Download Powerpoint (PDF, 1013.32
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Ethnically Asymmetric Political Representation and the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Evidence from Ethiopia Teferi Mergo, Alain-Desirˊ eˊ Nimubona, Horatiu A. Rus ASSA January 2020 San Diego University of Waterloo Outline Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion 2 Introduction • The internal boundaries of the country were redrawn mainly along ethno-linguistic lines. Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation • Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism in 1995, with the TPLF-led EPRDF capturing the state in 1991, after defeating the previous unionist government militarily. 3 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation • Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism in 1995, with the TPLF-led EPRDF capturing the state in 1991, after defeating the previous unionist government militarily. • The internal boundaries of the country were redrawn mainly along ethno-linguistic lines. 3 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Map 1: Former provinces of Ethiopia before 1995 (Source: 4 https : //www.mapsopensource.com/ethiopia − provinces − map.html.) Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Map 2: Current ethno-linguistic regions after 1995 (Source: https : //commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File : 5 Ethiopia regions english.png#/media/File : Ethiopia regions english.png.) • Dominance is measured here by cabinet share proportionality (CSP); • In non-democratic polities, CSP is indicative of how political power and economic rent is distributed (Burgess et al, 2015). Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation • The TPLF, representing the interests of ethnic Tigrayans, became the dominant party (MZ the architect); the other political groups have been fringe players; 6 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation • The TPLF, representing the interests of ethnic Tigrayans, became the dominant party (MZ the architect); the other political groups have been fringe players; • Dominance is measured here by cabinet share proportionality (CSP); • In non-democratic polities, CSP is indicative of how political power and economic rent is distributed (Burgess et al, 2015). 6 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation: The ethnic composition of the cabinet 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Tigray Amhara Oromia South Others Figure 3: Distribution of the proportion of all cabinet-level positions to population by Ethnic groups (regions), 1995 - 2012 7 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation: The ethnic composition of the cabinet 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Tigray Amhara Oromia South Others Figure 4: Distribution of the proportion of key cabinet positions to population by ethnic groups (regions), 1995 - 2012 8 • Ethnic cooptation arrangements have been established in several African countries (Francois et al., 2015), but it is not clear if they always translate into equitable economic outcomes on the ground. • The #OromoProtests of 2014 to 2018, which managed to displace the TPLF from the corridors of power in Addis, suggest that the TPLF/EPRDF system was perhaps not equitable. • More suggestive evidences that arrangement might have favored Tigray: Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation: Previous Work • Ethnic segregation is associated with economic inequity (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007; etc.) 9 • The #OromoProtests of 2014 to 2018, which managed to displace the TPLF from the corridors of power in Addis, suggest that the TPLF/EPRDF system was perhaps not equitable. • More suggestive evidences that arrangement might have favored Tigray: Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation: Previous Work • Ethnic segregation is associated with economic inequity (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007; etc.) • Ethnic cooptation arrangements have been established in several African countries (Francois et al., 2015), but it is not clear if they always translate into equitable economic outcomes on the ground. 9 • More suggestive evidences that arrangement might have favored Tigray: Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation: Previous Work • Ethnic segregation is associated with economic inequity (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007; etc.) • Ethnic cooptation arrangements have been established in several African countries (Francois et al., 2015), but it is not clear if they always translate into equitable economic outcomes on the ground. • The #OromoProtests of 2014 to 2018, which managed to displace the TPLF from the corridors of power in Addis, suggest that the TPLF/EPRDF system was perhaps not equitable. 9 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation: Previous Work • Ethnic segregation is associated with economic inequity (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007; etc.) • Ethnic cooptation arrangements have been established in several African countries (Francois et al., 2015), but it is not clear if they always translate into equitable economic outcomes on the ground. • The #OromoProtests of 2014 to 2018, which managed to displace the TPLF from the corridors of power in Addis, suggest that the TPLF/EPRDF system was perhaps not equitable. • More suggestive evidences that arrangement might have favored Tigray: 9 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Rate of access to piped water in urban areas by state South Oromia Amhara All but Tigray Tigray 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Post Pre Figure 5: Access to piped water (urban) 10 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Rate of access to piped water in rural areas by states 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 Tigray All but Tigray Amhara Oromia South Pre Post Figure 6: Access to piped water (rural) 11 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Access to electricity in urban areas by state 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Tigray All but Tigray Amhara Oromia South Pre Post Figure 7: Access to electricity (urban) 12 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Average distance in kms to nearest primary school in rural areas 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Tigray All but Tigray Amhara Oromia South Pre Post Figure 8: Access to primary school (rural) 13 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Background and Motivation Average distance in kms to nearest health center in rural areas by states 14.00 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 Tigray All but Tigray Amhara Oromia South Pre Post Figure 9: Access to health center (rural) 14 Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Comparison of ’Before’ Asset Ownership Rates in Tigray vs. Control Regions Variable: Year Other states Tigray Assets Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean p value Diff. Plough and Yoke 1995 1.56170 0.49620 1.55994 0.49673 0.00176 0.92666 1994 1.54937 0.49758 1.55858 0.49689 -0.00920 0.63121 Plough 1995 1.53926 0.49848 1.55115 0.49771 -0.01189 0.53619 1994 1.52829 0.49922 1.55722 0.49705 -0.02892 0.13268 Sprayer 1995 1.99358 0.07981 2 0 -0.00641 0.02958 1994 1.99420 0.07590 1.99318 0.08230 0.00101 0.72993 Tractor 1995 1.99852 0.03843 1.99863 0.03691 -0.00011 0.93681 1994 1.99802 0.04437 1.99318 0.08230 0.00483 0.00988 Farming Animals 1995 1.60263 0.48938 1.62261 0.48506 -0.01997 0.28924 1994 1.58821 0.49218 1.62670 0.48400 -0.03848 0.04222 Transport 1995 1.84958 0.35749 1.83787 0.36881 0.01171 0.39662 Animals 1994 1.83984 0.36677 1.83651 0.37006 0.00333 0.81366 Bicycle 1995 1.98606 0.11721 1.97820 0.14612 0.00786 0.08869 1994 1.98717 0.11251 1.98501 0.12158 0.00216 0.62017 Motorbike 1995 1.99926 0.02718 1.99455 0.07367 0.00470 0.00028 1994 1.99938 0.02482 1.99591 0.06384 0.00347 0.00274 Vehicle 1995 1.99297 0.08354 1.99046 0.09725 0.00250 0.44248 1994 1.99272 0.08498 1.99318 0.08230 -0.00046 0.88753 Refrigerator 1995 1.98643 0.11567 1.98228 0.13198 0.00414 0.35800 1994 1.98754 0.11089 1.98773 0.11012 -0.00019 0.96441 Home 1995 1.17087 0.37642 1.25340 0.43525 -0.08252 0.00000 15 Land 1995 1.17287 0.37816 1.24523 0.43051 -0.07235 0.00000 Question • Do effective representation issues associated with ethnic federalism contribute to observed disparities in economic outcomes among different ethnic groups? Outline Introduction Question Literature Model Empirical Framework Results Robustness Checks Conclusion Research Question • These facts call for a deeper investigation, and that is what we attempt to do in this paper.