Illei IImperii, 8. Primavera 2006, pp. 133-144 THE ORIGIN OF THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL ELITE JOSÉ S. ARCILLA, S.J. Ateneo de Manila University (Quexon City, Philippines) THEUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT had no knowledge at al1 about conditions in the Philippines awarded to it by the Treaty of Paris (10 December 1898) at the end of the Hispano-American conflict. President McKinley had instructed his delegates to the peace conference in Paris to ask for the entire Philippine archipelago, but he had no clear policy what to do with it. At the suggestion of Commodore Dewey, idling in Manila after coolly destroyed the decrepit Spanish fleet of Cavite on 1 May 1898, the President formed a commission to investigate conditions in the new colony, and named Jacob G. Schurman, president of Cornell University, to head it. From their reports the President hoped to formulate a program for the new colony. In due time, the Commission submitted its report after a few months in the Philip- pines, and the following year, 1900, William H. Taft was named head of a second Commission to implement the suggestions of the first. Because Schurman and his colleagues arrived in Manila shortly after hostilities between the Americans and the Filipinos had broken out, they had to look into the causes of the conflict and see how to bring about peace. The Commission invited people to provide information, assuring them of the benefits of a "wise and gener- ous protection of life and property" the American government would give the Fil- ipinos.1 In due time, the Commission reported to Washington that Manila was reeling under a "reign of terror." Fires were a daily occurrence, the city was half-deserted, streets were empty, rifle shots were frequent, and "some of the best in the city" who befriended the Americans either mysteriously disappeared or received threats. But, the Commission reported, except where emissaries of the rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, had done, the people were peaceful and not hostile. It was not surpris- ing that the Commission should conclude that the anti-American feeling was mere- ly a "Tagalog rebellion" brought about by the "ambition of a few and the mis~nderstandin~of many." The report continued: "[Aguinaldo's government] served only for plunderizing the people under the pretext of levying 'war contribu- tions,' while many of the insurgent officials were rapidly accumulating wealth."2 Schurman report in Reports of the Phzlippzne Commission, 1, p.185. Ibid., 1, p.97-123, 176. See also, for the various testimonies, the second volume of the Report. This was a serious charge, but what had happened? Out fo fear of retaliation, on- ly a few people bravely volunteered information. Some of the informants were for- eign businessmen residing in Manila, others were the educated elite, or the Filipino ilustrados who soon concluded that peace with the Americans was the better alter- native to a bloody fight. And so, perhaps without intending to, they served as spokesmen for the rest of the country.3 At the time, the Filipinos could be classified into three groups: (1) the ilustmdo elite and property owners who wanted peace, considering the futility of armed re- sistance, which, in 13 months of fighting since the revolution against Spain had killed 34,714 Filipinos, besides 572 recently killed Americans; (2) the middle class - teachers, clerks, writers, and government employees who urged continued resist- ance because they believed they were capable of self-rule and did not want a second colonial master; and (3) the majority of poor, property-less, landless, apathetic to public issues unless they affected them personally. The question, however, is whether or not a few months' investigation of Philip- pine conditions sufficed for a comprehensive view. Did the Schurman report, part- ly based on the ilustrado perspective, faithfully mirror the reality of the country? On the strength of this report, however, McKinley appointed William H. Taft to head a second Commission to implement the program Schurman had suggested.4 The Taft Commission arrived in June 1900 and assumed legislative powers the following September, ending the military government installed immediately on the arrival of the American occupation forces for the duration of the Philippine-Amer- ican conflict.5 As with the Schurman Commission, only the ilustrados cooperated and provided needed information. The rest Taft described in a reportas people, de- spite their defects and weakness, capable of development and growth, better than other people in a similar condition.6 How fairly Taft had assessed the Philippine sit- uation may be questioned, but he governed the Philippines through the eyes of the elite who had his ear. In ~laceswhere peace had returned, the Americans established a civil govern- ment, following a ~lanCol. William A. Kolbe had drawn up, which the Taft Com- mission later superseded with the Municipal Code passed in January 1907.7 In 1903, the first local elections were held for town presidents, vice-presidents, and members of the town councils. However, suffrage was limited to prospective voters who had the necessary qualifications: (1) literac~in either English or Spanish; (2) previous experience in government service; and (3) a minimum amount of assets. Intended or not, this limited voting privileges to only 2.44% of áhe population, namely, the Ibid., 1, "Exhibit VI," p.216-28. Actually, this program was based on suggestions frorn the elite, people like Trinidad Hermenegildo Pardo de Tavera, who later founded the first Philippine political party aimed at union with the United States. Ronifacio S. SALAMANCA,The Filipino Reactzon.. ., p.25-8. Censw of the Philippine I~lanás,1, p.529-31. Glenn A. MAY,Social Enginee~ingin the Philippines.. ., Chapter 3, but especially p.44-9. educated and wealthy elite, and, therefore, local administration, was effectively controlled by the privileged sectors of local society. At the same time, of course, gov- ernment action in the towns would have been impossible without these small groups of individuals who had experience in governance. In due time, the town oligarchy monopolized local political power. For example, from 1904 to 1912, a period of nine successive years, the town presidents in Taal, Batangas, were the same individuals who had been members of the pastprincipali'a. From 1904 to 1919 in Pampanga, 13 out of 20 own presidents were former local cap- itanes or gobernadorcillos, or their relatives. Political dynasties were clearly forming under the new American democracy in the Philippines. The effects were neither surprising nor unexpected. Abuse of authority was not rare, town presidents became petty dictators, fees were charged for government services supposedly free. Apparently, more than three centuria under Spanish ruled had not weaned the people from the pre-Hispanic tradition of subservience to datus. Add to this the traditional utang na loob (literally, "debt of affection"), which demands an expression of gratitude -and one can understand what has per- sisted as today's lagay system.8 Not surprisingly, higher budgetary allocations were approved for the salaries of the municipal officials, while neglecting the plight of the school teachers, or basic infrastructure, etc. Local treasury officials were ap- pointed, not by the local town council, but by the provincial governor who was usu- ally an American. Budgetary allocations or amendments needed the signature of the provincial treasurer, also an American. That these things occurred should not be surprising. More than 300 years of Spanish colonial rule, when government offices were sold, had not prepared the Filipinos for an active role in public administration, in which government service was not for personal gain. The new system was a novelty. In 1903,50% of the town elections were reported to be fraudulent and dishonest, while 33% were annulled. The election in Tiwi, Albay serves as an example. Ramón Morales won the town presidential elections over Pantaleón Azcuna, 95 votes to 64. But the Provincial Board annulled these results, because there was clear proof that qualified voters had been barred from casting their votes, while unqual- ified voters had been allowed to vote. Two months later, elections were again held, and Morales received 128 votes and Azcuna 119. These results were also nullified for the second time for the same rea- sons as earlier. After two months, a third election was held, with the same results in Morales' favor. For the third time, the election results were annulled again for the same reasons. Incidents like these confirmed the perception of the American decision makers that the Filipinos, by and large, lacked basic moral integrity and were still incapable of self-rule. In reaction, the more articulate Filipinos launched a fervid anti-Amer- A financia1 "gift" from an official staff member for services, like speeding up the renewal of a driver's license. ican campaign in the Manila newspapers. Glossing over the real issues, they con- centrated instead on the ever popular issue of national independence. It was about this time that the idea of forming a political party surfaced and, with Taft's approval, a few of the ilustrados organized themselves into the Partido Feder- b alista, the first political party in the Philippines. Its founders -Trinidad Hermenegildo Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, José de Luzurriaga- believed that peaceful union with the United States was the best program for the Philippines. Af- ter a period of economic development of the Archipelago, then they would consid- er the idea of independence.9 This won an immediate reaction from a younger group, who immediately formed their own political party, the Partido Nacionalista, with the platform of im- mediate and absolute independence. Differences among them split the members in- to smaller factions, but they al1 aimed at immediate and total independence.