco had created for his march on Madrid. At this point it was decided to bring the Second Bandera, commanded by Major Luis Carbonell Oc- ariz, into the fight.29 The Fourth and Fourteenth Companies flew from Spanish Morocco to Jerez de la Frontera while the Fifth and Sixth Com- panies flew to Seville. On August 12, 1936, the four companies were reunited in Seville’s Palacio de la Plaza. From Seville, the Second Bandera followed the route taken by the other banderas: passing through Santa Olalla del Cala, Los Santos de Mai- mona, and Villafranca de los Barros. One of its platoons occupied the village of Herbache while the rest of the battalion reconnoitered in the surrounding environs. The bandera suffered two casualties during the operation, its first since arriving in Spain. With the bandera reunited, it proceeded toward Mérida, arriving on August 14. In the following days, the Fifth and Sixth Companies carried out several mopping-up operations in the Sierra de Guadalupe (aka Sierra de Villuercas) in the province of Cáceres. During combat with government forces, Lieutenant Pedro An- drés Gómez of the Fifth Company was killed in action. The Second Ban- dera was then ordered to prepare for relocation, first to Cáceres by truck and then to Valladolid by train.30 The arrival of the Second Bandera in Valladolid, the capital of the province of Castille-León, was well received by General Mola, the commander of the Nationalist Army of the North.31 Since August 7 Mola had been pleading with Franco to send him a bandera he needed for his operations in the Somosierra Pass.32 By mid-August Mola was desperate for legionnaires and materiel (especially ammunition and fighter aircraft) and was constantly communicating by radiogram with Franco. On August 15 Franco informed Mola that he was sending him a convoy with supplies that included twenty thousand gas masks and six fighters (“little birds”). It is quite clear that Franco was the one with access to elite troops (such as the Army of Africa) and supplies (courtesy of Germany and Italy) and that other Nationalist generals like Mola were at his mercy. Franco’s decision to send Mola twenty thousand gas masks is significant, for the fear of poison gas in warfare was quite prevalent after World War I. The Spanish Air Force bombed the Riffians with poison gas (Yper- ite) during the Rif War in the 1920s, yet the use of poison gas against the The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 79 rebellious tribesmen had little effect on the outcome of the war. Never- theless, the fear that poison gas could be used in this conflict existed. In 1936 the Italians had plenty of mustard gas on hand because they had used it in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936).33 The arrival of the Second Bandera in the Castillian capital of Valladolid was joyously welcomed by its inhabitants. The soldiers marched in review past General Mola and his personal secretary, José María Iribarren. Irib- arren had never seen the men of the Spanish Foreign Legion in person; he was greatly impressed and awed by the bandera’s thunderous drum and bugle band, its quick-step march, its flag, its long-horned ram mascot, and the martial appearance of the legionnaires. He recorded that after they had marched past, he was left momentarily dumbfounded: “What was this? I was left with the feeling that I had seen a hurricane go by.”34 After Mola’s review, the Second Bandera departed Valladolid for Cerezo de Abajo (in the province of Segovia), then went to Robregordo, and finally, on August 19, arrived in Braojos (the latter two towns are in the province of Madrid). In Braojos the Second Bandera joined a column composed mainly of men from the Requetés (the Carlist militia)in Na- varra, under the command of a veteran africanista, Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo de Rada Peral. The Fourteenth Company took part in actions in Venta de las Barcas, and by the use of rapid and aggressive attacks (golpes de mano) was able to improve and amplify the front lines in the region north of Madrid.35 On August 15, Franco ordered the Madrid Column to proceed toward Madrid while leaving a small garrison to hold Badajoz for the Nation- alists. The left flank of the column’s force was protected by the Portu- guese border; the right flank was exposed and protected only by Civil Guard and Falangist militia units. In Badajoz the Fifth Bandera was occupied with personal hygiene and the cleaning of weapons. Along with the Fourth Bandera, it was inspected and congratulated by Yagüe, who placed a ribbon on its battle flag that said “Anticommunist Andalusian campaign.”36 At noon on August 16 Castejón’s column, which included the Fifth Bandera, boarded trucks and set out from Badajoz for Mérida, where it spent the night before continuing the march toward Santa Amalia.37 At dawn the following day the column reached and captured Santa Amalia from the defending militiamen. For ten hours, however, the column came under constant and punishing air attack from three Republican planes 80 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz operating out of the nearby Don Benito airfield, causing numerous casualties. In reporting on the battle, Radio Madrid assured its listeners that according to the War Ministry, Castejón’s column had been completely destroyed and its commander had committed suicide. That evening the column continued from Santa Amalia to Míajadas, where it spent the night.38 In addition to what transpired in Santa Amalia on August 17, on that day elements of Castejón’s column set out for Medellín (the birthplace of Hernán Cortés, the conqueror of Mexico), a few miles south of Santa Amalia. The militiamen who had fled Santa Amalia were now in Medellín, where they hoped to establish a new defensive line. At eleven o’clock in the morning, the attackers were nearly one mile from the bridge spanning the Guadiana River and leading to Medellín. This bridge had been prepared for demolition in case Medellín had to be abandoned and the defenders had to fall back to Don Benito. The man tasked with defending Medellín was Major Ruiz Farrona, who along with Captain Federico Angulo commanded a platoon of militiamen and another of Civil Guardsmen. Farrona had set up an observation post atop Medellín’s medieval castle. With two tanks and two cannons, Angulo prepared to defend the bridge and keep the attackers on the opposite side of the river. What won the day for the Republicans at Medellín was the intervention of the Republican air force—in this case, French novelist André Malraux’s air squadron of volunteers (La Escua- drilla España), flying two or three Potez 54 bombers, one or two Breguet 19 light bombers, and a Douglas DC-2 operating as a bomber.39 Checked at Medellín, Castejón’s men were forced to withdraw and return to Santa Amalia, and from there they continued the march toward Madrid. It was a minor setback for the Nationalists but an important propaganda victory for the government, which had suffered defeat after defeat in attempting to halt the Nationalists’ advance in Extremadura. The Nationalists eventually captured Medellín in July 1938. After the battle Republican sources erroneously reported that Mal- raux’s squadron had bombed the Second Tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán, inflicting significant casualties and the loss of materiel and vehicles. This Regulares unit was assigned to Asensio’s column, whereas Castejón had the Second Tabor of the Regulares of Ceuta. As at San- ta Amalia, the government’s War Ministry promulgated an exaggerated report about the outcome of the battle at Medellín, claiming that the The Breach of Death: Badajoz | 81 fascists had left behind three hundred prisoners and thirty trucks and that the rebel column had contained three hundred cars.40 The following day, August 18, Castejón’s column continued its drive toward the village of Míajadas, with Trujillo (the birthplace of Francisco Pizarro, the conqueror of Peru) as its ultimate destination. For the next six days the column carried out operations in the area surrounding Tru- jillo. In Trujillo itself, Yagüe established his new headquarters and held a war council meeting with his three column commanders (Asensio, Tella, and Castejón); they all agreed to continue their advance till they reached the town of Guadalupe.41 While Castejón’s column was advancing northeast from Mérida toward Santa Amalia and Trujillo, the Fourth Bandera, in the vanguard of Asen- sio’s column, began its northerly journey in trucks from Badajoz toward the town of Alburquerque on August 17 at five o’clock in the morning. Along with the Fourth Bandera was a platoon of the Civil Guards, ambulances, two platoons of artillery (howitzers), and auxiliary personnel, all under the command of Major Vierna. At ten o’clock in the morning the assault force reached the environs of Alburquerque; the howitzers were placed three miles from the town and trained on the Republicans’ defenses. The Tenth Company went ahead of the main body and deployed along the right and left flanks of the main road that led into the town. This gave it command of the high ground on both sides of the road and allowed it to move with alacrity. As a result the defenders were completely caught off guard, provided no resistance to the attackers, and fled. With Alburquerque secured, the Eleventh Company, with two machine guns from the Twelfth Company and under the command of Captain Francisco Sáinz, set out for the nearby town of San Vicente de Alcantara, where the defenders of Alburquerque had fled. The situation in San Vi- cente was the same as what had transpired in Alburquerque: the town was occupied without incident. At 5:30 p.m. the Eleventh Company returned to Alburquerque, where it reunited with the rest of the column, and at six o’clock it set out for Badajoz, where it arrived at eight o’clock and spent the night.42 From Asensio’s column, a combat group called Agrupación de Fuerzas was formed that consisted of the Eleventh Company of the Fourth Ban- dera, a machine-gun group from the Fourth Bandera, Falangist militiamen, and Civil Guardsmen. At 9:30 p.m. on August 18, this combat group set out for the towns of Albuera and Almendral in order to drive out the 82 | The Breach of Death: Badajoz

Republicans. The group arrived in Albuera at 1:30 a.m. on August 19 and captured the town without resistance. A negotiation committee had been assembled in Albuera, and it peacefully handed over the town’s weapons and ammunition to the Civil Guard.43 At two o’clock in the morning on August 20, Agrupación de Fuerzas left Albuera for Almendral. About four miles from Almendral, the road had been cut off by its defenders. Captain Sáinz ordered the First Platoon of the Eleventh Company to deploy along the eastern side of the town and to advance so as to occupy its upper streets. A squad from the Sec- ond Platoon of the Eleventh Company also advanced via Central Road toward the Plaza of the Republic. Once the objective of the First Platoon had been attained, the Second Platoon’s squad reached the Plaza of the Republic, and both units were united. The rest of Agrupación de Fuerzas watched the town from the surrounding heights. When the soldiers entered the town, they were surprised by a group of defenders, who fired on them with shotguns and rifles. The attackers quickly repelled the defenders, who were put to flight while leaving four dead behind. Once the combat group was inside the town, prisoners were freed, an administrative committee was named, and a large number of rifles and shotguns were confiscated. In addition, a portable radio transmitter was seized. At nine o’clck the same morning, the column began its return to Badajoz, where it arrived two hours later and remained until the following day (August 21).44 By mid-August 1936, the Nationalist juggernaut had captured the major cities of Mérida, Cáceres, and Badajoz in addition to the tiny towns that connected these major communication and transportation hubs in Extremadura. Now the Nationalists made their northeastern thrust toward the capital by advancing through Castille–La Mancha. In the vanguard of every major Nationalist offensive, both the Legion and the Regulares suffered heavy casualties. Only through vigorous recruitment in both Spanish Morocco and rebel-held territory were these losses mit- igated. Casualties on the Republican side had also been high, especially for the militiamen. Civilians had also paid a heavy toll in life and property because of the fighting. The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe

The Nationalists’ plan was to now proceed to Madrid by way of the Sierra de Guadalupe and the Tagus River Valley with all due speed. The operation began on August 21 at four o’clock in the morning with the Fourth Bandera, as part of the Madrid Column (Agrupación Asensio), boarding trucks in Badajoz and setting out for Cortijo de Pesquerito. Upon the column’s arrival the Eleventh Company was dispatched to re- connoiter Cortijo, and this was done without incident. The column continued on to Roca de la Sierra, which was also occupied without incident. The Eleventh Company, along with a platoon from the Twelfth Company, was ordered to advance to Puebla de Obando and secure it. Having done so, the soldiers returned to Cortijo, where the column was once again reunited. The column proceeded with its planned advance, but in order to ex- pedite the process Asensio ordered that a company of riflemen and two platoons of machine guns be formed into two combat groups. The first group, commanded by Captain Francisco Sáinz Arrabal, was ordered to take the town of Mirandilla, and the second, commanded by Lieutenant Francisco Mármol, was given the task of capturing Aljucén.1 Both towns were taken without incident and secured. The column then proceeded to Cáceres and arrived at ten o’clock at night. At eleven o’clock, after the column’s trucks had been refueled, the column renewed its advance toward Logrosán, passing through the towns of Herguijuela and Zorita and arriving at Logrosán at 5:30 a.m. the following day.2 The Fifth Bandera was also on the move on August 21, when the Seven- teenth Company, along with a platoon from the Twentieth Machine-Gun Company, headed for Logrosán; the town was captured without incident. Simultaneously, the Eighteenth Company, along with a tabor of the

83 84 | The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe

Regulares, began the march toward the Castillo de Belvis de Monroy. The soldiers returned to the Almaraz Bridge over the Tagus River, where they came under intense Republican aerial bombardment. At the same time, the legionnaires and the Regulares were able to repel an attack from the defenders who controlled the surrounding heights.3 Hoping to halt the Madrid Column as it worked its way across the Sierra de Guadalupe, the southwestern approach to Madrid, the Repub- licans turned to a former africanista and Rif War veteran, General José Riquelme. Riquelme, the commander of the Fuerza de Extremadura (Army of Extremadura), had a force of about nine thousand men, both regulars and militiamen, from Madrid.4 Riquelme’s forces turned out to be ill prepared to stop a well-trained and competently led force in the battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe. According to Hugh Thomas, “Nine thousand men retreated, including 2,000 anarchists who refused Riquelme’s orders in battle and launched useless attacks in the San Vicente hills.”5 It was not uncommon, during the first weeks of the war, for anarchist units to take and obey orders only from their own leaders and to vote on whether to fight that day. Desertions were a major problem for the Republicans, as was the inane belief by militiamen that digging trenches was for cowards.6 On August 22 the Fifth Bandera, as part of Agrupación Castejón, took part in the capture of the town of Guadalupe, renowned for its historic monastery. In the process the attackers inflicted a formidable punishment on the defenders, who lost a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. With the day’s operation against Guadalupe completed, the column returned to Trujillo for the night.7 The following day the Fifth Bandera’s Nineteenth Company and the Regulares, which had remained in Guadalupe, completed their mopping- up operations, and at nightfall they returned to Trujillo to rejoin the rest of the bandera for the night. The bandera remained in Trujillo for another day (August 24) to rest.8 From Trujillo the Fifth Bandera, as part of Agrupación Castejón, set out for Belvis de Monroy on August 25. The town was defended by Re- publican forces, which used artillery to impede the column’s advance but was eventually captured at the cost of a number of Legion casualties. The column remained in Belvis de Monroy through the following day, (occupying a power plant located on the bank of the Tagus River.9 On August 26 Agrupación Asensio, with the Fourth Bandera, boarded trucks and began the drive toward the town of Almaraz, passing through The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe | 85 the towns of Trujillo, Jaraijezo, and El Puerto de Mirabete (aka Casas de Miravete) without encountering any opposition. The column arrived in Almaraz the following day and spent the night there. In Almaraz the Fourth Bandera received pack animals (horses and mules) to carry its equipment and supplies. In addition, Almaraz was where Asensio’s column would link up with Agrupación Tella for the drive toward Madrid.10 On August 27 Agrupación Castejón began the day with reveille at three o’clock in the morning.11 The men crossed the Meadow of Valmojado as they headed to their destination, the village of Valdehúncar. As the sun rose, the column made contact with a company of the Aerostación de Guadalajara (military balloonists), which greeted them with a hail of gunfire. The legionnaires rapidly deployed, attacked, captured the village, and put the balloonists to flight. However, the fight was not quite over for the day. A Republican artillery battery opened fire, and a duel broke out when the column’s guns replied. This exchange, coupled with an aerial bombardment, lasted for the entire afternoon.12 As Asensio’s and Castejón’s columns made steady progress toward Madrid during the second half of August, Agrupación Tella, which included the First Bandera, was ready to hook up with them. On August 22 Tella’s column left Mérida and advanced to Navalmoral de la Mata. There the First Bandera regained a 105-millimeter howitzer battery that had been surrounded by the Republicans. The column advanced from Navalmoral and eventually occupied the towns of Calzada de Oropesa, Lagartera, and Torralba de Oropesa but faced stiff opposition for the remainder of the month.13 Resistance grew as the column got closer to Madrid. The Republican defenders increased in number and were better organized and supplied with equipment and modern weapons. On the Nationalist side, Legion casualties were replaced by newly arrived volunteers, who were integrated into existing companies and quickly learned not only to be a soldier but to be a legionnaire. In the summer of 1999 I had the unique opportunity to visit Rif War Legion battle sites and outposts in the former Spanish Morocco, accompanied by ex-legionnaires. One of them was Pepe Conde, a retired, lifelong legionnaire NCO who was originally from Salamanca but was then living in Ceuta. Pepe told me that before the outbreak of the Civil War, he had tried on numerous occasions to join the Legion only to be turned down for being “too narrow of chest.” As soon as the war began, he again tried to enlist, and this time he was accepted on the spot. Somehow the 86 | The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe start of the Civil War had caused his chest to magically expand enough to make him fit for military service. During the war, Pepe Conde operated, and personally carried on his shoulder, a captured Soviet PM1910 (Max- im) belt-fed machine gun—fifty-two pounds of solid steel. As the Fourth Bandera was heading for Almaraz, the Fifth Bandera was on the move as well. On August 27 it set out for Valdehúncar and captured the town without much resistance. However, that afternoon the occupiers came under intense Republican aerial bombardment and artillery shelling, which left several legionnaires wounded.14 As the sun was setting in Navalmoral de la Mata on the night of August 27, the three column commanders—Asensio, Castejón, and Tella—met and agreed to simultaneously drive toward Oropesa. Asensio would be on the left flank, Castejón in the center, and Tella on the right flank. They would advance along the banks of the Tagus River and occupy all the villages en route. The day before, General Franco had moved his headquarters from Seville to Cáceres so as to be closer to the advancing front and to distance himself from General Queipo de Llano. In addition to the three principal battle groups of the Madrid Column, two recently established groups were held in reserve, one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Barrón Ortiz and the other by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Delgado Serrano, both of the Regulares.15 As the Madrid Column methodically inched its way toward Madrid, the Republicans became alarmed by how quickly the Nationalists were advancing. In order to retard this encroachment, the government created the Steel Column and the Victory Column, under the command of the Cuban-born Lieutenant Colonel Julio Mangada Rosenörn. Mangada had a reputation in the army as a very odd fellow. Hugh Thomas refers to him as “the eccentric poet-officer (vegetarian, nudist, and theosophist), well- known in the army for his radicalism.” In addition, he was a Freemason. Stanley Payne describes Mangada as “an africanista but an ultraliberal and professional nonconformist.” Payne adds that Prime Minister Manu- el Azaña wrote in his diary that “Mangada is crazy” and a “vegetarian, an Esperanto faddist, and a spiritualist.” Furthermore, Azaña asserted that Mangada was a nonconformist as a result of being mentally imbalanced. Nevertheless, Mangada had done relatively well defending Madrid from rebels coming from the northwest (El Escorial zone) in early July 1936 by advancing toward Ávila. He managed to capture a few small towns where Civil Guardsmen had declared their support for the rebellion.16 The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe | 87

Opposing Mangada in this operation was the militarily incapable Ma- jor Lisardo Doval y Bravo of the Civil Guard, who, as a captain in Octo- ber 1934, had been responsible for the brutal repression and torture of those who had participated in the socialist-led Asturian uprising.17 For his heavy-handed actions after the Asturian uprising, Major Doval was hailed and acclaimed by the Right while similarly loathed and reviled by the Left. Having thwarted Major Doval, Mangada was celebrated by the people in downtown Madrid and awarded the rank of general. As Thomas noted, “Doval’s failure gave Mangada a reputation he scarcely deserved.”18 Colonel Mangada, the “people’s general,” was totally outmatched and outclassed by the Madrid Column’s martial professionalism and battlefield experience. His columns were defeated in spite of being well provisioned with weapons and ammunition. Those who were not killed or wounded fled for their lives as the legionnaires advanced toward Oropesa.19 From his command post in Alía, Captain Uribarri, the commander of the Phantom Column, prepared to lay siege to the monastery of Gua- dalupe. However, Yagüe’s advance units had alerted their commander to Uribarri’s intentions in the Sierra de Guadalupe and, beginning on August 22 Yagüe made his move to blunt his foe’s objectives. On August 26–27, the vanguards of each side clashed with Major Serrano Montaner, the commander of the First Tabor of the Regulares (Tetuán No. 1), part of Tella’s column. They came into contact with the Phantom Column defending the crossroads of the village of Guadalupe. For the next four hours, legionnaires and the Regulares exchanged fire with the defenders and succeeded in pinning them down so that the Fifth Bandera could move in from the flank and envelope them. What began as a bitter firefight turned into a complete rout for the hapless militiamen. The much-vaunted Phan- tom Column ignominiously fled, and General Riquelme was nearly taken prisoner on the road from Alía, from where he had come to witness the battle.20 The fighting ability of the militiamen and anarchists was quite poor. In most cases, the last time they had fired a rifle was during their military service, if then. In his detailed reports, the US military attaché, Colonel Stephen Fuqua, commented as follows on the martial incompetency of these groups during the first weeks of the war:

The military efficiency of the governmental forces is believed to be very low, not only due to the lack of unity of purpose and leadership, as the 88 | The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe

several political organizations are directing their own militia, but also to lack of training and discipline and to the absence of any trained commissioned and non-commissioned personnel. . . .21 At the front, lacking the basic essentials of soldierly training, without proper equipment and armament and poor leadership, his first baptism of fire, from which he is compelled to retreat, destroys his morale and shakes his faith in the successful consummation of his cause.22 Fuqua decried the paucity of competent field-grade officers in the -Re publican army as well as the inherent danger for officers commanding militias in battle:

Should the government have organized its army along military lines ex- clusively, a considerable number of the 10,000 middle-aged officers retired by [then Minister of War] Sr. Azaña in 1931 might have volunteered for service, but owing to the revolutionary principles of the militia, which are adverse to military discipline and professional leadership, very few officers have joined. Furthermore, the many instances of officers executed on the battlefield by the militia units after unsuccessful engagements for alleged treason in misdirecting them are contributing to discourage the seeking of field service by officers who feel themselves professionally -dis liked and always under suspicion.23 On August 28 Castejón’s column with the Fifth Bandera set out in the darkness for Peraleda de la Mata and arrived at sunrise. In the column’s vanguard was Captain Tiede with the Nineteenth Company. The defenders of Peraleda de la Mata sent out a reconnaissance party, which detect- ed the attackers and were thus alerted and prepared to defend the village. Well entrenched and determined to resist, the defenders opened fire on the attackers, first with a pair of 75-millimeter guns, next with machine- gun fire, and then with rifles. It was obvious to the attackers that these -de fenders were led by competent military officers, were using their weapons effectively, and were organized. The defenders consisted of a battalion from the Madrid garrison, another battalion made up of militiamen, and two other battalions. Despite the number of men opposing them, the legionnaires pressed their attack. The battle’s turning point came when the captain of the Sev- enth Battery of the Third Light Artillery, which was attached to Castejón’s column, silenced the defenders’ cannons, which were firing at point- blank range, thus allowing the infantry to advance.24 At approximately The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe | 89 two o’clock in the afternoon, the legionnaires entered the village with the Seventeenth Company company in the lead. Lieutenant Francisco de Mi- guel directed his company toward the left, where the two cannons were placed. The cannons were captured, and the defenders were trapped in the town’s center with no means of escape. However, in a final desperate attempt to flee, the beleaguered defenders were able to marshal all their remaining forces at one point and successfully break out of the encirclement. Many were able to escape along the right bank of the Tagus River until they ran into Asensio’s column, which was approaching from the north. Finding themselves trapped between two Nationalist columns, the escapees quickly faced a true disaster. Back in the village, a great quantity of war materiel was seized and many prisoners were taken, all at the cost of several legionnaires wounded.25 On August 28 the Fourth Bandera was detached from Agrupación Asensio and assigned to Agrupación Tella. The day’s operation began at dawn, when the Fourth Bandera set out in the vanguard from Navalmoral de la Mata. The Fourth Bandera made contact with Republican forces on top of Cerro Chico (Little Hill), in the area of the town of El Gordo.26 The legionnaires quickly deployed and captured Cerro Chico. From there the Fourth Bandera advanced to El Gordo, where at midday the soldiers surprised a Republican column and captured around two hundred prisoners and all their equipment. Among the personnel captured were a major, several officers, two medical officers, some NCOs, and some enlisted men. The equipment captured included a 75-millimeter battery, machine guns, mortars, assorted war materiel, two ambulances (motorized), a few trucks, and motorcycles. Taking advantage of the Republicans’ disorder and confusion, the legionnaires pressed their attack while leaving rearguard units to deal with the prisoners and the booty. After the capture of El Gordo, the Fourth Bandera broke away from Tella’s column and proceeded with its advance. Several Civil Guards- men attempted to flee on motorcycles (with sidecars) along the bandera’s right flank after the routs at Cerro Chico and El Gordo. The legionnaires caught up with them, killed them, and took their motorcycles and weapons. Other Civil Guardsmen were killed when they ran into a nearby house seeking refuge. The house, which according to sources belonged to Prime Minister José Giral, was burned to the ground by the legionnaires. Abandoning the main highway that led to Calzada de Oropesa, the Fourth Bandera returned to El Gordo in order to provide “security and 90 | The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe vigilance” for the remainder of the day and night. However, at around four o’clock in the afternoon, eleven trucks and several cars loaded with militiamen who were fleeing Castejón’s soldiers, who had just captured Peraleda de la Mata, came down the road toward them. The legionnaires allowed them to come as close as possible before opening fire. Within a few minutes the militiamen were again on the run, but they left behind a 75-millimeter gun and eight trucks loaded with ammunition. A short time later a cavalry detachment of approximately forty men appeared and suffered the same fate as the previous group, except for the few who escaped at full gallop. In his after-battle report, Yagüe recorded that the Republicans suffered one hundred casualties and that two hundred prisoners were taken that day.27 Agrupación Tella was also on the move on August 28. In its vanguard were the First Bandera (led by Major Álvarez) and a tabor of the Regu- lares (led by Major del Oro). Tella occupied Calzada de Oropesa (in the province of Toledo) with the support of the Ninth Battery of the Third Light Artillery. However, at 5:30 p.m. about eighty Loyalists counterattacked with two armored trucks, one of which had automatic weapons, and advanced to a little more than two hundred yards from Tella’s line of defense. Major Álvarez prepared to repel the attack by reinforcing his front line with two armored vehicles, one cannon, and two machine guns placed on the left flank, while on the right flank he deployed a platoon of the Regulares and two machine guns manned by legionnaires. By seven o’clock the attack had been repelled and the village returned to normal.28 After spending the night in El Gordo, the Fourth Bandera set out for Calzada de Oropesa on August 29 at 6:30 p.m. From there it boarded trucks for the journey to Lagartera and arrived there at 1:30 a.m. on August 30. Now on foot, the legionnaires marched toward Oropesa and took it by surprise, having traveled by a side road that ran parallel to the main road to Madrid. The lead unit in this operation was the Tenth Ri- fle Company under the command of Lieutenant Alfonso Mora Requejo. He began his advance on the village at around 3:30 a.m. and was able to capture the town’s castle, the railroad station, and an inn that had been turned into a munitions depot. Inside the inn the legionnaires found numerous rifles, a large quantity of hand grenades and smoke grenades, artillery shells, seventy-three cases of cartridges, mortar rounds, shotguns, and assorted equipment. On the inn’s patio they found several head of cattle. The discovery of all this equipment and livestock was greatly welcomed by the Nationalists; it The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe | 91 both deprived the Republicans of this materiel and provided the advancing column with much-needed provisions and equipment. Hugh Thomas notes that in previous clashes with the Nationalists, in which the militias had refused to dig trenches because they deemed it to be a sign of cowardice, this time they reversed themselves. Unfortu- nately, once they were in their trenches, they refused to abandon them even though they were surrounded by Yagüe’s men. It apparently proved hard to get a terrified soldier out of the momentary safety of a trench or foxhole.29 At 5:30 a.m. the rest of the column arrived to link up with the Fourth Bandera. Now reunited, the column left for the nearby village of Puente del Arzobispo, which was captured without incident at 9:30 a.m. The column spent the night of August 30–31 here.30 Starting on August 29, the Fifth Bandera was on the move for three days. It first occupied, without incident, the village of Berrocalejo, where it spent the night. The following day it captured Valdeverdeja, again without resistance, and spent the night in place. On the last day of August the bandera traveled by truck from Valdeverdeja to Puente del Arzobispo, where it joined up with Asensio’s column and spent the night.31 By the end of August Franco and his six-thousand- man army had advanced toward Madrid, traveling 185 miles in the last half of the month. However, further advance would be complicated by longer communication and supply lines as well as more dogged resistance from the Repub- licans. In addition, Franco worked to make sure that he alone received all the military and financial aid that was coming from Italy and Germany. Both countries were now willing to increase their aid to the rebels. This foreign aid gave him tremendous leverage over the other rebel generals as he maneuvered to be named generalíssimo. For the Army of Africa the next challenge would be the capture of Talavera de la Reina, a major town on the road to the capital.

September 1936

By September 1, 1936, the following banderas were in mainland Spain: the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. The Third Bandera arrived in Jerez de la Frontera and Seville on September 19–20, and the Seventh Bandera was reactivated on September 21, 1936, in Talavera de la Reina. While the Second Bandera was involved in the battle for Guipúzcoa (San Sebastián and Irún) and the Sixth Bandera was operating in Andalusia (Granada and Córdoba), the First, Fourth, and Fifth Banderas, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s Madrid Column, were engaged in the most pivotal campaign that was to capture the capital and thus end the war by the end of the year. On September 1 the Fourth Bandera was still in Calzada de Oropesa, where it was reviewed by the administrative officer in preparation for the next advance. Meanwhile, the Fifth Bandera was still in Puente del Arzo- bispo under the temporary command of Captain Luis Meléndez Galán and still attached to Agrupación Castejón. That afternoon, Republican airplanes bombed that village, leaving three wounded legionnaires from the Seventeenth Company. After the aerial attack the men of the Fifth Bandera rested, washed up, and cleaned their weapons.1 The advance resumed on September 2, when the columns marched along a line stretching from Valdeverdeja, Puente del Arzobispo, and Oro- pesa. Operating in a three-pronged attack, Asensio’s column took the center while Castejón’s was on his right flank and Tella’s was on his left flank. Setting out at one o’clock in the morning for the village of Calera y Chozas, Castejón’s motorized column, with the Seventeenth Company of the Fifth Bandera led by Captain Meléndez in the vanguard, made contact with the Republicans a few miles outside Puente del Arzobispo.

93 94 | September 1936

Although the column was surprised by armored cars and troops that confronted them on the road, these were easily driven off with gunfire. Before dawn and just about a mile from Calera y Chozas, the Nationalist and Republican vanguards met each other, and the casualties began to mount for the Seventeenth Company as it tried to organize a solid line of defense, which took hours to realize. This was ultimately accomplished by utilizing the supporting units and the Regulares of Ceuta, which initiated an enveloping maneuver attacking Calera y Chozas from the north. The Nationalist advance was impeded by the flat terrain and the lack of natural cover. The fighting was brutal. The Nationalists employed their artillery for more than an hour, intensely pounding the Republicans’ strong points. However, just as Castejón was about to give the order for the final assault, a squadron of eleven Republican planes roared overhead and began to unleash their bombs on the attackers. Under punishing bombardment and without any natural cover, the legionnaires could do nothing but spread out and take cover. The aerial attack lasted for three-quarters of an hour, which in turn delayed Castejón’s assault for close to an hour and a half. When the final assault came, with the legionnaires and the Reg- ulares enveloping the defenders’ rearguard, all resistance was futile, and the “Reds” experienced significant casualties. The Republicans suffered a major defeat and lost a great quantity of valuable war materiel, including three machine guns. The next step was for the vanguard to enter Calera y Chozas proper. Captain Meléndez was wounded and was replaced by Captain Carlos Tiede as commander of the Fifth Bandera. In Calero y Chozas the Eigh- teenth Company assumed responsibility for securing the village. After a two-hour lull, the government’s reserves, under the command of Captain Uribarri (the commander of the Phantom Column), appeared from their ambush spot along the banks of the Tagus River and attacked three separate parts of the village. Castejón met the challenge by setting up two machine guns in the plaza of the church to provide cover fire and led five hundred legionnaires against the three points of attack. They successfully defeated the Republicans, who left behind eighteen dead and sixteen rifles. The cost for the Legion was steep, with the wounding of Captain Meléndez; Lieutenants Fernando Álvarez Pacheco, Francisco Gassol Ruiz, and Vicente Gutiérrez Armajach; Venerando Pérez Guerra; and Sergeants Basilio Rodríguez Barroso and Alberto D’Silva Sousa—all of September 1936 | 95 the Seventeenth Company. This was in addition to Lieutenants Francisco González Soler and Manuel Pavia Martín of the Eighteenth Company. For the enlisted men, the toll was eighteen dead and forty-six wounded. In a postbattle interview with Diario de Lisboa, Castejón affirmed that the capture of the critically important city of Talavera de la Reina was done not at the outskirts of that town but at Calera y Chozas—about ten miles southwest of Talavera de la Reina.2 While the Fifth Bandera was having a rough time at Calera y Chozas on September 2, the Fourth Bandera, in the vanguard of Asensio’s column, was setting out for Gamonal from Oropesa at sunrise. With the Sixteenth Company in the vanguard, the column reached the 131-kilometer marker (81 miles) on the Madrid Highway. Outside the village the Sixteenth Company ran into a hailstorm of bullets from automatic weapons as well as artillery. The Tenth Company was quickly deployed to the left of the Sixteenth Company. To make matters worse for the attackers, a few Re- publican planes arrived to bomb them. In spite of this, the legionnaires were able to advance and capture, in hard-fought combat and with the support of their artillery, a few hills and houses close to Gamonal and then to pursue the defenders to their second line of defense. Again the Republican defenders, dug in on nearby heights overlooking Gamonal, were dislodged by the legionnaires while being fired on from both flanks and the front. The defenders suffered many casualties in this engagement. The path was now open for the capture of Gamonal, which was accomplished at three o’clock in the afternoon without incident.3 Without hesitation, the column pressed on toward its next objective, the outskirts of Talavera de la Reina, with the Tenth and Sixteenth Com- panies in the lead. Asensio divided his column into two subcolumns, which allowed him to go around the city and continue toward the Sierra de Medellín. With the support of a platoon from the 11th company and a few machine guns, the 10th company secured the foothills of the Sierra de Medellín in spite of the resistance of its well-armed defenders. The company then moved on to the strategic railroad bridge that spanned the Alberche River. The Eleventh Company suffered two casualties while fending off several counterattacks from Talavera de la Reina.4 Talavera de la Reina was the most important town between Gener- al Francisco Franco’s advancing forces and Madrid, so the government mustered all its resources to defend the town, including ten thousand 96 | September 1936 militiamen, all the available artillery, and even an armored train. Ar- mored trains played a pivotal role in the Russian Civil War (1918–1922), especially for the victorious Red Army; given this fact, they were also used by the Spanish Republic in its war. The Armored Train Brigade was established as soon as the war began and assigned to the engineer branch of the army. The Armored Train Brigade was divided into several armored train companies. One example of a Spanish armored train was the number 12 train, which was built in Valencia and featured two layers of armor plate with cement in between the plates. The trains were armed with either rifles and light machine guns or cannons ranging from 37 to 75 or 76.2 millimeters (i.e., heavy).5 According to Hugh Thomas, “On the Talavera front, for example, the republicans had high hopes for an armoured train, that favourite development of the Russian Civil War.” He added that in Spain, the armored train “proved useless.” The government’s plan was to mount a stout defense along the foothills that led into Tala- vera de la Reina.6 On September 3, Tella’s column, with the First Bandera, moved into the center of the advancing force from the left flank and proceeded toward El Casar de Talavera, where it quickly came under heavy artillery and aerial attack.7 Nevertheless, the column pressed on until it reached the outskirts of El Casar de Talavera, where it engaged in tough combat with Republican defenders who were well protected behind their fortifications and parapets. Unfortunately for these defenders, the city was being attacked by the Nationalists at various points. Advancing from Calera y Chozas, the Fifth Bandera made contact with a Republican scouting party from El Casar de Talavera at seven o’clock in the morning, which initiated an intense engagement. Militiamen fought bravely and tenaciously but were no match for the professionals from Africa, who advanced slowly and methodically and entered the town at two o’clock in the afternoon. Casualties were heavy for both sides. As on previous occasions, a great quantity of weapons and war materiel was captured by the Nationalists, which allowed them to resupply themselves at Republican expense.8 For the Fifth Bandera, the day of battle on September 3 began at four o’clock in the morning, when the column set out for Talavera de la Re- ina. The bandera was not in the vanguard of the column but marched behind the Regulares of Ceuta. After advancing about three miles, the September 1936 | 97 column abandoned the road and moved cross-country to reach the main highway between Oropesa and Talavera de la Reina. While the column was moving from one road to another, it came under fire from militiamen that became more intense as it neared the Oropesa–Talavera de la Reina highway. Under blistering fire, the bandera was forced to disperse and seek cover. Meanwhile, the Regulares of Ceuta, which was in the vanguard, tried to advance but was stopped by the well-entrenched militiamen. Around one o’clock in the afternoon the resistance of the militiamen began to abate as their trenches and fortifications were broken by the column, which had moved around their left flank. Once the trenches were occupied, the column continued all the way to Talavera de la Reina, arriving at two o’clock. The bandera was ordered to march through the city and to set up security positions on the road that led to Madrid and on the iron bridge that led to Alcaudete de la Jara. A vanguard unit was set up at Ermita del Prado and another on the iron bridge. When this day ended, the Fifth Bandera had suffered one killed and five wounded.9 With Asensio’s column split into two subcolumns, the commander of the Fourth Bandera, Major José Vierna, was given charge of the subcol- umn that included the Fourth Bandera (which was now put under the command of Captain Francisco Sáinz) and the Second Tabor of the Reg- ulares (Tetuán No. 1), led by Major Antonio del Oro. This column’s assignment for September 3 called for the Tenth Company to march in the vanguard of the column and occupy the Sierra de Medellín, located on the left flank of Talavera de la Reina. Together the legionnaires and the Regulares captured and occupied Torreta de la Atalaya. The Tenth Company advanced against heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, which ceased after the rest of the column moved forward. Only the constant bombing from Republican airplanes impeded its advance. At 6:30 a.m. the push toward the Sierra de Medellín was made without incident. With this accomplished, the bandera was ordered to remain in place by the high command and then ordered to resume its advance toward Talavera de la Reina. It reached the city and continued three miles past it until it reached a bridge spanning the Alberche River as well as the railroad bridge. Both objectives were secured without incident. The Fourth Bandera was assigned guard duty for both bridges.10 The arrival of the Nationalist army in Talavera de la Reina brought repression and executions. The New York Herald Tribune’s John Whitaker 98 | September 1936 wrote the following about what took place after the fall of Talavera de la Reina:

I never passed a night in Talavera without being awakened at dawn by the volleys of the firing squads. There seemed no end to the killing. They were shooting as many at the end of the second month [of the war] as in my first days there. They averaged perhaps thirty a day. They were simple peasants and workers. It was sufficient to have carried a trade-union card, to have been a free-mason, to have voted for the Republic.11 The capture of Talavera de la Reina by the Nationalists stunned the Republicans as much as the capture of Mérida and Badajoz had. Just as the government had carried out a strong counterattack after the fall of Mérida, it did so again against Talavera de la Reina. The republic’s loss of Talavera de la Reina also cost José Giral Pereira his post as prime minister on September 4, 1936. He was replaced by Francisco Largo Ca- ballero of the Socialist Party. In addition to naming a new prime minister, the government also promoted Colonel José Asensio Torrado to the rank of general and made him responsible for the Army of the Center (Madrid and its environs). The following day he organized a column of four thousand men taken from the forces of Generals Julio Mangada and Carlos Bernal García. The column included regiments from the Levant, the carabineros, and the Civil and Assault Guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ri- cardo Burillo Stolle. The government hoped that this column would stop the Nationalist steamroller on its way toward Madrid. With the column assembled in Maqueda, President Manuel Azaña called on the troops to drive the Nationalists from Talavera de la Reina.12 On September 4 the Fifth Bandera had an easy time, spending the day in Talavera de la Reina resting, washing, and cleaning its weapons. How- ever, the day was not as peaceful for the Fourth Bandera, which was sent to reinforce a tabor of the Regulares of Alhucemas that was defending a bridge across the Alberche River. During the previous night, the Reg- ulares had been attacked by a large force of men supported by armored cars, artillery, and aircraft in the hope of retaking the bridge. When the bandera arrived at the bridge, it was ordered to wade across the river and did so directly under the bridge. The Eleventh Company was in the vanguard of the crossing, and once it was on the other side it was quickly ordered to surround a house about 550 yards from the September 1936 | 99

Republicans. The legionnaires came under heavy fire, and the casualties began to mount. They tried to initiate an attack, but it was halted because the distance between them and the target was too great, especially across open terrain. Again they tried to reach a house that was full of defenders well armed with machine guns and rifles. A company from the Regulares advanced directly toward the house from its position on the bridge while the Elev- enth Company held them in place from the right flank. The house was taken by the Regulares and the legionnaires; the latter occupied the house and thus kept the two companies between the house and the Tagus River. The bandera’s Machine-Gun Company (the Twelfth) and a platoon from the Tenth Company remained in place and provided defensive security. At sundown the Sixteenth Company was ordered to the house in order to provide reinforcement in the event of a nighttime attack, which did not happen.13 At dawn on September 5 the government’s much-vaunted column began to move. Its advance was preceded by Republican aircraft, which bombed Talavera de la Reina. After this aerial assault the column launched a frontal attack against the bridges that spanned the Alberche River. It was up to Asensio’s and Castejón’s columns to repel the attackers. The Fifth Bandera was notified that an attack was eminent across the iron bridge, so the bridge was reinforced by the legionnaires, who in turn were subjected to the aerial bombardment.14 The defense of Talavera de la Reina was divided into two parts: the first covered the banks of the Tagus River along a broad front (Asensio), whereas the second called for fording the Alberche River (Castejón). The latter operation was supported by twelve artillery pieces, well camouflaged by Castejón on a farm, and under the experienced hand of Cap- tain Luis Alarcón de la Lastra in order to counter the Republicans’ three batteries.15 While the Fourth and Fifth Banderas were deployed in a defensive role on September 5, the First Bandera left Talavera de la Reina at night in a motorized convoy headed toward the nearby villages of Segurilla, Mejo- rada, and Cervera de los Montes. All three were easily occupied without incident and a pro-Nationalist government installed. The bandera rapidly returned to Talavera de la Reina.16 At 2:30 a.m. on September 6 the Fifth Bandera formed the vanguard of Castejón’s column as it moved toward Casas de las Torres, which was 100 | September 1936 found to be unoccupied. Castejón ordered that three batteries be placed in the vicinity of the houses so as to cover the road to Madrid, which the Republicans held. At sunrise the government’s attack began in earnest. Asensio’s men were tasked with holding the enemy’s thrust along the front of the line (the road to Madrid) while Castejón’s column advanced seven and a half miles along the right bank of the Alberche River until arriving a mile from the town of Cazalegas on the opposite shore. By the attenuation of the sounds of battle, Castejón knew that the enemy’s escape route had been eliminated. The column’s vanguard unit looked for a suitable spot from which to cross the river. A place was found where the water was chest deep, and the crossing was immediately made by the rest of the Fifth Bandera. At this time the Republicans opened fire with their cannons, trying to prevent the crossing. Once on the opposite side of the river, the bandera advanced slowly and methodically along the edge toward the vicinity of Cortijo de Vista Alegre with the ultimate goal of capturing the Republicans’ gun batteries. A machine-gun platoon set up its weapons and began to lay down a murderous stream of gunfire at both personnel and trucks. The Republicans were so overwhelmed by the ferocity of the vanguard’s assault that they abandoned Cortijo de Vista Alegre. Simultaneously, the Seventeenth Company of the Fifth Bandera, under heavy cover fire from its own cannons placed on high ground, launched a tenacious assault on the Republicans’ batteries about 440 yards away and seized them. In the capture of both Cortijo de Vista Alegre and the Republicans’ guns, it was the Legion’s celerity and aggressiveness that carried the day. The legionnaires pressed their attack toward the main road, captured another Republican battery, and then fell upon the Republican column’s rearguard with disastrous results. The distance between the two combatants was a mere 550 yards, but the Republicans inopportunely mistook the legionnaires for their own troops and began frantically signaling them by waving red flags. By the time they realized their mistake, it was too late. With a combination of rifle and machine-gun fire, the legionnaires unleashed hell on their hapless, trapped opponents, who dropped their rifles and fled for their lives. More than a hundred were killed, and another hundred men, including a General Staff officer, were taken prisoner in a matter of minutes.17 With the Republicans in complete disarray that day, Castejón pressed his attack. In conjunction with Asensio’s column advancing from one of September 1936 | 101 the Alberche River bridges, the two columns united and marched toward their next objective. The Eighteenth Company of the Fifth Bandera advanced with a machine-gun platoon about a mile toward Santa Olalla, where the men were ordered to halt by the high command (Franco’s headquarters). At four o’clock in the afternoon the legionnaires were relieved by a company of the Regulares of Tetuán and ordered to return to Tala- vera de la Reina. The return was slow and costly because the bandera endured continuous bombardment by government planes, but it finally arrived in Talavera de la Reina at seven o’clock that night. The Eighteenth Company and the machine-gun platoon were assigned to defend the bridge. By the end of the day, the Fifth Bandera had suffered three men killed and twenty-two wounded.18 While the Fifth Bandera was engaged in bitter combat on September 6, Asensio’s column was also quite active. In addition to repelling all government attacks against the bridges he held, Asensio supported Caste- jón’s advance toward Cortijo de Vista Alegre by launching an attack at eight o’clock in the morning along the right flank of the Madrid road, near the stone bridge that crossed the Alberche River. This attack was undertaken to provide support for a tabor of the Regulares (Alhucemas No. 5) commanded by Major Mohamed Ben Mizzián. Ben Mizzián was a Moroccan soldier who served in both the Spanish (1916–1957) and Moroccan Armies (1957–1970s). After the Regulares was established in 1911, Ben Mizzián was allowed to enter the Spanish Infantry Academy in Toledo in 1913 even though he was a Muslim. King Alfonso XIII, who had met him as a boy during a visit to Melilla, inter- ceded on his behalf in order to foster better relations with the indigenous population in Spanish Morocco. Ben Mizzián graduated in 1916 and served in the Regulares, where he rose to the rank of major during the Rif War. During this conflict he met Franco, and the two became lifelong friends. In 1936 he became the commander of the Second Tabor, and by 1939 Ben Mizzián had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. Among his many decorations were the Individual Military Medal and the Laure- ate Cross of St. Ferdinand, and he was wounded in battle during the Rif War and the Spanish Civil War. After the latter war he served as captain general of Galicia and the Canary Islands. After Spain abandoned the Spanish Protectorate in 1956, Ben Mizzián left Spain’s service to assist in the establishment of the Royal Moroccan 102 | September 1936

Army in 1957. In 1966 he served as Morocco’s ambassador to Spain, and in 1970 the Moroccan Army promoted him to the rank of field marshal; he was the only man to ever hold this position. Like his longtime friend Franco, Ben Mizzián died in 1975.19 It was Ben Mizzián’s Regulares of Alhucemas that attacked the heights of Cortijo de Vista Alegre along the left flank in conjunction with Caste- jón’s Fifth Bandera. The Sixteenth Company of the Fourth Bandera was in the vanguard of a force that advanced to a clump of woods at the foot of the farm in Cortijo de Vista Alegre. From there it proceeded to carry out a reconnaissance of the banks of the Tagus River while capturing several prisoners and their weapons along the way. In addition, a great quantity of war materiel was seized. With the day’s mission accomplished in the early afternoon hours, the Fourth Bandera was ordered to return to Talavera de la Reina, where it spent the night.20 Both the Fourth and the Fifth Banderas took September 7 off for rest and recuperation.21 On September 8 the action in this sector heated up once more when governmental forces attacked Cortijo de Vista Alegre, which was defended by a tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán. The Repub- licans attacked en masse and were supported by tanks, armored trucks, and even an armored train. Their advance reached to within eleven hundred yards of where the Regulares of Tetuán were dug in. The Fourth Bandera, which was in Talavera de la Reina at the time, was quickly pressed into service to reinforce the Regulares. The legionnaires boarded trucks and reached the stone bridge, where they deployed to the right of the Regulares. Suddenly Republican aircraft appeared overhead and at low altitude began to bomb the Nationalist units, causing eighteen casualties among the legionnaires. The Fifth Bandera then proceeded to Cortijo de Vista Alegre; the men carried their weapons and ammunition either on their shoulders or strapped to mules. As they neared the bridges that spanned the Alberche River, Republican artillery on the opposite side of the Tagus River began lobbing shells not only at the front-line defenders (the Regulares and legionnaires) but also at the rearguard, hoping to prevent them from reaching the front lines. The entire bandera was in position when Republican infantrymen began their assault, advancing behind a few tanks and the armored train’s cannon fire. The clash between the two sides was violent, and the tanks were able to crash through the bandera’s front lines. Nonetheless, a few of the tanks were set on fire by thebandera ’s defenders. Republican infantry followed the tanks, and in the parapets it September 1936 | 103 was militiaman versus legionnaire in brutal combat. Casualties began to quickly mount all along the front lines, and as one legionnaire fell, another rushed in to cover his place in the line. Eventually the legionnaires were able to gain the upper hand in the fight and began to push the attackers back. At first the militiamen retreated in an orderly fashion, but that changed quickly to disorganized flight. The legionnaires pulled back a few yards in order to restore their front lines. The Eleventh Company and a machine-gun platoon moved forward under shelling from the Re- publicans’ artillery and captured the left flank of the position. Now the Tenth Company joined the Eleventh and added a machine- gun platoon that had been held in reserve at a railway yard. The Sixteenth Company leapfrogged the Eleventh Company, deployed to its left, and continued the fight until it reached the Alberche River. The ultimate goal was to secure the bridgehead along the right flank of the highway that led to Madrid. With the situation stabilized and machine guns in place to cover the main highway, the Regulares of Tetuán were ordered to pull back about a mile to rest and to serve as reserves. With all avenues of advance sealed off and with their forces depleted, the Republicans gave up all hope of capturing Talavera de la Reina. For the time being, the situation in and around Talavera de la Reina was tranquil.22 On the same day, September 8, the First Bandera, as part of Tella’s column, boarded trucks and departed Talavera de la Reina to join with Colonel Francisco Delgado’s column, which was headed for Arenas de San Pedro in the province of Ávila.23 The First Bandera was in the vanguard of Tella’s column, and its mission that day was to link up with Colonel José Monasterio Ituarte’s forces, which had reached La Parra de las Arenas. Delgado’s column defeated all Republican opposition that stood in its way, forced the defenders to fall back, and entered the town of Arenas de San Pedro. Meanwhile, Tella’s men confronted a Republican force coming from Madrid and engaged them in heavy combat in the vicinity of Ayuso and Valdeolivo. The Republican column from Madrid was composed of the militia battalions named Octubre, Tomás Meare, and Libertario and included a company of railway men and another of streetcar workers—all union members. The column had a total of about fifteen hundred men. The pivotal point in the battle took place at the Boquerón Pass, where the mountainous terrain was particularly rough and thick with large pine and oak trees. Within this forest the legionnaires annihilated the callow militiamen, who were full of revolutionary fervor but lacked the martial 104 | September 1936 skill and battle experience of the men of the Legion. The Republicans suffered about 230 dead and a similar number of wounded or captured and the ignominy of the loss of the Libertario Battalion’s battle flag. This victory allowed the union of this column with a Nationalist cavalry force coming from Puerto del Pico. With the mission accomplished, Tella’s column returned to Talavera de la Reina.24 From August 8 to September 8 the Sixth Bandera operated in and around Granada providing security. Because of the high number of casualties suffered by the three banderas that were part of Yagüe’s Madrid Column, Franco decided to transfer the Sixth Bandera from Granada to the Madrid front. On September 8 the entire bandera departed for Seville aboard a train, and once in Seville the bandera boarded trucks that took it the rest of the way to Cáceres. From Cáceres the bandera proceeded to Talavera de la Reina and continued seven and a half miles past the city on the road to Madrid, where it awaited further orders for about a week.25 With the government’s failure to take back Talavera de la Reina from the Nationalists, Yagüe’s columns pressed forward. On September 9 the Fifth Bandera, in the vanguard of Castejón’s column, was on the move. It began its day at midnight, departing from the iron bridge and heading for some hills located between the roads of San Bartolomé de Abiertas and Alcaudete. On these hills the Republicans had placed two batteries that were constantly firing down on Talavera de la Reina. Employing a local guide (who repeatedly got lost in the dark) to lead them to the hills, the attackers finally reached their objective at 4:30 a.m. and neutralized the batteries. With the mission accomplished, they returned to Talavera de la Reina and spent the rest of the day providing security for the two bridges (stone and iron) across the Alberche River and taking the opportunity for some rest and cleaning up.26 At eleven o’clock at night on September 9, the Fifth Bandera was relieved of its guard duty in the city and ordered to board trucks for San Román de los Montes along with the rest of Castejón’s column. On Sep- tember 10, nearly two miles outside San Román de los Montes, the men of the Fifth Bandera climbed out of the trucks and proceeded to advance on foot. It was around eight o’clock in the morning when the column encountered the forward elements of the Republicans’ forces. The commander of the Fifth Bandera ordered the Seventeenth Company to pin down the defenders while the Nineteenth Company quickly deployed as soon as it reached the southern end of San Román de los Montes. September 1936 | 105

The rest of the bandera, the Eighteenth and Twentieth Companies, tried to carry out an enveloping maneuver but were stopped cold by the murderous machine-gun fire coming from the numerous defenders. The attackers became aware that the defenders posed a serious threat to the right flank of their deployment. Therefore, hoping to avert this danger, a platoon from the Nineteenth Company, supported by Lieutenant Nicasio Joaquín Montero García’s machine-gun platoon, set itself up at the edge of a small forest while the rest of the bandera proceeded to capture some hills that overlooked the town.27 Having reached the base of those hills, two platoons from the Nine- teenth Company attacked the heights while another two platoons, with machine guns providing cover fire, entered San Román de los Montes. The Republican defenders, beaten and demoralized by the column’s artillery, could not stop the assault of the legionnaires, and San Román was secured by 9:30 a.m. Taken from the militiamen in San Román was a machine gun, more than fifty rifles, a motorized ambulance, and fifty prisoners. Maintaining this momentum, at one o’clock in the afternoon the commander of the column ordered an attack on Hinojosa de San Vicente, a village to the north of San Román. With the Nineteenth Company in the vanguard, the Fifth Bandera entered the village at 3:15 p.m. and encountered no resistance. That night the bandera bivouacked in an olive grove east of the village and set up a security detail. In the capture of San Román de los Montes, one legionnaire was killed and six were wounded.28 The Fourth Bandera was also in action on September 10–11 as part of Asensio’s column. Republican forces aggressively attacked Agrupación Asensio on September 10, which compelled Asensio to order several offensive thrusts to deter further attacks. Asensio’s column suffered a few casualties when Republican aircraft bombed it for two days, but on the ground the Republicans were driven off by afternoon. At seven o’clock in the morning on September 11 Asensio’s column went on the offensive, with the Fourth Bandera in the center of the formation and with two tabors of the Regulares of Tetuán on either flank.29 On the road to Madrid, the tabores were ordered to seize the villages of Cazalegas and Lucillos, with the Fourth Bandera providing support or reinforcements as needed. As it turned out, it became necessary for the legionnaires to come to the aid of the Moroccan forces when the Repub- licans mounted a very stiff and determined defense. It took a combined 106 | September 1936 force of the Sixteenth Company and Colonel Delgado’s tabor to overcome the Republicans’ defensive fortifications (trenches and parapets), but this was accomplished by late afternoon. The Fourth Bandera spent the night in the trenches it had just taken from the Republicans. This operation cost the Fourth Bandera several wounded and one death, Lieu- tenant Francisco Cabañero Palacio of the Eleventh Company.30 At this time (September 10), while the Fourth Bandera was at its temporary headquarters in Cortijo de Vista Alegre, a much beloved and respected man joined the Spanish Foreign Legion: Father Fernando de Huidobro y Polanco. This short, myopic Jesuit priest had studied the- ology and philosophy at the University of Freiburg and was a disciple and friend of Martin Heidegger; now he was to serve as the chaplain of the Fourth Bandera. Before coming to the Legion, Father Huidobro had served with the Falangist militia in Valladolid. He approached Franco, then in his Cáceres headquarters, about serving in the Legion, and Fran- co granted his request, but with the admonition to desist from trying to convert the Moroccans. Franco put Huidobro in contact with Yagüe, who was the commander of the Legion and who at that time was in Talavera de la Reina. The commander of the Fourth Bandera, Major Vierna, described his first meeting with Father Huidobro while encamped on the shores of the Alberche River on the road to Madrid. He noted that the priest was basically a raw recruit, a man who had no combat experience, but who appeared delicate, intelligent, generous, and younger than his years. Vierna seriously doubted that he was up to the grueling task of serving as his bandera’s chaplain, but that doubt quickly evaporated as Father Huido- bro threw himself into his work evacuating the wounded from the field; administering last rites to the dead and dying; and bringing water, rations, and ammunition to the men in the front lines while under incessant aerial bombardment and gunfire. Veteran legionnaires were awed by his bravery and complete disregard for his personal safety. In addition to carrying out his battlefield duties, Huidobro tried to steer the legionnaires away from gambling and prostitution, and he chas- tised them for skipping confession. However, to the consternation of many officers, who feared for his personal safety, he spoke out strongly in numerous letters against the brutality and barbaric methods of the legionnaires and the Regulares after the capture of Toledo and recommended that some prisoners not be summarily shot but instead be put to work or imprisoned. September 1936 | 107

With his crucifix in hand, Father Huidobro marched all the way to Ma- drid with the Fourth Bandera. He was killed in action on April 11, 1937, on the Madrid front when a Soviet artillery shell smashed into the first- aid station where he was ministering to the wounded. He was thirty-four years old. Jesuits and legionnaires pushed to have him canonized, but when the Vatican looked into his case it discovered that he had not been killed by the Republicans but had been shot in the back by a legionnaire from his own bandera, so it did not proceed with the canonization process. Father Huidobro’s crucifix has become a relic of the Legion, and his photo adorns the Walls of Honor of Legion halls in Spain.31 Continuing the march toward Madrid, the Fourth Bandera went on the offensive at seven o’clock in the morning on September 12 with the goal of pinning down the militiamen defending Cazalegas, on the southern bank of the Alberche River, while Major Ben Mizzián’s tabor of the Regulares of Alhucemas approached from the right flank. The Tenth and Sixteenth Companies approached some olive groves to the right and left of the road while being covered by the Eleventh Company and the bandera’s machine guns. At this point the Republican defenders opened fire with their machine guns, which forced the legionnaires to wait for the Regulares in order to initiate the attack. With the attack underway, the legionnaires advanced in the center and, in cooperation with the Regulares, were able to move rapidly ahead. The occupation of Cazalegas was completed by nine o’clock in the morning and with the defenders leaving behind two machine-gun tripods and several cases of ammunition. Not willing to surrender Cazalegas so easily, the Republicans launched a concerted and coordinated counterattack via the Madrid road using aircraft, artillery, tanks, mortars, and machine guns. The legionnaires and the Regulares scrambled to set up defensive positions, using homes and erecting barricades so as to cut off street access to the attackers. After repeated failed attempts to take back Cazalegas and suffering many casualties, the Republicans eventually gave up. The Fourth Bandera remained in Cazalegas overnight.32 Operating to the north of the Fourth Bandera on September 12 was Castejón’s column. At four o’clock in the morning, the Fifth Bandera departed for El Real de San Vicente in the second line of Castejón’s column and arrived at seven o’clock without encountering any resistance. How- ever, once the column was in control of the village, Republican planes subjected the occupiers to intense aerial bombardment during the day. 108 | September 1936

Leaving behind a single company to provide security in El Real de San Vicente, the remainder of the column bivouacked on the outskirts of the village. That afternoon the commanding officer of the Fifth Bandera left El Real de San Vicente for nearby Pelahustán, where the tabor of the Regulares attached to Castejón’s column was under heavy attack by the Republicans. The commander of the Fifth Bandera, having assessed the gravity of the situation in Pelahustán, ordered two platoons from the Eighteenth Company under the command of Lieutenant Francisco de Miguel to depart at six o’clock that evening to reinforce the Regulares. On this day two legionnaires from the Fifth Bandera were wounded.33 When the Sixth Bandera arrived in Talavera de la Reina on September 13, it was ordered to replace the Fourth Bandera in Asensio’s column. Since its arrival on the peninsula, the Fourth Bandera (along with the Fifth) had seen constant marching and combat. As a result, the number of casualties had taken their toll on the bandera’s combat effectiveness. On September 14 the Sixth Bandera effectively replaced the Fourth Bandera at the front, and the latter returned to Talavera de la Reina to refit and reorganize.34 Also on September 13, the Fourth Bandera was in Cazalegas and under attack by Republican aircraft and artillery, but nothing came of it. At five o’clock in the afternoon, two companies from the Sixth Bandera appeared in Cazalegas with instructions to relieve the Fourth Bandera. At that point the Fourth Bandera returned to Talavera de la Reina, where Yagüe had his headquarters. Because of several counterattacks by governmental forces, the Fourth Bandera was unable to return to Talavera de la Reina until the following day.35 On September 13 the Fifth Bandera moved out at eight o’clock in the morning toward Castillo de Bayuela, a small village northeast of San Román de los Montes. The bandera arrived at 10:30 a.m., encountering no resistance.36 At one o’clock the commander of the bandera sent the Eighteenth Company, the Seventeenth Company, and the infantry cannon (70-milimeter) to Pelahustán, where the Republicans were applying strong pressure on the Nationalists. The Eighteenth Company covered the left flank and was able to repel several attacks. Both companies spent the night in place, with one company on the battlefield and the other in the village of Pelahustán in the reserve role for the other. The Nineteenth Company and the Machine-Gun Company bivouacked outside Castillo de Bayuela, providing security and protection for the 105-millimeter batteries. On this day the Fifth Bandera suffered one dead and seven wounded.37 September 1936 | 109

The situation of the Nationalists in Pelahustán had become so tenuous that they decided to abandon the village for the time being. At one o’clock in the morning on September 14 the Fifth Bandera, was evacuated, with the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Companies relocating to El Real de San Vicente in perfect order. At seven o’clock that night the two companies joined the rest of the bandera in the village of Castillo de Bayuela, where it provided security and spent the night without incident.38 Castejón’s column continued its march toward Madrid in spite of what had occurred in Pelahustán—an insignificant objective that did not merit a major commitment of troops and resources. As with Medellín, Caste- jón decided to bypass it and leave it for later. On September 15 his column left at two o’clock in the morning for El Casar de Escalona, north of the Madrid Highway and between the towns of Cazalegas and Santa Olalla. The soldiers crossed the Alberche River at San Benito, with the Fifth Ban- dera advancing behind the Regulares. Having forded the river, the column halted on the opposite shore and rested for a short time before continuing the march at seven o’clock and reaching the outskirts of El Casar de Escalona at about nine o’clock. The tabor of the Regulares, in the vanguard of the column, was ordered to take the town with the Fifth Bandera behind it and to its left. At about eleven hundred yards from the village the Regulares came under intense fire. When the Regulares failed to make headway in its attack on the village, Castejón ordered the Fifth Bandera to replace it. The Nineteenth Company, in the vanguard, sent one platoon to occupy a hill northeast of the village. This effectively cut off the village from the main road and allowed two other platoons to surround it from the north and take it. A pair of machine guns was set up to cover this advance. The Nineteenth Company, with support on its right from a platoon of the Seventeenth Company, advanced from the north and entered the village with such speed that its defenders, mostly from the Assault Guard, were caught off guard and were unable to organize an adequate defense. The defenders suffered many casualties, but a few continued to resist by barricading themselves in the town’s church. The Eighteenth Company, using a combination of hand grenades and Molotov cocktails, forced a few of the defenders to leap out of the church’s bell tower and plummet onto the street below. Meanwhile, the Republicans sent reinforcements by the road leading into El Casar de Escalona, which required that reinforcements be sent to the Legion platoon that was guarding that route while also leaving enough men to guard the northern part of the village. By this time the 110 | September 1936

Regulares were concentrated in the southern part of the village, and the commander of the column moved to reach the main road that connected Santa Olalla to Talavera de la Reina. Around noon a platoon from the Seventeenth Company advanced toward the road and occupied a hill about a mile away. In the town the commander of the bandera had at his disposal the Eighteenth Company and a platoon from the Nineteenth, while the remainder of the bandera occupied hills to the south and east that the Republicans had slowly been reinforcing. The platoon from the Seventeenth Company faced serious opposition on the hill as the Republicans attacked from both the front and the flank, thus making the situation extremely tenuous. The Regu- lares rushed to the aid of the legionnaires and, though suffering numerous casualties, continued to hold the hill. Simultaneously, the Republicans proceeded to bring up more men and equipment. Now it was the turn of the Republican air force to go to work as squadrons of bombers unleashed death and destruction on those below. Re- publican planes swooped in very low and dropped a veritable “hailstorm of bombs” on the town. A 105-millimeter battery opened fire with high- explosive shells from a short distance while thousands of government troops attacked from all directions. To make matters worse, a torrential downpour began at this time, inundating the town and the surrounding terrain. The casualties continued to mount for the Regulares and the legionnaires as the Republicans threw everything at their disposal at them in an attempt to drive them from the town. A platoon from the Nineteenth Company, under the command of Lieutenant León, was sent to Cazale- gas with the intent of making contact with Nationalist forces based there in the expectation of bringing reinforcements to help in the battle for El Casar de Escalona. Lieutenant León’s mission failed when his platoon ran into a Republican trench blocking his way into Cazalegas. Subjected to intense aerial bombing, artillery shelling, machine-gun fire, and rifle fire from the Republicans, the contested hill by the main road became untenable, and the commander ordered a retreat. The loss of the hill put the occupation of the town in grave danger. This turn of events forced the Nationalists to launch a counterattack with all available reserves in order to stabilize the situation. Once again the Republican air force made its third appearance of the day, dropping numerous bombs. This was followed by heavy shelling September 1936 | 111 from the 105-millimeter battery using high-explosive projectiles. In spite of this the Nationalists prepared to launch their attack. With determination and resolution, two companies of the Regulares advanced along the left flank while the Eighteenth Company advanced along the right flank toward the main road with the intention of recapturing the previously abandoned hill. For several hours the battle raged back and forth, with a few positions on the line coming under heavy attack and with the Republicans bringing two armored vehicles into the fight but having to quickly pull them back for fear of losing them. As the sun began to set, the Republicans finally withdrew for the day, which gave the bandera the opportunity to tend to the dead and wounded. As a result of this combat, the Fifth Bandera suffered thirteen dead and thirty-eight wounded. The Republicans also suffered heavy losses, with many dead and wounded, numerous prisoners taken, and nearly three hundred rifles captured. Many of these rifles came from Mexico; called Mexicanskis, they were Mosin-Nagant M1891 rifles made by the Remington Arms Compa- ny in the United States for the Russian Army in World War I. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, these rifles were sold to Mexico, which in turn supplied them to the Spanish Republic in 1936. The Mexicanskis were later used by the American volunteers of the Abraham Lincoln Bri- gade in the Spanish Civil War.39 The battle for El Casar de Escalona was so fierce and the human toll so heavy that after dark the column was instructed to evacuate the town. In this instance the government’s overwhelming use of air power and artillery had made the situation untenable for the Nationalists. As gunfire diminished throughout the night of September 15, the column began to withdraw at midnight. There were 120 wounded men who required evacuation to the rear, ammunition was nearly depleted, and there was no artillery or liaison. Major Castejón ordered the column to fall back toward Castillo de Bayuela, with the Fifth Bandera providing cover for the withdrawal. The evacuation began at two o’clock in the morning on September 16, with the most seriously wounded carried on stretchers while the others were transported on mules and on the officers’ horses. The march was carried out in total silence and without any interference from the Re- publicans. The Alberche River was forded, as before, at San Benito. With the column safely in Castillo de Bayuela by 6:30 a.m., the Fifth Bandera 112 | September 1936 stopped to rest for a few hours before it proceeded late that afternoon aboard trucks to Talavera de la Reina, where it spent the night.40 On the morning of September 16 the Fourth Bandera was relieved of its security mission, and at six o’clock in the evening the Eleventh Com- pany boarded trucks and headed for San Román de los Montes, which had previously been captured and abandoned but was reoccupied this afternoon by the Eighteenth Company. At seven o’clock that evening, the rest of the Fourth Bandera left Talavera de la Reina for San Román in order to link up with the Eighteenth Company. The entire bandera spent the night on site.41 On September 17 the Tenth Company of the Fourth Bandera boarded trucks at five o’clock in the morning with the goal of capturing the towns of Hinojosa and El Real de San Vicente. The rest of the bandera advanced on foot just in case it was needed to back up the company in occupying the two towns. Both towns were taken without incident, and the Tenth Company, along with a centuria of the Falange, remained in El Real de San Vicente while the rest of the bandera returned to San Román, where it spent the night. At nine o’clock on the night of September 18 the bandera was recalled to Talavera de la Reina, where it provided security for the next two days.42 While the Fourth Bandera was having an easy time in Hinojosa and El Real de San Vicente on September 17, the Fifth Bandera also rested that morning. In the afternoon Captain Carlos Tiede traveled via the Madrid road to search for a suitable site for the Fifth Bandera to bivouac in the area of kilometer marker 96 (sixty miles). At ten o’clock that night the bandera departed aboard trucks and accompanied by an artillery battery for the area of kilometer marker 96. There the unit set up its nightly security detail and bivouacked for the night.43 The Fifth Bandera remained at kilometer marker 96 on September 18, and all was quiet until around eleven o’clock that morning when a forward observation post came under attack by a group of Republicans who opened fire, killing one legionnaire and wounding another at the cost of three wounded on their side. At six o’clock in the evening it was decided to move the bandera’s bivouac location about two-thirds of a mile toward Madrid to kilometer marker 95 while spending the night in a torrential downpour. The bandera remained at this location the following day, Sep- tember 19.44 Since the start of the month the Nationalists had advanced toward their goal of reaching Madrid as quickly as possible by sweeping through September 1936 | 113 the villages of Marrupe, San Román de los Montes, El Real de San Vicen- te, Pelahustán, Los Cerralbos, and El Casar de Escalona. Now they were only about sixty miles from Madrid.45 With this zone under Nationalist control, the Madrid Column now prepared for its next major offensive, the capture of Santa Olalla and Maqueda, which began on September 20 with Castejón’s column departing from El Bravo, Asensio’s from Otero, and Barrón’s from El Casar de Escalona. That day the Fourth Bandera was instructed to be ready to depart at any time. When the order came, it was decided that a company of fusiliers, in this case the Sixteenth Company, would leave Talavera de la Reina for El Bravo. On the same day the Fifth Bandera set out at 4:30 a.m. for El Bravo, where it joined the rest of Castejón’s column and began the journey toward Santa Olalla, serving as the reserves for the column. During the operation to capture Santa Olalla, the Fifth Bandera did not participate but was simply held in reserve. Nevertheless, it was equally subjected to intense rifle and artillery fire, as well as aerial bombardment, by the Re- publicans. Around two o’clock in the afternoon Castejón’s men entered Santa Olalla and shortly thereafter continued the march toward the next town, traveling along the right shoulder of the Madrid Highway. As the day was rapidly coming to an end, the bandera bivouacked in some olive groves, where at sunset it came under heavy artillery fire.46 Also on September 20, the First Bandera captured Santa Olalla shortly before four o’clock in the afternoon. The bandera encountered tenacious resistance from its Republican defenders, who were very reluctant to surrender. With Santa Olalla secured, the First Bandera joined the other units of the Legion and proceeded toward Maqueda.47 In order for the soldiers to advance toward Maqueda, Santa Olalla had to be defended from the possibility of a Republican counterattack. The mission of providing security fell upon the Fourth Bandera, which left Talavera de la Reina at ten o’clock on the night of September 21. This bandera—minus its Sixteenth Company, which had left the previous day—became part of a fourth column commanded by Lieutenant Colo- nel Delgado of the Regulares (Alhucemas No. 5). The Sixteenth Compa- ny joined up with the Fourth Bandera on the road between Talavera de la Reina and Santa Olalla. Once in Santa Olalla, the bandera spent the night there, providing security.48 In The Spanish Civil War, Paul Preston quotes New York Herald Tri- bune correspondent John Whitaker’s account of the execution of six 114 | September 1936 hundred captured militiamen by Yagüe’s soldiers in Santa Olalla on Sep- tember 21:

They were unloaded and herded together. They had the listless, exhausted, beaten look of troops who can no longer stand out against the pounding of German bombs. As they cluster together, Moorish troops set up two machine guns and, firing short lazy bursts, mowed down the prisoners.49 The capture of Santa Olalla had been relatively easy, but the column’s next objective, Maqueda, posed a greater challenge. Maqueda was the linchpin of the republic’s defensive strategy on the road to Madrid. The most modern fortification techniques had been employed in constructing its defenses, and it was considered to be impassable by the military engineers who had worked on it. The perimeters of the fortifications were protected by three lines of barbed wire, and great quantities of concrete had been used to construct parapets and machine-gun nests. In addition, numerous and well-distributed underground communication bunkers had been built. General Carlos Masquelet Lacaci personally oversaw the construction of these fortifications, and they had recently been inspected by the president of the republic, Manuel Azaña, who declared that the trench system and defensive positions were invulnerable.50 Unfortunately for the republic, the Legion was not informed of this. The Nationalists’ attack on the fortified town of Maqueda began at 5:30 a.m. on September 21 when the Fifth Bandera, as part of Castejón’s column, advanced along a side road. As the column approached Ma- queda, it came under Republican artillery fire. Atabor of the Regulares moved into the vanguard of the column and deployed for battle about two and a half miles from the town. The bandera, which had been in the second rank, moved up to catch up with the Regulares, and with the goal of surrounding the defenders’ fortifications about a mile south of the town, advanced on the right flank. Captain Tiede, commanding the Fifth Bandera, ordered the Eigh- teenth and Nineteenth Companies to extend their front lines and told the Machine-Gun Company to provide cover fire for the other two companies in order to counter the intense rifle and machine-gun fire coming from the Republicans. With determination and will, the two companies advanced so that by eleven o’clock that morning, the Eighteenth Compa- ny had occupied one of the defenders’ entrenchments and the Nineteenth Company had taken, by direct assault, a roadworkers’ shack that was occupied by the Republicans and located about a mile south of Maqueda. September 1936 | 115

Next the Nineteenth Company was ordered to cover the road to Torri- jos with a pair of machine guns; Torrijos was nine miles southeast of Ma- queda. The rest of the Fifth Bandera rested in an olive grove in the vicinity of the roadworkers’ shack. Suddenly an automobile and two trucks full of militiamen drove up and were met with a hailstorm of lead from the legionnaires. The militiamen were forced from their vehicles, and after a brief firefight they were beaten off, leaving behind their weapons and several dead comrades. At five o’clock that afternoon, thebandera was ordered to return to Santa Olalla. The march back was uneventful except for one intense bombing run by Republican planes. The legionnaires arrived in Santa Olalla at seven o’clock and spent the night there. One memorable event that happened that day was the shooting down of a Republican plane by the Legion’s machine guns. At the end of the day, the Fifth Bandera’s casualties numbered one dead and ten wounded.51 The Republicans refused to accept the loss of Maqueda and tried to regain it by sending several motorized columns, but each time they were repelled, with heavy losses, by the First and Fourth Banderas. While the First and Fourth Banderas were preoccupied with the defense of Maque- da, the Fifth Bandera was on the offensive on September 22. At three o’clock in the afternoon it departed via a side road for Alcabón, a village halfway between Santa Olalla and Torrijos. No resistance or opposition was encountered in Alcabón, and the bandera decided to rest there before proceeding at six o’clock, again via a side road, for Torrijos. With the Nineteenth Company in the vanguard, the Fifth Bandera advanced as far as the railroad tracks and continued along the right side of the tracks toward the village. As it neared the village, the bandera came under heavy rifle fire from the defenders. The men of a platoon from the vanguard unit hurled themselves at the defenders’ positions and overcame the defenders while inflicting numerous casualties. Still defiant, the -Re publicans unleashed intense machine-gun and rifle fire at the Nineteenth Company. Undeterred, the company entered Torrijos along with a platoon from the Seventeenth Company, which provided security on the road to Gerindote while another platoon moved toward the road to Toledo to cut it off. All this was taking place while the Republicans who had been defending Torrijos fled for their lives in complete disarray. The defenders of Tor- rijos left behind more than one hundred dead, including three Republican army commanders, along with at least 150 rifles and 2 machine guns. At 116 | September 1936

4:30 p.m. the Fifth Bandera abandoned Torrijos and returned to Santa Olalla, where it spent the night.52 As the First, Fourth, and Fifth Banderas advanced toward Madrid, the Sixth Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Delgado’s column, was also in the fight. On September 18 the Sixth Bandera was transferred from Delgado’s column to Asensio’s column and took part in the capture of Alcabón and Val de Santo Domingo (located halfway between Maqueda and Torrijos); it was then united with the Fifth Bandera for the capture of Torrijos. The Fifth Bandera spent September 23 in Santa Olalla resting, cleaning weapons, and washing up.53 With its day of rest completed, on September 24 the Fifth Bandera departed Santa Olalla at 1:30 a.m. for Alcabón and Torrijos. Once it arrived at its destination, it spent the remainder of the day resting. On the same morning and also from Santa Olalla, the Fourth Bandera set out at five o’clock for Maqueda and arrived at six. Its mission was to provide security for the sector that included the roads from Ávila to Madrid and from Madrid to Torrijos. For the next two days the Republicans made several attempts to take back these roads. They launched both infantry and cavalry attacks while also subjecting the legionnaires to aerial and artillery bombardments.54 After the fall of Santa Olalla and Maqueda, the strategic goal of the Nationalists changed. Originally it had been to drive as quickly as possible toward Madrid so as to terminate the war; this is what General Mola had planned before the uprising. Franco now changed this plan and ordered his forces to advance toward Toledo in order to relieve the siege of the Alcázar that had begun on July 21. By September 20 the situation inside the Alcázar was getting desperate because food and water were nearly exhausted. During the previous two months the Republicans had thrown everything they could at the fortress, including aerial bombs, tear gas, underground mines, artillery, gasoline, hand grenades, and rifle fire. Even amplified insults and maledictions were fired back and forth between the attackers and the defenders. On September 21, Franco made the decision to relieve the siege in Toledo and to assign the Madrid Column to get the job done. Franco’s longtime friend and senior aviation advisor, General Alfre- do Kindelán, tried to convince Franco that diverting his forces to Tole- do might cost him the capture of Madrid and possibly the war. Franco September 1936 | 117 concurred with Kindelán but argued that relieving Colonel José Moscardó Ituarte and those in the Alcázar had spiritual and religious significance to Spaniards, as well as being a propaganda coup for the Nationalists. It was a political move that overrode a military and strategic one. It has also been argued that Franco relieved the Alcázar of Toledo in 1936 because of what he had personally witnessed after the Battle of An- nual disaster in the Rif War in July-August 1921, when Spanish soldiers were surrounded by Riffian tribesmen in Nador and Monte Arruit outside the Spanish presidio of Melilla. These men were not relieved, since there were only enough men to prevent the capture of Melilla, so those trapped in Nador and Monte Arruit were eventually forced to surrender and were butchered by the Riffians. General José Sanjurjo, the senior officer in Melilla, kept then Major Franco of the First Bandera of the Legion from leading a rescue party. Franco never forgot that.55 One man who strongly disagreed with Franco regarding the advance toward Toledo to relieve the Alcázar was Juan Yagüe, the commander of the Madrid Column. On September 21 he was temporarily relieved of his command by Asensio. When the Madrid Column reached the Guadarra- ma River on September 24, Yagüe was permanently replaced by General José Varela, who had just successfully finished up operations in Ronda. On that day, from his headquarters in Cáceres, Franco gave the official order to advance toward Toledo. Franco believed that it would take three days to capture Toledo and relieve the Alcázar. In reality it took an extra day to completely secure the city and eliminate all opposition. Yagüe’s dismissal as commander of the Madrid Column by Franco was said to have been for medical reasons.56 A major advance was planned for September 25, and the Fifth Bandera was in the thick of it. At three o’clock in the morning the bandera was in the second rank of the column that marched toward the bridge spanning the Guadarrama River. After passing through the village of Rielves, the column proceeded along the railroad tracks. The Eighteenth Company was ordered to advance to the railroad station in Villamiel de Toledo. No resistance was encountered upon reaching the train station, which was located just outside the village. A platoon from the Eighteenth Company was sent to occupy some hills to the east of Villamiel de Toledo that would provide cover for the tabor of the Regulares that was tasked with taking the village. The railroad line to and from the village was cut, and the Regulares easily entered 118 | September 1936

Villamiel de Toledo. The bandera then deployed along the Guadarrama River in support of the first line of attack and served as a reserve unit at the personal orders of Lieutenant Colonel Asensio, the senior commander on the scene. The bandera was spread out on barren terrain, which made for a difficult day because the location was bombed several times by Republican aircraft and shelled by Republican artillery. Nevertheless, at about one o’clock in the afternoon the first line of the column crossed the Guadarrama River, and at three o’clock the bandera moved up in preparation for crossing. The legionnaires sought cover from Republican planes by taking shelter in and around the bridge spanning the river. As the sun was setting the bandera crossed the river and spent the night there. Five soldiers from a battalion of the Argel Regiment, which was attached to the bandera, were wounded.57 While the Fifth Bandera was on the offensive, the Fourth Bandera was moved up to support it and to provide security in the areas that were now in the rear. At six o’clock in the evening on September 26 the Fourth Bandera set out for Torrijos. It arrived at seven o’clock and set up camp for the night. Its Eleventh Company was assigned to provide security for a convoy headed for the Guadarrama River front.58 The following day the Tenth and Eleventh Companies were still in Torrijos providing security, while the Sixteenth Company marched off to Rielves.59 For the Fourth Bandera the remainder of September brought light duty. On September 28 it was relieved of its security detail in Torrijos by the Argel Regiment’s Infantry, while the Tenth Company was sent to guard the bridge spanning the Guadarrama River and the Sixteenth Company which had been in Rielves, returned to Torrijos. During the next two days the Fourth Bandera was in Torrijos learning tactics and practicing parade marching.60 At four o’clock in the morning on September 26 Captain Tiede, the acting commander of the Fifth Bandera, was ordered to send one of his companies down the road to Toledo to provide protection for an artillery battery that had advanced too far. Captain Tiede sent the Seventeenth Company to carry out the mission. At 08:30 a.m. the remainder of the bandera was ordered to depart for Bargas, where it would come under the command of Major Ben Mizzián of the Regulares. Bargas, about four miles north of Toledo, was the key to the city’s defense; the capture of Bargas would seal Toledo’s fate.61 The Fifth Ban- dera, minus its Seventeenth Company, arrived at Ben Mizzán’s command September 1936 | 119 post in Bargas at around eleven o’clock that morning, and Ben Mizzán placed the legionnaires in his reserves. Bargas and the surrounding hills were occupied by the Republicans, who could also count on an artillery battery. Shortly thereafter two Nationalist batteries arrived on the scene to provide fire support for the attack that was about to take place. At three o’clock that afternoon the attack on Bargas began, with the Sixth Bandera advancing on the right flank and the Regulares of Tetuán on the left flank; the Fifth Bandera was kept in reserve. As the front line of the two attacking units neared Bargas, Captain Tiede observed that a sizable gap was developing between the two, so he ordered his Nine- teenth Company to quickly fill it and create a unified front line. The two Nationalist batteries were accurate and effective in their artillery fire at the two advancing units, which in turn enabled the Nationalists to easily enter Bargas at approximately four o’clock. The Fifth Bandera, which had primarily served in a secondary role, had no casualties on this day. After the capture of Bargas, the Fifth Bandera was ordered to provide security for the village, and its legionnaires were posted to guard the roads to and from the railroad station as well as the main roads in and out of the village. The bandera spent the night in the nearby village of Olías del Rey, located a few miles to the east of Bargas.62 It was during mid-September that the Seventh and Eighth Banderas, which had been eliminated after the establishment of the Second Repub- lic in 1932, were reconstituted by Franco’s order of July 26, 1936. The Seventh Bandera (Valenzuela) was reconstituted in Talavera de la Reina, and the Eighth Bandera (Colón) was reconstituted in Taüima (Melilla, Spanish Morocco). The Seventh Bandera was created from veteran legionnaires who were discharged from the hospital and had previously belonged to Legion units already in Spain, as well as from men newly recruited in Talavera de la Reina, the site of the Legion’s main recruiting station. This system of organization allowed the creation of a battalion of men that combined combat veterans with raw recruits. Legion officers and NCOs from established banderas volunteered to serve in the newly created units. Both banderas were organized in the traditional three rifle and one machine-gun companies. The Seventh Bandera was composed of the Twenty-Fifth through Twenty-Eighth Companies under the command of Major Siro Alonso Rodríguez. By late September the Seventh Bandera was undergoing extensive military training in preparation for joining the 120 | September 1936 fight. The Eighth Bandera, under the command of Captain Manuel Sán- chez, started to come together in early September and was composed of the Twenty-Ninth through Thirty-Second Companies. Its first mission was to provide security at the hydroplane base at Atalayón, the concen- tration camp at Zeluán, and the airfield at Taüima.63 Ten days after being reconstituted, the Eighth Bandera, now under the command of Lieutenant Vicente Rojo López, relocated from Taüima to the Legion’s base at Targuist and then to the airfield outside Tetuán. On September 13 the legionnaires began to board the trimotor planes that would fly them across the Strait of Gibraltar to Jerez de la Frontera. From there the Bandera traveled by train to Seville, to Cáceres on September 15, to Oropesa a few days later. On September 25 Major Rafael Gallego Sáinz took command of the Eighth Bandera, and it boarded trucks for Santa Olalla. From there the legionnaires made their way to Maqueda, where they were given the responsibility of providing security for a series of trenches. For the remainder of September the Eighth Bandera provided security; during this time it accepted the surrender of seven Republicans who approached the bandera’s front lines under the protection of a white flag, and it was also heavily bombed by Republican aircraft, which caused seven casualties. The Eighth Bandera was assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Delgado’s column and was kept in Maqueda with the mission of securing the Madrid- Extremadura Road while the other columns focused their attention on relieving the siege of the Alcázar of Toledo.64 The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo

The operation for the relief of the Alcázar of Toledo began on Septem- ber 24 in the town of Torrijos with three columns crossing the Guadarra- ma Bridge and advancing along the railroad tracks from Madrid. Major Mohamed Ben Mizzián’s column took the left flank, Lieutenant Colo- nel Fernando Barrón’s column took the right flank, and Major Antonio Castejón’s column took the center. Castejón’s column sidestepped Rielves and marched through Villamiel de Toledo, encountering no resistance. The First Bandera, in the vanguard of Barrón’s column, had entered Rielves and at dawn assaulted the hamlet of Aranchete, which was defended by a company of Republican soldiers. The column captured the company’s captain, three other officers, three sergeants, and thirty other soldiers along with an abundance of war materiel and food. Barrón’s column pressed on toward Toledo until it caught sight of the Guadarrama River.1 Because of Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s fortuitous “illness,” Gen- eral José Varela took over command of the operation. This relief column was now called the Agrupación de Columnas de Vanguardia, or Group of Vanguard Columns, and was composed of four columns under the following commanders: Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio (First Column and overall field commander), Barrón (Second Column), Lieutenant Col- onel Francisco Delgado (Third Column), and Castejón (Fourth Column). Like Varela, the first three commanders were from the Regulares; only Castejón was from the Legion. Stretched out along the bank of the Guadarrama River, the columns deployed on September 25. Asensio kept the Fifth Bandera as his reserves, and the operation began at one o’clock in the afternoon. With the first

121 122 | The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo battle line safely across the river, he stationed the bandera on a farm close to the bridge spanning the river. Meanwhile, the First Bandera occupied various heights that overlooked the left bank of the river. General Varela had this bandera under his personal command and placed it on a hilltop that dominated the entire battlefield and was about thirteen hundred yards from a house the Republicans had fortified and occupied. At two o’clock thebandera’s Machine-Gun Company poured murderous gunfire into the house, causing its defenders to flee for their lives. The three hundred or so Republican defenders, clad in blue jumpsuits belonged to two Assault Guard companies. Many of them did not survive the onslaught.2 The Sixth Bandera now joined the fight, and it did so as part of Ben Mizzián’s column. After attacking the bridge spanning the Guadarrama River, the column was about a mile from Bargas. Varela arrived at the bridge and set up his headquarters there, meeting with his column commanders to plan for the second phase of the operation: the capture of To- ledo. On September 26, while the First Bandera continued its operations along the Guadarrama River, the Fifth and Sixth Banderas resumed their advance toward Bargas. Before them were heights occupied by Republi- can forces. However, in their front lines there were some large gaps that were left unguarded. The Sixth Bandera advanced along the right flank while the Regulares of Tetuán advanced along the left. Exploiting these gaps, the legionnaires successfully entered Bargas at four o’clock in the afternoon. The going was not so easy for Major Ben Mizzián, who advanced along the left flank. The Republicans put up a spirited defense, which was weakened only by the Nationalists’ use of air and artillery bombardment. Barrón’s column advanced along the right flank. After fording the Guadarrama River, his column proceeded along the Ávila-Toledo road, where it ran into governmental forces that occupied the heights overlooking the road. Contact between the two opposing forces led to an artillery duel that ended when the Republicans ceased firing and withdrew their guns so they would not be captured by the Nationalists. Realizing that the easi- est entry point to Toledo was via the Ávila-Toledo road, the Republican defenders constructed their strongest redoubts there. Barrón’s column was tasked with pinning down the defenders on the Ávila-Toledo road while Ben Mizzián maneuvered his column from Bargas. In the vanguard of Ben Mizzán’s column were the Fifth Bandera, under the command The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo | 123 of Captain Carlos Tiede, and a tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán, commanded by Major Antonio del Oro.3 As the sun came up on September 27, Major Ben Mizzán’s forces de- tected a squad of well-equipped motorcyclists coming toward them on the Madrid road. Ben Mizzán was instructed to engage them, so he deployed his forces in a semicircle, which allowed them to advance into his center while his flanks closed in from the sides. When the trap was sprung, the motorcyclists were ensnared and forced to surrender; about a hundred new motorcycles were now in the hands of the Nationalists. At 07:30 a.m. the general attack on Toledo began, with the Regulares of Tetuán deploying on the left and the Fifth Bandera deploying on the right, using the main road into the city as its axis. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Companies of the Fifth Bandera were in the vanguard of the advance. After marching about a mile toward Toledo, the advancing column encountered resistance. The legionnaires set up their machine guns to provide cover fire for the vanguard companies to attack one Republi- can position after another. The Seventeenth Company reached the city’s cemetery at eleven o’clock in the morning and took it while capturing four machine guns and killing several well-armed defenders. The Eighteenth Company was reassigned to the rearguard as it prepared to advance across open terrain that at the time was devoid of defenders. From the cemetery the legionnaires could see for 875 yards down Torrijos Road and thus observed, at around noon, a large Republican column falling back toward Toledo on the road while being hotly pursued by the legionnaires coming from the right. The Le- gion’s machine guns ripped into those who tried to escape into the fields surrounding Toledo, causing many Republican casualties.4 Toledo’s bullring, north of the Alcázar and next to the hospital, posed a nearly insurmountable obstacle for the attackers as the Seventeenth Company found out, in its repeated failed attempts to fight its way in. Securing the bullring was the primary objective, so two platoons from the Eighteenth Company, under the command of Lieutenant Francisco de Miguel, were assigned to reinforce the Seventeenth Company, and together they were able to occupy some houses that surrounded the bullring. The attackers finally entered the bullring by pouring through a wide breach in its perimeter and slaying those who resisted. Without stopping, the men of the Fifth Bandera moved on to the day’s secondary objective, which was capturing the school for orphans. The school, a well-built edifice, was about fifty-five yards from the bullring 124 | The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo and occupied by hundreds of government troops. As with the bullring, the first attempts to break into the orphanage proved fruitless, so the acting commander of the Fifth Bandera, Captain Tiede, organized a special building assault team composed of grenadiers and two squads of riflemen. The plan was that the grenadiers would toss their grenades through the windows of the ground floor; the subsequent explosion and smoke would then allow the two rifle squads to crawl in through the windows and eliminate those inside. Two wings of the school were cleared of defenders in this manner, as were the ground floor and the first floor. More than 550 prisoners were taken, and the rest were killed.5 The third objective of the day was the Tavera Hospital, which was separated from the school for orphans by a narrow alleyway. The hospital was also occupied by Republican forces, but they lacked the tenacious resistance encountered in the first two objectives. A group of legionnaires was able to work its way inside one of the inner patios without firing a single shot. However, it was being drawn into an ambush. Once inside the patio, the legionnaires began to receive hostile fire from three directions. Their casualties mounted, and they were unable to occupy the rest of the building.

Legionnaires entering Toledo The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo | 125

At around five o’clock in the afternoon General Varela, the commander of the Madrid Column, met with Captain Tiede to assess the situation thus far and to report on the Republicans’ defenses and resistance. Varela ordered that the Fifth Bandera use the protection and cover provided by the bullring and from there advance into the heart of the city by moving to the left of the Covachuelas neighborhood. This operation was carried out by the Fifth Bandera as the day was coming to an end. Moving in single file, the legionnaires advanced toward the Miradero. In order to get to the road that led to the Miradero, a wall nearly ten feet high had to be scaled. One man at a time went over the wall, including the entire Machine-Gun Company with its guns and ammunition. The bandera concentrated itself on the road, and at eight o’clock that night it set out for the Alcántara Bridge, which spanned the Tagus Riv- er. From the bridge the legionnaires slowly worked their way to the left (westward) so as to reach the Alcázar, or what remained of it. By the time the Nationalists arrived in Toledo, the Alcázar was in ruins, especially its northern and western facades, which had been demolished by artillery and/or subterranean mining. Asturian miners, experts in the use of dynamite and explosives, were brought to Toledo to undermine the walls of the citadel. Operating in total darkness, the legionnaires came under intense rifle fire from all four corners overlooking the Alcázar. As they neared the Alcázar, the legionnaires realized that its defenders might mistake them for government forces and open fire, so they decided to form a reconnaissance squad that would make contact with the Alcázar’s front sentries. It was also imperative to instruct those besieged within the Alcázar to refrain from displaying any sort of celebration or audible jubilation so as to deny the Republicans that bit of information. The Alcázar de Toledo was captured after being besieged for more than two months (July 21 to September 27). That evening the Fifth Bandera, which had suffered eight dead and twenty-six wounded in the operation, spent the night inside the Alcázar. Meanwile, the Republican troops in Toledo, or at least those that could, fled for their lives toward Aranjuez.6 As the Fifth Bandera was fighting its way into Toledo, the First Ban- dera, in the vanguard of Barrón’s column, accomplished all its objectives for the day (September 27) and spent the night on the Cadets’ Sports Field just outside Toledo’s center. The Sixth Bandera was ordered to remain in Bargas to provide security for those advancing into Toledo.7 126 | The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo

On September 28 the First Bandera entered Toledo in the vanguard of its column through the Cambrón Gate. The attackers came under heavy rifle fire by government forces from rooftops and windows. Having surrounded and gotten past the Cambrón Gate, the legionnaires proceeded toward the center of the city, the Plaza de Zocodover. Before the advance toward the center of Toledo, the First Bandera and the Second Tabor of the Regulares of Melilla had captured the Toledo Arms Factory and the surrounding farmland. In addition to ammunition, Spanish-made swords and bayonets were manufactured in Toledo.8 On the same day at 5:30 a.m. the Fifth Bandera organized itself inside the Alcázar for the day’s objectives. It marched out the south, or main, gate of the demolished building toward the San Martín Bridge only to be fiercely shot at by government forces that occupied the nearby Marist School. The primary objective for the legionnaires was to dislodge the defenders of the Marist School, who were determined to resist at all cost. In order to take the building, the bandera’s companies surrounded the entire city block where the school was located. In an attempt to avoid un- necessary bloodshed, an envoy was sent to obtain the surrender of those occupying the school, but it was rejected. The commanders of the bandera decided on a frontal assault against the school and initiated it by hurling the contents of a can of gasoline at the entrance and setting it on fire. As the front of the building burst into flames, its defenders tried to escape, but all were killed. With the Marist School secured, the next objective was the mental hospital, which was also taken by storm, although it was less stubbornly defended. The Republicans had used the mental hospital as a jail for pro- Nationalists, and now its captives were freed. At around noon the Eigh- teenth Company of the Fifth Bandera advanced toward the San Martín Bridge and the Cambrón Gate. Although the First Bandera had already surrounded the Cambrón Gate, government forces still occupied its two upper floors. A platoon from the Eighteenth Company seized the gate’s ground floor by frontal assault as a Legion machine-gun platoon opened fire on those trying to escape across the San Martín Bridge. The men defending the gate were tenacious in maintaining control of it, employing light machine guns and hand grenades to keep the legionnaires at bay. Several unsuccessful attempts were made by the legionnaires to enter the gate through the ground floor. As in previous assaults, the legionnaires resorted to throwing gasoline and a lit match into the gate’s entryway, The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo | 127 setting it ablaze. The defenders moved back deeper into the stone building where the flames and the hand grenades tossed by the legionnaires could not reach them while continuing to fire their light machine guns at the opening. The fight lasted for hours as the legionnaires continued hurling gasoline into the building, hoping to burn its defenders out. The continuous pressure applied by the legionnaires began to take a toll on the defenders, and their casualties mounted, yet they continued to resist. The commander of the Fifth Bandera sent a message to Major Ben Mizzián asking him to send a cannon in order to blast the defenders out of the structure. By around 4:30 p.m. the cannon had not appeared, but it was no longer needed because the fire had started to take its toll. From the building’s second and third floors, Republicans engulfed in flames began jumping out the windows. The Cambrón Gate was now secured.9 In the hours after the capture of the Cambrón Gate, the other columns started to enter Toledo. The Republican defenders who safely managed to cross the Tagus River opened fire on Toledo with their 75-millimeter cannons. The Fifth Bandera came together in front of St. John the Baptist Church and was congratulated by General Varela and awarded the Mili- tary Medal (collectively). The bandera’s casualties had been significant, with the grave wounding of Lieutenant Miguel de León García Caballe- ro and the lesser wounding of nine other legionnaires. Yet the battle for Toledo was not over. On September 29 the First Bandera surrounded the seminary, which was occupied by Republicans who set it ablaze. It was taken early on the morning of September 30.10 The capture of Toledo was costly for the republic, which suffered more than four hundred casualties and the capture of several hundred prisoners. In addition, more than twenty cannons, thousands of rifles, hundreds of crates of ammunition, dozens of machine guns, many hand grenades, flamethrowers, aerial bombs, and a large stockpile of stores and winter clothing were lost.11 Two memorable events took place after the fall of Toledo. One was the meeting on September 28 between the beleaguered commander of the Alcázar, Colonel José Moscardó Ituarte, and General Varela, in which Moscardó saluted Varela and tersely reported, “Without incident at the Alcázar, my General.” Moscardó reenacted the event the following day when he greeted General Franco and the news media. The other event that received media attention was the sanguinary comportment of the legionnaires and the Regulares once they entered the city. Since Republican 128 | The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo resistance had been stiff and determined, neither of the elite units had been in any mood to take many prisoners, so the streets ran with blood. It was reported that at San Juan Hospital doctors were murdered and patients killed in their beds with hand grenades and bayonets.12 The fall of the historical city of Toledo and its Alcázar to the Nation- alists received international attention in the press and newsreels and became a propaganda coup for Franco in his quest to become the supreme leader of the generals’ junta. Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe returned to the front at this time and met with Franco and his older brother and trusted confidant, Nicolás, at Franco’s headquarters in Cáceres, soon to be relocated to Salamanca. Yagüe and the Army of Africa supported Franco’s bid to become the head of the junta, as did General Alfredo Kindelán, Franco’s air force chief. Thus, the rapid advance of Nationalist armies in the south toward Madrid, the successful relief of the Alcázar, the backing by Yagüe and the Army of Africa, and the pivotal military support of It- aly and Germany made Franco the preeminent candidate. On September 28 the junta generals met at Salamanca’s airport and named Franco gen- eralíssimo of the Nationalist forces and head of state (caudillo).13 From his newly named General Headquarters of the Generalissimo in Salamanca, Franco began to reorganize his administration and its staff to supplant the previous junta as well as to elevate his status above that of all the other Nationalist generals. His propaganda office required that all official transmissions include a Spanish version of the Nazi slogan Ein reich, ein volk, ein führer—“One fatherland (patria), one state (estado), one leader (caudillo)”—with the fatherland being Spain and the leader being Franco. The Nationalist army was also reorganized: General Mola remained the commander of the Army of the North, the Army of Afri- ca became part of that force, and General Queipo de Llano became the commander of the Army of the South. General Varela’s forces, the Group of Vanguard Columns, were added to Mola’s army after Franco became supreme leader.14 From Toledo to Madrid October 1936

For Franco and the Nationalists, the capture of Madrid remained the overriding objective because it was the capital of the nation, and since it was located in Spain’s geographic center it was an essential marshaling point for men and war materiel. The bulk of the Army of Africa continued its advance to Madrid, employing six banderas (the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth) of Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s column, while the Second Bandera was on the Aragón Front and the Third Bandera was assigned to Asturias. At the start of October the Legion’s banderas assigned to the drive toward Madrid were deployed as follows: the First Bandera (Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Barrón’s column) was in Cigarral de Camarasa; the Fourth Bandera (Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Delgado’s column) was in Torrijos; the Fifth Bandera (Major Antonio Castejón’s column) and the Eight Bandera (Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella’s column) were in Toledo; and the Sixth Bandera (Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio’s column) was in Bargas. The Seventh Bandera remained in Talavera de la Reina undergoing military training.1 As previously noted, General José Varela’s forces, the Group of Van- guard Columns, had been assigned to the Army of the North and placed under General Mola’s command. In early October Varela’s column began an operation to improve the front line that stretched from the towns of Miajadas and Guadalupe (southwest of Talavera de la Reina) to Real de San Vicente (northeast of Talavera de la Reina), thus covering the entire flank of the Tagus River. Meanwhile, in the southern sector the Repub- licans tried to defend at all cost the town of Santa Cruz del Retamar by digging trenches and setting up machine-gun nests that were surrounded by two separate lines of barbed wire.2

129 130 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936

The Fifth Bandera was in Toledo on October 1 and still under the temporary command of Captain Carlos Tiede; the Seventeenth Company was led by Lieutenant Fernando Álvarez Pacheco, the Eighteenth Com- pany by Lieutenant Francisco de Miguel, the Nineteenth Company by Lieutenant Nicasio Montero, and the Twentieth Company by Captain Mariano Rubio de Castro. The bandera spent the day resting, washing, and cleaning its weapons. At four o’clock that afternoon the Eighteenth Company was sent on a reconnaissance mission beyond the railroad station and the Castle of San Servando; it returned at dusk having met no resistance. Also that afternoon the Fifth Bandera learned that it would become part of Asensio’s column.3 On October 2, the Fifth Bandera boarded trucks at 4:30 a.m. and headed for the Guadarrama Bridge. Upon arrival an hour and a half later, two rifle companies and a machine-gun squad went into action to provide security on the southern bank of the river while the rest of the bandera bivouacked in the environs of the bridge. On the same day, the Eleventh Company of the Fourth Bandera was ordered to provide security for the Twenty-Seventh Battalion of the Argel Regiment, which had been ordered to march from Torrijos to Toledo. At five o’clock that afternoon, the Sixteenth Company traveled by trucks to Maqueda to relieve other units of the bandera that had been providing security there. Two hours later the rest of the bandera arrived in Maqueda, also by truck. For the next three days (October 3–5) the bandera remained in Maqueda, where it exchanged sporadic gunfire with government troops that inflicted numerous casualties.4 The Sixth Bandera was in Bargas on October 1. It began operations on October 3, when it marched off toward the Guadarrama Bridge. It took part in the occupation of Huecas, Fuensalida, and Santa Cruz de Retam- ar; these villages were taken after intense combat with their defenders. With the mission successfully completed by October 3, the bandera departed for Villamiel, where it remained until October 14.5 On October 4 the Eighteenth Company of the Fifth Bandera departed at 5:30 in the morning to provide protection for Nationalist forces traveling on Toledo Road. On this date the Fifth Bandera also joined Castejón’s column. That afternoon the Fifth Bandera was replaced by the Fourth Bandera in being charged with protecting and securing Tole- do Road. At 5:30 p.m. the Fifth Bandera boarded trucks for the journey From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 131 to Santa Olalla, where it was incorporated into Castejón ‘s column in preparation for a major offensive. Thebandera spent the night and the next day in Santa Olalla, cleaning its weapons, washing, and instructing new recruits.6 On October 6 the march toward Madrid resumed in earnest. At six o’clock in the morning the Fourth Bandera, as part of Delgado’s column, set out from Maqueda to capture the village of Quismondo. The bandera was in the second echelon of the column, whose mission was to provide security and protection for the left flank of the Nationalist advance on the Maqueda–Quismondo–Santa Cruz del Retamar road. Quismondo was taken without incident, and the bandera’s Tenth Company advanced beyond the village, where it provided protection until ten o’clock that night, when it returned to Maqueda. From Quismondo the column pushed forward in a show of force to the Republicans’ lines. This was to facilitate the envelopment maneuver coming from the right flank by the Asensio and Barrón columns as they prepared for the capture of Santa Cruz del Retamar, which was accomplished with scant casualties. The bandera returned to Maqueda, where it provided security and protection until October 8.7 The Fifth Bandera likewise saw action on October 6; it set out from Santa Olalla at 4:30 in the morning and arrived at Maqueda at six. The bandera’s mission that day was to provide security and protection on the left flank for the other columns advancing on Santa Cruz del Retamar. The Eighteenth Company covered the road to Escalona with the support of a machine-gun platoon. The Nineteenth Company remained in reserve while the Seventeenth Company was charged with protecting two 155-millimeter gun batteries. The day ended peacefully, and the bandera spent the night in Maqueda.8 At eight o’clock in the morning on October 7 the Fifth Bandera began the march toward Escalona, north of Santa Olalla. On this day the Fifth Bandera was in the second line of Castejón’s column. Before reaching the Alberche River, the legionnaires observed in the distance that the Republicans had constructed fortifications. At approximately two and a half miles from Caserio de Villalta, a bitter firefight broke out, and the bandera employed machine guns to spray the entrance to the village with intense fire and pin down its defenders. To deal with the village’s fortifications, the column’s artillery was rolled into place and used to pulverize them. 132 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936

This in turn allowed a tabor of the Regulares to undertake an envelopment maneuver from the left flank while the Nineteenth Company attacked from the front. Realizing they were about to be surrounded, the defenders abandoned their positions and fled, and the Nineteenth Com- pany occupied Caserio de Villalta. Castejón ordered the entire bandera to regroup in Caserio de Villalta, provide security for the village, and prepare for followup operations. At about ten o’clock in the morning the advance resumed with a platoon from the Nineteenth Company and the entire Eighteenth Company in the vanguard, both moving on either side of the road. As the legionnaires reached the Alberche River they came under heavy rifle fire less than a mile from Escalona. The attacking column responded with artillery fire while a machine-gun platoon set up its machine guns and began to rake the opposing shore with bullets. The platoon from the Nineteenth Company, under the command of Lieutenant Vizán, crossed the bridge spanning the river while the Seventeenth Company carried out an envelopment maneuver to its left, wading across the river. Escalona’s defenders could not withstand the legionnaires’ determined attack on their positions and retreated. Lieutenant Vizán and his men crossed the river and found that all that remained for them to do was to eliminate the last defenders, who were holed up in the town’s castle. After a brief exchange of rifle fire, the defenders were eliminated and the town secured. The Republicans suffered seven dead, and sixteen rifles were seized as well as more than two hundred thousand rifle cartridges, half a dozen trucks, numerous automobiles, two fully equipped ambulances, and a large supply of invaluable gasoline. After a short rest period, the bandera, in the second line of the column, set out at one o’clock in the afternoon in pursuit of those who had fled for the village of Almorox, north of Escalona. The column arrived in Almorox at four o’clock without any resistance from Republicans. The Nineteenth Company provided security for the rest of the bandera and the column, which spent the night in Almorox. A Legion sergeant was wounded during the day’s operations. With the capture of Almorox, the last Republican outpost in the Sierra de San Vicente was eliminated.9 The Fourth Bandera, as part of Serrano’s column, climbed into its trucks at seven o’clock in the morning on October 8 and traveled from Maqueda to Almorox. After arriving in Almorox the column continued to its intended destination for the day, the town of San Martín de From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 133

Valdeiglesias, twelve and a half miles north of Almorox. While traveling on the Almoroz–San Martín road, and just before reaching Villa del Prado, the column was strongly attacked on its right flank and rear and suffered heavy casualties. The Tenth Company was ordered to protect the column’s rearguard, to employ its artillery battery, and to fend off the attackers. The company was able to climb the crests that overlooked the road and the positions where Republican militiamen had dug themselves in in the foothills of the Vértice Quijada. The militiamen’s positions were strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements, which in turn forced the bandera to reinforce the Tenth Com- pany with the Sixteenth Company. A hard-fought clash with the tenacious militiamen ended with the legionnaires using their favorite weapon: the bayonet. The militiamen were driven from the trenches, leaving behind fourteen dead, a few prisoners, and a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. In addition to collecting their weapons, the legionnaires captured their battle standard, which was that of the Espartero Battalion, part of the republic’s Army of the Levant. After this firefight the column proceeded to San Martín de Valdei- glesias, entered the town from the south, and, meeting light resistance, captured it with little effort. With the successful conclusion of the day’s operation, the Fourth Bandera departed for Escalona, where it spent the night providing security. It remained in Escalona until its next operation on October 14.10 Like the Fourth Bandera, the Fifth Bandera went into action on Oc- tober 8, marching at six o’clock in the morning from Almorox to San Martín de Valdeiglesias in the vanguard of its column. At 8:30 a.m., having advanced past the Cenicientos crossing, the Seventeenth Compa- ny, under the command of Lieutenant Álvarez, came into contact with Republican forces. After using their field guns to weaken the defenders, the legionnaires attacked from both the front and the right flank in an enveloping maneuver. The defenders did not stick around to take on the legionnaires but quickly retreated to the safety of nearby thick woods. The column’s advance continued, but now the bandera abandoned the main road and proceeded to advance along the right side of it in order to protect the right flank of Delgado’s column, which was the column authorized to march on the main road and tasked with the capture of San Martín de Valdeiglesias. The Fifth Bandera’s march along the right side of the road was uneventful, and it eventually reached and occupied a hill 134 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 less than two miles outside the town. From what the legionnaires could see from the hilltop, there was little noticeable movement in the town, which was defended by four to five hundred men. Using the previously employed tactic of pounding the Republicans’ defenses with artillery to crack the defenders’ morale, the column wheeled its cannons into position and began to fire on the town and its environs. At around two o’clock in the afternoon, Delgado’s column moved forward by way of the main road; this led the Fifth Bandera to move toward the eastern exit of the town so as to cut it off from the road to Madrid and allow the bandera to enter the town. Led by Lieutenant Montero, the Nineteenth Company was in the vanguard of the bandera. The broken terrain outside the town made advancement difficult, but the legionnaires reached the road that led to Madrid. The Nineteenth Company set up an ambush position with four machine guns. The remainder of the bandera crossed the road and entered the town, encountering no resistance. The Nineteenth Company captured a few trucks and automobiles, and a few dead defenders were found. After capturing the town, the bandera spent the night on site providing security.11 The next day, October 9, the Fifth Bandera continued to provide security for the town while also taking the morning off for a bit of rest. At around one o’clock the peace was broken when Republican forces launched an attack against the northern sector of the town. In a brief but violent exchange the attackers were repelled by non-Legion forces serving as reserve troops. Later that afternoon, a platoon from the Seventeenth Company, led by Lieutenant Santamaria was ordered to provide security on the hill south of town. The hill had been occupied by the bandera the previous day and used to launch the attack on the town. Although the town was now in Nationalist hands, the Republicans occupied the hill. The platoon was unsuccessful that afternoon in regaining control of the hill because the terrain between the town and the hill was greatly broken up and the sun had gone down. The bandera spent the night in San Martín de Valdeigle- sias, having suffered one sergeant wounded.12 The commander of the column assumed that Lieutenant Santamaria had occupied the hill the previous night and ordered the acting commander of the Fifth Bandera, Captain Tiede, to relieve him and his platoon on October 10. Tiede sent the Eighteenth Company, under the command of Lieutenant de Miguel, to relieve Santamaria. Between the town and the From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 135 hill de Miguel stumbled across Santamaria and his platoon and was told that the Republicans still occupied the hill. De Miguel sent a messenger back to San Martín de Valdeiglesias to inform Tiede of the situation, and Tiede in turn sent the Nineteenth Company to reinforce the other Legion forces. With one of the companies employing an enveloping maneuver, the legionnaires were able to drive the Republicans from the hill, but at the cost of three legionnaires killed and eight wounded. The Nineteenth Company remained occupying the hill while the rest returned to the town.13 With the Republicans on the run, the Nationalists continued to press forward toward Madrid with all due speed. The next phase of operations, scheduled for October 14–15, called for creating a semicircular front that would link up the following towns: Añover de Tajo, Illescas, Valmoja- do, and Chapinería–Robledo de Chavela. This front would run from the Tagus River to approximately six miles south of El Escorial.14 The Fourth Bandera was moving toward Madrid in conjunction with the Fifth Bandera, both within their respective columns. On October 14 the Fourth Bandera marched northward from Escalona to Almorox, where its column was to congregate in preparation for the following day’s major operation. The bandera reached Almorox that evening and settled in for the night. The following day the bandera set out at four o’clock in the morning in the vanguard of its column for the town of Villa del Pra- do, northeast of Almorox. The town was occupied without incident. At nine o’clock the column continued to travel northeast toward Aldea del Fresno. Almost two miles outside Aldea del Fresno the bandera diverted from the main road to Madrid and took the road to its left in the belief that the bridge spanning the Alberche River had been blown up by the Republicans. With this deviation from the projected path, the vanguard of the bandera proceeded along the left flank of the column to protect it from a possible Republican attack from the foothills of the Sierra de Guadarrama, which dominated the route. As the legionnaires had expected, the bridge across the Alberche River had been demolished, so under the cover of a platoon from the Machine-Gun Company, which had taken positions overlooking the crossing spot, the legionnaires crossed the river at a ford called Los Santos. Two rifle companies crossed first and were quickly followed by a platoon from the Machine-Gun Company. Soon the entire bandera was on the opposite bank of the river and advanced on Aldea del 136 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936

Fresno. The plan of attack was for the legionnaires to surround the town from the north and the east while also occupying a few hills that overlooked the town. The Tenth Company was the first to enter the town and was soon followed by the rest of the bandera. In order to provide security and protection, the legionnaires occupied the surrounding hills while the rest of the bandera spent the night inside the town.15 On October 14 the column that included the Fourth Bandera was geo- graphically closer to Madrid than the one that included the Fifth Bande- ra. At five o’clock in the morning the Fifth Bandera, in the vanguard of Castejón’s column, set out eastward from San Martín de Valdeiglesias for Pelayos de la Presa. The legionnaires marched along the right side of the road and over rough and hilly terrain, crossing the mountains that surrounded the town. The heights that surrounded the town were occupied by several companies of the Assault Guard who were well equipped and dug in. They resisted the legionnaires’ attacks with great tenacity, and the fight ended with both combatants engaged in hand-to- hand combat. The legionnaires defeated the Assault Guard, which suffered eighteen dead, many wounded, ten taken as prisoners, and the loss of a great quantity of rifles. Losses for thebandera were two killed and six wounded. While the bandera dealt with the Assault Guard outside the town, the remainder of Castejón’s column entered Pelayos de la Presa. That evening Castejón ordered the bandera to spend the night in town.16 After a few hours of much-needed rest, the column departed Pelayos de la Presa at 5:30 a.m. on October 15 for Navas del Rey, northeast of Pelay- os de la Presa on the road to Madrid. The Fifth Bandera marched on the right flank of the column and reached Navas del Rey without incident at around noon. The demolition of the bridge spanning the Alberche River forced the legionnaires to wade across the river in waist-high water. The Nationalists met only light resistance from government forces on the opposite side of the river; this was easily routed and put to flight. Castejón’s column continued in hot pursuit of the Republicans on the run, unwilling to give them any respite. Advancing over rough and broken terrain, the column entered the village of Chapinería at two o’clock without resistance. However, the fight was not completely over because the Republicans attempted several futile counterattacks in the hope of regaining the village. All they accomplished, however, was losing many men, either killed or wounded, and having ten of their soldiers taken From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 137 as prisoners. That evening the bandera spent the night on site providing security and resting.17 The Nationalist victories of October 14–15 sent the Republican government reeling, which in turn led it to order two counterattacks: one directed at Bargas, with the ultimate aim of recapturing Toledo, and the other at just-captured San Martín de Valdeiglesias. In the latter attempt, the Republicans achieved nothing but the loss of valuable soldiers and equipment. The Republicans energetically attacked, running into Bar- rón’s column, which was able to defeat each attempt to break through. The offensive against Bargas was more important to the government and included more men and materiel than the one aimed at San Martín de Valdeiglesias. The Republicans first hurled themselves against Bargas, north of Toledo, and then launched attacks all the way around to Los Cigarrales, across the Tagus River and southwest of Toledo. The environs of Toledo were threatened by this powerful offensive. This sector was defended by Tella’s column, which not only withstood the government’s attacks but was also able to go on the offensive on October 15 with the aid of the Eighth Bandera, which had been held in reserve. Its Twenty-Ninth Company took up position across the Tagus while the rest of the bandera dislodged the Republicans from their positions in Los Alijares, Cerro Cortado, and Ermita de la Guía after several hours of intense fighting that included taking one redoubt after the other by using hand grenades to dislodge the defenders. Unable to withstand the tremendous amount of fire they were receiving, the Republicans fled their positions, abandoning their numerous dead, weapons, and rations. Tole- do would remain in Nationalist hands.18 The Sixth Bandera, which had been inactive since October 3, went on the offensive again on October 14, when it took part in the capture of Valmojado as well as the nearby villages of Las Ventas de Retamosa and Casarrubios del Monte. In Las Ventas de Retamosa the Sixth Bandera engaged in an intense exchange of gunfire with well-entrenched Republi- cans, which left eighteen dead and twenty-six wounded defenders; a good amount of war materiel was also captured. At around 2:30 p.m. the Sixth Bandera moved on toward Casarrubi- os del Monte, where again it got into a heavy firefight with its defenders. After the capture of the village, all the members of the village’s Red Committee were rounded up and immediately shot. The Sixth Bandera remained in Casarrubios del Monte until October 21, providing security 138 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 and fighting off numerous counterattacks by much larger Republican forces, and then boarded trucks for the ride back to Valmojado.19 After a few days of consecutive movement and combat, the Fifth Ban- dera spent October 16 in Chapinería, resting, cleaning their weapons, and washing up. Coincidentally, also on October 16 the Second Republic established the Ejército Popular de la República, or the Popular Army. This reorganized the republic’s army by combining regular army troops with militias and introducing a Soviet-style war commissar to the ranks.20 This brief period of respite for the Fifth Bandera was broken on Octo- ber 17, when at 9:30 a.m. more than four thousand Republicans attacked Chapinería. The entire bandera rushed to defend its forward lines against the attackers, defending its positions throughout the day. By sundown the shooting had stopped. Two legionnaires were killed, fourteen were wounded, and Captain Mariano Rubio was bruised (“contuso”).21 While the Fifth Bandera was fighting off a Republican attack at Chap- inería on October 17, the Fourth Bandera was having a much easier day. Before it set out at one o’clock in the morning for Méntrida, it was replaced in Aldea del Fresno by a tabor from the Regulares of Ceuta. In turn, when the Fourth Bandera arrived in Méntrida, it relieved the Second and Third Tabors of the Regulares (Alhucemas No. 5) and remained in Méntrida to provide security.22 The following day the Fourth Bandera departed Méntrida at one o’clock in the afternoon for Aldea del Fresno, but it did not reach its destination because the high command decided to recall it back to Méntrida, where it spent the night and enjoyed a bit of rest until October 20.23 The Republicans refused to give up on regaining Chapinería. On the night of October 17–18 the Fifth Bandera’s front observation posts no- ticed increased activity on the other side, which led the commander to order that the entire bandera go on full alert in anticipation of an attack. The attack came at six o’clock in the morning, when six thousand Repub- lican militiamen, in a well-coordinated assault that flanked both sides of the bandera’s defensive position, were able to cut off the road that linked Navas del Rey and Aldea del Fresno. A tabor of the Regulares was assigned to protect the road and was stationed in Aldea del Fresno. The Republican attack was so powerful and determined that its envelopment wing was able to reach the outer edges of Chapinería’s cemetery on the outskirts of town. The legionnaires resisted with great tenacity, hoping to hold off a final assault by the Republicans on their position. From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 139

The bandera’s commander sent an urgent message by heliograph for reinforcements to the neighboring village of Aldea del Fresno, where the Reg- ulares was. A company from the tabor of the Regulares was dispatched to clear the Republicans from the road. While waiting for the arrival of the Regulares, the bandera continued to hold off the Republicans, who now began to decrease their rate of fire because of the efficacious cannon fire coming from the column’s battery. The Regulares’s reinforcements arrived and cleared the Republicans from the road. Thereupon the Republicans began to fall back to their starting positions while being pursued by the legionnaires, who now went on the offensive. The Republican dead and wounded quickly mounted, and six heavy machine guns and a great quantity of rifles were also lost. At dusk the Republicans disappeared, and the shooting ceased. The commander ordered heavy security and vigilance for the town and the surrounding sector that evening to prevent the possibility of any further attack. The Fifth Bandera suffered three dead and seventeen wounded, including the commander of the Eighteen Company, Lieutenant de Mi- guel.24 From October 19 to 31 the Fifth Bandera remained in Chapin- ería digging trenches and building parapets while beating off numerous desultory Republican attacks. The time was also spent resting, cleaning weapons, and washing.25 With Toledo firmly in Nationalist hands, General Varela pressed his attack toward Madrid. On October 15 Varela’s army, advancing on a twenty-five-mile front, pushed the Republicans back ten miles. Operating to the southeast of the other columns and northeast of Toledo, the First Bandera, as part of Barrón’s column, continued its drive toward Madrid. At daybreak on October 17 the column marched toward the villages of Olías del Rey, Cabañas de la Sagra, and Yuncler. The latter town was entered at dusk under heavy fire. The following day the column continued its advance toward Yuncos and captured it without difficulty. In short, the column continued to press its offensive with all deliberate speed. The Republican defenders in this sector were put to flight, leaving many dead behind along with a large quantity of war materiel. Nationalist commanders were awed by the amount of equipment the Republicans possessed but how poorly their units were organized and led. The only advantage for the units was the bravery that individual Repub- lican fighters demonstrated in these engagements. Nevertheless, personal courage was trumped every time by the military professionalism and 140 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 experienced combat leadership found in Franco’s columns. From Yuncos the column proceeded toward its next target: Illescas. This was an important juncture on the road halfway between Toledo and Madrid. It was captured by Barrón’s column, and just as quickly the Republicans tried feverishly to take it back, launching one failed attack after another until they were forced to abandon the effort with their morale crushed. Illescas fell so quickly to the Nationalists that when Prime Minister Francisco Largo Caballero called to speak with the government’s commanding officer there, he was shocked to hear General Varela himself on the other end of the line.26 On October 20, after the fall of Illescas, General Varela ordered a recti- fication of the front line that would link the towns of Villamanta, Naval- carnero, Griñón, and Valdemoro. Asensio’s column would bear the brunt of the fighting, with Delgado’s column in support, and both columns were under the command of Yagüe.27 The Republican government refused to accept the loss of Illescas and prepared a massive counterattack in the hope of regaining it at all cost, since it was situated at a crucial communications crossroads. Lieutenant Colonel Barrón defended Illescas with legionniaires and the Regulares; the Republican forces were under the overall command of General José Asensio Torrado with Colonel Ramiro Otal Navascués as his field commander. The attack against the Nationalists’ poorly improvised defenses began at daybreak on October 20, with the Republican force coming from Madrid aboard double-decker buses and divided into three columns with about five thousand men in each. The Republicans were well armed with automatic weapons, mortars, and plenty of artillery. The three Repub- lican column commanders were Majors Vicente Rojo Lluch (soon to be promoted to lieutenant colonel), Arturo Mena Roig, and a former legionnaire, Juan Modesto Guilloto. The fight raged day and night, without letting up, as the Republicans launched one assault after another. In the northern perimeter of the Nationalists’ trenches, the Republi- cans advanced up to 650 feet but could advance no farther. The commander of the First Bandera, Major Álvarez, set up his command post at Illescas’s crossroads to deal with an attack coming from any direction. Unable to break through from the north, the Republicans now tried from the left (west), using their armored train. The armored train repeatedly attempted to smash through, only to be repelled every time by the Le- gion’s artillery. From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 141

Later the Republicans turned their attention to the sector defended by the Sixth Tabor of the Regulares of Melilla, attacking it with tanks and armored trucks. As the assault increased against the Regulares, the legionnaires were pressed into action providing fire support and resupply- ing it with ammunition. On October 22 the Republicans increased their attacks, having been reinforced with more infantry, artillery, and armored trucks. The armored train and the armored trucks joined together and repeatedly attacked, only to be turned back with losses in both men and materiel. Around midday the Republican artillery opened fire on both flanks of the Nationalist lines, followed by two infantry assaults on the northern part of Illescas and a similar number of attacks on the train station; as before, all attacks were repelled. From the First Bandera, the Second and Thirteenth Companies distinguished themselves with their total disregard for their personal safety. They bravely sallied forth from their trenches to drive back the surprised Republicans who approached their trenches. The tide of battle turned against the Republicans when Colonel Mon- asterio’s cavalry and Tella’s column, rushing from Toledo, joined the fight and outflanked them. By dawn the following day, with their morale shattered and frustrated by their continued inability to recapture the town, the Republicans withdrew and abandoned any hope of regaining Illescas.28 The Fourth Bandera was still in Méntrida on October 20 providing security for the village. Also on that day the bandera marched back to Tala- vera de la Reina, the Legion’s main base, where recruitment and training took place and where its hospital was located. The bandera’s commander, José Vierna, was sick and recuperating at the hospital. While Major Vi- erna was out of combat, Captain Francisco Sáinz took command of the bandera. On October 21 the bandera left Méntrida and marched in the vanguard of the column for Navalcarnero. The bandera traveled on the left flank of the column in an observatory and protective role. Less than two miles west of Navalcarnero the legionnaires temporarily bypassed the town of Villamanta in order to occupy the strategic heights that overlooked it. Le- gionnaires from the Tenth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Companies deployed for battle and quickly came under intense gunfire from Republicans entrenched outside the town. However, while the town’s defenders were occupied exchanging gunfire with the legionnaires, they let their guard down, which allowed the Third 142 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936

Tabor of the Regulares (Alhucemas No. 5) to enter Villamanta and to drive them from the heights at 4:30 p.m. After the capture of Villamanta, the commander of the column ordered the Fourth Bandera to set out for Valmojado to escort the column’s artillery batteries. The bandera and the column’s artillery arrived in Valmojado at eight o’clock that evening and remained there, resting and rehabilitating, until October 24.29 On October 21 the Sixth Bandera climbed aboard trucks and traveled from Casarrubio del Monte to Valmojado to advance from there to Na- valcarnero. As soon as the legionnaires made contact with Republican forces defending Navalcarnero, the fight was on. After a bitterly fought battle, Navalcarnero was taken by the bandera, which remained there for the rest of the month to provide security and vigilance.30 Still in Valmojado on October 24, the Fourth Bandera was sharing security duties with the Second Tabor of the Regulares (Alhucemas No. 5). On this day the Tenth Company was tasked with escorting a food convoy to Villamanta. This was accomplished successfully in a few hours, and the Tenth Company was back in Valmojado by dusk. The situation remained the same, with the two military units in place. On October 26 it was the Eleventh Company’s turn to provide protection for a convoy transporting food and the wounded to Villamanta, and it returned to Valmojado at seven o’clock that evening. Two days later the Eleventh Company was against tasked with protecting a convoy carrying food to Villamanta and returned the same evening.31 Operating in the vanguard of Barrón’s column, the First Bandera captured the village of Cubas on October 25 after a brief skirmish. Keep- ing the momentum going, the column moved on toward its next target, Griñón, and captured it by midday. On October 28, Torrejón de la Calz- ada fell to Barrón’s column. The speed with which this column was advancing caught the Republicans off guard, and it took them a few days to mount a counterattack. They did so on October 29, at Griñón and Tor- rejón de la Calzada, employing roughly three thousand men in what was designated as the First Mixed Brigade and led by a Spanish communist, Enrique Líster Forján. It included infantry, artillery, and tanks. The goal of the Republicans was to recover what they had previously lost. Unable to make any headway against strong Nationalist defenses, however, the Republicans altered their battle plan and shifted their focus of attack toward Seseña and Esquivias in the hope of reaching the main road to Madrid to sever the Nationalists’ lines of communication. At From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 143 first the Nationalists were caught off guard by this move, but they were quickly able to organize an appropriate defense that stymied the attack. Once again, unable to make any headway against a stubborn Nationalist defense, the Republicans were compelled to fall back.32 The Nationalists were now less than twenty miles from Madrid. The engagement at Seseña and Esquivas on October 29 was historically significant because it was the first time in the war that tanks were used on such a large scale. On October 15, 1936, the Soviet ship Komsomol had docked in Cartagena with a delivery of fifty vehicles, both tanks and airplanes. At Seseña the Republicans deployed fifteen T-26 light infantry tanks under the command of Captain Paul Arman of the Red Army; the Soviets’ principal tank commander in Spain was Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Krivoshein. The T-26 was superior to the Nationalists’ Italian-made CV-33 tankette because the T-26 was armed with a 45-millimeter cannon whereas the CV-33 was armed with a single 6.5 x 52 millimeter machine gun. In addition, the T-26 possessed thicker armor plating. At Seseña the Soviets launched their tanks blitzkrieg-style, which quickly outran their infantry support. The battle pitted the Soviet tanks of the republic against Colonel Monasterio’s cavalry, which also included about a dozen Italian-made CV-33s. Although the Nationalists were caught off guard at first by the force of the 26T- tanks, they were able to recover because Lister’s infantry was unable to follow up the attack. Using relatively anemic Italian-made antitank guns and the more effective Molotov cocktails, the soldiers with the T-26s were forced to retreat for lack of infantry protection. The Soviets lost three of their fifteen tanks, and one of them was totally destroyed by a direct hit from a Spanish 75-millimeter field howitzer. The government reported the battle as a victory, but the reality was that it had failed to slow down the Nationalist juggernaut headed for the capital. However, one important consequence of the introduction of Soviet tanks was the response from Franco’s allies. On October 30 the Nazis proposed sending major reinforcements to the Nationalists to counter the Soviets’ contribution to the republic. On November 6 what came to be known as the Condor Legion set sail from Germany to Seville. It was under the command of German officers and included fighters, bombers, antitank and antiaircraft guns, light tanks armed with twin machine guns (Panzer Is), and communications and support personnel. The Condor 144 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936

Legion eventually numbered five thousand men and played a pivotal role in Franco’s ultimate victory.33 At ten o’clock on the night of October 29, the Fourth Bandera boarded trucks for the journey from Valmojado to Azana (Nueva Numancia), passing through Yuncos on the way. Azana was occupied without incident, and the bandera spent the night there guarding the train station. The following day the bandera was once again on the road, traveling by truck from Azana to Esquivias, which it reached at eleven o’clock that night. It remained there until the next day, October 31.34 The Eighth Bandera, which had remained in Toledo in a reserve role, was called into action on October 29. Under the command of Legion veteran Captain Daniel Regalado Rodríguez, the bandera set out as quickly as possible for Illescas, where the Republicans were attacking in great numbers. Traveling by truck, the Eighth Bandera sped to the rescue of those under assault. As soon as the bandera arrived at Illescas’s front lines, it manned the most frontal positions. The Thirtieth and Thirty- First Companies were sent to the very front of the line, where they engaged in a bitter firefight with the Republicans, while the Twenty-Ninth and Thirty-Second Companies advanced along the right flank to relieve a tabor of the Regulares that had been completely decimated. For the duration of the day and into the night, the Republicans’ two brigades, with their tremendous artillery and air support, continued to press their attack but were repeatedly beaten back. With the line at Illescas secured, the Eighth Bandera relocated northward to Torrejón de Velasco on October 30 to serve in the vanguard of a column advancing on the town of Parla. This column was composed of regular Nationalist army infantry and Falangist militiamen. Parla was occupied with minimal Republican resistance and with only three legionnaires wounded. Once the bandera had prepared defensive positions and dug in, the Republicans launched a counterattack with two infantry battalions and supported by eight tanks. The Thirtieth Company took the brunt of the attack, but it held fast, and the Republicans were compelled to retreat, leaving a trail of dead stretching from the front line all the way back to their starting point. The Eighth Bandera’s next objective was to partake in an operation to reach the line that linked Brunete, Villaviciosa de Odón, Móstoles, Fuenlabrada, and Pinto. These towns, from Brunete in the west to Pinto in the south, formed a quarter circle about twenty miles outside Madrid From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 | 145 and were captured, as planned, between October 30 and November 3. On November 2 Eighth Bandera left Parla and captured Pinto after encountering light resistance.35 The Seventh Bandera received its baptism of fire at nine o’clock in the morning on October 30 when the bandera entered the line at Torrejón de Velasco with the intention of relieving the Mejazníes del Rif.36 This was the indigenous force created by the Spanish government after the establishment of the protectorate to serve as the caliph’s bodyguards, ren- der ceremonial services, assist the Spanish Army in military operations, and function as a Moroccan police force. Its main battle formations were tabors (battalions) and mías (companies) and were composed of infantry and cavalry units. Officers could be either Spaniards or Moroccans, whereas the NCOs and enlisted men were Moroccans. At ten o’clock that night the Republicans launched a spirited attack on the town and the legionnaires in their advanced positions, subjecting both to intense shelling and infantry assaults accompanied by tanks. In their first clash with the Republicans, the men of the Seventh Bandera held firm and were able to turn back repeated attacks while inflicting heavy casualties. Even though the Republicans outnumbered them and possessed greater resources, the legionnaires continued to repel the incessant attacks all night long. Many Republicans were killed, and many others were taken as prisoners. In addition, a large quantity of war materiel was captured, but at the cost of two legionnaires killed and seven wounded. At sunrise October 31 the Seventh Bandera and the Mejazníes del Rif formed a column under the command of the bandera’s Major Siro Alonso and set out for Valdemoro. From the moment the column left Torrejón de Velasco, it was continuously harassed by the well-entrenched Republicans, who at first fell back in echelon but eventually ended up in a disorderly retreat. The first phase of the operation ended with the Sev- enth Bandera reaching the train station in Parla, where it joined up with the Eighth Bandera. From there the column continued to its final destination, barely encountering any resistance and successfully capturing Valdemoro. On this day the Seventh Bandera suffered the deaths of three of its men and the wounding of twenty-three.37 The Fourth Bandera also took part in the capture of Valdemoro as part of Lieutenant Colonel Delgado’s column in support of Colonel Monasterio’s cavalry squadrons. On October 31 the Fourth Bandera set 146 | From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936 out at around six o’clock in the morning from Esquivias for Valdemoro. Reaching a point called Casa de la Sierra, the bandera ran into elements from a Republican column advancing toward Seseña along its right flank. The Sixteenth Company company sprang into action in support of the column’s tanks while two cavalry squadrons joined the fight. The combination of Legion infantrymen, tanks, and cavalry was too much for the Republicans, who broke and ran after suffering numerous casualties; prisoners were also taken. The column continued its advance until it reached some high ground on the outskirts of Valdemoro. These heights were situated about two miles from the center of the town. Republican artillery fire began to rain down on Nationalist tanks and troops. The order was given for the Fourth Bandera to advance along with the tanks. The bandera’s Sixteenth Com- pany provided infantry protection for the tanks up to about two-thirds of a mile from the town. Caught up in the excitement of battle, the Fourth Bandera outpaced the slow-moving tanks along the right flank. The legionnaires and Monasterio’s cavalry squadrons occupied Valdemoro. In addition to capturing an important town only seventeen miles south of Madrid, the column also freed many Civil Guardsmen who had barricaded themselves in the Young Guards School, and it captured two field pieces and a tremendous amount of war materiel. The Fourth Bandera remained in Valdemoro until nine o’clock that night, when it boarded trucks for the trip back to Villamanta.38 The Madrid Front November 1936

On November 1, 1936, the Nationalist drive toward Madrid was in full gear, with the prize of capturing the capital in sight. The First Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Barrón’s column, took part in the drive to capture Humanes de Madrid, southwest of Madrid.1 On November 1 the Fourth Bandera arrived in Villamanta from Valde- moro at four o’clock in the morning. From Villamanta it then set out for Villamantilla and captured the town without encountering any resistance. The bandera continued its advance toward Villanueva de Perales and took it, again without meeting any resistance from government forces. From Villanueva de Perales the Fourth Bandera moved toward Brunete, west of Madrid. It reached the Madrid–Chapinería–San Martín Valdeiglesias crossroads and proceeded into Brunete, which had already been occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio’s column. The Fourth Bandera provided security for Brunete and enjoyed a couple of days off for rest and recuperation.2 Under the command of Captain Carlos Tiede, the Fifth Bandera was reviewed and inspected on November 1 by the recently promoted Lieu- tenant Colonel Antonio Castejón in Chapinería, a village about thirty miles from Madrid. At five o’clock in the morning the Fifth Bandera, as part of Castejón’s column, began its march toward Brunete, but upon reaching the intersection of the roads to Brunete and Villamantilla, it ran into another Nationalist column (Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Delga- do’s column, which included the Fourth Bandera) headed for Brunete, so it diverted to Villamantilla, where it spent the night. The following day it left at daybreak for Sevilla la Nueva, south of Brunete; it arrived seven hours later and spent the night there.3

147 148 | The Madrid Front, November 1936

The Sixth Bandera, as part of Asensio’s column, departed Navalcarne- ro on November 1 at ten o’clock in the morning. The day’s mission called for the occupation of Sevilla la Nueva and Brunete. The occupation of the former was accomplished without resistance, but the situation was quite the opposite in the latter. The Republicans in Brunete put up a stiff resistance, fighting hand–to–hand combat in some cases, but were eventually defeated by the legionnaires. Many prisoners were taken as well as great quantities of weapons and materiel. However, the Sixth Bandera paid a heavy toll in the fight for Brunete, suffering twenty–five dead or wounded. The Sixth Bandera remained in Brunete until November 3, successfully repelling numerous counterattacks by Republicans who were hoping to regain control of the town.4 For the Eighth Bandera November 1 began with an attack on its forces coming from the hills to the southeast of Parla. The Republicans deployed eight Soviet tanks with two battalions of foreigners and various companies of the Assault Guard. The Thirtieth Company of the Eighth Bandera was in charge of defending that sector and suffered some difficult moments as it engaged the advancing Republicans. Fortunately, at the crucial moment that the Republicans pressed their attack, the Thirtieth Company received reinforcements that were sufficient to blunt the Republicans’ assault. The following day the Eighth Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella’s column, left Parla for Pinto and captured it after engaging in a brief firefight with the town’s defenders. The International Brigades had just arrived in Spain and were training in Albacete. They first went into battle on November 8–9, a week after this encounter. Prorepublic volunteers from Europe had already arrived in Spain and were fighting alongside the militiamen against the Nationalists. The first contingent of U.S. volunteers for the International Brigades set sail aboard the SS Normandie from the port of New York on December 25, 1936.5 At five o’clock in the morning on November 3 the Fifth Bandera—in the vanguard of the column, with a tabor from the Regulares of Tetuán on its right flank, and with atabor from the Regulares of Ceuta in reserve— began to assemble with other units on the outskirts of Sevilla la Nueva and close to the road that led to the village of Villaviciosa de Odón. The village was well defended by trenches, and the Republicans had blown up the bridge that spanned the Guadarrama River. Crossing the river, the legionnaires and the Regulares attacked from the front and the right flank, thus catching the defenders from the rear. The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 149

After an intense exchange of gunfire, which ended with a bayonet charge by the legionnaires, the defenders ran for their lives toward Boa- dilla. This encounter cost the Republicans numerous casualties as well as a great quantity of war materiel. At sundown the Republicans attempted to regain control of the village but were decisively driven off that night. The capture and subsequent defense of Villaviciosa de Odón cost the Fifth Bandera six wounded.6 On November 3 the Sixth Bandera, as part of Asensio’s column, left for Móstoles, captured it, and then proceeded toward Alcorcón, which was also occupied. The Bandera remained in Alcorcón to provide security for the village for the next three days. The southern suburbs of Madrid were now under siege.7 The Seventh Bandera was providing security for the town of Valdemoro on November 3. At sunrise the Republicans attacked in full force, employing several infantry battalions, artillery, and armored fighting vehicles. The battle raged for six hours, with each assault decisively rebuffed. During the battle an armored train bringing reinforcements made an appearance, which elevated the morale of the attackers. During the late afternoon, the legionnaires left their defensive positions and launched an infantry assault that caught the Republicans by surprise and put them to panicked flight. The Republicans failed to retake the town and left behind many dead as well as two armored cars. In addition, the armored train was attacked and destroyed with Molotov cocktails and hand grenades. For this successful defense of Valdemoro, the Seventh Bandera received great praise and recognition from its superiors.8 The First Bandera marched from Fuenlabrada toward Leganés on No- vember 4. This time the town’s Republican defenders were well dug in, having built trenches, machine-gun nests, barbed-wire entanglements, and other obstacles. With feints aimed at both flanks of the Republicans’ defenses, the bandera’s companies deployed for battle, and one company made a successful frontal assault on the trenches. This carried the day for the Nationalists, for the path was now wide open for the taking of Leganés. In Leganés the First Bandera was now just nine miles from the heart of Madrid.9 With the First Bandera in control of Leganés, the Eighth Bandera made its way on November 4, in the vanguard of its column, from Pinto toward Getafe. Getafe was the cradle of Spanish aviation, where an airfield had been built in 1911. The fall of Getafe to the Nationalists would place 150 | The Madrid Front, November 1936

Nationalist aircraft just minutes from downtown Madrid, and the government was determined to hold it at all cost. As soon as the bandera advanced beyond a series of heights to the northeast of Parla, the Republicans opened fire with artillery and machine guns. The terrain between the legionnaires and Getafe was badly broken up, which made the going slow and dangerous for the advancing infantrymen. The Republicans, determined and well armed, had constructed numerous trenches that had to be cleared one by one. The legionnaires received fire from every direction, from behind garden walls and country homes. Once they reached the outskirts of Getafe, the legionnaires came into contact with tanks and an armored train. The armored train had pulled up on the flank of the bandera and started firing, which quickly inflicted numerous casualties. The armored train successfully held up the bandera’s advance and had to be taken out. The legionnaires dealt with the tanks and armored train by attacking them with mortars and hand grenades. Pressing their attack, the Eighth Bandera entered Getafe at nightfall. Once they were inside the town, some legionnaires carried out mopping- up operations—eliminating all remaining pockets of resistance—while others tended to the many wounded. The legionnaires set up camp for the night across from the town hall and provided security for it as well. The fight for Getafe had been brutal and the costs high for the Eighth Bande- ra. Its commander, Captain Daniel Regalado Rodríguez, was wounded as he led his men into Getafe, and nearly fifty others ended up on the casualty list.10 Also on November 4, the Fifth Bandera was in Villaviciosa de Odón, where it came under heavy attack by Republican forces using artillery, airplanes, and tanks in preparation for an infantry assault. Despite the intensity of the government’s preparation, the attack on the Fifth Bande- ra failed miserably, and the town remained in Nationalist hands. In this instance three legionnaires were wounded.11 By early November the republic’s allies were starting to come to its aid. Soviet ships were unloading tanks and planes in Cartagena and Bilbao, the Comintern had put out the call for volunteers to come to Spain to save the republic, and the call had been answered by thousands from around the world. The Soviet T–26 tanks had already gone into combat in Octo- ber and now, in early November, it was time for the Soviet planes to make their debut. On November 4 the newly arrived Polikarpov I–15 fighters The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 151

Legionnaires advancing on the Madrid front

(chatos, as they were called in Spain) and their Russian pilots were in the skies patrolling above Madrid. The employment of this superior fighter plane greatly elevated the morale of the people of Madrid, who saw the stubby biplanes successfully engaging Nationalist planes above the city. With a top speed of nearly 225 miles per hour and armed with four .30-caliber machine guns, on November 4 the highly maneuverable chatos shot down two Ju–52/3m bombers, forced another to crash-land, and shot down down two Fiat CR.32 fighters as well as a Heinkel. For the time being, the republic, with the I–15 and the monoplane I–16 (“Mos- ca”/“Rata”), held air superiority in the skies over Madrid.12 At dawn on November 5 the Fifth Bandera began its advance from Villaviciosa toward Alcorcón after having rebuffed a Republican attack the previous day. The bandera proceeded along the left flank of Alcorcón, southwest of Madrid, encountering no resistance. However, the situation drastically changed the next day when the Republicans unleashed a massive and determined infantry attack supported by a couple of Soviet tanks and artillery. After intense combat the Republicans were once again 152 | The Madrid Front, November 1936 defeated and sent scrambling, leaving behind a great quantity of weapons and three tanks. The bandera settled in for the night in the hills of a small mound known as the Polvorin de Retamares. Four men had been killed and fifty–eight had been wounded. Lieutenant Dimitri Ivanoff, one of the wounded, was born in Varna, Bulgaria, in 1900 and joined the Spanish Foreign Legion on October 17, 1920. He fought in the Rif War, where he ascended from the rank of legionnaire. Known for his brutality and cruelty toward Moroccan civilians in the protectorate, he was charged with the murder of newspaperman Luis Higón Rosell (aka Luis Serval) in Oviedo after the Asturian uprising of October 1934. Ivanoff claimed that his service pistol (an Astra 300) had been altered to fire automatically, had gone off when it fell to the ground, and had accidentally shot Serval six times. He was found guilty of Serval’s murder and sentenced to six months and one day in jail. Since he had been confined for that length of time before his trial, he was re- leased and allowed to rejoin the Fifth Bandera.13 While the Fifth Bandera was inching its way toward Madrid, the First Bandera was doing likewise on November 6. Under heavy artillery and tank fire from the Republicans, the bandera moved toward Carabanchel Alto on the outskirts of the capital. The First Bandera was a battle–hardened outfit that had fought continually since its arrival in Seville and was now at the gates of Madrid. The fight for Carabanchel Alto was a street- by-street affair, but in the end the neighborhood was secured for the Na- tionalists. More than a hundred prisoners, well armed and equipped, were captured after their trenches were breached.14 The Fourth Bandera was ready to move out of Móstoles on November 6 after the return the previous day of its commander, Major José Vierna, from sick leave. At one o’clock in the afternoon the bandera set off for Alcorcón and arrived at six o’clock. It occupied the town and prepared to support the advance of Castejón’s column, which was set to capture Retamares. The Fourth Bandera spent the night in Alcorcón, sleeping out in the open.15 The Sixth Bandera advanced toward Cuatro Vientos on November 6 with the goal of occupying Carabanchel. Cuatro Vientos, five miles southwest of Madrid, is the site of Spain’s oldest airport, which began as a military airfield and then became available to commercial aircraft as well. After bitter fighting, the Sixth Bandera and the First Bandera took control of Carabanchel. From there the Sixth Bandera moved on to Casa de Campo, west of central Madrid, which in earlier times had served as The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 153 a country estate and a hunting preserve for Spain’s monarchy. From there the bandera proceeded toward Puente de los Franceses, a railway viaduct spanning the Manzanares River. For the next few days the Sixth Bande- ra continued maneuvering itself into position, eventually arriving at and capturing the University of Madrid on November 17.16 Puente de los Franceses was very important, for it spanned the Man- zanares River and provided easy entry to Madrid. The defense of the bridge was assigned to Colonel Carlos Romero Giménez, a former africanista and now a Republican in command of the Fourth Mixed Brigade. After defending the bridge for days, on November 15 he was forced to blow it up to prevent Nationalist tanks from using it to gain access to Madrid. The tale of the defense of the bridge became a very popular song for the Republicans during the war. On November 6 the Eighth Bandera was on the move in the vanguard of its column when it captured the village of Villaverde Alto after heavy fighting against defenders who fought from trenches topped with barbed- wire entanglements.17 For the future course of the war, November 6 was a very significant date. With Nationalist troops poised at the gates of Madrid, General José Varela divulged his plan for its capture. He listed the major objectives for each of his five columns:

• Castejón’s column would secure the left, or northern, flank of the advancing force and would deploy from Campamen- to de Retamares, cross the Manzanares River via the New Bridge in order to establish itself at kilometer 3 of the Ma- drid–Irún road, and seize the Fundación del Amo (an H– shaped, multistoried building that housed university students on scholarship), Asilo de Santa Cristina (an almshouse), and the Hospital Clínico. • Asensio’s column would occupy buildings in the neighborhood of Rosales, the Paseo de Moret, and the streets of la Princesa and Marqués de Urquijo by way of Parque del Oeste. • Delgado’s column would occupy the Paseo de Rosales, Ferraz Street, and the Plaza de España. • Barrón’s column would enter Madrid by way of Carabanchel and advance toward the Segovia Bridge. • Tella’s column would attack toward the Toledo Bridge and thus secure the right, or southern, flank of the advancing force. 154 | The Madrid Front, November 1936

Hugh Thomas adds that Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s Madrid Column was assigned the capture of a few noteworthy buildings, such as the Model Prison and the Don Juan Barracks by Asensio’s column and the Montaña Barracks by Delgado’s column, which was also instructed to “bring the Royal Palace and the Gran Vía under fire.” Around this time General Emilio Mola told an English journalist that he had four columns attacking the city from outside and a fifth column made up of Nationalist sympathizers living in Madrid who would attack from within. This marked the entry of the expression fifth column into the English lexicon with this meaning. Mola’s comment led to massive paranoia and the death of hundreds, if not thousands, of political prisoners and others who were suspected of being antirepublic or not being enthusiastically prorepublic.18 With the Nationalist army on the western edges of downtown Madrid, the government was in panic mode even though Republican soldiers outnumbered the Nationalists two to one and the city was not surrounded and could receive supplies and reinforcements from the rest of Republi- can–controlled Spain. Nevertheless, the government of Largo Caballero decided on November 6 to abandon Madrid for Valencia, which meant the relocation of the majority of government ministers, politicians, documents, archives, and files. Political and military control of the capital was given to General José Miaja Menant, the commander of the Ma- drid Division. He set up the Junta de Defensa (Defense Council) composed of government troops, trade union militias, and members of the International Brigades. He and his very capable chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Vicente Rojo Lluch, were tasked with stopping General Varela’s assault on the city.19 After spending the night about a mile outside the village of Alcorcón, the Fourth Bandera began its day on November 7 preparing to join forces with Castejón’s column to take the Polvorín de Retamares. At six o’clock contact was made with the Republicans. The bandera’s Tenth and Elev- enth Companies linked up with Castejón’s column to form the right flank; the Twelfth and Sixteenth Companies, along with the administration staff, got into a stiff firefight with the Republicans on the left flank while trying to envelop them. The latter three units continued to battle the Republicans until nine o’clock, when they were relieved by two Fa- langist centurias. The Twelfth and Sixteenth Companies and the administration staff then advanced toward Retamares in order to join the rest of the column The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 155

N R i o 1. Puente de los Franceses M

a 2. Parque del Oeste n z 3. Plaza de España a n 4. Puente de Segovia a r 5. Puente de Toledo e

Aravaca

Pozuelo Cerro de Ciudad Garabitas Universitaria de Alarcón 1 Castejón 2 Húmera MADRID Casa de Asensio Campo 3 4 Delgado Serrano Campamento 5 Carabanchel

Retamares Barrón Usera R i o Tella M a n z a n a Alcorcón r Villaverde e s

Cerro de Assault on Madrid, November 1936 los Angeles Getafe Nationalist Column

024 Kilometers 024 Miles

Assault on Madrid, November 1936 and arrived there without incident. At four o’clock in the afternoon the column was again on the move, with the Fourth Bandera in the vanguard and with the Second Tabor of the Regulares of Alhucemas protecting its rear. Taking advantage of the ruggedness of the terrain, the column arrived in Cuatro Vientos at six o’clock and spent the night on site.20 As part of Castejón’s column, the Fifth Bandera was in the vanguard on November 7 as it advanced with the Fourth Bandera and its column toward the Polvorín de Retamares. Early in the morning and after a brief 156 | The Madrid Front, November 1936 artillery barrage, the Fifth Bandera moved out toward its target, which was very well fortified with concrete bunkers and surrounded by two rings of barbed-wire entanglements. Artillery fire rained down from both Republican and Nationalist guns. The Republicans numbered between eight and twelve thousand men, whereas Castejón had only fifteen hundred men under his command. On his left flank he had onetabor of the Regulares while another tabor and the Fifth Bandera were in the center. One of the Fifth Bandera’s companies captured the first line of trenches from the right flank just as four tanks approached from the left. The legionnaires attacked one of the tanks with hand grenades and put it out of action while Nationalist artillery kept the others at bay. The legionnaires reached the first ring of defense by frontal assault and moved on to the second ring and its trenches after cutting the barbed-wire entanglements. Having opened up a wide gap in the wire, the Seventeenth and Eigh- teenth Companies poured into the trenches and engaged the defenders in hand–to–hand combat. The battle was a bonanza for the Nationalists: many Republicans were killed or wounded and many prisoners were captured. In addition, a huge quantity of weapons and other war materiel was seized from the government’s arsenal. The Fifth Bandera suffered six killed and ten wounded. As night fell, Castejón was in possession of the Venta de la Rubia. During the night the Republicans tried unsuccessfully to regain control of the position they had just lost.21 The two banderas that were reconstituted for the war, the Seventh and Eighth, were also in action on November 7, advancing on Madrid from the south. The Seventh Bandera was with Colonel José Monasterio’s column as it captured Getafe, and the Eighth Bandera was involved in the attack on Villaverde, on Madrid’s outskirts. As the legionnaires were hurling themselves at the defenders’ trenches and enveloping the village from the left, their maneuver was blocked by the appearance of an armored train that arrived from the area of the cemetery and began to punish the attackers. The armored train was neutralized and the resistance of the defenders eliminated, so the legionnaires controlled nearly half of the village. How- ever, the fight was not over; the Republicans rushed reinforcements into Villaverde, and the legionnaires had to deal with this new force. This was successfully accomplished, and the newly arrived defenders were forced to retreat, leaving the legionnaires in control of Villaverde.22 General Mola planned for the attack on Madrid to commence on No- vember 8, with his primary assault coming by way of Casa de Campo, a The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 157 woodsy area that would provide cover for his Moroccan troops and avoid urban warfare. As fate would have it, on November 7 the Republicans were fortunate enough to capture Mola’s attack plans for Madrid when militiamen knocked out an Italian tankette and the plans were found on the body of a Nationalist officer. Now the Republicans knew that Mola’s main attack would come from Casa de Campo and not through Cara- banchel and Usera, which was merely a feint, and therefore they could plan accordingly. For the defense of Madrid, General Miaja had eight columns, about forty-two thousand men.23 On November 8 the First Bandera was assigned the mission of advancing by way of Carabanchel Bajo (Lower Carabanchel) and securing the neighborhood up to the cross street that led to the military hospital. Supporting the bandera were four light tanks and two antitank guns. The objective was accomplished, and the path was now open for the attack on the military hospital. This attack was going to be difficult because the hospital’s defenders were many, well armed, and prepared to resist. As soon as the legionnaires came within range, they were greeted with a hail of gunfire. Major José Álvarez, the commander of the First Bandera, deployed one company to secure City Hall Plaza while the other three companies attacked the military hospital. Advancing methodically and seizing one wing of the hospital after another while employing bayonets and hand grenades to do so, the legionnaires engaged its determined defenders in hard–fought combat. The assault on the hospital started early in the morning and was over by 4:30 p.m. with the bandera in complete control of the hospital. In the process, the legionnaires inflicted many casualties on the Republicans and took a large number of prisoners.24 At noon on November 8 the Fourth Bandera, as part of Delgado’s column, set out from Cuatro Vientos for Casa de Campo. This time the Third Tabor of the Regulares of Alhucemas was in the vanguard of the column, whose mission was the occupation of the Batán Gate, the entrance to Casa de Campo. Casa de Campo was well defended, with trenches and other fortifications manned by hundreds of Republicans who anxiously awaited the arrival of the Nationalists. As soon as Delgado’s column began its advance, the Republicans unleashed a firestorm of artillery and machine-gun fire that came at the legionnaires from hills and houses located on the right flank of Extremad- ura Road. The attackers were caught in the open, with no possibility of cover, taking enfilading fire from the right. The Regulares of Alhucemas, 158 | The Madrid Front, November 1936 which was in the vanguard of the column, put an end to the shooting coming from the right by clearing out the entrenchments. The men of the Fourth Bandera now moved into the vanguard of the column and breached the garden walls in the area in and around the Batán Gate and stormed the Republicans’ defenses, which allowed the legionnaires to enter Casa de Campo. In addition, a few prisoners were captured along with their weapons. About 110 yards from Casa del Lago the Eleventh Company was in the vanguard of the column when it came under attack from a Soviet tank that fired machine guns at them. The Eleventh Company, with the support of two antitank guns, forced the tank to withdraw. With the coming of nightfall, the bandera prepared to spend the night in Casa de Campo and fortified the bandera’s positions with its scouts, the Eleventh Company, in the immediate area of Casa del Lago.25 On November 8, advancing alongside the Fourth Bandera, the Fifth Bandera moved toward Casa de Campo via the road to Carabanchel Alto (Upper Carabanchel). The bandera spent the night in the residential barracks of the Civil Guard. On this day two legionnaires were killed and five were wounded, including their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Castejón who was wounded in his left hip. Cándido Ortiz wrote that when the legionnaires saw that their beloved commander was wounded, they flew into a rage, and their thirst for blood and retaliation was evident. With reinforcements from the Fourth Bandera and the Regulares and with artillery support, the legionnaires went after the militiamen with a ven- geance, bayoneting those who fell as they tried to flee.26 The Army of Africa excelled in conducting battle in open country, where it could employ an artillery or aerial preparation followed by an infantry assault that usually employed an enveloping or pincer maneuver. Using medium machine guns to provide cover for advancing infantry— which skillfully employed cover, terrain, movement, and advancement by companies and platoons—the legionnaires and the Regulares usually made short work of the poorly trained but highly motivated militiamen they faced. Now that the war had arrived in Madrid proper, however, urban warfare replaced open ground warfare, and the advantage shifted to the Republicans. In the streets and neighborhoods of Madrid, fighting for hearth and home, the militiamen proved to be determined and tenacious in keeping the terrifying legionnaires and “Moors” from advancing. In conjunction with the newly arrived volunteers of the International The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 159

Brigades (the Eleventh Brigade), who were equally enthused and motivated by their revolutionary zeal to fight fascism, the soldiers of the Popular Front proved to be a formidable obstacle for Franco’s plan to seize the capital and win the war. In his report for December 19, 1936, the US military attaché, Colonel Stephen Fuqua, wrote that on November 7 Franco’s forces had reached the Manzanares River with about forty thousand men, which was one– third of the number of men (militiamen and others) the republic could call on to defend the city. Fuqua also wrote that although the Legion and the Regulares were excellent troops, they were not supported by other Nationalist units of equal quality and capability.27 The First Bandera advanced on the Toledo Bridge on November 9 looking for an advantageous defensive position from which to provide support for the advancing column as it neared the bridge. On the right flank of the road leading to the bridge was atabor of the Regulares, while the vanguard of the bandera was on the left flank. As soon as the advancing units began to deploy for battle, the Republicans increased their fire. At around three o’clock in the afternoon the First Bandera reached Barrio de las Pavas, and the tabor had advanced as far as the hill of Comercio. Both locations were essential to the Nationalists being able to dominate the Toledo Bridge and thus allow the passage of the column into Madrid proper.28 At sunrise on November 9 the Fourth Bandera could see from its observation point a large mass of Republicans advancing from Madrid through the street that led to Puerta del Ángel. The legionnaires allowed the Republicans to proceed to within combat range and then open fire on them, inflicting numerous casualties and taking many of their men prisoner as they fell back. However, this was merely a precursor to what was to come. The Re- publicans immediately carried out a larger attack from the opposite side of the lake in Casa de Campo and from the left flank that the bandera occupied. The Republicans unleashed a hailstorm of fire that forced the legionnaires to hit the ground and hug any piece of natural cover they could find. This was followed by an infantry assault that ended with legionnaires and Republicans engaged in mortal combat. The bandera received fire from all four sides because its position was overlooked by the Hermitage of San Antonio de la Florida, about 330 yards northeast. The Sixteenth Company of the Fourth Bandera was ordered to occupy some houses to the left of where the bandera was hunkered down. 160 | The Madrid Front, November 1936

Running at full speed, the men of the company attacked the houses with complete disregard for their safety. Hurling hand grenades to dislodge and incapacitate the houses’ defenders, the company occupied the houses, and the defenders who were not killed were captured. At around two o’clock in the afternoon the rest of the bandera, advancing by companies, joined the Sixteenth Company in the newly occupied houses and prepared to defend them from a possible Republican counterattack. These houses became the advanced frontal position for the column, which now settled in a location between the houses and the Batán Gate.29 On November 9 the Fifth Bandera continued its advance into Casa de Campo until it reached Garabitas Hill, where it set up camp and spent the night.30 Also on this date, Lieutenant Eduardo Ortiz de Zugasti and Subaltern Salvador Solana Martín joined the Fifth Bandera’s Eighteenth Company. However, the day also brought the death of one legionnaire and the wounding of three others.31 From November 10 to 14 the Fourth Bandera remained in the gardens of Casa de Campo, repelling continuous Republican attacks by men who were very well armed and determined to drive the Army of Africa from the gates of Madrid. The mere thought of what the Nationalists had done to the vanquished after the fall of Badajoz was enough to motivate trade union militiamen to fight with tenacity and resolution, something they had not necessarily demonstrated when they faced the Nationalists in previous encounters. From its base of operations in the parish church of Casa de Campo, the legionnaires withstood repeated assaults— sometimes for hours at a time—by the Republicans, who fired artillery and mortar rounds, lobbed hand grenades, and peppered their positions with rifle fire. With hand grenades and bayonets fixed, the legionnaires rebuffed the Republicans’ attacks and sent them reeling, but then they would regroup and later return. Because of these incessant attacks, it was difficult to resupply the legionnaires in the front positions with ammunition, food, and clothing and to evacuate the dead and wounded. The weather in Madrid in No- vember is typically cold and rainy, and for soldiers who had been constantly on the move for the past couple of months, the daily grind of living in and fighting from trenches and parapets was demoralizing; siege warfare was not for well–trained shock troops. Furthermore, after months of constant fighting, the Nationalist army was running low on Moroccan soldiers from the Regulares, which had The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 161 suffered tremendous casualties. It was much more difficult to recruit and train Moroccans than it was to recruit for the Legion, since the majority of Legion volunteers came from within metropole Spain or, to a lesser extent, from neighboring Portugal.32 The First Bandera was still in Barrio de la Pavas on November 10, where it came under intense rifle and machine-gun fire as well as shelling from tanks. The street battle raged throughout the night, with the Republicans advancing to the point that they occupied a defensive position very close to the bandera and from where they continued to harass it.33 Also on November 10, the Fifth Bandera was on Garabitas Hill when at around two o’clock in the afternoon a large Republican force assaulted the bandera from the front and was able to penetrate all the way to its rearguard in the interior of Casa de Campo. The Republicans had attacked a sector of the line occupied by a tabor of the Regulares (Ceuta No. 3). Taking advantage of the darkness, the men of the Fifth Bandera were able to organize their forces and at dawn counterattacked, driving the attackers from Casa de Campo and inflicting heavy casualties. In the overnight skirmish, three legionnaires were killed and thirteen wounded.34 By way of Extremadura Road, the Seventh Bandera marched toward the Segovia Bridge on November 10. Laying in wait for the bandera was a large number of Republicans ready to take it on from well–constructed trenches and surrounding buildings. As soon as the legionnaires approached, the Republicans opened fire and forced thebandera ’s scouts to fall back. Regrouping, the entire bandera went on the offensive and was able to occupy by assault a few of the houses near Puerta del Ángel.35 As part of Tella’s column, the Eighth Bandera was involved in bitter combat on November 10. The column encountered stiff Republican resistance coming from the left side of Extremadura Road, which is between Carabanchel to the south and Casa de Campo to the north. The Repub- licans had constructed a series of trenches, one behind another and well defended by machine guns, that could cover all points of advancement. The column’s advance companies moved into Usera that morning, which caused its defenders to bring up all the reserves that could be mustered to halt the attack. With the attack stopped for the moment, the Eighth Bandera was called up to the front lines to break the impasse. The legionnaires fought tenaciously for every inch of ground until Usera was secured. Now the legionnaires used the Republicans’ own well–built defensive works to repel 162 | The Madrid Front, November 1936 repeated counterattacks. On more than one occasion that morning the Republicans launched bayonet assaults, hoping to regain what they had lost. That afternoon two companies from the Eighth Bandera captured Vértice de Basurero and a line of trenches that had been built to its right. With the day’s objectives secured, the bandera’s job turned to evacuating its many dead and wounded. The Republicans too had paid a terrible toll defending their positions during the past couple of days, suffering more than three hundred dead. In his after-battle report, Tella praised the actions of the Eighth Bandera and recommended that it be awarded the Collective Military Medal.36 At about this time the famed anarchist José Buenaventura Durruti Du- mange reluctantly arrived in Madrid with four thousand militiamen from Aragón at the behest of fellow anarchist and minister of health, Federica Montseny. When the uprising began, Durruti and his fellow anarchists were successful in foiling General Manuel Goded’s attempt to gain control of Barcelona for the rebels. Later, as the leader of what came to be known as the Durruti Column, he led thousands of militiamen from Bar- celona to Zaragoza and took on Nationalist forces in Aragón. His success in Aragón led to his transfer to the Madrid front as well as the government’s attempts to unite the anarchists, socialists, and communists.37 General Varela’s plan for Madrid was for the bulk of his forces to attack from the west through Casa de Campo and into University City with a diversionary attack coming from the southwest and south into the Carabanchel and Usera neighborhoods. Between November 11 and 15 Varela employed probing attacks to gauge the Republicans’ strengths and weaknesses. The three sectors of the city designated for this probing were Casa de Campo, Extremadura Road, and Usera. In Casa de Campo the Fifth Bandera spent those days repelling repeated Republican attacks, hoping to drive them out. On November 11 the Fifth Bandera came under intense artillery shelling, and three legionnaires were wounded. Two days later the Republicans attacked in force and were repelled with numerous casualties, while two legionnaires were killed and eleven wounded. On November 14 the Republicans attacked the bandera’s front positions with every weapon at their disposal, leaving seven legionnaires wounded.38 The arrival of Franco’s forces on the outskirts of Madrid led to panic and paranoia among the Republicans. For those who remained in Ma- drid, the question of what to do with political prisoners became imperative. On November 11 one of the worst atrocities committed during the The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 163 war took place when 1,029 Nationalist prisoners were taken from Model Prison, loaded onto double–decker buses, and driven to Paracuellos del Jarama, close to Barajas airport. The prisoners were told they were being relocated to a prison in Valencia, but with their hands bound with wire, they were murdered by their guards, the Fifth Regiment, as potential enemies of the state. In subsequent days more Nationalist political prisoners in Madrid— at Paracuellos del Jarama, Torrejón de Ardoz, and San Fernando de Henares—were executed. Among the government officials responsible for these murders were the Pravda reporter and Soviet intelligence agent Mikhail Koltzov (Joseph Stalin’s man in Spain), Communist Party leader and Councilor for Public Order Santiago Carillo, and his deputy, José Cazorla.39 On November 12–13 the Eighth Bandera attacked Cerro Blanco and a few more houses in Usera. This brought a spirited counterattack by the Republicans, who employed artillery and tanks against the Legion, which defended its gains tenaciously but at great cost. By November 13 the bandera had suffered 110 men either dead or wounded; among the wounded was the commander of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella. For the Eighth Bandera the toll was high, but it did succeed in forcing the Republicans to retreat.40 To capture Madrid from the west, the Nationalists had to cross the Manzanares River. This objective was primarily assigned to Delgado’s column. It successfully crossed the river on November 15 and advanced into University City, with the column’s advance scouts reaching the area around the stadium. The Republicans responded by opening fire on the attackers and focusing specifically on their light tanks, hammering them with antitank guns and injuring their crews. To make matters worse for the Nationalists’ armor support, Colonel Romero blew up the Puente de los Franceses so their tanks could not cross the river. The Second Tabor of the Regulares (Alhucemas No. 5) was forced to wade across the river amid the splashing of machine-gun and rifle bullets coming from the well–entrenched Republicans on its left flank. With the support of a company from the Third Tabor and a machine-gun platoon, the Second Tabor threw itself at the Republicans’ trenches, tossing hand grenades and inflicting heavy casualties on those who were unable to escape. Having broken through the Republicans’ lines in this sector, the Na- tionalists advanced until they occupied the stadium and its environs. 164 | The Madrid Front, November 1936

Also crossing the Manzanares River the same day was Asensio’s column, which was able to capture the Architecture School, Casa de Velázquez, and, on the following day (November 16), the Agronomy School.41 At four o’clock in the morning on November 15 the Fourth Bande- ra was relieved by the Canarias Infantry Battalion so that it could advance into Madrid with its column. The Fourth Bandera reached Casa de Firmes Especiales, a warehouse for the maintenance of special roads, where it spent the night and remained until November 17. During the past couple of days of intense fighting, in which sandbag parapets had served as the front line between the two combatants, the number of men killed on both sides was high. Captain Carlos Iniesta Cano, who commanded the Twelfth Machine-Gun Company of the Fourth Bandera, wrote about burying legionnaires in a “provisional cemetery” and said that every corpse was interred with a bottle containing the man’s name.42 The Fifth Bandera was still in Casa de Campo on November 15, where it was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire, which caused the death of one legionnaire and the wounding of seven others. For the next week (November 16–23), the Fifth Bandera remained in Casa de Campo, where it was continually shelled by cannons and mortars. Breaking the monotony of the shelling was an infantry assault by Republican forces on November 17; the Republicans left their trenches and charged at the legionnaires only to be repelled, and with heavy losses. However, the Fifth Bandera also suffered heavy casualties, with ten legionnaires killed and sixty–four wounded. Finally realizing that the bandera was encamped in a very vulnerable position, the commander decided on November 23 to relocate to a spot within Casa de Campo that was better protected from Republican shelling from a nearby hill.43 On November 15 the Eighth Bandera was sent to Lower Carabanchel to improve the front lines in that southern district of the city. This action led to brutal street combat with the Republicans, who repeatedly attacked the legionnaires in the hope of improving their own positions. Each side battled to gain the upper hand against its opponent, and attacks led to counterattacks. The legionnaires were forced to build covered walkways to protect themselves from constant mortar fire and sniping. Small unit assaults increased with the goals of gaining control of nearby houses and buildings, setting up ambushes of Republican sentries, and taking many of them prisoner.44 The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 165

The order came down from Nationalist headquarters on November 17 for Delgado’s column to seize the Student Residence Hall and the In- stitute of Hygiene in the first phase of a two-phase operation. At nine o’clock in the morning the column was set to go and waited for the Na- tionalist air force to bomb Republican positions before the attack. The column waited for the Nationalist planes, which were delayed, to finish their bombing run, which was done by eleven o’clock. However, while Delgado’s column waited to attack, it in turn was attacked by the Republican air force, which inflicted heavy casualties, especially on the Third Tabor of the Regulares of Alhucemas, which lost six officers and more than seventy enlisted men. The Third Tabor was consolidated into two companies, and with the Second Tabor it moved toward the Student Residence Hall and occupied it. Keeping up the momentum of the attack, the Regulares assaulted hills that lay to the right of the Student Residence. Tossing hand grenades and engaging the defenders in hand–to–hand combat, the Regulares pressed its attack. The Republicans tenaciously held terrain, which forced Delgado to use the Fourth Bandera to reinforce the Regulares. Earlier in the morning the bandera had set out to take part in the capture of University City. It crossed the Manzanares River and then climbed up to the stadium, where it took up a position plugging a gap on the right flank. The bandera engaged the Republicans coming from the Parque del Oeste while the Regulares bore the brunt of the fight by taking on the Republicans in the buildings. When called upon by the commander, legionnaires were pushing back the Republicans at bayonet point, the Republicans fighting to the death for every inch. The battle was now for the Institute of Hygiene. For both attackers and defenders, nightfall made no difference; they continued to fight into the night, and even the bandera’s commander was slightly wounded but did not require evacuation. Finally, the nearly decimated legionnaires were able to make one final assault, which led to the capture of the last remaining rooms of the Institute of Hygiene. With the battle over, the rest of the night was spent evacuating the wounded, of which there were many, and sleeping in the Student Residence Hall.45 Also on November 17, at about two o’clock in the afternoon, Barrón’s column arrived to join the other columns in the attack on University City. The First Bandera was scheduled to serve in the vanguard of this column, but it was unable to do so and was replaced by the Sixth Bandera, which 166 | The Madrid Front, November 1936 was able to accomplish the day’s mission of seizing part of the Clinical Hospital and the Asylum of St. Christina.46 The Clinical Hospital became the primary focus of the Nationalist’s attack, and the recently reinforced Fourth Bandera, which had just replaced the Sixth Bandera, was called in to capture it on November 18. The Sixth Bandera was tasked that day with taking the Antirabies Insti- tute located close to the Parque del Oeste. The Fourth Bandera set out for the hospital from the Student Residence Hall at six o’clock that night. The Fourth Bandera and a tabor from the Regulares of Tetuán spent the night there in preparation for what was to come the following day. From November 19 to 23 the Fourth Bandera and the Regulares were engaged in some of the fiercest fighting to date inside the hospital and its environs. The hospital was a formidable seven-story edifice of modern construction. The column’s command staff wanted to continue the advance into Madrid and not be bogged down clearing the entire building. Therefore, the column captured the lower floors only, leaving the Repub- licans occupying the upper floors and other rooms in the hospital. The Republicans took advantage of their superior number and launched one counterattack after another. The legionnaires resisted every assault and engaged the determined Republicans in brutal combat, fighting for stair- wells by employing hand grenades and bayonets. Every hospital room, as well as each hallway and operating room, became a fortified bunker. Merely running from one room to another could prove fatal, and it was not uncommon for legionnaires to be holed up in one room and Re- publicans in an adjoining one and for them to exchange hand grenades through a hole in the wall between them. The extensive rubble created inside the hospital made for excellent cover and concealment. As the bodies of the dead began to pile up inside during the five days of nonstop fighting, they too were used as makeshift “sandbags” and shields while the living struggled with the unbearable stench of decomposition. The Republicans outside the hospital employed their artillery, mortars, and machine guns to pour fire into the building, adding to the carnage taking place within its walls. By November 23 the hospital was in the hands of the Fourth Bandera, but the human cost for both sides was as- tronomical. The bandera’s casualty list (dead and wounded) numbered 250 men, and the Republicans left behind even more men while struggling to evacuate their wounded.47 The type of ferocious indoor fighting that took place in the Clinical Hospital in 1936 would be seen again during The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 167 the siege of Stalingrad in 1942–1943, when the Russians and the Germans fought and died for every building and every room in the city. Not all of the fighting for Madrid was taking place in University City. On November 18 the Seventh Bandera was part of a column that was ordered to occupy Cerro de los Ángeles. The column set out from Pinto and arrived at its destination, where it engaged in brutal hand–to–hand combat with the Republicans. Once the column’s objectives were achieved, the legionnaires spent that day and the next repelling one determined counterattack after another.48 On November 19 the Sixth Bandera moved from the Antirabies Insti- tute to seize the Asylum of St. Christina and its grounds. After engaging in heavy combat with the Republicans there, the bandera remained on the site and withstood constant artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire for days.49 The Republicans refused to give up on regaining the Clinical Hospi- tal. Having failed to retake it by repeated ground attacks, the Republi- cans now turned to subterranean warfare. The plan was to blow up the building, and diggers began to excavate tunnels to reach the foundation of the building. They also used the building’s sewer system to reach the vital areas, where they planned to detonate hundreds of pounds of dynamite. Given the combination of attacks coming from all four corners abo- veground and mining from belowground, the hospital became the most dangerous piece of real estate in all of Madrid. Captain Carlos Iniesta of the Fourth Bandera wrote, “We fought corridor to corridor, room to room, in the stairways, operating rooms, etc.” Asturian coal miners were experts in digging tunnels and handling dynamite. They were used during the Asturian uprising of October 1934 to blow up government buildings and banks, and they were also brought in to mine the Alcázar in Toledo during the siege. It is very likely that those doing the mining of the hospital were Asturian coal miners.50 The republic was able to continually replace its losses by bringing fresh troops from other parts of Spain into the beleaguered city, something the Nationalists could not do. University City remained the epicenter of the fight for Madrid, and the Sixth Bandera was in the thick of it on No- vember 23 when its Twenty-First Company was assigned to defend the Cancer Institute. For the next nine days the company fought off repeated Republican attacks, which were directed not only at its front lines but also at its rear guard. By firing their artillery and mortars at the company’s 168 | The Madrid Front, November 1936 rear lines, the Republicans hoped to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the legionnaires to bring food and ammunition to those in the front lines. At one point ammunition ran out, and the legionnaires were forced to fix bayonets in order to defend their positions in what was now the rubble of the completely demolished building. During these difficult days, Lieutenant Primitivo Fernández Pérez led the efforts to improve and repair fighting positions as well as to evacuate the wounded. Furthermore, he distinguished himself by constantly en- couraging and rallying his men to perform at their highest level. Between November 16 and 30, the Sixth Bandera suffered forty–three men killed and eighty–one wounded.51 The Fifth Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Maximino Barto- méu’s column, was still in Casa de Campo on November 24 when its new encampment was attacked by two Soviet tanks. Immediately the men of the bandera’s headquarters attacked the two tanks, hurling a mix of Molotov cocktails and hand grenades and setting the tanks on fire. The acting commander of the Fifth Bandera, Captain Tiede, was grievously wounded and was replaced by Captain Mariano Rubio de Castro. Three other legionnaires were also wounded in this engagement.52 Captain Rubio did not hold this position for very long, however, because he was wounded the very next day when the Republicans unleashed a heavy bombardment on the bandera’s position. One legionnaire was killed in this attack. In addition, a couple of men were sent to the hospital because of illness. Rubio was replaced by Captain Francisco González Soler. For the next two days, November 26–27, the situation remained the same, but on November 28 the situation changed when Republican artillery scored a direct hit on the bandera’s ammunition dump which, caused the death of one legionnaire and the wounding of three others.53 Back at University City, the badly depleted First, Fourth, and Sixth Ban- deras received new replacements sent from the Legion’s principal training center in Talavera de la Reina. The new recruits quickly learned their trade as they took on the Republicans alongside the veterans, especially in the defense of the hospital, which was regarded as the linchpin of the Nationalists’ defensive line. Simultaneously, the Seventh Bandera, under the command of Major Siro Alonso Rodríguez, continued to engage the Republicans on Extremadura Road.54 On November 29 the Fifth Bandera welcomed another new commander, Major Eulogio Fernández Virto (or Victor), and Captain González returned to command his company. At dawn the bandera set out from The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 169

Garabitas Hill, slipped out of Casa del Campo through a breach in the wall surrounding it, and advanced toward the general headquarters of the Civil Guard, where it joined up with the rest of the column and be in its vanguard. The mission’s objective that day was assaulting the Republi- can–held Húmera Sanitarium. The first unit to get through the defenders’ barbed-wire entanglements at a place called Casa del Molino was Captain González’s company. Casa del Molino had just been reinforced by the Assault Guard armed with machine guns. González’s company was able to turn back a Republican scouting party close to Casa del Molino and Captain González ordered a bayonet charge that drove the Republicans from their positions and left the legionnaires with eighty prisoners. The other three companies of the Fifth Bandera also went on the offensive and assaulted the Republican’s lines, taking over their positions and then rapidly preparing to defend these positions from an expected counterattack. The Republicans were immediately reinforced, went on the offensive trying to regain their lost positions, and were able to reach the very same trenches they had just lost. The fight turned brutal in front of these trenches as the Republicans threw everything they had against the legionnaires and even wounded many of their own combatants, who were now prisoners of war and had been taken behind the front lines. Under murderous machine-gun fire from the Republicans, the legionnaires were pinned down and unable to move as they suffered ever mounting casualties. Captain González’s company was reinforced by another company from the Fifth Bandera, and together they went on the offensive and drove the Republicans from their positions. The Republicans abandoned a good amount of war materiel, especially Russian–made rifles (Mosin–Nagant Model 1891 or 1891/30). For a few days the Republicans were not seen again in that sector of the city. In recognition of his valorous action in this engagement, Captain González was awarded the Individual Military Medal, and the entire Fifth Bandera, which suffered eighty–eight casualties (eleven killed and seventy-seven wounded), was congratulated and recognized by the commander of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Bartoméu. The bandera finished out the last day of the month providing security and carrying out scouting patrols in and around the Húmera Sanatorium.55 An interesting element of this engagement was that among the numerous dead and wounded left behind by the retreating Republicans were women (milicianas) wearing the blue work overalls of the militiamen.56 170 | The Madrid Front, November 1936

The Second Republic ushered in a new era for women in Spain by giving them rights that they had not previously enjoyed, like suffrage. Later di- vorce was permitted, and with the start of the civil war abortion became available in government–held areas. The push for total equality between the sexes in a traditional machista society was supported especially by the communists and socialists; “free love” was accepted among some as an antiestablishment, anti–Church practice, with deleterious consequences. In the trade and party militias, women were expected and encouraged to shoulder arms to defend the republic, and many young women did. They walked away from their factory machines and picked up a Mauser. However, their military efficacy in the front lines was questionable. José Maria Bueno Carrera writes that the milicianas “were known as ‘the machine guns’ due to the casualties they caused among the militiamen through venereal diseases.” Bueno also asserts that they were militarily insignificant but were basically there to provide “moral support” for the militiamen.57 Peter Wyden recounts that “La Pasionaria”—Dolores Ibarruri Gómez— insisted on integrating women into the communist militias (e.g., the Fifth Regiment, led by Enrique Castro Delgado) as combatants, not support troops. “Within less than a month,” he says, “a medical captain told Cas- tro that 200 of his militiamen were infected with venereal disease and that the militiawomen were largely to blame. Castro ordered the women examined. Some 70 percent were infected.” Castro subsequently disbanded his women’s companies.58 While the Fifth Bandera was battling the Republicans at the Húmera Sanatorium, the Seventh Bandera was also in action as part of Major Siro Alonso’s column. At eight o’clock in the morning on November 29 the Seventh Bandera set out from the vicinity of Ventorro del Cano in two directions for the first phase of the day’s scheduled operations. One column marched toward Colonia de la Cabaña while the other moved toward Cota 730; both objectives were easily taken. The second phase called for securing the line that stretched from Pozuelo de Alarcón and the road that led from it to Húmera. Pozuela de Alarcón and Húmera are located west–northwest of Casa de Campo (west of Madrid’s center). After capturing the cemetery in Pozuelo de Alarcón and a few nearby houses, the column was halted in its advance by stiff Republican resistance, and the battle raged until sunset. The Madrid Front, November 1936 | 171

The front line now stretched from Colonia de la Cabaña to houses in Pozuelo de Alarcón to the cemetery and a farm that ran parallel to Ex- tremadura Road. On November 30 the fight resumed, with the right flank of the column advancing and capturing the house of the Marqués de Larios and then linking up with Bartoméu’s column. The Seventh Bandera left from Colonia de la Cabaña and captured a few houses in Pozuelo de Alarcón; among those seized was one called La Atalaya, next to the cemetery. The Republicans had built their fortifications at La Atalaya because it dominated the surrounding terrain. A company from the column was left to defend La Atalaya and, as expected, the Republicans launched a counterattack to regain it. The attack was so powerful that the company was forced to fall back to the cemetery, having suffered more than half of its men as casualties. In two days of combat, the Seventh Bandera experienced eighty–three men either killed or wounded.59

The Madrid Front December 1936

By November 17 it was clear to Nationalist leaders that the battle for Madrid had failed and that it would now become a battle of attrition. However, abandoning this front would represent failure from both a military and a propaganda standpoint. Therefore, the battle-weary Legion and the Regulares continued to occupy their positions in the city’s western fringe and defend them from repeated Republican attacks. At the same time, Franco’s new strategy was to attack the republic’s supply lines, especially on the Madrid-Valencia road. His plan was to choke off the capital and compel the city to capitulate or face starvation. Yet this would ultimately prove as futile as the Nationalists’ assaults of October-November 1936. Madrid would remain Republican until late March 1939, a few days before the official end of the war. On December 1 the First Bandera was defending its positions in Uni- versity City and the Parque del Oeste while the Fourth Bandera occupied the Clinical Hospital. On this day the Republicans detonated the first of many subterranean mines and followed it up with a spirited attack on the hospital. The mine was set off at 8:30 a.m., which caused the collapse of the main support beams of the seven-story building and buried a platoon from the Tenth Company and a squad from the Machine-Gun Compa- ny—a total of thirty-nine men. This explosion was immediately followed by an infantry assault aimed at the opening created by the explosion. The Tenth Company took the brunt of the attack, and it responded by climbing over the debris and the buried bodies of their comrades to repel the attackers with rifle fire and hand grenades. Supporting the Tenth Company were the Twelfth Company’s machine guns as well as other legionnaires from the Fourth Bandera, who rushed to replace the fallen. The Sixteenth Company devoted itself to digging

173 174 | The Madrid Front, December 1936 out those buried under the ruins of the hospital while under Republican cannon fire. Ignoring the potential danger of further building collapse, the legionnaires from the Sixteenth Company were able to dig out four of their comrades, two of them still alive. For the remainder of the day the Fourth Bandera rebuilt and repaired its fighting positions while receiving incoming rifle and cannon fire from the Republicans, who suffered heavy casualties in a failed attempt to drive the legionnaires from the hospital. For its actions in defense of the hospital on December 1, 1936, the Fourth Bandera was awarded the Laureate Cross of St. Ferdinand, Spain’s highest award for valor.1 The Fifth Bandera was still occupying the Húmera Sanitarium on De- cember 1 as part of Lieutenant Colonel Maximino Bartomeu’s column. While the bandera occupied itself with building and/or strengthening trenches, the Republicans shot at it from houses in Húmera. On this day one legionnaire was killed and four were wounded. The following day the Fifth Bandera was in the same position, but this time it came under cannon fire as well as shelling from an armored train, which forced the legionnaires to build protective bunkers. The situation changed on December 3, when the Republicans emboldened themselves with an assault on Garabitas Hill and then attacked the Nationalists all along the front line. At midmorning Republican airplanes bombed the area where the Fifth Bandera was dug in and wounded one legionnaire. The situation remained static for the next two days; then on December 6 the Republicans unleashed a torrent of shells from mortars, which forced the bandera to abandon the sanitarium, which had been reduced to rubble and was uninhabitable.2 On December 1 the Seventh Bandera was in the vanguard of a column whose mission it was to take the town of Pozuelo de Alarcón. The bandera was assigned the left flank. It quickly captured Colonia de la Paz, and two entrenchments were established after brutal combat with the dogged Republicans. The next day at sunrise another attack was launched on the Republicans in houses in the vicinity of Colonia de la Paz. Quickly, however, the Nationalists went from the offensive to the defensive, and all the column’s units deployed along the front, with the Regulares securing the right flank. From early that morning through the following day (December 3), the Republicans attacked relentlessly, hoping to regain Colonia de la Paz. Under a driving rain that hampered visibility and with three Soviet tanks leading the way, the Republicans, The Madrid Front, December 1936 | 175 including several battalions of carabineros, pressed their attack. Bringing their artillery to bear on the parapets of the legionnaires, the Republicans demolished them, leaving nothing standing between the attackers and the defenders but barbed-wire entanglements. The advance units of the Republicans reached the wire and were held there, unable to advance any farther, by the stubborn resistance of the legionnaires. Until December 23 every single attempt of the Republicans was foiled, with great loss of life and war materiel, including a significant number of automatic weapons. On December 23, with the front line stabilized, the Seventh Bandera was relieved by other units and ordered to relocate to the engineers’ barracks in Retamares. The bandera set out on December 24 for Leganes, boarded a train for Torrijos, and arrived there early in the morning on December 25. The following day the Seventh Bandera was transferred to the Legion’s main base in Talavera de la Reina, where it was refitted with new personnel, uniforms, and weapons. The fight for Pozuelo de Alarcón was also costly for the Seventh Bandera, which suffered the death of Individual Military Medal recipient (Asturian campaign) Captain Rafael González Pérez-Caballero, who was serving as the bandera’s interim commander. He was killed leading the Twenty-Sixth Company in a perilous mission. In addition to his stellar military service during the Asturian uprising, Captain González had recently gained famed within the Legion when he led the Sixteenth Company of the Fourth Bandera in the victorious capture of Badajoz. Captain Manuel Sanjurjo Carricarte was also killed in action and was posthumously awarded the Individual Military Medal in 1938.3 The Sixth Bandera was still fighting in University City on December 1 and continued to do so until December 5, when it was pulled out of the front lines and marched off to Talavera de la Reina for ten days of rest and rehabilitation. From there it boarded a train for Toledo on December 15, where it provided security for the city until it departed for Villaviciosa de Odón on December 20. From there it continued to Boadilla del Monte, where it remained for the rest of the month, providing security.4 On December 1 the Eighth Bandera was defending its entrenchments in Lower Carabanchel in southern Madrid. In addition to fighting the Republicans, the legionnaires had to deal with the cold winds that are typical of Madrid winters. Supplying the men with ammunition and other materiel was very difficult, and many legionnaires found themselves 176 | The Madrid Front, December 1936 poorly shod and clothed. These legionnaires eagerly sought out Repub- lican prisoners of war (POWs) to take their warm clothes and shoes, because they knew that once the POWs were behind the front lines and in camps, those items would be replaced. On December 12 the Eighth Bandera was ordered to set out for Vil- laviciosa de Odón in the vanguard of Colonel Eduardo Sáenz’s column; its ultimate destination was Boadilla del Monte. Heavy rain and fog impeded the column’s progress in reaching its objective, and it was forced to camp in the hills surrounding the town to await better weather conditions. The column did not have long to wait until the Republicans from Boadilla del Monte launched an attack on it. With eight Soviet tanks in the lead, the Republicans thought that the column would be unprepared and disorganized. This was not the case; two tanks were quickly taken out of the fight, and two rifle companies from the Eighth Bandera threw themselves at the Republican infantry, sending it scurrying back to Boa- dilla del Monte.5 The weather improved the following day, which allowed the column, with the Eighth Bandera in the vanguard, to proceed toward Boadilla del Monte. After three successive assaults, the column’s advance forces reached the outskirts of the town. On December 15 the Republicans, with two battalions of the International Brigades and the Assault Guard, launched an energetic counterattack. Supporting the attack were five tanks, which advanced right up to the legionnaires’ parapets and proceeded to blow them sky-high. The legionnaires fought back with hand grenades and antitank guns, which put the tanks out of the fight and left their supporting infantry on their own. Now on the offensive, the men of the Eighth Bandera began to push back the Republicans as they crossed the bridge and began going house- to-house. This operation took hours and had the ultimate goal of reaching the town’s plaza. Waiting for the bandera in the plaza were three tanks that opened fire on the legionnaires as they advanced down the street. Unable to move forward against the tanks, the legionnaires moved along the sides, using the buildings that lined the streets for cover so they could approach the tanks from the rear and the flanks. The crews were killed inside their vehicles, and the tanks were captured intact. Emboldened by their success against the tanks, the legionnaires now unleashed their fury with hand grenades against the Palace of the Duke of Sueca, which the Republicans had turned into their stronghold. By The Madrid Front, December 1936 | 177 making openings in the surrounding garden walls, the legionnaires were able to set up their machine guns to sweep the entrance and provide cover fire for those who advanced on foot inside. Inside the palace, the legionnaires encountered more than a hundred corpses of International Brigade members in its many rooms. After capturing the palace, the legionnaires fanned out in the town, rounding up pockets of intractable Republicans until the sun began to go down. Those Republicans who could escape fled the town. Sixty prisoners were captured, along with a great quantity of food, clothing, weapons, and materiel. Once a security detail had been set up to prevent a possible counterattack, the legionnaires began tending to the wounded Republican prisoners as well as to all the dead.6 Two days later, on December 17, the Eighth Bandera’s mission was to improve the front lines between Boadilla and Majadahonda. Part of the operation called for clearing the Republicans out of the woods they occupied in that sector. The legionnaires attacked the Republicans’ well- defended trenches in heavy combat and inflicted significant losses on them, in terms of men killed or wounded and the capture of weapons. In addition, the Thirtieth Company captured the battle flag of the First Brigade. Undaunted and undeterred, the Republicans launched one counterattack after another, with each successive one being stronger than the previous one. The legionnaires turned back every one of these attacks, including the most formidable one, which featured four Soviet tanks accompanied by four hundred infantrymen. This force was able to reach the barbed-wire entanglements of the legionnaires, and the fight ended up in hand-to-hand combat. The platoon of Lieutenant Inocencio Kadar Szass (better known as Karoly) bore the brunt of this attack with twenty casualties, but the Republicans were successfully turned back. For his actions that day, Lieutenant Karoly was awarded the Individual Military Medal.7 On December 4 the Fourth Bandera’s Tenth Company was pulled off the front line for restructuring and was replaced by the Sixteenth Compa- ny. The Tenth Company was refitted with men from other companies as well as with legionnaires who had recovered from battle injuries. On the afternoon of December 12 the bandera’s beloved chaplain, Father Fernan- do de Huidobro, returned upon his release from the hospital in Griñón after having been wounded three days earlier in Casa de Campo. At this time the Fourth Bandera was still defending the hospital, and it continued to do so until the end of the month. At the hospital the combat 178 | The Madrid Front, December 1936 routine was pretty much the same each day: a preliminary artillery bombardment followed by an infantry assault. Incessant artillery bombardment and mining had reduced the hospital to rubble. The near-constant sound of jackhammers drilling new openings for the placing of dynamite charges was something the legionnaires had to contend with as they awaited the detonation of those charges. With hand grenades the legionnaires successfully beat back every assault by the Republicans. Reminiscent of other wars, it was not uncommon for the men on opposite sides of the conflict to call out to their enemies during moments of tranquillity. This banter between the opposing sides increased as Christ- mas approached. From the front-line trenches, each side tried to convince the other to switch sides, and more than a few Republicans came over to the Nationalist side.8 During this period some legionnaires would slip out of their trenches at night and carry out a razzia—a raid for plunder—in the Republican- held parts of Madrid. Wearing uniforms and carrying rifles captured from dead or imprisoned Republicans, the legionnaires infiltrated the enemy’s rearguard and looted the nearby houses and business establish- ments, They brought back all sorts of goods—on one occasion they evem returned with a small piano and a wooden statue of the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception, the patron of the Infantry.9 On December 7 the Fifth Bandera was still defending its positions in and around University City and taking casualties on a daily basis. This situation continued until December 14, when at eleven o’clock in the morning the bandera was relieved and replaced by a regular army infantry battalion. The bandera set out on foot for the Colonia Jardin de los Angeles, west of Casa de Campo. Once it reached its destination, the bandera was housed in nearby hotels and provided security for the neighborhood. At around four o’clock in the afternoon on December 24 the Fifth Bandera set out on foot on Extremadura Road until it reached Leganés, then it boarded a train that took it to Torrijos, where it spent the night. Christmas Day was celebrated in Torrijos, and this was also an opportunity for the bandera to receive a large contingent of recruits to replace the dead and wounded. In addition, junior officers were moved from one company to another to replace those who were unable to carry out their duties because of illness or injury. From December 26 to 30 the Fifth Ban- dera remained in Torrijos resting, washing, and cleaning their weapons. The Madrid Front, December 1936 | 179

At six o’clock in the evening on December 31 the bandera climbed aboard a train that took it to Fuenlabrada, back toward the Madrid front, where it closed out the year.10 The situation in Madrid at the end of 1936 called into question the invincibility of Franco’s Army of Africa. For years the issue has been debated whether Franco squandered an opportunity to capture Madrid and conclude the war before the city could be reinforced by diverting his forces to liberate the Alcázar of Toledo and thus delaying his advance toward the capital by two weeks (September 21 to October 6). In his quest to become generalíssimo, Franco concluded that saving those trapped in the Alcázar was of paramount importance, in terms of both its symbolism and the propaganda benefit. Although a handful of his senior commanders—such as Alfredo Kindelán, Antonio Barroso, and Juan Yagüe—advised against this diversion, Franco disregarded their counsel and pressed ahead. By the end of 1936 it was obvious that Madrid, with the exception of Casa de Campo and University City, had withstood the Nationalists’ assault. The Republicans had succeeded in stopping Franco’s forces with the assistance of the International Brigades and great quantities of military aid (e.g., planes, tanks, and heavy weapons) from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the people of Madrid had fought tenaciously to defend their homes and their families, being unwilling to personally experience what the Army of Africa had unleashed on the citizens of Seville, Badajoz, and Talavera de la Reina after their capture. Nevertheless, by the end of 1936 the Nationalists controlled a great deal of territory in southern, western, central, and northwest Spain, and despite the situation on the Madrid front they were still on the offensive on a variety of fronts. Moreover, the Nationalist army, including the Spanish Foreign Legion and the Regulares, was expanding in both size and power while successfully replacing its losses with new recruits and volunteers. In addition, Italian and German military aid to Franco’s forces was being augmented with more men and equipment. With this expanded army, the Nationalists continued to advance on other fronts, especially in Asturias, the Basque provinces, and Aragón.

With the Second Bandera On the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front

While Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s Madrid Column was making steady progress toward its next major objective of Talavera de la Re- ina and eventually to Madrid, the Second Bandera was operating in the north. On August 22, 1936, the Second Bandera, as part of Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo de Rada’s column, boarded trucks for the trip to Burgos in preparation for offensives along the border with France. In the Nation- alist capital of Burgos, General Miguel Cabanellas, the president of the National Defense Council, reviewed these troops as they paraded before him. After this inspection, they boarded a train for Pamplona, the capital of Navarre. At this time the rebels controlled a strip of territory in northeastern Spain that included the major cities of Huesca, Zaragoza, and Teruel. From Navarre and Aragón the rebels would advance against Republican- held Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya on the Bay of Biscay. Pamplona would be the point of departure for the column as it moved toward its main objective, Irún. However, before the train arrived in Pamplona, it stopped in Vitoria, where the Second Bandera was reviewed by the Legion’s founder, General José Millán-Astray.1 After arriving in Pamplona the bandera boarded trucks and traveled in a convoy until it reached Goizueta. From there the legionnaires passed through Articutza y Alcíbar, near Oyarzún, and eventually reached Er- goyen, where they joined Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Beorlegui Canet’s column.2 By luck or mere coincidence, the Second Bandera was assigned to Beorlugui; it was a unit he was familiar with.3 On October 22, 1920, the Second Bandera was created in Ceuta with then Captain Beorlegui given command of its Fourth Rifle Company. He would soon be replaced by Captain Pompilio Martínez Zaldívar, who would become the first Legion

181 182 | With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front

Legionnaires transported on trucks officer killed in battle. Furthermore, Beorlegui’s brother, Lieutenant Joa- quín Beorlegui Canet, had been gravely wounded on June 16, 1922 (and died a week later in the hospital), while commanding a unit of the Fifth Bandera in Tazarut, Spanish Morocco.4 The campaign for control of Guipúzcoa, also known as the Northern Front, began in late July, continued into August, and culminated in early September with the capture of Irún. By gaining control of Guipúzcoa, the Nationalists would be able to isolate Asturias and Santander, both still under government control, from the rest of the Basque country while also cutting the government off from access to France, and thus Europe, on the Bay of Biscay littoral. According to Spanish historian Luis María De Lojendio, the victory of the Nationalists in Guipúzcoa was as strate- gically important as their victory in the battle for the Strait of Gibraltar. The first great strategic victory for the Nationalists was getting the Army of Africa across the Strait of Gibraltar from Spanish Morocco, which allowed the rebellion to survive, and the second was cutting the republic off from France.5 The battle for Guipúzcoa, especially the attacks on the important Republican-held cities of San Sebastián (Spain’s traditional summer With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front | 183

INSET MAP The Guipúzcoa Front, August–September 1936 FRANCE Nationalist Army 0 3 Kilometers 0 3 Miles San Fuenterrabia Mt. Rio B Bay of Biscay Guadalupe ida Sebastián so Irún a Behovia San Marcial San Erlaitz Sebastián Mt. NAVARRE Picoqueta

Huesca

R io Zuera Eb ro Alcubiere

Zaragoza

ARAGÓN Fuentes de Ebro

Belchite

The Aragón Front, September–December 1936

Front Line Gea de Albarracín Teruel 020 40 Kilometers Castralvo 020 40 Miles

The Guipúzcoa Front, August–September 1936 184 | With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front capital) and Irún, featured heavy Nationalist firepower from both sea and sky. The Nationalists sent their Dreadnought battleship España (the former Alfonso XIII), the light cruiser Almirante Cervera, and the destroyer Velasco to shell San Sebastián while both San Sebastián and Irún were being bombed daily by Nationalist Ju-52s.6 By the time the Second Bandera got into the fight in late August, the battle for Irún was reaching its critical point. The role of the legionnaires was to operate as reserves for Beorlegui’s front-line forces, which had been in the fight for many weeks. On the afternoon of August 25 the bandera departed Alcíbar and arrived in Ergoyen a few hours later; it reported to Beorlegui, who instructed the bandera’s commander to deploy his forces along the front line as follows: the Fourth and Fifth Companies on the right, the Sixth and Fourteenth Companies on the left, and the Sixth Company providing machine-gun cover fire for the others. The operation called for the column to drive down the center with the bandera protecting its left flank, considered to be its most vulnerable to attack from Republican forces from Zubelzu and Elaiza. The following day the column set out for Irún, with the bandera marching over Mt. Picoqueta (Pikoketa, in Basque), advancing to Erlaitz and beyond. Opposing the advancing column of about two thousand Na- tionalists were roughly three thousand Basques and government troops.7 Mola had provided Beorlegui with every available piece of artillery he could get his hands on, as well as a few armored cars and German PzKpfw I light tanks armed with two 7.92-millimeter machine guns. At this time the legionnaires came under intense rifle fire from the well-entrenched defenders on the heights above. Because of this heavy shelling, the vanguard troops were ordered to withdraw to Erlaitz.8 Undeterred, on August 27 the Fourth Company was ordered to make contact with Beorlegui’s vanguard forces along the right flank. This was done while occupying a few houses along the way. Simultaneously the Fourteenth Company set out for the command post of Major Rafael García Valiño’s column to reinforce some of its units imperiled by the Republicans. However, after two hours of combat the situation was pacified when a few of the defenders’ trenches were captured. A few hours later, protected by the cover fire provided by the Sixth Company, the Fourteenth Company embarked on a small operation. The legionnaires were able to reach the Republicans’ lines, cut their barbed- wire entanglements, and launch an assault. The Republicans’ position With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front | 185 was taken, and a very large quantity of weapons and ammunition was captured, enough to outfit the entire column. The capture of this position allowed the legionnaires to possess an excellent spot, well fortified, from which to launch their next advance to a better-defended position. The Fourteenth Company was assigned the task of driving the Repub- licans from a few houses they were occupying along the Behovia-Irún highway and to make contact with the vanguard’s command post. At ten o’clock in the morning the Fifth Company, commanded by Lieutenant Julio Coloma Gallegos, provided support for the Fourteenth Company, which was under heavy attack by Republicans who hoped to regain the ground they had just lost.9 Both companies withstood repeated counterattacks by the tenacious Republicans, who were driven back repeatedly but were able to regroup and renew their attack. As the sun began to set, the Republicans finally gave up their attack, leaving many casualties on both sides of the line.10 Unlike the relatively flat topography of Andalusia and Extremadura that allowed the Madrid Column to advance quickly and to use enveloping maneuvers to overcome resistance, the terrain in Guipúzcoa was mountainous and easy to defend. Throughout the entire day of August 28 the Fifth and Fourteenth Companies of the Second Bandera withstood repeated attacks by government forces well armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades. They also had the support of precise artillery and intense aerial bombardment. At dusk on August 30 the Fifth and Fourteenth Companies, led by Lieutenant Coloma, captured the Hermitage of San Marcial. The assault against the well-fortified hermitage had begun at dawn, when the legionnaires reached the Republicans’ defenses, cut the barbed-wire entanglements, and began hurling hand grenades while crying out, “Long live the Legion!” and “Long live death!” They drove from their trenches the defenders, who left behind their weapons as well as their dead. Lieutenant Coloma was wounded while leading his company against the defenders’ redoubts. Having taken these fortifications and the hermitage, the legionnaires prepared for the counterattack they knew would follow as well as for the advance on the town of San Marcial.11 On September 1 the entire Second Bandera participated in a sudden attack on the Republicans’ trenches, cutting their wire and preparing the groundwork for the larger attack scheduled for the following day. The bandera’s assault was successful in capturing a great number of prisoners, 186 | With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front but it also paid a heavy price with six men killed, including Captain Luis María Crespo de Guzmán, and twenty wounded. The same day, and in a few outposts to the left of those manned by Carlist militiamen from Montejurra (Navarre), the legionnaires attempted to drive a group of militiamen, the majority of them belonging to an anarcho-syndicalist group and from San Sebastián and Irún, from their trenches. The Carlist militiamen set out along the right flank in order to protect the movement of the legionnaires. The two groups provided support for each other as they advanced and came together for the attack on the defenders’ outer perimeter. The fight evolved into hand-to-hand combat; the defenders were defeated and suffered a great number of casualties. The new front now followed the Bidasoa River and the Endarla- za to Behovia highway, near the Spanish-French border. At a relatively low cost, the Nationalists had made significant strides in advancing their front toward Irún.12 The struggle for Irún turned bloodier on September 2. The Second Bandera moved skillfully and rapidly to overcome the stiff and tenacious opposition of the defenders and was thus able to capture the defensive system, which stretched from Fort San Marcial to Behovia. Located atop a hill overlooking Irún, San Marcial was a crucial position for the Navar- rese troops. After the battle the legionnaires collected a large quantity of rifles, pistols, ammunition, and assorted war materiel, all of it coming from across the French border. In addition to the captured armament, seventy-eight prisoners were taken. The bandera suffered seventeen dead and forty-nine wounded. Unable to accept their costly defeat, the Republicans launched several counterattacks that evening, hoping to regain what they had lost.13 At daybreak on September 3 the Second Bandera continued its attack on the Republicans’ lines, which involved the capture of Behovia, where there was a customs post, and the Spanish side of the International Bridge, which connected Spain and France. Both objectives were achieved with light combat. Behovia was captured at two o’clock in the morning, and both sides fought man-to- man in the encircled post. The defenders who were able to escape jumped into the Bidasoa River and swam to safety (and internment) in Hendaye, France. On this day two legionnaires were killed and nine wounded.14 September 4 was spent providing security and getting ready for the attack on Irún itself. Before the capture of Irún by Beorlegui’s With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front | 187 fifteen-hundred-man force, many of the town’s citizens—including the majority of its defenders as well as the governing committee in charge— fled in panic across the International Bridge. Only a detachment of Asturian anarchists, a few local leftists, and the French and Belgian communists remained. Parts of Irún were put to the torch by the Asturians; several right-wing prisoners, held in Fort Guadalupe at Fuenterrabía, were executed, and their executioners fled afterward. When Beorlegui’s men entered Irún on September 4, the town was almost empty and in ruins. Those who remained cheerfully welcomed the arrival of the Navarrese forces, especially those who had not been shot. The most tenacious defenders decided to make their last stand in the forts at Fuenterrabía and Guadalupe on September 6. The Second Bandera deployed for battle at Fort Fuenterrabia and advanced slowly and methodically toward the Republicans, coming under artillery fire until they reached the barbed-wire entanglements. The legionnaires assaulted the trenches and redoubts with hand grenades and small arms as they fought their way toward a position known as the Capuchinos, where a 155-millimeter battery was captured. The battle then shifted to Fort Guadalupe, where the defenders suffered heavy losses. As on previous occasions, large quantities of weapons and ammunition were seized. The capture of these forts did not come cheaply for the Second Bandera, since Lieutenant Manuel Galván Hernández and two other men were killed and twenty-eight wounded.15 Lieutenant Colonel Beorlegui’s great victory and triumph in Guipúz- coa (the capture of Irún on September 4 and San Sebastián on September 13) was short-lived, since he had been shot in the leg by machine-gun fire as he led his men in the battle for the International Bridge. Because he ignored the gravity of his wounds, he died on September 29 of gangrene at the age of forty-eight.16 With Guipúzcoa under Nationalist control, the Second Bandera was reassigned to the Aragón and Catalonian Front for the remainder of the war, from September 7, 1936, to February 17, 1939. The Zaragoza-Huesca Front As the Madrid Column was making its way toward Madrid by way of Toledo, the Second Bandera was operating along the border with France. The bandera first boarded trucks in Behovia and later transferred to rail for the journey to Zaragoza, the capital of Aragón, where it occupied 188 | With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front

Arenas de San Pedro and the heights south of the capital city. On Septem- ber 8 the Second Bandera joined other Nationalist forces in improving and stabilizing the front lines in the area around Fuentes de Ebro and then returning to Zaragoza.17 At this time Captain Félix López Maraver assumed command of the Second Bandera because its regular commander was ill. The city of Hu- esca, north of Zaragoza, was nearly surrounded by Republican forces, and heavy fighting could be heard in the distance from Zaragoza. On September 11 the Second Bandera set out by train for Huesca in order to reinforce the Nationalist forces defending the besieged city. The Republi- cans had amassed a large number of artillery pieces and, also relying on air support, hoped to take the city. The legionnaires of the Second Ban- dera took the village of Alquicena and were successful in beating back repeated Republican counterattacks on successive days.18 In mid-September Beorlegui arrived in Huesca to organize a column that included the Second Bandera, but by this time he had one foot (or his entire leg) in the grave because of his neglected thigh wound. He was evacuated back to San Sebastián, where he died. The Nationalist high command called for breaking the Republican siege of Huesca, which nearly surrounded the city, while also expanding the front line. In addition, the high command’s operation called for the relief of the garrison at Estrecho de Quinto, northeast of Huesca, which was under government attack. However, a list of goals to be accomplished before the relief of Estrecho de Quinto was drawn up. The first goal was to break the line that separated Huesca from the Manicomio (Huesca’s insane asylum), Puebla de Alquicena, and Casa de Pascualín. After the Republicans had been driven from these locations, the next step was to break the second line that the Republicans had established around Estre- cho de Quinto. At daybreak on September 15 the breakout operation began, with the entire Second Bandera in the vanguard. By the light of dawn the attackers advanced toward the well-fortified Republican trenches; they reached a point where the final assault was made, only to be met by intense Repub- lican artillery fire, which forced the attackers to withdraw to their starting point. The Nationalists’ withdrawal was carried out flawlessly but at the cost of many casualties. For the next three days the Nationalists strengthened their forces in preparation for a second try. On September 18, after a preliminary artillery barrage accompanied by air support, the attackers advanced along With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front | 189 the same paths as previously and assaulted the same fortifications. A Re- publican trench was captured and then instantly fortified just in time to repel a Republican counterattack, which failed. For the remainder of the day and that night, the two sides fought bitterly over that trench. Even- tually the Republicans abandoned any hope of regaining the trench and fell back. With the trench manned and secured, the Nationalists’ attack resumed on September 20 with an assault on the Manicomio, just outside the city. After several reconnaissance missions to the Manicomio, two companies of the Second Bandera attacked the building, engaged its defenders in brutal combat, and captured it. The following day the advance continued toward Casas de Pascualín. In spite of how quickly the bandera’s companies were able to carry out their mission against Casas de Pascualín, the more numerous Republicans managed to hold fast and beat them back. All the legionnaires were able to accomplish was to occupy some nearby trenches, which the Republicans tried repeatedly to regain. For three days Republican troops hurled themselves against the legionnaires, only to lose men and large quantities of materiel. On September 24 the entire Second Bandera, commanded by Captain López, renewed its attack. The Fourth and Fifth Companies were chosen to lead the attack and were successful in capturing a few more trenches. The Republi- cans resisted tenaciously, and Legion casualties mounted. The Fourteenth Company was thrown into the fight as well as some men from the Sixth, but it proved fruitless because the Republicans were unyielding in their determination to resist. The combination of a strong, well-constructed fighting position and dogged determination by the Republicans meant a bloody fight for the attackers, who after many days of combat were eventually able to capture Casas de Pascualín. These small victories outside Huesca allowed the Nationalists to relieve the besieged garrison at Estrecho de Quinto.19 The Second Bandera returned to Huesca, where it finished out the month of September reorganizing and refitting as new men replaced those who had fallen. The Second Bandera would be back in Zaragoza on September 28. The Second Bandera in Aragón (October 1936) In Zaragoza the reorganized Second Bandera was commanded by Ma- jor Francisco Jerez Espinazo. On October 11 the bandera was fully out- fitted with the necessary number of men and materiel and sent by rail 190 | With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front to Cariñena, southwest of Zaragoza. As soon as the bandera arrived in Cariñena, its Fifth Company was pressed into action in the Sierra de Alcu- bierre to improve the front line in that sector. This was accomplished, and several prisoners were captured who had tried to oppose the legionnaires. The other three companies of the bandera were dispatched to Per- diguera, which was in danger of falling to the Republicans. It was taken by the legionnaires during the early hours of October 16. Close to the buildings near the village, the legionnaires carried out an envelopment maneuver in order to sidestep the heavy resistance coming from the Re- publicans, who, unaware of what was happening to them, found themselves first overrun and then overwhelmed. Many prisoners were captured as well as weapons and materiel. This operation proved to be quite costly for the Second Bandera; nearly half of the officers were wounded, and Ma- jor Jerez was killed. He was replaced by Captain García Ruiz-Soldado.20 From Perdiguera the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Companies set out for the Sierra de Alcubierre, where they joined with the Fifth Company to man the trenches that defended the Nationalists’ lines from numerous Republican attacks. The bandera returned to Zaragoza to reorganize the companies, refill its ranks with volunteers, and replace officers. On Octo- ber 21 the bandera embarked on a reconnaissance mission in and around Tardienta, then returned to Zaragoza, where it took part in a military parade and was congratulated for its recent actions by the general who commanded the bandera’s division. Once again, from Zaragoza the bandera returned to the Sierra de Al- cubierre, where it served in divisional reserves, repelling repeated attacks and inflicting heavy casualties on Republican forces while taking many prisoners and capturing large quantities of weapons, particularly automatic weapons. The Second Bandera returned to Zaragoza on October 28, where it stayed for the rest of the month.21 The Aragón Front (November 1936) The Second Bandera was still in Zaragoza when November began. On November 6 the bandera was called upon to proceed to Zuera, north of Zaragoza, and improve the front line. This operation began on Novem- ber 7 with the legionnaires carrying out a reconnoitering mission in the sector that took them close to the Republicans’ barbed-wire entanglements. The area’s difficult physical terrain, coupled with the strength of the Republicans’ defenses, forced the Nationalist leaders to abandon the With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front | 191 operation and pull back their forces to their primary bases, which were more defensible. This operation was eventually successful, but at the cost of a few casualties. The Republicans launched an attack against Nationalist positions on November 8 to widen and enlarge their own front lines. In response the Second Bandera was sent on a punitive mission to blunt the Republi- cans’ thrust. The legionnaires immediately began taking heavy fire from every weapon the Republicans possessed, and their casualties began to mount. Regardless, they pressed on, getting about twenty yards from the Republicans’ positions. In this close-quarter fighting, the legionnaires began tossing hand grenades, which quickly took their toll on the defenders. Emboldened by the attack, the Republicans leaped out of their trenches and took on the legionnaires in what turned out to be inconclusive combat until nightfall. In the dark, both sides withdrew back into their trenches or front operating bases for the night and evacuated their wounded. Each side tried to infiltrate the other’s position throughout the night, but without success. Each attempt by the legionnaires to sneak up on the Republicans was foiled. At sunrise the following day the Second Bandera reorganized and focused on preparing for the day’s major operation: a second attempt against the Republican lines. Again the fighting was ferocious, involving hand-to-hand combat, with hand grenades and bayonets getting plenty of use. With the tide of battle turning against them, the Republicans concentrated their artillery, mortars, and firearms on the legionnaires to maintain their positions. However, this was fruitless, and the legionnaires put them to flight. Their retreat was so swift and disorganized that the Republicans were forced to abandon four machine guns, several mortars, two trucks loaded with ammunition, and other war materiel. With the front line now rectified, the Second Bandera advanced until it reached the town of Belchite, southeast of Zaragoza, where it spent the night. The following day, November 17, the bandera boarded a train for Zaragoza. In these battles the bandera suffered ten dead, twenty-seven wounded, and sixteen missing.22 On November 19 the Second Bandera departed Zaragoza and took part of the Sierra de la Corona as part of an operation whose goal was to recover some positions that the Republicans had occupied in the sector of Calamocha. In intense skirmishing with the Republicans, the Second Bandera’s companies were held up, so they divided into smaller fighting 192 | With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front groups and pressed on. A few legionnaires crawled up to the Republi- cans’ barbed-wire defenses, cut them, and enabled the companies to slip through and occupy these positions at bayonet point. The legionnaires now turned to fortifying the positions and providing security for the sector until November 28, when the Second Bandera was ordered by the high command to set off for Teruel and then to march westward to rescue a company of Civil Guardsmen besieged in Gea de Albarracín. After heavy fighting on November 29, the legionnaires captured the town, rescued the besieged guards, and took the column’s general staff as prisoners. The Republicans fled the town, leaving the streets and its environs littered with their dead and wounded along with their weapons and equipment. The casualties for the Second Bandera were four dead and thirty-one wounded.23 While the rest of the Second Bandera rested and refitted in Teruel, its Fifth Company went to Castralvo on November 30 to participate in an operation to dislodge the Republicans from their positions, which impeded Nationalist operations in that sector. As in Gea de Albarracín, in Castralvo the pro-Nationalist forces, primarily Civil Guardsmen, were surrounded and besieged in the town’s church. The Republicans had an ample supply of automatic weapons and had set them up in such a way that they could rake all the approaches into town with murderous machine-gun fire. Undeterred, the Fifth Company launched an attack that resulted in house-to-house fighting as the legionnaires methodically worked their way toward the center of town. By the time the legionnaires reached the church, the Civil Guardsmen occupied only the church’s steeple. The Republicans were driven out of Castralvo, leaving behind a large quantity of equipment as well as many casualties and prisoners. The Fifth Company was relieved by other soldiers and returned to Teruel, where it rejoined the rest of the bandera. For the remainder of 1936 the Second Bandera rested in Teruel and provided security for this zone.24 With the Third Bandera On the Asturian Front

When the Nationalist conspirators rose up against the Second Repub- lic in July 1936, they had written off Asturias, believing that the region would remain loyal to the Republic because of the uprising in October 1934, the subsequent repression, and the traditional strength of union- ized workers in the coal and manufacturing industry. This was not to be, however, for on July 19 Colonel Antonio Aranda Mata declared his support for the rebels in the capital of Oviedo, and in the nearby port city of Gijón the Fortieth Mountain Infantry Regiment of Montaña Simancas, under the command of Colonel Antonio Pinilla Barceló, barricaded itself inside the Simancas Barracks, a former school and convent. Colonel Pinilla had previously communicated his intentions of joining the rebellion to the city’s military, the Civil Guard, and the Assault Guard. Pinilla had a total of 600 men in Gijón, about 350 from his regiment and another 180 or so from the Eighth Battalion of Sappers and police or paramilitary units. The siege of Gijón lasted from July 19 to August 21. Pinilla hoped that he would be relieved by a Nationalist column coming from Galicia. Short on food and water and unable to further resist the intense shelling and aerial bombardment by the Asturian militias and the Republican air force, the Simancas Barracks fell on August 21. Colonel Pinilla was killed during the final assault, and his officers were summarily executed. The defense of the Simancas Barracks bought valuable time for the Na- tionalists, and especially Colonel Aranda in Oviedo, for the militiamen of Gijón stayed there until the capture of the barracks instead of going to assist the militiamen of Oviedo in wresting the capital from Colonel Aranda. Because Gijón is a port city, there was an attempt by the Nation- alist battleship España, the cruiser Almirante Cervera, and the destroyer

193 194 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front

N The Asturian Front, October–December 1936 ASTURIAS

Nationalist Army La Coruña Oviedo Bilbao

0510 Kilometers León 0510 Miles

Bay of Biscay

Gijón Pravia Santullano Otero de la Reguera Peñaflor Escamplero Grado San Claudio Oviedo San Roque Villamar Naló Trubia Rio n ASTURIAS

The Asturian Front, October–December 1936

Velasco to provide support. On July 29 the Almirante Cervera fired its guns in an attempt to assist those besieged in the Simancas Barracks, but it did little to stop the attackers’ assault. The most memorable part of the Simancas siege came on the last day, August 21, when Colonel Pinilla sent a desperate radio message to the Al- mirante Cervera requesting that the ship open fire on his position because the Republicans were inside the barracks. Thinking that the communication was a ruse by the Republican militiamen, the ship did not comply.1 Colonel Aranda pulled off one of the most memorable stratagems of the war when he led the Republicans in Oviedo to believe that he would remain loyal to the republic and that there would be no need to arm the workers. Aranda had earned a reputation as a masterful staff officer during the Rif War when he took part in the planning of the successful Alhucemas Bay amphibious landing in 1925, which was the turning point of the war and led to the defeat of the Riffian leader, Mohamed Abd-el- Krim. Appearing apolitical, Aranda convinced the leaders of the October 1934 revolution that Oviedo was safe and secure for the republic and that With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 195

Sappers and officers of the Third Bandera in Asturias the miners of the region could be better employed on other fronts that were still in doubt. Four thousand miners took a train to Madrid, leaving Aranda and his soldiers in control along with the full support of the Civil Guard, the Assault Guard, and the Falange. A phone call from General Emilio Mola at five o’clock in the afternoon on July 19 convinced Aranda to join the rebels. With about three thousand men and about a hundred Hotchkiss Model 1914 machine guns, plenty of rifles, and millions of rounds of ammunition, Aranda successfully resisted the hundreds of other miners who came from the coalfields—until October 16, when a Nationalist relief column arrived from Galicia. One of the units in that column was the Tigers of the Third Bandera of the Spanish Foreign Legion.2 The Third Bandera was in Toledo when it was reassigned to the northern front, so although it would not participate directly in Toledo’s relief, it did serve as a reserve force. On October 2 the bandera marched from Toledo to Cáceres and boarded a train for Galicia. The soldiers received a warm reception as the train stopped along the way in Salamanca, Zamo- ra, Astorga, and Lugo. At ten o’clock in the morning on October 5, the bandera left Galicia in trucks and entered Asturias. It was raining when the legionnaires arrived in Grado the following day, and they could hear the rattling of machine guns off in the distance from 196 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front the outposts of La Mata and Gurullés. In the driving rain three small columns were organized on the afternoon of October 6, and the Third Bandera took its place in the center. At sundown the columns began their march while listening to the echo of gunfire resonating from the pass at Peñaflor northeast of Grado. Full of anticipation as well as uncertainty, the legionnaires readied themselves to go into battle the next day against a well-armed and much larger army fighting on its home turf.3 On October 7 the bandera was in the vanguard of Lieutenant Colonel Jesús Tejeiro Pérez’s column as dawn broke over the fog-shrouded ravines and mountains. The Republicans, on the defensive, lay in wait. Visibility was poor, but this did not detain their artillery, which opened fire on the Nationalists—thus warning them that an infantry assault was eminent and denying the Republican infantry the element of surprise. The bandera arrayed for battle at the Peñaflor Pass, with each company having received its assigned mission for the day. The Republicans then began to fire their machine guns as well as their artillery. With every shell hitting the mark, casualties began to mount for the legionnaires. The situation turned potentially more dangerous as low-flying Republican aircraft unleashed their bombs. Fortunately for the legionnaires, however, these failed to hit their intended targets because of the fog. The Republican artillery increased its rate of fire while the Nationalist artillery, in a counterbattery exchange, tried to diminish its efficacy, but to no avail. Not only were the Nationalists unable to match the Republicans in artillery, they were also unable to match them in the air: the three old planes the Nationalists had in the sector were completely ineffective against the planes of the Republicans, who had total air supremacy. The Legion companies that reached the front line advanced with only their machine guns to provide fire support. Two armored trucks arrived from Peñaflor by way of the Trubia road to protect the Republicans’ flanks, but they proved ineffective. The legionnaires pressed forward, hurling hand grenades while climbing up the slopes. Before them was Volgues Peak, shrouded in smoke from the hand grenades. The Republicans then attacked in a wedge formation against the Fif- teenth Company. From Mount Cimera the Republicans poured lethal fire on the legionnaires, who suffered increasing casualties. The Republican defenders, overwhelmingly Asturians, fought tenaciously for every inch of ground. They were fighting for home and hearth and were intimately With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 197 familiar with the terrain. Despite the mounting casualty rate, Nationalist commanders continued to press the attack, citing the precarious situation in Oviedo where Colonel Aranda and his men were on the verge of being defeated. Finally, the bandera’s Ninth Machine-Gun Company was able to establish firing positions on Volgues Peak, which allowed for sustained indirect fire; in fact, its machine guns began to weaken the amount of fire coming from the Republicans. Another company advanced along the flank of the Nalón River while receiving fire from all directions. From Volgues, the bandera’s machine guns provided cover fire for the rifle companies as they advanced in echelon, carrying out a mopping-up operation throughout the nearby woods and ravines. The Fifteenth Company was ordered to attack to protect the left flank of the advance, but the nature of the topography made movement extremely difficult. Receiving incoming fire from all directions and fighting in small-scale units commanded by subalterns, the legionnaires slowly pressed on. Overcoming the roughness of the terrain, they took one Re- publican position after another from a committed defender willing to fight and die for every inch of soil.4 As darkness fell, the battle turned to skirmishing. The bandera deployed in a wedge formation along a two-and-a-half mile front and withstood repeated counterattacks by the Republicans, who pushed the legionnaires into a closed-off redoubt protected only by Palacin Hill. In darkness and in a driving rain, the Republicans pressed their attacks so strongly that the legionnaires were unable to evacuate their wounded from the field. At dawn on October 8 Lieutenant Coloma’s squad carried out a bold counterattack against the Republicans’ trenches; it had no significant effect on the course of the battle, but it did keep the Republicans off balance and vigilant. The situation remained the same throughout the morning, and the fighting continued. Mount Cimera still remained to be taken by the legionnaires; thus far it had proved to be an insuperable obstacle. The situation took a decisive turn when the Seventh Company, with the support of the Ninth Machine-Gun Company, launched a major attack on Mount Cimera that caught the defenders by surprise. As the Republi- cans fled their trenches, they were mowed down by the bandera’s machine guns. As soon as Mount Cimera was captured, the Fifteenth Company launched an attack on Loma de las Parras. There the Republicans were well entrenched, but they were nevertheless driven out of their positions 198 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front by the legionnaires, who hurled hand grenades and then resorted to their favorite weapon, the bayonet. The advance continued to Loma de Areces, where by nightfall the legionnaires consolidated their hold on the ground they had just captured and proceeded to reinforce the newly taken trenches and parapets.5 Early on October 9 the Nationalists continued their advance toward Oviedo, with Santullano de la Reguera as the next major destination. The Republicans offered little resistance, and the town of Transperana was captured, as was the intersection of the roads that led to Grado, Avilés, and Oviedo, the principal cities in that part of Asturias. At first the Republicans were caught off guard by the swiftness of the Nationalist advance, and they traded land for time in order to regroup their forces. Near Santullano the Republicans counterattacked. The legionnaires were able to occupy a few of the outer houses of the village, as well as the cemetery, as the day was coming to an end. Once again the Asturians demonstrated that what they lacked in formal military training they more than made up for in bravery and tenacity. It was obvious that the road to Oviedo would be arduous and costly. In a race against time as nightfall quickly approached, the order was given to take Santullano proper. Working in conjunction with a tabor of the Regulares, which was assigned the capture of Santullano Peak, the Third Bandera battled the Republicans for the town. The legionnaires took part of the town as well as the heights that surrounded it. However, as night fell and darkness set in, the capture of the town had not been completed. All units were ordered to hunker down in place and to remain on alert; meanwhile, they were battling a torrential downpour that was more troublesome than the Republicans. This operation was very costly for the legionnaires, who suffered heavy casualties, including the death of Lieutenant Álvarez de Toledo.6 At dawn on October 10 the Third Bandera attempted to renew its advance, but it proved to be in vain. The Republicans had spent the night not only fortifying their current positions but also selecting new ones that allowed them to set up their weapons to enfilade the attackers with interlocking fields of fire. Later, not satisfied with merely halting the advance of the bandera, the Republicans launched an attack on both its flanks, which isolated it from the rest of its column. The bandera was forced to fight for its life, repelling one thrust after another. The Ninth Company’s machine guns blazed away at the attackers, who tried repeatedly to take With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 199 them out only to be driven off by machine-gun crews who hurled hand grenades at them. The tabor tried to break the encirclement of the bandera only to find itself surrounded. Thetabor fought tenaciously, trying to hold on to what it had, and it was incapable of assisting the legionnaires. Unable to advance to the left of Santullano, the legionnaires and the Regulares tried to advance through the cemetery and then ford the river, but the Republicans had foreseen this route and shut it down, inflicting heavy casualties on the legionnaires and the Regulares. The Republicans brought to bear all their superiority in men and equipment, along with their aviation and artillery, and thus bombed and shelled Nationalist positions with impunity. The struggle between the two forces continued into the late afternoon, and it was only at nightfall that pressure began to sub- side, since the Republicans too had had suffered serious casualties during the past couple of days.7 Nevertheless, on the morning of October 11 the Republicans were once again ready for battle, having reinforced their forces overnight with Iberian Anarchist Federation militiamen who had been transferred from the siege of Oviedo. Under the cover of fog and a heavy downpour, several battalions of the militiamen threw themselves at the positions manned by the Seventh and Fifteenth Companies. These anarchists, though politically motivated and personally brave, were woefully outmatched by the legionnaires’ fighting skills and combat experience. The men of the two companies relished the opportunity of engaging the inexperienced militiamen in hand-to-hand combat rather than being on the receiving end of the Republicans’ incessant artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. The legionnaires advanced and occupied the important peaks of Otura and Otero. By doing so, the left flank of the column was able to proceed and the bottleneck unclogged. With the rearguard of the column now out of danger, the opportunity was taken to quickly evacuate the large number of wounded men and bring up a fresh supply of ammunition and replacements. The tide of battle had turned, but at a high cost. After the successful engagement that led to the capture of Otura and Otero Peaks, the Fifteenth Company lamented the death of Lieutenant Ignacio Tasso Izquierdo, whose machine-gun platoon was attacked by a company of anarchists. He had exposed himself to Republican fire at the head of his platoon, shouting words of encouragement to his men as they provided effective machine-gun cover fire that allowed other Legion units to advance. During the battle Lieutenant Tasso was shot through 200 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front the head and died. He had been at the Map Office of Melilla on July 17 when the uprising began.8 With the situation temporarily stabilized, the Third Bandera was pulled off the line and replaced by two battalions of the Volunteers of Orense. The bandera congregated in some gullies behind the front line to rest and refit after suffering heavy casualties in previous encounters. The period of rest and rehabilitation turned out to be short-lived, since within two hours of getting off the line, the situation changed. The bandera had reorganized its forces and was ready to deploy, and it was called upon to participate in a night mission to capture positions that had not been taken during the previous days. The operation failed because of darkness and the attackers’ unfamil- iarity with the difficult terrain, so the attackers were forced to return to their starting points. The following day (October 12), the commander of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Tejeiro, ordered an attack regardless of the cost. The Third Bandera was ordered to cross the river that bordered Santullano. The bandera’s companies deployed in the vicinity of the village of Ania while the Ninth Company set up its machine guns on the heights overlooking Ania and began to provide effective cover fire so that the other companies could advance toward the river. The Republicans took cover in houses by the river and tried to defend themselves, but the Legion’s machine guns unleashed a hail of bullets that kept them pinned down and unable to react. The other companies from the Third Bandera advanced boldly and crossed the river. The legionnaires hurled hand grenades at the Republi- cans and captured Forcón Peak. The tabor advanced along the left flank but ran into very stiff resistance that forced it to divert toward the Third Bandera. This turned out to be an auspicious move, for it brought the two units together just in time to confront an extremely powerful counterattack. It was imperative for the Republican military command in Asturias to halt, or at least delay, the arrival of the Nationalists at Oviedo and break the siege. To do so the Republicans threw every man and piece of equipment into the fight.9 The Republicans launched several spirited counterattacks to regain control of Forcón Peak but were thwarted by the Third Bandera’s machine guns. The Legion’s machine-gun placements were constantly moved as the tide of battle turned, with ultimately two machine guns set up to the right of Forcón Peak and the rest of the machine guns trained With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 201 on the front and the left flank. The Republicans tenaciously attacked in incessant waves. The hand grenade became their weapon of choice, and the bandera’s casualties began to mount precipitously as the Republicans struggled to gain control of the machine guns. A sergeant was killed defending the machine guns set up on the right flank. The crews serving the machine guns were pretty much defenseless, since the machine gun placements were extremely rudimentary and there had been no time to properly place them. At one point just about every member of the machine-gun crews was out of action. The legionnaires had to deal not only with a very determined Repub- lican infantry but also with its abundant artillery and aviation. During the clash to regain Forcón Peak, the Republicans had received continual artillery support that allowed them to rain down death and destruction on the legionnaires and their positions. The legionaries’ situation became perilous as their ammunition began to run short. The Third Bandera, though supported by a mountain battery, began to encounter difficulties in carrying out its mission. Not only were its field pieces old and worn, but during the height of the battle the captain in command of the battery reported that only four shells remained. The ammunition shortage was so dire that it was feared that if the Re- publicans launched another major attack, the legionnaires would have to defend themselves with their bayonets. The situation improved when the walking wounded and sick were pressed into transporting ammunition to the front posts. Adding to the misery was the incessant cold and rain that is typical of Asturias in the fall. The Third Bandera took a beating that day, suffering casualties in more than 75 percent of its men and having only ninety-three officers and men, many of them lightly wounded, to hold off the Republicans.10 At dusk on October 12 the commander of the column received an urgent telegram from Colonel Aranda in Oviedo pleading for help. How- ever, there wasn’t much the column could do at the time to accelerate its advance to rescue Colonel Aranda and his men. At this point the Republi- cans actually increased their attacks along the entire front line. Nonethe- less, after numerous engagements in which the legionnaires successfully fought off the Republicans, the situation calmed down for a short time. This respite allowed the men of the Third Bandera to work on building and strengthening their defensive positions and to resupply their men with ammunition. For seven straight nights the legionnaires and the 202 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front

Regulares had barely slept or even rested. The combination of getting to Oviedo in time to rescue the besieged and fighting for their own lives and those of their fellow soldiers drove them to carry on the fight. Through- out the night of October 12–13 the Republicans carried out desultory attacks along the line, probing for weaknesses, but they were driven off every time. Nevertheless, these continual Republican assaults were certainly taking a serious toll on the physical and psychological capabilities of the legionnaires and the Regulares.11 Once again the Republicans were ready for another attack in the morning after having reinforced their forces throughout the night. The Repub- lican attack on the morning of October 13 was even more ferocious and determined than previously, for its troops assaulted every part of the line. At some points of the line the Nationalists were caught off guard and were nearly overrun. Reinforcements had to be rushed forward to plug the holes and stiffen the defense. Throughout the morning the clash raged back and forth, and the casualties rapidly mounted. Around three o’clock in the afternoon the Republicans launched a massive, all-out counterattack that nearly wiped out the legionnaires. When all seemed lost, two tabors arrived to hold the line and keep the Republicans from breaking through. With these reinforcements the Na- tionalists solidified their positions and were able to enjoy a small period of much-needed rest.12 Desperate telegrams from Oviedo continued to arrive, informing the column that the Republicans were closing in and that the situation was critical. The Nationalist command decided to stay the course, and at sunset on October 13 ordered an all-out attack by all the column’s units. The Republicans withstood the assault and replied with intense gunfire. The most memorable part of this battle was the duel between opposing machine guns. In the impending darkness, the machine-gun nests resembled active volcanoes as they fired tongues of flame. The barrels quickly -be came red-hot from nonstop firing. Some machine guns were so overheated that the cartridges would self-detonate (“cook off”) as soon as they went into the chamber; there was no need to pull the trigger. The Regulares, along with the handful of legionnaires who remained in the fight, carried out an infantry assault to capture Valsera, leaving the battlefield strewn with the bodies of the dead and wounded. In total darkness and fog, the Nationalists failed to reach their objective. The weather and obscurity affected both sides; not knowing where they were With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 203 or where the enemy was, they decided the best thing to do was to stay put and wait for sunrise.13 By the light of day on October 14, the Regulares and the legionnaires regrouped and consolidated their forces in the most viable positions and evacuated their wounded. The Regulares suffered many casualties, and all that remained for the Third Bandera in that sector were a few riflemen, a machine-gun platoon, and a handful of officers. During a brief halt in the fighting the Nationalists resupplied their men with ammunition, and the Republicans also took advantage of the situation to resupply and replace their troops. After days of nonstop fighting the Republican leadership was certain that the Nationalist column was woefully short of men and equipment, so it decided to throw everything at it to wipe it out, regardless of the cost. The Republicans shifted their focus away from the front of the column to its rearguard, with the intention of cutting it off, encircling it, and obliterating it. The legionnaires in their defensive positions met the attackers head-on, and the battle seesawed back and forth with attacks and counterattacks and advances and retreats. The legionnaires were surrounded and thinly spread out along the front, so every available man was rushed to plug the gaps and replace the fallen. Stretcher bearers, clerks, muleteers, the walking wounded and the sick were all handed a rifle. Once again a shortage of ammunition made the legionnaires’ position tenuous, but the situation was temporarily re- solved when two mules belonging to the Third Bandera were able to work their way up the slopes to deliver their precious cargo of ammunition. The bandera’s machine guns were constantly being moved from one placement to another, depending on whether they were needed for offense or defense. About ten legionnaires attacked the Republicans with the intention of recapturing Valsera. These determined fighters inflicted heavy losses on the Republicans, but at a heavy price to themselves as well, since they were all killed. In another sector of the battle, Lieutenant Coloma and a group of legionnaires, under the cover of their own machine guns, assaulted the heights over the highway to Oviedo where the Republicans had entrenched themselves. However, Lieutenant Coloma had to be evacuated from the field because of wounds he had suffered in a previous engagement. As the sun started to set that evening, the legionnaires were surrounded and in quite a precarious position. The commander of the Third Bandera, 204 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front

Major Ricardo Alonso Vega, and the captain in command of the Ninth Machine-Gun Company were the only two officers who had not been wounded. Both the major and the captain spent the night directing the men to resist and tending to the many wounded who could not be evacuated. To make matters worse, a convoy bringing ammunition and accompanied by an artillery battery was shot to pieces by accurate and effective Republican fire. After two days of nonstop fighting and almost no sleep, the legionnaires could barely stay on their feet.14 At dawn on October 15 the Republicans decreased their attacks, which gave the Nationalists the opportunity to evacuate the most seriously wounded and also bring back ammunition to those on the front lines. The battle was renewed when the sun rose. Just as the Republicans were ready to launch their attack, two tabors arrived and went on the offensive. The Republicans were shocked and stunned by the arrival of the men from the Regulares, who attacked them with tremendous fury and resolution. By early afternoon, after hours of brutal combat, the encirclement was broken, which allowed the vanguard of the column to communicate with its rearguard through a gap. Through this gap the Nationalists sent a convoy full of provisions and ammunition, along with some regular army infantry battalions. All that remained of the Third Bandera that was fit to fight was a machine-gun platoon under the command of Lieutenant Piris Berrocal. The commander of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Tejeiro, ordered Lieutenant Piris to organize a machine-gun company with three machine guns from the bandera, three from the Regulares, and two mortars. With the newly formed machine-gun company providing fire support, atabor led by Major Gallego advanced toward the heights over the village of Escamplero. The heights were taken after a tough fight with a tenacious opponent. The machine guns were moved up to the heights to provide fire support for the next objective, which was the capture of Escamplero, which was pivotal to the column reaching Oviedo. After Escamplero was taken, the situation that evening was relatively calm. This gave the Nationalists an opportunity to improve their lines and to open a narrow corridor that allowed the Nationalists to finally reach the center of Oviedo on October 16 and save Colonel Aranda and his men. This action signaled the end of the Third Bandera’s participation in the drive for Oviedo. At this juncture, what was left of the Third Bandera was just a handful of men. The majority of the bandera’s men With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 205 were either dead or seriously wounded. For this reason the Nationalist leadership decided to pull the bandera from the front so that it could be reorganized. The Third Bandera was pulled back to Santullano de las Regueras, where it set up camp and waited for the arrival of replacements. The majority of these were new recruits. At the same time, the few riflemen fit for duty were detailed to provide security for the town of Otero in the Santullano sector. Major Alonso, the commander of the Third Bandera, was given command of this sector.15 After a week in Santullano receiving replacements, the Third Bandera had 250 new recruits, who were distributed among its four companies. Between October 22 and 24 the new recruits trained under the supervi- sion of the remaining veterans. Not only did they learn how to handle weapons, they were also imbued with the traditions and creed of the Le- gion. On the evening of October 24 the Ninth Machine-Gun Company was immediately ordered to proceed to the front position at Loriana. The company boarded trucks for the ride from Santullano to Escamplero, then abandoned the trucks and proceeded to march the rest of the way, carrying all their equipment on their shoulders. After a few hours of rest, the Ninth Machine-Gun Company was joined by the Mehal-la de Gomara No. 6, a Moroccan force. The mission for these two units was to rescue a supply convoy that was surrounded by the Republicans next to Puente de los Gallegos. At daybreak on October 25 the operation began with three machine guns placed at the point of departure to provide fire support for those advancing. Another three machine guns were carried up front with the vanguard of the forces deployed. The day’s first objective was the capture of San Claudio, which was easily accomplished. The next objective was the capture of San Roque. Here the heights overlooking the town and a few houses on the outskirts were taken by the legionnaires and the Moroccans. Caught by surprise, the Republicans fell back to their defensive positions to coordinate a counterattack. The Republicans struggled mightily to recuperate what they had lost in San Roque, and the battle raged for hours. Their major weapon was their artillery, which was close by and proved to be very effective against the Legion’s machine guns. The accuracy and effectiveness of the Republican artillery was impressive; the government shelled the machine-gun placements, sending both the machine guns and their crews flying through the air. 206 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front

Nevertheless, the legionnaires and the Moroccans continued to fight on with their rifles while deploying in small units. Unable to adequately cover such a wide front, the decision was made to withdraw. A company from the Mehal-la de Gomara No. 6 spent the remainder of the day and the entire night inside the church of San Claudio fighting off repeated Republican attacks. Meanwhile, in a driving rain, the legionnaires of the Ninth Machine-Gun Company spent the night in the environs of Casa Quemada.16 At the crack of dawn the following day, October 26, the order came from high command to renew the attack against San Roque. The Repub- licans were once again caught off guard by the celerity with which the Nationalists advanced. The attack by the legionnaires and Moroccans came so quickly that the Republicans had to abandon their breakfast cooking fires. The Ninth Company’s machine guns fired so many rounds so quickly that they overheated and became useless. They had to be set aside, and the company became a rifle company instead. All objectives were accomplished through the use of hand grenades to drive the Repub- licans from their trenches. This meant that the road to Oviedo was open. The supply column that had been trapped near Puente de los Gallegos was now free to make the journey to Oviedo. The situation improved for the legionnaires as well, because this was the first time since they had arrived in Asturias that the sun shone brightly. As the Nationalist column marched toward Oviedo, it was continually harassed and attacked by Republican forces, which refused to yield an inch of land. The infantry battalions that made up the bulk of the column successfully dealt with every attack. The valor and will of the militiamen was for naught.17 On October 26, after the battle in San Roque, the Ninth Machine-Gun Company went to Villamar (Asturias). Because the company’s machine guns had worn out in that battle from continuous firing, they needed to be replaced. The major problem with these World War I–era machine guns was that they were continuously fired until the barrels overheated and the rifling wore out. Also, proper maintenance and cleaning was quite often neglected. Lieutenant Piris, the commander of the company, requested permission to lead a platoon of eighteen men to Oviedo to obtain new machine guns. The platoon made it to Oviedo’s arms factory and planned on spending the night in the dormitories for Nationalist artillerymen. However, With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 207 as they were settling in, hand grenades exploded in the vicinity of the factory and set off a firefight with Republican forces. With the Republi- cans inflicting casualties on the Nationalists in Oviedo and fearing that his platoon would be cut off, Lieutenant Piris rallied his men, who broke into the arms depot, grabbed eight machine guns, and set them up in the factory’s windows. The Republicans had assembled 110 yards from the building when they began their assault, only to be stopped dead in their tracks when the machine guns opened fire on them. The Republi- cans were frozen in place by the hail of bullets going in their direction, which bought time for Lieutenant Piris to organize a proper defense for the building. The machine guns were set up in different pavilions of the factory, which allowed all avenues of access to be covered with interlocking fields of fire. Throughout the night the machine guns fired continuously, keeping the Republicans at bay. By daylight on October 27 the legionnaires’ faces were covered with soot and dust from a night of heavy fighting. The Republicans failed in their attempt to capture the factory and withdrew to a position a good distance away, having lost a great many of their comrades.18 Hoping to prevent another incident like the Republican attack on the arms factory, the Nationalists sent other military units from the Galician column to drive the Republicans away from their fortified positions. Un- able to make any progress against the well-entrenched Republicans by midday, the Nationalist high command decided to stay in place and fortify the defensive line to protect the arms factory. A Legion platoon emerged from the arms factory and marched down the street carrying brand-new machine guns. From Oviedo the legionnaires boarded trucks for San Roque, where they carried out the construction of fortifications and gun placements in preparation for the upcoming operations in Asturias.19 During October the Third Bandera accomplished the nearly impossible in Asturias when it fought, day in and day out, night and day, in the vanguard of the column that set out from Galicia to rescue Colonel Aran- da and other Nationalists besieged in Oviedo. The legionnaires had to deal not only with an opponent that was well equipped and fighting on its own terrain but also with one that was politically motivated. Moreover, the topography of Asturias was ideal for defensive operations, with its mountains and valleys making every step difficult and costly. The area’s incessant rainfall and fog only added to the hardship. 208 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front

After days of bitter combat, the “butcher’s bill” began to take its toll on the bandera, which lost 80 percent of its fighting men. On one particularly costly day of fighting, the bandera was reduced to its commander and two junior officers, and companies basically became platoons led by NCOs. In the end, fighting through sleep deprivation, a lack of food, and occasionally a critical shortage of ammunition, the bandera was able to break through to Oviedo on October 16. This was a big victory, both politically and psychologically, for the Nationalists and General Franco.20 The Third Bandera remained in Asturias in November, its main purpose being to keep the supply lines open to Oviedo. On November 8 now General Antonio Aranda and Colonel Pablo Martín Alonso inspected the front line along the sector of San Roque while planning an operation on Loma Verde and the cistern that provided Oviedo with water. The Mehal-la de Gomara and the Third Bandera’s Ninth Machine-Gun Company were assigned that mission, which began on November 9. The Mehal-la’s companies deployed under cover of heavy fog, bringing with them a couple of machine guns while the rest of the company’s machine guns remained at the point of departure to serve as a fire support base. One of the companies captured Loma Verde by surprise, cutting the road between Trubia and Oviedo. However, the other companies, which were advancing on the left flank, ran into a zone dotted with trenches. This slowed down their progress, but they pressed on, eventually reaching hills almost five hundred miles from the point of departure. Again the Republicans were taken by surprise but were able to quickly regroup and fight back, forcing the Moroccans to hit the ground and dig in. Fire support from the Legion’s machine guns back at the fire base was ineffective because of the fog that still hung in the air. The machine-gun group that had captured Loma Verde was now fighting in the vanguard. The Republicans fought back with great determination, and the battle went back and forth for hours as each side either attacked or counterattacked. Once the fog lifted, the Republicans received reinforcements, which allowed them to launch a massive assault against the Moroccans and drive them off Loma Verde. The Republicans occupied a few critically important positions, and the company was forced to retreat. This retreat was turning into a rout, and it was only the Ninth Company’s machine guns from the fire base that kept this from happening by pouring indirect fire at wherever the Republicans massed for an attack. With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 209

The day had started well for the Nationalists but quickly deteriorated as the Republicans came to realize their objectives. If the Republicans had lost access to the cistern and the road between Trubia and Oviedo, they would have lost Trubia as well.They were therefore willing to suffer heavy casualties, if necessary, to foil the attack. Trubia was Spain’s principal heavy-weapons factory, manufacturing artillery pieces, tanks, and armored vehicles. The Moroccan company and the members of the Ninth Machine-Gun Company were eventually able to make it back to their starting point, where they joined up with the rest of the Ninth Company. The Republicans continued to press their repeated attacks until the sun went down that evening.21 For the remainder of November the Third Bandera fought to keep the corridor to Oviedo open and incorporated new recruits to replace the fallen. Training was mostly on the job. The Third Bandera’s official record, for instance, notes that target “practice” was always done at the real enemy. Whether operating as individual companies or as the complete battalion, the Third Bandera manned defensive outposts along the route and made sure that the passage remained open. The most notable outposts on this zone were San Claudio, Monte de los Gallegos, Santullano, San Martín de Grullés, La Parra, and many other less important ones. When outposts manned by other military units were overrun and captured, it was the men of the Third Bandera who were called upon to take them back. This occurred on November 27, when Mount Cimera was taken by the Republicans and then quickly taken back by the tenacious legionnaires.22 The Asturian Front (December 1936) On December 1 the Third Bandera was operating in the San Roque sector when the Republicans launched a major attack in the area south of Escamplero. The Republicans seized Loma de los Gallegos and cut off the road to Oviedo. From its positions the Republicans were able to rake the vital road with their machine guns, making travel on it impossible. The Third Bandera’s Eighth Company, made up mostly of raw recruits who were still undergoing training, was ordered to stop the Republicans’ advance and, if possible, drive them from their positions in Escamplero. Contact was made with the Republicans at four o’clock in the afternoon, and the legionnaires of the Eighth Company handled themselves like veterans as they advanced against the Republicans’ trenches. Tossing 210 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front hand grenades as they moved from one cliff to another, the legionnairesa pressed their attack against an adversary superior in number. The first line of trenches was captured after repeated assaults, and the bodies of the Republican dead and wounded dotted the landscape. The Eighth Company’s achievements that day came at a great cost, with many casualties and the company’s inability to advance any farther. Those who remained fit for combat were ordered to dig in and defend what had been secured while the wounded were evacuated to the rear. With the fighting capability of the Eighth Company so diminished, the leadership ordered the Seventh and Fifteenth Companies of the Third Bandera to reinforce it, which they did with great promptness. The Re- publicans waited in their entrenchments for the arrival of these reinforcements and opened fire on them as soon as they came within range. As the bullets and shells whizzed back and forth, the legionnaires advanced in increments of fifty-five yards, and the Republicans gave up one trench after the other as they fell back. Legion casualties were heavy, and the men who fell were left behind as the rest pressed on with their attack. By the end of the day the legionnaires had achieved their objectives. The Republican trenches were filled with dead and wounded as well as copi- ous amounts of abandoned equipment. The casualty count for the Third Bandera surpassed 40 percent, but it was apparent that the Legion’s new recruits could get the job done just as well as the veterans.23 After this engagement the Third Bandera returned to Santullano, where it was joined by the bandera’s machine-gun platoons, which had been used as a reserve force in the line between Grado and Oviedo. San- tullano was designated as a strategic point from which the bandera could quickly respond to any threat in any part of the sector. All the Third Ban- dera’s companies set out for Grado on December 23 except for a platoon from the Seventh Company that was left to reinforce Otero. On Christmas Day the bandera’s companies embarked on an operation to capture Republican positions that were hindering travel on Cabruñana Road. Deploying for battle in El Fresno (in the Grado sector), the legionnaires took advantage of heavy fog to advance all the way to the Republi- cans’ lines without them noticing. When they did finally notice, it was too late; the legionnaires had the advantage, and after a brief but violent fight their objectives were achieved. The men of the Third Bandera quickly prepared for the counterattack they were sure would come. With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front | 211

The Republicans waited until nightfall to unleash the attack, following a preliminary barrage with all the weapons they possessed. The legionnaires responded effectively with their own machine guns, mowing down those who dared to leave the safety of their positions. Repeated attempts resulted in the same outcome, until the casualties were such that the Republicans abandoned their efforts to regain what they had lost. With Cabruñana Road secured and outposts along the line reinforced, the Third Bandera returned to Grado for some much-needed rest.24 The rest period for the bandera in Grado was short-lived. The Republi- cans went on the offensive in Gurullés on December 27, and the infantry assault was preceded by an artillery barrage, which landed shells just in front of the advancing troops. This allowed the attackers to get very close to the Nationalists’ positions and take them by surprise. The Nationalist defenders failed to halt this mass of determined attackers and were compelled to abandon their outposts. Like firemen responding to a blaze, the legionnaires of the Third Ban- dera hurried to halt the Republicans’ advance; the Seventh Company rushed to Gurullés, the Eighth Company was sent to Valduno, and the Ninth and Fifteenth Companies were ordered to take back Mount Cime- ra and restore the line of communications in that sector. It was a tenuous situation, and making it worse for the Nationalists was the appearance of Republican planes, which struck their reserves while strafing the legionnaires and inflicting many casualties on them. The Seventh and Eighth Companies accomplished their respective objectives by raising the morale of the defeated Nationalist troops and by leading the drive to regain the positions lost. The Ninth and Fifteenth Companies crossed the Peñaflor Bridge and climbed to the area close to Volgues Peak, which served as the base camp for the attack on Mount Cimera. The Ninth Company set up its machine guns and fired a curtain of lead that allowed the Fifteenth Company to advance. The men of the company clambered up the slopes of Volgues Peak, which was at least a half-mile climb. In conjunction with a company of the Regulares, the legionnaires attacked the defending Republicans, hurling hand grenades as they charged. With the capture of Mount Cimera and the road to Oviedo, Asturias’s capital was once again open. General Aranda was in Grado overseeing this operation, and its successful outcome moved him to telephone the 212 | With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front commander of the Third Bandera to congratulate him and to present the Ninth and Fifteenth Companies with a commemorative banner with PICO DE CIMERA on it that would be attached to the Third Bandera’s standard. In the battle for Mount Cimera the Third Bandera suffered the deaths of seven legionnaires and the wounding of fifteen. Meanwhile, the Sev- enth and Eighth Companies defended and fortified their respective positions against repeated Republican attacks for the remainder of the year and into early January 1937. On January 1 the Republicans unleashed a major offensive in this sector.25 Conclusion

By the end of 1936, serving as the “tip of the spear” of General Francis- co Franco’s Army of Africa, the Spanish Foreign Legion, in conjunction with the Moroccan Regulares, played a decisive role in taking the Nation- alist army from Spanish Morocco to the outskirts of Madrid and, in the process, occupying more than half of peninsular Spain. With the start of the Nationalist uprising against the Second Spanish Republic in Melilla on July 17, 1936, the plotters on the peninsula, as well as those in Spanish Morocco, were certain that if the uprising was to succeed, the Legion would have to be a major component of this effort. The conspirators had originally planned a swift and definitive coup d’état, but this did not occur. The revolt failed in the major cities of Ma- drid, Barcelona, and Valencia when workers and trade unionists took up arms to defend the republic. In Spanish Morocco the rebels, employing the Legion and the Regulares as shock troops, quickly and easily gained control of Melilla, Ceuta, the protectorate’s major urban centers of Tetuán and Larache, and its more considerable countryside. Seized by a temporary paralysis, the Republic made an unimpressive response to the immediate threat: it ordered the naval shelling of Mel- illa and the aerial bombing of Tetuán, both of which proved ineffective. The rebels in Spanish Morocco had sufficient time to prepare for their next move. With Spanish Morocco and its military forces secured for the rebels’ cause, the next step was to await the arrival of General Franco from the nearby Canary Islands to take command of the Army of Africa, which he did on July 19. The uprising in mainland Spain did not go as planned because only parts of the country joined the rebellion while others remained loyal to the republic. It was particularly imperative for the sustainability of the

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Nationalist rebellion in southern Spain in July and August 1936 that the rebels receive reinforcements from the Spanish Moroccan–based Army of Africa. This was initially accomplished by employing Spanish aircraft, and later Italian and German planes, to methodically airlift small numbers of legionnaires and members of the Regulares from Spanish Moroc- co to Spain in history’s first troop “air bridge.” However, this proved cumbersome and inadequate, and on August 5 the Nationalists turned to a daring sea crossing, the Victory Convoy, to ferry enough men, ammunition, and heavy weapons across the Strait of Gibraltar to support the Nationalist rebels in Andalusia during the first tenuous weeks of the revolt. Planes continued to fly from Tetuán’s airfield to rebel-held Seville, and ships sailed from Ceuta to the ports held by the rebels, permitting the Nationalists to build up their forces in southern Spain. The republic’s response, in terms of both land and naval forces, was insufficient to prevent the considerable transfer of this military force. By late August the bulk of the Army of Africa had made the crossing and was effectively operating in the field. From Seville, where the audacious General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano had seized the city for the rebels at the onset, the Nationalists had a secure base of operations with an intact and functioning airfield. With the Legion in the vanguard, Franco’s forces set out for the capital, not by the direct route that would have taken them from Seville through Córdoba, Ciudad Real, Toledo, and eventually into Madrid, but by a southwest route that took them toward the Portuguese border. The republic had anticipated the more direct route and was prepared to make a stand along it. However, Franco planned otherwise, since it would have meant crossing the rugged Sierra Morena, which runs east to west through Andalusia. This mountain range had caused headaches for Napoleon’s lines of communication between Madrid and Andalusia in 1808 during the War of Independence. Mountains provide excellent terrain advantage to the defender, and the republic could have theoretically cut off or halted the advancing rebel columns at Despeñaperros Pass, similar to what it had done at Somosierra Pass (Sierra de Guadarrama) and Alto del León north of Madrid, which successfully kept General Emilio Mola from taking the capital in early August 1936. During the march through the provinces of Andalusia and Extremad- ura, the Legion and the Regulares, in conjunction with the Civil Guard (which had joined the Nationalist cause) and the Falangist militia, carried Conclusion | 215 out a campaign of pacification, retribution, and terror. In a nation po- larized by political and ideological divisions since the Second Republic’s establishment in 1931, which had been greatly exacerbated by the election of the Popular Front government in early 1936, this campaign was particularly vicious. Instances of summary executions, torture, and brutality were commonplace, with old scores being settled by whichever side held the upper hand at the time in any particular location. Notable examples of this terror included the shooting of hundreds of prisoners in Badajoz’s bullring after that city’s capture by Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe Blanco’s forces in August 1936 and the murder of hundreds, if not thousands, of political and military prisoners by the republican government at Paracuellos del Jarama and Torrejón de Ardoz outside Madrid in early November 1936. Such horrors early in the war set a lasting precedent for the remainder of the conflict. Marching from Seville toward Mérida, Franco’s Army of Africa, as part of the Army of the South, advanced methodically in columns with the intent of hooking up with General Mola’s Army of the North. This was achieved in Aljucén (about nine miles north of Mérida) before moving eastward toward Toledo and Madrid. What made the Army of Afri- ca so potent was that it was led by the very capable Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe, a veteran of the Rif War who had served in both the Regulares and the Legion and was assigned the task of crushing the Asturian uprising of October 1934. Yagüe’s field commanders were also Regulares or Legion commanders with extensive combat experience. Moreover, what made the Legion and the Regulares so effective in the field was their strict discipline, valor, and training. Moving rapidly aboard trucks or on foot, these men were able to outmaneuver, outflank, and outfight the poorly trained and equipped militias sent by the government. After sealing off the border with Portugal and linking up with Mo- la’s forces in Cáceres, the Army of the South had in effect united the rebellious provinces of Galicia, Castille, and Navarre with Andalusia and Extremadura. Franco’s forces now turned eastward toward Talavera de la Reina, on the way to Madrid. However, at this point (September 21), Franco made a crucial decision to divert his forces toward Toledo to relieve Colonel José Moscardó It- uarte and his men, who were besieged in the Alcázar of Toledo by Re- publican forces. Yagüe strongly disagreed with this decision and argued 216 | Conclusion that the most important goal was to reach Madrid as quickly as possible, before the Republic could strengthen its defenses and make effective use of recently acquired Soviet military aid. Nevertheless, Franco saw the relief of the Alcázar as a propaganda imperative and an opportunity to bolster his image. After the relief of the Alcázar, the drive toward Madrid continued. By the fall of 1936, as Franco’s forces neared Madrid, the easy victories against poorly trained and poorly led militiamen became harder to attain as the republic’s supply lines with the battle front shortened and Soviet aid began to have an effect. The republic had also recovered from the paralysis that plagued it in the beginning and was now employing better organization, planning, and training. In Madrid, a Moroccan War veteran and the former minister of war, General José Miaja Menant, was given the task of defending the capital after the government’s relocation to Valencia. With the competent assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Vicente Rojo Lluch as his chief of staff, Miaja was able to stop the Nationalists at the Manzanares River on the western fringe of Madrid. In addition, the nature of urban warfare during the siege of Madrid was not the type of combat to which the Legion and the Regulares were accustomed. What had made the Army of Africa so successful during the first months of the war was its ability to move quickly by road, effectively employ its artillery to soften up the target, and then launch an infantry attack with enveloping maneuvers. Against poorly trained and poorly led militiamen in smaller towns and villages and the open countryside, this tactic worked very well. Howev- er, in Madrid every street became a redoubt as trenches and fortifications were dug in parks or across city streets. In addition, the republic still controlled the geographic center of Spain and could therefore move troops, equipment, and supplies from other fronts to bolster the defense of Madrid. On November 23 Franco abandoned his frontal assault on Madrid after failing to advance beyond University City and suffering staggering losses. The battle for Madrid ended the rapid advancement of the first six months on the central front, and the nature of the war became more conventional, with set-piece battles like those fought at Brunete (1937), Guadalajara (1937), Teruel (1937–1938), and the Ebro River (1938). Attrition replaced mobility as both sides attempted to gain the upper hand. After 1936 Franco’s new strategy was to encircle Madrid while Conclusion | 217 attacking northwest of Madrid to control Coruña Road; opening fronts in the far north (Asturias and Santander), in the northeast (Aragón), and in the southeast; and attempting to sever the vital road that connected Madrid and Valencia.1 In exchange for Spain’s gold reserves, Joseph Stalin sent modern airplanes (fighters and bombers), tanks, artillery, and technical advisors. Russian pilots and tank crews also went into battle on the side of government forces. In addition, the arrival of the International Brigades, courtesy of the Comintern, brought dedicated and in some cases experienced soldiers from around the world to Spain who were willing to fight and die for the republic against fascism. The arrival of Russian forces and the men of the International Brigade elevated the flagging morale of those in Madrid who waited in terror of what would happen to them and their city when the legionnaires and the “Moors” arrived. The Legion was involved in other fronts besides that of Franco’s Ma- drid Column. The Second Bandera was sent to Guipúzcoa and Aragón in August to assist Nationalist forces in the northeast part of the peninsula. The Second Bandera took part in the campaign that was successful in closing off the border with France at Irún, which meant that the republic’s only remaining border with France was through Catalonia. Furthermore, by holding on to Aragón despite concerted Republican attacks from Cat- alonia, the Nationalists created a buffer zone between Catalonia and Madrid. In the north the Third Bandera was dispatched to advance with Gali- cian forces to rescue Colonel Antonio Aranda Mata and his men, who were besieged in the capital city of Oviedo, Asturias. In brutal combat in the rugged Asturian mountains, the Legion and the Regulares, serving as the shock troops of the Galician column, played an important role in opening a gap that linked Galicia with Oviedo. In the mountains and valleys of Asturias, the legionnaires fought the well-entrenched militiamen as well as the inclement weather and the difficult topography. Subsequently, the fight for Asturias expanded beyond Oviedo, and the principality was seized by the Nationalists. As the casualties mounted for the Legion, it became imperative to increase the number of banderas, and this was done with the reconsti- tution of the Seventh and Eighth Banderas in September 1936 and the creation of the Ninth Bandera in December 1936. Eventually the Legion would grow to a formidable fighting force of eighteen banderas, composed mostly of Spaniards but with volunteers from other nations (e.g., 218 | Conclusion

Portugal, Ireland, Australia, and France) as well. Some men came looking for adventure, whereas others volunteered to fight for Catholicism and against “godless communism.” After the failed Nationalist attack on Madrid in late 1936, the Legion’s banderas and the Regulares were relocated to other fronts and incorporated into regular Nationalist army divisions (e.g., the 13th, 51st, and 150th), where they served as elite shock troops. In short, 1936 saw the apogee of the Legion’s importance to the Na- tionalist cause in terms of both its martial potency and its utility as a propaganda instrument to spread fear and defeatism among the republic’s civilian supporters. This reputation was certainly well deserved. In thirty-three months of combat during the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish Foreign Legion took part in 3,042 bloody engagements and sustained a total of 37,393 casualties: 7,645 dead, 28,972 wounded, and 776 missing in action.2 Notes

Introduction

1. Stanley G. Payne and Jesús Palacios, Franco: A Personal and Political Biogra- phy (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 36–52, covers Franco’s time with the Legion in Spanish Morocco from 1920–1927. 2. Subinspección de la Legión, ed., La legión española: 75 años de historia, 1920–1995 (Málaga: Gráficas Urania, 2002), 324; José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!: De Millán Astray a las misiones de paz, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 2005), 241. 3. At this time the Spanish Foreign Legion was officially called El Tercio. El Tercio was divided into two “legions”; the First Legion, commanded by Lieu- tenant Colonel Ricardo de Rada Peral, was based in Melilla, and the Second Le- gion was based in Ceuta. On May 8, 1937, El Tercio became the Spanish Foreign Legion, and the two former “legions” now became “tercios.” 4. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 248. 5. In 1927, when he was promoted to the rank of colonel, Mateo wrote a book about the Legion entitled La legión que vive: Episodios de la legión (Ceuta, Spain: Imprenta África, 1927). 6. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 249; Subinspección de la Legión, ed. La legión española, 327, also notes that the Seventh Bandera was accompanied from Ceuta by the Regulares.

219 220 | Notes

7. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 327. On June 4, 1931, the Legion was also instructed to reduce each bandera by one company and part of its Squadron of Lancers. 8. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 250. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 328–29, says that he was shot just once with a Smith twelve- caliber revolver, and the bullet entered and exited. See also “En Ceuta, un ex- sargento del Tercio asesina al coronel de este e intenta suicidarse,” ABC, Tuesday, March 8, 1932. It was quite common in the Army of Africa for some officers, and particularly sergeants, to skim funds from their soldiers’ mess allowance. 9. Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic, 1931–1936 (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2000). This is an excellent account of the history of the Radical Republican Party from 1901 to 1936. 10. Ricardo de la Cierva, Brigadas Internacionales, 1936–1996: La verdade- ra historia mentira histórica y error de estado (Toledo, Spain: Editorial Fénix, 1997), 274, says that each bandera was a battalion-size unit made up of seven hundred men. With six banderas, the Legion thus numbered forty-two hundred men at the start of the war, with 90 percent being Spanish. See also Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 250. In Spanish Morocco

1. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 365, 367. The five troops of the Regulares were based in Tetuán (No. 1), Melilla (No. 2), Ceuta (No. 3), Larache (No. 4), and Alhucemas (No. 5). Cierva, Brigadas Inter- nacionales, 274, notes that these soldiers were, for the most part, Spanish citizens of Morocco. Each troop was composed of three tabors (battalions) of infantry and one squadron of cavalry, totaling eleven thousand men. Cierva states that in July 1936 the Army of Africa numbered 47,127 men, but there is a great discrepancy in the sources regarding the size of the Army of Africa at the start of the Civil War. For example, Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada (Europeo-Americana), 1936–1939, vol. 2, s.v. “El ejército de Marruecos en 18 de julio de 1936” (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1944), 1447, lists all the military units in Spanish Morocco and gives a total of 32,239 men (16,729 Spanish and 15,570 Moroccan); of that number, 4,200 were Spanish Foreign Legion (six banderas) and 8,820 were Regulares (fifteentabors ). Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 297–298. On page 303, he notes that in July 1936 the Army of Africa numbered about 47,000 men, of whom 15,570 were Moroccans. Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution, and Revenge (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 115, also gives 47,000 as the number of soldiers in the Army of Africa. Peter Elstob, Condor Legion Notes | 221

(New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), 50, notes that the Army of Africa numbered 25,000 men (on page 33, he claims that two divisions were stationed in Africa). See also Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Touchstone, 1986), 205. María Rosa de Madariaga, Los Moros que trajo Franco: La intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil (Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002), 165, records that on July 18, 1936, the Army of Africa was composed of roughly 40,000 men of which 17,000 were Spanish conscripts, 5,000 were legionnaires and professional European troops, about 9,000 were Moroccans (Regulares), and about 8,000 were Moroccan auxiliary troops. Payne and Palacios, Franco, 128, state that the Legion and Regulares together numbered 21,000 men, but on page 538, note 6, he adds, “As can best be determined, there were about thirty thousand troops in the protectorate: forty-two hundred in the Legion and seventeen thousand were in the regulares and other Moroccan units [e.g., the police], and the remaining ten thousand were ordinary Spanish recruits.” See also Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Lon- don: Oxford University Press, 2002), 266; and Harry Browne, Spain’s Civil War, 2d ed. (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 37. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author. 2. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 296. See also Juan Yagüe Blanco file, Legajo No. LL-30, Archivo General Militar (AGM), Segovia; and Luis E. Togores, Yagüe: El general falangista de Franco (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2010). 3. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, for more on the assassination of Calvo Sotelo. 4. Elstob, Condor Legion, 37, 44; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 217n1, notes that Mola instructed all units to be ready at five o’clock on July 17 for the uprising to take place in Morocco and on the peninsula on July 18. 5. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 368–70, contains Lieu- tenant Julio de la Torre’s account of events. See also Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 215–216. According to this source, it was Lieutenant Colonel Darío Gazapo who telephoned the Legion to come to the rescue, whereas Elstob, Condor Legion, 44, says it was Lieutenant Colonel Juan Seguí who made the call. See also Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 1967), 341; and Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 308–10. Assault Guard Lieutenant Juan Zaro later joined the Nationalists, was promoted to captain, and died on the Madrid front. 6. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 216; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 314–15. On page 311, Rodríguez notes that 150 legionnaires, under the command of Lieutenant Bragado, surrounded the main government offices in Melilla. 222 | Notes

Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 20–21, covers the movement of the Second and Third Banderas from the interior of the eastern zone of the protectorate toward Melilla starting July 17. 7. General Amado Balmes Alonso file, Legajo No. B-340, AGM; Payne and Palacios, Franco, 122, 537n46. Although Balmes died at the gun range as a result of careless gun handling, conspiracy theories arose from his fortuitous death. See Ángel Viñas, “La conspiración del general Franco y otras relevaciones acer- ca de una guerra civil disfigurada” (Barcelona: Critica, 2011), 48–115; Antonio Monroy, “Chismes en torno a la muerte del General Balmes,” Razón española: Revista bimestral de pensamiento, no. 170 (November–December 2011), 341–47; and Manuel de la Fuente, “Franco no conspiró para asesinar al General Balmes,” ABC, April 5, 2015. Fuente quotes Moisés Domínguez Núñez, who discounts previous conspiracy theories that blame Franco for the death of Balmes with newly discovered evidence. 8. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 216–17, 224; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 320, 324. Rodríguez notes that General Gómez was eventually sentenced to twelve years in prison and discharged from the army, after waiting five years (1936–1941) to go to trial. Thomas incorrectly identifies Blanco as the commander of the First Bandera instead of the First Legion (see Introduction, note 3). Colonel Molina was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe, and Colonel Blanco was replaced temporarily by Lieutenant Colonel Maximino Bartoméu. Bartoméu turned over command of the First Legion to Lieutenant Colonel Heli Rolando de Tella y Canto, who had been away visiting the French zone and was then appointed commander of the Infantry Battalion of Melilla No. 3. Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 265, notes that Lieutenant Colonel Heli Tella had sought refuge from arrest in French Morocco in April after declaring to his regiment (the First Legion) that the uprising was coming soon. Lieutenant Colonel Yagüe, who had commanded the Second Legion, now turned over that position to the commanding officer of the Fifth Bandera, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Antonio Castejón Espinosa. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 10. 9. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 11. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, July 17, 1936. During World War II, as colonels, José Vierna Trápaga and Pedro Pimentel Zayas commanded regiments of the Spanish Blue Division in Russia. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, July 17–18, 1936. When Franco arrived in Tetuán from Las Palmas on July 19, he sanctioned the execution of his cousin, Ricardo de la Puente Bahamonde, who had surrendered the previous day, after an artillery and infantry assault by the Regulares on the Notes | 223 airfield. Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 151, notes that during one of many arguments with his Republican cousin, Fran- co told him, “One day I’m going to have you shot.” Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 269n6, adds that Franco turned over temporary command to General Luis Orgaz y Yoldi (the new high commissioner of the protectorate) in order to carry out the death warrant for this cousin so as not to have to do it himself. 11. José Manuel Guerrero Acosta, La vida dos veces: Biografía de Víctor Martínez–Simancas García (Madrid: Estudios Especializados, 2014), 21. A Re- publican bimotor plane first bombed the Legion’s base camp at Dar Riffien and then bombed Tetuán from a low altitude, dropping eight bombs and causing casualties in the Moorish neighborhood. 12. Madariaga, Los Moros, 168–69; Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 272–79. Sub- inspección de la Legión, La legión española, 11–12, notes that Dar Riffien and Ceuta were also bombed. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, 353, discusses the role of the Spanish Navy in remaining loyal to the republic and shelling Melilla. See also Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 217–19, 226–27, 231, 267. The three destroyers were the Sánchez Barcaíztegui, the Almirante Valdés, and the Churruca. The Sánchez Barcaíztegui’s crew remained loyal to the republic, over- powered their rebellious officers, shelled Melilla and Ceuta, and then returned to Cartagena. For technical details about these three destroyers, see The Illustrat- ed Encyclopedia of 20th Century Weapons and Warfare, vol. 6, s.v. “Churruca” (New York: Columbia House, 1978), 597–98. See also Rob Stradling, “Gernika in Context,” Historically Speaking 9, no. 1 (September–October 2007), 38. Ro- dríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 318, 323, writes that recruiting Moroc- can soldiers was not a problem because they would be fighting the “Reds,” who were “Godless infidels,” and adds that High Commissioner Álvarez was tried, condemned to death, and shot on October 16, 1937. See also Ali Al Tuma, “The Participation of Moorish Troops in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39): Military Value, Motivations, and Religious Aspects.” War & Society 30, no. 2 (August 2011): 91–104; Ali Al Tuma, “Tangier, Spanish Morocco and Spain’s Civil War in Dutch Diplomatic Documents,” Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 3 (June 2012): 451n75. Early in the war (December 1936) the Dutch envoy in Tang- ier, F. Gerth Van Wijk, questioned why the Moroccans would so eagerly join Franco’s army. Some of the reasons were the following: they were given a modern rifle, a prized possession for tribesmen; it gave them the opportunity to kill “a Christian dog” (roumi) without repercussions or punishment; they received a regular salary as well as the promise of plundering; and if they were killed in battle, they would enter heaven (paradise) for having fought the Christians. See 224 | Notes also Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931–1939 (Princ- eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 232. On July 18 workers in Tetuán and Melilla tried to carry out a general strike in their respective cities but were swiftly repressed by the rebels. 13. Servicio Histórico Militar (SHM), Madrid, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Ter- cio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), July 18–27; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 15. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 218, incorrectly wrote that the Second Bandera of the Legion took Ceuta. I believe his mistake, once again, was to confuse the Second Legion with the Second Bandera. The Second Legion, based in Ceuta and Dar Riffien, was composed of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Banderas. On July 17–18, the Second Bandera (which was part of the First Le- gion, along with the First and Third Banderas) was in Targuist, located halfway between Ceuta and Melilla, in the middle of the Spanish Protectorate. See Guer- rero Acosta, La vida dos veces, 22. 14. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 224. Of the five commanding officers of the Regulares, three joined the rebels: Lieutenant Colonels Carlos Asensio Cabanil- las, Fernando Barrón Ortiz, and Francisco Delgado Serrano. Lieutenant Colonel Juan Caballero López of the Regulares of Ceuta No. 3, who was on leave in Hué- var del Aljarafe, was shot in Seville by General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano’s forces on August 31, 1936, for not joining the rebellion. Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rome- ro Bassart escaped from Larache to the French Zone. See also Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 270, who says that five loyal officers and seven civilians were killed in Larache by the rebels. 15. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 16; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segunda Tercio, Sexta Bandera (1936–39), July 18, 1936. The Sixth Bandera traveled from Xaüen to Dar Riffien, where it took part in the ceremony paying homage to “S.E. [His Excellency], General Don Francisco Franco Bahamonde,” then proceeded to Ceuta, where it provided “security and vigilance” in and around the city for the remainder of the month. 16. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 12, 15; Preston, Franco, 153. In addition to the ships previously named, the merchant steamer Lázaro also took part, and together the ships ferried 220 men to Cádiz. On July 19 the gunboat Dato and another ferry carried another 170 men to Algeciras. In total, 225 men of the Regulares were shipped to the peninsula. Franco believed that the navy’s loyalty to the republic was a setback for the uprising and for his plans to ferry the Army of Africa to the peninsula. Although many naval officers were in favor of the uprising and supported it, the crews, made up of working- class and lower-class men, remained loyal to the republic, and in some cases Notes | 225 they imprisoned or killed their rebellious officers. For an excellent description of Franco’s army in the Spanish Civil War, see George Esenwein, “Spanish Civil War: Franco’s Nationalist Army,” in A Military History of Modern Spain: From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror, ed. Wayne H. Bowen and José E. Alvarez (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 68–92. 17. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 17; Preston, Franco, 145. Franco also raised the men’s salary, which was already twice that of the regular army. 18. For a colorful description of General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, as well as his role in the uprising in Seville, see Peter Wyden, The Passionate War: The Narra- tive History of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 43–44. General José Sanjurjo Sacanell never made it to Burgos to head the Nationalists. The corpulent general, along with his dress uniforms and decorations, was killed on takeoff aboard a small two-seater airplane. The pilot, Juan Antonio Ansaldo, survived the crash and recounted the episode in Robert Payne, The Civil War in Spain 1936–1939 (New York: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1962), 20–22. 19. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 12; John Scurr, The Span- ish Foreign Legion, Osprey’s Men-at-Arms Series, no. 161 (London: Osprey, 1985), 20. The first source says there were three flights per day, and the second one claims there were four per day. See also SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Ter- cio, Quinta Bandera, July 20, 1936. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 326–327, which details the actions and activities of the Fifth Bandera in eliminating the leftist opposition once it arrived in Seville. The Breguet 393T, which is the type of plane I believe they were in, seated ten passengers, whereas the Fokker seated eight to twelve passengers. Whichever it was, the planes that flew across the Strait had their seats removed and the legionnaires and Regulares packed in, usually sixteen men per plane. The top speed of these trimotors was about 120 miles per hour, and the distance between Tetuán and Seville is about 125 miles. See also Preston, Franco, 154. In addition to the types of aircraft already noted, there was a Dornier DoJ “Wal” flying boat, based in Ceuta, that ferried troops to Algeciras, and after July 25 there was a Douglas DC-2, capable of carrying twenty-five men per plane. When Franco permanently relocated to Seville on Au- gust 7, he used the Douglas DC-2 as his personal aircraft to visit with General Mola and other commanders. See also Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 24; and Jesús Salas Larrazábal, Air Power over Spain, trans. Margaret A. Kelly (Lon- don: Ian Allan, 1974), 354. The latter source details the deployment of military aircraft in Africa in July 1936 as follows: Group No. 1 (Breguet 19s) in Tetuán 226 | Notes

(Sania Ramel), Melilla (Nador), and Larache (Auámara) Fokker VII Squadron at Cabo Juby (western Sahara); and Seaplane Squadron (Dornier “Wals”) at Melilla (El Atalayón-Mar Chica). 20. James W. Cortada, ed., Modern Warfare in Spain: American Military Ob- servations on the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011), 3. In report no. 6382, “Spanish Situation—Military,” dated July 23, 1936, and sent from Madrid to Lisbon to Washington, DC (War Department), the US military attaché, Colonel Stephen O. Fuqua, stated that he was giving the “best information available but not wholly reliable” and added that “probably 2,500 Moroccan troops have been transferred to Algeciras and Cadiz.” This sizable discrepancy in numbers (250 versus 2,500) clearly demonstrates the lack of accurate information on rebel troop numbers at the time. See also José Manuel Martínez Bande, La campaña de Andalucia, Servicio Histórico Militar Mono- graph No. 3 (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1986), 18–21,which covers the uprising in Andalusia and Seville. 21. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 12, 14; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 329; Preston, Franco, 153; Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), 108; Néstor Cerdá Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander: Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July–October 1936,” Journal of Military History 75, no. 4 (October 2011): 1142–43. On July 25 General Luis Orgaz y Yoldi was sent by Franco from Tetuán to Granada so that he could supervise the preparation of defensive works to prevent the Republicans from trying to retake the city. 22. For more on the Lufthansa-German connection with Franco and the arrival of the Italian airplanes, see Elstob, Condor Legion, 47–53, 56. Javier Tusell, Vivir en guerra: España 1936–1939 (Madrid: Sílex, 1996), 51, mentions the anecdote that Hitler (who used a Junkers 52/3m as his personal aircraft) said that Franco should have erected a monument to the Junkers 52 since they had allowed him to transport twice the number of troops by air than he had by sea during the crucial first weeks of the revolt. The Junkers 52/3m had a speed of 157–177 miles per hour and typically carried seventeen soldiers. See also Preston, Franco, 153–54, 160–61. According to Fraser, Blood of Spain, 108n1, Italy sent nine S-M 81 bomber/transports to Franco. See also Raul Arias Ramos, La Legión Condor en la Guerra Civil (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2003), 76. Each plane could transport up to 40 men and flew four or five round trips per day; therefore a single aircraft could carry 160–200 men per day. See also Ángel Viñas and Carlos Collado Seidel, “Franco’s Request to the Third Reich for Military Assistance,” Contemporary European History 11, no. 2 (May 2002): 206. The fighters were “forbidden to engage in combat unless under attack.” Notes | 227

23. Payne, Politics and the Military, 354; John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 66–84 (for the Spanish-Italian negotiations of July 1936); Luis A. Bolín, Spain: The Vital Years (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), 167–173; Elstob, Condor Legion, 56. Ciano was able to convince Mussolini to aid Franco by telling him that French Prime Minister Léon Blum had agreed to provide substantial aid to the republic. 24. Viñas and Collado Seidel, “Franco’s Request to the Third Reich for Mili- tary Assistance,” 201. 25. Ibid, 191, 210. Hitler aided Franco because “Hitler, we surmise, basically for strategic reasons linked to his ardent desire to weaken France’s position, agreed to give some assistance to the rebel Spanish general.” See also Elstob, Condor Legion, 50–53. 26. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 15–17, 20; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 332–33. 27. Preston, Franco, 155. 28. Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 99. 29. According to Preston, Franco, 162, the airplanes that took part in the protection of the Victory Convoy were two Dornier “Wal” flying boats, several S-M 81 bombers, and six Breguet 19 fighter-bombers. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 17–20, gives a firsthand account of the crossing by a man who crossed aboard the Arango. Bolín, Spain, 174–76, describes his participation in the crossing while flying in one of the Italian bombers. Rodríguez Jiménez, A¡ MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 332–33, 344, says that the Victory Convoy transported three thousand men and materiel (e.g., artillery, medical supplies, and munitions) from Ceuta to Algeciras, whereas, Politics and the Military, 359, claims that the Vic- tory Convoy transferred twenty-five hundred men and materiel to the peninsula, so that by the end of August there were nearly nine thousand soldiers in Spain. Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1142, states that the Victory Convoy “managed on 5 August 1936 to ferry some 3,000 troops (1st Bandera, 3rd Tabor 2nd Grupo de Fuerzas Regulares Indigenas [GFRI], 3rd Tabor 4th GFRI) plus artillery batteries, communications, military and medical vehicles, 1,200 artillery shells, and two million rifle cartridges.” Francisco Espinosa Maestre, La columna de la muerte: El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), 2, notes that on August 5, eight thousand men and a large amount of materiel crossed from Ceuta to Algeciras as part of the Victory Convoy. 30. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 21–24; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 333. Scurr, Spanish Foreign Legion, 20, notes that 228 | Notes by November 1936 the Army of Africa had 23,393 men on the peninsula, having participated “in this first ‘air bridge’ in military history.” See also Joaquín Gil Honduvilla, Marruecos ¡17 a las 17! (Sevilla: Guadalturias, 2009). 31. Fraser, Blood of Spain, 108n1; see also José Manuel Martínez Bande, La campaña de Andalucia, Servicio Histórico Militar Monograph No. 3 (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1986), 43–65. The Legion Arrives in Andalusia

1. Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Commu- nism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 109–10. 2. In order to prevent revolutionary mobs from seizing an armory or arsenal and arming themselves, it was common practice for military rifles to be stored in one place and their bolts in another. Larrazábal, Air Power over Spain, 37, notes that in Madrid, “a close watch was kept on the bolts of 45,000 rifles deposited in the artillery park [depot].” Wyden, Passionate War, 47, says that when sixty-five thousand rifles were delivered by truck from the War Ministry to the headquarters of the two biggest labor unions, the workers grabbed the rifles only to find that sixty thousand of them did not have their bolts, which were stored in the Montaña Barracks and held by the rebels. The War Ministry ordered the colonel in command to surrender the bolts, which he refused to do. This led to an attack on the Montaña Barracks and an uprising in Madrid. Wyden compares the attack on the barracks in Madrid to the storming of the Bastille in Paris during the French Revolution. 3. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 232–36, 243–45, 248. The capture of the San Andrés Barracks provided the anarchists with about thirty thousand rifles; before this, they had only two hundred. Among the many rebel casualties in the failed uprising in Barcelona were Captain Ramón Mola Vidal, the brother of General Emilio Mola Vidal; Ramón committed suicide on the night of July 20–21, and the senior rebel officer in Barcelona and Rif War veteran, General Manuel Goded Llopis, was captured, tried, and shot on August 12 inside the fortress of Mont- juïc. See also Cortada, Modern Warfare, 3, 10, 11. In his report No. 6382, dated July 23, 1936, Colonel Fuqua reported that in Madrid, the Thirty-First Infantry Regiment of Sappers and Miners was virtually destroyed by government forces in their barracks (i.e., the Montaña Barracks) and that “some 100 officers and some 200 civilians [out of 400 civilian insurgents] are reported to have been shot immediately upon surrendering.” However, the Signal Regiment based in El Par- do (Franco’s future residence), ten miles north of Madrid, was able to escape by truck and join the rebels in Segovia. Notes | 229

4. Preston, Spanish Civil War. Chapter 4 covers the initial days of the uprising in great detail, including which cities quickly fell to the rebels (e.g., Burgos, Sala- manca, Segovia, Ávila, Valladolid, and Pamplona) and which successfully resisted (e.g., Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, and Málaga). See also Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 219–31; and Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 12. Colonel Fuqua reported that in Madrid twenty-five thousand citizens had been armed, and since they objected to being put under the command of the regular army or the police, they “will in any eventuality become a menace to society when with- drawn from the front lines.” Fuqua estimated that in the first days of the uprising in Barcelona, three hundred were killed and twelve hundred were wounded. 5. Payne, Civil War in Spain, 29–30. Right-wing militias were crucial for capturing and securing Andalusia for the Nationalists in July and August 1936. Scurr, Spanish Foreign Legion, 21, writes, “To fight in this crusade [the Spanish Civil War] 60,000 volunteers rallied to form 50 Traditionalist [Carlist] and Falangist militia battalions during the first three months of conflict, while more than half the strength of another 50 newly raised regular battalions were also volunteers.” For a detailed account of the combat actions of the Spanish Foreign Legion (and the Regulares) in crushing the Asturian miners’ revolt of October 1934, see José E. Álvarez, “The Spanish Foreign Legion during the Asturian Uprising of Octo- ber 1934,” War in History 18, no. 2, (April 2011): 200–24. 6. Preston, Spanish Civil War, 104–7. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 221–23, says that Queipo de Llano had fifteen Falangists with him, not fifty. See also Raymond Carr, ed., The Spanish Civil War: A History in Pictures (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 44–45. 7. Payne, Civil War in Spain, 29. 8. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), July 20– 22, 1936; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MI LA LEGIÓN!, 327. In the attack on Triana on July 20, the attackers used an armored car. The Assault Guard in all the major cities, including Seville, had been issued such cars. They were used by both sides during the civil war. I strongly believe that the armored car used was the standard vehicle for the time, the Autoametralladora Blindado Modelo 1932 (or the Bil- bao-1932). For more on the Bilbao-1932 armored car, see Javier de Manzarrasa, Blindados en España I: La Guerra Civil, 1936–1939 (Valladolid, Spain: Quiron Ediciones, 1991), 26–29. See also Tusell, Vivir en guerra, 20, for a photo of a column of Nationalist soldiers, accompanied by horses and wagons, headed for the Triana neighborhood of Seville. 9. Cándido G. Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid: Ruta libertadora de la columna Castejón, 4th ed. (Granada, Spain: Librería Prieto, 1937), 45–46. The 230 | Notes standard medium field piece of the Spanish Army’s artillery branch in 1936 was the Canon de 75 modèle 1912 Schneider (the “French 75”). This 75-millimeter gun was manufactured in Spain (Asturias) at the Fábrica de Armas de Trubia. Served by a crew of six, the gun fires twelve to fifteen rounds per minute, with an effective range of about five and a half miles. For a nice photo of the gun, see José Mario Armero and Manuel González, Armas y pertrechos de la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Ediciones Poniente, 1981), 40. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39); Subin- spección de la Legión, La legión española, 26. 11. Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 44. According to Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 327, the actions of the Fifth Bandera in Triana were uncalled for, because “the leftists had hardly committed injuries against people.” In 1936 the Fifth and Sixth Banderas were battle-tested units. Both banderas had taken part in crushing the Asturian miners’ revolt in October 1934. In that campaign, the Le- gion and the Regulares brought the brutality of the Rif War to the major cities and mining villages of Asturias. Now, in 1936, they were bringing the Rif War to the Pueblos Blancos (White Towns) of Andalusia. See Agencia EFE, Imágenes inéditas de La Guerra Civil (1936–1939) (Madrid: printed by author, 2002), 38. 12. Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 47–48; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Se- gundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), July 22, 1936. The “characteristic spirit” that Major Castejón referred to is the first and most important point of the twelve–point Legion’s Creed, which states, “The spirit of the legionary is unique and without equal; it is of blind and fierce combativeness, always seeking to close with the enemy to employ the bayonet.” See José E. Álvarez, The Betrothed of Death: The Spanish Foreign Legion during the Rif Rebellion, 1920–1927 (West- port, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 237–38. 13. Payne, Civil War in Spain 1936–1939, 29, 30. It appears that Antonio Bahamonde was greatly impressed, and terrified, by the Moroccan Regulares (“Moors”)—more so than by the legionnaires. Payne then describes how the Moroccans set up their camps in the city parks:

They uprooted shrubs and hedges to build the bonfires, over which, in groups, they cooked their meals; all brought teapots, which they kept continually over little fires, which extended in long files along the prom- enades; they washed their clothes in the ponds of the park; those who bathed did so in absolute nudity. The prostitutes and inverts were to be seen there at all hours; in plain daylight the most shameful scenes present- ed themselves.

This anecdote also appears in Wyden, Passionate War, 108. Notes | 231

14. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), July 23–31; Subinspección de la Legión, La legion española, 26. During the last week in July the following towns were secured for the Nationalists: Valencina de la Concepción, Castilleja de Guzmán, and Camas (July 24); Palma del Condado and Manzanilla (July 25); Fernán Nuñez, Castilleja de la Cuesta, Sanlúcar La Mayor, Utrera, and Algaba (July 26); Morón (July 27); Osuna, Aguadulce, and Estepa, (July 28); La Roda de Andalucía (July 29–30); Pedrera (July 30); and Casariche and Herrera (July 31). Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 331, details the role of two newspaper reporters who accompanied Nationalist forces in the campaign to secure Andalusia: Manuel Sánchez del Arco, who wrote for ABC (Seville). and Cándido Ortiz de Villajos, who was then writing for Ideal (Granada). It is interesting to note that on July 20, 1936, the branch of ABC in Republican-controlled Madrid declared on its front page, ¡Viva la República! (Long Live the Republic!), while the branch of ABC in Nationalist-held Seville declared on its front page, Viva España (Long Live Spain). 15. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 27. SHM, Lagajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), July 26, 1936. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 330, quotes Captain Tiede’s own account of what transpired that day: the Legion’s machine guns “created a veritable slaughterhouse” for those who tried to escape. Tiede was killed in action on January 11, 1937, and was posthumously promoted to the rank of major. In tribute, the Eleventh Bandera was named in his honor. His remains are buried in the Santa Catalina Cemetery in Ceuta. See Manolo González, “Copa de vino español con motivo de 73rd aniversario de la legión,” El Faro (Ceuta), September 19, 1993. 16. José María Bueno Carrera, La legion: 75 años de uniformes legionari- os (Málaga, Spain: Gráficas Urania, 1994), 13. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 328, notes that the title “His Excellency, the commander in chief of the armies of Spain and Spanish Morocco” was a position that did not exist, but all knew that it referred to Franco. See also SHM, Legajo No. 54, “Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial” and “Cambios y organizaciones hasta el presente.” The Circular Order of July 26, 1936, ordered the organization of the dissolved Seventh and Eighth Banderas and of successive Banderas until the Eigh- teenth. See also SHM, Legajo No. 27, Tercer Tercio, Septima Bandera (1936–39). Today the Seventh and Eighth Banderas remain active units of the Legion’s Third Tercio and are based in Viator, Spain. 17. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), July 28– 29, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 27; Martínez Bande, La Campaña de Andalucia, 23, 133–36. 232 | Notes

18. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera(1936–39), July 30, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 27–28. 19. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera(1936–39), July 31, 1936. This source records that in Coronil the legionnaires “put in an appearance with the column.” See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 28. 20. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 453–54. SHM, Lagajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), July 21–31, 1936. On the Road to Madrid

1. José Manuel Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid. Servicio Histórico Militar Monograph No. 1 (Madrid: Libreria Editorial San Martín, 1968), 17–26. 2. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 348. Yagüe was put in charge of the Madrid Column by Francisco Franco on August 11, 1936, after the Nation- alists’ capture of Mérida. 3. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 29–30. Later, another agrupación (Agrupación Tella), similar in composition to the two previous ones, was created under the command of the First Legion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Heli Rolando de Tella y Canto. Its principal combat unit was the First Bandera (commanded by Major José Álvarez Entrena), which arrived in Seville on August 6 after having crossed the Strait of Gibraltar by sea aboard the Ciudad de Algeciras on August 5 as part of the previously mentioned Victory Convoy. The First Bandera took part in the conquest and pacification of the villages of Lora del Río (August 7) and Constantina (August 9). By August 10 this battle group was ready to follow in the footsteps of the other two in moving north. See also SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera; and Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1146, 1152n115. Cerdá says that each column numbered two thousand to twenty-five hundred men, with legionnaires and the Regulares making up the infantry troops, while the artillery, ammunition, food, and other service and technical units came from General Gon- zalo Queipo de Llano’s Second Division. Cerdá lists all the units and weapons used by Asensio’s, Castejón’s, and Tella’s columns. For example, in Asensio’s column “the 7th Battery 3rd Light Artillery Regiment (Seville) equipped with 70/16 Schneider (mod. 1908) mountain-guns later exchanged for captured 75/28 (mod. 1906) during the occupation of Oropesa [on August 30, 1936], 1st Co. 2nd Engineers Bn. (Seville), and one mounted radio-transmission section. It received another battery of 105/11 (Mod. 1919) Schneider mountain-howitzers on 17 Au- gust.” Castejón’s column had the “4th Bty. 3rd Light Art. Reg. (Seville) equipped with 75/28 (mod. 1906) field guns.” Tella’s column had “the newly created 9th Notes | 233

Bty. 3rd Light Art. Reg. (Seville) with four 105/22 Vickers (mod. 1922) howitzers and one section [platoon] of [the] Civil Guard.” See also Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 8. Asensio’s column also included two armored cars (Bilbao-1932), and its artillery pieces were 70, not 75 millimeters. A typical Spanish Army artillery battery had four guns. 4. Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 48. According to Colonel Fuqua, the militiamen defending Madrid in the fall of 1936 “were issued shotguns of varying patterns as well as many types of American Winchester of 44 caliber.” 5. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 338–39; Esenwein, “Spanish Civil War,” 77; Michael Alpert, “The Popular Army of the Spanish Republic, 1936– 39,” in A Military History of Modern Spain: From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror, ed. Wayne H. Bowen and José E. Alvarez (West- port, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 97–98. For more on Nationalist army operations in Andalusia and Extremadura in 1936, see Gabriel Cardona, El gigante descalzo: El ejército de Franco (Madrid: Aguilar, 2003); and Gabriel Cardona and Fernando Fernández Bastarreche, España, 1936–1939: La guerra militar, vol. 1, La guerra de las columnas (Madrid: Historia 16, 1996). 6. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 341–43; Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 100–101. The militiamen preferred to fight in their own towns and villages in order to protect their homes and have cover, and when the attackers arrived at a village they would use loudspeakers, given to them by the Germans, to order the inhabitants to surrender. If the people failed to reply to the order to surrender, did not fly white flags, or opened fire, the pincer attack would commence. The columns operating from Seville were composed of the following units: the Legion, the Regulares, the Civil Guard, the Assault Guard, Falangist militiamen, Carlists, and right-wing civilian volunteers. 7. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 1, 1936. On this day Lieutenant Francisco de Miguel Clemente joined the Fifth Bandera and took command of its Eighteenth Company. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 331–32, quotes a very florid newspaper account of the capture of Puente Genil that describes how the flag bearing the coat of arms of Gonzalo de Córdoba (i.e., the Fifth Bandera) was planted in the town. 8. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 1, 1936. 9. Preston, Spanish Civil War, 120–21; Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 102; Ro- dríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 343. During the war, looting was not restricted to legionnaires and the Regulares; right-wing civilians, monarchists, and Falangists also participated in numerous incidents of theft of the homes of leftists incarcerated or killed. The homes and businesses of right-wingers were 234 | Notes looted as well. See Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 16. According to Colonel Fuqua, “For days during the first two weeks of the revolt, the streets were infested day and night with armed militia bands firing off their guns without any provo- cation, searching pedestrians without excuse and entering private premises and removing property without authorized warrants.” In an interview in Houston, Texas, on December 1, 2012, Ramón Candil, an eyewitness to the battle of Bada- joz in 1936, told me of personally seeing legionnaires smashing the windows of stores with their rifle butts and making off with wristwatches. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 2, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 30; Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 29–34; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 8. By blowing up the bridge, given the time it took the attackers to repair it, the defenders bought themselves twelve hours of respite. Moreover, almost four miles up the road, more sabotage delayed the column by another six hours. Preston, Franco, 163, notes that an important part of the operation was for Lieutenant Colonel Asensio to occupy Mérida and turn over seven million cartridges to General Mola’s forces. Ammunition was in short supply for the rebels, and ships loaded with munitions and war materiel arrived in southern Spanish ports from Spanish Morocco. 11. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera(1936–39), August 2, 1936. Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 102, writes, “On 2 August Yagüe reached the Tagus valley, where he swung eastwards towards Madrid,” but this does not jibe with Yagüe’s official personnel records (AGM, Legajo No. LL-30), which state that on August 2 he was still in Ceuta. On August 7 Yagüe left Ceuta for Tetuán and flew to Seville to join the Legion, which was amassing there. 12. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera (1936–39), August 1–3, 1936. This source simply states that Bracana was occupied, without giving any details about the battle that took place. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 28, gives more information. It notes that there were four dead but does not specify whether they were attackers or defenders; I assume they were defenders. 13. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 3, 1936; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 9. 14. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 9. Espinosa is quoting ABC (Seville) newspaperman Manuel Sánchez del Arco, who accompanied Castejón’s column. Espinosa also says that these trucks traveled at night with their headlights turned off. 15. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 3, 1936; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 9. Also on August 3, the German pocket battleship Deutschland and its escort, the torpedo boat Luchs, docked in Notes | 235

Ceuta. Franco invited the ships’ officers to lunch while the 250 sailors were given shore leave and treated as nonpaying guests at Ceuta’s businesses and restaurants on the orders of the military governor. This visit gave Franco the unique opportunity to portray himself to the Germans as the principal leader of the rebellion. See also Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1134; and Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 9. On August 3 General Mola announced that about three hundred Civil Guardsmen who had been sent by the government on August 1 from Badajoz to Madrid by train had switched sides that day in Miajadas. 16. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera (1936–39), August 4, 1936. 17. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 4, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 30–31. In the official account of the Fifth Bandera, the village of Monesterio is called Monasterio. See also Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 341. 18. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 12, 13. Castejón suffered two dead and twelve wounded in the engagement; the two men killed must have been from the Regulares. 19. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), Au- gust 4, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 28; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 10–11. Once Asenio’s column entered Monesterio, the mopping-up operations began in the village, and the leftists who had attacked the Civil Guard barracks and killed guardsmen on July 19, caused destruction to the church, or incarcerated and abused rightist citizens since starting July 26 were rounded up for punishment. See also Preston, Franco, 163. Asensio’s battle group advanced fifty miles in the first two days of the operation. According to Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 18, by August 4 three banderas (the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) and fivetabors (Third Larache, First and Sec- ond Tetuán, and First and Second Ceuta) had reached Andalusia. These soldiers, who were totally loyal to Franco, allowed him to have about fifty-six hundred men under his personal command. 20. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera (1936–39), August 5, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 28–29. 21. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 5, 1936; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 342. In Fuente de Cantos, leftists had rounded up rightists, imprisoned them in the church, and set it on fire. See also Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 17. Per Franco’s headquarter’s orders, a company of the Regulares was to be left in the vicinity of the village. 22. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 18–19, names the twelve victims and lists their ages, occupations, and political affiliations. Espinosa also notes that 236 | Notes on August 4, the day before Asensio’s column entered Fuente de Cantos, three women, one of them eighteen years old, died of traumatic shock or heart attack (369). The reputation of the Army of Africa preceded it; it was coming and there would be hell to pay. 23. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 5, 1936. This source calls Los Santos de Maimona (the correct name of the town in Extremadura near Badajoz) Los Altos de Maimona. This discrepancy is not uncommon in Legion documentation. These after-battle reports were typed and sometimes contain misspellings, typos, wrong dates, and incorrect words and personal names. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 31. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 21–23, gives a good description of the five- hour battle. Espinosa also notes that a legionnaire was killed in addition to the lieutenant. Asensio’s column suffered nineteen wounded, whereas Puigdendo- las’s troops suffered numerous casualties. One source claimed that three hundred were killed, but that number seems exaggerated. 24. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 5, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 31; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 23. Castejón recorded in his after-battle report for August 6 that a Republican airplane attack had caused him thirteen wounded, the first since his column had left Seville. 25. Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 72. The DC-2 bombing raid on Bada- joz on August 4 may have been a show of support and encouragement by Franco and Queipo de Llano for the 150 Civil Guardsmen and some Assault Guards- men who had joined the uprising, had failed to capture the city, and were now besieged in their barracks. The besieged guardsmen were forced to surrender on August 7. See also Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1147. 26. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 29; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera (1936–39), August 6 and 8, 1936. This source also mentions that at this time the bandera participated in operations in the following villages: Guajarsierra, Moraleda, Bracana, Iznayer, Loja Huectar, Tájar (or Tajas), and Caparecena in the vicinity of the Sierra Nevada. The Sixth Bandera remained in the province of Córdoba and Granada, providing security and vigilance as well as convoy protection for the remainder of the month of August. 27. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August [6], 1936. There is a typographical error in this source: although there is no entry for August 6, there are two separate entries for August 5, and the sequence of entries reads August 3, 4, 5, “5,” and 7. I believe that the second 5 should be a 6. See also SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 6, 1936; and Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 23. Notes | 237

28. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 29. Also on August 6, the German freighter Usaramo arrived in the port of Cádiz from Hamburg carrying a shipment of eleven Ju-52/3s bomber/transports (with ten air crews), six Heinkel He-51s fighters (with six fighter pilots), twenty antiaircraft guns (20-millimeter) with ammunition, aerial bombs, medical supplies, one short-wave and one long-wave radio station, and technical personnel. In addition, spare parts were shipped for both types of planes. From Cádiz the equipment and personnel were quickly sent to Seville by train. For all the details of how the Usaramo made it to Spain (avoiding the guns of the Republican battleship Jaime I) and how German personnel were subsequently deployed, see Elstob, Condor Legion, 66–69. 29. Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1143; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 2; Martínez Bande, La campaña de Andalucia, 69–78 (uprising and occupation of Córdoba). 30. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 371, gives August 6 as the date of Franco’s arrival in Seville as does Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 2, whereas Pres- ton, Franco, 163, claims that Franco arrived in Seville two days after the Victory Convoy (which took place on August 5). See also Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 334. Regarding attacks on churches and clergy, Preston, Spanish Civil War, 124–25, writes, “At the beginning of the war, particularly, there were waves of assassinations of priests and suspected Fascist sympathizers” and “Churches and religious monuments were destroyed. More than six thousand priests and religious were estimated to have been murdered, Falangists and members of yellow unions were favourite targets of the spontaneous checas, or pseudo-secret police units, set up by various left-wing groups, particularly the anarchists.” See also Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 70–71; and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 269–81. 31. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 334; José Manuel Martínez Bande, La guerra en el norte (hasta el 31 de marzo de 1937) Servicio Histórico Militar Monograph No. 4 (Madrid: Libreria Editorial San Martín, 1969), 13–61. 32. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 282–83, records that the National Defense Council was established on July 24, whereas Preston, Franco, 155, claims it was July 23. See also Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 335–36. On August 26 Franco became the commander of the Army of Africa and the Expeditionary Army, and Queipo de Llano became the general in chief of military forces operating in Andalusia. Thus, Franco usurped Queipo de Llano even though the latter outranked the former based on seniority as major generals. Queipo de Llano remained in Andalusia while Franco took the Nationalist troops to the gates of Madrid. See Esenwein, “Spanish Civil War,” 78–79. 33. Interview with Gen. Franco: Effort to Turn Rebellion into an Interna- tional Question,” Guardian (London), July 30, 1936. In this interview Franco 238 | Notes affirmed that “the Foreign Legion, both Spanish and native, is entirely loyal to me.” During the Spanish Civil War, the Guardian was a staunchly pro-Republic, anti-Nationalist (and anti-Franco) newspaper. See R. H. Haigh, D. S. Morris, and A. R. Peters, eds., The Guardian Book of the Spanish Civil War (London: Wildwood House, 1987), 23. 34. Preston, Franco, 163. Pacón Franco, who eventually rose to the rank of lieutenant general, was two years older than Francisco Franco. The cousins studied together at the Infantry Academy in Toledo, served in the Legion together during the Rif War, and died in the same year as each other, 1975. 35. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 333. 36. Archivo General Militar Ávila (AGMÁ), Ávila, Cuartel General del Gen- eralísimo (CGG), Estado Mayor Sección Segunda, Armario 6 (A.6), Legajo No. 337 (L.337), Carpeta 34 (C.34), Documento 34 (D.34), Operaciones: Ordenes, partes, y vicisitudes. In the same message Franco asked Queipo de Llano how many 70-millimeter cannons and how much ammunition was available in the depot; he told him to assign the cannons to the forces that had been transported by air and, if necessary, to make up the difference with materiel from the depots. By 1936 the Schneider 70-millimeter Model 1908 was relegated to the infantry support role and not commonly used by the artillery branch, which used the 75-millimeter and larger pieces. Built at Trubia (Asturias) and in Seville, the Schneider 70-millimeter/16 mountain gun served the Spanish Army very well in the Moroccan Wars (1909–1910 and the Rif War), and Franco was very familiar with its capabilities. 37. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 20, 23–24. By August 6, the Nation- alists were operating out of an airfield very close to the Portuguese border, near the Spanish village of Valencia del Mombuey and south of Badajoz. See also Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 72. By the time Lieutenant Colonel Asen- sio reached Almendralejo on August 7, he had traveled 105 miles from his base in Seville and was about eighteen miles from Mérida. 38. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 38. In addition to dropping bombs, Republican planes also dropped propaganda leaflets and newspapers published in Madrid. Both were collected and burned by the Nationalists. 39. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), Au- gust 7–8, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 32; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 344–45; Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 72; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 31–33, 38–39. Espinosa quotes from Asen- sio’s own account of the battle for Almendralejo’s church. 40. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 30. Notes | 239

41. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 7, 1936; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 29. The people in Zafra were terrified because they had heard stories of how the Army of Africa dealt with socialists and other leftists (i.e., summarily shot them), so they opted to leave before the Fifth Bandera arrived. Franco’s forces collected (i.e., extorted) money from both friend and foe when towns and villages were “liberated.” 42. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 30. See also José María Lama Hernán- dez, Una biografía frente al olvido: José González Barrero, alcalde de Zafra en la II República (Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 2004); and José María Lama Hernández, La amargura de la memoria: República y guerra en Zafra (1931– 1936) (Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 2004). 43. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 240; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 32; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segun- do Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 9–10, 1936. 44. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 345–46, writes that “cleansing” operations in Almendralejo were assigned to the Civil Guard as well as to Carlist and Falangist militias. He quotes from battle reports by Asensio and Yagüe. For a photograph of Almendralejo’s church after the battle, see Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 35. The church’s tower has a massive gaping hole, a cavity that one can see through. Asensio used a 105-millimeter mountain gun to make that gaping hole. See also Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 35–37, for a list of the names, ages, occupation, and political affiliations of the twenty-eight men who were murdered. Espinosa quotes an eyewitness on what happened in Almendralejo before and when the column arrived:

Many of the militiamen thought that four priests and friars were coming when in reality what was coming were Moors, legionnaires with rolled- up shirtsleeves dressed in green, with machine guns, trucks, and artillery. We with our [bolt-action] rifles and them with their machine guns, and [I thought], what we have to do is to get away. We were too few and some of us had already fallen. We took off running.

When the column entered Almendralejo, the soldiers beat on doors with their rifle butts, made arrests, and paraded those arrested past the jail so that they could see the dead on their way to the bullring. Some escaped, but others were shot and their bodies dumped along streets and roads. Uninhabited homes were looted by the soldiers, who also used them as latrines. Only the church tower, defended by about fifty militiamen, remained to be taken. See also Paul Preston, 240 | Notes

The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 310. He writes that after the town was taken, “many men were given the choice ‘to Russia or the Legion,’ ‘Russia’ sig- nifying execution. They usually chose recruitment into the Legion.” After the battle of Badajoz, a captured Republican army machine gunner was given the same option; he too chose the Legion. 45. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 8, 1936. The author believes that the “Captain Meléndez” mentioned in the day’s dispatch was Captain Luis Meléndez Galán who was awarded the Individual Military Medal on November 19, 1936. 46. Ibid. During this time, as Asensio prepared for his attack on Mérida, Major Castejón, with the Fifth Bandera, occupied the village of Ribera del Fresno, located east of Villafranca de los Barros and off the main road between Seville and Mérida. without resistance. This operation does not appear in the official account of the Fifth Bandera, but it does appear in Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 39–44. Other villages that were occupied during this time by Nationalist forces were Puebla del Prior, Casas de Reina, Usagre, Hinojosa del Valle, and Hornachos. 47. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 19, 1936. Torremegia, today a tiny agrarian location, is located east of the main road that connects Seville with Mérida, whereas the main village of Torremejía is just off the main road. According to SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colec- ción de Historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 240, the First Bandera occupied Torremejía and its environs. So it appears that the Fifth Bandera captured Torremegia while the First Bandera captured the larger and more important Torremejía. See Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 45. Mérida

1. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 346–47. By the time of the attack on Mérida, Franco was already planning on capturing Badajoz. The 105-millimeter mountain gun mentioned in Franco’s radiogram is most probably the Schneider 105/11 Model 1919 that had entered service with the Spanish Army in 1924 (during the Rif War), had a range of about five miles, and fired a twenty- six-pound projectile. See also Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 37. Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe’s column would have four batteries, munitions, and a general staff led by Artillery Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Iturzaeta. 2. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 47. The First Bandera, minus one company, was transferred from Tella’s column to Asensio’s column before the attack on Mérida. Notes | 241

3. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 347; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 38. On August 9, 1936, Franco informed Second Division headquarters (General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in Seville) and the Tablada airfield (Seville) that there should be no aerial bombing between Almendralejo and Mérida but that there would be no problem with bombing between Mérida and Badajoz (the next area of attack). On August 10 Franco informed Asensio and Castejón that he would be sending them two Junkers, with the stipulation that they employ them only at the request of the ground troops, and only where the artillery was firing, and only at the moment of entering Badajoz and Mérida. 4. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 32–33; Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 73; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera (1936–39), August 11, 1936; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 86–89. 5. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 348. Many of those who escaped Mérida for Badajoz did so for only a very short time, since they did not survive the battle of Badajoz. They had postponed death for only a few days. 6. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera (1936–39), August 11, 1936. 7. Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1148n98. In a radiogram from Queipo de Llano to Franco dated August 5, 1936, Queipo de Lla- no stated that “the Portuguese government authorizes the entry of people and weapons, but separately and at night [so] as to avoid attracting attention.” See also Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 46. Franco, in a communiqué to Mola, commented that Portugal would officially recognize the Nationalists (and most assuredly with him as its head of state) after the occupation of Badajoz. During the Spanish Civil War the greatest number of volunteers in the Spanish Foreign Legion came from neighboring Portugal. According to Stanley G. Payne, 40 pre- guntas fundamentales sobre la Guerra Civil (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2006), 456, about ten thousand Portuguese volunteers fought on the Nationalist side during the war. A Portuguese volunteer in the Nationalist army was called a viriato, in honor of Viriato, (or Viriathus), the Lusitanian chief who fought the Romans in the second century BCE. See also Cierva, Brigadas Internacio- nales, 272. He records that approximately two thousand Portuguese fought for Franco and lists the casualties for the Portuguese in the Legion as 6 officers, 23 sergeants, 58 corporals, and 530 privates—for a total of 617, which he mistakenly gives as 627. Finally, Payne, Politics and the Military, 355, notes that on July 22 Mola sent General Miguel Ponte to Lisbon to meet with Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar with the goal of gaining his support; he did so on July 26. 8. Cortada, ed., Modern Warfare in Spain, 33. 242 | Notes

9. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 348; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de Historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 240. 10. Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 73. 11. Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 92–93; Preston, Spanish Holocaust, 315. Between Mérida and Badajoz were the towns of Torremayor, Lobón, Mon- tijo, and Puebla de la Calzada. The Breach of Death: Badajoz

1. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 49, 57; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN, 348; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera. On Au- gust 12 the men of the Fifth Bandera were in Mérida resting and cleaning their weapons and themselves. 2. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 350. 3. Ibid,; Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 50. 4. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 351; Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 34–41. 5. Preston, Spanish Holocaust, 317. 6. David Eggenberger, “Badajoz,” in An Encyclopedia of Battles: Accounts of over 1,560 Battles from 1479 B.C. to the Present (New York: Dover, 1985), 40. 7. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 56. Yagüe had told Franco the previous day that on August 13 he would occupy Lobón and Talavera la Real between eight and ten o’clock in the morning and then prepare his artillery for the attack on Badajoz. See also Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 351–52; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 13, 1936; SHM, Lega- jo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera; and Preston, Spanish Holocaust, 317. Puigdengolas had approximately seventeen hundred defenders (one-third of whom were regular Republican army and the rest of whom were militiamen). Asensio and Castejón had twenty-five hundred men plus Falangist and Carlist militiamen. Most of Puigdengolas forces had been sent to reinforce the Madrid sector. 8. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 56. 9. Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 73; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN, 351; Preston, Spanish Holocaust, 313–14. Badajoz posed no threat to Franco’s rear, Preston asserts; its capture by the Nationalists was “a strategic error, contributing to the delay which allowed the government to organize its defences.” 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 13, 1936; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera; Subinspección de la Notes | 243

Legión, La legión española, 34. The Fifth Bandera crossed the dry riverbed of the Rivilla River and advanced toward the front of the Menacho Barracks, where it spent the night providing security. According to Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 94, the Fifth Bandera had secured its position that night by ten o’clock. See also Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 352; and Scurr, Spanish For- eign Legion, 22. Yagüe addressed his officers that night, telling them, “Gentlemen of the legion! The ‘Reds’ affirm that you are not soldiers but monks in disguise. Very well—enter Badajoz and say Mass!” 11. Wyden, Passionate War, 134. Manolo García, the commissar of the Nicolás de Pablo Republican militia battalion, was manning a machine gun covering the entrance to Badajoz at the Pilar Gate. After mowing down dozens of legionnaires and members of the Regulares, at around two o’clock in the afternoon he found himself surrounded by the attackers, so he decided to run away to Villanueva del Fresno, leaving his comrades to their fate. 12. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 352. The distance between the attacking legionnaires and the defenders of the cavalry barracks was half that distance, about 330 feet. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 36. 13. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, August 14, 1936. On this day the bandera suffered the following casualties: one legionnaire wounded from the Seventeenth Company; two killed and one wounded from the Eighteenth Company; one wounded from the Nineteenth Company; and one wounded from the Twentieth Company. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 36; and Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 352. Lieu- tenant Francisco de Miguel Clemente received his decoration on March 14, 1939. 14. Wyden, Passionate War, 133–34, recounts the story of José Larios (the future Duke of Lerma), who served as a crewman aboard a Ju-52 during the battle of Badajoz on August 14. At first his trimotor had been used as a transport to ferry the Army of Africa from Morocco to Spain, then it was used as a bomber. When he was finished dropping bombs by hand through a hole cut in the floor of the plane (the plane lacked bomb racks), he would climb down into the ventral machine-gun platform to strafe Loyalist positions on the town’s walls. He was very grateful that Republican fighters were nowhere to be seen flying over Badajoz. I believe that the Captain Pérez-Caballero mentioned here was Rafael González Pérez-Caballero. He was awarded the Military Medal for bravery during the As- turian uprising of October 1934, when he commanded the Twentieth Company of the Fifth Bandera. 15. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 14, 1936. This source gives the official casualty number for the Fourth Bandera at Badajoz as cinto cinco, but this should have been typewritten as ciento cinco, or 105. 244 | Notes

Scurr, Spanish Foreign Legion, 22–23, says that the Sixteenth Company marched into battle singing its hymn, “The Betrothed of Death” (El Novio de la Muerte) and that the overall casualty number was 285, not 185. Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 103, recorded that the total casualties for the battle of Badajoz was 185 (44 killed and 141 wounded); the Fourth Bandera suffered 106 casualties (24 killed and 82 wounded), and the Fifth Bandera had 12 casualties (4 killed and 8 wounded). See also Subinspección de la Legion, La legión española, 35–36; Ro- dríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 353–55; Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 102; and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 374. 16. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 15, 1936. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 36; and Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 357. 17. Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 102. 18. Colonel Antonio J. Candil Muñoz, interview by author, January 28, 2012, Round Rock, TX. Colonel Candil told me that his father, Ramón, was serving as an office clerk for the colonel of the regiment, José Cantero Ortega; he was not defending the walls of Badajoz, and thus he survived the battle. Another reason Ramón was unharmed was that his father was a pro-Nationalist Civil Guard officer. Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 102, writes, “The search for Republicans went on during the following days. Shirts were ripped away, and any man found with marks on his shoulder from rifle recoil was killed immediately.” 19. Jay Allen’s article on what he saw in Badajoz first appeared in the Au- gust 30, 1936, edition of the Chicago Tribune. It is reprinted in Payne, Civil War in Spain, 85–91. According to this article, “the rebel general” in Badajoz, most probably Yagüe, “stressed to a journalist the danger of entering the town, as the ‘Moors are excited.’” See also Haigh et al., Guardian Book, 35–36. 20. Retired Major Ramón Candil, interview by author, December 1, 2012, Houston, TX. Candil, who was ninety-four at the time of the interview, was a seventeen-year-old corporal in the Republican army before he switched sides. He said it was the Civil Guard that shot the prisoners in Badajoz. He also told me about the men who had fled to Portugal only to be returned by the Portuguese government; they were brought to the cemetery outside the city, where they were shot, their bodies were burned, and they were buried in predug mass graves. The stench of burned flesh permeated the air for weeks. 21. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 375n1. After an open-field battle, the Repub- lican prisoners were rounded up in a huddle and given a final cigarette while Moroccans in trucks with machine guns backed up, surrounded the group, and opened fire. During the Rif War the Moroccans mutilated the corpses of Spanish soldiers, and the legionnaires in turn mutilated the corpses of Moroccans. Notes | 245

22. Wyden, Passionate War, 139. Franco’s press secretary, Luis Bolín, was the man who had chartered the plane that flew Franco from the Canary Islands to Spanish Morocco. A seasoned journalist, Bolín worked as a war correspondent during World War I, reported for ABC (the Spanish newspaper), and had traveled to Britain, France, and the United States. He was pivotal in getting military aid for the Nationalists from Mussolini and Hitler at the start of the Spanish Civil War. In addition, during the war he held the rank of captain in the Spanish For- eign Legion. Spain: The Vital Years is his personal account of what he saw and did during the war. See also Claude G. Bowers, My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 308–9. Bowers, the US ambassador to Spain from 1933 to 1939), quotes newspaper accounts (published in Havas, United Press, the New York Herald Tribune, and Le Temps) about the executions that took place in Badajoz. A journalist for Le Temps in Paris wrote that when the Nationalists captured Badajoz, 380 political prisoners (“Fascists”) were “liberated” and that such treatment (arrest and incarceration) was not extended to the Republicans captured. Madariaga, Los Moros, 299–302, has more on the mass executions in Badajoz as well as Yagüe’s affirmative quote, which originally appeared in John T. Whitaker, We Cannot Escape History (New York: Macmillan, 1943). 23. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 374n1; Mario Neves, La Matanza de Badajoz: Crónica de un testigo de uno de los episodios más trágicos de la Guerra Civil de España (Agosto de 1936) (Salamanca, Spain: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 1986), 47, 60–61. 24. Wyden, Passionate War, 104, writes that “Hugh Thomas (The Spanish Civil War) accepts that 12 bishops, 4,184 priests, 283 nuns, and 2,365 monks were murdered, mostly in the war’s initial months, and that nuns were raped in isolated cases.” Rapes were committed by both sides during the war. Ramón Candil told me in our interview about personally witnessing the execution of four members of the Regulares in Villanueva del Duque (a province of Córdoba) in February or March 1937. Candil was in the Regiment of Castille No. 3, which was part of Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería y Martínez’s column. Without a court-martial or trial of any kind, the four Moroccans were shot for raping an old woman who subsequently died. The execution order was given by the colonel and carried out by a firing squad from the regiment. 25. Payne, Civil War in Spain, 94, contains an eyewitness account by former soldier Arturo Barea (the author of The Forging of a Rebel), who was living in Madrid at the start of the war. Barea recounted that men, women, and children would go to Mataderos to see the corpses of those shot the night before. This 246 | Notes happened pretty much on a nightly basis. On this occasion there were twenty dead. For more on the murders carried out in Madrid against suspected prorebel sympathizers by men and women (milicianas), see Wyden, Passionate War, 101– 5; and Julius Ruiz, The ‘Red Terror’ and the Spanish Civil War: Revolutionary Violence in Madrid (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 26. Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1147. It can also be argued that Franco wanted to take Badajoz in order to rescue the Civil Guard and some Assault Guardsmen who were trapped in their barracks. One month later Franco would do the same for those beleaguered at the Alcázar of Toledo by government forces. Martínez Bande, La Campaña de Andalucia, 141–146, covers the situation in Badajoz from July 18 to September 30, 1936. 27. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 33; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de Historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 240. 28. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 359. Millán-Astray was an important propaganda tool for the Nationalists and was part of Franco’s General Staff. At this event in Seville, he animatedly stirred up the crowd with the Le- gion’s war cry, “Long live death!” 29. The Second Bandera is no longer an active unit of the Legion. Its coat of arms, displayed on its flag, was the black double-headed eagle of Emperor Charles V, who was also Spain’s King Carlos I. SHM, Legajo No. 54, “Guiones de las banderas del tercio gran capitan.” 30. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 150. For his valorous actions under fire, Lieutenant Pedro Andrés Gómez was posthumously awarded the Individual Military Medal on September 9, 1936, and became the first member of the Legion to receive this prestigious medal for service during the Civil War. 31. Before relocating to Valladolid on August 20, Mola’s headquarters had been in Burgos. From Valladolid Mola could now oversee operations north of Cáceres and Madrid and visit the cities of Segovia, Ávila, and Salamanca. 32. Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1145n83; José María Iribarren, Con El General Mola: Escenas y aspectos inéditos de la Guerra Civil (Zaragoza: Librería General, 1937), 214. Iribarren, a lawyer, was Mola’s secretary and kept a detailed diary of his communiqués and activities. 33. Cerdá, “Political Ascent and Military Commander,” 1135. According to José María Manrique García and Lucas Molina Franco, Antes que Saddam: Las armas de destrucción masiva y la protección civil en España, 1924–2000 (Vallad- olid: Quiron Ediciones, 2003), 62, the Italians sent fifty tons of distilled Yperite to Spain between January and February 1937. Chapter 5 of this book covers the Spanish Civil War. Notes | 247

Chemical warfare authority Rudibert Kunz, coauthor of Giftgas gegen Abd el Krim: Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko, 1922–1927 (Freiburg, Germany: Verlag Rombach, 1990), wrote to me on February 14, 2012, that in his opinion poison gas was insignificant in the Spanish Civil War. Germany did not provide chemical weapons, nor did it repair Spanish poison gas factories. The Nazis did not want a gas war in Spain at the time. Kunz further noted that there are reports that Mussolini sent some mustard gas but that it was not used. 34. Iribarren, Con El General Mola, 276–77. In addition to reviewing the Sec- ond Bandera, General Mola, on a different occasion, had had the opportunity to review a tabor that he had commanded during the Rif War, the Regulares of Larache, which had returned from Navalperal after seeing heavy combat on the Huesca front. José María Iribarren, El General Mola, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1945), 195. 35. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 151. 36. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, August 15, 1936. 37. Ibid., August 16, 1936. 38. Ibid., August 17, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37; Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 74. On August 16–17, Nationalist Ju-52s bombed the Don Benito airfield and occupied it. 39. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 375. It appears that Thomas was mistaken when he wrote that “a section of Asensio’s column was nearly destroyed in the town of Medellín by Malroux’s air squadron in its first serious engagement.” It was Castejón’s, not Asensio’s, column. Malraux’s air squadron, which arrived in Madrid on August 16, grew until it had about three hundred men (pilots and ground crews) and fifty planes. The pilots recruited were mercenaries and adventurers who had flown in World War I or, more recently, in the Ethiopian War (1935–1936), the Sino-Japanese War in Manchuria (1931–1932), or the Chaco War (1932–1935). The pilots were paid a bonus for shooting down Nationalist planes and received a life and accident insurance policy. The head of the Spanish Air Force, General Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros, had nothing positive to say about Malraux’s pilots. He called them “useless” and “scoundrels” and tried on more than one occasion to discharge them from the air force. He said that in the Spanish Civil War, André Malraux was trying to play the role that Lord Byron had played in the Greek War of Inde- pendence. For more on Malraux, see Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros, Memorias: La república y la Guerra de España, vol. 2 (Paris: Sociéte d’Éditions de la Librairie du Globe, 1964); and Wyden, Passionate War, 91–94. 40. Since Legion troops were not involved in the battle for Medellín, this event does not appear in their sources for August 17, 1936. Information about the 248 | Notes battle at Medellín can be found at Sociedad Benéfica de Historiadores Aficio- nados y Creadoros, http://www.sbhac.net/Republica/Personajes/Biografias/Fed- ericoAngulo.htm. The Popular Front daily, El Pueblo Manchego, in its August 18, 1936, edition, stated on its front page, “En el frente extremeño también se triunfa—Destrucción de una columna enemiga en Medellín, gracias al magnifico esfuerzo de nuestra aviación. Las tropas leales bajadas de Madrid contienen el avance hacia el norte de las fuerzas enemigas.” The paper also published a pho- to of cheering militiamen standing atop the wall of Medellín’s Castle, with the caption “El escenario de la derrota facciosa en Extremadura” (The scene of the fascist defeat in Extremadura). 41. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera. While in Trujillo, some legionnaires on duty provided security, and others devoted their off-duty time to personal hygiene and the cleaning of weapons. The Fifth Bandera remained in Trujillo August 19 and 20. 42. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 17, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37. 43. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 18–19, 1936. 44. Ibid., August 20, 1936. The Battle of the Sierra de Guadalupe

1. On August 27, 1937, Lieutenant Francisco Mármol Arrabal was awarded the Individual Military Medal for valor. 2. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 21–22, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37. The Fourth Bandera and Agrupación Asensio column remained in Logrosán, providing “security and vigilance,” until August 26. 3. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37–38. The Republicans attempted to halt the column’s advance with a few cannons in order to shore up their defenses. The Almaraz Bridge was completed in 1537. According to Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 362, crossing the Tagus River was easy for the advancing Nation- alists because the bridges spanning the river had inexplicably not been blown up by the Republicans. 4. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 38. Part of Riquelme’s Fuerza de Extremadura was the Phantom Column from Valencia under the command of Civil Guard Captain Manuel Uribarri. This column was composed of about one thousand men, (militiamen, Assault Guardsmen, and anarchists) and Notes | 249 was well equipped with weapons and other materiel. This unit was assigned to Riquelme after its recent failed attempt to secure Majorca for the republic. De- spite that faiure, the republic must have considered the unit to be a battle-tested one. For more on the Majorca and Ibiza expedition, see Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 381–84. 5. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 375. 6. Ibid., 376. Whether a result of machismo or a deep belief in fate, digging trenches or taking cover was considered unmanly by some. General Mola, who experienced heavy combat commanding the Regulares during the Rif War, was noted for not taking cover during Republican air raids on his headquarters. As he told his secretary, José María Iribarren, a bomb (or bullet) is like a letter personally addressed to you. Either you get it or you don’t. 7. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, August 22, 1936. 8. Ibid., August 23, 1936. 9. Ibid., August 25–26, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37, 39. The latter source claims that it was the Eighteenth Company of the Fifth Bandera with a tabor of the Regulares that captured Belvis de Monroy and that they were aided in doing so by the Fourth Bandera. This source also records the capture of the power plant as occurring on August 27 rather than August 26. Captain Tiede and his company (it was the Nineteenth Company, not the Eigh- teenth, at the start of the campaign) were responsible for the capture of the power station as well as for the destruction of small boats used by the Republicans to move from Toledo to Ciudad Real. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 26 and 27, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37. 11. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 38. Reveille was played on a shiny silver bugle (cornetín), a war trophy taken from the Menacho Barracks in Badajoz. 12. Ibid; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera. In addition to the artillery duel, Castejón’s column was subjected to aerial bombardment, and a few legionnaires were wounded. Juan Yagüe Blanco file, August 27, Legajo No. LL-30, AGM. Yagüe’s forces suffered eighteen casualties from Republican attack. 13. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de Historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 240. 14. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera. Yagüe’s forces suffered eighteen casualties from Republican attack. 15. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 39. 16. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 320; Payne, Politics and the Military, 284. 250 | Notes

17. For more on Major Lisardo Doval and the aftermath of the Asturian uprising of October 1934, see Álvarez, “Spanish Foreign Legion,” 200–24. 18. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 320–21. 19. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 37–38. 20. Ibid., 38. 21. Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 29. 22. Ibid., 47. Colonel Fuqua also explained that these leftist militiamen (and women) marched from Madrid to the front with morale high and singing “The Internationale.” Cheered on by their comrades, they were off to fight the “fascist beast” and to bring economic equality and social justice to Spain. The cruel reality of combat against the Army of Africa quickly dashed those hopes and illusions. 23. Ibid., 29. 24. The Spanish term used in the Legion’s official Fifth Bandera postbattle report is disparar a cero (“zero elevation”); in Castejón’s words, at bocajarro (“close range”). 25. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 39, 40. After the battle, Major Castejón told Di- ario de Lisboa that twelve thousand armed and organized men awaited them in Peraleda de la Mata, that the battle lasted for six hours (“from midday until seven”), and that they came under government airplane attacks. The tide of battle shifted when darkness fell and the government’s airplanes ceased to fly over the village. That is when Castejón used his reserves to make the final push against the defenders enveloping them. He affirmed that the battle for Peraleda de la Mata determined the capture of Oropesa. See also Juan Yagüe Blanco file, August 28, Legajo No. LL-30, AGM. In the battle for Peraleda de la Mata, the Republicans suffered 250 dead and wounded, and Castejón’s column had 16 casualties. Yagüe also wrote that his General Staff at that time was in Navalmoral de la Mata and that it was defended by a tabor of the Regulares of Alhucemas (a newly arrived unit) and later by a tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán. The biggest threat to this forward command post was almost daily bombardment from Republican planes, which caused numerous casualties. 26. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 28, 1936, recorded the objective as “Cerro Cincho” instead of Cerro Chico, as it appears in Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 39. 27. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 28, 1936; Subinspección de la Legion, La legión española, 39; Juan Yagüe Blanco file, Au- gust 28, Legajo No. LL-30, AGM. Notes | 251

28. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 40. 29. Ibid., 39. Lieutenant Alfonso Mora Requejo was awarded the Individual Military Medal on November 20, 1936. See also SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 29 and 30, 1936. According to this source, in addition to all the items mentioned previously, the legionnaires were able to capture a 75-millimeter gun and gun carriage on the road between Lagartera and Orope- sa and four 75-millimeter cannons between Oropesa and the railroad station. See also Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 411. 30. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, August 30 and 31, 1936. At eight o’clock on the night of August 31, the Fourth Bandera, along with the rest of the column, boarded trucks for the journey from Puente del Arzo- bispo to Oropesa, where it spent the night and finished out the month. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 40. In addition to the Fourth Bandera, a tabor of the Regulares under the command of Major Serrano took part in the capture of Puente del Arzobispo. 31. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, August 31, 1936. The document is signed “Puente del Arzobispo 31 de agosto de 1.939 [sic].—El Comandante Jefe. —Firmado.” For the campaign from Badajoz to Talavera de la Reina, see Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 45–49. September 1936

1. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 1, 1936; and SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September, 1, 1936. 2. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 40–41; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 2, 1936. The following Le- gion officers who took part in this battle were awarded the Individual Military Medal during the war: Luis Meléndez Galán (November 19, 1936), Francisco González Soler (January 12, 1939), and Fernando Álvarez Pacheco (August 14, 1939). 3. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 2, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 41. 4. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 2, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 41–42; Preston, Spanish Holo- caust, 330. Before the capture of Talavera de la Reina by the Nationalists, the columns of Castejón, Tella, and Asensio had advanced an astonishing 190 miles in just two weeks. 5. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 400. 6. Ibid., 376. 252 | Notes

7. Casar de Talavera is approximately five miles west of the more important city of Talavera de la Reina. 8. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 42; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 241. The latter source gives Casar de Talavera as “Casas” de Talavera and explains that its defenders were aware of its importance for holding on to Talavera de la Reina. It also details how well their trenches were constructed, how effective their use of numerous automatic weapons was, and how their artillery was placed on both banks of the Tagus River. 9. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 3, 1936; Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 78. Two Republican planes were captured by the Nationalists at the airfield in Talavera de la Reina. See also Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 53–61 (campaign from Badajoz to Talavera de la Reina). 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, September 3, 1936. 11. Quoted in Preston, Spanish Civil War, 123. Preston claims that Talavera de la Reina fell to the Nationalists on September 2. 12. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 42. 13. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 4, 1936. In this document the typist erroneously typed “badear” instead of the correct vadear (i.e., to wade or ford). 14. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 5, 1936. 15. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 42. 16. Ibid., 44. 17. Ibid., , 42–43; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, Sep- tember 6, 1936. Castejón told Portuguese war correspondent Mario Neves of Diario de Lisboa that government forces numbered four thousand men, whereas he had seven hundred. 18. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 6, 1936. One of the wounded was the aforemntioned Dimitri Ivanoff. He has been described as being vulgar, arrogant, cruel, and a rapist. He epitomized what Legion detractors saw as the typical legionnaire: a sociopathic killer. 19. “Ben Mizzián, El General Moro,” Canal Historia, Televisión Española, 2012; Geoffrey Jensen, “Toward the ‘Moral Conquest’ of Morocco: Hispano- Arabic Education in Early Twentieth-Century North Africa,” European History Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2001), 207; Richard Pennell, “The Responsibility for Anual: The Failure of Spanish Policy in the Moroccan Protectorate, 1912–1921,” Euro- pean Studies Review, no. 12 (1982), 71–72. Notes | 253

20. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 6, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 43. 21. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 7, 1936; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 7, 1936. The Fifth Bandera was tasked with defending the iron bridge and remained there on September 8. 22. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 8, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 43–44. 23. Arenas de San Pedro is about thirty miles northwest of Talavera de la Reina. 24. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 44–45; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 241. 25. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, September 8, 1936. 26. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 9, 1936. 27. Lieutenant Nicasio Montero was a seasoned combat veteran who was awarded the Individual Military Medal on January 3, 1935, for his actions during the Asturian uprising of October 1934. He was awarded the same decoration for service during the early days of the Civil War, on June 17, 1937. 28. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 45; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 10–11, 1936. The latter source recorded that the vanguard of the Fifth Bandera arrived in San Román de los Montes at 3:30 a.m. and that the first clash between the attackers and the defenders occurred about half an hour later about ninety yards in front of the village. 29. Major del Oro commanded one tabor, and Major Delgado the other. 30. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 10–11, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 45. 31. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 45–47, 94. Father Huido- bro is shown in a photo wearing his Legion tunic and large crucifix. He’s probably the most remembered legionnaire padre of the Spanish Civil War, and a few in the Legion have been working since 1947 to have him canonized, including a personal friend (an ex-legionnaire) of mine. See also Preston, Spanish Holocaust, 337–340; and Carlos Iniesta Cano, Memorias y recuerdos: Los años que he vivi- do en el proceso historico de España (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1984), 96–97, 110. Captain Iniesta served in the Fourth Bandera and knew Father Huidobro well. During the Rif War, it was not an uncommon practice for legionnaires to shoot unpopular or martinet officers and NCOs in the back during combat. It is quite plausible that at least one grizzled and prickly legionnaire had had enough of Huidobro’s verbal castigations for his comportment and thus took advantage of a moment in combat to eliminate him. 254 | Notes

32. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 12, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 47. 33. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 12, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 47. 34. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, September 14, 1936. See also Subinspeción de la Legión, La legión española, 47. In the next two weeks the bandera took part in the capture of the following towns on the road to Madrid: Santa Eulalia, Maqueda, Santo Domingo, Torri- jos, and Bargas (rendered in this source as “Vargas”). See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 47. 35. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 13–15, 1936. On September 14 the Fifth Bandera was in Talavera de la Reina, and on September 15 it was providing security on the bridge spanning the Tagus River and on the Calera Road. 36. It is my belief that the typist of the official record erred when typing “19.30” for the arrival of the bandera in Castillo de Bayuela. I believe that the 9 should be a 0 and that the time of arrival was thus 10:30 a.m., not 7:30 p.m. 37. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 13, 1936. 38. Ibid., September 14, 1936. 39. Ibid., September 15, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 47. The latter source draws the bulk of its information from the former; usually the details mesh, but this time there is some discrepancy. For example, the latter records that the battle began as soon as the column crossed the river instead of when it reached the village, that the Republicans used several tanks, and that the legionnaires carried out a bayonet assault. The latter omits many of the details found in the former, which is the official battle reports of the Fifth Bandera. Ken Bradley, International Brigades in Spain, 1936–39, Osprey’s Elite Series, No. 53 (London: Osprey, 1994), 17, contains the information on the “Mex- icanskis.” Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 103, writes that in September 1936 the Spanish liner Magellanes docked in Cartagena and unloaded twenty thousand Mauser rifles along with twenty million rounds of 7 x 57 millimeter ammunition, courtesy of Mexico’s pro-Republic president, Lázaro Cárdenas del Río. The good thing about this shipment was that that particular Mauser rifle was the standard rifle of the Spanish Army. 40. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 16, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 47. On September 16 the Notes | 255

Fifth Bandera, as part of Regulares Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Barrón’s column and in conjunction with the First Bandera, occupied El Casar de Escalona, thus normalizing the situation. 41. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 16, 1936. 42. Ibid., September 17–18, 1936; José María Bueno Carrera, Uniformes militares de la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Almena Ediciones, 1997), Lámina 46. According to Bueno, a Falangist centuria was commanded by a lieutenant, and a bandera was commanded by a major. Thus a centuria was comparable to a platoon, and a bandera to a battalion. According to the Juan Yagüe Blanco file, Legajo No. LL-30, AGM, the Falangist centuria was from Cáceres. 43. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 17, 1936. 44. Ibid., September 18, 1936. 45. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 48. 46. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 20, 1936; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 20, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 48; Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 43. Colonel Stephen Fuqua recorded the first time he visited the Talavera front, which was during the Nationalists’ attack on Santa Olalla (September 30, 1936). He wrote that “from observations made at the time, it was definitely estimated ‘the complete government defeat, time dependent upon capitulating or defending Madrid,’ confirming similar estimate made in Report 6411—9/18/36.” See also Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 82. On Septem- ber 20, a Fiat fighter squadron was operating out of Cáceres in support of Na- tionalist troops advancing on Santa Olalla and Maqueda. On September 24 the squadron was transferred to Gamonal airfield in Talavera de la Reina in preparation for the drive against Toledo. At this time in the war, with a top speed of 224 miles per hour, the Italian Fiat CR.32 biplane was the best fighter the Na- tionalists had and was flown by Nationalist ace Major Joaquín García Morato y Castaño, who shot down thirty-six enemy aircraft of the same type. 47. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 48. There is a discrepancy between this source, which says that the First Bandera captured Santa Olalla shortly before four o’clock in the afternoon, and the after-battle report of the Fifth Bandera cited in note 243 of this source, which says that the Fifth Bandera entered the town at two o’clock in the afternoon and took it with no resistance. 48. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 21, 1936. 256 | Notes

49. Preston, Spanish Civil War, 124; see also Wyden, Passionate War, 165. 50. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 48. 51. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 21, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 48. There’s a discrepancy between where the bandera went after the battle for Maqueda; the former source says Santa Olalla, whereas the latter says Talavera de la Reina. I tend to favor the former source, because Talavera de la Reina seems too far a distance to cover in two hours. 52. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 22, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 48. Gerindote is written as “Jeringote” in the former source and as “Jerindote” in the latter source. Ger- indote is southwest of Torrijos. Another discrepancy between the two sources involves the number of Legion casualties; the former source records only one legionnaire wounded, whereas the latter source declares that the casualties for the bandera were equally numerous. See also Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Ma- drid, 136. In Torrijos the “Reds” murdered more than thirty people, and a priest, Liberio González Nombela, was tortured for three days in a reenactment of the passion and death of Jesus Christ. 53. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 50; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 23, 1936. 54. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 24, 1936. The bandera left Santa Olalla at “1.30 H.,” according to this source, and arrived at its destination at “26 H.” The “26 H.” is puzzling; it must be a typographical error. See also SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarto Bandera September 24, 1936. 55. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 411–12. For the religious symbolism of To- ledo, see Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 103. The Alcázar was important for both sides. The Republicans wanted to eliminate that point of dogged resistance inside their zone, and the Nationalists, especially Franco, wanted to save its beleaguered defenders. It was very significant in terms of propaganda, although it held no strategic importance, and for both sides it took valuable military assets away from other fronts. 56. Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 82; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 51. Yagüe was relieved of duty and replaced by General Varela because of a heart ailment (“dolencia cardíaca”). According to Preston, Franco, 174, Colonel Yagüe “had a weak heart [as a consequence of] problems with his aorta.” Shortly thereafter he was named inspector colonel of the Tercio (i.e., the Legion), with the rank of full colonel. See also Juan Yagüe Blanco file, Legajo No. LL-30, AGM. Because of illness caused by excessive fatigue and triggered Notes | 257 by this difficult campaign, Yagüe relinquished command of the Madrid Column on September 20 and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Asensio. On that day he went to Cáceres (Franco’s headquarters), and on September 23 he returned to Ceuta, where he had been posted at the start of the uprising and there finished out the month. 57. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 25, 1936. The village of Rielves is written here as “Rieves.” 58. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, September 26, 1936. 59. Ibid., September 27, 1936. Here the village of Rielves is written as “Rielva.” 60. Ibid., September 28–30, 1936. 61. Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 138. 62. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 26, 1936. Although the official name of the village is Bargas, it is also sometimes written as “Vargas.” 63. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 50. 64. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 277. This source says that the Eighth Bandera was dissolved on January 6, 1933, yet it then says that the same bandera, left for Ceuta on September 12, 1936, by land and crossed the strait by transport plane. To the best of my knowledge, the Eight Bandera never went to Ceuta, and there was no airfield there (there still isn’t one today); the airfield was in Tetuán. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 50. The Battle for the Alcázar of Toledo

1. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 51; Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 65–77 (campaign from Talavera de la Reina to Toledo). 2. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 51, 53. 3. Ibid., 53. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 26, 1936. 4. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 27, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 54. 5. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 27, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 54–55. 6. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 27, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 55–56. In addition to the Fifth Bandera, the First Tabor of the Regulares of Tetuán also reached the Alcázar. For what was probably the first book in English about the seventy-two day siege 258 | Notes of the Alcázar, see Rodolphe Timmermans, Heroes of the Alcazar (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937). Timmermans interviewed Colonel José Mos- cardó, the commander of the Alcázar, after its relief. In addition, the book contains excellent photos of the Alcázar as well as the soldiers who were besieged. 7. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 56, 453. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 260. The Third Bandera, which had recently arrived from Spanish Morocco and was most recently based in Talavera de la Reina, was incorporated into Barrón’s column (in reserve) and was in Toledo on September 27, 1936. From Toledo the Third Bandera was sent to Asturias on September 30. 8. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campañ de Liberacion, First Bandera, 241; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 58; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 412. The militiamen had moved out as much of the contents of the arms factory as they could before its capture. See also Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 31. Colonel Fuqua informed his superiors that the Toledo arms factory “is devoted to the manufacture of steel arms [bayonets and swords] and rifle ammunition and is in the possession of the government. The insurgents, before withdrawing to the Alcazar, took with them important parts of the machinery with a view to prevent the utilization of the factory by the government.” 9. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 28, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 58. The latter source says that the defenders who escaped the burning Marist School were taken prisoner, whereas the former source states that they were all killed. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 28, 1936. On September 29 and 30, the Fifth Bandera was in Toledo, where on the first day it rested and on the second it underwent inspection at ten o’clock in the morning and then spent the afternoon washing up, cleaning weapons, and relaxing. See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 58. According to Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 412–13, the seminary was occupied by forty anarchists who, once surrounded and with no hope of escape, got drunk on anisette, set the seminary on fire, and perished in the fire rather than surrender. See also SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 241–42. According to Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 140, after the capture of Toledo General Varela’s next assignment was to secure the province of Toledo for the Nationalists and then return to the south for the capture of the port city of Málaga. Notes | 259

11. Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 140–41. 12. Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 104, states that “in the hospital 200 wounded militiamen left behind were killed in their beds with grenades and knives.” Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 412, was much more conservative: “Moroccans also killed the doctor and a number of wounded militiamen in their beds at the San Juan Hospital.” For more on the siege of the Alcázar, its relief, and the aftermath, see Payne, Civil War in Spain, 67–84; and Wyden, Passionate War, 140–46. 13. Wyden, Passionate War, 146–48; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 375–78. 14. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 378–79. From Toledo to Madrid, October 1936

1. Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 379. 2. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 60. 3. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 1, 1936. 4. Ibid., October 2, 1936. These units remained in place the following day, Oc- tober 3. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 2, 1936. 5. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, October 1 and 3, 1936. 6. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 4–5, 1936. 7. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 6, 1936. This source refers to Santa Cruz del Retamar as “Santa Cruz de Retamares.” 8. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 6, 1936. 9. Ibid., October 7, 1936. In this source the village of Almorox is written as “Almorochs.” According to Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 145, the bridge had been wired for demolition, but the captain of the engineers cut the wires that led to the explosive charges. See also Subinspección de la Legion, La legión española, 60, 62. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 8, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 62–63. 11. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 11, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 63. The latter source recorded that the Fifth Bandera traveled to the right of the main road in order to protect the left flank of Delgado’s column. According to Rodríguez Jiménez, A¡ MI LA LEGIÓN!, 380, on October 14 the Fifth Bandera suffered twenty-five casualties. See also Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 147. In this engagement the Re- publicans lost twenty trucks and eleven cars, an ambulance, lots of food and ammunition, two cannons, and more than two thousand rounds for the cannons. 260 | Notes

Moreover, they suffered numerous dead, and more than fifty men were taken prisoner or voluntarily surrendered. While this operation was taking place, Colonel Monasterio’s column was also on the move: it crossed the divide between the Tiétar and Alberche Rivers and used as an axis the road from Casavieja to San Martín de Valdeiglesias. At dusk that day, both columns united in San Martín de Valdeiglesias. 12. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 9, 1936. 13. Ibid. For the next three days (October 11–13) the Fifth Bandera remained in San Martín de Valdeiglesias and suffered three legionnaires wounded. 14. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 63. 15. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 14 and 15, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 65. The latter source says that Villa del Prado was occupied on October 14, whereas the former gives October 15 as the date. 16. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 14, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 63; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 149. Ortiz saw that the Republicans had left 114 dead on the field in Pelayos. 17. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 15, 1936. This source incorrectly identifies the village of Navas del Rey as “Navas de Marques.” See also Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 63–64; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 149–50. Republican prisoners reported that all their officers had been out of action. 18. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 65; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 277–78. According to the latter source, this was the first major action for this newly createdbandera . After this action on October 14 the Eighth Bandera was reassigned to patrol and scouting duty. 19. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, October 14, 1936; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MI LA LEGIÓN!, 380. The latter source says that the capture of Las Ventas de Retamosa and Casarrubios del Monte took place on October 16. 20. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 16, 1936; Michael Alpert, The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For more on the Popular Army, see Alpert, “Popular Army of the Spanish Republic.” 21. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 17, 1936. 22. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 17, 1936. Notes | 261

23. Ibid., October 18, 1936. 24. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, October 18, 1936, incorrectly lists the names of the two towns linked by the road as “Aldea del Rey” and “Nava del Fresno.” Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 65, notes that twenty-five men were casualties (“bajas”), including the commanding officer of the Eighteenth Company. Thomas,Spanish Civil War, 436, writes that Castejón “led a sally” by way of the cemetery and was able to counterattack the Republicans and deal them another loss. See also Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 43. Colonel Fuqua wrote that Republican forces in the area of Valmojado fluctuated from six thousand to two thousand men. The Republican commander told Fuqua that he had six hundred front-line men but with supporting troops and reserves, the total could reach two thousand men. 25. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Ter- cio Quinta Bandera, October 19–31, 1936; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Ma- drid, 151. Ortiz claims that the Republicans suffered three hundred dead and lost 220 rifles, 4 machine guns, and many thousand cartridges. 26. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 65–66. This source, while not stating it directly, leads the reader to believe that Illescas was captured on October 19. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 242, gives the name of the village of Yuncos as “Juncos.” See also Thomas, Span- ish Civil War, 436; and Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 380. Thomas states that Illescas fell to the Nationalists on October 17 and that at this time the Republican soldiers were constantly told by their political commissars that Soviet aid was on its way. 27. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 66; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 380. 28. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 66; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 436. 29. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 20–21, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 66. 30. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, October 21, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 66. 31. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 24, 26, and 28, 1936. 32. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 66–67. 33. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 468–69. Also on October 29, the Republi- cans sent four Soviet-piloted Tupolev SB-2 Katiuska (or Katyushka) twin-engine bombers on a raid targeting Seville’s Tablada airfield. The story goes that the 262 | Notes gasoline-filled wine bottles used in the Molotov cocktails that were hurled at the T-26s were from wine drunk by the legionnaires. One famous casualty of the battle of Seseña was the ill-fated Colonel Ildefonso Puigdengolas, the former commander of Republican forces in Badajoz. He had escaped Badajoz and fled to Portugal, where he was interned; later he returned to Spain. On October 26 he was given command of a column and took part in the battle of Seseña, where it is believed he was killed on October 30 by the militiamen of Lieutenant Colonel Valentín González aka “El Campesino” as he (Puigdengolas) tried to prevent them from fleeing. For more on the arrival of the Soviet tank crews in Spain and the battle of Seseña, see Wyden, Passionate War, 170–74; Antonio J. Candil, “Soviet Armor in Spain: Aid Mission to Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment,” Armor 108, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 31–38; and John L. S. Daley, “The Theory and Practice of Armored Warfare in Spain, October 1936– February 1937,” Armor 108, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 30, 39–43. See also Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 95–97; and Steven Zaloga, Spanish Civil War Tanks: The Proving Ground for Blitzkrieg, Osprey’s New Vanguard Series, No. 170 (London: Osprey, 2010). 34. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 29–30, 1936. 35. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 67–68; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 278. This source records that the Eighth Bandera left Toledo for Illescas on October 28, not October 29, and that on October 30 it set out for “Torrejón de Ardur” instead of Torrejón de Ve- lasco. On August 30, 1937, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Regalado Rodríguez was posthumously awarded the Individual Military Medal. He was killed in action on July 24, 1937, while leading his bandera during the battle of Brunete. 36. The Mejazníes del Rif was also known as the Mehal-la Jalifiana No. 5. For more on its history and organization, see Madariaga, Los Moros, 104–9. 37. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Tercer Tercio, Septima Bandera (1936–39); Subin- spección de la Legión, La legión española, 68. 38 SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, October 31, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 68. The latter source says that the Fourth Bandera made it easier for the newly created Seventh Bandera to capture the town of Valdemoro. This information does not appear in the former source. See also Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 81–109 (campaign from Toledo to the gates of Madrid). Notes | 263

The Madrid Front, November 1936

1. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 242; Sub- inspección de la Legión, La legión española, 68. 2. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 1, 1936. 3. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 1, 1936. 4. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, November 1, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 68. 5. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 68. Unfortunately, this source fails to identify who made up the two battalions of foreigners. See Thom- as, Spanish Civil War, 452–64. 6. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 3, 1936; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 151, 158–59. On the way to Villaviciosa, one of Castejón’s adjutants told Ortiz that in their attempt to recapture Chapin- ería, the Republicans had left close to four hundred men dead on the field. 7. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, November 3, 1936 (refers to Asensio’s column as “column no. 1”); Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 68. On November 3, according to the latter source, the Sixth Bandera occupied Fuenlabrada after engaging in heavy combat with its defenders, who had dug themselves in in its environs. This information does not appear in the former source. 8. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Tercer Tercio, Septima Bandera; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 68–69. The latter source claims that the infantry battalions involved in the battle were composed of foreign volunteers from the International Brigades. 9. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 242; Sub- inspección de la Legión, La legión española, 69. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 278; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 381; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 69. 11. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera. 12. Mikhail A. Maslov, Polikarpov I–15, I–16, and I–153: Aircraft of the Aces (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2010), 16, 18; Elstob, Condor Legion, 91, 113; Salas Lar- razábal, Air War over Spain, 98. 13. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 5–6, 1936. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 69; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A 264 | Notes

MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 264–65. Ivanoff was fearless in combat and was awarded the Individual Military Medal for bravery on March 7, 1939. For more on Ivanoff, see Álvarez, “Spanish Foreign Legion,” 220, 222. 14. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 69. This source claims that the defenders’ barbed-wire entanglements on their trenches were electrified. 15. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 5–6, 1936. 16. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, November 6–17, 1936. 17. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 278. 18. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 473–74; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 70. 19. Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 131–32; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 475–76. 20. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 7, 1936. 21. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 7, 1936 (records one legionnaire killed and twenty–five wounded); Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 70–71; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 160– 62. While Castejón was recuperating in the hospital in Talavera de la Reina from a wound he received on November 8, he was asked by Ortiz which battle had been the toughest so far. Without a second thought, he replied, “Retamares.” In Castejón’s recounting of the battle (or in Ortiz’s account of it), the Twenty- First Company captured the first line of trenches. The Twenty-First Company was part of the Sixth Bandera, however, not the Fifth Bandera, which was with Castejón, so perhaps they meant the Twentieth Company. 22. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 71; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 278–79. On November 7 the bandera attacked the Barrio de Usera, a neighborhood just to the north of Vil- laverde. On the streets of Usera, the legionnaires ran into a labyrinth of street barricades and trenches and received machine-gun fire from nearly every house. 23. Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 99; Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 136. This event, the fortuitous discovery of the enemy’s battle plan, reminds me of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Special Orders 191 for the Battle of An- tietam on September 17, 1862, which were found by soldiers from the Twenty- Seventh Indiana Volunteer Infantry wrapped around three cigars. 24. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,”, Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 242; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 71–72. At this time the Notes | 265

Nationalists’ principal light tank was the Italian CV–33 armed with a single 6.5 x 52 millimeter machine gun. According to Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 475, about twenty Italian tanks and their crews, under the command of Italian Army Cap- tain Oreste Fortuna and as part of the Spanish Foreign Legion, took part in the battle for Madrid. There were also German tanks involved as part of the Condor Legion and led by Colonel Wilhelm von Thoma. Germany’s most popular tank in Spain was the Panzer I, which was armed with only two 7.92 x 57 millimeter machine guns. It was easily outclassed by the Soviet T–26s, which were armed with a 45-millimeter cannon and a 7.62 x 54 millimeter machine gun. 25. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 8, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 72; Iniesta Cano, Memorias y recuerdos, 96. 26. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, September 8, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 73; Ortiz de Villajos, De Sevilla a Madrid, 171–72; Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 102, 105. While Caste- jón recovered from his hip wound, Colonel Maximino Bartoméu took command of his column. Besides Castejón, Nationalist column commanders Tella and Del- gado were seriously wounded during the battle for Madrid. In December Gener- al Varela was also wounded and had to temporarily give up his command while he spent a month in the hospital recuperating. 27. Cortada, Modern Warfare in Spain, 50–51; Bradley, International Brigades, 18, 31. The Eleventh International Brigade, about nineteen hundred men, was composed of the Edgar André (German), Commune de Paris (French-Belgian), and Dombrowski (Polish-Hungarian) Battalions under the command of General Emilio Kléber (né Manfred Lazar Stern). When the men of this brigade marched through the streets of Madrid, the citizens believed they were Russian soldiers and loudly cheered them. According to Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 481, General Kléber led the Eleventh International Brigade into battle for the first time on November 9–10 in the Casa de Campo and lost one–third of its men, but it kept the Nationalists from breaking into the city center. See also Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 137. 28. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 242; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 73. 29. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 9, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 73. The Fourth Bandera’s chaplain, Father Fernando Huidobro, was wounded himself while tending to the wounded at the bandera’s aid station in Casita de Patinaje. 30. Garabitas Hill rises to an elevation of twenty-two hundred feet and is ideal for an observation point and for artillery placement. 266 | Notes

31. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 9, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 73–74. The Sixth Bandera took part in the occupation of Casa de Campo and was prepared to turn back any attempt by the Republicans to drive it out. 32. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 11–14, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 73; Cierva, Brigadas In- ternacionales, 275; Al Tuma, “Participation of Moorish Troops,” 107. Cierva says that about seventy thousand Moroccans fought for the Nationalists, and Al Tuma gives the number as in the “tens of thousands.” 33. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, First Bandera, 242; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 74. 34. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 10, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 74. 35. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 74. 36. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 279; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 74. 37. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 483; Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 138; Payne, Civil War in Spain, 124. 38. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 11–14, 1936. On November 11 Salvador Solana Martín was transferred from the Eigh- teenth to the Nineteenth Company; and on the next day, Ángel Moreno Ruiz replaced him in the Eighteenth Company. 39. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 477; Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 133; Preston, Spanish Civil War, 184. About 1,200 prisoners were shot at Paracuellos del Jara- ma and Torrejón de Ardoz. Between November 7 and December 3, 4,276 prisoners were shot by militiamen from the Vigilancia de Retaguardia. See also Wyden, Passionate War, 206–8; and Ruiz, “Red Terror,” 231–83. The latter thoroughly covers Paracuellos and the “extractions.” 40. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 74–75. 41. Ibid., 75–76. 42. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 15, 1936. In 1926 a law was passed to modernize and improve Spanish roads. Ac- cording to Iniesta Cano, Memorias y recuerdos, 97, he and other Nationalists were disgusted that the Republicans would leave their dead out in the open to rot without trying to recover their bodies. 43. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 15–23, 1936. Notes | 267

44. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” Tercio gran capitan 1º de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 279. 45. At this time the principal Nationalist bombers were the German Ju–52 and the Italian S–M 81 with Italian CR 32s and German He–51s providing fighter escort. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 17, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 76; Iniesta Cano, Memo- rias y recuerdos, 97. 46. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, November 17, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 76. By mid–November the battle for Madrid was at such a critical stage that Franco moved his headquarters from Salamanca to Madrid to be closer to the action. 47. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, November 18, 1936; SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, November 18–30, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 76. 48. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Tercer Tercio, Septima Bandera. 49. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, November 19, 1936. 50. Subinspección de la Legión, La Legión española, 77. Iniesta Cano, Me- morias y recuerdos, 97, recalls that during this time, he and three fellow Legion officers and men of the Fourth Bandera captured three “Reds” who were in possession of a flag with the inscription “Battalion of Dynamiters.” 51. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 77, 79. Lieutenant Primiti- vo Fernandino Pérez was awarded the Military Medal for valor on December 19, 1938, according to this source. I am pretty sure that Primitivo Fernández Pérez and Primitivo Fernandino Pérez are one and the same. 52. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 24, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 79. Captain Tiede was actually replaced by Captain Francisco González Soler, but the latter source fails to mention that Captain Mariano Rubio de Castro was the commanding officer for one day. See also Maurice Duval, Lessons of the War in Spain, trans. John Eoghan Kelly, ed. Michael E. Chapman (Reading, MA: Trebarwyth Press, 2006), 71n173. Kelly writes that “Franco’s Moors delighted in capturing or destroying tanks with army blankets, which they lobbed into the cogs, thereby throwing the chain and stalling the tank. Then they resorted to another blanket soaked with kerosene, which they tossed over the turret and set afire.” 53. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 25–28, 1936. 54. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 79. 55. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, November 29–30, 1936. The wounded of the Fifth Bandera included Lieutenant Joaquín Valenzuela 268 | Notes

Alcibar and Eduardo Ortiz de Zugasti. Captain González was awarded his medal on January 12, 1939. 56. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 79. 57. Bueno Carrera, Uniformes militares, 278; Mary Nash, Defying Male Civ- ilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War (Denver, CO: Arden Press, 1995), 105–20, 154–65. The latter source provides an excellent and earnest assessment of the role of the milicianas on the Republican side as well as of the issues of prostitution and venereal disease. 58. Wyden, Passionate War, 160. 59. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Tercer Tercio, Septima Bandera; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 79–80. On November 29 the Republicans suffered heavy casualties and many prisoners were captured. Lots of war materiel was also taken, including four medium machine guns and several light machine guns. The former source refers to the capture of a casa blanca (“white house”), which might refer to La Atalaya. Unlike the latter source, which has the Nationalist column withdrawing, the former source notes that on November 30, despite the Republicans’ tenacious resistance, it was the Republicans who retreated in disorder. See also José Manuel Martínez Bande, La Lucha en torno a Madrid: En el invierno de 1936–37. Servicio Histórico Militar Monograph No. 2 (Madrid: Libreria Editorial San Martín, 1968), 44–53 (operations in Pozuelo and Humera northwest of Madrid); and Martínez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid, 113–60 (Madrid campaign). The Madrid Front, December 1936

1. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Cuarta Bandera, December 1–31, 1936; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 80–81. The Tenth Compa- ny suffered ninety-eight casualties (thirty-eight dead and sixty wounded). Both the Laureate Cross of St. Ferdinand and the Military Medal can be awarded to either an individual or an entire unit. The Fourth Bandera was also awarded the Military Medal on March 23, 1937, for its actions on December 1, 1936. Accord- ing to Iniesta Cano, Memorias y recuerdos, 98–99, the explosion was so powerful that the survivors ended up sprawled on the floor after having been lifted off the ground three to six feet. This source contains Major José Vierna’s official report of the incident. 2. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, December 1–6, 1936. 3. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Tercer Tercio, Septima Bandera; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 82–83. Notes | 269

4. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Sexta Bandera, December 1, 5, 15, and 20, 1936. 5. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 279; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 83. According to the former source, the operation began on December 13, and it was rain and snow (not fog) that impeded the column’s advance. 6. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 279– 80; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 83. Three tanks emerged from the left side of town, and immediately the legionnaires pounced on them, setting two of them ablaze and capturing the third. There is a two-day difference in these sources. The former gives the date of this battle as December 15, whereas the latter gives December 13. 7. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Coleccion de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Eighth Bandera, 280; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 84. Again there is a two-day difference in these sources. The former states that the battle took place on Decem- ber 17 and that a battle standard from the International Brigades was captured but does not specifically say that it belonged to the First Brigade. The latter says that the battle took place on December 19 and notes that Lieutenant Karoly was a second lieutenant when the action took place. 8. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 82, 84; Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918: The Live and Let Live System (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980). The latter source covers the relationship and fraternization of opposing armies engaged in trench warfare. See also Iniesta Cano, Memorias y recuerdos, 111. After the battle for Madrid stabilized in December 1936 and early 1937, there was plenty of vocal interaction between the two trenches as militiamen replaced Republican front-line troops who were sent to other fronts. The distance was less than eleven yards, and megaphones were fashioned out of either cardboard or tin plates from the ammunition crates. 9. Iniesta Cano, Memorias y recuerdos, 100. 10. SHM, Legajo No. 27, Segundo Tercio, Quinta Bandera, December 7–31, 1936. With the Second Bandera on the Guipúzcoa-Aragón Front

1. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 151. 2. Alfonso Beorlegui Canet, a lieutenant colonel of infantry, sided with the Nationalists at the start of the war. He was in Pamplona when the uprising 270 | Notes started and reported to General Emilio Mola, who instructed him to take command of the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard and provide security for the city. After Mola received the ammunition (six hundred thousand rounds) that he needed from Franco, he was able to mount an offensive north of Pamplona into the Basque province of Guipúzcoa. Mola sent three columns, one of them commanded by Beorlegui, to drive toward San Sebastián (Donostia) and Irún to cut Spain off from France along the western Pyrenees. Beorlugui had two thousand men, and his column consisted of regular army troops, Falangists, Carlist militiamen, Assault Guardsmen, a machine-gun section, a mortar section, and a 105-millimeter battery. The Second Bandera was later attached to this column. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 315n1, 376–77. 3. There seems to be a discrepancy regarding the true rank of Beorlegui. Thom- as, Spanish Civil War, 315, refers to him as a colonel, whereas Beevor, Spanish Civil War, 98, refers to him as a major. Spanish sources (e.g., Euskomedia, http:// www.euskomedia.org) refer to him as a lieutenant colonel or a colonel. He was promoted to the rank of colonel in 1930. 4. Álvarez, Betrothed of Death, 21, 82. 5. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 151; Luis María De Lojen- dio, Operaciones militares de la guerra de España, 1936–1939 (Barcelona: Mon- taner y Simon, 1940). 6. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 377. The Republican commander of San Se- bastían threatened to shoot right-wing hostages if the Nationalists shelled and bombed the city. The Nationalists ignored his threat, and some of the hostages were shot. 7. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 378. Aiding the Basques were some anarchists from Barcelona and some French and Belgian technicians who had been sent by the French Communist Party; the group also had a regiment of artillery. One major player in getting French and Belgian communists to fight for the republic in Spain was André Marty, who represented the Comintern in Spain. He held a high leadership position in the organization, and later he was made the political commissar and chief organizer of the International Brigades in Spain (in Albacete). The Twelfth Brigade (in reality a battalion), composed of French and Belgian volunteers, was named in his honor. See also Cierva, Brigadas Internacionales, 149. André Marty was called the Butcher of Albacete by his own men, foreign volunteers. He freely admitted that he had had “only 500 men shot.” 8. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 151. Colonel Antonio Candil told me that in the battle for San Sebastián the Nationalists employed a platoon of Fiat CV-33 tankettes that had arrived from Italy. The tankettes were manned by Italians but were under the nomimal command of a Spanish artillery lieutenant. Notes | 271

9. On June 5, 1939, then Captain Julio Coloma Gallegos was awarded the Individual Military Medal. 10. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 151–52. 11. Ibid., 152; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 247. 12. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 152. 13. Ibid.; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 379. The battle in this region was so close to the French border that Beorlegui ordered his men not to shoot east lest ordnance land in France. The rebels prepared for the attack with an artillery barrage followed by an infantry assault; the Basque defenders would abandon their positions only to launch a counterattack and try to reoccupy their lost positions, which would then start the process again with a Nationalist artillery barrage. The Puntza Ridge was fought over this way four times: destroyed, evacuated, recaptured, and finally captured. On this front, the only times the guns fell silent were during the night and the afternoon siesta. 14. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 153; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 379; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Ter- cio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Ban- dera, 247. 15. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 153; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 379; Martínez Bande, La guerra en el norte 61–94 (Guipúzcoa campaign, including capture of Irún and San Sebastián). 16. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 379–80. Retreating French communist machine gunners may have shot Beorlegui. San Sebastián fell to the Nationalists on September 13. The fight in the north then shifted to Santander and Asturias. 17. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 247; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 153–54. 18. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 247; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 153–54; José Manuel Martínez Bande, La invasion de Aragon y el desembarco en Mallorca. Servicio Histórico Militar Monograph No. 5 (Madrid: Libreria Editorial San Martín, 1970), 55–126 (Aragón front, July to November 1936). 19. Estrecho de Quinto is also known as Estrecho Quinto. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 247–48; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 154. 272 | Notes

20. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 248; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 156. 21. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 248; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 156. Captain José García Blanco was killed in Zaragoza when his pistol discharged accidentally. 22. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 156–57; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 248. The latter source erroneously records activities for October that I believe should be for November. It notes that the bandera took part in the capture of Azuara on November 9 and Ermita de Belchite on November 13. 23. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 157, 159. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 248–49. On November 19 the enemy left Bolea and took the town of Ayerbe and Loma de la Corona, and on November 27 it was in the sector of Calamocha, the position called Diablo. This source mistakenly gives December 29 as the date of the fight for Gea de Albarracín instead of the correct November 29. 24. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 159; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Second Bandera, 249. This source refers to Castralvo as “Castralbo.” With the Third Bandera on the Asturian Front

1. For more on the siege of the Simancas Barracks, see Fraser, Blood of Spain, 239–41; and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 236. 2. For a good description of the siege of Oviedo, see Fraser, Blood of Spain, 238–54; and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 236. 3. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 260; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 125–26. 4. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 260 (refers to Volgues as “Bolgues”); Subinspección de la Legión, La legión españo- la, 125–26; Salas Larrazábal, Air War over Spain, 83. On September 24 a Ger- man He 51 fighter squadron was moved to León in the north and away from the Notes | 273

Toledo front on the insistence of General Emilio Mola to provide air support for Nationalist troops advancing on Oviedo. 5. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 260– 61; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 126–27. Lieutenant Fran- cisco Coloma was awarded the Individual Military Medal on January 10, 1937, having been wounded on four occasions. After the war he remained in the army and served in the government until General Franco’s death in 1975 and beyond. Two of his most important commands were as colonel of the Third Tercio (Don Juan of Austria) in Spanish Sahara from 1959–1961, and as captain general of Madrid, Seville, and Cataluña. When Franco died, Coloma was Spain’s army minister. Coloma died in 1993. 6. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 261; Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 127, 129. 7. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 129; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 261. 8. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 129. 9. Ibid., 130. 10. Ibid., 130–31. At the start of the war the standard light bomber of the Spanish Air Force was the Breguet 19, which had a bomb load of about a thousand pounds. In July 1936 the Republicans had seventy of them, and the Nation- alists had thirty. 11. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 131. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 131–32. The Nationalists were outnumbered thirty to one by the Republicans in this campaign. 14. Ibid., 132. 15. Ibid., 132–33; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 261. 16. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 134. 17. Ibid.; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 261. 18. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 134; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 261–62. 274 | Notes

19. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 134–35. 20. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 262. 21. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 135. While the Ninth Machine-Gun Company of the Third Bandera was involved in this sector of As- turias, the other three companies were in Santullano de la Regueras undergoing refitting and training while manning outposts in Otero. 22. SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 262–63. 23. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 135–36; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 263. On December 1 the Republicans attacked the Third Bandera along the Grullés–Valdino–La Mata line, and the legionnaires were facing militiamen. According to Cortada, Mod- ern Warfare in Spain, 52, Grado was the Nationalists’ main base in Asturias, and the distance between it and Oviedo was about twenty-five miles from Oviedo. The Republicans remained in control of the important ports of Avilés and Gijón. 24. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 136; SHM, Legajo No. 54, Rollo 16, “Colección de historiales,” “Tercio gran capitan 1° de la legion historial,” Campaña de Liberacion, Third Bandera, 263. 25. Subinspección de la Legión, La legión española, 136–37; Martínez Bande, La guerra en el norte, 103–38 (Asturian campaign from the uprising to the relief of Oviedo). According to Aranda, the Nationalists suffered twenty-six hundred casualties in advancing from Ribadeo to relieve Oviedo. Conclusion

1. Martínez Bande, La lucha en torno a Madrid, 13. 2. Scurr, Spanish Foreign Legion, 35; Rodríguez Jiménez, ¡A MÍ LA LEGIÓN!, 406. Bibliography