Politics of Accommodation, Power Sharing and Consociational Democracy

Dr. Mohd Foad Sakdan Dr. Oemar Hamdan

Political of Accommodation

The concept of accommodation refers to pragmatic solution to divisive conflicts by abandoning the principles of unilateral majority decisions and including representatives of the main group in the organs of government and decision marking.

The political of accommodation is based mainly on a recognition of the need for political stability, and not necessarily on a recognition in principle of the right of all group in society to participation, representation and equal status. Therefore, the more societal and political a particular group has, the more willingness there will be to consider it as a partner to the politics of accommodation.1 The political potential of a group is not determined exclusively or even mainly by its electoral achievements or even its coalition bargaining position. Other important factors are recognition of the legitimacy of the value and interests represented by group and acceptance of the group as part of the social and cultural consensus.

Meanwhile, political stability in the country has been attributed to the political system that could be called `an elite accommodation model' or `consociational model' in which each ethnic community is unified under a leadership that can authoritatively bargain for the interests of that community. The leaders of each community, in turn, have the capacity to secure compliance and legitimacy for the bargains that are reached by elite negotiations. Under such circumstances, there exists sufficient trust and empathy among the elite to be sensitive to the most vital concerns of other ethnic communities. Above all, representative institutions accept their diminished role of merely ratifying the product of elite bargaining as appropriate for a resolution of ethnically sensitive issues ( Means, 1992).

The politics of accommodation is based on a weakness and cooperation among the elite level. The success of this system depends to a large extent on the leaders’ joint efforts at peace-

1 Since the establishment of the basic pattern of the politics of accommodation in 1917, the process of negotiation among bloc leaders has become more institutionalized. It takes place in words of the Dutch Reformed Synod, within `so-called summit organization’. From informal and ad hoc contact, it has moved to formal and more or less permanent institution and finally to official organization anchored in the country’s legal-consitutional framework (Lijphart, 1968,112). keeping and peaceful change. The politics of accommodation a divided to two categories; Autonomy and Power Sharing.

1.1. Autonomy

The option generally preferred by states is a system based on the liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination and the operationalisation of the individual rights language. Minorities claim that the liberal solution does not employ sufficient guarantees for the preservation of ethnic identity, in particular linguistic rights. They require collective rights and autonomy, in order to be able to control their cultural reproduction. The contents of the terms "autonomy"2 and " collective rights" remain highly controversial and there is little agreement on what concrete meanings should be ascribed to these terms. Nevertheless, both terms indicate a degree of self- rule, which can only be achived collectinely.

Ruth Lapidoth (1997) describes autonomy in territorial terms, as "an arrangement aimed at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but which forms the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinctive identity". Autonomy can be operationalised either as territorial autonomy or as personal autonomy. Either form employs language rights and access to education in mother tongue, participation in the local or regional government and a degree of control over the allocation of land and natural resources (Hannum 1990).

Unlike secession and repressive practices, autonomy is a less threatening and costly mechanism of ethnic conflict management (Gurr 1995). The concept of autonomy indicates a subsystem of governance within the state, which is controlled and administered by a minority through its legitimate elites.

1.2 Power Sharing

The concept of Power sharing has long been debated within political science notably by Nordinger (1972), Lijphart (1977,1991,1999), Lehmbuch (1967,1975), McRae (1974a,1986), Alcock (1994) and McGarry/O’Leary (1990a, 1993).

The term power sharing has been defined by scholars such as Arend Lijphart as a set of principles that, when operationalized through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a

2 Hannum (1990) definition of autonomy is; "Personal and political autonomy is in some real sense, the right to be different and to be left alone; to preserve, protect, and promote values which are beyond the legitimate reach of the rest of society".

degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group. Lijphart's principles of power sharing-known as consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977a).

Power sharing 3 in the executive in a grand coalition, or a variant thereof, ensures that the minority is not permanently excluded from political power. Parliamentary systems are argued to be more conducive to the creation of inclusive governing coalitions. In grand coalitions, political elites-representing the various segments of society-thrash out their differences in an effort to reach consensus, but public contestation among them is limited. The common denominator, and most important feature, is that decision making takes place consensually at the top among elites representing underlying social segments (Lijphart 1977a).

Consociational principles are based upon the acceptance of national and ethnic pluralism. They aim to secure the rights and identities of all communities, and to create political and other social institutions which enable them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation. In some zones of conflict the relevant populations effectively have the choice of creating consociational democratic institutions or having no meaningful democratic institutions at all.

During the Cold war era, political science developed two major normative models of conflict management. These are the consociational theory4 and the integrative model. These approaches to conflict management have become the most advocated theoretical models of ethnic conflict management. These models were originally developed in order to explain the types of group accommodation in selected fragmented societies in Western Europe and the nation-building processes of plural (Eckstein, 1966, Lijphart, 1977) or deeply divided (Horowitz, 1985), societies in the new independent states formed as a result of de-colonisation. Later, both approaches were incorporated in the broader concept of power sharing (Sisk, 1996), which has become the theoretical umbrella for tackling conflict resolution in fragmented societies throughout the world.

3 There are a few points to be noted here. First, Power Sharing is likely to be most effective if it is constitutionally mandated. In this case, Power-Sharing is not a simple coalition or marriage of convenience but it is a "grand coalition" cabinet comprising the representative parties and Cabinet positions are divided in proportion to the percentage of votes acquired at election. What differentiates Power Sharing from the simple coalition is that the former is constitutionally mandated while the latter is not. Second, any grand coalition must be premised on an agreed national direction that includes agreement on a broad national developmental program. Third, the leaders of the various segments must have a deep and abiding commitment to the unity of the nation and must be prepared to uphold the laws and the democratic process. Cooperation and compromise must be the guiding principles and must be predicated on a willingness of the leaders of one segment to work with the other segments.

4 The Consociationalism Theory was first presented by Arend Lijphart ( Consociational Democracy ) and Gerhard Lehmbruch ( A Noncompetitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzeland, Austria and Lebanon) , working independence at the 1967 World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Brussel. Since then a broad discussion has followed (Lijphart, 1969,207-25).

1.3 The Consociational Approach

There are two approaches to constructing democracy in divided societies. First , the consociational or group building-block approach that relies on accommodation by ethnic group leaders is a mains actor and second the integrative approach, which seeks to create incentive structures for moderation by political leaders on divisive ethnic themes and to enhance minority influence in majority decision making. Consociational approaches rely on elite accommodation and guarantees to groups to protect their interests, such as a mutual or minority veto, whereas the integrative approach relies on incentives for intergroup cooperation, such as electoral systems that encourage the formation of pre election pacts among candidates or political parties across ethnic lines.

a). Consociational democracy",

Consociation derives from the Latin word `consociatio’ which means ` the action or fact of associating together’ or `union in fellowship’ (Barry, 1975). Apter was defined consociational as the ` Joining together of constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of union’ (Apter, 1961 quoted in Boulle, 1984). Thereafter Lijphart developed a general model of consociational democracy departing from classical pluralist theory in so far as latter required `criss crossing conflict and multiple loyalties to produce stability (Lustick, 1979). "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" ( Lijphart, 1969).

Consociationalism, above all, relies on elite (political leaders) cooperation as the principal mechanism of successful conflict management in deeply divided societies.5 Consociationalists suggest that even if there are deep communal differences, overarching elite cooperation is a necessary and sufficient condition to assuage conflict.6 In the consociational approach, elites

5 The literature on consociational democracy is well developed. While the groundbreaking work is Lijphart's, particularly his book Democracy in Plural Societies (1977a), many other scholars have contributed to the approach. First, consociationalism has its antecedents in the earlier work of Lijphart (1968), which termed the approach "the politics of accommodation." Landmark works in the school include Daalder (1971), McRae (1974), and Pappalardo (1981). Several scholars, led by Jürg Steiner, have sought to extend the consociational approach to a broader framework of decision making in coalitions. See Steiner's articles (1981a; 1981b). Other scholars, such as Lembruch and Schmitter, have related consociational theory to the corporatist model, arguing that these approaches are complementary; their views are best stated in Lembruch and Schmitter (1979). Lijphart (1985) catalogs and responds to critics of the consociational approach.

6 Eric Nordlinger (1972: 73) goes so far as to argue that elites "alone can initiate, work out and implement conflict- regulating practices, therefore they alone can make direct and positive contributions to conflict-regulating outcomes." directly represent various societal segments and act to forge political ties at the centre. Elite engaged in political competition for popular support. In order to be elected, political elite must fulfil the wishes of the electorate and maintain the edge in terms of popular support. The leader engaged in a game with other community leaders at the national level (horizontal game). Lijphart (1977) mentioned that horizontal game are ` a basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit of cooperation and compromise’. In his earlier works, Lijphart identifies four prerequisites for elite cooperation:

i. awareness of the dangers inherent in fragmented systems; ii. commitment to system maintenance; iii. ability to transcend subcultural cleavages; iv. and ability to forge appropriate solutions that can meet the demands of the subgroups.

In addition to these prerequisites, Lijphart introduces five favorable conditions for elite cooperation and the stable support of nonelites:

i. first, a multiple balance of power--all segmental groups are minorities and three or four subgroups are preferable to two subgroups of roughly equal power or one hegemonic subgroup; ii. second, size of country--small is better; iii. third, the presence of overarching loyalties (moderate nationalism); iv. fourth, segmental isolation (even federalism); v. and finally, a prior tradition of elite accommodation.

In his older works he suggests five other favorable conditions:

i. the unifying effect of external threats; ii. widespread support of the elite cartel system iii. distinct lines of cleavage; iv. socioeconomic equality among segmental groups; v. and a low decision-making load on the political system.

In consociational democracy7 ethnic groups are recognized by the state and given all the necessary conditional, such as separate communities, language rights, schools and mass media to preserve their separate existence and identity. Lijphart singles out the four characteristics of consociational democracy:

7 There after consociational comparable types of which are Lorwin’s (1971)`segmented pluralism’, Lembruch’s (1975) Proporzdemokratie and konkordanzdemoktatie, Bluhrn’s (1968)`contractarianism’ has tried to explain how democracy survives in politics without shared value.

1. Grand coalition,

The grand idea in the politics of accommodation is the tendency to form grand coalitions that include representatives of all or most of the main group or subcultures in the society8. A grand coalition amongst minorities elites group facilities elite cooperation and collaboration. The coalition can take a variety of institutional including a coalition cabinet in parliament system, a distribution of different offices amongst group of each minorities or equitable representation on council and advisory aboard that support government.

Nordlinger (1972) regards a `stable coalition’ that includes representatives of opposing group as one of the most salient methods of resolving conflict in `deeply divided society. The coalition partnerships itself does not explain by what means the representatives of the various coalition group resolve their dispute and preserve the stability of the coalition and the political system as a whole. As indicated above in a consociational democracy effort are made to resolve conflicts using other method such as proportional representation , autonomy ang the mutual veto. (Dahl 1966, Lijphart 1971).

2. Mutual veto.

Lijphart has argued the case for a mutual veto9 on following ground, although the grand coalition rule gives each segment a share of power at the central political level, this does not constitute a gurantee that it will not be outvoted by a majority when its vital interests are at stake (1979).

In many cases, status quo practise are based on accommodation reaches in negotiations between among group in the pre state period. The status quo can be used to preserve political agreement through the explicit or implicit consent of all parties involved not to respond an issue which was dealt with by those arrangement. . In this way the status quo can be regarded as complementing the other conflict resolution methods by helping to sustain and stabilize accommodation based on them.

Nordlinger (1972) suggests that the status quo method may, under certain conditions give the parties involved an incentive to strive for a compromise solution, in the knowledge that an inconclusive state of affairs may take effective operation of the system extremely difficult and

8 Grand coalition refers to a ` summit diplomacy forum’ , a `coalescent style of leadership’, a ` coalition cabinet’ or a `grand coalition council’, where bargains are struck by `a cartel of elites’ (Dadrendorf, 1967:269, Boulle, 1984:46- 7), Powell, 1982:214). 9 Dahls defines a mutual veto in government policies’ as a method that enables each of the rival parties to `veto changes in the status quo involving his subculture. . This method enable the disputants to refrain from making decision that are liable to lead to bitter clashed and profound crises in the political system (Dahl 1966: 358).

produce immobility. A mutual veto acts as the ultimate weapon of the minority in order to protect its fundamental interests.

3. Proportionality

The proportional method is refer as the applied to the allocation of position and job, funds raised aboard and other resources such as land settlements and immigration certificates or what ever resources which were distributed among the political group in proportion to the size of each group or society. Proportional methods some time tends to give representation to weak group in open competition. A good examples is the system established in Lebanon. During the implemented consociational democracy period, Lebanon divide representation in government institutional among the religious community (Maronite, Shiite-ShM; Sunni-SuM;). This arrangement which was based on predetermined, fixed quotas gave preference to the Christian community, grating it representation in parliament and in the government greater than its share of population (Muslim 70%, Christian 30%).

4. Segmental autonomy

Autonomy principle refer to the right of various group (community) or subculture to act according to their values and ways of life is recognized and these group are given a free hand in running their institution and enterprise.

Another word, segmental autonomy provides each minorities with the security it needs to ensure that its distinctive interest are protected and minimizes the degree to which it must coordinate, comprise and negotiation with other group. Lijphart describes it `good fences make good neighbours’ (1971).

Lijphart argues that all of these characteristics must be present if a political system is to qualify as a consociational democracy. However, by insisting that all four should be present Lijphart narrowed the coverage of consociational democracy unnecessarily.

These four basic elements ensure that government becomes an inclusive multiethnic coalition, unlike the adversarial nature of a Westminster winner-take-all democracy. Lijphart cites Riker's minimum winning coalition theorem in support of his view of consociationalism or over-sized government coalitions, in that they are not just desirable in plural societies but are the most rational product of bargaining among elites under such conditions. Riker's theory is based upon the zero-sum game of coalition bargaining. However, he concedes that when there are common advantages for coalition players the zero sum game disappears; and it is logical tosee over-sized coalition governments. As noted above, in bitterly divided societies the stakes are too high for politics to be conducted as a zero-sum game. Also, the risks of governmental collapse and state instability are too great for parties to view the executive branch of government as a prize to be won or lost. As Rousseau observed, "the more grave and important questions discussed, the nearer the opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity.( Jean Jacques Rousseau 1950)

The Netherlands is a good case to begin with since in the 1960's Lijphart used it to develop the consociational theory. At the time, the Netherlands was segmented in the three pillars of Calvinists, Catholics and seculars, and Lijphart argued that it was thanks to consociationalism that despite its segmentation the country was politically stable. In Belgium consociationalism gained prominence in 1958 when the "school pact" could diffuse a severe crisis about the role of the Catholic church in educational matters. More recently, Belgium tries to manage the language issue of the country through consociational means, not always very successfully.

However the consociational democracy has been critized for its weak empirical support in Europe and for being undemocratic since elections play little role in allocating power between parties (Barry, 1975 and Van Schedelen, 1984). Nordlinger (1972) and Horowitz (1985) have also found the model inappropriate for deeply divided society in Africa, Asia and Middle East because its not flexible enough to cope with changes in the balance of power between group.

The one real failure of Consensus Democracy was in Cyprus 1960. Despite having the perfect consensus constitution, the country erupted in civil war after only a few years. The major reason for this breakdown was the fact that there was a very large majority Greek segment (78per cent).

The Turks comprised a mere 18 per cent. But the Turks were awarded the Vice-Presidency, three out of ten cabinet seats and five out of 50 parliamentary seats! The same ratio applied to the Civil Service while there was a 6:4 ratio for the police and army. In addition the Vice President had equal powers to the Greek President and an equal veto over the cabinet and legislature on matters of defense, security and Foreign Affairs. The Turks therefore were over represented and tended to stick to the letter of the constitution. The Greeks on the other hand had reluctantly accepted the constitution at the time of Independence and their attempt to alter the constitution to achieve stricter proportionality sparked the civil war that led to the breakdown of Power-Sharing. But apart from the internal dynamics, the situation was influenced by the fact that both Greece and Turkey intervened on the sides of their respective nationals.

Table 1: The Distribution of State on type of Democracy Consociational

State Element of Power Sharing Period of Parties in Conflict Coalition Coalition Netherland Linguistic Dutch Speaker / 1917 - 1967 CDA, LPF and French Speaker VVD Canada Linguistic English, French 1840 - 1867 Liberal Party of Canada. Lebanon religious Muslim 70%, 1943-1975 Maronite, Shiite- Christian 30%, ShM; Sunni-SuM; Switzeland Religious Roman Catholic 1943 - SPS, FDP, CVP 48%, Protestant 44%, and SVP. other 8% Austria Religious Roman Catholic 1945 - 1986 OVP and FPO 85%, Protestant 6%, Malaysia Ethnic Malay 59%, Chinese 1955-1969 Parti Perikatan 32%, Indian 9% Colombia Ethnic mestizo 58%, white 1958-1974 Democratic 20%, mulatto 14%, Alliance black 4%, Movement Cyprus Religous Greek Orthodox 1960-1963 DISY, DIKO and 78%, Muslim 18%, KF. Belgium Ethnic/ Fleming 55%, Since 1970 VLD, PS, PRL- Linguistic Walloon 33% FDF-MCC, SP, Ecolo and Agalev.

Szecho- Religious Roman Catholic 1989 - 1993 SKDU, SMK, Slovakia 60%, atheist 10%, KDH and ANO. Protestant 8%, Orthodox 4%, other 18% South Ethnic black 75.2%, white 1994 ANC African 13.6%, Colored 8.6%, Indian 2.6% India Ethnic / a. Indo-Aryan 72%, 1947 - 1967 BJP, SHS, BJD, Religious/ Dravidian 25% AITC, SAD, Lok b. Hindu 80%, Shakti, Samata Muslim 14%, Party, DMK, Christian 2.4%, Sikh JD(U), NCP 2% Nigeria religious Muslim 50%, 1957-1966 People's Christian 40%, Democratic Party indigenous beliefs 10%

Kenya ethnic Kikuyu 22%, Luhya Kenya African 14%, Luo 13%, National Union— Kalenjin 12%, KANU Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6% Gambia ethnic Mandinka 42%, Fula Alliance for 18%, Wolof 16%, Patriotic Jola 10%, Serahuli Reorientation and 9% Construction ethnic Fijian 49%, Indian SDL and MV. 46%, Yugoslavia ethnic Serb 63%, Albanian 14%, 1996- SPS-JUL-ND0 (1974) Montenegrins 6%, Hungarians 4%, other 2000 -DOS 13% [Demokratska Opozicija Srbije];

Source : Netherlands (Daalder and Irwin 1989, Mair, 1994) [1917 to 1967], Belgium (Huyse 1987, Zolberg 1977) [since 1970] , Austria (Powell 1970, Luther and Muller 1992) [1945 to 1966], Switzeland (Lehmbruch 1993, Linder 1994, Steiner 1990) [since 1943 until now],Lebanon ( Doekmejian 1978, Messarra 1994)[1963 to 1975], Malaysia (Von Vorys, 1975, Zakaria 1989) [ 1955 to 1969], Colombia (Dix,1980, Hortlyn 1988) [1958 to 1974], Cyprus [1960 to 1963], Canada (Cannon 1982) [1840 to 1867], Venezuela (Levine 1973), Surinam ( Dew 1994), Italy (Graziano 1980), Nigeria (Chinwuba 1980), Gambia (Hughes 1986), Kenya (Berg Schlosser 1985) , Sri Lanka (Chehabi 1980) , India (Liphart, 1979, Powell 1982), Non democracy State Yudoslavia (Goldman 1985), Former Soviet Union (Van den Berghe 1981, 190-91), South Africa (Huntington 1988, Lijphart 1994, Worrall 1981).

The Distribution of State on type of Democracy Consociational

State Grand coalition ( Segmental Propotionality ( Agreement power sharing Autonomy as a principle of Minority Veto executive) (involving either political (mutual veto) territorial or non representation, territorial form civil service of government) appointments and location) Netherlands i.Parties Coalition i. the right of 1917 - ii.Cabinet religious and Pacification in Coalition linguistic the Netherlands minorities ii.educational autonomy Belgium I. Parties coalition The allocation of Constitutional ii.Cabinet the right of top government 1993 Coalition (equal religious and office - the upper number of linguistic ranks of army Flemish / French minorities and highest court speaking minister) Federal arrangement in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide Lebanon i. Cabinet 1943- National Coalition The allocation of Pact (President - top government 1989 - Taif Maronite. office agreement Prime Minister- Sunni) ii. The 6:5 ratio of parliamentary between Muslim and Christians Cyprus (1960- i.Cabinet Personal Law - Constitutional 1963) Coalition ( A Marriage, The allocation of bicommunalism Greek president divorce,custody top government and Turkish vice and adoption of office Communal president)/ 7 children and - ethnic court System minister for inheritance representation by Greek and 3 quota - army Turkish. 60:40, Public services 70:30. Malaysia Cabinet Coalition the right of 1955-Grand religious and The allocation of coalition linguistic top government minorities office

educational Public services autonomy 4:1

Austria Cabinet Coalition Protection of the 1945-Grand right of cultural, Coalition religious and linguistic communities. South Africa Cabinet Coalition Constitution 1994 (article 185,235) India Autonomous status constitutionally the right of religious and linguistic minorities

Federal arrangement in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide

Personal Law - Marriage, divorce,custody and adoption of children and inheritance

the right of religious and linguistic minorities

educational autonomy Switezerland Federal arrangement in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide Czecho Slovakia Federal arrangement in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide Fiji 1999- The Fijian Institution The Gambia i.Cabinet National Coalition referendum 8 ii. The allocation august 1996. of top government office

b). consensus democracy.

The concept of consensus democracy is to provide a option for political systems that cannot fulfil all the four criteria for consociational democracy. Thus, consensus democracy is seen as a "kinder, gentler" type of democracy, that responds to the claims for democratic quality, as it is not bound by rigid criteria for achieving stability.

Lijphart identifies two dimensions of consensus democracies are proporational representation and oversized coalitions. The first is measured by three variable, parliamentary fragmentation (effective number of parliamentary parties), disproportionality (reduction of the effective number of parties electoral to parliamentary) and the type of electoral system. The second feature is measured by the present of minimal winning coalitions and the dominance of the government over opposition (surplus pf the proportion of seats of a government coalition) (Lijphart, 1984).

2.2.2 The Integrative Approach

The integrative approach relies on incentives for inter- group co-operation such as electoral systems that encourage the formation of pre-election pacts among candidates or political parties across ethnic lines. The key to the inter-group co-operation is to foster political organisation that cross-cuts ethnic loyalties. The integrative approach sees as desirable the creation of pre-election coalitions between ethnic parties and, ideally, the creation of larger multi-ethnic parties based on interests that transcend ethnic interests, such as region or economic interests. Integration also relies on forces of economic interaction to help create social cleavages that crosscut inscriptive identity.

2.0 Focus cases

The Consociationalism Democracy in Fiji

2.3.1 Political Situations

In April 1970, Fiji became independent as a British colony after a constitutional conference in London agreed that Fiji should become a fully sovereign and independent nation on October 10, 1970. The population of the Fiji consists of two mains communities. Fijian which is consequently Fiji’s largest ethnic group (50.7 percent). The second largest group is the Indians (43.7 percent) and the other ethnic, 5.6 percent. 10

10 The Total population of the Fiji Island 25 August 1996 Total Population Percentage 393,575 50.7 Indians 338,818 43.7 Rotumas 9,727 1.2 Other Pacific Islanders 10.463 1.4 All other 22,494 3.0 Total 775,077 100.0 Since 1970 until 198711, Fiji post-independence politics came to be dominated by the Alliance Party12 of Sir Kamisese Mara13.

In April 1987, a coalition led by Dr. Timoci Bavadra14, from Fijian supported by the Indo-Fijian community, won the general election15 and formed Fiji's first majority Indian government, with Dr. Timoci Bavadra serving as Prime Minister. Less than a month later, Dr. Bavadra was removed from power during a military coup led by Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka16 on May 14, 1987.

Rabuka was lead a second coup on September 25, 1987 after the negotiation among the ethnic leaders was failed . The military government revoked the constitution and declared Fiji a republic on October 1017. On December 6 1987, Rabuka resigned as head of state and Governor General Ratu Sir was appointed the first President of the Fijian Republic. Ratu

Sourses : Alison Quentin-Baxer 1999. Ethnic Accommodation in The Republic of The Islands, School of Law. Waikato University.

11 April 1972, Fiji's first post-independence election in which Ratu Mara's gained a 14-seat majority in the house of representatives. The following January, the paramount chief of the Fijians, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, was sworn in as governor general, succeeding Sir Robert Foster, the last governor under colonial rule. http://www.fijiguide.com/Facts/history.html

12 The Alliance Party led by Chief Minister Ratu Mara and the National led by A D Patel, the party's founder. The main stumbling blocks were the issues of full self-government and communal roll elections. The Patel-led Indians wanted a republic with no ties to the British Commonwealth or Crown and a one-person/one- vote electoral system. The Alliance Fijians and other races, including a minority of anti-NFP Indians, insisted on maintaining close links to the Crown and rejected any idea of a republic. The Alliance Party was also insisting on a communal election system.

13 Ratu Mara was born on 13th May 1920. As Head of Government, first as Chief Minister from 1967 to 1970, and then as Prime Minister from 10.10 .1970 to 13.4.1987 and again in the interim Government from 6.12.1987 to 2.6.1992, followed by his elevation to the Presidency from 18.1.1994 until 19.5 2000.

14 Dr Timoci Bavadra, Prime Minister in the predominantly Indo-Fijian Labour/National Federation Party coalition government, He was born in 1938 and died of natural causes on 3 November 1989.

15 Fiji election office was conducted 9 times election in Fiji started 1966, 1972, 1977(april), 1977 (September), 1982, 1987, 1992, 1994 and 1999.

16 Major General (Retired) Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka, Chairman of Fiji's and formerly Prime Minister of Fiji from 1992 to 1999. He served in the Fiji army from 1968 to 1991 retiring as Commander in the rank of Major General.

17 Governors-general Inggeris in Fiji from 1968 until Rabuka announced Fiji as a Republic.

Sir Robert Sidney Foster 12.1968-13.01.1973 Ratu Sir George Cakobau 13.01.1973-12.02.1983 Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau 12.02.1983-06.10.1987

Sir was reappointed Prime Minister, and Rabuka became Minister of Home Affairs.

The new government drafted a new constitution that went into force in July 1990. Under its terms, majorities were reserved for ethnic Fijians in both houses of the legislature. Under this format, in 1992 elections brought to power a coalition dominated by the principal ethnic Fijian party, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT). Rabuka assumed the premiership. However, under domestic and international pressure, the Rabuka government made several modifications to the constitution, to guarantee equal rights for all. By the time the revised version came into effect in 1998, Fiji’s poor economic performance had undermined the Rabuka government’s popularity.

The 1997 constitution was introduced a new principal which recommend `equitable sharing of power among all communities in Fiji is matched by an equaitable sharing of economic and commercial power to ensure that all communities fully benefit from the nation’s economic process..(1997 constitution, note 2, s6(1). see Appendix B).

The first legislative elections held under the new constitution took place in May 1999. Rabuka's coalition was defeated by Indo-Fijian parties led by Mahendra Chaudhry, who became Fiji's first Indo-Fijian prime minister. One year later, in May 2000, Chaudhry and most other members of parliament were taken hostage in the House of Representatives by gunmen led by ethnic Fijian nationalist George Speight18.

Speight organised a coup, holding Chaudhry and other ministers as hostages while he issued a series of demands. The stand-off lasted two months. After initially conceding to most of the rebel demands (including the dismissal of Chaudhry), the military, led by Commodore Frank Bainamarama, took control at the beginning of July. A few weeks later, the military moved against Speight and his followers, who were arrested. An interim government under the veteran Taukei19 politician, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, was installed with Laisenia Qarase as Premier Minister. Following the elections in August 2001, a coalition government was formed between the Conservative Alliance Party and the Fiji United Party, despite the fact that most votes were won by the Labour Party. Laisenia Qarase remained as Prime Minister.

2.3.2 Political Conflict

For 17 years after independence, Fiji was a parliamentary democracy. During that time, political life was dominated by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and the Alliance Party, which combined the traditional Fijian chiefly system with leading elements of the European, part-European, and Indian communities. The main parliamentary opposition, the National Federation Party,

18 George Speight has adopted a Fijian name, Ilikimi Naitani, as candidate for the Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua Party, small nationalist group, in his only area of serious electoral support. On 18 February, 2002, George Speight pleaded guilty to committing treason under section 50 of the Penal Code Cap 17. The Judge, Hon Mr Justice M D Scott, then pronounced the mandatory death sentence 19 Fijians owned the land - they called themselves Taukei, which means "owners". represented mainly rural Indo-Fijians. Intercommunal relations were managed without serious confrontation. However, when Dr. Bavadra's coalition democratically installed a cabinet with substantial ethnic Indian representation after the April 1987 election, extremist elements played on ethnic Fijian fears of domination by the Indo-Fijian community. The racial situation took a turn for the worse from which it has yet to fully recover. Three coups, two discarded constitutions, and tens of thousands of outward emigrants have been the result.

The primary source of conflict In Fiji, concern relation between Fiji’s indigenous population and the Indian Fijian community. Two groups, indigenous Fijians and Indians, constitute over 94 per cent of the total population. They live side by side, but each is hostile to the other. They do not share basic cultural institutions. Their economic resources are different but complementary, rendering economic exchange necessary. Until independence in October 1970, the two cultural sections were kept together in outward harmony by the colonial government which served as umpire. Since independence, they have engaged in deeply divisive disputes over the issue of ethnic domination. The two communities maintain a high degree of separation in spheres of six major criteria:

1. Race : Racial differences serve as the first signals in identifying relationship of ethnic affinity. 2. Religious : is a major divider with practically all Fijian adhering to Christianity while Indians overwhelmingly adhere to Hinduism or Islam20. 3. Language: is also a pervasive separator for when in their country. Fijian and Indian speak their own tongue. 21 4. Cultural: practices such as rituals and observances around religious, diet, marriage and family matters separate the groups literally into two different world. After sharing the same country and colonial master, cultural convergence has been minimal. 5. Economic: in Fiji dominated by Indian community who control the sugar industry and intermeddle size business. European owned the very large businesses such as banks, hotel and factory . Meanwhile Fijian controlled the government, public sector22 and also owned 83.8 percent of all the land23.

20 The distribution by religious in Fiji :Christian 52% (Methodist 37%, Roman Catholic 9%), Hindu 38%, Muslim 8% and other 2%

21 Comman language among ethnic in Fiji - English, Fijian and Hindustani

22 Fijian armed force

Regular Territoral Naval Total force force Squadron Fijian 372 502 59 933 Indian 5 29 2 36 Other 19 32 10 61 Total 396 563 71 1030 Source : R.K. Vasil. 1972. Communalisma and Constitution-Making in Fiji. Public Affairs 45(23). 185.

23 European own in freehold 5.5 per cent of prime commicle land and Indian own 1.7 per cent. The overwhelming majority of Indians are tenants and sub tenant who depend on Fijian for leased land.

6. Resident: Most Indian communities are dwellers in rural and live in individual homestead. Fijian are also rural resident but they live in widely separated nucleated village.

In the cases mentioned above, Fiji is a classic plural society where, in the words of Furnivall (1948) , "different sections of the same community … mix but do not combine". Culture was separately the two major communities. While English is the cross communal language, Indian speak Hindustani among themselves and Fijians their indigenous language. The radio station24 carry separate programmes in Hindustani and Fijian and until recently education25 institution were segregated. Ethnic conflict in Fiji also often fired by stereotype shared by communal group in a plural society. Fijian generally regard Indian as a frugal, profit-orientation and aggressive. Meanwhile India stereotype of the Fijian is that of person who lazy, unambitious and inferior.

One of the main issues of contention is land tenure. Indigenous Fijian communities very closely identify themselves with their land. In 1909 near the peak of the inflow of indentured Indian labourers, the land ownership pattern was frozen and further sales prohibited. Today more than 80 per cent of the land is held by indigenous Fijians, under the collective ownership of the traditional Fijian clans. Indo-Fijians produce over 90 per cent of the sugar crop but must lease the land they work from its ethnic Fijian owners instead of being able to buy it outright. The leases have been generally for 10 years, although they are usually renewed for two 10-year extensions. Many Indo-Fijians argue that these terms do not provide them with adequate security and have pressed for renewable 30-year leases, while many ethnic Fijians fear that an Indo-Fijian government would erode their control over the land.

The problems in achieving political co-operation among Fiji’s main ethnic communities from the interaction of four key factor.

1. The principles that Fijian interest should be paramount - political paramountcy- (that only Fijian controlled the government) 2. The communal system of representation ( the increase in the size of the India community for the long head the Indian to take control of government) 3. The role of political parties ( The multi ethnic Alliance was not successful in attracting the support of mainstream voters) 4. The principles that a government must command the support of a majority in Parliament.

24 Radio Fiji One in English and Fijian Language, Fiji 2 in English and Hindi and Fiji 3 in English. FM96 a commercial radio station, broadcasts 24 hours in English (source: http://www.worldinformation.com/world/Oceania/Fiji)

25 For examples : Indian High School, 151 Rewa Street, Deshbandhu Vilogo Primary School, Vitogo Parade (source: http://www.blackworld.com/webvert/fiji/educ/schools.htm)

2.3.3 The Grand Coalition and election

The first election in Fiji was held by 1966. The result of the 1966 elections in particular heartened the Fijians since it gave the Fijian-dominated Alliance Party an overwhelming victory against the predominantly Indian National Federation Party (NFP). Between 1966 until 1972, the Alliance had scored three convincing victories leading observers to predict that the Alliance would win all , including the March-April 1977 general elections. But this felicitous anticipation was predicated on the prevailing structure of the two-party system. No one expected a splinter party to emerge, especially with its base in the Fijian section, to challenge the Alliance. But exactly this occurred in the March-April election when the Fijian Nationalist Party competed for the votes of Fijians. While the Nationalists won only one seat, they drew substantial numbers of Fijians away from the Alliance, reducing its total share of votes from 83 per cent obtained in the 1972 elections to 67 per cent. This allowed the National Federation Party to score victories in at least six of the nine seats that the Alliance lost in 1977.Additionally, Indians voted so overwhelming for the Federation Party that their 25 per cent support for the Alliance in 1972 fell to 16 per cent in 1977.

The Federation Party won the elections with 26 seats. By facilitating the Federation Party's victory, it demonstrated to Fijians that the independence constitution of 1970 did not guarantee that a Fijian will always be Prime Minister and that the Indians were likely sooner or later to take political control of the country (thereby endangering Fijian rights). Fortunately for the Alliance, the Federation Party won only half of the total number of seats in Parliament. The Fijian governor-general in a curious decision re-appointed Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of the Alliance as Prime Minister. When the new government convened, the Alliance quickly lost a vote of no- confidence requiring a new election to be called. During the subsequent elections, the Alliance government saw to the jailing of Butadroka and when the results were in, the Alliance had won a resounding victory with 36 out of the 52 seats.

The 1987 general elections were the fifth in Fiji's history since independence. To begin with, the electoral system remained a combination of communal and national seats26. The prescribed parliamentary ethnic ratios were 22 Indians, 22 Fijians, and 8 General Electors (Europeans, Chinese, mixed races, etc.). The elections were for the 52 seats in the House of Assembly and were administered by the politically neutral Elections Commission. The main actors in the elections were the two established parties, the Indian-based National Federation Party and the Fijian-based Alliance Party. The major addition among the party contestants was the (FLP).

26 The had a deference argument between communal and open seat. The first argument All parties, whether or not ethnically based should be eligible to compete for them by nomating candidates without regard to their ethnicity. That is important to make an appeal for the support of all communities.

In Election 1987, a new multi-ethnic party, The Fijian Labour Party (FLP) led by Dr. Bavadra contested the general election in coalition with the National Federal Party (NFP), the main Indian party. In Indian communal seats, the Labour-Federation coalition obtained 82 per cent of Indian votes whereas in 1982 the Federation Party obtained 83 per cent. In the Fijian communal seats, the Alliance obtained 78 per cent in 1987 compared to 82 per cent in 1982. In the General Communal seats, the Alliance support fell from 89 per cent in 1982 to 82 per cent in 1987. Essentially, then, a sectional voting pattern persisted in the communal seats. Fijians in previous elections gave only 2 per cent of their votes to the Federation Party.

In 1987, they gave 9 per cent to the Labour-Federation coalition. It was mainly in the national constituencies that the Alliance lost votes to the coalition. It was the split Fijian community, the absentee Fijian vote, and in particular the role of splinter parties in four critical constituencies that led to the Labour-Federation victory. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that in the 1987 general elections, communal voting dominated the elections, especially in the communal seats and in the safe Indian and Fijian national seats which accounted for 48 out of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives. Even though in four critical electorates a small swing of Fijians to the coalition occurred and accounted for the defeat of the Alliance Party, the overall results were not about class realignment of voter preference. The Labour-Federation coalition was described as the old Indian menace in disguise with popular Indian leader Jai Ram Reddy the real power behind the coalition scene, which was surreptitious use of the fear of racial domination by Indians to ensure the loyalty of the Fijian voter. An Alliance stalwart ominously warned that "without the Alliance in power, this country could turn into another Uganda where Indians were made to leave".

From 1987 to 1990, the government of fiji was replased by former Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara when it was overthrown at gunpoint by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka. The 1990 constitution, size of the House Representatives was increded to 70. The 37 seats for Fijian gave them an overall majority. Indo- Fijian had only 27 seats. Rotumans formerly treated as a part of Fijian community, were given a separate seats. The number for general voters was reduced from 8 to 5 seats. Pacific Island voters were transferred from the Fijian roll to the general voters. The Prime Minister was required to be a Fijian. All seats were to be filled by voting on communal rolls.

The first election under the 1997 constitution for the 71 seats in the House of representatives was held in Mac 199927. All communities must willing to forego the idea of governing alone. It had

27 House of Representatives Elections May23 Feb18 Mar8 Party 1992 1994 1999 FPP-SVT 30 31 8 FLP 5 7 37 NFP 27 20 - FAP 7 5 10 GVP - 4 - PANU - - 4 fought the election in two coalition parties. The first coalition led by Mahandera Chaudhry from FLP and with two Fijian parties - the (FAP) led by Adi Kuini Speed and the Party National Unity (PANU) led by Apisai Tora. The second coalition was combination by The Fijian Soqosoqo Ni Vakavulewa Ni Taukei, formerly the main government party then led by Sitiveni Rabuka, the National Federation Party (NFP) and the United General Party (UGP). The Fijian coalition led by FLP’s had won the first outright majority in Fiji’s political history.

2.3.4 The Cabinet Coaliation

The 1997 constitution , The President28 acting in his or her own judgment appoints as prime Minister the member of The House of Representatives who in the President’s opinion can form a government that has the confidence of House of Repersentatives. The Prisedent appoint other minister on the advice of the Prime Minister.

The Constitution goes on to provide that the Prime Minister must establish a multi-party cabinet, comprising such number as he or she determine. Under the constitution 1997, the Prime

VLV - - 3 UGP - - 2 NVTLP - - 2 GEA - 1 - independent - 2 5 other 1 - - Total 70 70 71 Christian Democratic Alliance—VLV [Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito] Fiji Labor Party—FLP; left-wing; Mahendra Chaudhry Fijian Association Party—FAP; ethnic (Fijian); Adi Kuini Speed Fijian Political Party—FPP-SVT [Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei]; ethnic (Fijian); Maj. Gen. Sitivini Rabuka General Electors' Association—GEA; centrist; David Pickering; formerly All Nation Congress General Voters Party—GVP; centrist; Leo Smith National Federation Party—NFP; left-wing; ethnic (Indian); Jai Ram Reddy Nationalist Vanua Takolavo Party—NVTLP Party of National Unity—PANU; Apisai Tora United General Party—UGP; centrist

28 The president (head of state) is appointed for a 5-year term by the Great Council of Chiefs, a traditional ethnic Fijian leadership body. The president in turn appoints the prime minister (head of government) and cabinet from among the members of parliament. Both houses of the legislature have seats reserved by ethnicity. The Senate is appointed; the House of Representatives is elected. The president (head of state) is appointed for a 5-year term by the Great Council of Chiefs, a traditional ethnic Fijian leadership body. The president in turn appoints the prime minister (head of government) and cabinet from among the members of parliament. Both houses of the legislature have seats reserved by ethnicity. The Senate is appointed; the House of Representatives is elected.

Minister is to establish a multi party Cabinet. The prime Minister must invited all parties with more than seven members (10 per cent) elected to form the Cabinet. The Prime Minister may look to his or her own party or coalition of parties to fill all the places in the Cabinet. In 1990 election, besides FLP, the only parties to receive at least 10 percent of the 71 seats were the Fijian Association Party (FAP) led by formely Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka. Sitiveni Rabuka had announced his party’s intention of remaining in opposition if it was not a in position to form government, but as requires by the consititution, Prime Minister Chaudhry offed it two places in the cabinet.

This is an aggrement for power-sharing between all the main political parties. The current cabinet lineup ia represented by 15 FLP, 4 FAP, 2 PANU, 2 VLV and one Rotuman independent.

2.3.5 Segmental Autonomy

Education

One means of achieving such an outcome is through provision of education of comparable quality to all. The current education system that allocates resources in favour of urban and government schools is inequitable. This system of education discriminates against children who attend small rural schools relative to those in government and urban schools. The current system favours those social groups that are already advantaged. Such a system is bound to augment and reinforce the imbalances between the rich and poor, and urban and rural. An alternative strategy conducive to inter-generational mobility (that is the movement of families between the socio- economic strata) will foster political tolerance and reduce income inequity over time. Discrimination constrains this mobility and could be costly in an environment of rapid structural change.

By Independence in 1970, large numbers of Indians and Fijians were attending elementary and secondary schools, but Indians predominated. Fijian students suffered a greater rate of attrition also as they moved to high grades in school. It was almost inevitable, then, given the trend in Indian education, that most university positions went to Indians. The government has over the past 20 years allocated F$3 million annually for Fijian education which has been used to equip Fijian school and fund secondary and tertiary study for Fijians.

Economic

The rational of affirmative action in favour of Fijian is the notion that equality between the races is necessary for social harmony. Government policy directed at achieving economic equality between two races has in place since 1970 when Fiji became independence from United Kingdom.

Social and economic equality between the two races would be the same distribution of members of each race across the entire social scale. This would necessitate, for example, that the same proportions of business-men, doctors, dentists, lawyers, and the like would be present in each occupational subcategory.

Income equality would require the same income distribution across the entire income band for the two races. In fact, in terms of the proportion of people in poverty, the two races are now equal; but achieving true racial equality as described above is impractical. The income within The Indian community is the highest of any racial grouping in Fiji.

If quality of life comparisons are made, then there are no discernible differences. For example, in terms of life expectancy an all encompassing indicator of quality of life the marginally higher life expectancy of Fijians suggests that as a group they are at least well off as Indians (The Gujaratis still have a strong hold on the retail trader in urban Fiji and the non Gujaratis retain a strong foothold in the agriculture sector, and success in the professions and the public service.

To be sure, at any earlier time, the leaders and elites in the various ethnic communities might have been able to communicate and beat out compromises for inter-communal co-existence. But as conflict continues and deepens, even the upper layers of society become victims of inter- communal intransigence. The ethnic monster devours everyone in the end.

Compromise and co-operation are the very heart of the developmental process. This is true of all social structures, integrated and divided alike. The democratic fabric itself is constituted of give- and-take in beating out public policy, based on a culture and psychology of mutual trust in exchanges. The mortar of co-operation and compromise maintains the integrity of the edifice of society. In the multi-ethnic states of the Third World, the tension in working out mutually satisfactory exchanges is often strained by the fact that cleavages and differences are ethnicized. Protracted institutional ethnic conflict undermines the culture and psychology of co-operation, rendering collective development difficult if not impossible.

Compromise and co-operation are embodied in devices for conflict resolution. In Fiji, compromise and co-operation came alive and were implemented in the system of balance. When balance was no longer operative and was replaced by the quest for paramountcy and power by Indians and Fijians, each group settled into its own niche in the ethnically-influenced structure. When it seemed that communal tension and ethnic rivalry were beyond control, the Labour- Federation party (an amalgam of Indians and Fijians) came to power. With this new structure, the opportunity for cross-cultural legitimacy in government was given a new lease on life. This however was quickly torpedoed by the military intervention which put an end to all pretences at establishing a multi-cultural government. The costs are very real for they include the persistent threat of destabilization by those who are excluded. The effects are registered in a new repressive order inimical to all citizens.

As a matter of fact, consociational theory tries to explain the probability that power sharing will be instituted and maintained in divided societies if ;

1. The mostly serious to power sharing in divides societies is the presence of a solid majority in election. This factor was mainly responsible for the 1963 failure of the Cyprus consociational state.

2. A further important factor is that there should be some degree of socio- economic equality. While economic inequality is not an insuperablem barrier to consociationalism, it is clear that the larger the economic differentiation between segments, the more difficult political power sharing will be.The social economic differences among the ethnic or group of a divides societies. For example riot in Malaysia at 1969 was happened because the differences of socio economic among Malays and Chinese.

3. If there are so many group , then negotiations among them will be too difficult and complex. India has had a variety of interethnic and intercommunal as well as monoethnic parties and sometimes coalition among these. The eight election from 1951 to 1984 yielded eight manufactured majorities (seat majorities won with out vote majorities). Too many segments will require complicated and bilateral bargaining between elites, which will engender gridlock within legislation. Therefore, there should be a small number of segments with the optimum number being between three and five

4. The most important factor is that there should be no one majority segment If there is a dominant segment withover 50 per cent support nationwide, it is much more likely that majoritarianism will take hold. If the groups are of roughly the same size, then is a balance of power among them.

5. The decision making process is also simplified if the state has a small population size, because foreign affairs usually takes on less importance and the distribution of resources is easier to manage. And the process is less complex.

6. The existence of external threats may help to unify a society around a common nationalism, and thus increase the potential for cooperation among its component segments. 7. An overarching sense of national loyalty which transcends societal divisions and provides the basis for successful consociationalism and reduce the strengthen of particularistic loyalties.

8. A geographical concentration of segments will aid the development of federalism and decentralization -- both important aspects of power sharing in a plural society.

2.1.1 Finally, long-standing traditions of accommodation, which settle conflict by consensus and compromise and are rooted in the culture, will increase the likelihood of a successful consociational democracy.

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