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Pakistan Human Rights Ignored in the "War on Terror"

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Pakistan Human Rights Ignored in the [EMBARGOED FOR: 29 September 2006] Public amnesty international Pakistan Human rights ignored in the "war on terror" September 2006 AI Index: ASA 33/036/2006 INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 0DW, UNITED KINGDOM TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 2. Political background.............................................................................................................. 3 3. Arbitrary arrests and detentions............................................................................................. 6 3.1 Safeguards relating to arrest and detention in Pakistan................................................... 6 3.2 Arrests in the “war on terror” shrouded in secrecy.......................................................... 7 3.2.1 Number of arrests ..................................................................................................... 7 3.2.2 Failure to record arrests ............................................................................................ 8 3.2.3 Lack of information.................................................................................................. 8 3.3 Recent enforced disappearances..................................................................................... 8 3.4 Circumstances of arrest ................................................................................................... 9 3.4.1 Exclusion of safeguards for arrest .......................................................................... 10 3.4.2 Involvement of foreign intelligence agents ........................................................... 10 3.5 The location and manner of arrests................................................................................ 12 3.5.1 Arrested while fleeing Afghanistan........................................................................ 12 3.5.2 Mass arrests ............................................................................................................ 13 3.5.3. Arrests in the tribal areas....................................................................................... 14 3.5.4. Arrested abroad ..................................................................................................... 16 3.5.5. ‘We got you cheap’: rewards facilitate arbitrary detention ................................... 18 3.6. Secret detention ............................................................................................................ 20 3.6.1. Secrecy surrounding detention: the case of Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan........ 20 3.6.2 Conditions of detention: ‘a feeling of complete hopelessness’ .............................. 21 3.6.3 Involvement of US personnel................................................................................. 22 3.6.4 Secret detention is banned under international law ................................................ 23 3.7 Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 24 3.7.1 To the Government of Pakistan.............................................................................. 24 3.7.2 To the US government............................................................................................ 24 4. Arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and enforced disappearance of children ....................... 25 4.1 Arbitrary arrest and detention of children ..................................................................... 25 4.2 Torture of children in detention..................................................................................... 28 4.3 Child hostages ............................................................................................................... 29 4.4 Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 30 5. Torture and deaths in detention ........................................................................................... 30 5.1 Torture and other ill-treatment ...................................................................................... 30 5.2 Deaths in custody .......................................................................................................... 33 5.3. Complicity of foreign intelligence agencies................................................................. 34 5.4 Torture and other ill-treatment not only unlawful but counterproductive..................... 36 5.6 Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 38 5.6.1 To the Government of Pakistan.............................................................................. 38 5.6.2 To the Government of the USA.............................................................................. 39 6. The fate of victims of enforced disappearances .................................................................. 39 6.1 Possible extrajudicial executions................................................................................... 40 6.2. Reappearances .............................................................................................................. 41 6.3 Criminal charges after enforced disappearance............................................................. 43 6.3.1 Charges under the Foreigners Act .......................................................................... 43 6.3.2 Charges under the Frontier Crimes Regulation ...................................................... 43 6.3.3 Other criminal charges ........................................................................................... 44 6.4. Unlawful transfers to other countries ........................................................................... 45 6.4.1. Requirements of extradition in Pakistani law........................................................ 46 Amnesty International September 2006 2 Pakistan: Human rights ignored 6.4.2 Detainees transferred by Pakistan to US custody................................................... 47 6.4.3. Detainees sent to Guantánamo Bay....................................................................... 47 6.4.4 Unable to return home after release from Guantánamo.......................................... 49 6.4.5 Other persons subjected to enforced disappearance ............................................... 50 6.5 Denials and secrecy ....................................................................................................... 51 6.5.1 The case of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar ................................................................... 51 6.5.2 The case of Abu Faraj al-Libi................................................................................. 53 6. 6 Unlawful transfer of Pakistani nationals ...................................................................... 54 6.7. Transfers of detainees to home countries ..................................................................... 56 6.7.1 To Indonesia and Malaysia..................................................................................... 56 6.7.2 To Turkey ............................................................................................................... 57 6.7.3 To Afghanistan ....................................................................................................... 57 6.7.4 Transfer of a juvenile to Egypt............................................................................... 58 6.8 Renditions from Pakistan to countries in the Middle East ............................................ 58 7. Impact on families of enforced disappearances................................................................... 59 7.1 Anxiety .......................................................................................................................... 59 7.2 Frustration ..................................................................................................................... 60 7.3 Harassment .................................................................................................................... 60 7.4 Social exclusion............................................................................................................. 60 7.5 Economic hardship ........................................................................................................ 61 8. Ineffective remedies ............................................................................................................ 61 8.1 Informal channels .......................................................................................................... 62 8.2 Inadequate action by members of the criminal justice system ...................................... 63 8.3 The right to habeas corpus undermined......................................................................... 64 9. Excessive use of force and possible extrajudicial executions ............................................. 68 9.1 The case of Amjad Farooqi ........................................................................................... 69 9.2 The tribal areas .............................................................................................................. 69 9.2.1. Number of possible extrajudicial executions......................................................... 70 9.2.2 Use of lethal force .................................................................................................
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