THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF 'S 1987 COUP

Carolyn Henning Brown Department of Anthropology Whiteman College Walla Walla, Washington, U.SA. Until May 14, 1987, Fiji enjoyed a reputation as a model plural society which made parliamentary rule work well in spite of its knife -edge ethnic balance. The native , slightly in the minority (47%) to the Indians (49%), dominate the government and the military, while the Indians dominate agriculture, business and the professions.1 It is the sort of division of economic and political power in which there is always plenty for anyone to feel disgruntled about. For the same reason, mutual distrust has been a chronic state of relations; but animosity has never flared beyond occasional pushing and shoving to anything remotely like the violence of similarly structured societies in Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka. This has remained true even during the aftermath of the May 14 coup in which the military stole power from the Indian-dominated coalition which won its first election in seventeen years since Independence. Commentators who have sought to interpret the May 14 and sub- sequent events have had three levels of power relations to examine: Fiji's internal ethnic power struggle; the regional relationships dominated by and with Fiji as a leader of the smaller Island societies, where recently Polynesian-Melanesian differences are emerging into political importance; and the stratosphere of Superpowers where there is just the beginning of Soviet competition for influence in a steadfastly pro-Western Pacific scene. Given the nature of the factors involved in the coup, it makes best sense to begin with the local level political structure and its social context; the broader levels may well be affected by Fiji events, but played little part in shaping them.

Fiji 1874-1987: A Balanced Plural Society

It was the labor needs of European cotton and sugar planters which brought Indians and Fijians together, creating a classic plural society2 out of an indigenous ethnically Melanesian society structured on hierarchical Polynesian principles, a system of ranked lineages and competing chiefdoms. And it was British administrative

SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 38 (1), March 1989 96 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

policy which preserved relatively intact the traditional Fijian chiefly system and political hegemony, structuring a post-independent state in which ethnic competition has inevitably been the foremost political preoccupation.

The Indigenous Fijians

Fiji was ceded to Great Britain in 1874 by joint action of the paramount chiefs led by Cakobau, Tui Viti (Paramount Chief of Fiji) in order to protect themselves from US extortion over the burning of a local resident's house and to bring British law to control a small but growing community of European planters, traders, and adventurers. At that time there were eleven great chiefdoms spread among Fiji's 300 islands, the most powerful of them surrounding the Koro Sea. The highest ranked of these chiefdoms was and still is , on Viti Levu's southeastern coast; another great chiefdom was Lau, the island group to the east; and a third was Cakaudrove on Vanua Levu. The three elder statesmen of modern Fijian politics just happen to be Sir , recently retired Governor-General and the Vunivalu Bau (great-grandson of the Cakobau who ceded Fiji to Great Britain); , Governor-General until October 1987 and Roko Tui Cakaudrove; and Ratu Sir , Prime Minister and Tui Nayau of the Lau Islands.3 The critical document on which present Fijian claims to hegemony are based is the 1874 Deed of Cession which carried the provision that "the rights and interests of the said Tui Viti and other high chiefs and the ceding parties hereto shall be recognized so far as is and shall be consistent with British Sovereignty and Colonial form of government."4 The humanitarian ideology of the time, as formulated into policy by Sir Arthur Gordon, the first governor, was protectionist; Fijians were to be isolated from the depredations of Western culture (with the major exception of Christianization, which was already far advanced), economic interests and land alienation. In both the latter two policies he ran counter to the desires of the 2,000 or so planters who wanted Fijian land and labor, and thought the best future for Fiji would be dissolution of the traditional social organization which could be achieved by a policy of benign neglect. To govern the Fijians, a Native Administration5 was established as an encapsulated government within the broader colonial government. It was modeled on the British officials' understanding of traditional Fijian social organization, giving offices to traditional chiefs, establishing provinces and districts roughly corresponding to FIJI'S 1987 COUP 97 traditional states and lineage territories, and creating a native court system which enforced a blend of Fijian custom and British justice. An advisory body, the Council of Chiefs, could make recommendations to the superordinate legislative Council, but there was no general franchise for Fijians, and membership in the Legislative Council was by appointment. The actual administration was carried out by British District Commissioners and District Officers. Through this structure Fijians were subject to laws and policies dis tinct from those which governed Indians, Europeans and other resident of the colonies. The system had the further conservative effect of preserving traditional village life so that Fijians have suffered far less from the disruptions of mo dernization than has been true of most developing nations. In truth, their politicization in any significant way dates from 1970. The second major conservative policy of Fiji's colonial ad- ministrators grew out of their determination to prevent the destruction which was wrecked on the Maoris and Native Americans. This was effectively accomplished by Britain's land policies based on an extensive study from 1876 to 1879 of the land tenure system and its preservation, though in distorted form, in the Native Land Ordinance of 1892.6 By this act 83% of Fiji land was permanently vested in Fijian lineages and since 1940 has been administered through the Native Lands Trust Board. It could be leased but never sold to non-Fijians. Although these percentages have not significantly changed in the 95 years since enactment of the ordinance, the danger of loss of land was a primary incitement to the coup of 1987.

Fiji Indian Society

These institutions for preservation of Fijian interests were largely in place by the time Indians began arriving in 1879 under five-year indentures to work in the cotton and sugar plantations.7 If the colonial government invested considerable administrative ingenuity in protecting Fijian traditions, the same could not be said of their governance of Indian migrant workers. Humanitarian opinion had brought about an end to slavery throughout the empire half a century earlier but not the end to the economic need for cheap labor, an inseparable concomitant of the plantation system, and the indenture system was, as Hugh Tinker has observed, a new system of slavery. In all, 60,553 Indians embarked from Calcutta and Madras, mostly young, single men, unskilled labourers, to work for a 98 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

promised shilling a day on the plantations. Although the Government of India insisted that one-third of recruits be women so that some kind of family life could develop in the islands, it was rarely possible to meet that quota. Fiji's Indian population is a diverse group, a diversity originating in the pattern of migration, and that was a reflection of economic conditions pertaining in India in the late 19th century. Very few Bengalis went, even though Calcutta was the principal embarkation point, but Bihar, where one-fifth of the population was landless by 1916, sent more recruits than any other province. From 1879 to 1903, all Indians came from North India and were relatively homogeneous, speaking mutually intelligible dialects of Hindustani for the most part. According to Gillion (1962: 209) 16% were high castes, 31% were agricultural castes, 6% were artisans, 31% were low castes, and 14% were Muslims. In 1903 this population was surprised by the arrival of a kind of Indian they had never seen before: "We didn't know what they were," remembers an aged ex-indentured labourer. They were "Madrassis", speakers of Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam, and followers of Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. All these migrants, brought as girmitiya, formed the original base of Fiji Indian society. Two other groups came between 1920 and 1936 as free men paying their own fares: Punjabis, mostly Sikhs, who settled in agricultural areas and generally fit in well with the preceding migrants; and Gujaratis, almost wholly small tradesmen who settled in towns and maintained a social gap between themselves and the "coolies" who worked on the plantations. The census of Fiji does not enumerate Indians by sub-group, but estimated proportions of the self-identified "cultural groups" are as follows: North Indians 64% South Indians 20 Muslims 10 Sikhs 3 Gujaratis 3 These cultural groups have far greater significance in Fiji Indian society than do caste identities. This is so for several reasons. More " than 50 castes can be identified among Fiji's 350,000 Indians, and these are distributed rather randomly around the two main islands in a pattern established to meet the needs of plantation owners. None of these castes has organized associations, they rarely have any occupational significance8, and local-level politics is managed by FIJI'S 1987 COUP 99 cultural groups and to a certain extent dominated by men of high caste status for whom caste identity means little more than a "bonus of esteem".9 Several studies of marriage patterns10 have shown a persistent preference for endogamous marriage, albeit a low expres- sion of it when compared to India; in one conservative region, that of the town of Sigatoka and vicinity, Brahmans, Chamars and Thakurs had the highest rates of endogamy at 70%, 60% and 56% respectively. I have argued elsewhere that demographic limitations make any higher rates impossible, and that the rate of endogamy is a function of the size of a caste's population within a region.11

Economic Competition between Indians and Fijians

If societies vary along a continuum from homogeneous to plural, the degree of plurality may be measured by examining the degree to which various social institutions are shared or not shared. Fiji is ex- treme or. all measures; there is almost no intermarriage, so that the kinship domain is completely pluralized; Fijians are almost totally Christian, while only 1% of Indians are Christians, the rest being Hindu, Muslim or Sikh; in education there are Indian schools and Fijian schools, although there is greater integration in this domain than in others. In the economic sphere, there is somewhat more overlap, but the segregation is still highly significant. Almost half of the Fijian population is still primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture, while less than 1% of Indians are so engaged. On the other hand, 51% of Indians are engaged in primary production, most of it sugar cane. The percentage by agricultural commodity is strikingly segregated:

Table I: Major Crop Production by Ethnic Group

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Indians predominate in the occupational categories of secondary industry, construction, commerce and transport, where they compose from 54% to 63% of the total work force. This, of course, is one side effect of the exclusionary land policy; Indians have to extend into other spheres of the economy, and in fact it is the Indians who have largely created a non-agricultural economic sphere. The Fijians dominate in one strategic sphere: government and administration, where their proportion is 53% to the Indian 35%. It is an axiomatic statement of the balance of power philosophy in Fiji that the Indians run the economy and the Fijians run the government, and the possibility of an Indian-dominated government has always carried with it the implication of de-stabilizing this balance. I shall return to this issue later. A final sphere of Fijian control is the Defence Force and the Fiji Police. The former is 100% in Fijian hands; the latter is 60% Fijian, although significantly, the police are not armed.

Sharing the Land

Among plural societies, Fiji's system for land sharing is unique. There are basically three kinds of land in Fiji: Fijian mataqali-held land comprising 83% of the total land area, another 6.9% Crown land, and 9.9% freehold. land is the land which no Fijian group claimed at the time of Cession or land whose owning mataqali has died out. According to these figures, less than 10% of the land of Fiji can be bought and sold on the open market. The 83% mataqali-held land is shared among 6,600 land-owning units. Fijians own 3,776,000 acres, of which only 7% is leased to non-Fijians, although that seven percent includes the best agricultural land in Fiji, only 20% of which is suitable for agriculture without improvements more than manuring. Indians own only 75,830 acres of freehold land, or one-sixtieth of the total land area of Fiji, yet they comprise 49% of the population. In spite of this disparity, Indians have never seriously asked for a change in the structure of landownership, but only for greater security of tenure. Indians began using mataqali lands during the indenture period as their individual indentures came to an end. At that time land use agreements were worked out between the Indian and Fijian mataqali on the basis of individual negotiations involving gifts and annual cash payments. For the Indian there was no security of tenure and no rent protection since there was no group or agency to which he could turn for support. The land situation improved considerably for FIJI'S 1987 COUP 101

Indians from 1917 to 1920 as the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. made a seminal policy decision to phase out its large plantations and henceforth leave the production of sugar cane in the hands of independent Indian small farmers.12 Its large plantations were divided into ten acre plots and leased to Indians along with a contract from the company to purchase cane. Because the company had an interest in the success of these Indian enterprises, their land leases were usually fair and long-term and were much preferred by Indians over the insecure native-lands arrangements.13 Accumulating complaints from Indians about Fijian extortion, and from Fijians about Indian rent arrears and soil mismanagement resulted in the establishment of the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) in 1940. Henceforth all transactions have been handled by this independent agency located in Suva. As originally established, tenants were given 30-year leases with periodic reassessment of land value and rent increase. This length of time was, for Indians, the duration of a man's productive life-span, but did not allow for in heritance or the identification of a family with a piece of land over several generations. The legislation also allowed for setting aside some land for the future use of the Fijian people; this land could not be leased to non-Fijians. The process of placing land in reserve is remembered by rural Indians much the same way the flu epidemic of 1918 is remembered; the victims can be recounted by date, number of acres and tons of cane no longer harvested. In one settlement area, Sabeto, twenty-one farmers lost between seven and forty acres each as their leases came to an end and the land was set aside for reserve. A Muslim leader in this community remembers: "The Indians made Fiji a paradise, but no one knows this. All this area has returned to jungle. Before reserving we used to fill 40 railroad cars with cane. It took two engines to haul it. After reserves, only 10 cars." The situation was worsened by the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance of 1966 (ALTO), which set up a tribunal to which both tenants and owners could appeal on a number of issues; if Fijians could show hardship, they could re-claim land on which an Indian tenant had a lease; or if land was being mis -managed by a tenant, it could be rescinded. Tenants could make appeals against the termination of a lease, against the amount set as fair rent, or to be declared the lawful tenant through a deceased relative with whom he had resided on the land. Both ethnic groups dislike ALTO, Fijians because with their communal villages they can rarely show as much hardship as Indians can; and Indians because in the 102 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN implementation of ALT O government reduced leases to the minimum ten years. This was a strong disincentive to Indians to make major improvements in either soil or buildings on their land. However, in 1975 modifications of ALTO restored the 30-year leases which had pertained previously. A related question is how the two ethnic groups are distributed on this land, which they share as landowner-tenant. To demonstrate this relationship, I refer again to the settlement area known as Sabeto, which is a relatively prosperous cane-growing area in the Western dry zone of Viti Levu, midway between Lautoka and Nadi (see map). Sabeto has no central place and is not considered a village for, apart from towns, only Fijians are thought to live in real villages. Sabeto is a typical Indian-settled area, a "settlement" consisting of a sprinkling of homesteads along a road leading inland from the single road which circles the island of Viti Levu. There is one main road into Sabeto along which are ranged four general stores owned and operated by Indian entrepreneurs, two elementary schools and one secondary school, a temple and a mosque. The railroad running north and south between the mills at Lautoka and the furthest fields in Siqatoka extend inland as far as Wailoko and Luvici, the former CSR Co. plantation. The Malika River separates Sabeto from Votualevu, the next settlement to the south. The four Fijian villages (Koros) are clearly bounded and isolated from their Indian neighbours who live in dispersed homesteads on their leased land. In rural areas like Sabeto the concept of "ethnic boundaries" may be taken quite literally. This spatial separation was reinforced by law until recently in two ways. Indians were forbidden to reside in Fijian villages, and Fijians had to have special dispensation to live outside the village as independent farmers or labourers, and had to pay a commutation tax to their village which was deprived of their services and customary exchanges. Such exceptions are rare, however, and the pattern of Fijian villages dotted throughout Indian settlement areas is general all over Fiji, their villages hidden in tranquil seclusion in oases of tropical vegetation amongst sugar cane fields cultivated by Indians. The total population of the four Fijian villages is 910, and they are landlords indirectly through NLTB to most of the 3,653 Indians living in the rest of the area. The total acreage of native lands in Sabeto is 17,600, excluding the 400-acre parcel previously held in freehold by the CSR Company (Luvici). The process of determining lands to be placed in reserve reached Sabeto in the late 1950's, at which time 8,585 acres were FIJI'S 1987 COUP 103 declared to be native reserve land. This included acres already retained by Fijians, but affected 880 acres on which Indians held leases, had built houses and grew sugar cane or rice for their livelihood. The map shows a section of Sabeto surrounding the main Sabeto koro and edging the Queen's Road. Land held by Indians under lease are shown in outline. Formerly most of the land north of the main road was held in lease by Indians with sugar cane contracts; now it has all been placed in reserve and has subsequently returned to bush. This outcome, so frequently the result of the system of reserving, has been a great disappointment to government planners, who hoped the additional land would be profitably cultivated Indian-style by Fijians. In most cases, land which was for- merly producing is now idle, and everyone has lost: Indians lost their livelihood, and Fijians lost their rents.14

Political Development of Fiji Indians

Structural changes to improve Indian conditions did not so much emanate from the colonial government of Fiji, which saw the Indian presence merely as a convenient labour substitution for protected Fijians which made the governance of the colony economically self-sustaining, as from India. The Indians have their own versions of the Fijians' Deed of Cession protections in the "Salisbury Despatch," written by Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, during early negotiations regarding Indian labor migration: "...Indian settlers who have completed the terms of service to which they agreed, as the return for expenses of bringing them to the colonies, will be in all respects free men, with privileges no whit inferior to those of any other class of Her Majesty's subjects in the Colonies" (Gillion 1962:26). It may well be argued that the language of the two documents is contradictory, at least so far as Fijian interests have been interpreted as being "paramount", while Indians have privileges "no whit inferior" to any others'. The earliest Indian politicians such as Vishnu Deo to the latest have assented to the paramountcy of Fijian interests while also claiming the equality of rights guaranteed by the Salisbury Despatch. This contradiction continues to be the critical point of principle in the current troubles in Fiji. In addition, conditions of Indians in the colonies became a major theme of the early stages of the Indian Independence mo vement, perhaps because of Gandhi's long residence in South Africa. The handful of educated Fiji Indians in the first few decades of the century were in touch with Congress leaders, and a stream of activists of 104 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN various persuasions began to arrive from India, among them Manilal Maganlal Doctor in 1912, C.F. Andrews and A.D. Patel. In India, Gandhi used the issue of indentured labor as the first test of satyagraha, threatening to picket ships unless the system were ended, with the result that in 1917 all recruiting for the colony stopped and by 1922 the last indenture had expired. From the beginning of Indian society in Fiji, Indians had to struggle for improvements in their political status, a political reality which has shaped the culture of politics in a way which, in the post-colonial setting, may have become maladaptive. The European community during the colonial period regarded itself as the true polity in Fiji; the Fijians were their wards and the Indians their laborers. Neither of these two groups were allowed to participate in the political process, the Fijians because they were seen as retarded in the civilizational and democratic arts, and the Indians because they were aliens, citizens of India in Fiji on a temporary basis and on sufferance. Citizenship could not be claimed until Independence in 1970 because aside from the Fijians there was no real citizenry; all the rest were British citizens who merely happened to reside in Fiji. The gradual achievement of such rights as membership in the Legis lative Council, enfranchisement and security of tenure on leased lands, all had to be obtained through political struggle which were often acrimonious. A single political party, the National Federation Party, has been the voice of Indian political interests since its formation in 1969, but its roots were in cane unions formed during the 1930's and 1940's. During this earlier period, the Kisan Sangh competed with the Maha Sangh for allegiance of growers, each attempting to outbid the other in whatever areas dispute happened to arise, setting a pattern of intra-communal political infighting which still characterizes Indian politics in Fiji. Several nation-wide strikes, in which cane was burned or allowed to rot in the fields, in which the losses ran to millions of pounds sterling, demonstrated the economic power wielded by Indians when they were organized and united, a demonstration which encouraged Indians but alarmed everyone else.

Removal of Colonial Mediation: 1970 and Beyond

The dismantling of the British empire which became inevitable following World War II reached Fiji in 1970. Ironically, though it was the Indians who vociferously urged the departure of the British against the wishes of most Fijians, it may be they who are the losers FIJI'S 1987 COUP 105

in the withdrawal of mediation which the British presence insured. Britain began preparing Fiji for independence in 1961 when a number of legislative and constitutional changes were proposed which would give executive responsibility over various governmental departments to members of the Legislative Council along with a plan of gradual expansion of these responsibilities until Fiji could assume self-government. This proposal was resisted by practically all Fijians and Europeans in the Legislative Council as certain to work to the advantage of Indians and against the present Fijian control of land.15 The resistance to executive responsibility illustrates the attitudes of the Fijians toward any change in what was viewed by them as a precarious balance of power. As these proposals were debated, Ratu Sir George Cakobau (later Governor-General of Fiji's highest ranking chief) said: "I have nothing against independence. Let independence come. But when independence comes, I should like this to be recorded in this house—let the British government return Fiji to the Fijians in the state and in the same spirit with which the Fijians gave Fiji to Great Britain."16 The hope that Fijians could have Fiji returned to them as they had originally ceded it—that is, without Indians—was naive, but widely hoped among Fijians. At that time, the Fijian people were in no way prepared to compete with the Indians who had been politically active since the 1920's. But in the decade of 1960's, Fijians came into the national political arena by beginning participation in the elective process, by formation of the , and by participation in the process of creating the constitution and the structure of the future society. The party which held power for 17 years following Independence is the Alliance Party, a tight coalition of Fijian, Indian and European sub-groups dominated by the Fijian chiefly establishment. This party emerged dominant out of the 1963 elections when Fijians voted for the first time for members of the Legislative Council. They had three choices of parties: one based on the Fiji Farmer's association; a second one founded by an urban labor leader; and the third, the Fijian Association (which became the Alliance Party) a more broadly based and conservative association of commoners and chiefs within the social service and the Fijian Administration. The outcome was a triumph for the Fijian establishment, since the members of the Legislative Council which had been nominated by the Council of Chiefs in former years were returned to office with the Fijian people themselves having had a chance to vote. In subsequent years the Fijian Association allied itself with similar associations representing other ethnic groups to become the 106 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN multi-racial Alliance Party. In 1966 European, Part -European and Chinese leaders formed the General Electors' Association which for- mally linked itself with the Fijian Association. Dis sident Indians, especially urban, educated, businessmen, Arya Samaj or Ahmadiya liberals became the Indian Alliance, making a third subgroup of the Alliance Party's coalition. The Indian Alliance regularly polls between 15 and 25 per cent of the Indian vote, a substantial contribution to Alliance's long hegemony. The Alliance Party, then, under the uninterrupted leadership of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, is a multi-racial party dominated by the Fijian establishment but with support from important minorities within Fiji. This formalized coalition of ethnic groups has permitted political power to be kept out of the hands of the numerically dominant ethnic group represented by the National Federation Party. At Independence in 1970 Britain invited the Alliance Party to form the first government; the Queen remained the titular head of the of Fiji, and in 1972 her representation in Fiji in the office of Governor-General was vested in Ratu Sir George Cakobau, great-grandson of Cakobau, Tui Viti. A complicated voting system was devised for Fiji which is a kind of compro mise between common roil and communal roll systems. The 52 seats in the House of Representatives are distributed as shown:

Candidates choose to run for either a communal or a national seat, both of which are slated for particular ethnic groups. Candidates running for a communal seat, however, face an electorate composed only of persons of the same ethnic group. Candidates running for a national seat face an electorate composed of all ethnic groups in the district. Voters then vote for a communal candidate and, on the national slots, they vote for a Fijian, an Indian and a 'general" (European, Part -European, Chinese, other) candidate, The political parties put forward candidates for all of these seats, which means that parties are encouraged to have members from all ethnic groups; otherwise, for instance, an Indian party would have no candidate for the Fijian national seats. FIJI'S 1987 COUP 107

The Culture of Fiji Politics

When a population of fewer than a million people has a full complement of competing political parties, regular elections and legislative deliberations well covered by a free press, the populace is inevitably absorbed in the national political process. One chronic feature of that process is the contrast of political styles of the two parties. Indians view the Alliance Party as only a minimal transformation of the old chiefly structure in which chiefs/politicians are revered and obeyed unquestioningly, a veneer of democracy only. Fijians view Indians as quarrelsome agitators always itching for a fight, insulting each other and everyone else, with no respect for the dignity of office or rank. They readily admit that Fijian society is not and never was democratic, and the rough and tumble style of democratic politics is distasteful to many of them. A second chronic feature of Fiji politics is its limited ideological nature; there has been, in the two dominant parties, fundamental agreement on certain premises of democratic society. Ratu Mara has developed a philosophy he calls "the Pacific Way," which recognizes the fundamental ethnic identity of groups and holds that the well-being of individuals is best insured if society is structured to protect collective communal interests against the potential in tolerance of numerically dominant groups. Indians have asserted a "justice is blind to race" view since the 1920's, demanding a common roll, and equal competition in society of everyone on the basis of their own natural abilities. NFP has reluctantly accepted the protectionism of the current land structure which is contrary to their deeper views on what democratic society should be, but dislikes all special dispensations and quotas favouring Fijian development where there are plenty of Indians capable of filling slots. There is little true interest in other ideologies in Fiji. Ethnicity, not class, is the absolute base of political competition. Small socialist parties appear with regularity and disappear just as regularly, "Land reform" can mean no more than better security of tenure for Indians, or opening more land in the interior to try terracing or, more radically, "full ownership" of land by Fijians such that they can also sell it. The "owners of the means of production" are now too few and not of the right sort for waging united political struggles against. The CSR Co. is now owned by the government of Fiji. There are a few other overseas companies such as the Emperor Gold Mining Corp., but these do not much attract the attention of Fijians and Indians who are mainly preoccupied with each other. 108 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

The other main targets would be local businesses, mostly Indians, which tend to be small and family-operated; and the "landlords"—the Fijian mataqalis. The ethnic division of wealth and power is simply not amenable to a social reform movement based on class lines because the cleavages between ethnic groups are much more serious than the cleavages between classes. This non-ideological character of ethnic politics is the chief reason why party-switching is so common in Fiji, especially among Indians. Indian politicians build a personal following based primarily on their own personal charisma. It has to be based on charisma, because there is little else to b ase it on; Fiji Indian politicians cannot support clients in the manner of politicians elsewhere since they have little to offer supporters in the way of influence-peddling; they are nearly always not in office, not bureaucrats and not wealthy. What they are for the most part is out- spoken in articulating Indian views. They hold large public meetings, they get widely quoted in the press and on the air; and the content of all their talk is assessment of current issues in the great competition with the Fijians. It is possible for them to see the situation now in such a way that one would support the NFP, then revise the analysis in such a way as to justify working with the Fijians through the Indian Alliance; or vice versa. Sir Vijay Singh, at one time a member of the Indian Alliance and Speaker of the House, is now a member of NFP; Irene Jai Narayan, once the leader of the Hibiscus faction of NFP, is now one of the two Indians supporting the new military regime that ousted NFP from power.

Fijian Backlash

As Independence came, the great fear for Fijians was that the numerically superior Indians would ultimately get their chance to take control of the nation and begin dismantling the protections built into the system for native Fijians. This obsessional fear has driven a backlash reactionary movement among Fijians to tilt the balance in the opposite direction with a culmination in the military coup of 1987. Three major political dramas have been the high points along this route to the coup. The Butedroka Debates, 1975. Within the Fijian ranks a commoner dissident group began to grow vociferous, articulating their antagonisms to the chiefs in Fijian-nationalist terms: the chiefs had sold out to the Indians. Idi Amin's action in became a model for solving Fiji's problems. In 1973 and 1974 Sakiasi FIJI'S 1987 COUP 109

Butedroka, a Member of Parliament, began saying openly that Indians should be deported, organizing the Fijian Nationalist Party on that premise. In 1975 he introduced the following motion into Parliament: "That this house agrees that the time has arrived when In dians or people of Indian origin in this country be repatriated back to India and that their travelling expenses back home and compensation for their properties in this country be met by the British government".17 The debate on this motion lasted until midnight for seven days, covered detail by painful detail by the press and followed closely by every man, woman and child in Fiji. In the end, an amended version was passed which reversed the sense of the motion to commend Indians for the part they had played in the development of Fiji. But this was not the end of a now articulate view that the constitution could be discarded, Indians could be deported and the moderate positions of the chiefs could be abrogated. NFP Wins, Then Loses, Its First Election: 1977. Two years later the unthinkable happened: NFP won an election. Even NFP was astonished. When all the votes were counted, the Fijian Nationalist Party had siphoned enough votes away from Alliance (20%) to give NFP a majority so slight that there was a question whether a viable government could be formed. A coalition with the single independent candidate, a Fijian, was finally organized, and then NFP spent four days closeted trying to form a government.18 When finally NFP came to its leadership and ministerial decisions-Siddiq Koya was to be Prime Minister and Captain Maitoga, a Fijian, Deputy Prime Minister-they called the Governor-General and discovered that he had just finished swearing in Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister. The Governor-General had acted on a constitutional provision that his office could appoint as prime minister the person who in his judgement could best lead the country; in his judgement, after four days with no government at all, that was Ratu Mara. Incredibly, this theft of the election from NFP provoked outrage but no violence at all. Indians had fears even then of the Fijian backlash that was possible if they ever "upset the balance" (Indians control the economy, Fijians control the government); as one Indian politician was quoted in the press: "If an Indian Government did take charge, it might not be acceptable to the Fijian community. You have to keep in mind that the army is completely Fijian." Last year there was confirmation that the idea was also in the mind of the military when Lt. Col. Rabuka, leader of the military coup, revealed that he had first thought of a military takeover in 1977. During new elections in September of 1977 the two main parties 110 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN sorted out their internal troubles; Alliance was able to demonstrate to Fijians what could happen if Fijians followed dissident leaders, and were able to bring back the nationalist votes that had defected to Butedroka. NFP was racked by recriminations, and finally broke into two hostile factions, the Hibiscus and the Dove, led by Irene Jai Narayan and Siddiq Koya respectively, each claiming to be the true NFP. With this split in NFP ranks, Alliance easily won the new elections. Propose Constitutional Changes, 1982. The lesson learned by Fijians from the events of 1975 and 1977 apparently was that if a Fijian movement to limit Indian inroads into government were to be successful, chiefs and commoners had to work together in communal action. Following on the 1982 elections, the most volatile yet,19 the next major political offensive against Indians came out of deliberations of the Great Council of Chiefs on Bau, the sacred center of the highest chiefs, in November 1982. They voted to revise the constitution to reserve two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives for Fijians, and to bar non-Fijians from holding the positions of Governor-General and Prime Minister. The Prime Minister spoke against the motion, pointing to the achievements of his 12 years of leadership and reaffirming the "Pacific Way" of multi-racial harmony, but abstained from voting along with 39 other chiefs, and the motion was carried by a vote of 25 to 15. Mara's failure to speak out more strongly against the mo tion was seen as deference t o reactionary Fijians who view him as collaborationist. Indians saw the motion as a move toward apartheid from the highest levels of Fijian society.

The 1987 Coup

The events of 1987 were a re -run of the elections of 1977, but with an alternative ending, the one that might have occurred a decade earlier. In 1985 yet another party, the Fiji Labor Party, formed by ex-NFP members and a Fijian commoner, Timoci Bavadra, came into existence. Bavadra, a physician with a distinguished career in the government medical service, is a commoner (though with a chiefly wife) from a Western district of Fiji where the power of the chiefs has never been strong. Yet he had good relations with at least Ratu Sir George Cakobau, who Was the only high chief to encourage Fijian villagers to welcome political parties other than Alliance. Bavadra's success must be attributed partly to his polite deference to FIJI'S 1987 COUP 111 chiefs and care to explain to Fijians that their obligations within democratic society were different than their obligations within Fijian society.20 Shortly after taking power and before being deposed he went to Bau to pay his respects to Sir George. The Labor Party formed a coalition with the Hibiscus faction of NFP to fight the 1987 elections. A less acrimonious election than the 1982 one, Labor-NFP endorsed a foreign policy of non-alignment, banning of nuclear-powered and armed ships, and permission for Soviet fishing and research ships to re-fuel and re -supply in Fiji. Its position was less extreme than it might have been and than it was often depicted in the foreign press; there was little interest in joining the Non-Aligned Movement, or in allowing a Soviet consulate to open in Fiji, or to develop links with Libya, all of which has been happening in nearby Vanuatu. Nor were there any hints of frightening proposals to modify the constitution or alter Fijian land control in any way. Following the triumph at the polls, the coalition set up a government which ought not to have been too disturbing to Fijians. The Prime Minister, Bavadra, was a Fijian; the cabinet included seven Indians and five Fijians. The transition appeared to be a peaceful triumph of Fiji's multi-racial democracy, "the jewel of the Pacific." A month later the Fiji Sun mourned that Fiji had become just another banana republic after Lt. Col. Rabuka stormed the parlia ment with 18 masked soldiers and arrested the new government. During the intervening month, resistance to the new Indian-dominated government had begun to grow among Fijians, with an accelerating pattern of road-blocks, threats against Indians and Indian businesses, and mass demonstrations. Rumors of burning cane crops and bombing sugar mills circulated. There were assertions that the balance of power had now been ineradicably overturned and a renewal of demands for the constitutional amendment proposed by the Great Council of Chiefs in 1982. Asserting that he was acting only to prevent more serious bloodshed in the future and to restore Fijians in control of their own country, a pre-emptive move to thwart terrorism, Rabuka carried out the first coup in modern Pacific history.21 Rabuka, a devout Methodist lay preacher, was only third in com- mand of the army, the commander being in Australia at the time. His motives did not appear to be to take power for himself, but to set up an interim government during which the constitution could be amended to provide the safeguards for Fijian political hegemony sought by the pro-Fijian Taukei movement.22 He did not remove Sir 112 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

Penaia Ganilau, the Governor-General, but sought his ratification of an interim council on which Ratu Mara quickly agreed to sit (so quickly, in fact, that some speculate on his complicity in the coup). The Great Council of Chiefs met to debate the merits of the coup finding them generally positive. However, the Chief Justice of Fiji refused to acknowledge the legality of the council which Rabuka attempted to set up, and finally in late May the Governor-General declared that as chief executive he would manage Fiji's affairs with the help of the advisory council until new elections could be held in six months. The Council of Advisers included Bavadra Mara, and 17 others, only one of whom was an Indian. By September 25, Bavadra, Mara, Ganilau and Rabuka had worked out a compromise, agreeing on equal representation for their parties in a joint government. It was also agreed that constitutional reform would be decided by a committee composed of three members from each party chaired by a foreign expert. The committee would give regard to but was not bound by the August, 1987, recommendations of a Fijian-dominated committee on constitutional change that proposed a 71-seat parliament elected entirely on communal rolls with 41 seats reserved for Fijians, along with key positions, and the governor-general being selected by the Great Council of Chiefs.23 At the last minute, however, Rabuka caved in to criticism that he was about to sell out the Taukei interests, and he carried out a second coup. By this point, Rabuka's support among the chiefs began to dissolve. He had the support of only a dozen chiefs. When he carried a traditional whale's tooth gift to Ganilau to atone for his action, Ganilau retorted, "I will take lions to move me out of here," and the former deputy prime minister Ratu David Toganivalu, standing behind Ganilau, said, "If he attempts to put a finger on the governor general, this country is up in flames."24 But on October 16, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau gave up in defeat, resigning as Governor-General, a resignation which, when accepted by the Queen, severed Fiji's membership in the Commonwealth.25 A republic was declared with Rabuka as head of the state, home affairs and public service minister in a council that included two Indians, a part-European and the rest Fijians. A draft constitution giving Fijians the majority of seats in parliament and reserving the positions of president, prime minister and foreign minister for Fijians was in preparation. As of mid-December, however, Rabuka had stepped down, appointing Sir Penaia Ganilau , who appointed Ratu Mara prime minister, in an apparent return to conditions before the April election.26 FIJI'S 1987 COUP 113

Conclusion

Seen in long-term perspective, the recent turn of events may appear ironic to those who all along saw the political sophistication of the Indians, as well as their economic power and demographic majority, as likely ultimately to dominate the Fiji nation. Indians themselves, up to the time of independence, disregarded Fijians as any serious competition in three-quarters of a century of competition with the British colonial government. It is now apparent, however, that a "balance of power" in which one party controls government and the military is no true balance, especially when the party that controls the military feels seriously disadvantaged in the economic domain, and when electoral politics may tilt the government toward the non-military side. In hindsight it now appears that Indians committed a folly when they boycotted the war effort during World War II, thus paving the way to the establishment of an all-Fijian army. Indians seemed to have good reason then; they were not being recruited to armed divisions, but to menial service; they were demonstrating solidarity with India's struggle for independence; and they were tending the cane fields and gardens which were needed to feed the colony. Indians have always argued that they were treated as second class citizens in a nation which acknowledged Fijian interests as paramount. Their second class status is about to be more fully assured with the proposed constitutional changes, whether or not Fiji succeeds in re-establishing a relatively harmonious public life under the leadership of its chiefs. Another unexpected consequence has been the severence of Fiji from the Commonwealth, something which most Fijians deplore, probably even Rabuka himself, conservative that he is; Fijians were loyal subjects of the Queen, and the high chiefs tend to hold the monarchy in great esteem. Both sides could see membership in the Commonwealth as serving their own interests, Indians because the Commonwealth stood behind the constitution as it was originally formulated, promising a genuine democratic arena for the working out of lingering differences, and the Fijians because the British monarchy was the example that inequality of status and democracy could co-exist. The marvel, however, is that in all the rancorous events recounted here, there has not been the loss of a single life. The schizmogenic tendencies of the last 17 years have not led to the extremes they may well have reached; both Indians and Fijians, living 114 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN so closely in koro and settlement, could be locked in a nightmare of terrorist activism, but are not. This suggests that conditions are not even yet seen as desperate; both sides still see themselves as having much to loss should violence become a way of life. Although the culture of political action has altered, there has been a retreat from the brink evident in the return of Ganilau and Mara and the retirement of Rabuka. There is the danger that the economic ramifications of the coup (the Fiji dollar has been devalued twice, the cane crop was largely lost, tourism has all but disappeared, planned investments have been cancelled, and Indian businessmen are leaving in droves) will produce the kind of destitution that may yet lead to real violence. In addition to the significance of the coup for Fiji, the coup has significance for the region as well It is a setback for the anti-nuclear, anti-Western movement which has been strengthened by events in New Zealand and Vanuatu, and which the Bavadra government may have joined. Instead, the destabilization effected by the example the coup set to other nativistic movements, especially in Melanesia where they are now growing27, may well have a far greater impact on regional relationships. The regional powers, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, cannot be pleased with either development.

NOTES

1. The remaining four percent are Europeans, "Part-Europeans", Chinese and Other Pacific Islanders. 2. See Furnival (1939), Smith (1965), Despres (1967) and AH (1978). 3. 'Ratu' is a term of address for a chief; 'Tui' is paramount chief; 'Roko Tui' is administrative paramount chief which sometimes co-exists with a traditional, non-executive chief; and 'Vunivalu' is a special honorary title given to Cakobau and his heirs in the senior male line. 4. See Legge (1958). 5. See Roth (1951). 6. See France (1969). 7. See Ali (1977), GiWon (1962), Prasad (1974) and Tinker (1974). 8. There are some exceptions. Brahman priests still perform certain samskaras, mainly marriage and death ceremonies; a few people of potter descent make divas at Diwali; occasionally a Nai is actually a barber, but these are largely ceremonial functions. 9. Adrian Mayer's phrase. His study, Peasants in the Pacific: A Study of Fiji Indian Rural Society. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972) remains the seminal study of Fiji Indians. 10. See Brown (1981). 11. See Swartz (1967). 12. This decision has had a decisive impact on the economy of Indians in Fiji as compared to ex-indentured Indians in other parts of the world in that Fiji is the only major sugar producing country where the bulk of production is in the hands FIJI'S 1987 COUP 115

of small farmers rather than large plantation owners. 13. See Moynagh (1978). 14. Most scholars who have studied the land tenure system believe major modifications are necessary, though there is no consensus on what these changes should be. See Belshaw (1964), Walters (1969), Fisk (1970) and Ward (1965). 15. See Anthony (1968). 16. Legislative Council Debates (1961:679). I7 For a fuller discussion of this political drama, see Brown (1977). 18. See Premdas (1978). 19. Mutual accusation and insult reached new heights in the 1982 elections. An Australian television show describing Rata Mara as the descendant of chiefs who "clubbed and ate their way to power" was widely distributed to Fijians; the Prime Minister accused NFP of accepting a "six-figure sum" from the Soviets in an attempt to oust him: an unused strategy document, the Caroll Report, suggesting that Alliance fight the election by smearing the character of the NFP leaders, exploit racial and religious tensions, and buy off or threaten other opponents, was leaked; and the rhetoric and name-calling was offensive by all standards. ("Fiji's Poll of Records: Most Voters, Most Bitterness, Most Mud-Slinging," Pacific Islands Monthly, 10-13, September 1982). 20. See Keith-Reid (1987a). 21. See Keith-Reid (1987b) and McDonald (1987). 22. Taukei means aboriginal holders of the land. 23. McDonald, "Rampant or Restrained?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 12-13, 8 October 1987. 24. McDonald, ibid. 25. See Keith-Reid (1987c). 26. See "As We Were" (1987). 27. See "Melanesia's Last Hurrah" (1987).

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