Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas)

chapter 28 Imperfect or Particular Prudence (Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas)

Acting prudently, as has been repeatedly stressed, means to do something in the present for the future by means of experience from the past. Memory and foresight are thus essential cognitive components of prudence. As the previous chapters have shown, nonhuman animals do not fully possess these capaci- ties, according to various later medieval thinkers. Although many animals are capable of remembering things, nonhuman species are incapable of what was usually called recollection. Hence, their memory is incomplete or imperfect in comparison to human memory, as, for instance, Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus put it. With the component of foresight, it is even worse because all of the authors under consideration argued that other animals do not anticipate future states or events. All they do is to react to present stimuli. Admittedly, their behaviours are often directed towards the future. But this does not mean that they actually discern between the present and the future. Rather, they pro- vide for the future without really knowing that they will profit from their present operations. In both cases, the lack of intellect and reason is what causes the deficiency, or even lack, of recollection and foresight. The question now is what conclusions should be drawn from this for the prudence of nonhuman animals. Can they be prudent if they do not, or not fully, possess memory and foresight? One possible answer to this question was given by Albertus Magnus. For Albert, it is clear that memory is a necessary prerequisite of prudence. Un- less there is a storage of sensible forms and insensible intentions, there is no prudence, he argues. Consequently, those animals which possess sensory pow- ers but lack memory, are ‘imprudent’ (imprudentia). All other animals can be called ‘prudent’ (prudentia) at least to the extent that they possess ‘a control of life from memory’ (regimen vitae ex memoria).1 One might assume that Albert says this simply because he is trying to cope with the famous statement at the

1 See Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 9: “Quibusdam vero ex sensu secundum actum facto fit memoria prius acceptorum sensibilium. Et cum memoria non tantum sit thesaurus et coacervatio formarum sensibilium prius acceptarum, sed etiam intentionum convenientis et inconvenientis, boni et mali, amici et inimici et huius- modi cum sensibilibus ab aestimativa acceptorum, sicut in libro De memoria et reminiscentia

194 chapter 28 beginning of the Metaphysics in which Aristotle claims that there is memory in some animals, but not in others and thus that this is also the case with prudence.2 Yet, Albert’s account of “animal prudence,” as Summers calls this capacity, is much more than just a literal adoption of Aristotle’s text because Albert is well aware of the deficiency of both memory and foresight in nonhuman animals.3 Therefore, he needs to explain how there can be prudence if the lack of intellect and reason affects a creature’s cognitive components. In his Metaphysics commentary, Albert solves this problem by saying that we can call nonhuman animals prudent but ‘not according to the perfect mea- sure of prudence’ (non secundum perfectam prudentiae rationem). If we talk about prudence in bees, for instance, we do not talk about ‘an active habit in- volving true reason’ (activus habitus cum ratione vera) which aims at gathering whatever is useful or harmful for life.4 In other words, what one finds in them is prudence ‘in a certain respect’ (secundum quid) rather than prudence ‘in an absolute sense’ (simpliciter), as he puts it in his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics.5 In order to illustrate this difference, he refers to the example of the reflection of light or sound. If we look at a ray of sunlight that is reflected by a wall, we still see a ray of sunlight but this ray is less intense than the unre- flected ray. The same applies to prudence in human and nonhuman animals: in comparison to humans, nonhuman animals possess a weaker form of prudence. But in what sense is the prudence of nonhuman animals weaker than that of humans? According to Albert, there are two main differences between human and nonhuman prudence.6 First, there is a difference with regard to the mental representations that are involved in prudent behaviour, or, more precisely, in the cognitive processes underlying such behaviour. While humans employ not only particulars but also universals, other animals do not go beyond the level

probavimus: propter hoc quidem alia prudentia sunt animalium habentia regimen vitae ex memoria, alia vero solo sensu vigentia sunt imprudentia.” 2 See p. 165 n3. 3 On “animal prudence” see Summers (1987), 270. 4 See Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Geyer (1960), 9: “Dico autem memoran- tia prudentia non secundum perfectam prudentiae rationem, quae est activus habitus cum ratione vera eorum quae in nobis sunt, ad vitam conferentium.” 5 See Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, lib. vi, lec. 10, ed. Kübel (1987), 462: “Dicendum quod in brutis non est prudentia simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Unde dicit Commentator, quod est in eis quaedam resonantia prudentiae. Fit autem resonantia ex soni reflexione; unde reflexum procedit in debilius esse sicut lumen defectibilius.” See also Roling (2011), 232. 6 On these differences see also Köhler (2014), 140f.