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"ARE YOU NOT REALLY A BEHAWOURIST IN DISGUISE?" ---PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN 'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGA TZONS

Mark Stephen WorreU

A submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of Ptiilosophy, in the University of Toronto

O Copyright by Mark Stephen Worrell 1999 National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliognphii Services services bibliographiques

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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substimtial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent êeimprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Title: "Are You Not Redy a Behaviourist in Disguise ?"-Philosophical Psychology in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Inveshgations Doctor of Philosophy, 1999 Mark Stephen WorreU Department of Philosophy University of Toronto

ABSTRACT My thesis investigates the nature of the relation between bebaviowism and the use Wittgenstein makes of it in his remarks on philosophical psychology in Philosophical Investigations. It examines Wittgenstein's disavowai of the claim that his remarks show a cornmitment to behaviourism. Wittgenstein raised this question himself in a section of the Investigations dding with the possibility and implications of pnvate . Although Wittgenstein exhorts philosophers to determine the rneaning of words by observing the multiple uses we make of them, neither he nor his commentators foilow this precept in dealing with "behaviourism". In order to illustrate that Wittgenstein's discussion displays a limited knowledge of behaviourism, accounts of the work of hree behaviourists are presented. My focus is limited to behaviourist thinkers whose writings antedate Wittgenstein's shift to his later philosophy, in this case John Broadus Watson, Albert Paul Weiss, and Edward Chace Tolman. This is done to provide a backdrop for evaluating the merits of Wittgenstein's repudiation of the charge of behaviourism and his commentators' appraisal of its relevance to his cornments on philosophical psychology. 1 next show that commentators who address the relevance of behaviourism to Wittgenstein's later remarks also mort to the same deficient picture of behaviourism on which Wittgenstein relies. This is folIowed by an examination of how he treats mental activity in the earliest work of his later period, The Blue Book, as an example of the continuity he shares with the behaviourists not only in his approach to psychological but also in his comments about the nature of psychological phenomena. Furthemore, 1 maintain that The Blue Book's decidedly behaviounst treatment of mental activity is reproduced in a subtier fashion in the Investigations. It is argued that the method Wittgenstein adopts for txeathg problems in philosophy of and his contention that the intelligibility of mental concepts requires a conceptual comection between their application and behavioural factors betray a pronounced cornmitment to behaviourism in his later writings.

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1 would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Robert E. Tully, for his guidance and continual support during the course of this research and the preparation of this thesis. Professor Tully often spent countless hours helping me to cl* my silly about and how to approach the subject of philosophy in general and to engage in scholarship. 1 am humbled to have studied under his tutelage and have grown to cherish him as a fiend. 1 would

also like to express my thanks to my advisor, Professor Fred F. WiIson. 1 consider myself fortunate to have distilled some of his encyclopedic knowledge about various areas of philosophy. 1 am also grateful to Professor John V. Cdeld for tolerating my ramblings on this topic in his graduate course on Wittgenstein a few years ago and for continuing to indulge my in many consultations thereafter. Financial support from the University of Toronto is aclcnowledged, Massey College served as my first home during my graduate studies and as my introduction to the University of Toronto and Canada. It rernained my retreat throughout my graduate studies. 1am thanldul for the friends and many quaintances made there. My thoughts drift fondly to Ms. Andrea Sam, Dr. Linda B. Gowman, Dr. Pierre Dubé, Dr. Mary Condon, Dr. Eugene Lee, Elizabeth M. Callery. Dr. Soon Ai Low, and Dr. Nicole M. Schulman. Massey College provided me with the opportunity to meet and interact with a diverse group of people

whose intellectual and personal interests were equdy varied. Victoria University and Hart House played important roles during the latter stages of my tenure at the University of Toronto. 1 am grateful for my association with both places and the friends 1 discovered there. Among these Marianne Stevens (neé Fedunkiw), Sarah K. Scott, Faith

Holder, JO Park, Catherine Bate, and Dr. David S. Barker deserve mention. There are many others whom 1 regret not mentioning. Lady, 1 wish to express my most hdelt gratitude to Mrs. Wendy M. Toppin, my rnother, without whose support and contributions, especially in the last few years, this pmject would have remained merely a fitful play of fantasy. TABLE OF CONTENTS -. ABSTRACT Il

ACKNO WLEDGEMENTS iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS vi

-.* EPIGRAPH vu

INTRODUCTION 1 PART 1: PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND TEE PROBLEM OF BEHAVIOURISM

CHAPTER ONE "So you are saying that the word '' reaily means crying?"

CHAPTER TWO Behaviourism Classical Behaviourism Neo-behaviourism Purposive Behaviourism Epilogue

PART II: COMMENTATORS CHAPTER THREE Logicai Behaviourism: Fodor

CHAPTER FOUR Grarnrnar as Anthropology: Malcolm 113

CHAPTER FIVE "Crypto-behaviourism?": Hacker 139 PART III: BEHAVIOURISM IN THE BLUE BOOK CHAPTER SIX "This queer thing, "

BIBLIOGRAPHY

vii a way of putting it-not very satisfactory: A periphrastic snidy in a wom-out poetical fashion, Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle With words and meanings. T. S. Eliot East Coker

viii Introduction Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophical psychology and is vast.

nie force of his remarks on mental concepts does much to dispel the mystery sumounding the allegedly private, indescribable processes and states to which these concepts refer. Wittgenstein's attack on the inherent and natural Cartesianism whereby we come to think of psychological phenornena and psychological language seems to bring into the qwstion the very of these phenornena. This appears to be the obvious result of his attack on conceptions which use a narne- object theory of to account for the intelligibility of Linguistic employment Particularly in the private language sections of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein questions the very that meaning and understanding are fundamentally private, incorporeal processes hidden in the

medium of the mhd. His attack on the idea of private language, on , on scepticism, and on the argument from analogy al1 seem to come to the unavoidable conclusion that psychological phenornena are nothing but fictions, illusions traceable to our confusions about the workings of ordinary language. His arguments support the conviction that Wittgenstein wants to deny that "in remembering, an inner process takes place" (PI, §305), and to maintain that there really is nothing to my expenence of pain, joy, grief, anxiety, etc. except various bodily movements and physiological characteristics, that "everything except human behaviour is a fiction." (PI, 5307) It is appropriate and probably inevitable, then, that Wittgenstein should have raised the accusatory question, "Are you not realiy a behaviourist in disguise?" (PI, 5307) The purpose of this study is

to examine this question, to consider how Wittgenstein has answered it, to describe how others have answered it, and to provide--at the very least-a clearer and more complete answer than Wittgenstein himself provided. Wittgenstein himself raises the issue of behaviourism and its relation to meatal states and processes near the end of the private language discussion in Philosophical Investigations. It should be noted that Wittgenstein regards behaviourism from a philosophical perspective, as a doctrine which like other philosophical theories is nourished by a certain picture about how language works. His famous question occurs at a point in the Philosophical Investigatiom where he has dismissed the idea that private ostensive definition is the means whereby we corne to know sensation and understand how to use sensation language. Wittgenstein may have may wanted to raise the question as a means of counteracting the impression that his attack against private language revealed an underlying commitrnent to behaviourist pnnciples. After all, since he rejects the possibility of an exclusively private mental in Our use of psychological language, it might seem that he wished to take the fùrther step of repudiating mental States as well, a step associated with classical behaviourism. Such a position would be similar to that promoted by John B. Watson, the 'founder' of behaviourism. Wittgenstein makes it clear that he does not want to take this step. Wittgenstein's invocation of behaviourism appears to be connected with his general attempt to dispel a number of confusions, myths, and illusions about language which resdt from philosophical investigation, narnely, the tendency in philosophy to misappropnate (and literalty

mi s-use or overextend) an analogy w rought from everyday language and discourse. Wittgenstein thought that the impetus for misrepresentation of or confusion about language lies beyond language itself. This point is made in his discussion in PZ 5 105 - 5 1 15. In 5 1 1 1, he notes that "the problems arising through a misinterpretation of our foms of language have the character of deprh.

They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the foms of Our language and their significance is as great as the importance of Our language." He claims that the notion that an inner picture functions as the corollary of the outer expression of sensation is a grammaticalfiction.

Al though he never defines what he means by the word "behaviourism" , Wittgenstein's use of the word strongly suggests an extreme form of the doctrine which repudiates mental phenornena. It is my contention that this crass form of behaviourism serves as the counterpoint not only for Wittgenstein's remarks against behaviourism but even for those of scholars who seek to exonerate him from accusations of king a closet behaviourist. The answer 1 give will differ from theirs. My study, which divides into six chapters, will argue that his position shows an affinity with behaviourism which is not fully appreciated by the scholarship on this topic. My investigation of Wittgenstein's relation to behaviourism is limited to two works which mark his later philosophy, The Blue Book and Philosophical Investigations. My reason for doing so is not simply for purposes of econorny. Wittgenstein intended the laiter work to be the definitive statement of his philosophical position and as a repudiation of his early views; the former work consists of lectures acquainting his Cambridge students with the inteUectua1 transformation he had undergone. In other words, these two works form public testaments of his later philosophical viewpoint, the former king in a sense a proiegomenon to the latter. It also must be

noted that Wittgenstein intended the latter work to be his authoritative presentation of ideas which

he considered other thinkers to have CO-opted and disseminated as their own. As he remarked in

the "Vorwort"to the Investigations, "this stung my vanity and 1 had diiculty in quieting it." My inquiry investigates one issue, namely the relation Wittgenstein understood to hold between his mature philosophical views-those that he chose to make public-and behaviourism. This relationship is specifically addressed in the Phüosophical Investigations and 1 shall begin my inquiry by describing the dynamics of Wittgenstein's answer to the question he posed to himself. In a later chapter 1shaii attempt to show that Wittgenstein's adoption of a behaviouristic outlook is more overt in The Blue Book than in the Philosophical Investigations, but that a knowledge of the

former heips us to track the form this cornmitment would later take in the latter work. Although the investigation of behaviourisrn's relation to Wittgenstein's later philosophy could extend to a

number of other texts (including Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, the bst Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology , and Wittgenstein 's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology. 1946- 47, ed., P. T. Geach, for example), such an inquiry is a more generd project than the one

undertaken here. What follows is an examination of the accusation Wittgenstein raises, in the fom of the now famous question, directed explicitly against his own views in Philosophicol Investigations, and implicitly against the more pronounced presentation of such views in The Blue Book. In the first chapter 1 maintain that a consideration of strict behaviourism 'bookends' the discussion of the idea of private language and that Wittgenstein dallies with this exûeme fom as a means of attacking the Cartesiankm of the private language defender. The next chapter is an examination of three behaviounsts, John Broadus Watson, Albert Paul Weiss, and Edward Chace Tolman. Wittgenstein's invocation of behaviourism cas to mind the type of doctrine Watson espoused but, 1shall argue, it nonetheless fails to adequately convey the varied nature of Watson's behaviourism. These airee behaviourists are chosen to give an indicaiion of the breadth of the behaviouristic writings which were contemporaneous with Wittgenstein's development of his own ideas on mentai concepts and to provide a faim characterisation of what is meant by 'behaviouris m'. Watson, dong with the other two behaviourists to be examined, investigated psychological phenomena in a manner which heralds Wittgenstein's own treatment of psychological phenomena in his later philosophy. For example, Weiss argued that one can look for the meaning of psychological concepts in the complex network of conventionalised (bodily and linguistic) responses of individuals. Tolman, as well, thought that the intelligiblity of mental concepts and psychological phenomena lay in customary behaviour and not in reference to conscious states and processes, privately understood. A study of the three behaviourists reveals that behaviourism is not properly characterised by the extrpme form which surfaces not only in Philosophical Investigations but also in the extensive commentary which has sought to exonerate Wittgenstein from the accusation that he really is a behaviourist in disguise. Chapters three, four, and five form a section on three weli-known scholars who have examined the question whether Wittgenstein is a behaviounst. These are: Jerry A. Fodor, and P. M. S. Hacker. The first answers the question in the affirmative, while the latter two defend Wittgenstein's denial. For reasons 1shall develop in these chaptea, their answers are unsatisfactory. 1 chose Jerry A. Fodor because he devises a category which seeks to classify the brand of behaviounsm found in the Investigations. His analysis of behaviourism proves helpful in making intelligible how and to what extent Wittgenstein's later remarks can be charactensed as behaviouristic. Although 1 am in agreement with Fodor that Wittgenstein is a behaviourist, 1 am driven paradoxically to defend Wittgenstein against Fodor because he gives a deficient answer to the famous question which Wittgenstein poses. Fodor argues that Wittgenstein's remarks on determining the applicability of psychological predicates to others commit him to a "logical behaviourism" based on 'an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and meaning'. 1 question ~odofschamterisation and try to show that Wittgenstein's behaviourism is philosophically subtler than Fodor allows. As for Malcolm, my own interpretation of Wittgenstein is sympathetic, although 1 will challenge his defence of Wittgenstein against the charge of behaviourism. Most of Malcolm's philosophical writings are devoted to eliminating many of the confusions about Wittgenstein's philosophy and on making sense of those confusions contained in Wittgenstein's remarks. Nevertheless, 1contend that Malcolm fils to redise that he in fact interprets Wittgenstein as a behaviourist in order to defend him against the charge. Hacker (dong with G, P. Baker) has devoted his efforts to the project of explicating Wittgenstein's later philosophy, in particular to showing how Philosophical Investigations represents a revolutionary approach to philosophical methodology. His account of Wittgenstein owes much to Malcolm's, and he interprets Wittgenstein's notion of criteria as a novel logical relation which separates Wittgenstein not only from Cartesianism and Behaviounsm büt other philosophical doctrines as well. Against Hacker, 1 argue that it is the notion of cntena in Wittgenstein's remarks which in fact points the way towards showing that he is a behaviourist. 1 Mtmyself to Hacker's works which speak directly to the topics of behaviounsm, critena, and the subjects Wittgenstein discusses in the pnvate language passages in the Investigations. In this way, 1 have hied to maintain a sharp perspective on the centrai question which my thesis has set out to examine.

Finally, in my sixth chapter, I examine Wittgenstein's analysis of the topic of thought in The Blue Book and in the Philosophicai Investigations as an example of his behaviourist treatment of a mental . My reason for doing so is to show that Wittgenstein did not simply engage in idle dalliance with behaviourist principles, but that his new method and approach to doing philosophy indicate a continuity with older forms of behaviourism and help illuminate certaui aspects of behaviourism whic h Wittgenstein defends in Philosophical Investigations. Generdly speaking, it is my contention ihat he aimed to provide a philosophical vindication of a basic scientific attitude towards psyc hological phenomena which is found in these earlier forms. PART 1 Trivute Layuage and th Tro61ém of Behvioutism Chapter One:

'50you are sayiy tfïat th word 'painfreaG5y meameanr cyiy?" A hokat B&viourimr in TI $243 - $315 Much of the established discussion regarding the private language sections (roughly, PZ:§243 - 53 15) of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigationsl concentrates on the issue of ptivacy and sensation-language (i.e., in what senses are our sensations 'private') and that of the possibility of a private language.2 1 would like, however, to emphasise another aspect of these sections, namely the relation of behaviourism to his remarks and arguments. Wittgenstein hirnself is well aware of this issue in his musings about philosophical psychology and about the mind-body problem. It cornes to the fore in $307 where the following question is posed: "Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise?" However, it would be a mistake to think that this is the frst tinte the issue of behaviourism makes its appearance in the private language discussion. On the contrary, one could make a case that this issue is a continual reference point3 for Wittgenstein's remarks about philosophical psychology. Nonetheless, my concem here is with the private language sections. The case 1 want to present is as foiiows. The topic of behaviourism and its relation to

Wittgenstein's views forms the 'bookends' of the private language sections. It is first broached at 5244 and then revisited in $304 - $308. My contention is that Wittgenstein deliberately selects a crass behaviourism with which to contrast his own position. The behaviourism, or type of behaviourism, which one finds dismissed in the Investigations is an extreme variety, one associated with John B. Watson, whose views will be examined later. The Watsonian position is in many respects the antipode of the Cartesian dualist position on the mind-body problem. In other l. Reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Piailosophical Investigations will be to the bilingual edition tcanslated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). 2. cf. for example, rnost of the articles in Essays on Wittgenstein. edited by E. D. Klernke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971) and many of those found in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968)- Recent contributions to this discussion have centred on the exonerating Wittgenstein from the charge of behaviourisrn by denying that he subscribes to a cenain rnetaphysic of the body found in behaviourism and thus does not treat mental concepts reductively in the manner behaviourism does. in this regard, consider: Anthony Kenny's Wittgenstein, London: Allan Lane The Penguin Press, 1973, pp. 17 and 184; John W. Cook's "Hurnan Beings," in Sudies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed., Peter Winch, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. pp. 1 17 - 151, also Peter Winch's "Introduction: The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy," in the same volume, p. 18; David Pear's The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Volume II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 228, 270, 349 footnote 38. 351 - 354. 414, and 427 - 429; Joachim Schulte's Irtpenérice and Expression: Wirtgensrein's Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1993. pp. 66, 159 - 16 1, and 166; Robert J. Fogelin's "Wittgenstein's Critique of Philosophy." in The Cambridge Cornpanion to Wittgenstein. ed., Hans Sluga and David G. Stem, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 34 - 58; Ham Sluga's "'Whose house is that? Wittgenstein on the self." in The Cambridge Cornpunion to Wittgenstein, ed.. Hans Sluga and David G. Stem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 320 - 353; Paul lohnston's Wittgesntein: Rethinking the Inner, London: Routtedge, 1993, pp. 5, 25, 28.94 - 99. and 205 - 207. . Along with behaviounsm a few other topics to which Wittgenstien's comments are directed throughout the Investigations are the argument from analogy. soIipsism, the causal theory of meaning, and Cartesian dualisrn. words, the behaviourism from which Wittgenstein attempts to distinguish his remarks amounts to a strict (or, to be more precise, it should be said that it is a strict ) on the nature of mental concepts and the meaning of langage meant to express them. The main concem in the pnvate language sections or the positing of the pnvate language problem is an epistemological one, Le., how do we use language to refer to mental phenornena

(PI, §244)? That said, it seems that Wittgenstein is primarily interested in exposing a certain picture or conception we have about mental concepts. As he States later on, the basic impulse or commody-held is that "language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts". (PI, 5305) Guided by this belief, we think that sensation- statements and talk about mental events are concemed with some inner events. The germ of this picture of meaning is founded in a misguided conception about the nature of individual words in a language and how they mean. (This point will be addressed in greater detail at a later stage.) That an epistemological concem drives the discussion of private language is evident in the opening rernark. 1 will quote it in full.

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. So we could imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themse1ves.-An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them rnaking resolutions and decisions,) But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner expetiences-his feelings, moods, and the rest--for his private use?-Well, can't we O so in our ordinary language?-But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking: to his immediate private sensations, So another person cannot understand the language. (PI. 824314

It is customaiy to begin the discussion of private language by concentrating on the second paragraph, in which the features or requirements of private language are delineated. Consider, rather, the first paragraph of 5243; therein one finds a number of assumptions about language which Wittgenstein regards as centrai to our understanding of language, and which in fact are characteristic of a behaviourisitc outlook. First, verbalization is connected with the behaviour

(activities) of the language speaker. In other words, people may engage in idle babble but there is

*. It should be noted that this is not the fint tirne in PI that Wittgenstein makes ceference to the idea of private Imguage. In 5202, a rernark which foreshadows the discussion in 5243 - 9315. he noted that it was impossible for one to follow a de privately. some purpose (though not a singular one) to using language which issues in a speaker's actions and deeds. Secondly, this fact aiIows for translatabiiity. That is to Say, that someone (namely , a person who uses a different language) should be able to effect an approximation of another language into his or her own; this is so because there exists a common, shared behavioural basis from which spoken language evolves. Thirdly, translatibility assumes some predictabïiity regarding the intentional content of language use, e.g., with regard to resolutions and decisions. For instance, Our hypotheticai foreign language-user may look at the people he or she is observing to see if their actions iüifil or are at least commensurate with their resolutions. Finaiiy, language is fundamentally public. In order for a 'system' of words to count as language it must be intelligible to a community of some sort; there must be a common framework within which words have meaning. These assumptions or premises are embodied in Wittgenstein's 'anthropological' contention that meaning in language is detennined by use and that language is a form of iife,

continuous with other human activities.5 But, 1am leaping ahead and should return to the issue at hand.

The epistemological concem about sensation-language arises in the question, "how do words refer to sensations"?, which begins $244. I think that it is not coincidental that he shifts gears in this direction right at the beginning in order to clariQ the parameters of a private language. Implicit in this question about reference and sensation-language is a philosophical assumption that first-person psychological language is based on an exclusive experience or acquaintance with the referents of such language which Our common psychologicai talk and discourse does not, and cannot, capture. That is to say, that first-person psychological statements or utterances are essentially reports of certain peculiar events falling completely outside of the public domain. This 'paradox' does not shake Our cornmonsensicai notion about Our ability to understand first-person psychological utterances. It is no wonder then that Wittgenstein is prompt to specify that the words of this private language "are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking", so

5. I attributs this 'anthmpologicai' conception of Wittgenstein's notion of meaning to a course I twk with Prof. J. V. Canfield and a nurnber of subsequent discussions with him thereafter. My own understanding of this idea is that Wittgenstein regards our facility for Ianguage to be a basic part of our naturd history as are other activities such as "walking, eating, drinking. playing". cf., PI, 825. that another person would be prevented €rom understanding such a lanpage. Nonetheless,

seems to be no puzzle or confusion in holding that in spite of the fact that one could make one's expeience intelligible to others, they carmot appreciate the peculiarity of one's experience. One

would maintain that there is still a sense in which another person "will never quite confront or comprehend the nature of my sensation expenence" irrespective of the fact that we may use sidar words or names. How is this possible? Why do we feel compeiied to hold that psychological language enshrines an epistemologicai priviIege in the first-person case in spite of shared psychological terms? Wittgenstein identifies a particular pichire about the function of language which nurtures this compulsion. This picture is informed by the notion that the individuai words of our language serve as referents for objects and that the sufficient account of a word's meaning can be given by pointing to its bearer. Thus, it is no great marvel to contend that others are barred from comprehending the nature of my sensations or thoughts, for example. The reason for this is that we conceive of our sensations on the following mode1 or one similar to it. We regularly talk of going into a room and taking stock of the fumiture lying therein. Analogously, we also make staternents about looking inwards and surveying Our thoughts. We imagine that sensations are simply intangible mental fumiture analogous to the various physical objects contained in any public room, and which we can just as easily point to. We do not question the symetry which seems so natural in these different forms of expression. After dl, 1can easily walk into a room and note the furniture in it and with similar ease point to the sensations-my sensations---to which my words refer. Just as we can record the items located in a room and treat words simply as names for objects, we assume that sensation statements direct us to an aethered closet-the mind-wherein

we can point to the various feelings which our sensation names stand for or catch a glimpse of that elusive thought that just ran through our head. Comrnon narnes do not provide access by others to my sensations, we believe; they disguise the facr that only 1am logically acquainted with them. Wittgenstein confronts this picture in $244 when he points out that the question regarding how words refer to sensations is synonymous with how the connection is established between a name and that which is named. In other words, "this question is the sarne as: how does a human being lem the meaouig of the names of sensations?" Whaî he is remincihg us here is that the issue of reference is interwoven with how one lems the meaning of words in language, which has been a constant theme since the beginning of the Investigations. Thus, when one is asked to

imagine the possibility of a person using words to refer to expenences which would make up a language intelligible to this penon alone, the issue is how the person learns this language, as well as how people leam sensation words in our language. What is problematic in the case of a pnvate language is the implicit assumption that it would not be unreasonable to expect that a person could CO-optwords in cornmon use for his private use, an exclusively pnvate use. The private language would not be translatable, unlike a secret code which any of us could use in diary accounts of Our activities and thoughts. Wittgenstein is not asserting that the private linguist is merely someone who wants to guard his comments from the public at large. The opening statements of the private

language formulation make this clear ("a human king can encourage himself, give himself orders,

obey, blarne and punish himself '). Furthemore, it requires no great stretch of the imagination also to suppose that a person "cm ask himself a question and answer it", or even speak "only in monologue". What we are asked to imagine is that the sphere of inteliigibility in this language would be limited to a single individual. This is no easy conception because even if a person were to perform a soliloquy, its intelligibility is not restricted in principle to the speaker. Wittgenstein is careful in his formulation to ensure that we do not mistake the pnvate linguist for a soliloquist, for he pointedly specifies that another person cannot understand this language. However, there are some explicit assumptions which the reader is asked to bear in mind, namely (1) that there are experiences which are peculiarly intelligible to an individual, and (2) that an individual can restrict linguistic expression and understanding of these experiences to himself in an exclusively private

language. It should be also pointed out that (2) presupposes that the individual can build this language alone.

1 mentioned that there is a certain picture about the essence of language on which the above idea is founded and to become clear what this is, 1 would iike to return to the beginning of the

Investigations. The idea or theoiy of meaning that feeds notions such as the pnvate language described in 5243 is the notion that the meaning of a word is that for wkhthe word stands, Le., that words name objects. This point is made in reference to what has corne to be known as the Augustinian picture of language found in 8 1. It folIows:

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, 1 saw this and 1 grasped that the tbing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out- Their intention was shewn by their bodiiy movements, as it were the natural Ianguage of al1 peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the rnovement of other parts of the My, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking ,having, rejecting, or avoiding something- Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, 1gradually leacnt to understand what objects they signified; and after 1had trained my mouth to form these signs, 1used them to express my own desires. First, 1 would iike to state that although Augustine is not describing a private language, his rerniniscence of learning language preserves the same basic picture of language. Not only that, it

also contains a view about language found in the type of behaviourism that Wittgenstein addresses.

This latter point wili be taken up later. However, it must be noted that the pnvate linguist maintains that he need only associate names with his sensations; furthemore, these names must be invented ones because the limiting condition is that only he may find them intelligible. Consequently, since only he knows his sensations, and others cannot understand the words of his language, any word which he associates with a sensation will have that item as its pariicular

meaning. In other words, it appears that whatever name he gives to a sensation means the sensation, that the association of word to referent results in a direct connection between them.6 This would seem to be the 'mode1 of rneaning' to which the private linguist is comrnitted as

formulated in 5243. Wittgenstein's cornments on the Augustinian account of language-learning are

instructive in the case of the pnvate language sections.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names.--In this picture of language we find the mots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. (PI, 5 1) This can be read as a statement of the name-object theory of meaning-the meaning of a word is its referent. From the standpoint of the private linguist there does not seem to be any problem with the question which Wittgenstein raises, narnely, how does one use words to stand for sensations in

6. "But 1 speak. or write the sign down. and at the same time 1 concentrate my attention on the sensation-and so. as it were. point to inwardly, ... for in this way 1 impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation." (9258) absence of any public expression? (PI, 8256) One simply associates a name witb the sensation

(PI, §256),gives a name to it (PX, 5257). wntes a sign '*XWdown whenever it occurs and can then "point to it inwardly" (PI, $258). In other words, it is the private linguist's contention that it is suficient that 1name a sensation. "That is how 1 mean. Whenever, this particular sensation ' X ' occurs, 1 utter 'X' or note it as king that sensation 'X'." Because the pnvate linguist is the only one who is privy to this process of determining how the word is to apply, there can only be an exclusive and close connection between the sensation and its name.' With this in mind, it becornes apparent that in order for the pnvate linguist to construct an absolutely personal psychological language, he would have to rely upon a theory of meaning founded on Wittgenstein's conception of the Augustinian picture of language. Words in a private language would sirnply have to be given referents, which would constitute their meanings. In other words, it would be a suffiçient (and necessary) condition for meaning if words were given ostensive definition. The private linguist wiil maintain that he has satisfied the condition(s) for establishing the meaning of a word, for instance a sensation-word, by simply concentrathg his attention on a particular sensation and pointing to it inwardly, i.e., providing a private ostensive definition (PI, $257). Wittgenstein has already made his views clear about ostensive definitions, clearly opposing the idea that association and narning are sufficient criteria for meaning.8 A crucial problem faced by the private linguist is making intelligible his process of giving meaning to words. In general, since it is supposed to provide an entry itno language, naming would have to serve some public purpose in addition to there king a pubiic technique for establishing what constitutes understanding the narne. This would make it possible to teach someone the name, namely to give sense to it. But how would another person lem the use of the private linguist's sensation-word? In order for the private linguist to teach someone else the name which he invents for a sensation, he must be able to direct that person's attention to the name, in

'. Bernard Gert. in Witrgenstein's Private hnguage Arguments. Synthese 68 (1986) makes an interesiing point about the quoted passage from 81. 'We need." he States, "only substitute "sensation" for "object" in the tast sentence of the quotation, and we have the view of meaning that allows words to have pnvate meaning. Le., that makes one think that a private language is possible." (p. 413) 8. cf., PI, $256 - S257; also consider some earlier remarks. namely §27 - $30. g32 - 534, 938 and 549. effect to provide an "ostensive teaching" of the word. (PI, 56) Earlier in the Invesrigations, Wittgenstein distinguishes "ostensive definition" from "ostensive teaching". Both of hem involve someone "... pointing to objects, directhg the child's attention to them, and at the same tirne uttering a word, for instance, the word 'slab', as he points to that shape." (PI, 96) The former presupposes that a person aiready knows a language and "can ask what the name is". One would be able to effect a translation into one's own language as a result For example, consider the case

of an English tourist in Germany. As a result of ostensive definition (not to mention ostensive training), the English speaker would redise that the German word "Brot" corresponded to the English word "bread. Ostensive teaching implies that a person has not yet mastered a language and does not yet know the use of the word being taught. "... oniy together with a particular training" can understanding be effected in a person, so that that person can act upon a word in such-and-such a way. "With a different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding." However, the private linguist seems precluded from making the words of his ianguage intelligible to another, because of Wittgenstein's requirement that "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking." (PI, $243) Therefore, he could not ostensively teach or train another the function of his words. The consequences of Wittgenstein's argument are twofold: (1) the private linguist's language is not a language and (2) his notion of pnvacy is ihsory. I will deai with the former point first. That the sphere of intelligibility of his language is idiosyncratic puts the private linguist in a quandary. If he cannot properly explain the meaning of words in his language to another the question arises whether he himself finds them intelligible. "So does he understand the narne without king able to explain its meaning to anyone?" (PI, $257) The private linguist's misconception can be sumrned in the following manner:

When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great ded of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of narning is to make sense- And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grarnmar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. (PI* 8257) The private linguist, it could be argwd, conceived of naming as a magicd process indispensable to devising a language. Wittgenstein, on the other hand. maintains naming is only a prepafafoq exercise for carrying out other functions with words. Naming presuppses that a hguage-game already exists which would make naming intelligible. Without the existence of a customary practice or set of practices to instantiate (and perhaps substantiate) giving something a name, naming by itself is idle. "...naming is a preparation for . Naming is so far not a move in the language-garne-any more that putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess.

We may Say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing is named. It has not even got a name except in a language-game." (PI, 949) The private linguist's ceremony lacks the regularity requisite for making his process of naming intelligible; more sharply stated, the notion of regulaity falls to the ground in a private language because at bottom the picture of language on which this notion rests is illusory. There isn't any "stage-setting" in place to make the private linguist's naming a move in a language-game. The private linguist felt justified in asserting that mere association and private ostensive definition were sufficient for establishing the meaning of a word because this satisfied the iimiting condition of his language, namely, that its referents were to be "his immediate private sensations". (PI, 9243) This king the case, the private linguist saw no problem meeting the challenge of creating a language which specified "his inner experiences" and was specifïcaiiy "for his private use". After all, sensations are exclusively private. "Another person can't have THIS pin!" (PI, $253) One of Wittgenstein's concems in the private language sections is to attack precisely the notion of pnvacy which nurtures this misconceived notion about Our sensation experience. Wittgenstein's discussion contrasts two different notions of 'private': something can be private which is intended to exclude others, as do certain games, e.g., "one plays patience with oneself'

(PI, §248), but these are games which anyone cm play and (for that matter) anyone else can observe being played. In a private language, however, a person has privileged or exclusive access to something, namely his sensations. This notion of privileged access to Our sensationexperience cornes naturaily to us. (It is also at the heart of a number of issues in philosophy of mind since Descartes.) Afier dl, each of us feels that we are the sole, or at lem the best, judge of the nature of our sensations. One should like to say that when one exclaims, "I'm in pain," it is as if one first peeked into oneself and found there the imer 'backing' for the clah to be experiencing a sensation. In other words, sensations are simply objects or events inside us which we can inuospect or identiS in some private manner. It should be apparent how the private linguist is led to this view. The private linguist's conception of naming is founded on the idea that words in language designate objects (PI, SI), and that he could establish the name of his sensation by concentrating his attention during an of it (PI, $258). If the individual words in language designate objects, should I assert that 1 can identify a particular sensation by some new term or sign, then 1 am claiming that the sensation is some 'thing' which 1 can identifj in a particular way. Thus if 1 am again experiencing that nagging, tingling sensation in my knee that 1 was a couple of days ago, then 1 know that my knee hurts, because I ptthat sarne tingling sharp pain again. 1know this to be so because 1can direct my attention inwardly to that 'tingling' inside my knee. My knee pain just is that 'event' (state) located inside my knee. Therefore, when 1 narne my pain, I have a definite 'picture' of what is taking place. 1point my attention to that inward state in my knee. It is some 'thing' happening in me. Wittgenstein shows that the private linguist's position is grounded in a theory of meaning which could not lend intelligibility to his (or, for that matter, any) language. In other words, it cannot adequately account for how words acquire their rneaning in language. Furthemore, this theory feeds a misconception about psychological concepts and the nature of our sensation- experience; it supports a radical pnvacy that would compromise the ability of others to use psychological te- and to communicate their sensation expenence. In other words, it reduces to the position of solipsism. In reaction,Wittgenstein offers an alternative to the mode1 of meaning found in the pi-ivate language, one which directly attacks its implicit Cartesianism by flirthg with behaviourism. In $244, Wittgenstein raised the question of how words refer to sensations in a private language; this same question he observed was synonymous with the question of how one learns the meaning of sensation names. He offered the following possibility: words are connectecl with the primitive, the naturai, expressions of the sensation and used in theu place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults ta1 k to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. As the private iinguist understands it, Wittgenstein's suggestion that sensation "words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of sensations" results in his having to Say that the word 'pain', for example, "really means crying".

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"-On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe.

In other words, the private iinguist wants to be clear about Wittgenstein's conception of meaning with regard to sensation. 1s it the case that he is simply presenting a variant of the mode1 of meaning on which the private language is grounded, i.e, an externul or public name-object theory? Therefore, the verbal expression of pain would describe it and the word 'pain' would indeed mean crying. One would be able to ascertain that an individual was expenencing a particular sensation by simply pointing to the bodiiy 'behaviour' that individual is expressing. Wittgenstein's reply to the private language defender's question suggests a reductive materialist position with regard to sensation and psychological concepts in general; and it appears that this is the type of behaviourism one finds him calling into question throughout the private language debate. Another well-estabiished Cambridge philosopher, C. D. Broad, also viewed behaviourism in this fashion. To be more precise, Broad equates behaviourism with reductive materialism. He defines reductive materialism in the foilowing manner: "This theory holds that there really are materiai objects, and that materiaiity is a differentiating attribute. And it also holds that the characteristic of king a rnind or king a mental process reduces to the fact that a certain kind of body is making certain overt movements or is undergoing certain internai physical changes."g He claims that "it is true that all Behaviourism is a form of Reductive Materialism."lo Thus, if we were to interpret Wittgenstein's reading of behaviourism in this iight, he would be seen as saying that mental concepts reduce to physical (behavioural) attributes.

9. C. D. Broad, The Mind and ifs Plocc in Nawe. London: Routledge â Kegan Paul Ltd.. 1925, p. 612. Io. Ibid.. p. 617. Similarly, behaviourism was treated reductively in 's work. Carnap

advanced a physicalistic thesis regarding psychological language; his contention was that '*aU sentences of psychology describe physical occurrences, numely, the physical behavior of humans

mid other animals."~Camap's understanding was that psychology need not concem itself only with physical and material subjects, but that it may study whatever it wished; nonetheless, psychological statements will be translated into the physcial language. It was the general thesis of the that "physical language is a miversal longuage,"* a language into which every sentence could be translated. What this cailed forth was a production of definitions and formulations within psychology that wouid ensure this translatibility. Psychology, as far as

Carnap was concerned, could utilise its own terrninology as iong as it provided definitions which would link psychological language with physical language. Thus, with regard to a statement about other rninds, its epistemoIogical character would "be clarified by means of an analogy with a sentence about a physical property, defined as a disposition to behave (or respond) in a specific

manner under specific circumstances (or stimuli)."l3 Now, we have some clue to the private linguist's question in $244 ("So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?") In other words, the private linguist might ask Wittgenstein, "so you are providing a dispositional analysis of 'pain'?" In truth, Wittgenstein's account of behaviourism seems more to resemble Broad's formulaticri. Much of the commentary in the private language debate is based on Wittgenstein's general project of trying to show the folly of the imer-outer picture of meaning and

understanding. After ail, it appears from his dismissal of the Augustinian picture that the name- object theory of meaning can not be used to ground a public language as well. This latter notion, namely that mental events serve as referents for--or are to be identifieci with-physical abjects (in this case behaviourd attributes) would support a crass behaviouristic account (Le., a reductive materialistic understanding) of psychological language and seems to form the substance of much of the private language defender's queries to Wittgenstein (in 5243 - $280) about the alternative he is

Rudolf Carnap."Psychology in Physical Language," in . ed.. A. J. Ayer, Glencoe. Illinois: The Free Press, 1959, pp. 165. 12. Ibid., p. 165. 13. Ibid., p. 170. proposing. Instead, Wittgenstein seems to toy with a contextuai account that resembles Carnap's to some extent, the difference king that he is interested in prornoting a multiplicity of tneaning whereas Carnap's insistence on definitional analysis is too inflexible. 1will return to this point at a later stage. 1 would like to point out that there is an interesthg pdel here with the Augustinian passage in 5 1. The exchange in 5244 - P257 hearkens back to a comment found in the opening section of the Investigations. There, Augustine is quoted as having made the foilowing statement:

Their intention war shewn 6y their bodily movements, as it were the naturai language of a11 peoples: the expression of the face, the ptay of the eyes, the movement of otherparts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses the state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. (Emphasis -1 He also adds that once he had understood the objects that words sigdied and trained himself to verbalize them, he "used them to express (his) own desires." 1 highlighted this section again because, as was stated earlier, Wittgenstein's enterpnse is to reveal that this picture of language nurtures the idea of a private language. The private linguist is committed to the view that his words name objects, and since these referents are intelligible to him alone, they must be private and inner. Furthemore, this amounts to his subscribing to the view that "once you know what the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use." (PI, $264) The private linguist is confused by the alternative which Wittgenstein offers conceming how psychological concepts are learned, because it appears that he is merely saying something similar to Augustine, the difference being that Wittgenstein is making the claim that psychological language has an exclusively outer reference; thus, 'pain' means crying or writhing or something else external and observable. The private Iinguist seems to understand that, according to Wittgenstein, he is claiming that there is some particular object whic h ( 1) corresponds to a particular psychological/rnental concept and which (2) his words describe. This he does not dispute. However, he finds Wittgenstein's position puvling because it seems to accord meaning only to the public side of mentai concepts, namely words adorbehaviour. It is no wonder then that his puulement finds expression in the following question: "So you (Wittgenstein) are really saying that the word 'pain' redy means crying?" "The only difference between your position and that of Augustine's (as presented in 5 1) is that you are claimirtg that words are not reports of imer referents. And, consequently, it seems to be your claim that my desires, wishes, intentions, etc. are to be identiftecl with my my 'behaviour'."

It would appear that Wittgenstein should present a direct response to this question at the end of $244, but in tmth he seems to deflect it instead. He does tell us that what he means is that our verbal expressions of sensation expenence are sophisticated replacements (evolutions) of Our primitive (gross) behavioural expressions. As chiidren, Our expression of sensations are basic and rudimentary, but through socialization we leam to step into more complex language-garnes involving mental and psychological concepts. In contrast, the picm of language or the theory of meaning which idomis the idea of a private language can not aar>unt for the complicared language-games we do engage in everyday with mental concepts. For example, as a result of the picture of language offered by the pnvate hguist, we could not clearlly ascertain how meaning is established, or how we detennine that a person is shamming; or what counts as a correct use of a word; or how common language involving mental concepts develops and can exist. Generally speaking, this picture results in a smltified view of language. This is the message that Wittgenstein wants to leave with us, that he is presenting an alternative to a name-object mode1 of meaning. He wants us to see that his 'use* account of meaning avoids the inevitable confusions and misconceptions which plague the private linguist. We would thus be saved fiom being cornrnitted to an innedouter picture of meaning. Instead we would be brought to see that

For a large class of cases-though not for ail-in which we empioy the word "meaning"it can be &tined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the rneaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. (PI, $43) However, if we look beyond the didactic message of these passages, we discover that the private linguist's queries about Wittgenstein's 'alternative1 and behaviourism are not so easily avoided. After dl, it is not clear at times how the distinction is to be made between Wittgenstein's position and that of the reductive materialkt (Le., behaviourist), which 1 am contending he posits as a foi1 to his own views. Wittgenstein's ktresponse to the query of how words refer to sensations in $244 is that words are tied to the natural expressions of sensation, and that we use sensation language as a replacement for these naturai, primitive expressions when we learn to use adult (sophisticated) psychological statements. Here he is already toying with a feductive rnaterialist view of mental concepts, the ciifference being that he does not go as f' as to claim that the ontology of a sensation is to be wholly found in its expression (or whatever physical behaviour consists in). As was stated earlier, that is the reason $244 concludes with the exchange, "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" "No!" is the implicit response we fmd: "On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it." That Wittgenstein wants to avoid questions of ontology is found in the next passage, $245, where he continues the thought: "For how cm 1 go so far as to try and use language to get between pain and

its expression?" In a sense, Wittgenstein does concede that "pain" is a phenomenon. He refuses to concede, nonetheless, that it is a special kind of phenomenon, one which is intelligible solely by private means or one that has a status apart from the contextual circumstances in which it is

sensible. What Wittgenstein suggests in this passage is that pain is essentially comected to its expression, that it is not distinguishable from its behaviourai manifestations. In fact, it is ody in light of behavioural expressions of pain that we are made aware of its existence. We can not separate it from the activities and reactions whereby it becomes intelligible to us. Thus, although he seems willing to acknowledge that pain certainly is a phenomenon. he repudiates the notion that

it is a feeling which somebody has. To do so, he might have to agree with the pnvate linguist that there is a contingent relation between sensation and its expression (and perhaps raise the issue of

scepticism). This would then introduces the notion of causality into the debate. That is to Say, the private linguist places pnority on the ontology of sensation. Wittgenstein on the other hand appears to place priority on the expression of sensation (while resisting the view that one can define "pain" as its expression), whereas for the private linguist the existence of a sensation is the cause of its expression, the sensation expression is contingent upon the sensation experience. (cf.,

1294,5296 - $300) In other words, the private language defender seems to think that the absence of observable signs (expressions) of sensation expenence is irrelevant to the existence of such experience. "Other people," he declares, "cannot be said to leam of my sensations only from my behaviour,-for I cannot be said to leam of them. 1 have them." ($246) This accounts for his thinking that it is a sufficient condition for meaning to simply "invent a name for the sensation" (8257) and then to impress the comection between the invented name or sign and the sensation on himself. ($258) Sensation expression highlights the fact that a sensation is a discernible state; but, according to the private langage defender, such a state is inner and pnvate. Wittgenstein simply opposes the inherent privacy of sensation; one accounts for sensation experience in others by reading off their bodily movements.

Such a view accords with the position taken by classical behaviourism, specifically that of John Broadus Watson, the "founder" of behaviourism. As Watson maintained, "the behaviounst ... asks only to be allowed to make observations upon what his subjects are doing under given stimulating conditions. On the metaphysical side he merely asks to be put into the sarne basket with other natural scientists."l4 Watson conceived of psychology as an objective science on the level of the natural sciences whose goal was the prediction and control of behaviour. Introspection was to form no part of psychology as he conceived it, nor should be its subject matter. This was the only way, he felt, to ensure uniforrnity in methodology and to achieve objectivity within psychology.15 Watson dances around the issue of the ontology of mental concepts, and sometimes jabs at it. Watson asserts that consciousness is a useless concept for psychological research and as such it should be jettisoned. Responding to the charge that behaviourism suffers from a mind-body problem in that the behaviourist does not deny mental states but simply ignores them, Watson writes, He 'ignores' them in the same sense that chemistry ignores alchemy, astronomy horoscopy, and psychology telepathy and psychic manifestations. The behaviourist does not concen himself with them because as the Stream of his science broadens and deepens such older concepts are sucked under, never to reappear.16

Note the parallel with Wittgenstein's own response to the charge that he too is denying mental states in PI, $304 - 8308. Wittgenstein deflects the question of the ontological status of mental

14. John B. Watson. "1s Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanism?" British Journal of Psychology, (V.) 1920. vol. XI, p. 94. 15. cf., his polemical article, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It." Psychologicol Revicw. 1913. vol. XX, pp. 158 - 177. States to one of methodology. Like Watson, he wants us to see psychological matters differently. He urges us to foliow him in "setthg our faces up against the pichue of the 'imer process'."

($305) Watson, for his part, ncognises that psychology bas not been able to fulfil its clai. of king a natural science "due to a mistaken notion that its fields of facts are conscious phenomena and that introspection is the only direct method of ascertainhg these facts, it has enmeshed itself in a series of speculative questions which, while fundamental to its present tenets, are not open to experimental treatment."*7 This has resulted in a metaphysical preoçcupation in psychology which, in his view, has been utterly unproductive. Wittgenstein's prescription for the philosophical disease which he finds exemplined in the case of the private langauge defender is that we must look at how words are actuaüy used in everyday Life and in the language-games wherein they originate. (PI, 8 116) Watson's recommendation for psychology's ills is simple:

The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things chat can be obse~ed,and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now what can we observe? We cmobserve behavior-whm the organkm does or says. And Iec us point out at once: that saying is doing-that is, behuving. Speaking overtiy or to ourselves (thinking) is just as objective a type of behavior as baseba1l.l 1 remarked earlier that the private language defender was in a state of puzzlement about the position Wittgenstein was profiering against his own. The private linguist codd be said to be wondering whether a position like that of Watson's was not informing Wittgenstein's views (or whether he is not simply offenng a restatement of Watson's position). Implicitly. this seerns to be the extent of much of the discussion in $243 - 8280 inclusive. The rest of the private language sections only then explicitly bring this view to the fore, notably so in 8307, where the following questions are posed: "Are you not redy a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?" Before this point, Wittgenstein appean to be consciously using a somewhat Watsonian standpoint to 'stump' the private linguist every time he tries to resort to the picture of an inner prwess and the notion that private ostensive definition is a sufficient condition for constituting understanding and meaning. Wittgenstein is

17. Watson, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," p. 176. 18. Watson. Bchaviorisrn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Phoenix Books. c. 1924. Fifth Impression 1966. p. 6. constantly, quite literaily, pushing the discussion out into the open, by queryùig the private language defender about how he codd ever account for others' using the words he devises or

employs. If the defender wants to maintain that everyone can only "know hmhis own case" with regard to mental concepts, then it would be impossible to verify whether dfierent people shared exemplars. Wittgenstein's challenge is fundamentai: how is it that everyone does not wind up closed up within himself, if the pnvate linguist's view about pain language meaning is correct?

($272) And this challenge is not limited to feelings: What am 1to say about the word "redn?-that it means something 'confronting us dl' and that everyone should really have another word, besides this one. to mean his own sensation of red? Or is it Iike thîs: the word "red" means something known to everyone; and in addition, for each person. it rneans something known only to him? (Or perhaps cacher: it refers to something known only to hm,) (PI, 5273) Wittgenstein is reminding the private linguist that if we indeed examine how words are used, we discover that other people do utilise the same psychological terms that we each individually use. This can not mean that sensation, for example, has a peculiarity which only one person can appreciate. When we look at what people Say and do-- in language-games-we notice that 'pain' does not have an exclusively private meaning or reference. One could imagine the private language defender wondenng why reasoning such as this isn't simply Watson's statement philosophically

regurgitated. He finds himself being met at every tum by what appears to be a materialist (therefore behaviounst) position on the mind-body problem; i.e., his debate w ith Wittgenstein seems to reduce to a confrontation between dualism and materialism. Wittgenstein is prepared for this encounter; more precisely stated, he allows the discussion to take on the guise of a skirmish between and "behaviourisrn", the latter position king his own. In spite of this appearance, this is not the position Wittgenstein endorses. If one accepts the view that sensation is physical or is reducible to physically observed facts, then one must also maintain that, in one's own case, learning about sensation is achieved by observing one's own bodily movements. But this is ludicrious, Wittgenstein wants to Say. Committing oneself to the notion of privacy which the private language defender demands rniscontrues the fact that sensation

is grounded in a public sphere of intelligibility. Failure to recognise this gives nse to misguided notions such as the following, that 1 can know with pater certainty than othea that 1 am in pain (62461, or "another person can't have my pains," and hirthennore that "surely another person can't have THIS pain!" (5253) These notions show a tendency to retreat to the idea of private ostensive definition as the means whereby one comes to understand sensation in particular and mentai concepts in general. Wittgenstein, however, promotes the idea that understanding in this regard

cm only be approached in the public theatre of circumstances, customs, and conventions.

"But doesn't what you say corne to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain- behaviour?'-It comes to this only of a living human king and what resembles (behaves Iike) a Living human king can one Say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is de* is conscious or unconscious. ($281) Now, the private linguist is directly questioning Wittgenstein on what appears to be his reductive materialist stance. In other words, the private language defender finds himself continually opposed by Wittgenstein's refusa1 to agree that meaning can be based on private ostensive definitions or that mental concepts have an intemal psychical reference. Wittgenstein's rernarks keep emphasising that in the case of sensation, for example, meaning is tied up with the natural expressions of

sensation, which are behavioural. He refuses to acknowledge that "there is something there all the

sarne accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that that 1 utter it." (8296)lg In other words, not only does Wittgenstein disallow that the private linguist can account for others' use of psychological language by the argument from analogy (narnely, by imagining that others also experience sensations based on one's own experience), he inclines to the position that the is fictitious and that only behaviour and gross bodily movements and gestures are what matter. This is essentidly the contention that is attributed to the interlocutor in the second part of the private language sections. It means that Wittgenstein is king accused of adopting a position that parallels (to some extent) that of Watson. In other words, the pnvate language debate in its latter half shifts back to the issue of the ontology of sensation. The private linguist is detennined to discover what stance Wittgenstein takes regarding the nature of sensation in panicular and of mental concepts in generai. To extend the question raised in 828 1:"If there is no pain without pain- behaviour, then are you saying that the expression of pain confms the existence of the mental

19. Earlier 1 made reference to the notion that Wittgenstein attempts to avoid the issue of what is the source of pain. namely what causes it. 1 made the point that the private Ianguage defender appeared to be implying that it was the existence of the 'pain', the inner state to which he could draw his attention that was the source and cause of his utterance of pain. The remark attributed to the private linguist in 5296 appeacs to hit directly upon this notion. cf., also 8290 in this regard. state cailed 'pain'?" Wittgenstein insists that sensations and the like are aîûibuted only to a "living human king". What does he takes this connection to be? Given that the first part of the private language discussion hvolves the underminhg of the idea that private ostensive definition is the sufficient condition for establishing the rneaning and understanding of a word. the second part is focused on the opposite conception. namely, that the meaning of a word is a physical and observable referent. In temis of the issue of behaviourism, the latter half of the private language sections ($28 1 - $315) can be interpreted as providing us with a statement of Wittgenstein's reductive materialistic conception of behaviourism,20 a view to which he was equally opposed.

It cm be argued that the private Linguist gives prominence to the mind (Le., the inner psychical nature-'the mental') whereas Wittgenstein gives prominence to the body (the public aspect of Our use of psychological language). "Only of what behaves like a human king can one Say that it has pains. For one has to Say it of a body, or, if you iike of a sou1 which some body has." ($283) Since he spends so much effort showing that the notion of the private inner referent of sensation does not correctly account for the understanding of sensation statements and also criticises the view that 'has' expresses owemship, what does this Say about the inner referent itself? Afier ail, "isn't it absurd to Say of a body that it has pain?" (8286) "It is not the body that feels the pain," we want to Say. "but I do!"

What sort of issue is: 1s it the body that feels pain?-How is to be decided? What makes it plausible to say that it is nor the body?-WelI, something like this: if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand dœs not Say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face. (PI, $286) Yet one feels that it is only appropriate to inquire: "How is it that 1am fdled with pity for this man? How does it corne out what the object of my pity is?" (5287) It must be the case that Wittgenstein means that we feel pity for another because we note the way that he behaves. If we are to adopt the behaviourist's views on sensation, namely, that it is "the body that feels pain". then al1 that we are

20. Actudly, in this regard, it is more correct to state that the latter half of the private language discussion shows Wittgenstein as conceiving of behaviourism as the repudiation of mental states and processes, Le., as crass materialism. This half of the debate could be best understood as an attempt to distinguish his contention that the pnvate exhibition of meaning (and the argument from anaIogy) give the correct picture of the use of psychological language from the idea that there are no mental processes. left with is gross bodily movements. We ascribe pain to another by reading off his behaviour and consequenily are led to pity him as the situation requires. Pity, then would merely be another ph y sical reaction precipitated by the person's behavior. It should be noted that the classical behaviourists held the view thaî man was simply a stimulus-response organism. As Watson noted, "behavioristic psychology bas as its goal to be

able, given the stimulus, to predict the response-or, seeing the reaction take place to state what

the stimulus is that has called out the reaction."n Therefore, a behaviourist could be said to understand emotional expressions as reactions to certain stunulating conditions in particular situations. Using Watson as Our example, the behaviourist takes a mostly environmentalist (and externalist) view of emotion. Watson declared that it was a mistake to regard emotions as "mental

states" instead of seeing them as modes of behaviour which were leamed like other habits? As he argued, "under the action of environmental factors (habit influences) situations which originally did

not cal1 out emotional response corne later to do so. This enlargement of the range of stimuli capable of calling out emotiond activity is responsible largely for the complexity we see in the emotional life of the adult."= Thus, in the case presented where Wittgenstein raises the issue of how is it that we feel pity for another, the private Linguist could understand hirn as taking a viewpoint that pardels the stimulus-response understanding of emotion found in classical behaviourism. Therefore, we would be led to pity Clyde, for instance, if we observed that while he was walking pass the building a chunk of scaffolding fell and stnick him on the head. After dl, Wittgenstein does note that we respond differently to that which appears to possess similar bodily movements to ours. We don't ascribe sensation to inanimate objects or corpses. he points out. "If anyone says: "That cannot simply consist in the fact that the living behave in such-and-such a way and the dead do not", then 1 want to intimate to hirn that this is a case of the transition 'from quantity to quality'." ($284) This explains the reason why the private linguist is still confused as to Wittgenstein's meaning. for it seems that he is simply claiming that

21. Watson. , pp. 18 - 19. 22. cf., The Ways of Behaviorism. : Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1928. p. 47. 23. Watson, Pqchology From the Standpoint of a Bchuviorist, Philadelphia: 3. B. Lippincott Company. Copyright 1919, Third Edition Revised 1929, p. 241. "there is no pain ... without pain-behawiour." Yet, this flies in the face of Our comrnonsensical understanding of the nature of sensation. It seems more straightfonvardly correct that one does know, for example, what the word pain means from one's own case. But, Wittgenstein counters, this would completely disrupt communication because none of the langage-games which revolve around a particular sensation would ever get started. What this would mean is that we would be forced into holding a Cartesianism about sensation experience in Our own case (that "pain", for instance, has an exclusive, pnvate, and singular referent) ,and a strict Behaviourism with regard to it in others (that one ascribes sensation to them based on their behaviour--bodily movements). If one does not make reference to others' sensations based on the analogy of one's own, and if the case that the private pichire of pain does not gives the correct meaning of the word 'pain', then what is left? The private linguist is pushing Wittgenstein for a statement about the existence of sensation. He finds some rather perplexing points in Wittgenstein's responses to his contentions: one does not identiq one's own sensation by cntena, instead one repeats an expression; nor is a description of one's mind like a description of one's room-the latter is no model for the former (5290); the pnvate exemplar is an illusion ($293, $294, 9295); that it is not necessarily the case

that there is an accompanying sornerhing to one's expression of sensation (5296, $300); the private exemplar is an empty notion (5298, $299); one cannot imagine someone's else pain on the model of one's own ($302); it is not possible to doubt another's pain in a real situation (8303); sensation is a concept which lacks definite reference ($304)- These comments seem to lead to ody one conclusion, that Wittgenstein opposes the private linguist's view with that of behaviourism. In fact, this concem is captured in a spinted exchange between the private linguist and Wittgenstein.

"But surely you will admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain- behaviour without any pain?"-Admit it? What greater difference could there be?-And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nozhing. (5304)

Wittgenstein's response displays his understanding of behaviourism. Once again, he will det'ect the issue of whether or not he is advocating behaviounsm. His comment to the pnvate linguist is that, as he conceives of it, sensation "is not a something, but not a nothing either!" With this answer, Wittgenstein has now behiddled the private language defender. In spite of the fact that he maintains that the private the- of rneaning is an illusion, he contends that he is not repudiahg the notion ttiat sensation is an imer process. Yet his emphasis on the pnonty of behavioural activities for understanding mental concepts, that for instance sensation is attributable only to a living human king and what resembles a Living human king (528 1, §283), and that it is a body that has sensations (§282), appear to jus- the conclusion that he is therefore denying mental processes and consequentiy is indeed a closet behaviourist (1305 - 8307). There seems to be no other option given the tone of Wittgenstein's comments, as the private linguist sees it. The private linguist's perplexity has merit in this respect, namey that the behaviounsm which Wittgenstein toys with in demolishing his views is a crass version of behaviourism; in fact it is a strict physicalism or reductive materialism. In this respect 1 am equating physicalism with reductive materialism, because the behaviourism which Wittgenstein uses as a convenient contrast for the 'use' alternative which he presents approaches a strict materialism, although it is likely that no behaviourist actualiy did adopt such a position. (As in the case of the pnvate linguist, he reduces the behaviouristic position to one of absurdity, that of repudiating the existence of mental States or processes. Although many of its critics also saw behaviounsm as the metaphysical counterpoint of the mentalistic it rejected, it is not clear that classical behaviourists like Weiss, Holt or Watson were driven by metaphysical considerations of the mind-body problem. They were concemed about advancing a programme of objectivity within psychology, ix., their purpose was methodological not metaphysical.) Wittgenstein does not appear interested in exploring behaviourism (or so he would have us beiieve) as a viable option to the Cartesian presuppositions of the private language picture, and what he offers is a caricature lacking the sophistication of its counterpart. He seems to give in too easily to the inteilectuai prejudice of seeing behaviourism as promoting a metaphysics. Not only does his treatrnent of behaviourism bnng to mind C. D. Broad's views but those of Edna Heidbreder's as well, who argues that

at the basis of the behaviorist's thinking is the mind-body distinction in the metaphysical sense--not as a convenient ~Iassificationof facts of experience, but as a division between appearance and reality. Embedded in the very core of the behaviorist's doctrine is the Platonic distinction between mind and matter; and behaviorism, Iike Plato, regards the one term as red and the other as illusory. Its very case against dualism is stated in te- of that distinction and is made by the classical metaphysical procedure of reducing the one tem to the other. ... Behaviorism has adopted a metaphysics to end metaphysics.24 The main tenets of behaviourism, as presented by Wittgenstein, are (1) the denial of mental States and processes and (2) the assignment to mental concepts of physical referents (i.e., they can be defmed as gross bodily movements which are j%eà responses/reactions to certain definite stimulating circumstances). Whether such a doctrine could count as a viable contrast to the private linguist does not seem to concem Wittgenstein. Instead he presents behaviourism as a mechanistic doctrine that equals the private language position in absurdity. In this regard, Wittgenstein's depiction of behaviourism appears to paraiel Broad's assessrnent of it as an example of a 'silly' theory, "one which may be held at the time when one is talking or writing professionaily, but which only an inmate of a lunatic asylum would think of carrying over into daily life."25 That Wittgenstein is so dismissive of behaviourism should raise some suspicions particularly in view of

his reliance on behaviouristics in order to repudiate the picture of meaning that informs the idea of private language. However, that is not the project of this study. Suffice it to say that his own account of meaning bears some striking ~imilarities~~to some aspects of classical behaviourism and the physicalism of the Vienna psitivists, and that his methodology appears to make him guilty of the charge he and his scholars want to disavow. His caricature of behaviourism, as it is, is a consequence of his refusal to succumb to an inner-outer dichotomy with regard to mental concepts. This dichotomy is the logical and necessary result of king wedded to the Augustinian picture of language, of understanding mentd concepts on the mode1 of 'object and name'. What this leads to

24. Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.. Inc.. 1933, pp. 267 - 268. 25. Broad, p. 5. Broad's later comments in The Mind and 1r.r Phce in Norure are wonh quoting:

It seems to me then that Reductive Materialism in general, and strict Behaviourism in particulas. may be rejected. They are instances of the numerous class of theones which are so preposterously silly that only very leamed men could have thought of hem, ... But is important to remember chat a theory which is in fact absurd may be accepted by the simple-minded because it is put forward in highly technical terms by lem& persons who are themselves too confused to know exactly what they mean. When this happens, as it happened with Behaviourism, the philosopher is not altogether wasting time by analysing the theory and pointing out its implications. (pp. 623 - 624) 26. It is probably more correct to state that his alternative shows a sophisticated development of themes found in classical behaviourism: his notion of cnteria seems an evolution of Watson's stimulus and response conception of mental concepts; his socialization of language ('form of life') shares traits with the environmentalism (in both classical behaviourism and the physicalistic behaviourisrn of the Vienna positivists), Le., the notion that the human animal was best understood as reacting in an environment. is the belief that giving a report of one's mental üfe is analogous to making a report or inventory of the contents of one's room. This is a misapplication of a certain analogy and a confusing of two different language-games. If we hold that understanding a mental concept is best treated in terms of a name-objea theory (i.e., seeing mental states as special kinds of objecwthings), then the denid of acquaintance via radical privacy must rnean that the objects are physical instead of psychic. In other words, if we disallow that sensation is an inner process, then it rnust be an outer one, What we fail to redise with this misguided notion is that the same 'picture' (theory of meaning) supports both views. Stated in another way, when we conceive of mental concepts and the nature of the mind according to a name-object theory, we are committing ourselves to a certain metaphysic or philosophy of mind: one which inevitably runs the danger of embracing the two extremes: that there are only mental processes, and that there are only physical processes. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, makes a deft epistemological move and shifts the ground to the grammar of mental concepts: how these words are used in the language-garnes in which they originate and are played. By focusing on the gramrnar of 'use', one is spared the muddle of the ontology of sensation, for example, whether it is a something or a nothing. Thus, although it may appear that he is adopting a strict behaviourism by discounting the legitimacy of the picture of the inner process for determinhg the correct use of a word, his project is epistemologicd and not ontological. "The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as weli as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force iwlf on us here." (8304)

Wittgenstein's dialogue with the private language defender is meant to confuse his opponent. The reason for this is that the private linguist is protrayed as the sort of person who that if his view cm not serve as the foundation of meaning for mental concepts, then it must be the case that only behaviour is to serve as the referent for meaning, because a behaviounst name-object theory of meaning is the only alternative. Wittgenstein relies on behavioutism's perspective to attack his opponent. According to this perspective, the only thing that one can point to as the meaning of mental concepts is the organised behaviour of human beings; one has recourse to behaviour only, understood in terms of the practices, responses and activities (the language- games) of the community for determining what Our words mean, how we make sense of them, and how we teach (and leam) them. In one of the most farnous rem& from the Investigations, Wittgenstein maintained that "what has to be accepteci, ihe given, is-so one codd say--fom of life." (Pl, p. 226) Perhaps there is no more perplexing notion in Wittgenstein's later wntings than this one. The private linguist would be confused, as 1 have maintained, and he is justifiably perplexed, because Wittgenstein, while rejecting behaviourism itself, keeps talking about behaviour in order to show that there are not mental objects which serve as the referents for the meaning and intelligibility of mental terrns. Wittgenstein does not think that he is a behaviounst for the simple reason that he is not adopting the theory of meaning which he takes to underlie behaviourism. Yet he adapts a great deal of the methodology of behaviourism by turning attention to the behavioural and contextual parameters of how language is employed to dende the idea that mentalism must be the necessary and sufficient reference for the inteliigibility of our psychological concepts. For Wittgenstein, "crying" is just behaviour. It is not a phenornenon which has a separate cognitive content, one that cm be discemed apart from its contextual expression. "Crying" is essentially connected with its expression and it is only in this fashion that it is intelligible. In the same manner, there is not a sense in which one can speak of a contingent connection or relation between a "pain" and its expression. (PI, 5245) Mental phenornena do not possess that type of ontology. Their being is intimately tied to their behavioural manifestations and the circumstances in which they (the concepts) become intelligible. Wittgenstein's first move against ihe private linguist is a stark and jarring one. He infonns the private linguist that what is at issue is not the business of describing the content of "pain", that what he is doing is not offenng a description of the semantic status of the word pain'. What he is undertaking is a campaign agauist the idea that something inner serves as the coherent bais of language. The private linguist is befuddled by what follows because he is unclear of the project Wittgenstein is attempting to establish given his continual reliance of behaviounstics in order to disarm the internalism of the private language defender's position. He is even more confused by this move because it would seem to indicate a coITlfnitment to behaviourism on Wittgenstein's part, one which he nonetheless refuses to admit. However, his refusal to make a statement about the cognitive content of 'pain' for instance, to declare whether sensation is a sornething or a nothing, masks the fact that a behaviouristic method for making sense of mental concepts is present all dong* Wittgenstein dismisses behaviourism as a metaphysic and as a mode1 of meaning while endorsing it as a methodology for detennining the intelligibiiity of Our use of psychological language. Wittgenstein's dialogue with the private language defender is an interesting and lively one. In the first half of the debate, Wittgenstein irnplicitly and continually questions the private linguist's desire to look for an interna1 meaning for mental concepts and to give a private ostensive definition

to "pain". Wittgenstein's move puzzles the private linguist because it appears that Wittgenstein is adopting behaviourism in order to counter the private linguist's declarations. The pnvate linguist thinks that he can give an essential (albeit pnvate) description of the nature of pain but Wittgenstein consistentiy fnistrates his efforts but caiiing into question his intemalist picture of meaning. Wittgenstein fust deflects any questions of reference to the epistemological concern of how words are customarily applied and then appears to identify mental phenomena with behavioural events, i.e., seeming to endorse behaviourism as a metaphysic in the process. When prodded as to whether he has cornmitted himself to this son of crass materialism, Wittgenstein merely taks about

the 'grarnmar' of linguistic employment while relying on behaviouristics to explain the acquisition of concepts and their correct application to others. Wittgenstein continues to befuddle the private Iinguist by refusing to defend any classic or narrow behaviouristic theses but instead relies on behaviourist methodology and its assurnption of a public theatre of rneaning to disarm the private linguist's queries. in the second half of the debate, Wittgenstein returns to the question of reference by s witching the discussion away from ontological considerations. His increasing leanings towards behaviourism finally erupt in a charge from the private linguist about his docuùial allegiances. Wittgenstein again refuses to answer defmitively or directly on behaviourism and

merely responds by denying any cornmitment to a crass behaviourist thesis, specifically the denial of mental events. Whatever we are refemng to does not constitute the meaning of the words we use in refemng, he contends. However, ail dong his dependence on a behaviouristic methodology is evident in his dismissal of the views of the private linguist, Wittgenstein dismisses behaviourism as a theory of meaning (or so we are led to believe) but his remarks, given their reiiance on its methodology, reveal sunilarities between his treatment of psychological language and that of the behaviounsts. In this debate, what is meant by "behaviourism" is not given any attention. The foiIowing chapter will tq to provide a few details. Chapter Two: Be fiauiourisrn Clearly Wittgenstein's responses to the defender of a private language rely heavily on the extemal perspective favoured by behaviourists. However, it is not my contention that his purpose is to analyze the concept of behaviourism or to debate its viability as a solution to the muid-body problem; in any case, it does not appear to be his intention to do so in any direct manner. Wittgenstein addresses a number of traditional subjects in the Investigations (such as the nature of thinking, the problem of other , the concepts of understanding and meanîng) which revolve around the mind-body problem and have plagued philosophers since the time of Descartes.

Nontheless, his primary concem is to deal with the intelligbility of psychological language in particular and that of individual words in generai. That is to Say, his interest lies in exposing the theory of meaning which generates the philosophical problem of the nature and structure of mental States and processes. The preceding chapter gave some indication of how Wittgenstein tackies this issue in the case of a supposedly private language. In what amounts to the first haif of the sections ($243 - $280), the private ianguage defender challenges Wittgenstein's dismissal of his contention that a language cm be creaied solely for private use (where words refer to private inner objects and are given meaning by private ostensive def~tion)by accussing him of advocating a behaviourist approach to meaning, apparently of a radical reductive sort. Wittgenstein does not respond directly to this accusation, but nonetheless seerns to accept this characterisation of behaviourism. What he points out to the private language defender is that intelligibility in language requires a public sphere of meaning, public and physical accompaniments or correlates to psychological language (i.e., a public sphere of reference). Because of the requisite epistemic privacy of his language, a private linguist would not be able to use words or signs for sensations drawn from our comrnon language.

His only recourse would be to resort to private ostensive definition, but without niles for checking the correctness of signs or cntena for detennining application or misapplication of established customs or conventions about proper usage, the notions of meaning, reference and understanding would lack sense in a pnvate language. In the second half of his debate ($281 - §315), Wittgenstein deliberately shifts the debate to the notion that sensation and sensationexpenence can only be ascnbed to that which displays the behaviour of a living, active human being. In fact, his point seems to be that since mental concepts are only aitributable to what behaves Like a human being, there can be no talk of pain without pain-behaviour. The private language defender is lefi wondering whether this moE overarching claim expresses a commitment to a disguised behaviouristic doctrine. Wittgenstein's retort is to disavow a metaphysical behaviourism, to insis: that he is not repudiating mental States and processes. Essentiaiiy, what Wittgenstein is assertïng is that he is not a strict matenalist. My objective is to describe behaviourism itself as a movement in psychology and a which was influentid on philosophical treatments of subjects within philosophy of mind In his debate with the private language defender, a caricature of behaviourism is readily offered by Wittgenstein as a convenient foil, only to be pushed into the background for the rest of the discussion. But no interlocutor in the text ever asks the more basic question: "what is a behaviourist?" Wittgenstein seems to deliberately disregard his own recommendation that meaning is best got at when we review the multiplicity and flexibility that language exhibits in use.

Instead, we find behaviourism represented-though not explored-as reductive matenalism, which itself is treated as a strict materialism by the end of the private language discussion. In view of this, 1 would like to discuss this basic question. It is important to do so, if Wittgenstein's own question is to be satisfactorily answered. If, as it appears, Wittgenstein does make the behavioural aspect of psychological language cenual to his account of mental concepts, then why is he not a behaviourist in disguise? Or what would vindicate his denial? In the next few sections 1 survey the work of three important behaviounsts, al1 of them historically appropriate to the era of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. The three behaviounsts are John B. Watson, Albert Paul Weiss, and Edward Chace Tolman." A discussion of their views wiii help provide details about the use

27. Clark Leonard Huil was another influential behaviourist in the early part of the century. His major contributions to the behaviourist rnovement occuned after Wittgenstein's turn to his later philosophy. For example, his most significant behaviouristic work, Principles of Psychology was published in 1943. Hull sought to develop a thoroughgoing materialistic theory of thought which was based on an expticit emulation of physics. He had criticised Watson for not providing an adequate defence for his own matenalism. Hull defended a theory of behaviour which emphasised the mechanistic and adaptive characteristics of behaviour and he argued for an integration of the sciences (both the natural and social sciences) at the levels of method, law, and social cooperation. Like Weiss and Tolman. Hu11 regarded consciousness as a phenornenon that could be explained in objective behaviouristic terms, instead of something which psychotogy must deny or ignore (as Watson did) in order to further scientific progress. Hull took this one step funher arguing that the of "behaviourism" which are not to be found in the Investigations and perhaps ihrow some Light on Wittgenstein's own discussion of psychological concepts as reference for cl-ing how Wittgenstein's rernarks are to be distinguished from a behaviourist philosophy of mind.

elimination of metaphysics was fundamental to scientific progress. B. F. Skinner is perhaps the most famous behaviourist but he was also excludcd from consideration because his impact upon psychology came after Wittgenstein's later works. His objective was to develop an empirical frorn a behaviourist basis. He conceived of knowledge primarily as a historical and biological phenornenon. According to Skinner. behaviourism was closely related to epistemology: and he regarded behaviourism as a theory of knowledge because knowing and thinking were forms of behaviour, ways of adapting to an environment, he argued. Skimer's analysis focused on the causa1 relations between behaviour and the environment. He contended that the environment performs the functions which we had previously corne to assign to feelings and introspectively observeci States- The problem of privacy can be handled without abandoning the basic position of behaviourism, namely that of scientific accessibility, according to Skinner, by starting with behaviour instead of immediate experiencc. He attributed private evena to stimuli within an individual's skin and maintained that they possessed the same kinds of physicai dimensions as public events. Some of his major works include Science and Human Behavior (1953). Verbal Behavior (1957). and About Behaviorism ( 1974). Classical Behaviourism John Broadus Watson

"Behaviourism was many things to many people, but one of the main things it was was an attempt to be rigorously rientific in the pwtice of psychology.'28 Irrespective of their differences, behaviourïsts shared a cornmitment about the proper dimensions of psychological practice. Thus, it could be argued that the behavioMst movement was fiteled by a philosophy of science2g an ideology about the nature of scientific investigation within psychology. Behaviouxïsrn in this respect was protrayed in John B. Watson's polemicd essay, "Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It" (19 13). Watson's initial statement of the behaviourist programme, or rather his exhortation to psychologists to raUy around the behaviowist banner, set the standard for the whole enterprise. Watson called for a new approach to psychologicd investigation, one that would place psychological phenornena on the same level as other naturd events. The way this wouId be achieved would be for psychology to abandon its philosophical preoccupation and enslavement to 'consciousness' as subject matter and to introspection as a method of observation. He declared instead:

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science- Its theoretical goai is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to the interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animai response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with al1 of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's totai scheme of inve~ti~ation.~

The focal point for much of Watson's critique was the traditionai domain within traditional psychology and, in particular, the subject matter of psychological investigation, 'consciousness'.

28, Brian D. Mackenzie, Behaviourism and the tirnits of Scientific Method, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1977). p. 2. 29. 1 am purposeIy making a distinction between behaviourism as the scientific study of behaviour and behaviourism understood as a 'philosophical' movement since it is my object to clarify what bearing this movement has on theorizing about the mind-body problem. and not the history of the science of behaviour. It should be noted this distinction is not my own. B. F. Skinner once rernarked chat "behavionsm, with an accent on the last syllable. is not the scientific study of behavior but a philosophy of science concerned with the subject rnatter and methods of pyschology-" ("Behaviorism at Fi fty ," in Beitaviorism and Phenomenology: Conrrasting Bases for Modern Psychology, ed., T. W. Wann, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 79.) John M. O'Donnell in his book The Ongins of Behaviorism ( Press, 1985) as does Edwin G. Boring in his A History of Erperïmental Psychology (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc,, 1929, Second Edition, 1957) also make the distinction, whereas Man D. Mackenzie (in Behaviourism and the Limits of Scientific Investigation. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) seems to regard behaviourism definitively as a philosophy of science. 30. John B. Watson, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It." Psychological Review, (20) 1913. p. 158. "What they [the behaviourists] shared was a dissatisfaction with the way that psychology was being done by those who dorninated the field and a hop that a new way of doing things would bnng important and scientifically respectable results."31 One fin& this dissatisfaction strongiy expressed in Watson's 19 13 article, wherein he stipulated that psychology should aim exclusively

at the objective study of behaviour, that only a certain set of methods (meaning ones that abjure any form of mentalism) were objective and appropriate to this endeavour, and that psychology conceived and practiced in this manner would becorne a successful scientifc enterprise. If

psychology did not free itself from the philosophical seduction of mentalism, Watson declared,

then it would never advance as a bona fide scientific enterprise, and it would never divorce itself from philosophical speculation and scepticism the way the other sciences had done. One could say that Watson was essentially accusing psychology of having been preoccupied up to that tirne with the argument from analogy in approaching the mind-body problemJ2 The introspective mediod

was O bviously inadequate for and irrelevant to animal research. "It seems reasonabiy clear,"

Watson declared, "that some kind of compromise must be effected: either psychology must change

its viewpoint so as to take in facts of behavior, whether or not they have bearings upon problems of 'consciousness'; or else behavior must stand alone as a wholly separate and independent science."33 The latter approach would fiee psychotogy from the 'confusion' in which it found

itself and pave the way to scientific advancement.

31. Op. cit.. p. 5. Besides the three thinkers discussed in this section, this hope which behaviounsm expressed can also be found in works by others: cf., W. S. Hunter (''The Problem of Consciousness." Psychol. Rev.., 1924, 3 1, pp. 1 - 3 1; "The Symbolic Process." ibid., pp. 478 - 497; "The Subject's Report," ibid.. 1925. 32. pp. 153 - 170; "General anthroponomy and its systematic problems." Amer. J. Psychol.. 1925, 36, pp. 286 - 302; "Psychology and anthroponomy." C. Murchison. Psychologies of 1925, 1926. pp. 83 - 107; same title and editor. Psychologies of 1930. 1930, pp- 281 - 300; Hwnan Beliavior, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928: and his presidential address before the Amencan Psychological Association. "The Psychological Smdy of Behavior. Psychol. Rev.. 1932. 39. pp. 1-24.) K. S. Lashley ("The Behavioristic lnterpretation of Consciousness." Psychol. Rev., 1923. 30, pp. 237 - 272, pp. 329 - 353; E. B. Holt, "Response and ," J. Philos.. 1915, 12, pp. 265-373, pp. 393 - 409; The Fre+ Wish and Ifs Place in Erhics, New York: Henry Holt and Company. 19 15; G. A. de Laguna, Speech. Ils Funciion and Developmerir, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927; to name just a few, 32. Watson and his colleagues working in animal psychology felt that commitment to 'consciousness' was folly when analysing the nature of animal behaviour. In effect, were they to speculate that the animal's behaviour indicated conscious processes as antecedents CO the behaviour as the had reasoned about human behaviour? As Watson pointed out, "this attempt to reason by analogy from human conscious processes to the conscious processes in animals, and vice versa: to make consciousness, as the human king knows it, the center of teference of diII behavior, forces us into a situation similar to that which existed in biology in Darwin's time." ("Psychology as the Behaviorist Views [t," Psychological Review, (20) 19 13, p. 161 .) 33. Ibid., p. 159. The tirne seems to have come when psychology must discard aü reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking that it is rnaking mental States the object of observation, We have become so enmeshed in speculative questions conceming the elements of mind, the nature of conscious content (for example, imageless thought, attitudes, and Bewussteidage, etc-) that I, as an experimentai student, feel that something is wrong with our premises and the types of problems which develop fiom them. There is no longer any guarantee that we al1 mean the same thing when we use the terms now current in psychology~~

It cm be seen that the programme which Watson was trying to exhort his colleagues to adopt was not metaphysically driven as some have maintained.35 Watson demanded operational consistency regarding the subject rnatter of psychological research and objectivity and uniformity in the methods employed in such research. "1 am more interested at the moment in trying to show the necessity for maintaining unifomiity in experimental procedure and in the method of stating results in both human and animal work, than in developing any changes which are certain to come in the scope of human psychology."M Watson makes it clear in this initial statement of his programme for psychology that his interest is methodologically driven.

The plans which 1 favor for psychology lead practically to the ignonng of consciousness in the sense that that term is used by psychologists today. I have vinually denied that this realm of psychics is open to experimental investigation. 1donet wish to go further into the problem at the present because it leads inevitably over into metaphysics. If you will grant the behaviorist the right to use consciousness in the same way that other natural sciences employ it--that is, without making consciousness a speciai object of observation-you have granted al1 chat my thesis requiresW3' The thesis required by behaviourism, as Watson understood it, involved an emulation of the methodology of the natural sciences. Behaviourism's cornmitment to objectivity, and its rejection of introspection as a reliable source of knowledge found sympathy in philosophicai circles. For example, remarked that in spite of his reservations about behaviourism as a philosophy, nonetheless "as a method to be pursued as far as possible, 1 thought it valuable. 1 detennined in advance that 1 would push it as far as possible while remaining persuaded that it had very definite lirnits."38

34. Ibid., pp. 163 - LW. 35. What I mean is that there are those who hold that Watson's position amounted to a denial of consciousness ontologically, but his wntings do not appear to substantiate this contention. Edna Heidbreder in her book Seven Psychologies (New York: Century, 1933; cf., chapter titled 'Behaviorism'.), and A. A. Roback in his study. Beliavioristn and Psychology (Cambridge: University Bookstore, Inc., 1923) are just two examples of writers who subscribe to this view. However, as 1 will try to illustrate, Watson's position was that 'consciousness' understood as an inner. ineffable, idiosyncratic, psychic phenomenon was a useless concept and not a viable notion for scientific investigation. 36. Op. cit., p. 170. 37. Op. cit., p. 175. 38. Benrand Russell. My Philosophical Development, London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985. p. 96. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that James had already corne to regard consciousness as a fictitious entity, and his remarks about its ments as an object worthy of specid shidy pre-echo Watson's. In his essay, "Does Consciousness Exists?" published posthumously as part of Essays in Radical , James referred to consciousness in the following manner: "It is the narne of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among fitprinciples. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint mmor left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philo~ophy."3~ Watson's brand of behaviourism (as well as the other two types described later in this chapter) showed an inherent 'physicaiistic' bias; that is to Say, he believed that progress in psychology would be made by limiting investigation to only those things that were accessible to public scientific exploration,a Le., public objectivity would be the definitive cnterion of the subjects investigated and the results to be reached. Implicit in this cali for 'objectivism' in psychology were the presuppositions that direct observation, quantification and measurement, and repeatability would be the goveming rules of research. In effect, no matter their differences as to what could be studied or in particular in what way, if at dl, consciousness should be studied, behaviourists (and especiaily Watson) laid the ground in psychology for placing priority on the 'outer': the body and and what it is obsewed to do. Given Watson's prioritisation of the body, Le., his insistence that psychology should only concentrate on the observable and, thus, the objectively verifiable,*l it may be asked how he accounts for mental conceptsand 'states of consciousness'. In other words, in view of his mechanistic and 'physicalistic' conception of the problems and scope of psychology, are "subjective terms such as sensation, , image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion"42 excluded from his vocabulary? This question seems justified in view of Watson's dogged opposition to psychology as the science of consciousness. Because of the reliance on the

39. William James. Essays in Radical Empiricism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1976. pp. 3 - 4. 40. This meant that the reaim with which psychology concemed iisell wouM be the world circumscribed by the naturai sciences, in particular physics. Weiss was even more explicit in his physicdism than Watson as we shall see later on. Il. cf.. John B. Watson. Behoviorism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Phoenix Books, c. 1924. Fourth Impression 1962, p. 6. 42. Ibid.. p. 6. introspective method, Watson points out, psychology, uniike the natural sciences, has no community of data, i.e., its data consisting of sensations, image, etc. are not a cornmon or shared property. This means that there is a problem of verifkation which confronts introspective psychology. The data of introspective psychology "even if they existed, ... would exist as isolated, unusable "mental" curi~sities."~~The data amived at by a particular psychologist would be idiosyncratic; each psychologist would be confined to the subjectivity of his own findings, Consequently, Watson is led to conclude: "The behaviorist finds no evidence for "mental existences" or "mental processes" of any kind."44 There is an unavoidable impulse to want to oppose what appears to be the abandonment of an essential part of the human being. Watson himself recognises this:

"Why, yes, it is worth while to study human behavior in this way, but the study of behavior is not the whole of psychology. It leaves out too much. Dont 1 have sensations, , conceptions? Do I not forget things and remember things, imagine things, have visual images and auditory images of things 1 have once seen and heard? Can 1 not be attentive or inattentive? Can 1 not wiil to do a thing or wiil not to do it, as the case may be? Do not certain things arouse pIeasure in me and displeasure? Behaviourïsm is trying to rob us of everything we have believed in since earliest chi~dhood."~~ Given Our bias for introspectionism, Watson retorts, it is only natural that we express antagonism towards and are suspicious of any view which seeks to provide a behaviouristic formulation of Our psychological life. He suggests that we put aside Our resistance to treating psychological concepts behaviouristically until we are better familiar with how behaviourism treats them. Moreover, he contends that we would find ourselves beset with contradictions and confusions if we were forced to explain what we mean by these "mental" terms. The reason for this is, he maintains, is that introspectionism (and the dependency on first-person experience as the source of knowledge about mental phenornena) is so much a part of Our social and literary tradition, we have accepted it uncritically as the hindamental basis of the meaning of mentai concepts. Should we corne to recognise that behaviourism provides a more adequate conception of the intelligibility of

". Watson. Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, c. 1919, Third Edition Revised, 1929). p. 2. 44. Ibid.. footnote to p. 3. 1 should like to point that this appeam to be the only place (Le.. in the second of his three books) where Watson's position approaches a naive materialism and seems to cake on the crass behaviourism which sorne associate with his conception of psychology. ln his later works. e-g.. '1s thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?" and Behaviorism, he adopts a more sophisticated stance, one in which he offers a more subtle reflection on mental concepts and processes. 45. Ibid., pp. 9 - 10. psychological phenomena, we would not consider a behaviouristic characterisaiion of such phenomena to be an insufficient understanding of their meaning. "Later you wiii find that you have progressed so far with behaviorism that the questions you now raise will answer themselves in a perfectly satisfactory naîural science ~ay."~ Watson was not prepared to abandon his approach in the face of objections such as the ones stated above. His fundamentai view was to describe a particular piece of behaviour according to a 'stimulus-response' model. By this he meant that man, just Like other animals, adjusts hirnself to his environment according to various habitua1 and hereditary means. In other words, when an individual acts, he is merely responding to certain stimuli in the particular situation, which cal1 forth a specific reaction-specificaliy a bodily response. Our progress fkom infancy to adulthood involves a ceaseless organisation and evolution of the complexity of Our system of habits. According to Watson, it is the purpose of psychology, behaviouristicaily conceived, to try to forrnulate by means of systematic observation and experimentation the generalizations, laws, and principles which govem Our beha~iour.~~Nonetheless, this still puts Watson's conception at odds with mental concepts and processes, commonly understood. He appears to be left with three options: to ignore them, to deny them outright or to effect a translation or reduction of them to physical concepts. Watson's position is ambivalent. The approach which he sometimes favours is to assert that, because such concepts, as traditionally understood in psychology, are not open to scientific investigation, they should for the most part be excluded from consideration. Thus, he seerns to ernbrace the fmt option. However, at other times he lems to a stronger view. Watson daims that psychologists have traditionally misconstrued what certain mental concepts consist in. This is especially evident in his treatment of Ianguage and thinking.

46. Ibid.. p. 10. 47. "When a human being acts--does something with his amis. legs or vocal cords-there must be an invariable group of antecedents serving as a "cause" of the act- For this group of antecedents the term situation or stimulus is a convenient tenn. When an individual is placed face to face with sorne situation-a fire, a menacing animal or hurnan, a change in fortune---he will do something, even if he only stands still or faims. Psychology is thus confronted immediately with two problems-the one of predicting the probable causal situation or stimulus giving rise to the response; the other, given the situation. of predicting the probable response." (Psychology From rhe Standpoinr of a Behaviorist, p. 5) "How does the behanorist know there is any such process as thinking since he cannot directly observe it?"" Supposedly this objection was nised against the behaviourist's insistence that only the observable should fom the subject matter of psychology. 'Ibe implication is that the behaviounst simply has utilised introspection to discover thinking and afterwards discarded his original method and extemalised the process by translating it into the universal langage of science. "In other words, he describes it merely as the hinctioning of laryngeal or other motor processes."49

The irnplicit notion in the above objection is that it is only through introspection-which Watson discards (or denies) that one has any ideu of thinking in the first place. Watson does not expressly deal with this this contention. Instead, his direct response to the expressed objection is as follows:

The behaviorist's answer is that he can ut present arrive at this conclusion only by making use of a logical inference. In those cases where the response to the stimulus is not immediate but where it finally occurs in some form of explicit verbal or manual behavior, it is safe to say that something does go on, and that that something is surely not different in essence from that which goes on when the behavior is e~plicit.~

To the more basic objection raised in the aforemention question, Watson appears to hint at an answer. One relies upon introspection because it seems the only available means of accessing the nature of thought, that it is the only reasonable means of explaining a person's actions when there appears to be no discernible determinants of the behaviow. However, Watson points out that this does not discount the possibility that a person may have developed implicit language processes which can be used in novel situations.

In other words, since our assumed expIanation is simple and straightforward and adequate to account for ail the facts and is in line with what can be actually be observeci in other activities, the law of parsimony demands that the upholders of "imagery" and "imageless thought" should show the need of such "processes" and demonstrate objectively their presence.51

What Watson maintains is that no trustworthy scientific conclusions cm be drawn from introspective methods. The behaviouristic approach avoids this fault by couching its speculations in terms which can be attacked experimentally.

The point we would emphasize here is that if we are ever to leam scientifically any more about the intimate nature of thought other than that which can be obtained by obsewing the end results--that is, by

48. Watson. Psychology Frm tlw Standpoint 4 a Beliaviorist, p. 360. Watson daims that this question was posed b y Titchener. 49. Ibid.. p. 361, %. Ibid., p. 361. Ibid., p. 362, footnote 1. observing the overt verbally expressed behavior or the overt ensuing bodily actions-we shall have to cesort to instnimentation.S2 As Watson sees it, thinking is merely an organisation of various language habits which are exercised silently. If we were to understand language and thought properly, we would discover that the notion that there is a "mental" life is fictitious.s3 Watson appears to rely on a mechanical conception of language which matches words with objects. He maintains that not only do words call out other words, phrases and sentences, but they

can also elicit all of our manuai activity, if we are properly organised. His point seems to be that when we learn the names of extemal objects we evenhdly corne to repiace the objects with the

words which narne them. Given that words elicit responses in exactly the same manner that objects for which the words serve as substitutes, we develop verbai habits which are equivalent to the manual habits we origindy had with the corresponding objects. When infants begin to vocalise sounds, adults watch for a sound which they can match up to some conventional word which they associate with an object or situation. In other words, adults attempt to bring an infant into verbal confonnity with our standard usage of words, by conditioning various syllables in the infant (until they can get the child to articulate actual words) which they can then match up to objects and situations. The parents teach the child various verbal habits which various objects and

situations can elicit. They establish various verbal patterns for the child to imitate. "As the child grows up, then, it establishes a conditioned word for every object and situation in its extemai environment. Society in the fom of parent and teacher and other members of the social group arranges this. But strange as it may seem, at first sight, it does not have to be word conditioned to many, many objects in its intemal environment-to changes in the viscera themselves-because parents and the other members of the social group havent any words for thern? Viscerai happenings therefore remain unverbalised, Watson believed. However, an individual possesses a verbal substitute supposedly for every extemai object, and he cm manipulate these words

- --

52. Ibid.. p. 364. 53. Watson, Beiiaviorism, p. 224. %. Ibid., p. 233. privately, thereby ailowing him in a sense to manipuiate the world of objects without their king sensibly present. Watson mermaintaineci that this substitute word world was essentially baggage which we carrieci around with us as bodily organisation, "in the muscuiar and glandular organs of Our throat, chest (including of course, the sense organs in the muscles and the nervous sy~tern)."5~AU that is needed for the organisation to function is the appropriate stimulus which may be some verbal habit that was onginally organised around a particular object or set of objects, since we retain the series of responses ongindly fmed around an object or situation. This does not mean that language is exclusively social, Le., that it is only used for public adjustments, because it can also be used for individual adjustments which are not social, e.g., silent talking.56 In other words, our language habits fùnction in much the same manner as Our manual habits. Language is the verbal analogue of the manipulation which takes place in the development and organisation of

Our bodily or manual habits. It is for this reason that Watson objects to the traditional view of thinking as something roto cm10 different from organisation processes with which we are already farniliar. Thus, he does not advocate abstracting "language, overt or implicit, or other implicit thought processes, from their general setting in bodily integration as a wh0Ie."5~ It is no wonder, then, that Watson regards thinking in the following manner:

The tem thinking ought to be made to cover generally al1 implicit language activity and other activity substitutable for language activity. ..- Thinking would comprise then the subvocal use of any language or related material whatever, such as the impIicit repetition of poetry, &y dreaming, rephrasing word processes in logical terms, running over the day's events verbally, as well as implicit planning for the morrow and the verbal working out of difficult Iife situations. The term "verbal' here must be made broad enough to cover processes substitutable for verbal activity, such as the shmg of the shoulder and the lifting of the brows, It must embrace the implicit movements demanded in the use of the deaf-and-dumb sign manual, which are, in essence, word activity. Thinking then rnight become our gened tenn to cover al1 subvocal behavior-% In a symposium titled "1s Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?"59 Watson responds to some misunderstandings about his conception of thinking. His article is for the most part a restatement of much of the material already contained in the chapter dealing with thinking in Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. He devotes some space to cIariQing

55. Ibid., p. 234. 56. Op. cit., pp. 353 - 355. 57. op. cit., p. 355. 58. Ibid.. p. 356. 59. British Journal of Psychology, Vols. X and XI, 1920. Watson's own contribution can be found in vol. XI pp. 87 - 104. his notion of 'habit', since it appears from the account given therein he means "a fixed or invariable chah of responses" ." He offea the following account: 1 have generally made the term habit coextensive with that part of an individual's organism which is not hereditary; but surely in al1 learning there is a display of previous organization-of habits (and hereditary activity) most closely connected with the type of situation confionting the leamer. No single response dready learned (habit) will bring about the present adjustment-there must be a recornbination. But the partial habits fonning the new whole adjustments, be they Iaryngeai or manual, have each had a history and their origin cmoften be traced.

He wants to emphasise that an individual thinks bodily and biographically, Le., that thinking is an integrated bodily process whereby the individual thinks (reacts) with his entire body. The various situations that the individual has encountered has resulted in his development of certain bodily responses which may then become substitutes for words. When faced with a new situation to which we can only respond by thinking it is Our laryngeal mechanisms which mostly corne into play though our whole body may be sent a-titter, and we merely react with implicit language activity or processes in order to arrive at an overt response even if none be forthcoming. The novelty of the situation dictates that the only type of organisation available is an implicit or subvocal one. As Watson declares, if we were to lock a person in a room and inform him that he would not be let out until he solves a puzzle which we assigned him, "merely because observation of his behavior could not take place so long as he was hidden from the observer gives no one the nght to assume that any different or unusual process went on."62 We are led to believe that constructive thinking, planning, problem-solving, etc. are evidence that thinking must be some mysterious, aethereal process. But why do we not want to admit that "the expression of a thought in some kind of implicit or explicit verbal action or in general bodily movement is not necessarily thought"? Watson's point seems to be that thought is its expression, whether it be overt or covert. "When we study an individuai's implicit bodily processes we are studying his thinking; and when we study the way a golfer stands in addressing a ball, in swinging his clubs, etc., we are studying

60. Ibid., p. 90. 61. Ibid., footnote to p. 90. 62. Ibid., p. 95. the way he plays golf."a He even asserts that conceptual thinking is really a fallacy since "all Our responses are to definite and particular things."

Long before behavioun'sm took me in tow, 1came to the conclusion that such things were mere nonsense; that al1 of our responses are to definite and particular things. 1never saw anyone reacting to tables in general but always to some particular representative. When 1began to watch how a child leanis to react to words denoting (from the standpoint of logic) a class, the process became clear, When he had his arms full of toys and the stimulus for depositing them was present, his mother would say, "Put them on the table." whether the table was one-legged, an extension table, a library or dining table. The word thus becomes conditioned. The word table (any class or abstract word such as animal, justice, mercy, infinity has the same history) becomes a part of his world of objects. ready to cal1 out a single defiriire respome (appropriate ro the situation he is in) when he speaks it himself, thinks it or hears it spoken.@ It is no wonder that some, like Edna Heidbreder, regard these views as expressive of one who conceives of man mechanically, Le., as a stimulus-response machine.65 This view is not altogether incorrect nor does Watson appear troubled by it. He thinks that our notions of psychological concepts, particularly those embedded in the notion of %onsciousness', are misguided and misleading. We fail to acknowledge that the human animal is simply "a complex of reacting systems1'66 and instead want to posit interna1 process or processes not open to scientific observation which we think offer a better explanation of human activity. For example, we think that the proper account of how a tailor makes a new cloak must be that he had a "pichire in his rnind" of what it would look like.67 We forget that the tailor has made many cloaks on many other occasions and that he therefore has a reservoir of habits-his manual organisation about making cloaks which is quite large---to draw upon. To regard the process as something otherworldly and unavailable to public observation is the charm and the magic of the traditional conception of thought, Watson holds, the behaviourist account, in contrast, appears too straightforward, too simplistic. Behaviourism seems to take the easy way out of the mind-body problem either by denying mentai concepts or ignoring them. However, it is Watson's contention that if the behaviourist platform is properly understood it would be seen that these older categories and concepts which give rise to the mind-body problem are undermined as fictions and are useless for a

*. Ibid., p. 100. 64. [bid., p. 102. 65. cf., Seven Psychologies. p. 242. 66. Op. cit., p. 94. 67. cf., Watson. Beiraviorisrn. p. 247. correct (meaning scientific) understanding of human behaviour. Thus, we need not introduce a concept of 'meaning' bto behaviour and assert thai behaviourism cannot account for it. There is no problem here according to Watson; for the behaviourist it never aises. If thinking is conceived

as an aftivity comparable to manual activity then we need not engage in idle speculations about 'meaning'. "We watch what the animal or human being is doing. He means what he does. It is

foolish to ask him while he is acting what he is doing. His action is the meaning. Hence, exhaust the concept of action and we have exhausted the concept of meaning."68 It can be seen that Watson employed a name-object mode1 of meaning for psychological words in a highly public sense. Mental processes are not inaccessible private objects or events open only to individual introspection. Psychological words stand for and are to be identified with

various physiological and bodily traits. For example, 'thinking' is to be identified with various laryngeal processes which we can point to and which serve as the meaning of this allegedly psychic activity. It is represented by certain discemible Linguistic habits. In other words, implicit in Watson's conception of meaning is the notion that a word's meaning is correlated with the object

it signifies and the corresponding responses we have to it. In this sense one finds a picture of meaning that is not too dissirnilar frorn the one Wittgenstein attributes to Augustine in Philosophical Investigations. But this is only part of the story. There is also a more sophisticated side to Watson's discussion of what (for example) "thinking" means. Thinking is associated with

a cluster of activities, e.g., the shmg of the shoulders, the catching of the breath which have meaning, not absoluteiy, but within a context. We leam to shmg, just as we learn to Say, "Well, 1 don't know" (or "1don't care"). In such cases "thinking" is not being used as a name. According to Watson, the path to understanding "thinking" is paved by the fact that we lem to substinite words for objects and because we learn to make most of Our reactions verbally. This led Watson to the view that thinking represents a process or activity comprised of organised behavioural

responses executed implicitly in the muscles of chest, throat, and larynx and verbally as welI. "A nod of the head for "yes," a shake to the right and left for "no," a raising of the eyebrows and head

68. Watson, "1s Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?" p. 103. Emphasis added. and shoulders for "1doubt it," are also part and parce1 of the complex process of thinking."69 And, it should be emphasised, this process or activity is determined contextually. "In other words, €rom the moment the thinking problem is set for the individual (by the situation he is in) activity is aroused that may Iead finally to adjustrnent. Sornetimes this activity goes on in terms of (1) implicit manual organzatioa; more frequently in terms of (2) implicit verbal organization; sometimes in terms of (3) implicit or even overt viscerd organi~ation."~o

69- Watson. The Woys of Behviorism. New York: Harper & Brothers Riblishers, 1928, p. 85. 70. Watson. Behaviorism. p. 266. Neo-behaviourism Albert Paul Weiss

Albert Paul Weiss. Like Watson, became a polemicist for the behaviouristic conception of psychology. His own formulation of behaviourism followed very much dong the lines laid out by Watson. However, compared to Watson's behaviourism, one finds a marked physicalisrn in Weiss's conception of the behaviowistic programme. In fact Weiss sees very Little distinction between the ph ysicist and the psychologist (understood as a behaviourist)." Consequently, he recommends the framework of the natural sciences as the appropriate mode1 for conducting psyc hological investigation.

For the wnter, behaviorisrn in psychology is merely the name for that type of investigation and theory which assumes that man's educational, vocational, and social activities can be completely described or explained as the result of the same (and no other) forces found in the natural sciences. I believe that eventually psychology will be recognized as an intertocking segment through which the social sciences will become an extension of the natural science^.^ Weiss, Iike Watson, saw the need for a new conception of psychology due to the failings of the traditional conception. Weiss launched his attack on the assumptions of structural psychology. As Weiss saw it, the structural psychologist attempted to describe consciousness in terms of these three basic classes: (1) sensations, (2) images, (3) affections. The method which the structurdist employed to analyze a conscious complex into its elements was introspection. "Briefly, we may state the problem of the stnicturalist as an attempt to answer the question: What are our mental

States and how do they come about? while the behaviorist problem is: What are our actions Md how do they come about?'lJ Behaviounsm was also a reaction against functional psychology, which was concerned with how consciousness affects and alters human behaviour or conduct. Behavioural psychology arose in part because functionalism failed to offer a precise and accurate account of how a conscious process could be regarded as controlling behaviourS74 Thus, as

71. " ... even though the behaviocïst classifies himself as a physicist. he must develop, so to speak. special equarions (individual and social measurements) which meet his special requirements." (Albert P. Weiss. "Behavionsm and Behavior," 1, Psychological Review , 1924. vol. xxxi, p. 37.) 72. Albert Paul Weiss, A Theoreticai Basis of Human Behavior, (Columbus: R. G. Adams & CO., c. 1924, Second Edition Revised, 1929) pp. 7 - 8. 73. A. P. Weiss, "Relation Between Structural and Behavior Psychology." Psychologicof Review. 1917. vol. xxiv, pp. 304 - 305. 74. Ibid.. "Relation Betwoen Functional and Behavior Psychology." Psychologicaf Review, 1917, vol. xxiv. pp. 354 - 355, characterized by Weiss, behavioural psychology can be regarded as a reaction agaiost the functional and structural formulations of the mind-body problem75 and the introspective method of investigation.

For the writer behaviorism represents. as it does for many others. a protest against al1 attempts to explain human achievement by the introduction of an element which is beyond the range of physical measurement 1 believe that human achievement is of the same order as the organic and inorganic processes which prevail in the physico-chernical universe In Weiss's system, the behaviowist's starting point is that of the namal scientist's. Weiss argues for a physical in psychology, i.e., that psychology should begin and formulate itseif from the fundamental assumption that electrons and protons are the ultimate elements. Psychology must accept that human behaviour only cisers in complexity from the motions and dynamics of physics and rnechanics. There need be no introduction of non-physical (meaning psychical) entities until mechanical has been exhausted and found wanting. Therefore,

In adopting physical monisrn any conscious or psychical entity as distinct from the physicd electron-proton entity is, of course, excluded. The formulation of the behavioristic position is then expressed in the statement that ail human conduct and achievement reduces to nothing but: (a) different kinds of electron- proton groupings characterized according to symmetry or geometrical structure; (b) the motions that occur when one structural or dynarnic form changes into another. In other words, 1assume that the scientific study of what is genemily known as personality and socid organization can be conducted under the assumption that the physico-chemicd continuum is the sole existential datum and that the totality of the electron-proton aggregates is the univer~e.~ Weiss wants it understood that he is not proposing that we tum to the physicists for instruction on the development of human behaviour, because it is not his daim that human achievement is reducible to an electron-proton formulation. Physicalism is a hypothesis, not a requirement, of

Weiss' s programme. As he States,

My statement merely implies that 1 am opposed to the general attitude that until the iast event or occurrence (especially those known as human achievement) has been reduced to a mechanical resultant, we must assume the existence of a non-physical (psychical) entity. It seems to me scientifically more expedient to follow the physicists who have (as physicists) inverted the principle and refuse to accept a non- physical entity until al1 mechanical conceptions have proved futile.18

75. The former position takes the view that "consciousness does not enter as a causal agent into such actions as reflexes and instincts, but it does function in what is usually known as intelligent or voluntary action." The latter position is that of the double-aspect view, in which there is "parallelism between conscious processes and neural processes without a causal relationship between them." Behaviounsm, in Weiss' view, subscribes to the position that "consciousness cannot be regarded as the invariable antecedent to any kind of action whatsoever." ("Relation Between Structural and Behavior Psychology," p. 304) 76. Weiss, A Theoretical Baris of Humun Behavior. " pp. 147 - 148. n. Ibid., p. 54. 78. Ibid., pp. 54 - 55. Weiss's adoption of physical monism displays his lack of reluctance, in contrast to other psychologists, about including a theory of ceality into his conception of psychology. He argues that to shy away from classifjing or analyzing observations on some fundamental basis, in the face of there not being any great controversy about what is observed, inhibits scientifiç development.

The behaviounst need not be intimidated by metaphysics since it "is merely a name for specid types of linguistic habit~.'*~g Weiss is wary of the dangers of an egocentric view (i.e., conceiving of the universe as a function of man) as the working hypothesis and explanation of ultimate reaiity. Psychical monism, i.e., regarding the world as "a theoretical construction buiit up out of some non-material psychical equipment possessed by man"80 does not provide us with consistent principles for explaining human achievement. For exarnple, if a person were to regard "pain" as simply a psychicai percept which he could easily displace by pleasant feeüngs and should he adopt this as the bais of his adjustment to the world, he should not survive long nor should anyone else who subscribes to this viewpoint. In other words, it seems impossible to formulate laws according to which the psyche functions without at the same time postulating "an entity or existentid datum (a sensory-cerebro- motor system) outside the psychical sy~tem"~~on which the psyche works in sorne causal fashion. What this means is that "mental or psychical elements must be hitched to biophysical elements of some sort to receive scientific recogniti~n,"~~he points out. Yet, Weiss also maintains, there has been a historical succession, whereby the psychical factor loses dominance and a more physical (and scientific) standpoint gains prominen~e.~~In his estimation, then, psychical causation is unnecessary. "From the behavioristic point of view human achievement as the product of purely physical processes seems to me to be inevitable from a consideration of the facts revealed by the history of psychology. Since a psychics without a physics seems to be impossible or

79. Ibid., p. 44. He funher maintains that "when the metaphysical problem is stated in the form of the question. What are the essentials of reality? the term realiry for the behaviorist is merely a word stimutus which individuals of a given social status use to designate the fact that the responses occumng at any one moment might be more cornplex and varied than they actually are if the bodily response mechanism were more complex than it really is." (p. 46) sO- Ibid., p. 68. Ibid., p. 72. 82. Ibid., p. 73. He believes that the series: physics. biology. psychology. sociology is an illustration of this, inadequate, behaviorism has adopted the working hypothesis of physics without a psychics."a Weiss believed that the occurrence of the psychical or mental processes (or, supposed introspective reactions, as he sometimes refers to them) can be completely explained by analyzing them into "sensory-cerebro-motor and bio-social antecedents":

Human behavior or human achievement for the behaviorist is thefinction of the sensory- cerebro-motor mechanism, in the same way as respiration is a function of the lungs, and digestion is the function of the alimentacy tract- To assume that there are psychical processes in addition to physicai processes introduces into the study of human behavior an entelchy which has not been able to maintain its status in the other sciences, and which cannot be introduced either as a constant or a variable into the description of human behavi~r.~~ Scientific development has made it easier to undentand the relations between an environment and the responses which individuais make to it. Scientific advancement has made anirnistic or psychical theories of human behaviour unacceptable or inadequate. We had recourse to such theories, Weiss claims, only when we had a fragmentary knowledge of the actual behavioural mechanism. This does not mean that we will always be able to clariQ the relationship between the environment and the individual's responses to it, but we are no longer in an adolescent period of evolution and need not accept a poetic or animistic theory of human behaviour as the only possible alternative. In the behaviouristic conception, "man is only one stage in cosmical evolution"~and human achievement is not regarded dong the lines of any psychical or teleological schemes.

As I stated earlier, Watson's behaviourism displayed an implicit physicalisrn. at times a strict one. Watson appeared not to deviate much from his early view "that there are no centraüy initiated processes1'fJ7and that the higher thought processes could be dismissed frorn psychology.

He wanted to dispel the idea that imagery was necessary to nature of thought and sensation. Thus, he was even critical of the attempt by stmcturaiists to reduce higher cognitive functions to groups of obscure organic functions. These processes could be easily afcounted for by role the environment plays in the establishing an individual's habits.88 In other words, Watson advocated a strict environmentalism to explain those seemingly elusive mental processes, such as thuiking and

84. Op. cit.. p. 75. 85. Ibid.. p. 76. Ibid., p. 84. 87. Watson. "Image and Affection in Behavior." Prychologicol Review. 1913. vol. X. p. 423. 88. Ibid., p. 423. sensation, for which it was traditionally believed that the existence of Uiiagery was essential to our understanding of them. Much of this he contended was result of a tendency among traditional psychologists to view the brain as something more than a mechanism for coordinating incoming and outgoing impulses:

When the psychologist threw away the soul he compromised with his conscience by setting up a "mind" which was to remain always hidden and difficult of access. The transfer fiom perïphery to cortex has ken the incentive for driving psychology into vaic and fruitless searches of the unknown and unknowable. 1 am yuite sure dia&if i1e idea of dit: image had ncver &en such firm hold upon us we would never have ociginated the notion that we are seeking to explain consciousness. We would have been content to study the very tangible phenornena of the growth and control of explicit and implicit habitsa9 Watson's programme began as a radical one (e-g., he was highly sceptical of the existence of imagery) and it is onIy in his later work that we find him presenting a more subtle view of "mental life", which examined more closely the relationship between thought and speech. He came to regard words such as "thinking" and "memory" as representative of activities arising from Our langage habits. There are not narnes for private processes or mysterious events hidden in the mind. In fact, Watson clairned that if we could observe the muscular activity in the throat, chest, and larynx which occurs when we think, we would not regard thought to be some mysterious, mental state;gO furthermore, he maintains that it would be less confusing to substitute the term irnplicit behnviour for the term "ti~inking".~lHe also makes similar points about "memory", narnely that it confusing to hold on to the idea that it is compnsed of "images" which serve as "ghostlike pictures of objects" that are present to the mind when we think.92 In other words, according to Watson, the notion that we have a "mental life" shows a preoccupation with the picture that the soul or mind provides us with the clearest means for understanding mental concepts. Instead, these concepts represent activities whose bais cm be found in our implicit organised behaviour and Our verbal responses. Nevertheless, he had already countenanced and expressed the hope that with the improvement of scientific methodology and instrumentation mental processes and the malm of psychics would eventually give way to objective (rneaning

89. Ibid., p. 424. 'O. Watson. The Ways of Behaviorism. p. 84. Ibid., p. 85. 92. Behaviorisnt, pp, 265 - 266. physical) explanation.93 However, even though his later work does show less of a tendency to reduce higher thought processes to a gross bodily stimulus-response mechanisrn, Watson's view of mental life illustrates what another weii-known behaviourist, Weiss, would refer to as king "intirnidated by metaphysics". T'hat is to Say, Watson does not offer any substantive justification for his anti-mentalism beyond his bias for objectivity and his naive acceptance of reality as given

by physics. His view was that it was misguided to regard phenomena such as "thinking" or "memory" other than as a kind of behaviour or physical activity; to imbue them with mystery is to conceive of them as special kinds of non-physical (Le., mental) activity. Watson recognised no such distinction between physical and mental activity. He saw no need to attribute any special status to the activities generally thought to comprise Our "mental me"; but this was not based on some fundamental theory of reality. Watson's refusal to admit a chasm between mental and physical activity was founded on his celebration of and the cornmitment to accept only that which was given by observation. To conceive of (allegedly) mental phenomena as having a distinctively non-physical, non-behavioural status is to accept the untenable position that one was investigating events which by their very (dleged) nature were impossible to investigate. Other than his insistence that psychological phenomena so understood were inaccessible to scientific investigation, Watson provided no justification for his anti-mentaiism. Weiss's view of consciousness, mind, and thinking, however, follows directly frorn his physical monistic ~ystern.~*Nonetheless, Weiss would agree with Watson that the psychic or mental phase of experience is superfluous in the study of human achievement. Weiss does not deny that there are

93- "Having thus summady dismissed the image and affective elernents, I crave permission to restate the essential contention of the behaviorist. It is this: the world of the physicist, the biologist, and the psychologist is the same. a world consisting of objects---their interests center around different objects. to be sure. but the rnethod of observation of these objects is not essentially different in the three branches of science. Given increased accuracy and scope of technique, and the behavionst will be able to give a complete account of a subject's behavior both as regards immediare response to stimulation, which is effected through the larger muscles; delayed response, which is effected through the same muscles (so- ca1ted action after de1iberation)--these two fonns comprising what 1 have called explicit behavior; and the more elusive types, such as the movements of the larynx. which go in cases where action upon stimulation is delayed (so-called thought processes)." ("Image and Affection ..." pp. 427 - 428) 94. In al1 faimess to Watson however. it should be not be rnaintained chat his psychology arnounted to mere "muscle- twitchism". His approach was directed towards captivating the attention of psychologists to the fact that the accepted modus operandi was detrimental to advancement in psychology. Thus, his emphasis was not on theory development but on forecasting the benefits of a particular methodological approach. One could argue that in Weiss one finds a sophisticated and developed view of rnuch of what was implicit (and perhaps naively stated) in Watson's formulation of behaviourism. many unknown factors in the analysis of human achievement which appear to be different from the biophysical and biosocial elements which we can gather from behaviour, but his contention is that it would be more s~ient~callyexpedient to operate on the assumption that thete is one system of events which we do know:

1 assume that, if the properties of mental processes are not reducible to physicai processes whether known or unknown, then there are at least two separate entities making up the universe. If, however, the mental or conscious processes are regardeci as particular types of chemicai or physicai processes of as yet unknown composition then onIy one entity or one system of events need be assumed and consciousness or mind belongs to the systern of physical monism although it would be scientifically simpler not to use such terms as consciousness, or mentai at all, but merely indicate the events to which they refer by those physical properties which most adequately describe them. as is done in the other science^?^ It is for this reason that Weiss finds fault with both the structural and functional approaches; there is too much arnbiguity about the terms 'consciousness', 'mind', 'mental', et. al- Besides, it is meaningless from a scientific standpoint "to speak of investigating a non-material, non-biological, non-mechanical, non-causal entity. "96 Like Watson, Weiss recognises that behaviourism's proposal of a mechanistic conception of human behaviour, as opposed to an anirnistic one, appears to eliminate something essential from psychology. The behaviounst is confronted with the problem of having to explain certain conceptions and classifications which in spite of their ambiguity have been firmly established and thought to refer to phenomena and to forces which are non-material, non-biological, non-mechanical. Thus, when behaviourism is critised and reproached for explaining human nature without reference to these intangible forces, it appears that it is making light of what is diffcult about the nature of psychology, Le., that it is restrïcting the problem by ignoring mind or consciousness. However, in affirming the physicalistic and mechanistic nature of his science, the behaviounst wonders whether giving "a study of the material, biological, mechanicai, and social antecedents that are at the basis of human achievement ... does not represent the expectation of even those who have given us the traditional formulation of psychology better than does the traditional definiti~n."~~What may appear to be an ignoring of mind or consciousness on the part of the behaviourist is a misunderstanding of the fact that the

95. Weiss, "Behaviorisrn and Behavior," 1, p. 33. fooinote three. 96. Weiss, A Theoreticcal Basis of Human Behavior. p. 279. 97. Ibid., p. 279. behaviourist is actudy presenting a better formulation of psychological terms than heretofore accomplished. Afier ali. the behaviourist is not ignoring or repudiating any of the causal factors involved in human achievement:

He would &rm further that to the extent that modern psychology is itself repudiating the non-causal, non- material entity conception it is becoming more behavioristic, even though it is obscunng this by retaining the old subjective or non-causal temiinology and re-defining it on the basis of physical and causa1 conceptions. The implicit responses for the behaviorist are merely those responses that can not now be classified as specifically biophysical or biosocial- They are one group of 'unknowns' in the study of human conduct. 1s it not better to recognize them as unknowns than to cd1 them consciousness, subconscious, mental, psychical, etc.p8 Although he does not adopt the sarne sort of materialistic/physiological reduction which Watson presents, Weiss appears to agree (to some extent) with Watson's notion that subvocai speech and implicit habits are what was understood as psychical concepts. He states, "the writer has made several attempts to carefuiiy work out the behavior equivalents of the more important traditionai psychological terms, but implicit reactions and subvocal speech seem to explain everything."99 Weiss's concern is to offer clear formulations of behaviour categories and to examine what are the biosocial conditions which stimulate behaviour. Subjective ternis such as volition, perception, reasoning, emotion, conception, etc., described as various conscious complexes, are no more descriptive of biosocial and sensori-motor conditions than the notion of consciousness. "Consciousness as a non-physical. spontaneous, self-initiating form of energy does not exist. Consciousness as an implicit form of behavior or as an obscure physicochemical process is best described as behavior."100 "Frequently," Weiss points out. "the term mind is used as a subterfuge to cover up the very important fact that for almost any form of behavior that may be mentioned, no one is able to indicate or describe the essential biosocial antecedents through which this particular form of behavior may be established in a nomai individual."101 The dualistic preoccupation in traditional psychology (i-e., that there is a man-within which directs neural function and thus influences

98. Ibid., p. 280. 99. Ibid.. p. 273. He continues that "any attempt to be more specific immediately raises the question, what is the meaning of the psychological term? and here the analysis or synthesis stops in a tautology." IO0. Ibid., p. 273. lol. Ibid., p. 274. behaviour) is indicative of man's tendency to personify events for which no adequate fom of behaviour has been established. Once social organisation and achievement reached a certain stage it appeared that there was a signif~cantdifference between man and ?he animals not ~~ciently accounted for by anatomy and physiology. Human reflective ability seemed to indicate that its achievementloz could not be fülly explained by appealing to animal reactions or by describing man

Ho wever, Weiss argues:

That condition which is called awareness and which has always been surrounded by a halo of mystery, merely indicates that neurai activity may take place and yet the individual may not be able to detect any bodily movements, or react discriminatively to the neural activity. That is to Say, awareness means only that there is no detectable overt action, but nonetheless there is neural function which, if it could be observeci, would have a specific configuration-10Q This is why he chooses to regard sensations and images as movements which have specific sensori-motor configurations. He believes that these terms represent biophysical or biosocial phenornena, aithough it is not possible to definitiveiy classify them as one or the other. However, this does not mean that one must necessarily assume that consciousness or awareness denotes another kind of entity, as assumed by the traditional conception of these terms.

Such phrases as I am aware of red for the behaviorist mean the same thing as, I am reacting to red. Speaki ng more generally ,I am conscious of, only means I am reacting tu; I was conscious of means I reacted to; I shall attend to means 1 shall react The nature of sense qualities, more precisely the differences between consciousness of various colours for example, can be explained dong stimulus-response lines: the individual merely reacts differently to a red stimulus than to a blue one. Furthemore, this does not indicate an existentid correlate of redness or blueness. Sensation qualities do not represent something additional apart from the conditions under which one lems to discriminate them. A sensation quality, like redness, for instance, is only "a nme for the relationship between bodily processes which at

IoThe temi "achievement" appears to hold a special sense for Weiss. one which ernphasiseî cultural, genetic. and evolutionary improvement as opposed to the history of an individual's successes. This is evident from one of his statements: "To understand human achivement," he noted, "psychology musc do more than scrutinize man as he is at a given instant. It must assume that he is the product of biological, anthropological, and social antecedents as definitely causal in character, as the forces in physics and chemistry." (A Theoretical Basis of Humun Nature, p. 4.) IO3. Weiss does not believe that the terni instinct is suprfiuous for the investigation of human behaviour. cf., "Behaviorism and Behavior." II, Psychological Review, 1924, vol. XXXI, p. 120, footnote. IO4. Weiss. The Mind and the Man-Within," Psychological Review. 1919. vol. 26. no. 5, p. 333. *O5. Weiss, A Theoretical Bais of Human Behavior, p. 289. present we can neither localize or describe."l" The only thing one would fnd if one could

"designate all the anatomicai and physiological factors that are involved'm would be a specific complex sensori-motor condition which nonetheless always hinctions when an individuai receives the sensation of, for example, a particular Light of specified frequency. Weiss contends that it is

only a matter of time before the biophysical and biosocial conditions that underlie what are cded sensory-qualities can be measured and compared but that this is not justification for ascribing them in the meantune to some mental (non-physical) category inaccessible to scientifk investigation. The sarne principles apply to the notion of imagery. The ciifference between imagery and sensation is one of sensori-motor conditions:

While discussing the so-called sensation of redness, we isolated three steps: (1) a light stimulus, (2) an inherited or acquired reaction of localiùng the object or the sense organ, (3) a specific conventionaiized reaction CO the stimulus. The image of redness is the occurrence of (3) without (1) and (2) in such an incipient manner that an ouiside observer cannot detect it, but that the self-observer may report it.*08 Thus, if one were asked to describe one's image of a particular painting (as the behaviourist understands it), one could stimulate another person so as to cause Chat person to respond (without seeing the painting) as one did after having seen the painting. There is no issue of privacy here with regard to imagery; there is only a semblance of privacy because the individuai cannot isolate

the anatomical and physiological structures which are involved; imagery is reaiiy a social phenomenon.lm Weiss's account of language avoids the gross behaviouristic clab that it must be reduced

to its laiyngeal components. He argues that two sorts of relatively distinct movements may be discriminated if human achievement is conceived of as a form of behaviour: manipulative responses and linguistic responses. "Speaking generally, for the average adult humm individual

every stimulus may release either a handling response, a languuge response, or both. "lI0 The

'O6. Ibid., p. 293. 'O7. Ibid., p. 293. log. Ibid., p. 294. log. It is interesting to note that Weiss does think chat it is obvious that one knows more about one's self than about others. This is the case, he claims. because one has more classes of sense organs which are stimulated when one studies oneself therefore one is able to ascertain more than when another studies one's behaviour. Thus, one's own experiences are richer than one's outward behaviour reveals. However, this does not mean that one should subscribe to a dualistic mind- body conception of human achievement. Such an approach is only negative. Il0. Op. cit., p. 307. behaviourist, in Weiss's view, is not interested in discovering the exact effeçtors which operate in a given speech reaction; "his problem is that of determinhg how the fmal result (whether this is a sound, a written word, a bodily movement, a facial expression) acts as a stimulus on others and thus determines the social status of the individual."lll According to Weiss, the importance does not Lie with the actual musculature or organs that produce the sounds, characters, or symbols involved in the language reaction, but with those characteristics themselves. Language is first acquired as a habit which a child adds to some handling response and, as learning continues, the child is taught to imitate adult linguistic structure and grammar such that her linguistic responses may function independently of sensory stimuli and with either handling responses or other language responses. Subsequent social conditions teach the child how to make a biosociai response. When a parent reacts to the word "ball", let's Say, by bringing a ball to the child, the parent in essence is bringing about a relatiomhip which is spatial and probably manipulative between the bail and the childF Eventually, the child will learn to respond to the word "ball" in absence of and independent of the object (a ball) as a sensory stimulus. The child cornes to associate many different sensory situations and relations involving not only the word ball but many other words and objects as well. That is to say, the child at some point lems generalized language responses; for example, she may also be taught the word "plaything" at some later point for which she will acquire various handling reactions such as throwing, catctung, grasping, etc.. Thus, she will corne to establish through social reinforcement a network of sensori-motor connections whereby many dissimilar objects and their specific reactions are intercomected via some general term in such a way that those reactions which are biosocially associated are easily accessible by means of a common stimulus and response. In other words, because the response is independent of the sensory nature of the stimulus, the behaviourist has no trouble accounting for generalization in language, i.e., generalization is simpiy a form of behaviour where many different stimuli rnay

Il1. Ibid., pp. 309 - 3 10. li2. Note the parallel to Wittgenstein's primitive language-garne involving the word "slab" in PI $2. release the same word reaction:113 "bali", "fisbee", "doll", etc. becorne associated with

"plaything".

Essentially, then, we find in Weiss, as in Watson, a nameabject theory of language and meaning; there is a deflinite and specific stimulus and response reaction to each word,n* and "the meaning of a stimulus is defined by the responses that are made to it."U5 In addition, they both appear to defend a "use" account of meaning as well, albeit a causal one, where words provide us with a means to manipulate others by effecting various responses and reactions from thern. We are able to utilise words to influence the behaviour of others, according to both of these thinkers, because there are equivaiences of reaction between words and objects (for which the former are but substitutes). In addition, like Watson, Weiss interprets thinking LnguisticalIy, in fact he regards it as problem-solving behaviour. Thinking becomes for Weiss a repertory of many standardized or conventionalized responses which have been found to be usefui in dealing with new biosocial conditions. The very complex response series that comprise the form of behaviour understood as thinking are continually forming throughout the life of the individual and of soçiety, for that matter. Thinking is simply a stimulus-response reaction just like any other form of human behaviour.116 The traditional conception of thinking places great emphasis on the interval (which is a latent period in Weiss's view) between the problem stimulus and the stimulus response, as if it were some supernatural, spontaneous judicial process where "the problem stimulus is supposed to arouse some dormant thought force or thinking faculty which classifies the stimuli and selects some solution to the problem, by applying the niles of logic and then sends this solution out to be expressed in the responses of the individual. If the individual happens to be wrong more often than nght, the individual is unfortunate in either king awarded a poor mind or having lost control over it."ll7 There is no mystery surrounding 'the higher thought processes'. The entire series of problems which are supposed to be exemplified by them "reduce themselves to residuai effects of

Il3. Op. cit.. pp. 318 - 320. Il4. Ibid., p. 322. Il5. Ibid., p. 325. Ibid., p. 354. Il7. Ibid., p. 353. acquired behavior series thaî have become so fragrnentary thaî the responses are largely implicit."*l8 Where Watson ignored consciousness without denying it, Weiss's more sophisticated

account retains it (while arguing strongly against psycfücal causality in human behaviour) by making it public and scientifically objective. Instead of conceming himself with the supposed non-

material, non-physicai data of consciousness, he directs his efforts to the more ùnmediately fruitful project of dealing with the social and physical components of behaviour.

Il8. Ibid., p. 356. Purposive Behaviourism Edward Chace Tolman

Tolman's contribution to behaviourism cm best be seen as a contrast to Watson's stimulus- response 'muscle-twiichism'. Tohan worked towards establishing a new formulation for behaviourism, one which moved away from a mere physiological behaviourism (as found in

Watson's early version) but was yet comprehensive enough to cover the results of animal psychology and the mentalism of traditionai introspective psychology. Tolman believed that the

grounds for the possibiiity of a behaviourism which was not a mere physiology had already been evident to other behaviouristic psychologists, including Watson.llg It seemed to hirn that others (including himself) had moved away from a physiological reductionist conception of behaviour towards a conception of behaviour which conceived of it as an "emergent" phenornenon "with descriptive and defming properties of its ownW.f20Tolrnan referred to this as molar behaviourism, as opposed to molecular behaviourism which sought to present a complete neural, glandular and viscerd picture, i.e., in effect to give a strict physiological reduction of behaviour. The la~erhe associated with Watson and the former with himself and Weiss, among othen (Holt and de Laguna were also included).

Both varieties of behaviorism start with the same initial facts: (a) the fact that organisms, human and sub- human, come up against environmental stimulus situations and suffer from internal physiological disequilibriums; (b) the fact that as a resuIt of such stimulus situations and such internal upsets these organism behave; and (c) the fact that the nature of this their resulting behavior is determined by a set of intervening variables to be conceived as lying in the organism. But whereas, the molecular behavionst-- that is, the behaviorist with the physiological bent-seeks to state the nature of these intervening variables in terms of such concepts as chemicai or other physical action in the sense organs, innate and acquired neural pathways, sympathetic systern reverberations, and the like, the molar behaviocist seeks to state the intervening variables as specific types of behavior readiness or, in more common sense terms, as objectively definable "demands," "in tentions," "expectations" and "attainment~."~~~

Tolman felt he found in Watson's later formulation of the behaviourist programme a departure from his earlier pronouncement. He saw Watson as introducing two different concepts of behavior. He points out that Watson gave a definition of behaviour "in terms of the strict physical and physiological muscle-twitches which make it up" but later on argued that behaviour also involved "integrated responses" which appeared to possess qualities which were different frorn their constitutive physiological elernents. In other words, he contends, Watson dallied with two different notions of behaviour, one which emphasized its "strict underlying physica1 and physiological details". and the other which implied that behaviour was "more than and different from the sum of its physiological parts". (E. C. Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, New York: The Century Co.. 1932, pp. 5 - 7. lZ0. Ibid., p. 7. 121. Tolman. "Psychology venus lmrnediate Experience," Philosophy of Science. July, 1935; repcinted in Collecred Papers in Psychology, p. 101. This form of behaviourism was therefore purposive and cognitive: Tolman did not eschew concepts from introspective psychology. What he wanted to point out was that the behaviour of anirnals and men showed that their actions were dited towards certain ends, that behaviour shows itself to be purposive. One discovers this if one looks at behaviour as a whole instead of in terms of its mere physiological elements.

... behavior, which is behavior in out sense, always seems to have the character of getting-to or getting- from a specitk goal-object, or goal situation. The complete identification of any single behavior-act requires. that is, a ceference first to some partîcular goal-object or objects which that act is getting to, or, it may be, getting kom. or bath.*

... we note the further fact of such a gening to or fiom is characterized not only by the character of the goal- object and this persistence to or fiom it, but also by the fact that it always involves a specifîc pattern of commerce-, intercowse-, engagement- communion-with such and such intenrening means-objects, as the way to get thus to or from.123

... we find that, in the service of such gettings to and from specific goal-objects by means of commerces with such and such means-objects, behavior-acts are to be characterized, also, in tenns of a selecrively grearer readiness for short (i-e.. easy) means activities as against long ones.12* Tolman emphasised that purposes and were fundamental to behaviour regarded as a molar phenornenon, whether it be the behaviour of a rat or a human being. However, he did not think that these concepts were exclusive to mentalistic psychology ;that is to Say, he did not regard them as essentially mentalistic categories which behaviourism was incapable of investigating due to an alleged cornmitment to reductive materialism. As iilustrated by Weiss and himself, behaviounsts found that there was no need to ignore mentalistic concepts as Watson had done as long as they realised that these concepts could be made scientific objects of study if they were properly defined or formulated. In other words, they adopted an operationaiist methodology as part of their behaviourism.l15 Thus, as far as Tolman was concemed, purpose was simply goal- seeking behaviour, found in an animal's leaming or general activities which was charactensed by a certain behavioural persistence to acheive some desired objectJ26 and cognition was a term l*- Ibid., p. 10. 123. Ibid., pp. 10 - II. lZ4. Ibid.. p. 1 1. lZ5. In this regard, Tolman once reFerred to his psychology as an operational behaviourism. cf.. E. C. Tolman, "Operational Behaviorism and Current Trends in Psychology." Proceedings of the Twenry-jïfth Anniversary Celebration of rAe lnauguration of Gmrlirare Studies ut the Universiry of Soutliern California, 1936; reprinted in Coilected Papen in Psychology, Edward Chace Tolman, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 195 1. He also referred to i t as a purposive behaviourism. (cf.. Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men) 126. E. C. Tolman. "Behaviorism and Purpose," The Journui of Philosophy. 1925. vol. 22. pp. 35 - 41; reprinted in denoting ihe immanent &terminan& of behaviour, Le., how the animal goes about making object adjusmients." Tolman's conception of behaviow is captured by the formula B = f (S, H, T, P). This means th& behaviour is a function of the situation (environmental stimulus) and other antecedent causal variables, namely, the heredity of the given organism, its past training, and its phy siological disequilibnum (appetite or aversion)? Like the two other behaviourists, Tolman began his theorizing with the problem of consciousness and the introspective method, though it does not Iead him to an outright denial of conscious contents. Like Weiss, Tolman argues that the privacy of conscious states or processes is meaningless from a scientific perspective: "this pnvate something or other never 'gets across,' as such, from one individual to another. All the things that do 'get across' are rnerely behavior phenomena or the objective possibilities of such phenomena"lW Tolman maintains that all that one can ever learn about another's consciousness of colour is whether or not thai person behaves towards colours in the same fashion as we do. One can only know what the behaviour possibilities of the colours are for that person; but whatever unique "feel"or quaiity they may possess for another person can never be ascertained. He insists that what the mentalists refer to as conscious awareness and ideas be objectively and îùnctionaily defined. It is in this regard that he finds fault with what he refers to as the Watson-and-Weiss doctrine of "implicit behavior". He contends that they need only have emphasised the importance of the sub-vocal speech or sub- gestural gesture as a "surrogate for acaial behaviour", but that they jeopardize this point by insisting that implicit behaviour is "dependent upon the further hypothesis that structurally such 'implicit behaviors' always involve sub-vocal speech or sub-gestural gestures, or indeed, that they necessady involve any motor discharges at all."13CJ Tolman does not want to discredit this notion because, as he maintains, his own concept of behaviour-adjustments is based on it. Instead, his

Collected Papers in Psycholugy. E C. Tolman. "Purpose and Cognition: the deteminers of animal learning." Psychological Review. 1925. vol. 32, pp.- - 285 - 297; repnnted in Collected Papers in Psychology. 128. Tolman. "Psychology venus Immediate Experience." and "Operational Behaviorism and Current Trends in Psychology," in Collected Papers in Psychology. 129. Tolman. "A New Formula for Behaviocism." Psychological Review. 1922. vol. 29; reprinted in Collccred Papen in Psycllology, p. 4. 130. Tolman. Purposive Behavior in AnimaLr and Men. p. 21 2. Emphasis added. point is that it is somewhat confusing. He would raîher highlight the importance of the character of implicit language as a sumgate for actual behaviour; he does not think îhat it is necessary to specw the neuro-muscdar factors of implicit behaviour. Tolman's critique of the Watson-Weiss doctrine is not altogether clear. It appears to be a consequence of his wanting to establish a nonphysiological psychology. Tolman regards it as the business of psychology not to engage in physiological specification of the neuro-muscular basis of behaviour, but instead to determine the functional relations between behaviour and its antecedent causes. Tolman maintained that al1 that is conveyed from one organism to another, whether it was from rat to scientist, or from scientist to scientist, was the performance of certain functions. If the rnentalist wants to protest: "But consciousness per se is not a behavior or the function perfonned by a behavior. It is a unique 'inner stuff.' It is a unique 'raw feel'," Tolman answers: '"Very good,' ... but then, by definition, consciousness is not something with which we, as scientists, need be concerned. 'Raw feels*are by very definition outside the purview of our science."'31 The inner, private, ineffable stuff of consciousness is not a matter of scientific concem. It can be left to the poet or the metaphysician. Tolman believed that earlier psychologists seemed to regard human behaviour as illustrative of some special distinctive facility which man possessed. Whereas behaviour-determinants are common to aU animals, the behaviour processes of "speech" and "introspection" appear to mark human beings as unique and 'mysterious' creatures. In other words, it is humans' ability to use language that causes us to lapse into metaphysical ideaiking about human behaviour and achievement, i.e., that human beings are 'creatures of wonder'. Tolman notes that

it seems to have been this possession of speech, by man, which rnisled earlier psychologists into the erroneous assumption that "introspection" accomplishes something sui generis. It seems to have been the fatal facility of their "subjects" for talking which seduced the mentalistic psychologists into supposing that in causing "verbalization" in these subjects they were somehow causing the latter to convey something about their "insides"-which was not, and couid be, conveyed by other more gross forms of behavior. Even Watson, the behaviorist par excellence, wMe not making speech the basis for a mentaiism, in his early writings did accord to it the role of king the sole mechanism for "thought." The lower animals, he said, do not "think because they do not speak. And man himself, when he thinks, does so, according to Watson, only by virtue of sub-vocalizing or sub-gest~rin~.~~~

131. Ibid.. p. 215. 132. Ibid.. pp. 235 - 236. Wittgenstein alludes to this notion that animals do not think and CO its relation CO their inability But, Tolman argues, we need neither make language out to be a thing of marvel. nor dei& man as result of his facility for language; language is simply an instrument:

According to us, on the other hand, speech (though obviously a remarkable phenornenon and as a matter of empirical fact pnmariiy restricted to man) is not in its essence to be considered as anyîhing so very extraordinary or unique. Speech accomplishes the same sort ofresuit that other behaviors would, only more expeditiously. Speech, in the last analysis, is but a "high-faluting""tool," not differing in essence from other tools such as "strings," "sticks," "boxes," and the like.lj3 He maintains that, since other creatures (notably chimpatlzee~)engage in creative thinking,

" ideation or creative thinking originates ontogenetically and phy logenetically, prior to speech. "134 Ideas, he contends, are behaviour-adjustrnents. "Speech, as the successful manipulation of a tool, requires, that is, that the capacity for ideation precede it."'s According to Tolman, then, the

nature and function of introspection is eady understood. Introspection, if it is to be credible process, simply involves the possibility of responding to one's own behaviour-adjustments. However, it can not convey anything "pure," unique or distinctive to an individual not conveyable by gross behaviour. This then helps to dispel the notion that in the final analysis sensations and

images are things private or mentalistic and thus only accessible via introspection. If sensations and images possess pnvate and mentalistic chancters they are unconveyable and thus are not of scientific interest.

Imagine that we had a "subject" in the laboratory. in whose color "sensations" we were interested. in routine laboratory fashion we should present him wilh a bit of color, say the red of a two-cent postage stamp; and we should ask him to "introspect." He would tell us what this red looked tike to him, He would describe the "sensation-quality" which he expecienced when looking at it- He would "name" it as "red." But what would this descnbing and naming convey? It would provide merely the same sort of information that we should get if, instead of having him "introspect," we let him discriminate the postage- stamp color in some other, more gross way. We should learn no more than we should if, instead, we were to let hirn sort differently colored stamps into piles, putting the reds al1 into one pile; or if we were to let him match and locate this specific postage-stamp color on a chart of al1 colors, Le., a chart showing al1 possible variations in hue, intensity and saturation, .... His introspective naming and "descnbing" could convey to us no information not conveyed by such gross discriminatory re~~onses.~~~ Tolman's point expresses well the spirit of classicai behaviourism. If one wants to subscribe to the mentalist view that sensations involve something in addition to what we gather from a person's

to speak in PI 825. 133. Ibid., p. 236. 134. Ibid., p. 239. 135. Ibid., p. 239. 136. Ibid., p. 246. Note the parallel to Wittgenstein's discussion in the private tanguage sections of PI and his assessrnent of the value of saying that one has "named" one's pain by means of introspection. sensation-behaviour which the behaviour does not convey, this 'information' is supeduous. To suppose that the= are immwliate mental givens. unique subjective suffisions in the mind which constitute ultirnate elernents of sensations or images. is not a feasible project for eientific investigation. And, furthemore. the question of their existence or ontology is also not a psychological concern. "'Sensations,' in so far as they have any cash value, are, for the purposes of science, merely readiness to discriminate in ways relatively enduring, or r~lativelytemporary and perspectively biassed."l37 This is al1 that any psychology, including introspectionisrn, can succeed in conveying. According to Tolman, in spite of the fact that his system differs fiom the strict behaviourisrn of Weiss and Watson by regarding behaviour as having characteristic descriptive propenies of its own, he nonetheiess agrees with them that only organisms, their behaviour, together with the environmental and organic conditions which induce it, are to be the subject matter of psychology. His behaviourisrn, king a purposive one, asserts that behaviour has meaning, is cognitive and molar (what he refea to as "gestaltedWI38)but does not break up into atornisticaüy defined reflex units. He contends that the way to get at mind is not by means of introspection but by inference within a range of behaviour and stimuli. He recognised his starting-point to be the same one as the stimulus-response behaviourists but he was forced to anive at "the concept of objectively defined capacities, immanent determinants and behavior-adjustments"l39 and "their directly experienced gestalt^,"^^ moving away from seeing only stimulus and response, with neurology in between. Nonetheless, the purposivism of his system is not a metaphysical statement about the nature of the universe but an operational methoci. Tolman is only seeking to do for psychologicai phenomena what had been done for physical phenomena by the other sciences. That is to Say, he wants to reduce psychological phenomena "to a series of functional relationships by virtue of which it is possible to predict and contro1."141 This illustrates his view of the status of

137. Ibid., p. 253. 138. Ibid., p. 418. 139. Ibid., p. 419. 14*- Ibid., p. 420. 141. Ibid., p. 424. science. One of the requirements which he regards as essential to science is that it function as a

map, "a short-hand for finding one's way about from one moment of reality to the next-that it be a symbolic compendium by means of which to predict and ~ontroi."~uHe thus regards his account

of mind as a map-account. Tolman thinks that he avoids subscribing to a naniralism in spite of his

philosophy of science, that his procedure of abandoning the traditional qualities of experience for functionally defined quantities does not issue from a fundamental naturalist adherence, since he

only sees his approach as sharing with physics the goal of demibing the physical relationships of things in space.

la. Ibid., p. 425. Epilogue

As I have argue4 the behaviourists were primarily concemed with questions of rnethodology. In fact, it can be seen that they, for the rnost part, tended to subsume theory to method. In some cases, their approach to studying psychology and psychological phenomena evinces a mitigated agnosticism with respect to the ontological status of mental phenomena. and one finds a preoccupation with what they took to be tried and tme objective procedures, these being ones established by the natural sciences. Although it could be argued that this committment to a methodological objectivism by Watson, Weiss, and Tolman is founded on an anti-mentalist prejudice,l43 its a priori basis was the exclusion or modification of any and aii psychological subjects that were not otherwise amenable to a scientifk treatment. In this sense, behaviourism showed an obsession with methodology of the established sciences; each version began with the specification of the class (es) of problerns to be considered and how these problems were going to be approached. Thus the behaviourists were comitted, above ail else, to a certain practice which they believed would ensure that psychology could be placed on par with the 'bard sciences'. They were united in this vision that methodological pnnciples were a sufficient basis for establishing a scientific system.

The behaviounsts came to agree, that is, that a set of decision procedures for evaluating research, appropriate to ail sciences indifferently, was the principal requirement for the constitution of a science; that with these decision procedures determined the content of scientific theories would be self-correcting; and that once their science possessed these it would as a result acquire continudly increasing systematic vaiidity as it continued to develop; and in alf fhis fhey were wrong.144 In spite of Mackenzie's declaration, it seems that behaviourism's treatment of mental concepts can provide insight for philosophers dealing with issues revolving around the mind-problem, as

Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophical psychology indicate. In the next few chapters, 1 will be exarnining behaviourism's devance to the issue of determining the meaning of mental concepts as it relates to Wittgenstein's own contribution to the subject. Specifically, 1 will be addressing how Jerry Fodor, Norman Malcolm, and P.M.S. Hacker view the relation of behaviourism to Wittgenstein's treatment of the philosophical problem of mental States and processes. Fodor

143- Brian MacKenzie for instance makes this claim. cf.. Behaviourïstn and the hits of Scient@ Merhod. p. 13. lu- Ibid., p. 23. argues that Wittgenstein's remarks show a cornmittment to a 'logical behaviourist' doctrine; 1 will contend however that his intexpretation does not properly characterise the con~uitybetween classicd behaviourism and Wittgenstein. It will be argueci that Malcolm and Hacker mat behaviourism reductively-they view it as a metaphysical thesis-thus reproducing the unrefined characterisation which Wittgenstein ernploys. PART II Commentators In this section 1shall address what some commentators have written regarding the question of behaviourism and Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophical psychology in the Philosophical Investigations. The standard approach is to accept Wittgenstein's characterisation of behaviourism as an ontological doctrine about the mind-body problem, sptxifically one of reductive materialism. It can be seen from my accounts of the views of Watson, Weiss, and Tolman that this charaçterisation does not adequately represent the nature of behaviourism. Nevertheless, the approach appears to influence, if not penneate, much of the scholarship on Wittgenstein and its understanding of behaviourism. In evidence of this, 1 shaii examine three commentators. The first (with whom 1 agree) provides a positive answer to the question whether Wittgenstein is a behaviourist but nonetheless ascnbes an andytic or logical form of behaviourism to Wittgenstein with which 1find fault; the other two accept Wittgenstein's confession that his remarks are neither endorsement of nor apologia for this doctrine of philosophical psychology. These scholars are respectively Fodor, Malcolm, and Hacker. 1 intend to argue that Fodor's contention that Wittgenstein is a logical behaviourist is incorrect, but that he is correct in his clairn that Wittgenstein offers an operational analysis of confirmation and language. 1 will try to show that Wittgenstein's philosophical behaviourism is more subtle than Fodor redises, although 1 agree with him that the central issue is the notion of criteria. My general approach will be to endorse Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein, which for the most part maintains that language is an anthropological phenornenon, as the correct analysis of Wittgenstein's remarks. However, 1 intend to show that his interpretation suppons Wittgenstein's denial of king a behaviourist in disguise only because. Like Wittgenstein, he accepts the narrow conception of behaviounsm found in the Investigations. As for Hacker, he defends Wittgenstein by contending that the behaviourist conception of body and behaviour is founded on a mechanistic conception of human beings. He claims that Wittgenstein's notion of criteria is an assault on not only the Cartesian picture of mind, but on the behaviourist one as well. 1will argue that the notion of criteria is pivotal to settling the question of behaviourism in relation to Wittgenstein, and that Hacker underestimates how this idea marks the continuity between Wittgenstein and behaviourism.

Chapter Three: JewA. Fudor Jerry A. Fodor hgical Behaviourism

The basis for Fodor's interpretation of the philosophical psychology in Wittgenstein's later writings can be found in a paper which he CO-authoredwith C. S. Chihara. The argument of this paper is that the operationalistic analysis of confidon and language which arises in Wittgenstein's later wrïtings is essentially a 'logical behaviourist' account. They are led to this conclusion because they regard the later Wittgenstein's treatment of the problem of other mincis to be an attack on the sceptical premiss that there is no good justification for supposing that someone's behaviour provides grounds for maintaining that this person is experiencing a particular mental state. Furthemore, they think that Wittgenstein's purpose is to show that the sceptical position is based on a misconception and is logically incoherentY They contend that Wittgenstein's treatment of psychological subjects and mentai concepts shows that the sceptical notion that one cannot reasonably ascribe mental predicates is false:

Wittgenstein's way of deding with the sceptic is to attack his premiss by uying to show that there do exist conceptual relations between statements about behavior and statements about mental events, processes, and states. Hence, Wittgenstein argues that in many cases our knowledge of the mental states of some person rests upon other than an observed empirical correlation or analogical argument, viz- a conceptual or linguistic conne~tion.~~~ The sceptic, according to Fodor and Chihara, maintains that there are no logicaily sound inferences of the application of mental predicates to others; also, that there are no strong grounds on which analogies and correlations used to support inferences of mental predicates in others can be justified.

However, "to hold that the sceptical premiss is false," Fodor and Chihara argue, "is ipso facto to commit oneself to some version of logical behavioh where by 'logical behaviorism' we mean the doctrine that there are logical or conceptual relations of the sort denied by the sceptical premiss. "147 According to Fodor and Chihara, the strongest form of logicai behaviounsm appears to be a strict physicaiism which, they claim, "maintains that statements about mental states are

l45. C. S. Chihara and I. A- Fodor, "Operationalisrn and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein." Ainericon Plzilosophical Quarrerly, vol. 2, no. 4 (1965). p. 28 1. 146. Ibid., p. 282. 147. Ibid., p. 282. translatable into statements about behavior."l48 Thus it would seem that they view the strongest form to be a radical behaviourism or materialistic monism. However, in his other writings, Fodor uses the terms "behaviourism" and "logical behaviourism" in a more liberal manner. In fact, he appears to subsume behaviourism, understood as a philosophy of psychology, under the category of logicd behaviounsm. In this sense "radical behaviourism" would be included as a variety of logical behaviourism, since behaviourism, generafly speaking, represents a relational treatrnent of mental and behavioural predicates. He regards behaviourism as holding the following as a necessary truth: "For each mental predicate that cm be employed in a psychological explanation, there must be at least one description of behavior to which it bears a logical coiinection."i49 According to Fodor, the clab that this proposition, which he caiis P, expresses a necessary truth is common to a number of different formulations of behaviourism:

Thus, 1 take it that the necessity of P is entailed by (but does not entait) the familiar philosophical doctrines associated with such slogans as: mental events require behavioral criteria; intervening variables in psychological explanations must be tied to observables "at both ends"; theoretical terms in psychological explanations must, in principle, be eliminable in favor of (definable by) terms that designate observables; psychoiogical theories are smooth projections of observed correlations between the input and output States of organisms; there exists a "grammatical"connection between each mental predicate and some behavioral predicates.lm 1 interpret Fodor to mean that these slogans can be attributed to the various versions which strong logical behaviourism takes; the difference between them is marked by the form of the logical connection between psychological and behavioural predicates. Strong versions of logical behaviounsm appear to be characterised by strict or one-to-one type correspondence between mental and behavioral predicates, i.e., they are eliminative doctrines. From this it can be seen that a behaviourism which followed the dictates and precepts of Watson's programme, for instance, where mental concepts are essentially ignored (or simply repudiated), would be a strong logical behaviounsm. According to Fodor, the strongest form of logical behaviounsm is a semantic theory about the meaning of mental concepts, narnely, a physicalism in the tradition of Rudolf

Carnap .151 From its inception, behaviounsm (as in Watson's programme) espoused principles

148. Ibid., p. 282. 149. Jerry A. Fodor. Pqcitological Erpfanarion. p. 51. 150. Ibid., pp. 51 - 52. 151. It will be seen later on that Malcolm iakes Carnap's physicalism as the paradigm of logical behaviourisrn. In fact. he with which Carnap and the Viema Positivists would have great sympathy. Both share an operationalist conception of the nature of scientific investigation and extol the virtues of the natucal sciences (in particular, physics) as prescriptive paradigms of methodology. It is no wonder then that many scholars have seen behaviourism as reductive materialism in a new guise. Although

Fodor does distinguish between physicalism and behaviourism, the two are closely related in his treatmen t of logical behaviourism. if physicalism holds that psyc hological states are essentially physical states, and strong logical behaviourism holds that psychological states are eliminable in favour of behavioural states, then it seems to me chat the doctrines eventually merge depending on how behavioural and physical states are defined. Whaî they share, in Fodor's view, is a strict correspondence beiween mental states on the one hand, and behavioural or physical statements on the ~ther.l~~ According to Fodor, then, logical behaviourism is any doctrine which draws a conceptual comection between behaviour, defined as particular 'bodily movements', and mental states. Strong versions of logical behaviourism equate or identiQ mental statements with behaviourai statements, or translate the former into the latter; weak versions place the prionty for determinhg the sense of mental statements on observable, accountable, or discemible factors. Wittgenstein falls into the latter category, according to Fodor and Chihara, because he is concerned about the conditions which govern the coherent employment of psychological concepts. Of the behaviourists examined earlier in the preceding chapter, it appears Watson and Weiss fit into the first category, whereas Tolman falls into the latter. Tolman offers a weak version of behaviourism because (we recall) he held that mental concepts were not simply to be reduce or identified with behavioural manifestations but could be inferred as the emergent patterns of these manifestations. Fodor implies that the less elirninative a behaviouristic doctrine, the more defensible its position. However, doctrines of this nature lack the appeal of strong versions of logical behaviourism which eliminate any terms (such as "eating hungrily," "writhing in agony," or

sees the two as being synonymous. 152. Fodor thinks that there is no empirical evidence to support thir type of correspondence. cf.. N. I. Block and 1. A. Fodor. "What Psychological States Are Not," Philosophical Review, vol. 81, no. 2 (1972). pp. 159 - 181. "smiling happily") from the vocabulary, the application of which require interpretation of the phenomenon that is being confirmed. Fodor sees seifter forms of behaviourism as upholding a key principle of empiricist epistemology that "inductive risk should be isolated "at some level of theory construction that is formally distinguishable fiom the level at which data statements are articulated thus bestowing upon the latter a unique pnvilege of unrevisability and hence a unique type of cognitive certainty."*~If a behaviounst doctrine should count locutions such as "writhing in agony" as behavioural when it claims to be offenng neutral language for characrerising mentai phenomena based on observation alone, then it cannot leave room for inference to some 'hidden' state. Thus, "writhing in agony", for example, would have to be recognised as the phenomenon. In other words, not only must what is observed determine the context of the phenomenon under scrunity, the language used for detailing it cannot incorporate any inference beyond the publicly accountable sphere; otherwise it fds victim to the problem of induction, since there must be some standards to which inference from observed states and movernents of an organism to its alleged mental states cm be made. The application of the principle cited above in psychology, Fodor maintains, cails for a theoreticaliy neutral language for descnbing behaviour, otherwise the description of behaviour itself becomes a theoretical language. "If the point of behaviorism is to be preserved, it must be taken as analytic that whether and how

Is3. Op. cit., p. 54. It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein did not think it peculiar that rnixed locutions should be induded in 'analysis' of a situation. He rnakes the following comment:

It seems paradoxical to us that we should make such a medley. mixing physical states and states of consciousness up together in a single report: "He suffered great torrnents and tossed about restlessiy". IL is quite usual; so why do we find it paradoxical? Because we want to Say that the sentence deds with both tangibles and intangibles at once.-But does it worry you if 1 say: "These three stnits give the building stability"? Are three and stability tangible?---Look at the sentence as an instmment, and at its sense as its employment. (PI, $421)

Watson, on the other hand, held to the principle Fodor cites above maintaining that behaviourism need have no use of terms such as consciousness, mental states mind, etc., and insipid terminology derived from such reference. Watson, at Least in his original statement for behaviourism. argued that psychology coutd function without any reference or inference to such muddling concepts. According to him, observation was the sufficient foundation for inquiry about the data of psychology. "Unless our observed facts are indicative of consciousness, we have no use for thern, and unless our apparatus and rnethod are designed to throw such facts into relief, they are thought of in just as disparaging a way." ("Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," PsycItological Review, 1913, vol. XX, pp. 162 - 163.) It can be seen then that Watson's eliminative conception of behaviourism coincides with the parameters Fodor distinguishes for suong logical behaviourism. an organism is behaving are questions to be settled by observation, in the sense of that tem in which what is observed is ipso facto not inferred."m That Wittgenstein does not demand that mental pcedicates be defVlnble in terms of behavioural ones, marks his view as a weaker form of logical behaviourism. To conceive of the

logicai connection in this manner would involve subscribing to the notion that the essence of

mental phenomena is paramount for understanding and using mental terms. To determine meaning by offenng only a definition makes meaning itself a matter of reference. It opens up a seerningly unavoidable avenue into the ontology of the term or concept whose meaning is under question. For instance, asking for the meaning of "joy", if taken as a request for a definition, leads one down the path of ontology, which one then takes to be fundamental to its meaning. Thus, one is led to

claim that "joy" refers to some specifiable set of behavioural characteristics perhaps (or pnvate, indescribable, psychical ones). Instead, of resorting to this manner of examining the meaning of concepts, Wittgenstein highiights the grammar of theu employment. According to Fodor and

Chihara, his is a phiIosophica1 version of logical behaviourism which does not ask for definitions- -but is concerned with the conditions for the coherent employment of mental predicates.155 This view involves the notion that an analysis of mental concepts requires an articulation of the operations or observations whereby we determine that a particular mental predicate is ascribable to another person. Fodor and Chihara make the following cornrnents about Wittgenstein's suggestion that in order to grasp the meaning of 'pain', for example, we must examine the various linguistic activities in which the concept of pain plays a role:

This notion of analysis Ieads rather naturally to an operationalistic view of the meaning of cenain sorts of predicates. For, in those cases where it makes sense to Say of a predicate that one has determined that it applies, one of the central Ianguage-games that the fluent speaker has learned to play is that of making ad reporting such determinations.

Is4. Ibid., p. 54. lS5. Fodor and Chihara . Opcrationalism Md Ordinory ïanguage. p. 282 cf-. footnote 3. There it seems that they are implying chat Wittgenstein's case which they contend is strikingly similar to Hull, is an example of a many-to-many correspondence between rnentd and behavioural predicates. Although they do not specificaliy spedc about many-to-many correspondence, it does not appear thar they would conrend that this a viable doctrine for philosophical psychology. 1 wouId contend, however, that Fodor's refusal to accept any mindhehaviour correlationism is founded on the presupposition that a mental evenvstate is the cause of a psychological utterance. 1 intend to comment on this ar a later stage. But clearly, such determinations are ultimately made on the basis of the behavior of the individual to whom the predicates are applied (taking behavior in the broad sense in which it includes verbal reports). Hence, for Wittgenstein, reference to the characterîstic features of pain behavior on the basis of which we detennine that someone is in pain is essential to the of the word "pain" just as reference to the operations by which we determine the applicability of such predicates as "thtee feet long" is essentid to the philosophical analysis of the word "length", In both cases, the relations are conceptual and the rule of language which articulates them is in that sense a rule of ~o~ic?~ It would seem that Fodor has hit upon something. After dl, his notion that there is an operationalistic framework behind Wittgenstein's later wntings seems borne out by various rernarks about philosophical psyc hology in Philosophical Investigations, such as, "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward critena," (PI, 5580) or that there is no pain without pain- behaviour (PI, $304). It wiil be recalled that Wittgenstein admonishes the private Linguist by pointing out that the move to sophisticated sensation language-garnes results in the adoption of Linguistic utterances for formerly primitive, natural sensation-behaviour such as wnthing, crying, etc. in the case of 'pain'. These psychological statements, however, do not give idormation about the state of mind of the person experiencing the sensation-they are not reports on his 'innards'. In other words, what Wittgenstein wants us to be clear about is that he does not accept the Cartesian muddle of psychicai causality of bodily events or, to be more precise, he is trying to show that the issue of privacy and psychicai causality of behavioural events is nonsensical. A person does not learn to use language as a bridge between his sensations and their expressions. Language does not function in this way; it cannot. "For how can 1 go as far as to tq to use language to get between pain and its expression?" (5245) The sense of a sensation or a mental concept is to be found in its expression. Of course. as has been mentioned earlier, this approaches the dangerous conclusion that a sensation is essentially its behaviourd expression. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein thinks that he avoids this quandary because his analysis of mental concepts is a 'grammatical' one. That is to Say, he believes the issue of ontology (and thus causality) is superfluous to the understanding of such concepts which can be best grasped by illuminating their conventionalism, i.e., by his 'use' account of meaning.

i56. Ibid., p. 283. However, Fodor and Chihara contend haî there is a logical connection between mentai predicates and their behavioural expression in Wittgenstein's philosophy. They do not thïnk that, for Wittgenstein, a person's gross behavioural movements define experienced sensation, i-e., they are not accusing hirn of a (strict) materialistic behaviourism (a strong logical behaviourism, as defined by them). Instead, they believe that in Wittgenstein's view the logicd or conceptual connections for determinhg the applicability of a predicate are marked by the term "criterion". The logical relation which characterises a criterion and the phenomenon of which it is a critenon does not fall into the ordinary categories of 'definition', 'entailment conditions' or even 'necessacy and sufficient conditions', nor is it properly described by mere empiricai characteristics identified as 'symptoms'. Nevertheless, they contend, there is a logical connection between a cntenon and thaî of which it is a critenon, and this connection forms the basis of Wittgenstein's attack on the

sceptic. They daim that he attempts to refute the position of the sceptic by dernonstrating that there must be cnteria for psychological predicates which form part of their public use and therefore part of their meaning. If the sceptic wants to maintain that it not possible to conceive of what would serve as justifiable evidence that someone else was thinking, or experiencing either pain or some other sensation, then such a position would make it impossible to teach the meaning of

psychological predicates. Recall 5257, where Wittgenstein remarks: 'mat would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the meaning of the terrn 'toothache'." What this means, as I remarked earlier, is that not only could the adherent of such a position not account for how others learn to apply the same psychological predicates, it would be impossible to ascribe sensation experience to them without adopting two opposing viewpoints simultaneousiy, narnely, a Cartesianisrn to account for one's individual application of psychological predicates and a Behaviourism to ascribe these predicates to others. But, of course, this is absurd. We must be able to ascertain that the child has grasped the teaching of a particular predicate, which means that the= must "be a criterion of having succeeded in teaching the child."19 And the only plausible critenon in this case would

15'. 15'. Ibid., p. 288. be the child's demonstration that she can consistently apply the predicate comctly (as we ordinarily do). Fodor and Chihara offer the following comment on this obvious conclusion:

It would seem that, on Wittgenstein's view, empüical justification of the clairn to see, recognize, or know that such and such is the case on the basis of some observablefeature orstate of Mairs, would have to rest upon inductions fiom observed correlations, so that ,if a person clah that Y is the case on the grounds that X is the case, in answer to the question "Why does the fact that X show that Y?" he would have to cite either conventions or observed correlations Iinking X and Y. Thus, Wittgenstein appears to be arguing that the possibility of ever infemng a person's toothache fiorn his behavior requires the existence of a critenon of toothache that can sometimes be observed to obtaîn. A generalized form of this argument leads to the conclusion that "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria" (Pl, These remarks show how Fodor and Chihara's constme Wittgenstein's notion of criteria.

That is to sôy, critena point towards the niles of applicability of a particular tem or expression, they are given by the rules of the language-garne. In this sense, criteria are not simply a matter of empirical justification, because in a way they 'define' a permissible use of a word or expression.

In particular, criteria are not to be confûsed with symptoms. The latter are observable features which are usually associated with the use of a particular term or predicate, and they provide a basis for infemng what that term or predicate describes, whereas the former appear to be included in the description itself.1s9 Of this distinction Norman Malcolm wrote:

What makes something into a symptom of y is that experience teaches that it is always or usually always associated with y; that so-and-so is the critenon of y is a matter, not of experience, but of "definition" ($354). The satisfaction of the criterion of y estabtishes the existence of y beyond question. The occurrence of a symptom of y rnay also establish the existence of y 'beyond questiont-but in a different sense. The observation of a brain process may make it certain that a man is in pain-but not in the same way that his pain-behavior makes it certain. Even if physiology has established that a specific event in the brain accompanies bodily pain, still it could happen (it makes sense to suppose) that a man was not in pain although that brain event was occurring. But it will not make sense for one to suppose that another person is not in pain if one's criterion of his king in pain is ~atisfied.~~~ Critieria are contextuai. Expressions of pain, for example, are criteria of pain only within certain surroundings or circumstances. They are not absolu te and independen t of particular language- games. Fodor and Chihara acknowledge that "it is evident that Wittgenstein did not think that some proposition to the effect that a person is screaming, wincing, groaning, or moaning could entail the proposition that the person is in pain."161 Critena are deducible from the rules of the

158. Ibid., p. 286. 159. cf., Norman Malcolm. "Wittgenstein's Philosophicai Investigations," in Knowledge and Cerruinty, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 1 13. 160. Ibid., p. 113. 161. Fodor and Chihara. "Operationalism and Ordinary Language," p. 283. particdar language-game. As they point out in the example of basketbail, the roar of the home

crowd is a syrnptom that a field goal has been scored (by the home tearn), but it cannot be taken to

be a criterion for a field goal king scored. The ball has to be 'in play', not have been blocked by the opposing team, must travel through the net, no member of the home team can be assessed a rule violation while a player on his/her tearn is attempting to put the ball in the basket, etc. ".... to claim that X is a criterion of Y is not to claim that the presence, occurrence, existence, etc., of X is a necessary condition of the applicability of 'Y, and it is not to claim that the presence, occurrence, existence, etc., of X is a sufficient condition of Y, dthough if X is a criterion of Y, it may be the

case that X is a necessary or a sufficient condition of Y."*62 Although, Fodor and Chihara present a convincing account of Wittgenstein's notion of criteria, they contend that it fails to offer a viable alternative to sceptical doubts regarding the ascription of 'inner states' to others. They claim that Wittgenstein's views about criteria include the assumption that the sceptic requires an unusual use of mental predicates, which is logically incompatible with the operation of ordinary language niles for applying these terms, and that since it deviates from those rules it leads to the absurd conclusion that it must be impossible to teach the meaning of psychologicai predicates. In other words, Wittgenstein condemns the sceptical position as logicaüy in~oherent.1~~In taking his stand against radical scepticism, they think that

Wittgenstein has a tendency "to write as if X (a critenon of Y) just is Y or is what is called ' Y' in certain circumstances."~~That is to say, they believe that Wittgenstein's notion of criteria results in a strict identification of mental states with behavioural manifestations,lfi so that (for example) we are able to assign pain to another because the rules of the language dictate that the penon in

pain is the one who is expressing a certain set of associated behavioural correlates (e.g., writhing, facial contortions, crying, etc.) and that one or more of these correlates are logically sufficient in ordinary circumstances to establish what it is to be in pain. Fodor and Chihara are wrestling with

162. ibid., p. 285. 163. Ibid., p. 288. 164. Ibid.. p. 285. The next staiement follows the quotation above: ''We cm understand a philosopher's wanting to Say that shooting the bal1 through the basket in the appropriate situation just is scoring a field goal or is what is called 'scoring a field goal."' 165. Ibid., p. 289. Fodor and Chihara use material frorn The Blue Book to support their daim. the diffïcult fact that, for Wittgenstein, neither cnteria nor the rules of language-games arefued. If the criteria of X do not serve to define X, it remains a problem for Wittgenstein to explain how certain circuntstances satie a criterion. It would seem that criteria must approach somejiied-ness in order to 'define' (as Malcolm reads it) the ascnption of a predicate. That is to Say, if there mut be some cnterion or other for an alleged 'inner process', if there must be pain-behaviour in order for us to be justified in making a third-person ascription of 'pain' (and, of course, for us to confirm that a person has understood the use of pain-language), then why are not Fodor and Chihara correct in nudging Wittgenstein down the slope towards strong logical behaviourism? One

wants to be able to point to something on the basis of which we can judge that a predicate is applicable, that the student has grasped the equation, that the person is indeed in pain. Moreover,

the fact that Wittgenstein insists on directing our attention to the conventions and customs, which belong to the various language-garnes of confirmation, only elevates the importance of behaviour in fumishing criteria which justify Our third-person psychological statements. Given different circumstances, the criteria of ascription will differ. Nevertheless, collective1y, particular sets of movements, contortions or whatever are a kind of reservoir of cnteria for justifying pain- ascription. These movements, observed in someone, certify that he is in pain. As Fodor and Chihwa write:

One cecognizes that another is in a certain mental state, Y, on the basis of something, say, X. Now it is assumed that X must be either a criterion or a symptom of Y. If X is a symptom, X must be known to be correlated with Y, and we may then inquice into the way in which this correlation was established. Again, X must have been observed to be correlated with a criterion of Y or with a symptom, XI, of Y- On the second alternative. we may inquire into the basis for holding that XI is a symptom of Y....Such a chah may go on for any distance you like, but it cannot go on indefinitely. That is, at some point, we must come to a criterion of Y. But once this conclusion has ken accepted, there appears to be no ceasonable alternative to Wittgenstein's logical behaviorism, for if "inner" States require "outward" criteria, behavioural cri teria are the only plausible candidates.166 1s Wittgenstein, then, a logical behaviourist in disguise as they suggest? Part of the problem 1 find with Fodor and Chihara's analysis, is their view that Wittgenstein was presenting a direct attack on the sceptical position. In my view, Wittgenstein's account of third-person psychological predication is more concerned with underlying philosophical pictures of meaning, in

166. Ibid.. p. 287. particdar the narne-object picture, private ostensive definitions, and the argument from analogy. He wants to Say that confimation with regard to third-person psychological predication is not the primary concem in the fanguage-games which constitute it, i.e., it is not the purpose of those language-games to ovemedoubts or challenges. Time and time again, Wittgenstein stresses the responses which express our ability to continue the formula, to apply the rule, to ascribe a mental predicate. His concern is not to establish critena which overcome doubts about the applicability of a predicate to others. Critena do not function in this manner, this is not their normal use. No language-game is circumscnbed by rules for every circumstance, yet that does not undermine our

ability to play them, stdi les Our confidence in them. The language-games of psychological ascriptions are not plagued by doubts, rather, the players rnove the language-game dong, which may make one particular language-game a preparatory exercise for another. If his account is indeed a weak logical behaviourist one, it is neither an abstract nor static account of hypothesis formation and confirmation, for "doubting has an end." (PI, p. 180.) He wants to maintah that, if anything, hypothesis formation and confirmation engage certain patterns of reaction which were

ingrained in us when we learned how to make third-person psychological ascriptions and how to determine the criteria which constitute them.

A doctor asks: "How is he feeling?" The nurse says: "He is groaning". A report on his ôehaviour. But need there be any question for them whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression of anything? Might they not, for example, draw the condusion "if he groans, we must give him more anatgesic"-without suppressing the middte term? Isn't the point the service ro which they pur the description of his behaviour? (PI, p. 179. Emphasis .rLitY1) 1should like to point out that my comments echo concerns raised by John W. Cook who questions whether Wittgenstein does make a direct attack on sceptical presuppositions about the . He contends that Wittgenstein does not respond to the sceptic on the latter's tems because the sceptical position is founded on a challengeable notion of the 'body', and Fodor and Chihara fail to recognise this. Cook understands them to be holding the view that Wittgenstein introduced his notion of criteria, which they see as particular patterns of behaviour that are related to sensation words such as 'pain', to respond to the sceptical challenge. Cook questions whether it was the problem of other min& which precipitated Wittgenstein's concept of criteria He points out that Wittgenstein's purpose was to highlight the dangers of essentialism and his own objection to this idea that there is a single test for determinhg the applicability of general terms to individual cases. In other words, Cook maintains that Wittgenstein's notion of criteria was meant to address the idea that words are learnt and used according to strict rules. Wittgenstein, he argues was not using the concept of critena to attack the notion of 'the hidden' which arises from Descartes' metaphysical use of the 'body'; instead the concept of criteria addresses the supposition that there is an essence to thinking, expecting, or speahg apart from the mastery of language. That is to say, it opposes the notion of the hidden which arises from looking for a common element in the applicabiiity of a general term and finding none. "1 take it," Cook writes, "that Wittgenstein's opposition to this notion of 'the hidden' does not make him a behaviourist."'67 Cook's point here is that, Wittgenstein's opposition to the confusions inherent in an essentialist conception of the workings of language make it appear that he is in fact denying the 'mental' aspect to various cognitive operations, for example that thoughts and images are inessential to understanding, remembering, or playing chess. However, as Cook points out, Wittgenstein's contention is that certain surroundings are required in order to properly ascribe such operations to another person. Cook's analysis has ment. Fodor and Chihara misinterpret Wittgenstein's attack on essentialism as a direct assault on scepticism. However, Cook does not appear to fully grasp the nature of their claim about Wittgenstein's notion of criteria They maintained that Wittgenstein uses the tem criterion to mark the special connection behueen pain and pain-behaviour and that this connection seems to work in a manner anaiogous to definition. In a note about this claim, Cook writes,

Chihara and Fodor cannot, 1 think, be putting this in just the way they want, for it would seem to be merely redundant to say that there is a logical connexion between pain-behaviour and pain. What they mean, 1 suppose, is that Wittgenstein thought that there is a logical connexion between such and such 'bodily movements' and pain.168 Moreover, it is this ambiguity in Wittgenstein's remarks-one that Cook does not fùlly acknowledge---about the connection between behaviour statements and sensation statements which

16'- 16'- John W. Cook. "Human Beings". in Srudies in the Philosophy of Wittgcnsrein, ed.. Peter Winch. London: Roulledge & Kegan Paul. 1969, p. 136. 168. Ibid., p. 130, footnote two. appears to lead one to conclude that he is offering some pecuiiar behaviouristic theory of meaning. Fodor and Chihara appear to be justified in thinking that Wittgenstein seems to be claùniog that Our learning of mental concepts involves criteriai connections which map them ont0 characteristic patterns of behaviour.169 But it must be emphasised in Wittgenstein's favour that he argues ihat these characteristic patterns are not fuced; they are indefinite. And, hrthermore, he does not simply argue for a strict physicalistic account of mental concepts; he insists that behavioural criteria only have sense when situationally or conventionally placed. Fodor's criticisms of Wittgenstein form part of a much Iarger project, to show that logical behaviourism does not disprove the daim that behavioural events are caused by and explicable in terms of an organism's intemal States. This is the claim of a certain kind of mentalism, which he wants to defend. Fodor thinks that Wittgenstein's analysis of philosophicai psychology is deficient precisely in this respect and that there is after aii a sense in which a private language is possible.

The question whether such statements as "He moaned because he was in pain" function to explain behavior by relating it to an assumed cannot be settled simply by reference to ordinary linguistic usage. Answering this question requires broadly empitical investigation into the nature of thought and concept formation in normal human beings.170 Briefly stated, Fodor claims that Wittgenstein errs in his assessrnent of Augustine's account of how a child first learns language. Recall Wittgenstein's comment:

Augustine describes the ieaming of human as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it the child already had a language, only not this one, Or again, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And 'think' would here mean something like 'talk to itseif. (PI, 532) Fodor's contention is that Wittgenstein fails to understand how first languages are actually iearned. In his view, Augustine does indeed give a precise account of the acquisition of a first language. Fodor maintains that it is not possible to acquire a first language unless "one already has a system capable of representing the predicates in that language and their extensions."'n The reason for this is that learning a language means learning the meaning of its predicates, and this requires learning a

16'. Ibid., p. 13 1. Ibid., pp. 294 - 295. l7I. Fodor. The hguage of Thougltt, p. 64. determination of their extension- This in tum means that one must leam the mies-Fodor refers to them as "truth rules"-under which the predicates are subsumed. However, wne of this is possible without a representational system for the predicates. This system cannot be the language that is king learned nor cm it be a nanual language. In other words, what Fodor wants to claim is that some cognitive operations do not take place in natural languages, i.e., that there is a medium or language of thought. If one were to subscribe to the view that this representational system or medium of thought was nevertheless a natural language it wodd conflict with the obvious fact that nonverbal organisms think. It would seem that claiming that there must be a "metalanguage in which representations of the extensions of object language predicates are formulatedl~would lead to an infite regress of meta-metalanguages. Fodor's point, however, is not that one cannot leam a language unless one has already learned one but that requires that one already knows a language-

Thus, "the medium for the computations underlying cognitive processes"*n must be innate. He believes that this notion can be found implicitly in Augustine's characterisation of the child's acquisition of a fust language and that it represents the most plausible means of explaining how first languages are learned. Fodor argues that Wittgenstein's analysis of psychological topics suffers from a cornrnon tendency to see an exclusive and exhaustive distinction between mentalism and behaviourism. Or, to be more precise, he sees Wittgenstein as king part of a tradition which seeks to show the untenability of duaiism by providing arguments against mentaiism instead of repudiating the two- substance theory. This mistake is easily made, Fodor maintains, since a dualist is likely to be a mentalist as well; however, it is not the case that conversely al1 mentalists are dualists.

To maintain that statements about minds and statements about behavior are Iogically independent is fully compatible with maintaining that mental and behaviorai predicates apply to substances of the sme kind-- for example, either to persons or physicalobject~.~~~

--- -- 172. Ibid.. p. 65. 173. Ibid.. p. 65. 174. Jerry A. Fodor, Psychological fiplanarion: An lntroduclion ro rite Philosophy of Psychology, New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 56 - 57. Mentalism defmed in this fashion is compatible with a familiar definition of materialism, i.e., "it is compatible with the doctrine that mind states and brain states are contingently identical."m Fodor thinks that the reason for the failure to recognise thîs distinction has been the tendency to want to establish a logical comection beh~eenmental and behavioural ascriptions. He regards the

Philosophical Investigations as, in part, an assemblage of arguments "designed to establish that the existence of behavioural criteria is logically prerequisite to the use of rnentaI terms, at least in certain of their employment~."~~6Here, as in other analyticai behaviourist accounts of psychological predicates, the point of departwe is the scepticai premise. Thus, mentalism is shown to lead (very quiçkly) to the impossibility of king certain about one's claims regarchg other minds. This, it is purported, shows that there is something wrong with mentaiism since we ordinarily do not feel unjustified about the tnith of Our ascription of mental predicates to others. Such evidence appears to make a powerful case for adopting some variety of behaviourism. However, Fodor is not willing to concede so easily. He maintains that there need not be a necessary logical connection between mental statements and behaviour statements in order for one to be certain about applying mentai ascriptions to others. In other words, the absence of such connections is compatible with the possibility that the truth of statements of one sort should provide reasons for validating one's acceptance of statements of the other sort. He contends:

The dilemma that the behaviorist poses for the skeptic-either there is a logical connection between mental and behavioral predicates, or else one's certainty about some mental ascriptions is inexplicable-may property be said to rest upon an insufficiently subtle appreciation of the varied ways in which words such as 'certain' work.ln To maintain, as Fodofs Wittgenstein does, that inference from pain behaviour to pain is automatic, that reference to pain behaviour is sufficient justification for pain ascription, does not exclude the possibility that an equally sound accounting of mentai and behavioural predicates cm be given without the positing of a logical connection between them.

It cannot be stressed too often that there exist patterns of justificatory argument which are not happiIy identified either with appeals to symptoms or with appeals to criteria, and which do not in any obvious way rest upon such appeals. In these arguments, existentid claims about states, events, and processes,

-- -- - 175. Ibid., p. 57. 176. Ibid., p. 58. 177. lbid.. p. 66. which are trot directly observable are susceptible of justification despite the fact that no logical relation obtains between predicates ascribing States and predicates whose applicability can be directly observeci. There is a temptation to hold that in such cases there mmbe a criterion, that there must be some set of possible observations which would settiefor sure whether the theoreticai predicate applies. But we succumb to this temptation at the price of postulating stipulative definitions and conceptual alterations which faiI to correspond to anything we can discover in the course of empirical argwnents. The counter- intuitive features of philosophic analyses based on the assumption that there musc be criteria are thus not the consequences of a pmfound methodological insight, but rather a projection of an inadequate philosophical theory of justification.178 These sentiments echo Wittgenstein's reproach to an a priori account of the "reading" connection (PI, 5 156 - 9 158). In those remarks he cautions against thinking that what goes on inside a practised reader as opposed to a beginner distinguishes reading from not reading. He contended that thinking in this fashion only amounts to concocting hypotheses and models "to explain, to sum up, what you observe." (5156) One only wants to hold on to an a priori account of the reading connection because it is the sort of account which one finds extremely convincing. (5 158) One wants to Say that there is something highly characteristic occurring when a person reads, some happening beneath the surface of the spoken words, for instance. But, as Wittgenstein maintains, we ordinarily use the word "to read" in a variety of cases. In other words, as Fodor contends above, it appears that there are certain psychological processes whose applicability is not readily covered by a criterial relation, but this is only the case because we succumb to the view that there must be an a priori mechanism which accounts for them, that this mechanism alone correctly determines their applicability . However, as Wittgenstein reminds us, "in different circumstances we apply different criteria for a person's words." (PI, 5 165) There is no singular account which could be said to cover such cases. Nevertheless, although Wittgenstein inveighs against systematic accounts, he relies throughout his discussion of psychological predicates on the concept of cnteria- Criteria constitute a major part of the use of such predicates, and therefore of their meaning. To apply a mental predicate correctly, we rely on sorne criterion or other, although certainly not the same criterion. Rules of use allow a fairly wide substitution of behavioural cnteria. There is much that recommends Fodor's overall analysis of Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophical psychology. Wittgenstein's contention that criteria point us towards the proper

17*. Fodor and Chihara. "Operationalism and Ordinary Language," pp. 291 - 292. account of how we apply mental predicates to others does show the many-t~nerelational connection between behavioural and mental predicates. It is not clear, however, whether this connection possesses the analytic nahm protrayed by Fodor and Chihara in theû paper. There are times when Wittgenstein presents a stimulus-response view of psychological language and its referents, where another person's expressive behaviour (including his linguistic utterances) are the stimuli which elicit a pre-arranged network of habitua1 responses and reactions in 0thers.l" On the other hand, he does not attempt to cIari@ what the stimulating conditions for psychological utterances are, possibly because he considered them anything but exact, strict or fixed. Contextuai features may always be too indefinite to allow for a definitive selection of criteria that would form the bais of a theory . This is why his behaviourism is neither suictiy elirninative (a repudiation of mental states) nor stnctiy reductionistic (a translation of mental statements into behavioural ones). Wittgenstein's approach to psychological Ianguage and the supposed phenomena of rnind is, as he says, grammatical, which means that he is concerned with investigating their 'conventional' aspect. Although early types of behaviourism seem to have been inspired by a reductionist ontological impulse, namely the elirnination of mental variables fiom psychological explanation, Wittgenstein's method of philosophical 'ground-clearing' is less systematic. Recall the private linguist's query as to whether Wittgenstein was identifying pain in a child with crying; it appears that he is repudiating the inner state by insisting that we concem ourselves solely with behavioural observables.

Nonetheless, to mat behaviourism as a doctrine which can only deal with mental phenomena via reductive analysis or explanation is to accept ngid parameters. 1would claim that Wittgenstein was merely toying with the customary caricature of behaviourism as a materialistic monism or as a behavioural analogue of physicalism. He reaiised that if one were to adopt behaviounsm on these grounds, one would be subscribing to the view that words must name objects. For example, if one equates pain with crying, then one is claiming that 'pain' is the event called crying, but he saw

179. cf., PI, $290. for example. where he notes that a pain-utterance is not the end of the language-game of 'pain'. I take his meaning there to be that in the first-person case one has Iearned to repeat an expression of 'pain' as a matter of training. This then opens up the situation possibly to further ceactions even in the case of the person making the utterances. The utterance, itself, may be one of a number of ceactions precipitated by the speaker, such as 'jumping up and down', writhing, contorting his face, grasping the painful spot. etc.. etc.. that the consequences of this fwidamentai picture of language, ihat we use words solely to offer reports of our individual expenence, are stuliifying. In this regard 1 thuik that he is correct when he remarks that grasping the nature of mntai phenomena is ifrelevant to the intellig'bility of psychological predication. Furthemore, 1would contend that his fiuidamentai claim that grasping essences is not necessary for predication and ascription is a sound one:

Instead of producing something common to dl that we call language, 1am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for dl,-but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them al1 "language".(PI, 965) In making this contention he erodes ow belief that interactionism, parallelism or some fom of theory must be the 'true' account of mental activities and mental language. Consequently, his theory of justification does appear to be inadequate, inchoate and perhaps even counter-inituitive. He recognises our need for explanations, however. We feel a cextain epistemological unease since Our performance greatly outstrips our training. "There must be some explanation!" we think.180 And, so we fall back on the mentaüst premise which we think will satisfy our epistemological pangs. Wittgenstein appears to be correct in maintaining that our explanations, which are supposed to compensate for the paucity of Our grasp of the nature of things, never tmly strike at the mot assumptions of Our restricted pictures of language. That is why Fodor thinks that instead of our learning to establish criterial connections which map various mental terms ont0 characteristic patterns of behaviour, we may fom complex conceptual connections that interrelate a wide variety of mental States. "It is to such a conceptual system that we appeal when we attempt to explain someone's behavior by reference to his motives, intentions, beliefs, desires, or sensations."'81 What Fodor wants to say is that when we leam a language we develop a number of intricately intemlated "mental concepts" which we use for coming to ternis with our own behaviour and that of others. The acquisition of these mental concepts results in Our

180. cf.. Pl. $654 and 8655. In other words. Fodorls move towards a hidden conceptual representational system, though intuitive, is stili a move away from what is in plain view. cf.. $102:

The strict and clear niles of the logical structure of appear to us as something in the background--hidden in the medium of the undentanding. 1 already see them (even though through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, 1 use it to Say something. Ia1. "Opentionalism and Ordinary Language," p. 292. developing a variety of beiiefs involving them, which are subject to correction and alteration during our interaction with other individuals throughout Our lives. "On this view, our success in accounting for the behavior on the bais of which mental predicates are applied might properly be thought of as supplying evidence for the existence of the mental processes we posnilate."l82 In

other words, Fodor simply reverses Wittgenstein's formulation at $580, claimhg instead that an outward syndrome stands in need of an inner pr~cess-l~~

But, in making such a claim, Fodor fails to redise th& he has not avoided the traditional conception of sensations and mental concepts, i.e., he has not escaped using a name-object mode1 of reference. Fodor's view appears to arnount to the claim thai pain, for example, is a syndrome which is a conflation of various mental variables which cannot be precisely arrangecl according to criteria. Yet this view is based on the rnisleading presupposition that a concept or a term or a name

must signify or denote some 'event', 'object', 'state', or thing, a referent (whether mysterious or obvious) which forms the basis of the name's meaning and sense. Fodor merely reaffiis the philosophical disease-the urge for explanation-in spite of the fact that he recognises that Wittgenstein's later writings highlight the dangers of remaining cornmitted to traditional philosophical attitudes. Thus, he sees no danger in the following argument:

To maintain that there are no criterial connections between pains and behavior does not commit us to holding that the fact that people often feel pains when they cry out isjust a contingent fact (in the sense in which it is just a contingent fact that most of the books in my library are unread). The belief that other people feei pains is not gratuitous even on the view that there are no criteria of pains. On the contrary, it provides the only plausible explanation of the facts 1 know about the way they behave in and vis à vis the sorts of situations 1 find painful. These facts are, of course, enormously cornplex- The "pain syndrome" inchdes not only correlations between varieties of overt behaviors but also more subtle relations between pain and motivations, utilities, desires, and so on. Moreover. 1confidently expect that there must exist reliable members of this syndrome other than the ones with which 1am currently familia. 1am in need of an explanation of the reliability and fruitfulness of this syndrome, an explanation which reference to the occurrence of pains supp~ies.*~~ What this shows is that Fodor steadfastly believes that the ascription of a psychological predicate points to some inner event, which grounds its meaning. This also indicates that Fodor is unprepared to accept Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as a 'form of life'. Fodor sees

lg2. Ibid., p. 293. lg3. Ibid.. p. 293. la. Ibid., p. 293. Wittgenstein's remark that the= must be criteria which justify Our ascription of psychological predicates to others as indicating that behaviourai criteria can be the only plausible extemal candidates for 'inner' states. He appears to think that Wittgenstein fails by not tehg us how this type of justification is exhausted, or when Our justification by cnteria is supposed to end. In this sense he appears to be accusing Wittgenstein of positing a type-to-type correspondence of mental states and behaviourai states, Le., that a mental state forms a complex of events/processes which can be (are) correlated and identifid with a particular set of behavioural movements. Such an accusation would mean that Wittgenstein's apparent weak logical behaviorism, Le., that there is a relation between mental statements and behaviour statements which is a 'grammatical' one, is reaily a mask for a stronger logical behaviourism when one takes into account how criteria work in justifying predicate ascription. Yet this overlooks Wittgenstein's hint that there are no fmed desof context. In spite of this plasticiity of rules, it is the context which shapes the sense of the ascription of a predicate. What would count as critena only makes sense within a given context; abstracted from their constituting conventions they are dead.

A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute out of this proceeding out of its surroundings: the crown is king pIaced on the head of the king in his coronation robes.-But in different surroundings gold is the cheapest of metals, its gleam is thought vulgar. There the fabric of the robe is cheap to produce. A crown is a parody of a respectable hat- And so on. (PI, 8584) Criteria do not constitute a static logical relation in spite of the fact that they are fundamental to detemiining the intelligibility and applicability of tenns and concepts. Because they must be able to account for the indeterminacy and indefiniteness of rules of use and be sufficiently flexible to connect behavioural manifestations (which are oftentimes relatively unpredictable) to supposedly 'inner' states and processes, criteria escape easy categonsation dong traditional lines. A criterion does not fulfil the role of truth-conditions for the verifkation of a proposition, reminiscent of the project of the Tractatus. Although it may serve as a ground for an assertion or as justification for a judgement, it is more properly understood as an instrument for describing how the grarnmar of a language-game works. Criteria allow us, more or less conclusively, to discriminate the circumstances in which a particular expression is applicable and thereby they are intemelateci with the rules that govem employment. In other words, they are active ingredients of a context which draw us into the web of language-garnes. It seems fair to speculate that Fodor does think that

Wittgenstein has found a new way of making the logical project of the Traciatus viable in the analysis of mental concepts, Le., that criteria presented him with a novel means for avoiding problems encountered in tmth-conditional about psychological statements. However, it should be clear by now that Wittgenstein is not interested in anulyzing mental phenomena, but instead is trying to illuminate the phenomena of conventions and traditions by which we leam to use and understand mental terms.185 Fodor and Chihara wnte, "what is at issue is the possibility of a type of justification which consists in neither the appeal to criteria nor the appeal to obsemed c~rrelations."l~~And he thinks that Wittgenstein fds to provide grounds for the exhaustiveness of these types of justification. However, this is an unfair assessrnent of Wittgenstein's notion of criteria Wittgenstein's point seems to be that unless we have behavioural criteria for the applicability of concepts, unless we are able to appeal to observed comlations, we would find it impossible to teach or establish language. "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as it rnay sound) in judgements." (PZ, 5242) That is to Say, unless there is a relational connection between psychological language and circurnstances and behaviour, then intelligibility and coherent linguistic employment would fa11 to the ground. Critena cernent the relational connection between what we Say and do and the concepts and predicates that we utilise, because (it must be remembered) a language-game may not end with my assertion that "he is tmly in pain", but rnay only be the beginning of the language-game or a prelude to other games which this one intersects. In other words, Wittgenstein is not using criteria simply to confm that a predicate is

appropriate to a particular case. It may indeed be the case that he "failed to consider ail the possible types of answers to the question, What is the justification for the claim that one cm tell, recognize, or determine that Y applies on the basis of the presence of X?"l87 Then again, his project is not simply one of hypothesis formation and confirmation in the abstract. "What we have rather to do

185. cf., PI, $90. lg6. "Operationalism and Ordinary Language." p. 291. lg7. Ibid., p. 291. is to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false." (PI, p.

200.) This may leave us somewhat dissatisfied, because we would Wre to think thaî there is stili room for another type of justification aside fkom criteria, but perhaps here we should admit that we have reached bedrock and that Our spade is tumed.la The challenge which Fodor would have to meet is whether another category of justification, besides that of criteria, could account for the complexity of the language-games in which we engage daily and for the truth of our psychological ascriptions. Wittgenstein reaiizes that eventually one reaches a point where there is no Merneed of justiîication.lg9 1notice someone in pain and 1 simply react to assist or not. My reaction-and ùiis is the crucial point in Wittgenstein treatment of sensation language-is not based on assuring myself of the grounds for thinking the other person's behaviour non-genuine in view of the circumstances. Justification is an immediate activity; it is not an abstract process but a practice (a form of life). 1 consider that a proper understanding of the later Wittgenstein's method (a conventionalism with an underpinning of operationalism) is central to resolving the question about behaviourism which Wittgenstein poses to himself. By rejecting a metaphysical treatment of words, reference, or meaning ("what we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage" (PI.8 116)). Wittgenstein's approach, with its apparent scientifk perspective and empiricist predilections, essentially snubs more traditional philosophical investigations of mental phenomena. It echoes. if not in substance, then in a~itude,Watson's polemical rallying cry for the behaviourist agenda: "1 feel that behavionbn is the only consistent and logical functionaIism. In it one avoids both the Scylla of pdlelism and the Charybdis of interaction. Those time-honoured relics of philosophical speculation need trouble the student of behavior as littie as they trouble the student of physics."*g0 Fodor's account, that we possess a progressively interrelateci network of mental concepts which account for our behavioural expressions and responses, is the exact antipode of Weiss's lS8. cf., PI, 8217. ls9. cf., PI, 921 i and 5217, lgO. John B. Watson. "Psychology As The Behaviorist Views It." Psychological Review. 1913. vol. XX, p. 166. account of how we apply psychological ternis. Thinking, Weiss held, "is a fom of behavior highly conventionalized, made up of very complex response series which are in process of formation throughout the life of the individual and throughout the history of the race."lg' Weiss maintained that our application of menral predicates is due to a complicated self-correcting network of habits and responses which we develop from Our interactions with others, a view which seerns to parallel (with some modifcations) Wittgenstein's treatrnent of our ascription of mental predicates to others. What I mean here is that although Wittgenstein does not follow the mechanistic

conception of mental concepts which Weiss employed, he too held the view that how people act and react in certain contexts constitute grounds for ascription of a psychological predicate. Where Wittgenstein differs from a behaviourist who follows Weiss's mode1 for understanding of mental concepts is that he does not think that such reactions in their respective circumstances defne or entail the meaning of the psychological predicate in question. Nonetheless, Weiss appeared to hold that the intelligibility of various mentai phenornena did not necessitate introspective ontological reference. For example, consider the following claim: "1 have the sensation of redness, etc., is certainly a verbal reaction that occurs under rather definite stimulating conditions and as such presents sensori-motor conditions which may be investigated quite independently of any mind- body implication."l92 Note the sarcasm in one of Wittgenstein's remarks, which sirnilady deflects attention from an inner process:

Of course, saying the word "red" "refers to" instead of "means" something private does not help us in the least to grasp its function; but it is the more psychologically apt expression for a particuIar experience in

lgl. Albert P. Weiss, A Theorerical Basis of Fiwnan Behavior, Second Edition Revised, Columbus: R-R. Adams & Co., 1929, p. 353, Weiss did not see our actions as independent. isolated wholes or units. He held a deterministic view of human activity. He felt that every action was an effect of every other action in the history of an individual and was also a partial cause of consequent actions; that it is to say. that our activities conformed to some bioscocid plan or order which was dependent upon our inheritance. training. and our environment- He wrote:

The reason why our so-calIed wants. desires, and purposes seem to be such spontaneous affairs and apparently independent of environment and past training, is due to the fact that the adult is unable to designate in just what way a given behavior possibility will fit with his future life. (Ibid., p. 378)

Purpose or purposive behavior is the name for the fact that in addition to multiplicity and variety in the responses of the individual there are also inter-organizations of the various response systems that conform to traditional or conventionalized sequences. These sequences fom parts of longer behavior life history series- The terminal responses of the sequences belong to the individual or biosocial categones and are designated as the purpose or aim of the antecedent activities. (Ibid.. pp. 379 - 380) lg2. Ibid., pp. 287 - 288. doing philosophy- It is as if when 1 uttered the word I cast a sidelong glance at the private sensation, as it were in order to Say to myself: 1know al1 nght what 1mean by it. (PI, 5274) Essentially, Fodor's accusation stems €rom his view that adherents of logical behaviourism are unable to disprove the mentalist's contention that "the cau.uzti;on of behavior is determined by , and explicable in ternis of, the organism's Uitemal states."lg3 Fodor conceives of meaning and understanding as matters of intemal representation whereas Wittgenstein, of course, argues that allegedly 'private' processes can only be made intelligible by means of public language, that al1 taik of presupposes public language. Fodor's attack is directed against any kind of reductionism which attempts to show "that the mental events that psychological explanations appeal to cannot be causal antecedents of the behavioral events that psychological theones seek to

account for."l94 He sees Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology as an example of this sort of reductionism which alleges that there is a conceptual relation between behavioural and mental predicates in typical instances of psychological explanations. The acknowledgment or implication that such a connection exists yields what he describes as the "second-class ontological status of mental events".1g5 It should be pointed out, however, that Wittgenstein's contention that a conceptual comection exists does not arise from some a priori assumption about the essence of phenornena of mind. 1have already indicated that Wittgenstein claims that the attempt to intemalise the nature of meaning and explanation is fruitless, that intemaüzation cannot produce sense. In addition, it bars repeating, Wittgenstein contends that the ontological status of mental concepts and processes, second-class or otherwise, has no bearing on the cogency of how mental predicates are applied and understood; the issue of ontology only serves as a seductive philosophical lure away from accepting that the inteugibiiity of these concepts lies readily accessible in Our linguistic and behavioural practices, customs, and traditions. Fodor appears to think that Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology shows an implicit , in that use of language requires a means for determining fhat its tems are consistently and correctly employed. He contends that Wittgenstein's argument against the idea of lg3. Fodor, The Lunguage of Thoughr. p- 8. lg4. Ibid., p. 8. Ig5. Ibid.. pp. 8 - 9. a private language arnounts to the notion that language requires a coherency between the way ternis

are used and the way the world is.196 Wittgenstein is taken to be defending, apparently, a conventionalist account of the nature of the world, Le.. thai the custorns of the linguistic community determine the facts of the world-customs which are prior ta the facts. Fodor thinks

that Wittgenstein is insisting that proper use of linguistic terms is indicated strictly by

correspondence with customary employment. However, to hply that Wittgenstein held to conventionalism in this sense would be to cIaim that the sense of a word is simply what the linguistic community decides it to be, and it would ignore the criterial comection between a word and its use. This, however, does not accurately convey Wittgenstein's meaning. According to Wittgenstein, proper use of linguistic terms is linked with criteria, criteria which point out that our use of particular terms is conceptually connected to a certain reportoire of primitive reactbns and

responses, cornrnon to aii human beings, which some temis corne to replace. This is what underlies Wittgenstein's attack on the i&a of a private language, which severs the criterid connection between a word and its employment, prescribing instead that coherence of employment points, necessarily, to an intemal relationship between words and their meaning. This relationship cannot be understood to be a simple correspondence of use of terms to what the speech comrnunity agrees upon, Fodor acknowledges, but bespeaks something subtler:

Wittgenstein has. I think, a certain picture of what coherence of employment cornes to for terms in a public language (e.g., English). Very roughly, the use of public language tenns is controlIed by the conventions of the speech community. These conventions relate the terms (in many different ways) to paradigrn public situations, To use a term coherently is to use it in accordance with the governing conventions. To use it in accordance with the goveming conventions is to use it when the paradigms are satisfied. In short, a term is coherently employed when its use is controlled (in the right sorts of ways) by the facts of the wor1d.lg7 Fodor wants to counter this interpretation with the view that language employrnent is not simply deiermined by a person's intentions but also by that person's beliefs. A person's verbalisations do not arnount to a simple matter of coordinating his utterances with the paradigrnatic situations for respective terms. "Even in the case of public languages, coherence doesn't require a stable relation between the way the terms are used and the way the world is: What it requires is a stable relation

lg6. Ibid., p. 7 1. Ig7. ibid., p. 71. between the way the te- are used and the way the spehr believes the world to be."lg8 Fodor wanu to emphasise that should an individual's beliefs be consistently incorrect, there may suU be sense to the notions which this individual employs in his lanpage, irrespective of the fact that there may be very littie correspondence between the individual's statements and the Linguistic practices of the general community. However, if one wants to maintain that intentional statements, for example, need not be primarily predictive in order for them to have sense and do not require a conceptual relation between meaning and behaviour, then one is resorting to a private theaire of meaning, a move which makes it diffiscult to account for the intelligibility of one's concepts.

In al1 faimess to Fodor-in spite of the fact that his project is obviously to argue for the cogency of private language4iagenstein's characterisation of understanding and meaning does

appear to take on a disguised verificationism, where terms are said to properly apply if their use complies with conventional employment, or what could be imagined to be a possible general application. Fodor also appears to be correct in thinking thaî Wittgenstein's notion of criteria highlights some logical connection between hypothesis formation and confirmation. In this regard, 1 would like to review Wittgenstein's treatrnent of what detennines understanding. Beginning in § I 5 1, Philosophical Investigations combats the idea thx "understanding" is a mental process or consists in some inner psychical state. Wittgenstein makes the case that "understanding" and "knowing" are not words which denote queer, inner processes or States, but that their meaning is a matter of application: these concepts are best highlighted by certain operations, procedures and activities by which an individual is trained to work (to respond).

In other words, a person's grasp of them is shown by how well he is able to perfom any number of activities which can be said to comprise the 'grammatical' landscape of these concepts. Wittgenstein is arguing that there is no set one-to-one type conespondence between menial and behaviour statements, that 'paradigrnatic' circurnstances are flexible and indefmite,and not exhaustible: Try not to think of understanding as a 'mentai process' at al1.-For thaf is the expression which cocifuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what circumstances, do we Say, "Now 1know how to go on," when, that is, the formula h4S occurred to me?- In the sense in which thece are mental processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of undentanding, understanding is nota mental process. (PI, 9 154) What justifies whether an individual understands a principle or a formula is his lattr performance, his king able to continue, how he uses it in paiticular circumstances. Furthermore, this activity must be consistently repeated. An individual must show that he has mastered the application of a particular term or is able to follow a rule beyond a single instance. And, it should be emphasised here, the important consideration is how the individual indicates thaî he has understood a concept, term or predicate. It is a matter of display. Can he consistently show that he has grasped the sense of a particular term or predicate? This appears to imply that the community of language- users must be able, and are able, to confm that an individuai has used a term adequately, that there are some implicit 'standards' to which they can resort in passing judgement based upon an individual's behaviour:lg9

Thus what 1 wanted to Say was: when he suddenly knew how to go on, when he understood the principle, then possibly he had a special experience-and if he is asked: "What was it? What took place when you suddenly grasped the principle?" perhaps he will describe it much as we described it above-but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an expenence that justify hirn in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on. (PI, 5 155) That Fodor defends the picture of the 'inner' to account for meaning and understanding shows that he reproduces the sarne presuppositions which Wittgenstein directly attacks. Fodor appears to err in his exaggerated assessrnent of the relevance of a person's beliefs to that person's correct employment of ternis in language. 1t seems to me that Wittgenstein does appear to take into consideration the issue of a person's beliefs and its bearing on the problem of meaning. He would not want to discount the relevance of a person's beliefs for determining his verbalizations, but regardless of what goes into constituting a person's verbalizations, their sense lies in his intentions and activities. Prionty in determining coherence of employment must lie with the public stage on which a person's operations take place. To think otherwise, for instance, to elevate belief and

lg9.cf., also PI. 3 156 whem Wittgenstein writes: ''The word *to cead is applied difircnr[y when we are speaking of the beginner and of the practised reader." There appears to be a tacit premise that out training. and the reference of the common natural behaviour of human beings allows us to establish criteria which distinguish various applications of terms and predicates, and thus consequently acts as means for confirming and verifying proper usage. internal representation as offering illumination on the problem of understanding is to not appreciate our ultimate dependence on criteria for a person understanding a formula, king able to continue a series, etc.. Fodor is not incorrect in claiming that one's convictions about what counts as the appropriate situations in which a prcdicate is applicable must be consistent with the Linguistic policies which govem the correspondence of particular predicates to their respective situations, but he is misguided in thinking that this justifies there king a language of thought. In this respect he rnisinterprets the challenge proposed by the private language argument. According to Fodor, that challenge is as follows:

We musc give some sense to the notion of tems in an internai representational systern king used coherently and we must show how that sense is at least reasonably analogous to the sense in which the terms in public languages are coherently ernp~o~able?~~ From Wittgenstein's viewpoint, any such project is misguided; it is a philosophical mirage! Even if there are private referents for Linguistic terms, sense is a public notion; intelligibility is a public matter. Therefore, it is not possible to give sense to terms in an intemal representational system independently of reference to public language. One would have to account for how one is able to leam the 'grammar' of the terms, and this cannot be accomplished without an intersubjective theatre of meaning. Fodor does not think that Wittgenstein's argument against pnvate language applies to his representational theory of meaning/predication, on the grounds that "the language of thought is presumably innate. Hence, though there is an obligation to make sense of the notion of its king used coherently, there is no obligation to show how it could be taught or learned."201 A language of thought "does not require that one should be able to detennine that its terxns are consistentiy employed; it requires only that they should in fact be consistently employed."*O2 In this respect Fodor appears to not fully grasp the implications of his view that Wittgenstein is guilty of verificationism in his treatment of coherence of employment Fodor disagrees with what he takes to be Wittgenstein's assumption in the private language argument that coherence requires a stable

200. Op. cit., p. 71. 201. Ibid., p. 70. 202. Ibid., p. 70. relation between the way terms are used and the conventions which give sense to their use. This is a fundamenial point in the private language argument. Because the basis for coherence of employment are nile-govemed conventions, there is no possibility of private as opposed to public languages. Langage is fundamentally public; it is an activity founded on primitive, natural behavioural expressions which are common to al1 human beings. It begins with and is founded on training. This is the reason why we are able to agree in the terms we use. Wittgenstein's parable of the explorer is instructive. If we were to stumble upon an unknown people, we should be able to leam their language provided that there is a regular connection between their behaviour and their articulations.*03 A language must have niles of employment, for we must be able to uain someone to apply its ternis and predicates, and be able to determine that this penon has mastered the training. Herein Lies Wittgenstein's apparent verificationism. Because language is founded on

training and we thereby are taught to react in certain ways, for example, "we react to an order in a particular way,"204 this makes it possible for us to pmlict a person's reactions based on his utterances.2s Therefore, Wittgenstein is claiming (correctly in my estimation), that the existence of a certain correspondence between a speaker's propositional attitudes (including beliefs) and the Linguistic practices of the cornmunity, not simply the practices of the speakerhearer as Fodor

believes, is essentiai to the coherent use of a language. Wittgenstein's argument against the idea of private language is that the relation between Linguistic foms and propositional attitudes cm only be rnediated by public conventions, and that this relation is highlighted by criteria Instead of refuting

this contention, Fodor repeats the rnistake that coherent employrnent must point the way to an intemal representationaVcomputational system which accounts for it. Fodor has failed to corne to grips with Wittgenstein's behaviourism. Fodor's interpretation of Wittgenstein as a logical behaviourist is influenced by his own mentalist agenda, Le., to show that a representational theory of mind--the content of which is the

203. cf., PI, $207. 204. Ibid., 9206. 205. cf., $242. computer metaphor-is a biologicai necessity.*M (His contention is that behaviourism is not a valid theory because it is dependent upon something which cannot be me, namely, rnindhehaviour correlationism.2~He is correct in thinking that Wittgenstein's remarks owe much to an impücit operationaiist conception of meaning. According to Wittgenstein one confirms or

verifies that a particular concept is appropnate based on reference to its originaiing situation and circumstances.2~8 By doing so, he defiects the issue of the nature of phenomena for a consideration of the circumstances of coherent Iinguistic employment. Unlike Watson, however,

he does not subscribe to a definitional approach. Although the context provides the criteria for the

206. Op. cit., p. 71. 207. N. J- Block and J. A Fodor, "What Psychological States Are Not". Philosophical Review, 81, 1972, p. 160. The following statement is dso made there: "The paradox about behaviorism and physicalism is that while most of the arguments that have surrounded these doctrines have been nanowly "conceptuai". it seems increasingly likely that the decisive arguments against them are empirical." (Ibid.. p. 162-1 I take Fodor's meaning here to be that the type of correspondence between psychological states on the one hand and behaviour or physical states on the other hand is implausible in both cases. Firstly, he seems to think that behaviounsm, because it is a semantic theory about the logical relations between types, essentially requires a strict identity between psychological states and behavioural states. For the most part he makes a similar point about physicalism as well. In fact, it strikes me that the suicter a behaviounsm is forrnulated it becomes indistinguishable from physicalism. One could maintain that it is simply materialistic monism redressed. The problem with this is that it is empiricdly impossible to speciQ the behavioural correlate of a psychoIogical state; the same argument would hold for the physicalistic version as well. Fodor's implication appears to be chat psychoIogica1 states are too complex for a simplification of that sort- Given that there is no evidence for one-to-one correspondence, this does not warrant philosophical theories which require it. Now, it is only fair to Say that this is true of a strict behaviourism which is a fundamentally eliminative ontological doctrine. However. one could cal1 for a many-to- one correspondence (for both physicalism and behaviourism), where as Fodor points out. there is a distinct disjunction of types of behavioural or physical states corresponding to a specific type of psychological state, Again, Fodor's contention is that psychological states are too complex for this correspondence as well.

For exarnple. there is really no reason to believe that the class of types of behaviors which. in the whole history of the universe, have (or wiU have) expressed rage for some organism or other, is distinct from the class of types of behaviors which have expressed, Say. pain. In considering this possibility. one should bear in mind that practicdly any behavior might. in the appropriate circumstances. become the conventional expression of practically any psychological state and that a given organism in a given psychological state might exhibit almost any behavioral disposition depending on its beliefs and preferences. The same kind of point applies, mutatis mutandis. against the assumption that there is a distinct disjunction of types of physical states corresponding to each type of psychological state, since it seems plausible that practically any type of physical state could realize practically any type of psychological state in some kind of physical system or other. (Ibid., pp. 162 -163)

Frankly, it is not clear chat this argument applies to Wittgenstein or for chat rnatter to behaviourism generally speaking. Fodor is right in countenng the stnctness of both one-to-one correspondence and many-to-one correspondence. but they are both variants of a monistic behaviourism (Watson's early formulation would be exarnple of such a doctrine). Boch types of conespondences are founded on name-object modeIs of meaning which Wittgenstein's philosophical behaviourism avoids. Now, if one were to claim that his behaviourism is represented by the notion that there is a IogicaI relation between psychological and behavioural predicates, one must nonethetess avoid contending that this relationship cm be isolated from the conventional situations wherein its sense is detennined. Fodor appears to make this mistake at times. 208. cf.. for example, PI, p. 212 where Wittgenstein remarks:

Now it is easy to recognize cases in which we are interpreting. When we interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove fa1se.--"I am seeing this figure as a ....." can be verifid as little as (or in the same sense as) "1 am seeing bright red". So there is a similarity in the use of "seeing" in the two contexts. Only do not think you knew in advance what the "state of seeing" means here! Let the use reach you the meaning. (Pl. p. 212) application of a tenu or concept, a term's meaning is not fixed imvocably by a specific set of circumstances. In other words, many predicates are 'fuzzy-edged', meaning they have no defmed limits of use and thus are not amenable to strict specifications of circumstances for their application. That many predicates do not have &terminate extensions also strengthens their depiction in terms of family resemblances.209 One has been trained regarding the appropriateness of the potential application of predicates, but this training does notfix a particular term's ascnption. Although one learns the sense of a predicate from the situations to which it applies, the sense of that predicate is not defined for al1 time by those situations. For example, it is not a simple matter

to cl& that 5 o'clock on the Sun means the same thing as it does here?O Although Fodor disagrees with Wittgenstein that the notion of criteria starnps the connection between the mental

statements and behaviour statements, he is correct that this novel logical relation establishs a

sufficiently definitive, Ait uncategorisable correspondence between the two. Wittgenstein does claim that there is a conceptuai connection between mental and behavioural statements, yet he rejects any thesis that would explain the connection as grounded on an ontological one, as was customary with other forms of behavioutism. In this regard, at least, he adhered to his own pronouncement in the Investigations: "Philosophy simply puis everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anythmg.--Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain." (PZ, 5 126) The impulse of Watson's programme was reductionistic, for (at first) he wanted to eschew al1 reference to mentalistic entities in his behaviouristic conception of psychology, and thus he prescribed an artificid and abstract comection between mental and behavioural statements in the conditions he placed upon the type identity of psychological States. The same point can be made about physicalism as well. Essentially, a behaviourism which is eliminative in scope can only present an artificial conneciion-an implausible and artificial one, according to Fodor211-between mental and behavioural predicates because it is based on a materialistic monism. Such an approach still affis a name-object theory of meaning and reference which Wittgenstein repudiates, dong

209. cf.. PI, $65 - 568. 210. Ibid.. $350. 2f l. Block and Fodor. "What Psychological States Are Not." pp. 161 - 163. with any doctrine which =sorts to introspective repmsentation. Wittgenstein does indeed claim chat there must be a logicd connection betwcen the terms we employ and what we Say and do, otherwise we could not train someone in the use of our language nor would a stranger be able to translate it into his own. This shows that, although he is eschewing a strict scienhfic or definitional accounting of linguistic employment, he nonetheless retains an attitude which, by stressing the relational nature of language and behaviour, owes much to scientific investigation. His starting point (to the extent that one can clairn that he does have one) is our common natural primitive behaviour. Thus, it is not clear whether his behaviourism is a logical behaviourist account, as Fodor and Chihara clah, since the criterial relation he argues for between psychological predicates and behavioural predicates is neither a strict one-to-one correspondence nor a strict multiple disjunctive correspondence (though it does share many features with the latterm). This may make it appear that 1am vindicating Wittgenstein against the charge of king a behaviourist in disguise, but that is not my intention. My own sympathies lie with Fodor and Chihara. Wittgenstein's criterial relation, in spite of the fact that it fds outside the normal categones of logical relations, does more than simply illustrate his philosophical psychology's debt to behaviourism; it follows a thread between his approach to philosophy and his analysis of psychological concepts and our use of psychological language that stretches back, through the influence of behaviounsm upon philosophical treatment of the mind-body problem, to Watson's formulation of the pnnciples of his behaviouristic protest against the traditional schools of doing psychology. Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy of psychology does not simply echo behaviourist themes, it displays an inheritance and, more importantly, a development of them. It could be said that much of the pnvate language argument implicitly indicates that Wittgenstein realised that a traditionai behaviounst identification of mental phenornena with their behavioural expressions was a philosophically simplistic account of Our use of psychological language, but that the behaviounst contention that there is a conceptuai relation between mind and behaviour nonetheless provided the best framework for explaining how

212. in this respect 1 am thinking of his notion of family-resemblances. we do in fact come to know and understand mentai concepts. His idea of criteria provides a means for marking that relationship between the indetenninacy of the meaning of such concepts and the relative unpredictability of human behaviour. In this regard his bebaviourism appears to evade

Fodor's and Chihara's classification of weak logical behaviourism. Nevertheless, the family resemblance is close. Wittgenstein's behaviourism appears to show an implicit operationalism according to which the meaning of psychological concepts should be treated as pubk and theorising should be replaced by 'empirical' description. If a systematic account were to be given that incorporates such views, then it would clearly point to a refmement of the theory of mind found in a weak logical behaviourism. Bnefly stated, Wittgenstein's account of the relation between behavioural statements and menta1 ones shares the primary feature with Fodor's notion of weak logical behaviourism, that there must be some logical or conceptual connection between the two in order for psychological concepts to be intelligible and to be sensibly applied. Beyond this, Wittgenstein's remarks do not sufficiently allow for the characterisation which Fodor attempts to assign to them, since he would like to maintain that the criterial relation establishes a strong category of justification, a fmer one than Wittgenstein's remarks appear to consistently allow for. To Fodor's credit the criterial relation does complicate the contention that Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist because for Wittgenstein it provides a definitive means for describing the coherent employrnent of terms. Although Fodor suives to make a case for bringing his position under the rubric of traditional logical categories, Wittgenstein's own lack of clarity about the nature of a critenon makes mcult any classification dong these traditional lines (as will be argued in more detail later on). Nevertheless, the resemblance to weak togical behaviourism is close, despite some distinctive differences which Fodor seems to not fuliy appreciate: (a) Wittgenstein does not argue for any definitional correspondence between mental and behavioural statements, although he sometimes describes criteria in a manner which suggests a definition (as in the case of 'toothache'213), which leaves it unclear how the notion is to be properly understood. (b) Wittgenstein places emphasis on

213. cf., The Blue Book, pp. 24 - 25. the grarnmar of psychological language, which rneans that he is canvassing the operations which constitute meaning and understanding, i.e., his enterprise is a descriptive one, not an andytic one. (c) It is not possible to abstract the 'content' of activities and circumstances from their contextual setting, according to Wittgenstein. One cannot hold that writhing or facial contortions, for example absolutely constitute the meaning of 'pain'. (d) It is sufficient justification for most predication to acknowledge that this is how the language-game is played, that for example, it makes sense to say that John is in pain if one notices that he has just slammed a door on his finger, sharply tosses his hand about, then grabs it, whilst exclaiming, "ouch!" (e) Wittgenstein's main project is not that of hypothesis formation and confirmation; his concem lies with determining the multiple ways in meaning is established. For these reasons, aithough 1share Fodor's contention that Wittgenstein is indeed a behaviourist in disguise, Wittgenstein's behaviourism seems to elude even Fodor's notion of weak logicai behaviounsm. Chapter Four: Nonnan Mukuh @zmmar as Antfiropoligy Norman Malcolm Grammar as Anthropology Since Norman Malcoh attempts to vindicate Wittgenstein's denial of the charge of behaviourism, it would seem that my own interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophicd psychology must clash with his. However, 1 will attempt to show tbat Malcolm's generai conception of Wittgenstein's approach, in pglticular his understanding of the latter's notion of philosophy as gramrnar, point towards a behaviouristic reading of Wittgenstein which highlights the striking parailels between Wittgenstein's underlying principles and those found in various forrns of behaviourism. The ciifference between his concIusion and mine is that 1 do not take behaviourism to be solely a reductionistic doctrine. Malcolm upholds Wittgenstein's dismissal of the charge by placing emphasis (overly so in my view) on the contextual framework whereby the intelligibility of psychological concepts is established. Malcoim commits the fault of treating behaviourism as a theory which approaches rneaning by resorting to defintional analyses and overlooks the behaviouristic method Wittgenstein uses for the purpose of rejecting referentiaiism as the essential means for resolving problems of rneaning. 1shall begin by contrasting Malcolm's reading of Wittgenstein with Fodor's. 1 think that Maicolm quite correctly points out that Fodor's enterprise is a mythical one.a4 It arises from the feeling that there are hidden processes which properly explain our mastery of mental concepts, i.e., that there must be something behind and in addition to Our remembering something, recognising a face, understanding a principle, and so on. Of this predicarnent Wittgenstein noted:

We are trying to get hold of the mental process of understanding which seems to be hidden behind those coarser and thetefore more readily visible accornpaniments. But we do not succeed; or, rather, it dws not get as far as a real attempt. For even supposing I had found something that happened in al1 those cases of understanding,--why should if be the understanding? And how can the process of understanding have been hidden?! And If1 Say it is hidden-then how do 1 know what 1 have to look for? 1am in a muddle. (PI, § 153) The point king made here. as Malcolm illustrates, is that many philosophers think that there must be something 'mysterious' behind our operations with mental concepts, the assumption king that

213. cf., "Thinking." and "Wittgenstein: The Relation of Language to Instinctive Behavior," in Wirtgensteittian Themes: Essays 1978-1989, ed., Georg He~kvon Wright, Ithaca: Corne11 University Press. 1995, pp. 1 - 15 and pp. 66 - 86 respectively; also Norhing is Hirldew Wirtgenstein's Criricism of his Eariy Thoughr, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1 986, Chapter Seven: "The Inner Process of Analysis". understanding or intending, for example, must consist in a process or some special kind of phenornenon. 'We are strongly atttar:ted by the assumption thai the meaning of a word is something that 'corresponds' to the word. For exarnple, we are inched to think that the meaning of the word 'red' is something red."a5 This assumption is nurtured by a certain picture of language, namely a name-object theory, and is founded on some vague sense of psycho-physical causation. We are seduced by the notion that a process of understanding must be an aethereal correlate of its behavioural manifestation/expression which in spite of its distinction from the latter is nonetheless the 'efficient cause' of it. Or, as Wittgenstein suggests, we are led to believe that the queer, covert process of understanding is not conveyed by its accompanying expression. "In Our failure to understand the use of a word we take it as the experience of a queer process." (PI, 5 196)

From Malcolm's perspective, this belief underlies Fodor's contention that there must be a representational system in order for linguistic predication to be possible. In Malcolm's view, Fodor accepts that a person is somehow guided in his use of language.216

There must be something on hand that shows him how to speak, how to put words together gramrnatically and with coherent sense, and how to recognize a combination of words as being ungrammatical or arnbiguous or incoherent. What is king explained is knowledge-both knowing that and knowing how- The presence in him of the structure of the language or its system of niles is supposed to account for this knowledge--to explain how he I~nows.~~~

For MaIcolm, the seductive assumption that there must be some mechanism of guidance involved with Our acquisition and use of language shows the remnant of psychophysicd causality, the irnplicit Cartesianism regarding the relation between mental statements and behavioural staternents. This predicament arises, as he (and Wittgenstein) point out, in attempts to analyze or explain Our grasp of mental concepts (for exarnple, in PI, 5 153, quoted above). Malcolm further clauris that philosophy is plagued by a "veneration of evidence"218 and this. in conjunction with the misguided notion that there must be an object of thought which coexists with the thought.219 nourishes the

14- Norman Malcolm, "The Mystery of Thoughtee.Wittgensteinian Themes, p. 181 216. cf.. *TheMyth of Cognitive Rocases and Structures" in Thought and Knowledge. pp. 159 - 169, and "The Mystery of Thought", in Wittgensreinian Themes, pp. 182 - 194. 217. Malcolm. "The Myth of Cognitive Rocesses and Structurd"' in Thought d Knowledge. p. 164. mis appean to be an accurate characterisation of the philosophical assumption behind Fodor's projext. 218. cf., "The Groundlessness of Belief' in Thought and Knowkdge, pp. 199 - 216. 219. Malcolm. "The Mystery of Thought". in Wittgensreinian Themes. p. 186. conception th& there must be psychical causality or a psychical infonning of physical activities

(verbal and behavioural). 'We are tempted to think that Our comrnon agreement in the use of the word 'remembering,' for example, must have an ~xpIanation."~Fodor's theory that there is a metalinguistic computation involved in our application of predicates is an example of this tendency. Our reasoning in this matter displays our confusion about the phenomena of mind. We are plagued by a picnire. Meaning, intending, remembering, thinking, understanding strike us as peculiarly mental or psychical events. We are led to this conclusion because we feel that these phenornena must consist in something, that they are in some indescribable way analogous to the objects we perceive in the world. They strike us paradoxicaliy as things partly public but essentially private. And we are puzzled by the fact that we nonetheless appear to be in comrnon agreement about the application of predicates regarding these unspecifiable, idiosyncratic, inner phenomena. How is this possible, we wonder. There mus? be an explmation since others share the same words that 1 use to describe my mental phenomena. If one holds an a priuri psychophysical account of the meaning of mental concepts, namely that they are private inner episodes, then it is clear why one might want to account for intersubjective agreement about Our application of mental predicates via a notion of an intemal representational calculus. Unless one were able to account for the grarnmar of psychological language in spite of the privacy of its referents, then one would have to give way to the conclusion that predication could never get started; and, such a position--a strict solipsism, if the underlying premises of such a view are drawn to their logid consequences---is absurd, since we are able and do apply mental terms to others. Malcolm sees Wittgenstein as combatting a certain picture about language, namely chat the individual words in natural languages are the names of objects and that their meaning must consist in something. The picnire they condemn is deeply flawed. The philosophicai consequence of accepting a narne-object paradigm of language use and meaning is the dilemma of accepting some variety of mentalism as opposed to some vanety of

Malcolm. "Wittgenstein on the Nature of the Mind." in Stuàies in rhe Theory of Knowledge. Amcrican Philosophicol Quarrerly, Monograph Series, ed., , Oxford: Basil Blackwell (with the cooperation of the University of Pittsburgh). 1970, p. 23. materialism, for if one subscribes to the pichtre that mental phenomena must consist in something, then one must hold that they are eitber inner or outer. The mentalist defends the former proposition, whereas the materialist defends the latter.='

But whichever hom of this dilemma we choose, there are decisive objections, Joy is not manifested in joyful behavior ..-. A young woman's joyous exclamations, movements, smiles, would not be manifestations of joy if they occurred in quite different ciccurnstances. Instead they could belong to a bitter parody of joy; or they could be symptoms of madness-m Malcolm goes on to Say that this difficulty canot be solved by conceiving of more elaborate behavioural constructions, for example, stimulus-response models or networks which would define mental phenomena or psychological concepts. This is a direct criticisrn of the ontological impulse of reductionisitc materialism, namely eliminative behaviourism. The point here seems to be that attempts to identify mental phenomena with a sequence of behavioural manifestations or with a disposition to manifest such behaviour under certain stimulus conditions do not escape the dilemma created by the ontological impulse to ident~fior mark these dieged phenomena- Both

behavioural identification and inner representation are founded on the same picture, that joy for instance must be some event, state, or process. Although a strict behavioural identification of mental phenomena appears to give a clear sense of the meaning of these concepts, it leaves us somewhat dissatisfied. One feels that no constellation of responses adequately conveys one' s sensation of 'joy' or 'pain'.223 One feels that there is something more which is not translated or accounted for by one's responses and utterances. As Malcolm points out, the move away from outer identification towards inner representation is a stronger lure than behaviourism; and, he maintains, that is the reason why Wittgenstein devotes more attention to the idea of the inner:

... our desire to identifi the phenomena of mind, together with our idea that they must consist in something inner or something outer, carries us by natural progression to the thought that meaning, remembering, thinking, joy, etc., are, each of hem unspecifiable, indesccibable, inner states or events. You ieel that

=l. 1 am using these ternis somewhat genemusly. For present purposes 1 take a mentalist position to ix one which defends the notion that mental phenomena have inner referents; and. 1 cake the materialist position to be one which defends the opposite view, namely one which equates mental phenomena with physical (observable) (or translates them into or identifies them with such), anaor denies the mental sphere of reference. 222. Maicoim, "Wittgenstein on the Nature of Mind". p. 17. m. cf., PI, 0296: "Yes, but the= is something there al1 the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that that I utter it. And this something is what is important--and frightfu1."--0nly whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion? you know what meaning or remembering are; you can almost see them going on inside of you; yet you cannot say what they are.2t4 It is this picture mat mental phenomena are inner events, Malcolm contends, which prevents us from observing the situations and activities, the contexts to which 'mental' words belong and whereby they receive their significance. Herein Lies Malcolm's dismissal of the charge of behaviourism against Wittgenstein, namely, his contention that Wittgenstein's emphasis is on the contextual nature of psychological concepts. According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein's project is neither one of identehg nor explaining mental phenomena. Philosophy in Wittgenstein's view should describe language, i.e,, elucidate the grurnmar of our 'forms of Me'- Although Malcolm credits behaviourism with pointing out that there must be some conceptual tie between the language of mental phenomena and public circumstances and behaviour, he faults it on two counts: (1) for holding that one could effeçt a reduction of phenomena of mind to behavioural manifestations, or to a constellation of behavioural responses; and (2) for holding that first-person and third-person psychological statements have the same "content", or verifkation.= 1 want to consider both of these points. Malcolm regards behaviourism as a philosophical doctrine continuous with the program of physicalism. This claim does not strike me as king entirely untrue, as 1 have mentioned earlier, but it seems to have a negative influence on his appraisals of behaviounsm's potentid as a viable theory for philosophy of mind. Actually, it may be more correct to state that Malcolm views physicalism as the paradigm of behaviourism. Although many of Malcolm's comrnents are directed at Skinner's brand of behaviourism, they are nonetheless applicable to his general conception of behaviouristic doctrines.226 Essentially, according to Malcolm, the continuity between physicalism and behaviourism can be found in its attempt to clarify mentalistic expressions of Our ordinary language by attempting to translate and reduce them to environmental variables, Le., namely observable variables such as physical circumstances and outward

224. op. cit., p. 18. W. cf.. l*Behaviorismas a Philosophy of Psycho[ogy.*' in Thought and Knowledge. pp. 85 - 103. 1 chose not to include Skinner in my survey of types of khaviourism. because as 1 pointed out in the chapter on behaviounsm, his major writings came after Wittgenstein had already taken up the new approach which characterises PI and other later works. behaviour. Accorduig to Malcolm this is how a behaviourist attacks the 'methodological' problern of how we come to knowledge of the subjective world of othea. Whereas a behaviourist may

regard the problem of other mincis as a methodological problem, Malcolm prefers to see t as a philosophical problem. In my estimation, this is where Malcolm misconsmies the import of

behaviourism. 1would contend that Malcolm overlmks the fiindamental importance to phiiosophy of behaviourism's methodology. This is not to Say that MaIcolm is incorrect in thinking that behaviourism (like mentalism) is plagued by a misguided picture of ontological reference but that he, like Fodor, appears to overlook the 'methodological' continuity it shares with physicalism, a new method of Iooking at phenomena. This method insists that the intelligibility of psychological

concepts, and of language in general, can be accounted for (solely) by public and accountable means, namely what can be observed about an organism's actions, its physiology and its overt behavioural movements, and it derides the conception that epistemic privacy in some form or fashion is required for the cogency of meaning. Frorn behaviourism's standpoint, the philosophical dependency on first-person experience as the source of knowledge about mental phenomena is a detrimental and unproductive 'neurosis'. Although Malcolm sees the latter point sharply brought out in Wittgenstein's remarks, he faiIs to notice this conception about method as in fact an underlying principle of behaviourism. When Watson (in the original staternent of his

behaviourist programme) expressed frustration at the speculative atmosphere brought on by the

reliance on introspectionism in psychology, he was combatting-though he may not have expressed it in these terms-the solipsistic idea that psychology investigates mental States of consciousness which were accessible only by means of introspection. Although the implicit operationalism of behaviourism may offend Our mentalist predilections, this need not be because behaviounsm inevitably defines Our experiences out of existence. Behaviourism's name-object

foundation can be discarded without discrediting its methodological significance. When Watson was chalienged about how he could do a psychology without "mind" and "consciousness", his response was: "Behaviorism is at present a satisfactory way going at the solution of psychologicd problems-it is realiy a methodological solution of psychological problems."W In my estimation, Wittgenstein's rehisal to iden- pain with a specific behavioural manifestation= is one example of his non-diminative behaviouristic treatment of a supposediy exclusive mental phenornenon. For Malcolm, behaviourism, understood as a philosophical doctrine, means logical behaviourism. It should be noted that he does not recognise the distinctions within logical behaviounsm that Fodor does. (Thus 1 will be using "behaviourisml' and "logical behaviourism" in terchangeably in discussing Malcolm's appraisal.) Moreover, he regards phy sicalism as the paradigm of logical behaviourism the view "that the meaning of mental term such as 'thinking,' langer,' 'intention' can be explained wholly in terms of bodily behavior and of the physical circumstances in which it 0ccurs."~2~In other words, according to Malcolm, logical behaviourism considers a statement about other mincis to be a statement about the physical state of the body of the person in question, and he thinks that what is correct in logical behaviourism is its repudiation of the introspective origin of mental concepts (and thus the issue of privacy of experience).

However, he holds that behaviourist philosophers went wrong in assurning that there was a syrnmetry in respect of verifcation between ascriptions of mental predicates to oneself and to

others. 1 already mentioned Wittgenstein's contention that thinking one's psychological utterances were primarily reports on one's condition was to fall prey to a misguided conception of how words function, since, one requires no evidence for ascribing a particular sensation to oneself, whereas one is expected to have it for ascribing it to another. We do not apply mental concepts to ourselves on the basis of behavioural criteria, such as some change of countenance, or utterance or physical action which others use in applying them to us. This shows that logical behavionsm gives an incorrect account of the use of mental concepts in regard to their first-person employment. According to Malcolm, "the Achilles' heel of this doctrine lies in its treatment of psychological statements in the first person. The same error occurs in physicalism."230

. John B. Watson. Behaviorism. Phoenix Books. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924. Revised Edition, 1930. p. 18. 228. cf., PI. $243 - $246. 229. Norman MalcoIm. Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein. New York: Harper & Row. 1971, p. 80. 230. Norman Malcolm. "Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology." in Thought and Knowledge. p. 96. Behaviounsm rejected the notion that one could ver* one's own fmt-person dedarations by comparing them with one's own inner experiences or mental States. The only alternative in sight was to hold that each person cm verify his own first-person psychologicaI sentences by comparing them with his own behaviour andlor physical statesZ1

I can Say of another person, "1 know his stomach hurts from the way he is groaning and doubling over," But 1cannot speak this way of myself, without revealing a ludicrous misunderstanding of the concept of sensation. 1 can Say of another person, "From the look on his face 1cm tell he is surprised; but to Say this of myself would show that the= is some misundersianding some~here.~~ The assumption that is made in any self-pronouncement of 'certainty' of the application of a mental predicate to oneself is that one is able to observe something which acts as corroboration of one's first-person psychological statements. But, in Malcolm's view, behaviourisrn goes wrong in perpetuating the philosophical veneration of evidence. It attempts to physicalize psychological subjects by reducing them to either internal or extemai physical variables," or some combination of the two. However, this move is still one in which the significance of the meaning of sensations and mental concepts is to be found in considering them as existentid data, for it leads to the conception that a person's intentional utterances, for example, are based on his awareness of events in his body. But of course, "no one knows what these internal physical occurrences wouid be which are supposed to 'characteristically' precede or accompany my going home, signing my narne, making a phone cd, or any of the innumerable actions which 1 can announce myself as about to do."w In short, Malcolm attributes to behaviourism the notion that a psychological tem hm afixed sense or specific definition. The result is that behaviourism still shares with its nemesis, introspectionism, a false assumption, namely, an ontological conception of psychological subjects, i.e., "that a first-person psychological statement is a report of something which the

*l. Norman Malcolm. Nothing is Hidden: Wiligensrein's Criticism of his Early Thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986, p. 134. 232. Malcolm, Problems of Mind. p. 85. 233. Malcolm is referring to Skinner's conjecture that a person bases his intentional statements on observation of internal variables, namely "private stimuli", events or occurrences within his body. According to Malcolm, Skinner had speculated that an individual is taught to use psychological language when he is exhibiting the correct public behaviour. Interna1 physicai variables or "private stimuli" are then associated with the appropriate "public manifestations". Subsequently, the person responds to these private events when they occur without corresponding public behavioural manifestations. Thus. one wouid understand the announcement. "1 am about to go to the office," as the equivalent of "1 observed cenain events in myself which characteristically precede or accompany my going to the office." This is how Malcolm descnbes Skinner's view of how we leam to apply the Ianguage of mental terms to ourselves. (cf., Problems of Mind. pp. 82 - 87) Ttierefore, internal physical variables wwld mean private bodily events , whereas extemal physica1 variables would mean public behaviour or gross bodily movements. Op. cit ... pp. 84 - 85. cf., as well "Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Prychology" in Though and Knowledge. p. 98. speaker has, or thinks that he has, observed."23s Inirospectio~smmaintained that such statements were based on observations of inner psychical events whereas behaviourism adopted other sorts of observations, whether of outward events or of physical events under the skin of the person making the statement. Malcolm does recognise that a behaviourist need not adopt the view that psychological utterances such as "1 fee1 ill" or "1am going home now" are statements or reports or descriptions but instead could be interpreted according to a stimulus-response mode1 of meaning where they function to eücit cettain responses from oiher people.= However, his response is that circumstances wiii dictate the nature of an utterance, whether interpreted as an exclamation or a report. In other words, the meaning of an utterance cannot be fixed beforehand and, whatever the hnction of a first-person utterance tums out to be, it is not usually the case that the speaker bases it on behavioural criteria. It seems that in attacking the behaviourist notion chat first-person utterances are based on self-observation Malcolm is not only combatting its name-object presuppositions, but its disguised retention of privacy. He seems to be implying that, although some behaviourists would maintain that with advancements in measurementsu7 intemal physiological identifications of various

235- "Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psych~logy~"p. 98. cf.. also "Knowledge of Other Minds." in Knowledge Md Certainry. pp. 138 - 140. In the latter article, Malcolm writes:

The destruction of the argument from anaiogy also destroys the problem for which it was supposed to provide a solution, A philosopher feeIs himself in a difficulty about other minds because he assumes that first of al1 he is acquainted with mental phenomena "from his own case." What troubles him is how to make the transition frorn his own case to the case of others. When his chinking is freed of the illusion of the priority of his own case, ther. he is able to look at the f'miliar facu and to acknowledge chat the circumstances, behavior, and utterances of others actually are his criteria (not merety his evidence) for the existence of their mental States. Previously this had seerned impossible. But now he is in the danger of flying to the opposite extreme of behaviorism, which em by believing that through observation of one's own circumstances, behavior. and utterances one can find out that one is thinking or angry. The philosophy of "from one's own case" and behaviorism, though in a sense opposites, make the common assumption that the first-person. present-tense psychological statements are verified by self- observation. According to the "one's own case" philosophy the self-observation cannot be checked by others; according to behaviorisrn the self-observation wouId be by means of outward criteria that are available to all. The first position becomes uninteiligible: the second is false for at lest many kinds of psychological statements. We are forced to conclude that the first-person psychological statements are not (or hardly ever) verified by self- observation. It follows that they have no verification at all; for if they had a verification it would have to be by

self-observation. (pp.- - 138 - 139) 236. Op. cit.. pp. 86 - 87. Such a view would be consistent with Watson's treatment of psychologkal subjects as comprising a constellation of habits or with Weiss's more sophisticated conception of a 'progressive' interrelated habituai network. . This was a hope expressed by Watsonk expikit peripheralism, Le.. that some emotions and sensations were simply under the skin, so to speak, and thus were measurable. In his Behaviorism (Phoenix Books, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924, Revised Edition, 1930, p. 238) Watson cfaimed chat "as new scientific facts are discovered we have fewer and fewer phenomena which can not be observed. hence fewer and fewer pegs on which to hang folk-lore." psychological subjects would be publicly avaiiable (that is to Say, would be quantifiable), their doctrine still retained vestiges of private access in spite of its rcpudiation of introspectionism. In

other words, by thinking that an individual does engage in self-verifkation of his fmt-person psychological experiences, a behaviounst is advocating a mitigated form of what Malcolm calls "the privacy of observability,"m namely the view that a person can observe something which no

other person cm. One finds a retention of mental privacy in Weiss's investigation of behaviour. Consider the following passage.

When another studies my behavior he uses mainly his eyes and ears. When 1study my behavior the classes of sense organs that are stimulated are more numerous, including the cutaneous, kinesthetic, gustatory, olfactory, static and organic senses. It is to be expected therefore that 1can record as occurring in myself types of changes that cannot be detected by another; or to use a popular characterization, that I know more about myself than othersknow about me, or that my own experiences are richer rhun my ounvard behavior will show. No matter how complex and involved human achievements may become they are in the last analysis the functioning of contractile elements in the individuai's body.239 Of course, Wittgenstein dismisses both the idea that psychological concepts point towards hidden processes, mental or cognitive ones, and the 'scientific' hope that advancement will bring these processes to light. This following rernark reminds us of the muddle of Fodor's project:

But isn't that only because of our too slight acquaintance with what goes on in the brain and nervous system? If we had a more accurate knowledge of these things we should see what connexions were established by the training, and then we shouid be able to say when we looked into his brain: "Now he has read this word, now the reading connexion has been set upW.--And it presumably must be Iike that-for otherwise how could we be so sure that there was such a connexion? That it is so is presumably a priori--- or is it only probable? Now, ask yourself: what do you know about these things?--But if it is a priori, that means it is a form of account which is very convincing to us. (PI, 6 158) Malcolm wants it understood that, in spite of the fact that a difference exists between first- person application of psychological language and second and third-person (Le., that there is an asyrnrnetry with respect to venfication), this does not indicate that there are two different senses of

a mental concept. That is to Say, one may feel a push towards solipsism, given that one does not usually use behavioural cntena for applying psychological subjects to oneself, whereas it is

customary to do so in the case of others. This suggests a simple division: Cartesianism for self- predication and Behaviourism for predication in others, so that one has two different concepts of pain, for example. Malcolm, however, argues that psychological terms have two different kinds of

Malcolm. "The Privacy of Experience." in Thought und Knowledge. pp. 104 - 132. 239. Albert Paul Weiss, A Theorerical Baris of Hw~nBeltavior, Second Edition Revised. Columbus: R. G. Adams & Co.. 1929, p. 302. Emphasis added. application, not two different senses. His claim is that despite the asymmefry of vetiflcation there are logical equivalences between fust-person psychological indicatives and their second- and third- person counterparts. The possibility of a first-person psychologicd utterance shares a criterial continuity with its second- or ihird-person counterpah In other words, although my utterance that 1 am in pain is made without ceference to criteria, it is connected to behavioural criteria which would make it possible for someone else under the sarne circumstances to make the third-person counterpart of my first-peaon indicative. "First person utterances and their second and third person counterparts are linked in meaning by virtue of king tied, in different ways, to the same behavioral cnteriaw2* This connection prevents it fiom being the case that we possess different mental concepts for self-ascription and for ascription to othen. Thus, Malcoim criticises behaviourism because it assimilated first-person psychological ascription to its second- and third-person counterparts with respect to verification, and in doing so repeated a mistake made by introspectionism. Behaviourism countered this duality of inner mentai and outer physical objects by making first-person ascription and its second- and third-person counterparts symmetricai in terms of verification, i.e., possessing the same 'content'. Like Fodor, Malcolm believes that since the ontological impulse of behaviourism is reductionistic it could only conclude that there was symrnetrical venfication between first-person utterances and their second- and third-person counterparts. Malcolm contends also that this is a continuation of the verficationist principle, since he argues that we find in behaviourism a translation of mental phenornena into physical descriptions. However, he daims that for Wittgenstein the meaning of mental concepts in the fint-penon case is not based on a =port of something which the speaker has observed, and that first-person utterances do not possess the same content as their second- and diird-person counterparts. A person who has mastered the use of certain psychological ternis does not base his own statements on any primitive, preverbal behaviour. First-person psychoIogical statements are not nomdy based on criteria, unme their second- and third-person counterparts. Malcolm develops Wittgenstein's view that the meaning of mental concepts, in normal cases,

240. Malcolm. Problems of Mind, p. 9 1. require criteria only when applied to others, not to oneself, and it is in this way that he defends Wittgenstein against the charge of king a behaviounst. Wittgenstein, he notes, does not make the rnistake one finds in behaviourism of adopting a symmetry of verifcation between the two categories of statements in order to deal with mentalistic presuppositions about the employrnent of psychologicd language. The germ of Malcolm's argument "that the natusal temptation to which behaviorist philosophers have succumbed is to assume that first-person psychological statements have the sarne "content," or the same verifkation, as the corresponding third-person sentencesW241can be found in Wittgenstein's remark at PI, g357:

We do not Say that possibly a dog talks to itseif. is that because we are so minutely acquainted with its soul? Weil, one might Say this: If one sees the behaviour of a living thing, one sees its sou1.-But do 1 also Say in my own case that 1am saying something to myself, because 1 am behaving in such-and-such a way?-1 do not say it from observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because 1do behave in this way.-Then it is not because 1mean it that it makes sense? It is this assimilation of fust-person to third-person psychological statements which highlights another criticism of behaviourism according to Malcolm, namely its mechanistic conception of human beings. He takes behaviourism's attack on introspectionism as proof that Our concepts of mental states cannot be divorced from behaviour, that Our common understanding of psychological words is proof that Our use of such words must be logically connected with other public behaviour. It may be asked, in view of the fact that behaviounsm was dedicated to the refutation of introspectionism, why one should not acknowledge that Wittgenstein's remarks endorse this philosophy of psychology. The reason, Malcolm sees it, is that, because behaviourism seeks to account for human relations in strictiy physical means. it does not display an appreciation of Our attitude towards other persons. He contends:

There is a dimension of our concept of a person which consists of the way in which we perceive living human beings. The main problem is whether we can make sense of the idea that there might be a man whose attitude towards living human beings was no different from his attitude towards any cornplex physical organism or rnechani~m.~*

241. Malcolm. "Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology." p. 97. 2*. Op. cit., p. 92. Thus, if a behaviourist declares that aU descriptions of human beings employing mentalistic terms can be translated or replaced by physicalistic descriptions, thereby effecting an equivalence between the two where psychological predicates are only denvative, then 'other minds' corne to be seen simply as assemblagedmechanisms of physical movements and reactions. In other words, a naturd or real behaviourist (not just a theoretical one) would appear an odd creature. We could not imagine how this person could carry on simply by physicalizing his relations with others. Not onIy could we not understand him, but he would appear, to echo Broad, a lunatic, or (perhaps better) a robot. If we only applied physical descriptions to others, Our language-garnes would remain rudimentary and primitive, and our forms of Iife would also become stultified (or they would atrophy) due to Our resulting deficiency in concepts. Our concepts and predicates would have lost their plasticity. Malcolm contends that we rarely view people's actions in purely physical terms. Consequently, someone who adopted the behaviourist viewpoint as a natural mode of living would be unable to "see a human face as fnendly or as angry. (Perhaps we should even say that he cannot see it us a face.) Ke does not see changes of expression as such." The changes would be seen "only as physical alterations in three dimensions. "2*3 Malcolm is here echoing a remark of Wittgenstein made in the private language sections:

Think of the recognition offacial expressions. Or of the description of facial expressions-which does not consist in giving the rneasurements of the face! Think. too, how one can imitate a man's face without seeing one's own in the mirror. (PI, $285) It should be pointed out that Malcolm is reproducing a caricature of behaviourism. He is correct in noting that behaviourism in an extreme form reproduces the sarne error made by introspectionism, namely treating mental concepts as representing objects which serve as their meaning and which can be readily discemed. In other words, behaviourism fails to escape the narne-object picture of meaning found in the view it repudiates. However, Malcolm criticises behaviourism for treating fmt-person psychological statements as verifiable observation claims. In other words, he faults behaviourism for not acknowledging that self-testimony is the best source of information we have about a person's intentions, desires, thoughts, etc., that "it mistakenly

243. lbid.. p. 96. assumes that when a man teUs you what he wants, intends, or hopes, what he says is based on observation and, therefore, he is speaking about himself as if he were an object of his own obseniation."244 Malcolm is cIauning that bebaviourism cannot conceive of hwnan relations other than in an -cially mechanistic manner. But this is a misrepresentation of how the behaviourists conceive of behaviour and our use of psychological language. Although Malcolm is correct that there is in some sense an unavoidable faith we must attach to the veracity of the first-person psychological claims of others, it is not clear that we naively credit self-testimony. As Malcolm himself notes, "fust-person psychological sentences must be correlateci with behavior up to a point."2= Malcolm sees behaviourism as j%ing this correlation and leaving us with an aaificial conception of Our employment of psychological terms which confines this use to our primitive, preverbal behaviour. In this regard, Malcolm is interpreting behaviourism's environmentalism in a rigid manner. This is not to Say that behaviourism does not lend itself to such a view but, as Weiss pointed out, the complexity of our adult responses and activities-though dependent upon and traceable to more rudimentary stimulus-response behaviours-seem to belie their foundation in them. In this regard it is unfair to suggest that behaviourism would be unable to account for Our perception of a human face as fnendly, joyful, moumful, or what have you. This criticism perpetuates the notion that behaviourism in its quest to explain our employment of mental concepts without recourse to mentaiism was only able to do so by conceiving of the human organism as a sophisticated machine. What this view overlooks is that for the behaviourists our psychological utterances (first-person or othenuise) only become intelligible against a background of stimulating conditions and circumstances. It is this theatre of public circumstances and behaviour, the behaviourists daim, that allows us to discem a face as friendly, as angry, as anxious and give to sense to the language of mental phenornena. In this regard behaviourism's fault lies in taking an unsophisticated view about the ment and privileged status of self-testimony, but it does not follow

244. Ibid.. pp. 102 - 103. 245. Ibid., p. 101. from this that behaviourists conceive of humans as "robotic" in nature, that we regard changes of aspect-perception "only as physical alterations in three dimensions." Malcolm finds support for his contention that a natural behaviourist would lack our customary attitudes towards other persons in Wittgenstein's own conception of behaviourism (as suggested by comments such as PI, 8285 quoted above). Perception reduced to purely physical terms is not natural for us, Malcolm contends. Logical behaviourism is founded on an equivalence of descriptions, but this requires an equivalence in use; logical behaviourism is therefore an incorrect doctrine, he claims, since it is not conceivable how we could manage purely physical descriptions of human beings. We have an immediate perception of people via mental descriptions, i.e., Our perception of them is not based on an inference from physical variables which we isolate from theu circumstances. A natural behaviourist, as characterised by Malcolm, would not possess the same reactions and natural attitudes which we have towards others. A behaviourist may want to hold out the hope that, once we know more about the personal history, environment, and behaviour of an individual, we can always infer the sarne information given to us by the subject's testimony (such a hope is expressly stated by Watson and replicated in Weiss's account of behaviourism). Note how Watson, for example, expressed such hope in his early polemic. "As our rnethods become better developed it wiil be possible to undertake investigations of more and more complex forms of behavior. Problems which are now laid aside will again become imperative, but they can be viewed as they arise from a new angle and in a concrete ~ettings."*4~And here is how Weiss responds to the introspectionist's concerns about the nature of our sensation of colours:

The question, 1s my blueness like your blueness? is the same sort of a question as, 1s my tallness like your rallness, except in the latter case we can describe (measure and compare) that anatomicai factors that are involved. In time we shall be able to measure and compare the biophysical and biosocial conditions that underlie so-cailed sensory-qualities, but the fact that we cannot do so now is no justification for pIacing them in a non-physical (mental) category and thus practically removing them from investigation by the rnethods of modern science.247

246. John B. Watson, "Psychology as The Behaviotirt Viewr It." Prychologicol Revicw. 1913, vol.. XX. p. 175. 247. Albert Paul Weiss, A Theoretical Baris 4 Himuur Behavior, Second Edition Revised. Columbus: R. G. Adams & Co., 1929, p. 293. Malcolm does not share this hope chenshed by the behaviourists of king able to peer into another's soul:

The testimony that people give us about their intentions, plans, hopes, worries, thoughts, and feelings is by far the most important source of information we have about them. To a great extent we cannot check it against anything else and yet to a great extent we credit it- 1beiieve we have no reason to think it a theoretical possibility that self-testimony codd be adequately supplanted by inferences fiom external and/or interna1 physical Therefore, in Malcolm's view, logicai behaviourism is a radically fdse doctrine because (a) it is not the case that first-person psychological utterances are based on self-observation and (b) purely physical description is not more fundamental than mental foms in second- and third-person psychological statements.

Thus fat 1 have not contested Malcolm's assessrnent of behaviounst's viability as a philosophy of psychology. 1 consider his understanding of behaviounsm to be prejudiced by the continuity he draws between it and physicalism. In kt,he appears to regard the former as the heir to the program prescribed by the latter, therefore he reads behaviourism as an eliminitive, reductionistic materialistic monism. He sees it as countering introspectionism's ontological pnority of mental events by elevating a mechanistic and physicalistic conception of human beings. And, of course, his implication is that Wittgenstein does not subscnbe to this view. Wittgenstein does not pronounce on the existentid status of phenomena of mind either as intemal private events and States or a public, physical ones. Although he rejecü the introspectionist theory of mind and meaning, as the behaviourist does, he is not simply "saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction." (PI, $307) His enterprise, we are told, is a granunutical one. Malcolm would have us believe that although Wittgenstein devotes most of his remarks to addressing the introspectionist theory of meaning he does not accept the simplistic solution offered by the behaviourist. Malcolm does admit that he feels some dissatisfaction with the notion that the philosophical theme of privacy does not give us the explanation of the grammar of sensation and of

mental phenomena in generd, or show the coherence of using mental concepts which are neither dependent upon nor founded on privacy.

248. "Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology." p. 102. As 1remarked earlier, he thinks that we are plagued by what he refers to as a 'veneration of evidence' in philosophy which leads us to think that our coherent employment of psychological concepts must have an explanation. This leads us to expressions such as "1 know ... only fiom

my own case", (PI, $295) "When 1 Say '1 am in pain' 1 am at any rate justified before myse[fl (PI, $289) or that "only 1 can know whether 1 am redy in pain; another person cm only surmise it." (PI, 9246) We want to find a place for doubt and cenaine in psychological language, but do not redise that this search for philosophical bedrock Mies our cornmon agreement about the concepts

we use. Wittgenstein insists that "what has to be accepted, the given, is-so one codd say- forms of life." (PI, p. 226) Malcolm concurs with this when he maintains that our concept of a person and our attitudes towards each other would be different if we resorted to a conception that either privacy or essential publicity (of the form adovocated by behaviourists) governed Our employment of language. In other words, we need not follow Weiss's lead blindly, who thought that it was inexpedient to work from the assumption that a mental series played any part in

understanding human achievement, in view of the fact that a physical or strictly scientific

conception was sufficient:

1 assume that a reformulation of the psychologial postulates is justified, if it estabiïshes a methodology which replaces mind-body dualism by a systematic rnonisrn based on the assumptions of the physical sciences; and if the psychological elements that are adopteci, fonn the antecedents and components of individuai conduct or behavior, and of social achievement or ci~ilization.24~ Nevertheless, there are interesting similarities in the approaches taken to behaviourism by Malcolm and Weiss. Consider how Malcolm describes our development of concepts:

Our concepts of sensation and emotion, of belief and doubt, grow out of regular patterns of behavior and circurnstances that are kquently repeated in human life. Our concepts are taught and mastered, by ceference to those patterns. The concepts can be extended gradually to new patterns that resemble the Now, note the following passage from Weiss:

Even if supposing it be possible to secure a comprehensive record and description of the so-called mental States or processes of any given individual fiom birth to death, such a record is not a record of the antecedents of those actions nor of the social effects of those actions which represent individual or social ac hie~ernent.~~~

249. Weiss, A Theorerical Ba& of Human Behavior, p. 427. 250. Malcolm, "The Privacy of Experience." in Thought and Knowledge. p. 130. 251. Op. cit., p. 426. Malcolm reads behaviourism as taking the view thaî in fi-person psychological utterances a person possesses a paradigm (behaviour) which he uses to determine the self-ascription of a sensation to himself- However, this is oniy one paradigm of behaviourism. One can also regard behaviourism as operating under a paradigm of 'methodological objectivism',z2 according to which behaviourism can be taken to represent a cedn method for idenwing various aspects of human achievement exclusively in terms of their surroundings (history, behaviour and training). Behaviourism in this sense prescribes, as Brian D. MacKenzie puts it, "the rigorous use of explicit and formal decision procedures - desfor arriving at any kUid of conclusions about hypotheses, theories, and data."s3 1 do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein was doggedly scientific or positivist in his approach to psychology, Le., that he set out to impose strictly-defined, systematic procedures for dealing with psychological subjects or conducting investigations in psychology. What 1 am maintainhg is that he appears to be engaged in a similar commitment (just as the behaviourists) to accounting for the intelligibility of mental concepts, one which celebrated scientism as a viable means to effect that entepise. In Wittgenstein's case this celebration of scientism was somewhat muted. Wittgenstein's approach relied upon and prescribed a certain method for understanding the meaning of psychological terms, one that emphasised that we need not and should not transcend public circumstances and behaviour to appreciate the sense of a mental concept or how psychological predicates are correctly applied. What an individual does and says are the only proper objects of study for both the behaviounsts and Wittgenstein. Like the behaviourists, Wittgenstein gives prominence to a particular method--one in which the description of the rule-govemed communal activities of language-users takes prominence--for treating mental phenornena and for understanding the coherent employment of psychological Ianguage. Thus, one can see the acquisition of concepts as part of Our training and familiarity with the goveming situations for their applicability. While such a view does not take on the absuact physicalism of

252. 1 borrow this conception from Brian D. MacKenziels Behuviwrisni ad the Limirs of Scienti/c Method. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 253. Ibid., p. 143. 1 would like to point out however. that in my estimation this commitment is somewhat modified in Wittgenstein's approach. This is another reason why 1 do think that logicai behaviourism. as understood by Fodor. does not adequately characterise Wittgenstein's behaviourism. Weiss's program, his approach does share with his system a willingness to place human activity within an evolving network of reactions and responses. This willingness may help to explain why others< like Fodor, have thought that Wittgenstein is a behaviourist. Maloolrn is correct in claiming that if behaviourism is regardeci as the view that assimilates first-person psychological statements to third-person ones, that translates mental phenornena to physical variables, then Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist. Nevertheless, Malcolm's Wittgenstein (like the behaviourists) recognises that there must be a concepnial connection between psychological language and public circumstances and behavior which link sensation statements to naturai, nonverbal, primitive forms of sensation behaviour. Malcolm is correct that Wittgenstein did not suppose this to mean that there is a specific behavioural correlate for every alleged mental phenornenon.= But what of the methodological paradigm? How does Wittgenstein's use account of meaning differ from a stimulus-response model? It appears to share similiarities with behaviouristic doctrines descrïbed in earlier chapters. Like the behaviourists, Wittgenstein's recognition of the conceptuai tie between language and behaviour is based on the acceptance of the idea that past training is fundamental for mastery of sophisticated language-garnes, and that this appears to be the only satisfactory account for Our comrnon understanding and agreement about coherent linguistic employment. In fact, Wittgenstein contends that Our regular activities and responses are the bais for understanding not onIy mental concepts but mental capacities and abilities. (PI, $206 - $207) Consider some of Wittgenstein's comments regarding ostensive training:

In the course of this teaching 1 shall shew him the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes, 1 shall make him find them and produce hem, and so on. I shdl, for instance, get hirn to continue an ornamental pattern unifonnly when told to do so.--And also to continue progressions- And so, for exampte, when given: ...... to go on: ...... , . 1 do it, he does it afier me; and 1 influence hirn by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. 1 tet him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained in this teaching. A gesture, among other things, might serve this purpose. The gesture means "go on like this", or "and so on" has a function comparable with that of pointing to an object or a place. (PI, 8208)

David M. Armstrong (cf.. his A MaterialLrr Theory of Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1968) is another thinker who thinks that Wittgenstein presents an analytical behaviourist philosophy of mind. 255. Malcolm. "Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology" in Thought md Knowledge. p. 101. Thre are, afm all. sensation expressions for example which are strictly linguistic (Le., transcending direct behavioural correlation, e.g., fearing that something will happen tomorrow. cf., PI, $650). Malcolm takes no cognisance of the striking pdlel. or more precisely, the striking continuity between Wittgenstein's method and that of behaviourism, yet his own interpretation of the former bears out this continuity. My point is that Malcolm fails to acknowledge what Fodor does, Le.,

that behaviourism as a psychological doctrine assumes epistemological and Linguistic forms which go beyond the ontological impulse of the original theory (Watson's reductive materiaiism) or later versions (such as Carnap's physicalism). Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein's attack on the notion that thought is a mysterious or queer process is one illustration of this. Malcolm States that,

in our normal discourse, when we speak and respond to the words of others, this exchange does not have to be supplemented by something 'mental'-neither by images of the things that are the subjects of the discourse, nor by silent thoughts about the meanings of the words employed in the dis~ourse.~~' Malcolm is expressing a view that is not foreign to behaviounsm, that past training enables one to respond appropnately under similar conditions, where the response has no 'mental' character w hatever.

Let me ask this: what has the expression of a nile-say a sign-post-got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here?--Well, perhaps this one: 1 have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now 1 do so react to it. But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; 1 have fucther indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (PI, 5 198) This does not mean that the same situation will effect identicai responses. Mer dl, Our future performance does outstrip our past training. Weiss implicitly recognised this and therefore postulated that we develop a progressively complex and intemelated network of linguistic responses throughout Life, a view not too dissimilar from Wittgenstein's notion of language iwlf as a multiplicity of language-garnes. Weiss claimed that in language,

the generalizing function includes a neurological net-work of senson-motor connections through which many dissimilar objects and their specific reactions are interconnected througha common sensori-rnotor function (the general term) in such a way that those reactions which biosocially belong together are readily made available through a comrnon stimulus and response. Simply stated the generalizing function of language organizes the whole repertory of reactions which the individual posesses into groups and sub- groups which are made available through appropriate language stimuli, without the need of the stimuli from the actual objects or situations. This makes possible an almost unlimited refinement of behavior ~ate~ories.257

256. "The Mystery of Thought," in Wittgensrcinian Themes, p. 188. 257. Weiss. A Theoreticcal Basis of Humun Behavior. p. 319. Weiss goes on to state that "such relations and discriminations between objects that are expressed by such terms as acceleration, pitch, irrational number, atomic heat, justice, science, would be impossible without this generalizing function."* 1 take Weiss to be arguing that Ianguage dows us to establish increasingly diverse and complex relationships with words (and objects) beyond the initial acquisition of their meaning. He aiso ciaims that human achievement is the consequence of senson-motor mechanisms which beIong to categones of responses whose originating environmental conditions are now extinct. (RecaU Wittgenstein's notion that our sensation statements are conceptually linked to primitive, natural expressions which are common to ail of us.259) Weiss's point is that Our learning the meaning of a word is not lirnited to the original situation by which we came to understand it, othenvise we would not able to exist CO-operatively with others. According to him, language serves as an index of an individual's effectiveness in relating to others because not only do the language responses "unite all the members of a group into a single sensori-motor organization," but language also serves a biological function, namely to greatly extend an individual's environment and increase the variability of his behaviour.260 Thus Weiss maintains that

it is through the specificity of the response to complex environmental conditions and relations that the individuai's effectiveness as a CO-operativeunit in a sociai organization is determined and unless these specific motor patterns dso act as specific stimdi on others they do not meet the CO-operative requirements.261 The composite features Weiss finds in language-its independence of the objects or events for which it is a substitute, its abiïlity to act as a stimulus on others, allowing us to establish various inter-related networks of responses for individual tems and phrases--have a family resemblance to Wittgenstein's concept of language-games. Wittgenstein noted that Our use of terms is tied up with behavioural responses in the normal case but that there is no defmitive set of responses for a particular tem, although depending on the situation there will be certain reactions which we expect of another person in use of that term. Because of the behavioural link to particular words or, to be

258- Ibid.. pp. 3 19 - 320. 259. cf., PI. $243, $281, 9283, $288. 260. Op. cit., p. 323. 261. Ibid., p. 327. more precise, because the basis of their meaning lies in primitive natural reactions, people are in

fundamental argeement about the definition of words, their uses, and the multiplicity of language-

garnes which they give rise to (cf., 5243). However, "this multiplicity is not something fixed,

given once for ali; but new types of langugage, new language-games, as we may Say, corne into existence, and others become obselete and get forgotten." (PI, 523) For another example of Mdcolm's behaviouristic reading of Wittgenstien, consider Wittgenstein's remark in $454 about the arrow that "the arrow points only in the use that a living being rnakes of it." Of this remark Malcolm makes the fotIowing comment:

If you were following a trail marked by arrows painted on trees and rocks, when you came upon an arrow there would be no act of interpretation or of thinking to yourself, 'Iam supposed to go rhat way', You would just go that way. Early in life you were taught the use of arrows as direction indicators. You lemed to cake your direction from an arrow. So now you do respond to an mow in the way you were taught-

The beauty of the example of the arrow is that what is true of it is also true of a sentence of language. Someone says to you, Tm to the right'. The words in themselves do not mean anything. But you grew up in a community where you were introduced to the peculiar institution of giving and obeying orders. You learned what an order is, and what obeying an order is. Just as you learned the use of signposts. Your acquired mastery of these practices enables you to respond with understanding, without the mediation of an inner mental Wittgentein's doctrine that coherence of employment in Ianguage requires an essential connection between words and behaviour, that there must be criteria for our ascription of predicates to others, that Our use of language is de-govemed and that meaning does not require reference to ontology, not only emphasises the notion of the active, living human king as fundamental for understanding

language use but also explains how use is tied up with the fundamental reactions and responses we make. When we lem language we are saturated with the idea that there is a cornmon behaviour which serves as a systern of reference for living, active hmnbeings. Our language-games presuppose certain reactions and responres to each other. This helps explain why it is not possible that there could have been a single occasion in which a rule was followed, why intention statements are predictive in nature, and why the language-game of pain does not stop with the utterance of pain. Because language is founded on the comrnon behaviour of mankind, there is a natural constellation of reactions and responses fundamental to human beings and Our attitudes

262. "The Mystery of Thought." pp. 189 - 190. about each other. Regularity is fundamental to its use and to our understanding the myriad of language-games which comprise it. This means for instance that statements about intention and other psychological statements presuppose certain predictabie responses which we are ~rainedto expect. The grammar of our employment directs us towards the criteria which highlight the regular connection between owarticulations and our actions. We becorne aware of the inherent customs and techinques involved in the untilisation of language. Herein Lies the behaviouristic point underlying Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein; it can be found in his placing linguistic coherence within the natural behavioural history of mankind, Le., reading grammar as anthropology. Malcolm maintans that logical behaviourism errs because if one were to adopt its principles as one's mode of living or fundamental 'form of life', then one's reactions to others would be monotonous and mechanical; and, if this were the foundational attitude towards language, language-games would be neither extensive nor indefinite. That is to

Say, Our use of words would be programmatic and proper application of a term could be satisfied strictly by meeting the conditions which entai1 it. However, although future application appears to be guided by quasi-paradigrnatic circumstances that determine the term's adequacy, our reactions are more progressive than allowed by a definitional analysis of concepts, which Malcolm prefers to regard as the essence of behaviourism. According to him, the behaviour which is the naturai expression for any sensation or mental phenornenon is not 'isolated' behaviour but behaviour arising within particular situations and circumstances.*63 This allows him to exculpate Wittgenstein from the charge of behaviourism by clairning that he is denouncing only gramnrutical fictions (cf., 5307). However, in doing so, he is in fact associating Wittgenstein's views with the approach favoured by behaviourists.

In his sense of the word, 'grammar' comprises far more than syntax or sentence construction. In describing the grarnmar of an expression you would be saying something about the part that the expression plays in the Iife of the people who use it. The grammar of the word 'promise', for example, pertains not just to the fonns of words in which promises are made, but aiso to the various circumstances are relevant to whether a promise has actuaily been given. It pertains to the part rhat a promise plays in creating expectations; to what kinds of circumstances are called 'breaking' a promise; to what counts as a 'reason' for breaking a promise; to how a promise âiffers from a forecast; to what part trust plays in the practice of making and accepting promises; to whether this

263. "Turning to Stone," in Wifrgensteinian Themes, p. 138. practice could exist if promises were never kept, To describe the grammar of the word 'promise' would be to describe a particulat pattern of human behavior, a pattern that is a blend of words and actions. It is to describe, in Wittgenstein's happy phrase, 'a fom of Iife'. Once we understand Wittgenstein's use of the word 'grammare,the conception that the grammar of a word constitues the meaning of the word is not so ~ur~rising.264 Malcolm makes a move rerniniscent of the behaviourists discussed in the second chapter, which is to emphasise the pnority of the environment (the surrounding circurnstances and situations) in detemiining the meaning of terms and concepts. Utterances oniy makes sense in that they are connected to regular patterns of behaviour situated in customs and traditions which the community of language users follow in their application of those utterances. This accords with Watson's approach to mental phenomena. Watson, as pointed out previously,*fi avails hunself of only what is readily discemible about mental phenomena, taking it to be scientifically useless to examine or

describe phenomena which are aliegedly hidden from public view. "Let us limit ourselves to

things that can be observed. Now what can we observe? We can observe behavior-what the

organism does or says. And let us point out at once: that saying is doing-that is, behaving."266 Malcolm's Wittgenstein begins from a position not very dissirniliar. He reads Wittgenstein as starting strictiy from the public manifestations wherein mental concepts play out their relevance to

statements in which they are 'subjects' of reference. Wittgenstein begins with the plain fact that we share a customary set of activities, both linguistic and behavioural, involving mental concepts. He

does not seek to uncover new facts about them, but accepts the given, which Watson does, that the ceactions and activities of human beings are a sufficient basis for 'analysis', for understanding the

meaning of mental descriptions. Wittgenstein, as Malcolm reads him, does not definitionally isolate or abstract the behavioural component of linguistic employment, but instead addresses the regular

connection between language and behaviour as an anthropological 'phenomenon'. This move, although subtler than the approach taken by some behaviourists, Iike Watson, shares their fundamental approach of giving priority to the public sphere; not only that, it endorses their

2M. Op- cit., p. 192. 265. cf., for example. J. B. Watson. "Ir Thinking merely the action of Language Mechanisms?'. British Jouml of Psyckology. 1920. vol. XI. pp. 87 - 104. 266. John B. Watson. Behaviorism. Phoenix Books. Chicago: 'l'le University of Chicago Press. 1924. Revised Editian. 1930, p. 6. conviction that the careful describing of facts is a tonic for the philosophical obsession which inists that the essences of things mwt be the foundation of al1 inquiry.s7

267. cf.. PI, 8109, $126, and 5654 - 8655. Chapter Five: P. M. S. Hacker Crypto-behaviourism? Although P. M. S. Hacker concedes much ground with regard to the question of behaviourism and Wittgenstein, he too, Lüre Malcolm, defends Wittgenstein's negaiive answer to the question of whether he is reaiiy a behaviourist in dispise. Hacker recognises that there is a "convergence" between Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology and both logical and psychological behaviounsm. (He is careful to avoid conceding that Wittgenstein could be said to be presenting a "theory" about the nature and meaning of psychological phenornena.) However, as with Malcolm, Hacker's limited view of both of these doctrines appears to define what he means by behaviourism. 1shall be concentrating on Hacker's distinction but WU occasionally refer to the various categories of behaviourism which Fodor empbys. With reference to Fodor's broader perspective on behaviourism, what Hacker describes as "logical behaviounsm" can be categorised as strong logical behaviourism, while "psychological behaviourism" stands for basically a reductive ontological thesis. To his credit, Hacker maintains that it is not possible to give a uniforrn account of Wittgenstein's notion of cnteria,*68 a point which may highlight a deficiency of

Fodor's analysis, but he does not acknowledge as fùlly as Fodor that the nature of the logicai relation which connects a criterion with what it is a criterion of rnight irnplicate behaviourism in Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. Hacker defends Wittgenstein by insisting that the behaviourist's conception of body and behaviour and its picture of the mind not only display a faulty inheritance from Cartesianism, but are based on a mechanistic understanding of human beings, a view which Malcolm shares. 1 wiil therefore be revisiting some of the sarne criticisms made in the previous chapter. Hacker notes that it is quite evident that Wittgenstein rejected psychologicai behaviourism, the view which held arnong other things that "mental life", as Watson put it,269 was really a fiction.

* This title is taken from a section of Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, An analytical commentary on the Plzilosopliical Investigations, Volume 3, Oxofrd: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 239. 268. P. M. S. Hacker. "Criteria". in Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind. An analyticaf cotnmentary on the Pldosophical Investigations, Volume 3, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1990. p. 561. Al1 further references to ihis text will sirnply be dernarcated by the surname of the author and the title of the essay to which such references are made. 269. cf., Watson. Behaviorism, p. 224, Instead, he notes, Wittgenstein was interested in exposing grc~ttntancalfictions (as the remark in PI, 8307 indicates) and disagreed with the view of some radical behaviourists that mental phenomena, like pain, were phantoms drearned up to explain human behaviour.

But, more enigmatically, he aiso denied that pain was a something and justified this ph-facie obscure remark as a rejection of 'the grammar which tries to force itself on us here'. He also repudiated the picture of an inner process associateci with, for example, the notion of remembering (PI $305). Contrary to the empiricist tradition, he denied that feeling or 'experiencing' pain is a pre-condition for understanding the word 'pain' (PI $315). and that clarification of the rneaning of the verb 'to think' requires any introspective scrutiny of thinking (PI 83 16). One might harbour the suspicion that his repudiation of psychological behaviourism gws hand in hand with acceptance of a fonn of logical behaviourifl

As Hacker himself points out, Wittgenstein makes certain puzzling comments about the connection between dlegedly mental phenomena and their behavioural counterpatts or manifestations? That is to Say, some remarks appear to indicate that he wants to identiQ a mentai phenomenon with its behavioural manifestation or rebuild the former in terms of the latter. Wittgenstein, himself, had confronted this suspicion at PI, 0244: "So you are saying that the word 'pain' reaily means cry ing?" The question leads Hacker to wonder how the distinction between Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and behaviourism is to be made. "1s this not a logical behaviourist account of fnst-person psychological propositions?", he asks.* Mer dl, "Did Wittgenstein not claim that the body is the best picture of the soul (PI p. 178), and that if one sees the behaviour of a living thing one sees its soul (PI §357)? But remove the poetry of these remarks, and do we not have before us a form, indeed an extreme form, of logical behaviourism?"m in fact, Hacker doubts whether it may even be a radical account. If anything, he sees the contrary opinion as a fundamental failure on the part of those who prematurely conclude that Wittgenstein is a behaviourist, i.e., that they do not fuily grasp Wittgenstein's remarks on philosophy of psychology .

270. Op. cit.. p- 240. 271. Ibid.. p. 240. cf.. PI. 0244: a child is taught new pain-behaviour. a verbal expression. which is a replacement for crying; $180: utterances such as "Now 1 can go on" or "Now 1 know how to go on" arc not descriptions of mental states but signals of later performance; 3323: such utterances are exclamations which correspond to an instinctive sound or a glad scan; and 5343: the words one uses to express one's memory are one's memory-reactions, 272. [bid.. p. 240. 273. Ibid., p. 241. Nevertheless, he notes in detail the apparent convergence between Wittgenstein's remarks and behaviounsm: (a) dong with logical behaviounsts, Wittgenstein rejects the traditional philosophical (privileged access) conception of the inner; (b) like psychological bebaviounsts, he accepts that language acquisition is based on brute training which presupposes for its success a variety (and reservoir) of natural forms of behaviour and reactions; (c) unlike traditional empiricists, he does not regard language employment as a translation from language-independent thoughts into 'word-language' for the benefits of others; (d) in Company with logical behaviourists, he argued that the ascription of psychological predicates is logicaily connected with behaviour; and (e) like behaviourists in general, he denied that 'introspection' was the proper means of conductùig the empirical study of human psychology.274 These parallels and sunilarities make it seem that the case against Wittgenstein is decided, that he is indeed a behaviourist in disguise, that the recognition and acceptance of the ciose relational co~ectionbetween language and behaviour is tantamount to embracing behaviounsm. If a person's avowais did not license certain predictions about his behaviour, for exarnple "if people's expressions of pain were not integrated into more general patterns of pain-behaviour,"

Hacker writes, then "their words would be meaningIes~."~%How can Wittgenstein share such fundamental points with behaviourism and yet avoid marking himself as a 'card-carrying member' of this school of philosophical psychology? Why is it that we should not classi@ Wittgenstein's descriptions of the so-called grarnmar of psychological expressions as a form of logical behaviourism? After dl, Wittgenstein shared with the behaviourists the repudiation of mistakes made by Cartesianism and perpehiated by cIassical empiricism. Here is Hacker's answer:

The convergence is explaineci by the common repudiation of (roughly speaking) Cartesianism and the classical empiricist Cartesian inheritance. To escape from these confiisions, the radical psfchologicai behaviourist denies the existence of the mental. and the logical behaviourist reduces the mental to behmiorrr. Wittgenstein did neither. To a first approximation, what he did was to explore the grammar of the expression or manifestation (~ussemng)of the inner. In his detailed examination of the relation of behaviour to what it is a manifestation of, of the logical status of avowals of experience, of thinking and imagining, OF intention and desire, and of the very concepts of body and behaviour (i.e. of what counts as behaviour), his account diverged dramatically fiom logical behaviolrnst ~trate~ies.~'~

274. Ibid.. pp. 241 - 242. 275. Ibid., p. 242. 276. Ibid., p. 242. Thus, according to Hacker the distinguishing marks between Wittgenstein's views and those of both psychological behaviourism and logical behaviourism are that he treats mental phenomena neicher as ontological fictions nor as metaphoncal allusions to what is mere behaviour. However, it should be clear from Hacker's characterization that both psychological behaviourism and logical behaviourism are covered by Fodor's category of strong logicd

behaviourism. What 1mean is that he identifies both doctrines with their extreme varieties: radical behaviourism for the former, and reductive materialism for the latter. In other words, Hacker conceives of logical behaviourisrn and behaviourism generally as king founded on a strict and rigid one-to-one type correspondence of mental and behavioural statements. In doing so, he merely repeats Wittgenstein's own deficient conception. It should be recailed that in PI, $308, Wittgenstein cornmenteci that the philosophical problem about mental states and behaviourism arises from a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of mental phenomena and Our use of psychological language. We expect, he sardonically remarks (and as Watson and Weiss had expressed), that "sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think." The problem

results, he noted, from a particular way we have of regarding the matter. That is to Say, we have a certain picture of how to examine, of how to corne to know the alleged phenornenon better. And when this particular philosophical approach comes up empty, so to speak, it appears that "we have

to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied the mental process." It is a mistaken inference, Wittgenstein protests, because he does

not want to declare that mental phenomena are fictions. After dl, we do talk about them ail the time. Nevertheless, it is Wittgenstein's approach, his philosophical attitude, which shows his strongest debt to behaviourism. As he notes in 5308, the problem of mental states and processes and the question of behaviourism results from a particular attitude, a method which has become so customary to us for investigating the nature of phenornena and their relation to language that it "altogether escapes notice". It is part and parce1 of our philosophicd cornportment: "in numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture and once it is found the application as it were comes about of itself. In this case we already have a picm which forces itseif on us at every mm,--but does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins here." (PI, $425) Hacker succumbs to the ch- of Wittgenstein's attack on the traditional philosophical approaches and attitudes, which leads him to cast behaviourism as the view thai an extemd relation comects a behavioural expression with that of which it is an expression, Le., that the inner can either be simply identified with the outer or else treated as simply a fiction. By maintaining that khaviounsm only draws an externa1 relation between the inner and its outward manifestations, Hacker points out the continuity it shares with Cartesianism, where the relation is a causal one of an entity to its effects. In elirnination the Cartesian phantom, behaviourism has sirnply retained the mechanistic conception of behaviour, which is also Cartesian. in contrast, Hacker wants to argue that in Wittgenstein's more lucid understanding of philosophical psychology the relation is not causai or dispositional, but is intemal and grammatical instead. Pain-behaviour is not related to pain as symptom to hypothesis, rather it is a criterion of pain. "This grammatical relation," Hacker writes, "though distinct from entailment, nevertheless ailows for certainty, although it is defeasible."* Where behaviounsm goes wrong in Hacker's view is in regarding a psychological utterance as only a kind of behaviour. "One might Say that behaviounsm, no less than dualism, failed to appreciate the grammatical (logical) significance of the fact that '1 have a pain' is an expression of pain. In other words. radical behaviounsm did not take cognisance of the fact that a psychological utterance is also an articulate use of language, that the avowal "1 have a toothache", for example, is not about whatever gross behavioural movements 1 may be dispIaying. Sensations are not simply patterns of behaviour, as Watson and Weiss maintained. To claim as Watson did that our emotional reactions, for example, were "compiicated conditioned habit patterns",279i.e., that they were responses built up through direct conditioning and substitution of various stimuli for specific emotional behavioural reactions, is to overlook the fact that mere brute training or conditioning could not adequately account for the

277. Ibid., p. 243. Hackcr's interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of criteria will be discussed at a later stage. 278. ibid., p. 244. 279. Watson, Behaviourism, p. 165. complexity of Our ascriplion of psychological predicates. We judge whether a person is in pain based on his current behaviour and the present surrounding circurnstances, not by reference to his previous reactions. The question of behaviourism is intimately related to the problem of other mincis, according to Hacker (whose argument loudy echoes that of Malcolm's), a problem traceable to the Cartesian picture of the mind's relation to the body. "Behaviounsm (by and large) rightly repudiated the Cartesian conception of the mind but accepted the correlative conception of the body - as it were, an empty glove that moves in accord with the laws of stimulus and response (molar behaviourism), which are probably ultimately reducible to the laws of physics (molecular behaviourism)."~O However, as Hacker notes (again echoing Malcolm), a proper philosophicai understanding of our concepts of both imer and outer, of psychological staternents and behavioural ones can only be achieved by repudiating both haives of this classical 'wishbone' of Cartesianism. Even though Wittgenstein devotes most of his remarks to countering the Cartesian notion that the body is somehow animated by an aethereai soul, like "an immaterial hand within a visible glove," Hacker contends that this does not show that he adopted the opposing conception of thinking of human beings as mere mechanistic assemblages of gross reactionary behavioural movements. When someone asks, 'what is it about others that convinces me that they have a soul or possess consciousness, i.e., that they experience the same sensations and mental states that 1 do, when all 1 see are their bodies', it is too easy to become ensnared by the web of solipsism and to make an irresponsible generdization from one's own case? "But can't 1 imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?" We feel inclined to think so, because we have the disquieting sensation that others really are a mystery, that one's self is the limiting condition for mentd experience. But,

if 1 imagine it now-alone in my room-1 see people with fixed looks (as in a trame) going about their business--the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the Street, say! Say to yourself, for example: "The children over there are mere automata; al1 their liveliness is mere automatism." And you will either find these words becorning quite meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

280. Op. cit.. p. 246. 281. cf., PI, 5293. Seeing a living human king as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example. (Pi, 5420) This remark calls to mind Descartes's Nminations in his Second Meditation about the certainty of his immediate knowledge of mental acts and concepts compared with indirect knowledge of material objects. The former provides him with a gmund of certainty, the latter with what can be doubted. Note how he supports his scepticism about the mental life of others:

Although 1 am considering these points within myseif silentiy and without speaking, yet I stumble over words and am almosr deceived by ordinary language. We Say we see the wax itself, if it is there; not that we judge from its colour or shape that it is there. 1 might at once infer: 1 see the wax by ocular vision, not by merely mental contemplation. 1 chanced, however, to look out of the window, and see men walking in the Street; now 1Say in ordinary language that 1 'see' them, just as 1 'see' the wax; but what can 1 'see' besides hats and coats, which may cover automata? 1judge chat they are men; and similady, the objects that I thought 1 saw with my eyes, I really comprehend only by the mental power of j~dgrnent.~~~

The tacit principles of Descartes's reasoning are that the mental is essentially private, in an exclusive sense, a notion which the private language argument fundamentally undermines, and ttiat (in contrat) scepticism about the extemal world is not unwarranted.m The idea that the mental is a private exclusive domain opposed to the material world is suggested in the wax example.

Descartes's metaphysical convictions divide the world into mental and the material. Furthemore, he argues that the former is logically distinguishable from the latter, and that the mental is known imrnediately, directly, and with greater certaïnty than anything material, including the body. "It is

indeed possible," he writes, "(or rather, as 1 shall Say later on, it is certain) that 1 have a body closely bound up with myself; but at the same tirne 1 have, on the one hand, a clear and distinct

idea of myself taken simply as a conscious, not an extended, being; and, on the other hand, a

282. Rene Descartes. "Second Meditation". in Descartes Philosophical Writings. tram and ed., Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach, Indianapolis: Bobbs-MerrilVLibrary of Arts, 1971, pp. 73 - 74. Emphasis is mine. 283. Anthony Kenny. in his essay, Cartesian Privacy, Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, ed.. George Pitcher, Anchor Books, (New York, 1966) pp. 360 - 361 rnakes an interesting point about Descartes' 'innovation'. He writes:

If Descartes' innovation was to identify the mental with the private. Wittgenstein's contribution was to separate the two. Since Wittgenstein, we tend to equate the mental with what is peculiar to language-users; and if Wittgenstein's arguments are valid, languages cannot be private. The cogitio and the private language argument each lie at the hem of the episternology and philosophy of mind of their inventors, The cogito led to the conclusion that mind is better known than body. The private lang~ageargument leads, we might Say, to the conclusion that body is better known than mind.

There is merit in Kenny's comments in view of the fact that Wittgenstein counters the inherent Cartesian principles in the idea that mental phenornena are mysterious and private by pointing out that our use of psychologicai language requires that there be a concepmai relationship between mental and behavioural staternents, that there must be behavioural criteria for mental concepts. It is this internal, grammatical relationship coupled with Wittgenstein's prioritising of the body for explaining the intelligibility of mental concepts that show his affinity with behaviourism. distinct idea of body, taken simply as an extended, not a conscious, king; so it is certain that 1 am reaily distinct fiom my body, and could exist without it."m As is well-known, Descartes conceives of the rnind as a substance wherein mental acts (such as perception and sensation), experiences, etc. can be found, and to accord it pnority over the material.% In effect then, he treats words in public language, particularly psychological ones, as if they primarily stand for private mental powers or modes; thus, "perception" and "sensation", in his view, are mental acts. As a result, Descartes is wary of acknowledging that he actually "sees" men outside his window and suggests that he is a privatist with respect to the meaning of psychological concepts- This invites scepticism about the existence of things, including other mincis, And, here in a nutshell, one finds the germ of the problem of behaviourisrn*~answer to the problem of other mincis.

The problem with this approach, which Malcolm has also pointed out, is that it does not sufficiently account for the aîîitude we have towards others. As Hacker claims, "to repudiate the sentence '1 am my body*,and to deny that a person is identical with his body or that a human king is a (human) body is not to affi that 1, or any other person, is identical with something else distinct from the body -- a mind, soul, or ~elf."2~~Hacker appears to fault behaviourism, therefore, for holding that unless the body was taken to be the sole arbiter of what constitutes our

nre of each other then we would not be able to escape the confusions produced by the Cartesian 1 of soldering the spirit to the body:

If one views the body as the vehicle of the soul, if one thinks that one does not really 'see the men themselves' but only 'hats and coats which could conceal automatons' (Descartes), then one is bound to think of human behaviour as 'several motions. changes' of 'the outward form, colour, or shape' of a 'mere body' (Berkeley). (This aberration is parallel to the thought that we do not even see 'the things themselves'

284- "Sixth Meditation." in Descarres Pl,ilosophical Wniings, pp. 1 14 - 1 15. 285. In the Sixth Meditation. he funher remarks:

1 find in myself powers for special modes of consciousness. e-g., imagination and sensation; 1 can clearly and distinctly undentand rnyself as a whole apart from these powers, but not the powers apart form myself--apm frorn an intellectual subsmce to inhere in; for the essential (formafi) conception of them includes some kind of intellectual act; and 1 thus perceive that they are distinct from me in the way aspects (modus) are from the object to which they belong. 1 also recognise other powers-those of local motion, and change of shape. and so on; these. like the ones 1 rnentioned before, cannot be understood apart from a substance to inhere in; nor, therefore, can they exist from it. ClearIy these if they exist, must inhere in a corporeal or extended, not an intellectual substance; for it is some form of extension. not any intellectual act, that is invoIved in a clear and distinct conception of them. (Ibid., p. 115.) 19. Hacker, "Behaviour and behaviourism," p. 248. but only their mere appearances, sensedata or impressions.) The consequent distortion of the concept of behaviour is the seed-bed of the philosophical problem of 'other Thus, despite the many farnily resemblances he acknowledges, Hacker disagrees that Wittgenstein's opposition to the Cartesian picture of human beings and of meaning supports a behaviourist philosophy of psychology. He maintains that Wittgenstein rejects both the Cartesian and behaviourist conceptions of body and behaviour dong with the Cartesian picture of the mind, that he does not resort to conceiving of behaviour in sterile terrns as mere 'colourless movements', as C. L. Hull had done.% It should be noted that, pfimfacie, Weiss adopts a rather sterile definition of behaviour as simply king types of movements; this appears to make his conception vulnerable to the type of attack that Hacker directs specificaüy against Huii. Whaî Hacker sees as deficient in behaviourism's rejection of Cartesianism is the idea that mental concepts can be deduced or consmcted from the strict underlying physiological and physical details of the body. However, this alleged silliness is applicable only to a behaviourism w hich follows the radical programme of elirninative metaphysics found in the earliest formulations of behaviounsm, for example in

Watson's. As 1 have shown earlier, Watson's later conception of the behaviourist programme, while still placing stress on a conception of behaviour that was more or less fundarnentally physiological, emphasised that an adequate understanding of behaviour must encompass its operation within the environment. Weiss held a simila. conviction. Moreover, Tolman's conception of behaviour recognised that in spite of its dependence upon the physiological and physical elements which compose it, behaviour nonetheless has emergent patterns and meanings which differ from its underlying basis? He wrote:

It will be contended by us (if not by Watson) that "behavior-acts," îhough no doubt in complete one-to-one correspondence with the underlying molecular facts of physics and physiology, have, as "rnolar" wholes, certain emergent propecties of their own. .... Further, these molar properties of behavior-acts cannot in the present state of our knowledge, Le., prior to the working-out of many empiricai correlations between

287. Ibid., p. 250. 288. Ibid.. p. 251. 1 noted earlier that C. L. Hull's major contributions to behaviourism were made afta Wittgenstein had already written the Phifosophical Investigations and thus his account of behaviourism wwld not be considered in my survey. 289. Edward Chace Tolman. Purporive Behvior is Animufs ond Men. The Century Psychology Se"es, Nnv Yo&: The Century Co., 1932, pp. 4 - 12, and p. 418. behavior and its physiological correlates, be known even inferentially hma mere knowledge of the underlying, molecular, facts of physics and physiology. For, just as the properties of a beaker of water are no& prior to experience, in any way envisageable fiom the propeaies of individual water molecules, so neither are the properties of the underlying physicai and physiological processes which make it up. Behavior as such cannot. at any rate at present, be deduced from a mete enmeration of the muscle twitches, the mere motions qua motions, which make it up. It must be studied for its own sake.m However, while Tolman adopts emgemtist language farniliar from C. D. Broad's work,291 he is not using it to talk about any inner, metaphysicai properties; he is simply trying to show the complexity of behaviour. That is to Say, he wants to show that the behaviourist is not doctrinaire, that he cm conceive of behaviour in a manner other than as a deduction from inner physicai parts.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that there is ment to Hacker's argument since ail three of the behaviounsts discussed earlier are susceptible to the argument that behaviourism, generally understood, does not undennine the fundamental inner-outer distinction which nurtures Cartesianism and other traditional conceptions of mind, but simply holds one end of the distinction to be vaiid. As an exarnple, consider how Tolman regards the thesis of behaviourism:

For the behaviorist, "mental processes" are to be identified and defined in terms of the behaviors to which they Iead. "Mentaï processes" are, for the behaviorist, naught but inferred deteminants of behavior, which ultimately are deducible fiom behavior. Behavior and these inferred detenninants are both objectively defined types of entity, There is about hem, the behaviorist would declare, nothing private or "inside," Organisms, human and sub-human, are biologicai entities immersed in environments. To these environments they must, by virtue of their physiological needs, adjust. Their "mental processes" are functionally defined aspects determining their adjustments- For the behaviorist ail things are open and above-board ....292 Nonetheless, Hacker's criticism cannot be said to be a decisive blow against Tolman's behaviourism, which contended that behaviour is fundarnentally purposive, intentional and goal- directed. Hacker's cnticism appears to be more properly directed at behaviourist doctrines which are founded on the principle that mental predicates are eliminable in favour of behavioural ones, a condition not strictly found in Tolman's version of behaviourism.

290. Ibid., pp. 7 - 8. 291. cf.. C. D. Broad's The Mind and Its Place in Nature. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy. md Scientitic Method, London: Routledge Br Kegan Paul. Ltd-. 1923. Seventh Impression, 1962, pp. 58 - 81. Broad had rernarked that "the characteristic behaviour of the whole could not, even in theory. be deduceci from the most complete knowledge of the behaviour of its components. taken separately or in other combinations, and of their proportions and arrangements in this whole. " (p. 59) It is wonh mentioning that Broad approves of as "a iogically possible view with a good deal in its favour" (p. 59). which helps to explain his antipathy to behaviourism. 292. OP. cit.. p. 3. It may appear mat Wittgenstein's own remarks are based on a thesis similar to the one above; afier all, he attacks the idea that one can be a witness to the fact that one possesses consciousness (PI, §416), that the sense of one's words is something mental which another person grasps in communication (PI, §363), and that thinking is an incorporeal process which somehow makes verbalization intelligible (PI, $339). But that, according to Hacker, would be to misconstrue

Wittgenstein's notion that an inner process requires outward criteria (PI, §580), that one needs a behavioural criterion for an alleged mental state (PZ, 8 149, $572 - $573). Haçker claims that Wittgenstein's position differed from traditional conceptions of the mind and behaviour associated with behaviourism in three major respects. (1) In examining mental phenomena, Wittgenstein does not limit the tenn 'be haviourt to gross bodil y movements, i .e ., facial expressions and gestures, but situates behaviour within a context of circurnstances and customs. Though he recognises that a behaviourist would not necessarily disagree with this, he points out that the behaviourist tends to conceive of the situation in purely causal terms of stimulus and response. And while Wittgenstein aiso describes behaviour in the context of a specific stimulus, he does not resuict the explanation of behaviour to strictly causal mechanisms. Hacker States that such a characterisation of behaviour would "obliterate or distort the crucial distinction between reason and cause, and hence too the difference between the causes and the objects of emotions and the propnety of the behaviour (e-g. obeying an order) with respect to its occasion (viz. the issuing of a c0mmand)."2~3 (2) Behaviour, as Wittgenstein conceives of it, is not simply what we do after leaming and training; it is also our use of linguistic techniques, i.e., what we Say. (3) We cannot refer to much of what falls under the concept of the outer without using psychological language. That is to Say, "although what is 'outer' (behaviour) is a criterion of what is 'inner', far from the inner king describable only in terms of the outer, it is --- a little paradoxically at first blush --- the outer, or at least much of what is most important to us about it, that is essentially and unavoidably describable in terms of concepts of what is inner."m In other

393. Hacker, "Behaviour and Behaviourism", p. 251. 294. Op. cit., p. 252. words, it would be practically impossible to describe expressive behaviour in ternis of strictly physical movements; in Our characterisation of the outer, psychological language inevitably creeps in. Aspect-perception, for instance, is nfe with mental concepts. Seeing a face as king angry or seeing the same face as king samastic is one example which indicates that the outer sometimes is only intelligible by reference to allegedly mental accompaniments. When Wittgenstein remarks that the human body provides the best picture of the human soul (PI, p. 178). he does not mean that the soul is to be conceived of as king bodily, but that the soul is manifested in behaviour. For example, the human face cm display many varied forms of expressions and emotions which presuppose a highly complex behavioural repertoire spread over vastly differing circumstances and situations. Hacker writes: "the articulations of the human face and body in the circumstances of human life are not extemally related to what it makes sense to Say of the human soul."295 In other

words, pain can neither be defined by nor abstracly identified with facial contortions coupled with

bodily writhing, for instance. For Wittgenstein, the fact that out concepts are as flexible as they are and that they make possible the attitude we have towards each other as human beings, presupposes an intemal or grammatical relation between our articulate use of Ianguage and our behaviour. In Hacker's estimation, this delivers Wittgenstein from the misguideci conception of the inner-outer to which both Cartesianism and behaviourism itself fa11 victim. EssentiaiIy, Hacker argues that according to Wittgenstein the inner-outer distinction is deeply rooted in Our language about criteria with regard to psychological subjects, which he nonetheless claims is not a behaviouristic characterisation. Furthemore, it could be argued that when Hacker describes the grammatical relation between our articulate use of language and our behaviour as an "internai" one, he is using "intemal" in a heretofore unappreciated manner, narnely, in a 'non-spatial', non-metaphysical sense.= That is to Say, he is trying to point out that Wittgenstein's argument is that the meaning of a sign cannot be attributed to its effect, that a sign's meaning is not something "determinable in

- .------

295. Ibid., p. 253. 296. 1 owe this conception to a discussion with R. E. Tuliy. advance of the behavioural consequences of its use fiom occasion to occasion."^ The meaning of a sign or an expression is given by an articulation of the rule(s) of its use: the meaning of terrns is given within language. Asking for the maning of a sign points one towards the criteria-relation for deterrnining its correct use. This is why a causal conception of meaning does not adequately account for how meaning is actually detemiined by Our ordinary use of language. We cannot reduce the meaning of an expression to a hypothesis about what reaction it will produce. "A wish seems already to know what would satis@ it; a proposition, a thought, what makes it tme-even when that thing is not there at dl! Whence this detemining of what is not yet there? This despotic demand? ("The hardness of the logical must.")" (PZ, 5437) One is aware only that the student understands the formula, that a wish or desire is fulfilled, that 'James has toothache', by the satisfaction of certain criteria given by the contextual circumstances which makes these activities intelligible. According to Wittgenstein what determines meaning is not some artificial or arbitrary demand which language must answer to, e-g., a causal structure or a calculus, but the acquisition of a technique and practical ski11 based on training in the rudiments of using words which results in a progressive mastery of a normative linguistic structure.29s This appears to be Hacker's interpretation of the deeper meaning of "grarnmar", and 1will retum to it at a later stage. However, 1 would like to point out that Hacker, as did Malcolm before him, directs his analysis of the principles of behaviounsm from within the confines of Wittgenstein's sketch of it.

In other words, he uncriticaiiy accepts Wittgenstein's representation. It is tnie that Wittgenstein does not want to counter the dudist or mentalist with the simplistic notion that behavior is the only thing that matters (PI, §307), or that sensation statements merely describe gross behaviour (PI, $244). But it is fundamental to behaviounsm-as well as to Wittgenstein's thinking-that man is regarded as basically a reacting organism within a social environment. While Wittgenstein's development of this principle may not take on the deterministic overtones found in some stimulus- response models of behaviour (e.g., Watson and Weiss), he was hardly indifferent to the causal

297. Op. cit., p. 238. 298. Ibid., pp. 238 - 239. effects of training, beginning with the simplest language-gams demibed in the Investigations.

Also, although be haviourism shares a continuity with p hy sicaiïsm, behaviour in most behaviounst systems is not strictly bue-boned physiology but includes language as well. AU three behaviourists regarded language as one of the essential means by which an individual manipulates his environment and others. It should be noted that in this regard Wittgenstein does not differ from Watson. Although Watson did think of behaviour in stimulus-response terrns, he regarded a person's articulate use of language to be part of behaviour. "For the behavionst, psychology is that division of natural science which takes human behavior-the doings and sayings, both leamed and unlearned, of people as its subject matter."= In accepting the notion that the shared activities and responses of individuals within a community are the only building blocks for understanding psychological concepts, Wittgenstein implies that a philosophy of psychology need not be based on hidden causal mechanisms in order to explain how psychologicai language works. It should not be lost of sight of that even the 'hidden' mechanisms of classical behaviounsm were only skin deep. It is not the case for Hacker's Wittgenstein that we need only concem ourselves with the outer and consider the inner as (perhaps) a drearn of Our language. Wittgenstein claims that the inner-outer dichotomy is not properly characterised by a strict opposition of one sphere to the other, which only gives rise to impennissible conceptions of this distinction which infect both Cartesianism and behaviourism.

"The phenornenon is at first surpnsing, but a physiological explanation of it will certainly be found."- Our problern is not a causal one but a conceptual one. (PI, p. 203) For Hacker, the inner and the outer are more properly marked by a conceptual connection, that an inner process is related to behaviour via cntena, that mental phenornena are only meaningful by means of a logical relationship with behavioural expressions. Hacker has observed: "it has ken thought that Wittgenstein differed from the Vienna Circle primarily in introducing a novel, and

299. John B. Watson. Prychology Fmthe Standpoint of a Bchovioriri. Third Edition Revissd. Philadelphin: I. B. Lippincott Company. 1929, p. 4. 1 should also point out that Weiss and Tolman also included an individual's use of language as part of her behaviour. (cf.. Weiss. A Theoretical Bais of Hw~nBehavior, pp. 307 - 325 and Tolman, Purposive Behaviour in Animals adMen, pp. 235 - 241.) perhaps dubious, logical relation to mediate (mere) observable behaviour and psychologicai state, viz. that of a criterion."3~ Hacker is able to defend Wittgenstein against behaviourism by simplwing it. In his estimation Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist, because ( 1) unlike the psychological (meaning radical) behaviodsts he did not deny the imer, and (2) uniike the iogical behaviourists he does not effect a reduction of the inner to the outer, nor does he accept the correlative conceptions of the mind and body which go dong with these viewpoints. Nonetheless, as 1 have contended in my examination of Malcolm's interpretation, these radical conceptions of behaviourism do not exhaust its varieties. It strikes me that Hacker's penchant for defining behaviourism by its extreme forrns results in a failure to fully appreciate ihat Wittgenstein's notion of cnteria may point the way towards settling the question of whether he may not in fact be a behaviourist in disguise, and 1 shall now examine Hacker's account of this notion.

According to Hacker, one of the things that must be understood about Wittgenstein's conception of cnteria is that it does not form part of a larger philosophical theory of meaning. This is because Wittgenstein's later philosophical approach is one that is fundamentally descriptive with regard to method and therapeutic in regard to its aim. (Hacker does not recognise that this very attitude or Anschauung is resonant with, and indistinguishable from, what many behaviounsts took to be the fùndarnental nature of behaviourism's enterprise."l) In fact, Hacker offers the customary pronouncement found in much of the scholarship about Wittgenstein's later philosophy that Wittgenstein would have viewed any attempts at theory-construction to be chimencal.~2 Hacker issues the foilowing caution against trying to categorise Wittgenstein's notion in this

If we are to obtain a clear picture of his use of the term 'criterion', we must eschew theory and engage in patient description. It is far fiom obvious that it is a technical tenn or term of art. As we shalI see, it converges substantially, hough not uniformly, with the ordinary use of the word. It is not part of a thcory of meaning, but a modest instrument in the description of the ways in which words are used. As we should expect if we have followed Wittgenstein thus far, it plays a significant role in his philosophy, but not by way of a premise in an argument, nor by way of a theory. 'An "inner process" stands in need of outward

300. Op cit.. p. 25 1. This point wualready made in reference to Malcolm's interpretation. 302. Hacker. "Criteria." in Wiirgenstein: Meoning and Mind. p. 545. criteria' (PI 0580) is not a thesis hmwhich philosophical propositions are proved. It is a synopsis of grammaticai mies that determine what we caü 'the ~inef.~~ It bears pointing out that Fodor and Chihara were not persuaded by the interpretation that

Wittgenstein's notion of criteria was the result of a radical and innovative methodological insight. h fact, they claimed that to suggest that the inteiiigibility of terms and concepts and the coherence of theû employment required criteria, Le., that one must evenniaiiy corne to a criterion in order to

determine that a term or predicate is adequately applied, was the "projection of an inadequate theory of justification" instead." They contended that Wittgenstein's novel relation did not seem to fit the traditional categories of logicai relations. They held that Wittgenstein's explanation and use of the term pointed to an fi~~itywith necessary and/or sufficient conditions in such a manner that while neither one or both of these relations could suffrciently capture the essence of a criterion, it seerned to convey a force somewhat 'analogous' to them. They understood Wittgenstein to have found a way of rnitigating a strong logical behaviourist position through his insistence that the inner is only understandable by means of the grmar of the outer. This led them to respond that the outer

often stands in need of clarification by means of the inner. Hacker, on the other hand, argues that this countermove shows a failure to appreciate Wittgenstein's contention that the inner-outer distinction is fundamental to Our use of langage in a way that does not require our affirming either one at the expense of other. Our being deceived by grammatical fictions about the inner-outer prevents us from fuUy appreciating this fact. There is a relation of mutuai dependence. According to Hacker's interpretation, Wittgenstein's notion of critena does not coincide with a behaviouristic understanding of how psychological predicates are ascribed, for that would lend support to a kind of scepticism about other minds, that we cm never really know whether another person is in pain or possesses a certain ability, "that our judgements are at best probable and never certain, for our evidential grounds are never really adequate."305 Hacker's retort against this type of speculation is to argue thaî Wittgenstein's notion of cnteria must be seen against the

303. Ibid., p. 546. 304. cf.. Fodor and Chihara, "Operationaiism and Ordinary Language," p. 292. 305- Op. cit., p. 563. backdrop of his general philosophical appmach in his later work, that Wittgenstein's purpose was

to cure philosophy of the inteilectual diseases such as the belief that the inner and the outer represent two distinct domains and that no conceivable acwunt of mind and behaviow can dissipate the mystery surmunding other minds or the relation behueen actuality and potentiality. Furthemore, he maintains that one cannot take passages such as PI, $580-"an 'inner process'

stands in need of outward criteria"-as proving that Wittgenstein's notion of criteria forms the basis of a behaviourist philosophy of psychology, or properly interpret his continual reliance on language-games to explain the meaning of psychological language as an endorsement of behaviourism. This would be a misconstnial of the logical or grammaticai relation which marks cnteria. Wittgenstein's innovation, he asserts, lies in his elucidation of a logical relation which other thinkers had heretofore failed to recognise. In Hacker's view, behaviourism responds to the problem of other rninds by thinking that the behavioural grounds for judgements are covered by

entailment-conditions, and thereby conhises criteria with symptoms. "It is not an empirical discovery that people scream when they are in severe pain, that they avoid obstacles in their path which they see, and laugh when they are amused. These forms of behaviour, in context, constitute

logical criteria,"306 he points out. Although Wittgenstein at times remarked that behavioural cnteria are evidence for mental phenomena (cf., PZ, 5641 and p. 228 for example), which may appear to relate criteria more with symptoms, Hacker insists that this does not justiw the contention chat Wittgenstein was moulding a conception of a logical relation in order to demonstrate to the sceptic how the supposed ontological gap between the inner and the outer could be bridged.307 Such a gulf between the inner and the outer is, so to speak, a mere "dream of our language". There is no gap between cnteriai grounds for inner states and the statements about such states which they support. Scepticism about other min& is based on the claim that the relation between behaviour and mental phenomena fails to confonn to the mode1 of inductive evidence for a phenornenon. What we must accept is that behavioural criteria are the best possible grounds we have for

306. Ibid., p. 563. 307 Ibid.. pp. 563 - 564. It should be remembered that Fodor and Chihara. in their paper. "Operationalism and Ordinary Language". argued that Wittgenstein developed the notion of criteria to make a direct attack on the sceptical position. determining that a person is in pain. Othemise, we becorne fooled by the picture that the inner is identical with the outer, or that the fornier is hidden behind the latter. As Hacker points out, "the criterial evidence for the inner falls short of what it is evidence for only in the sense that it does not entail it, but not in the sense of falling short of direct observation."^ We engage in what Hacker refers to as "'cross-categoriaf' support" when we try to elucidate the grounds for potentiaiities and abilities as well as the outward critena for inner states:

Occurrent propectïes or past, present, and often subsequent performances are the criteria for potentiaiities and abilities; sirnilarly, past. present, and subsequent behaviow - the 'outer' - consti tutes the cnteria for the 'inner'. In both kinds of case it seems, when doing philosophy, as if there were a gulf between two difierent domains, between actuality and potentiality and between behaviour and the mental. Confused by this misconceived picture, philosophers have ken tempted to reifL powers on the one hand (and to conceive of them as occult causes of their exercise) and mental phenornena on the other (conceiving of sensations or sense-impressions as 'inner abjects', these likewise king cast in the role of causes of theu behavioural expression). When the grammatical differences between powers and their actualization and between the mental and the behavioural are constmed as refecrions of ontological reaiities, then the apparent gulf between distinct 'ontological realms' also seems CO be reflected in our reasoning about powers or about the 'inner'. For our judgements rest on grounds which do not entail the existence of powers or e~~eriences.309 Hacker's point here has ment. As he notes there is a cornmon philosophical tendency to create a schism between ability and performance. That is to Say, one judges whether a person has the ability to correctly carry out a paxticular mathematicai operation by observing how she has previously performed that operation. In spite of this, one is not justified in claiming that the person's current action entails that she has the ability in question. One can only make judgements about her capacity based on her performance in a current situation. This makes it appear that Our judgements never approach certainty and remain only probable, because our evidential grounds seem to be always inadequate. We may therefore suppose that powers and capacities are wholly diffèrent things from their exhibitions and belong to some realrn removed from their actualization. In other words, because we fail to appreciate the ordinary role these concepts play in their constitutive situations, we turn to ontological categories to grasp their intelligibility. We id back on the notion that powers and capacities must be inaccessible because we can never seem to justify a knowledgeclairn about them, i.e., that they must in some mysterious manner cause their

308. Ibid., p. 564. 309. Ibid., p. 562 behavioural exhibitions. Thus, we rashly pmject ontology ont0 the -d structure of ianguage-games involving capacities and their exercise. Such seemingiy intractable philosophical dilemmas, Hacker claims, are what prompted Wittgenstein to utilise the notion of a criterion which, nevertheless must be understood "not as a technical tenn within a novel theory, but as a humdmm expression useful in the description of iinguistic practice."310 The common thread here between

actuality and potentiality and behaviour and the mental is chat in neither case is there an issue of cross-categorial support. In both cases there is a reluctance to acknowledge that ontology is not essential for explaining the grammar of the 'fonns of iife' which deal with these cases. According

to Hacker, Wittgenstein intended criteria to serve as an innovation to bridge the supposed ontological gulf between the outer and inner. "There is no 'guif between the outer and the inner, any more than there is a 'gulf between what one has previously done and what one is able to do. The wince of pain, the shriek of agony, the careful nursing of the injured hbare, of course, not themselves the ~ensations.~'311This does not mean that Wittgenstein assigns the sensation to a domain removed from the sensation's behavioural manifestations. The behaviour is logically or grmatically connected with the sensation; there is no gap between the criterial grounds for the mentai phenornenon and its behavioural expressions. "Hence it is neither necessary nor indeed possible to concoct new logical fonns or relations to fil1 it."312

Hacker clairns that philosophea and logicians gave no cognisance to the possibility that

there could be "a relation of presumptive implication or defeasible support." Moreover, "to the extent that Wittgenstein's use of the term 'criterion' signifies such a relation, to that extent it falls outside the received scope of reflection on logical relations."313 Cnteria are fuced by gramrnar (PI, §322), i.e., a cnterial relation is an a prion grammatical one; they are a matter of convention in that they are established by the rules of language; they specify ways of verifying a proposition, i.e., of answering 'How do you know that p?. Recall Wittgenstein's remark: "asking whether and how a

310. Ibid.. p. 563. 311. Ibid., p. 564. 322. Ibid., p. 564. 313. Ibid., p. 545. proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking 'How do you mean?' The answer is a contribution to the grarnrnar of the proposition." (PI, $353) As Hacker notes, Wittgenstein himself is not particularly helpful in clarifying specifically the nature of a critenon, a problem which appears to be exacerbated by his attempt to contrast it with symptorns (on the one hand) and to distance it from customary categonsations of logical relations (on the other):

Criteria are determinants of meaning. They are grammatical or logical grounds for the tmth of a proposition, But the kind of logical relation which is involved here is unclear and has ken much disputed, 1s a criterion a logically sufficient condition or a necessary condition ot a necessary and a sufficient condition? Or is it decisive for things king thus-and-so wirhout amounting to entailment? And how could that be? Or are criteria kinds of evidence which. like empirical evidence, do not amount to entailment, but, Iike entailment, are detennined in grammar? 1s that intelligible, Le., could there be any such thing as necessarily good evidence for something? And if so. could it be de~isive?~~~ One finds a similar difficulty expressed by Fodor and Chihara in their analysis of this notion of criteria. They noted, "to claim that X is a criterion of Y is not to claim that the presence, occurrence, existence, etc., of X is a necessary condition of the applicability of 'Y', and it is not to daim that the presence, occurrence, existence, etc., of X is a sufficient condition of Y, although if

X is a critenon of Y, it may be the case that X is a necessary or a sufficient condition of Y."315 For example, although the criteria for allegedly private processes and states are behavioural, one can nonetheless display certain customary manifestations of pain without king in pain, and one can also experience pain but yet not manifest it. However, Hacker maintains that the failure to find a uniform account of criteria delineated in Wittgenstein's remarks does not warrant the rash assurnption that he was thereby wrestling with a novel theory of meaning. "In some contexts a criterion amounts to a suff~cientcondition, whereas in others it constitutes grarnmaticaily determined presumptive grounds."316 The constancy with regard to criteria lies in Wittgenstein's use of the term: cnteria are established by rules of use, determine fully or to some extent the meaning and use of expressions, are grounds for assertion, justifications for judgements, and answers to knowledge queries.

314. Ibid., p. 558. 315. Fodor and Chihara, p. 285. 316. Hacker, "Criteria," p. 561, However, this interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion, while doing much to show how he avoided reawakening scepticism. does not conclusively break Wittgenstein's continuity with behaviourism. Hacker's defence appears to take the following path. Wittgenstein pointed out that the inner-outer distinction is fundarnentally rooted in our language about aiteria and psychological subjects. As we have already seen, he does not give license to scepticism nor conceives of the relation between the mental and behaviour in a manner which gives rise to the problem of other rninds. In fact, as Hacker rnaintains, Wittgenstein undercuts the traditional philosophical positions on mind and body by showing that the presuppositions of many such accounts (e.g., the private language defender, the Cartesian, the solipsist, the sceptic and even the behaviourist) either sever or rnisconstrue the comection between mental concepts and their criteria. For example, it is a crucial feature of the idea of a private language, Hacker claims, that it severs the concept of pain from its behavioural manifestations, which constitute cnteria for third-person pain-ascriptionPl7 Where behaviourism goes wrong, Hacker implies, is that it tries to counter the 'constitutional uncertainty'318 about the mental by replacing the indeterminancy of psychological concepts with sharper, more exact, behaviouristic ones. In other words, behaviourism handles the mental by redefining the concepts which characterise it as well as their relations. It advances the view that the relation between our concepts of the inner and behaviour (in surrounding circumstances) and between Our concepts of capacities in past performances and cun-ent circumstances is marked by entailment conditions. In both cases, Hacker protests (echoing Malcolm), this would mean that we operate with ngid and inflexible concepts. which is conirary to how we do in fact ordinarily behave. Behaviourism presents a picture of human beings and behaviour which is mechanicd and deterministic. "We would have to envisage a far greater degree of uniformity and predictability in respect of human behaviour, "319 he insists. Tme, there are certain normal regularities of behaviour and in human life which go into keeping Our language-garnes stable, but this regulaity is neither mechanical nor perfectly predictable. "And Our concepts reflect the irregularity in this pattern no

3i7. Ibid., p. 556. 31s- Hacker. "The inner and the outer," pp+ 281 - 286. 319. Op. cit.. p. 565. less than fie non-uniformity in Our reactions to exemplifications of the Moreover,

Hacker points out, we would not know how or where to begin with analogous concepts that were based on necessary connections. On the other han4 he maintains that the fact that criteriai support is defeasible does not invalidate the legitimacy of Our knowledge clairns nor does it leave a viable avenue for scepticism. They arc justified by cnteria This argument is generally a reproduction of the one found in Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Admittedly, Wittgenstein did not duplicate the mechanism found in classical forms of behaviourism, but his criteriai relation between the mental and behaviour is an advancement of a more fundamentai behaviourist approach, narnely of emphasising the prominence of the body in our understanding of mental concepts and Our use of psychological language. Hacker insists that Wittgenstein's innovation in eliicidating a logical relation which escapes standard logical categones does not form the basis of some novel theory of meaning, and perhaps in this sense he is correct. However, Wittgenstein's new conception of philosophy as king fundamentally descriptive with regards to method and therapeutic with respect to its goal, of pointing the fly the way out of the bottle (PI, §309), not only echoes Watson's original formulation of behaviourism in attitude but in substance as weil. in that it throws off the shackles of consistent reliance on fust-person experience as the bais of knowledge and our inteiiigibility of mental concepts. When Wittgenstein announces that explanation must be eschewed in favour of description as the modus operudi of philosophy, that we must resolve philosophical problems by delving into the workings of ordinary language (PI, 5 log), he is expressing a sentiment which highlights the influence upon philosophy of Watson's radical break with the traditional approach in psychology. Fodor and Chihara implicitly acknowledge this point when they accuse Wittgenstein of having developed a philosophical psychology in his later work which is supported by an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language. Although they too thought that the Iogical relation of a critenon placed it ouiside accepted logical categories, they felt that Wittgenstein's use of it indicated that he had indeed adopted a (logical) behaviounst stance with regard to mind and body. While Hacker narrowly constmes behaviourism as holding that either the mental is behaviour or that the mental is reducible to behaviour, another possibility suggests itself. In the notion of a criterion, Wittgenstein may have found a new way for behaviourism to articulate the conceptual relationship between mental concepts and their behavioural expressions, one that was sufficient to the task to adequately describe the flexibility of the mental by means of constitutive language-games, the indetenninacy of niles, and the relative unpredictabiiity of human behaviour; a notion which, in addition could confer certainty as weU as justify knowledgeclaims about the experience of others, and in general account for the intelligibility and cornmon meaning of terms as expressed in the 'forms of life' of a people. As 1 noted eariier, Hacker moves Wittgenstein's notion of cnteria to a new level. That is to Say, Hacker understauds Wittgenstein to have employed a new sense of 'intemaIn to describe the role a criterion plays in determining the meaning of a concept or term. He interpreted Wittgenstein to be using intemal in a non-metaphorical, non-metaphysical sense to express the nature of the citerial relation. Nonetheless, even this subtle interpretation of the criterial relation does not alter the fact that Wittgenstein is still deding with the same extemal and Iinguistic facts that the behaviourist looks at. According to Hacker, Wittgenstein suggests that the meaning of tenns or concepts is to be found within the foms of life which are constitutive of them, in effect eliminating any supposed ontological gulf between the inner and outer, as weU as the gap in the problematic inference from behaviour to the mental. This only underscores a basic behaviourist contention that the phenornena which require explanation (more exactly, description) are plainly before us. But claiming that Wittgenstein regards the relation between imer and outer, behavioural and mental, as grammatical, one that must be investigated from within the language-gmes whereby this relation becornes intelligible, does not radically distinguish Wittgenstein's understanding of this relation from a behaviourist's account of it. The behaviourists also conceived of the relation between the mental and behaviour (in spite of retaining the Cartesian conception of the body) as a conceptual one, i.e., as one where the intelligibility of psychological concepts was logicdy linked to behavioural expressions and certain circumstances. As was acknowledged earlier, the behaviourists incorrectly sought to Ihit the meaning of various mental phenomena to specifc physiological and bodily traits and habitual responses. Some radical forms of behaviourism sought to eliminate the inner in favour of the outer, or reduce the former to the latter. Hacker is correct to see Wittgenstein's approach as more sophisticated. Wittgenstein limits the inteIligibility of the inner to the activities and fonns of life which characterise it but does not hold that these activities, regular patterns of behaviour, situations, and circumstances in any way define the inner. The inner, the mental, is manifested in them. Moreover, uniike Watson (or both Weiss and Tolman for that matter),321 Wittgenstein did not contend that one could predict a peaon's actions due to the significance of these activities for understanding that person's behaviour; that is to Say, he did not hold that behaviour was a uniform and determinate concept which could easily be characterised by stimulus-response parameters. Hacker supports Wittgenstein's contention that there is an essential unpredictability of behaviour corresponding to which is a logical indetetminacy in explaining behaviour. "The limited predictability of human behaviour is not that of an only partly understood mechanism, and its unpredictability is not always a function of our ignorance, as if, were we better informed, we would always be able to predict with ~ertainty."~ZYet Wittgenstein himself recognized that fomof life and Our language-games are held together by normal regular patterns of behaviour which aiiow us to predict a person's actions with reasonable certitude (PI, $243) and to properly account for her use of concepts and terms. Hacker's interpretation seeks to save Wittgenstein from behaviourisrn by stressing the role of critena in the logical fabric of the language-games involving Our use and application of terms and concepts. nie notion of a cnterion, according to Hacker, bespeaks the flexibility of the concepts which we use and the relative unpredictability of our behaviour =d activities. In fact, this idea serves not so much as a counterpoint to the extreme forms of behaviourism which Wittgenstein criticises but as a refinement of their radical and unsophisticated accounts of the meaning of psychological concepts.

321. For example, Tolman wrote: "we have attempted to do for psychological phenomena what the other sciences have done for physical phenomena. We have attempted to reduce the former to a series of functional relationships by virtue of which it is possible to predict and conuol." (Purposive Behavior in Animals & Men, p. 424) Watson as well had written: "The psychologist ..., having chosen human behavior as his material, feels that he makes progress only as he can manipulate or control it. (Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. p. 7) 322. Hacker, "The inner and the outer." p. 283. Wittgenstein does not want to Say that the word 'pain' really means crying (PI, 9244); he wants to modi@ this view by moving expressive behaviour away fkom the idea that rneaning requises reference and ontology. In effect, he wants to elevate behaviowistic pnnciples above rnere physiological reductionism. Yet he wants to uphold the conceptual dation between the mental and behavioural expressions, the criterial connection between our use of words and our cornrnon repertoire of primitive behavioural reactions and responses, without at the same time reinforcing (or falling victim to) confused pictures which commit philosophy to an ontological thesis He wants to advance the priority of the body for the intelligibility of our use of psychological as weli as public language, but in a manner that does not use language to create a gulf between psychological phenomena and theû behavioural manifestations. (PZ, $245) When Wittgenstein contrasts his grammatical account of the relation between the mental and behaviour against that of behaviourism's reductive or definitional conception (5243 - §280), or its eluninative or one-sided account in favour of the behavioural side of the relation (828 1 - 93 15), one can only conclude that he is certainly not a classical behaviounst, narrowly understood. Hacker's defence of Wittgenstein is a spiriteci but puzzling one. He indicates that there is much that suggests an affinity between Wittgenstein's comments on psychological subjecrs and a behaviourist's treatment but that nonetheless his notion of criteria provides the screen which separates the two. However, it remains a mystery why it is not correct to conclude that this conceptual connection provides the justification for branding Wittgenstein a refined sort of behaviounst. Despite his claim that "critenon" was not "a technical term within a novel theory,"323 Hacker constructs a sophisticated and technical language for describing the nature of a criterion. Hacker is correct that it is not often clear how to discem the nature of the criterid relation given the myriad roles it plays in Wittgenstein's treatment of mental concepts and Linguistic employment in general: its service in the grammar of expressions; its fluctating relation to "symptoms"; its use as a determinant (or partial determinani) of the meaning of a word; its role as a ground for proof, verification, and knowledge; the fact that a single criterion is sometimes not sufficient not meaning;

323. Hacker, "Criteria," p. 563. its defeasability. However, when one attempts to determine what a critenon is from Wittgenstein's own use of it in regard to psychologid language, one finds, not a theoreticai vocabulary but the very sort of signals and features which the behaviourists employ to account for a penon's exercise of a particular ability. Recall his example of determinhg whether a student has understood a formula correctly-it is determineci by what the student does (PI, 8146). And compare this with his later remarks:

1s it correct for someone to Say: "When 1 gave you this rule, I meant you to .,... in this case?" Even if he did not think of this case at a11 as he gave the rule? Of course it is correct- For "to mean it" does not mean: to think of it. But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and- such?-* fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and alegebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a cntierion, (PI, 8692) One finds Wittgenstein continually highlighting responsive activities as the criterial markers for an abiiity king exercised, a capacity king displayed; for example, that an expectation is irnbedded in a particular situation (g58 1), that hope may be expressed as a sigh (§585), that we tum away from

what is tangible as king important to a mental state and instead tum towards the intangible, the special atmosphere that best characterises it in Say, estimating the time (§6û8),or that an intention statement is a form of self-disclosure, not by way of self-observation but as a response ($659). "What is the natural expression of an intention?" Wittgenstein asks. "Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape." (PI, 8647) As I emphasised previously, criteria according to Wittgenstein arise out of the natural, common behaviour of active human beings.

They point us in the direction of the established rules a community uses to teach its concepts and decide on the adequacy of the Iingusitic practices of its participants. Crtieria bring us back to the

fact that language is not a static mechanism for individuals to use as a diary of their private experiences but is a public technique, an instrument for interacting with and manipulating other language-users. In this sense it is surprising that Hacker argues that the criteriai relation distinguishes Wittgenstein from behaviourisitic theories of meaning. He emphasises that the criterial relation properly accounts for the plasticity of our concepts and linguistic expressions and that it does not serve to axtificially curtail a word's (or a predicate's) meaning to some specifiable List of conditions, customs and activities, Le., that meaning cannot be adequately represented by entailment conditions. This, nonetheless, shows a predïlection on his part to exonerate Wittgenstein by not explonng more fully the possibilities of behaviouristic doctrine.

Cha~terSix: My goal in this chapter is not to parry Malcolm's and Hacker's interpretations of Wittgenstein on the waning of psychological words but to challenge the claim that he does not offer definitional accounts of these words in tenns of outward behaviour. Malcolm and Hacker both argue that, since Wittgenstein does not identify the meanhg of a psychological word with its expression, he avoids the charge of king a behaviounst. My view differs from theirs. Like the early behaviourists, Wittgenstein maintains that answers to substantive questions are readil y apparent and open to 'objective' investigation; the answers (not a single demitive answer) are in front of us all the time in Our responses and activities and in our use of language. While never claiming that the inner is a fiction (as Watson did in his early wntings), he does resist resorting to the inner as an explanation for psychological concepts, and seems to regard it as a hindrance to advancing Our knowledge and understanding of their meaning. His suggestion is that the inner is not the foundation for the meaning of psychological language and that the inteliigibility of the activities and operations surrounding Our use of words does not require reference to some inner, private theatre of meaning. It is not my contention that Wittgenstein's 'grammatical' account of the use of expressions about psychological activities rests on behaviourist principles merely because it rejects the possibility of a private language. His general approach to philosophical problems and psychological subjects displays more than an innocent flirtation with behaviourism. 1 would like to show this by examining the general approach Wittgenstein takes to the concept of thinking in The Blue Book and the Investigations. In the Fust work of his later philosophy, The Blue Book, Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with the deficiencies of traditional approaches to meaning and the nature of philosophical problems. In opposing these approaches, Wittgenstein draws upon the method of behaviourism for his analysis of psychological concepts in The Blue Book, thus offenng linle support for his later disavowal of king a behaviourist in disguise. This early work also de& with other topics e.g., the problem of solipsism, with which 1 wiU not be concemed. However, before exarnining what appears to be a less disguised cornmitment to behaviourism in Wittgenstein's method for dealing with psychological concepts in The Blue Book, 1 wish to make some further comments about the criterial relation between psychological phenomena and their behavioural expressions.

We know that Wittgenstein wanted to reject traditionai pictures of the inner-outer distinction which portray a chasm separating the meaning of behaviourai and psychological statements- The classical behaviourists, on the other hand, in attacking these pictures, had substituted crude replacements focused on the body as an organism. Refusing to endorse either these simple pictures or their elimination, Wittgenstein shows that there is a conceptual relation between mental and physical concepts, one that is made inteIligible by criteria. By understanding the role of criteria, Wittgenstein thought that we could render these pictures innocuous. His conception of philosophical psychology starts from an attack on the idea that the outer is to be explained by reference to the inner. This coincides with the behaviouristfs assumption that the content of psychological language is not inner experience. In fact, Wittgenstein takes behaviourism one step farther by redirecting our attention away from the laboratory and by stressing that it is in the ordinary activities, conventions, and institutions of language-users that we can best examine the nature and structure of these phenomena (in essence, mitigating the artifïciaiity of behaviourism while embracing its devotion to objective methodology). These public phenomena furnish the criteria on which our inteiiigible use of psychological language rests.

As we have seen, Hacker maintains that it is dificult to offer a unifonn account of Wittgenstein's use of the terni 'criterion'. The following is his surnmary of some of Wittgenstein's uses of the term:

(a) criteria belong to, or are aspects of, the gramar of the expressions for the use of which they are critena, Hence (b) they are aspects of, or partial determinants of, the meanings of such expressions; and (c) they are grounds for asserting a proposition, providing justifications for judgements, and hence connected with proof, vetification, and knowledge. (d) In some cases at least, there are multiple criteria, (e) In some cases, criteria are defea~ible.~~~ Hacker clearly wants to emphasise that a criterion (as Wittgenstein conceives it) gives a slice of a word's meaning and cannot be used to define it. Although he grants that The Blue Book uses

- -

324. Hacker. "niinking: the sou1 of language.' in Wittgenstein: Meuning

Screaming in circumstances of injury, assuaging one's limb after having hit it, etc. are criteria for king in pain; but 'to have a pain' does not mean the sarne as 'screaming and assuaging one's Iimb in such-and-such circumstances'. Rather, one crucial facet of the use of 'pain*is determined by th fact chat this behaviour in these circumstances constitutes a justification for saying 'He is in pain'. Someone who has failed to grasp this does not understand what 'pain' means and does not know how to use it correctly. To specify the verifiing criteria for someone's king in pain is to speciQ a rule for the use of 'pain', and in that sense, part of its grammar. But it is no less crucial an aspect of the grarnmar of 'pain' that 'I am in pain' is rightly uttered without grounds, that 'I doubt whether 1am in pain' and 1 wonder whether 1am in pain' make no sense, and so on.326 Here Hacker is emphasising the notion of a criterion as a cietenninant or partial determinant of the meaning of expression, namely as something which specifies one of its ntles of use. This appears to form part of his defence that Wittgenstein, by not using criteria in a definitional sense, was abandoning an earlier behaviouristic tendency. Wittgenstein does appear to use 'criterion' in this

stronger sense in The Blue Book. Let us examine what he does Say. He remarks that because we are unable to circumscribe the concepts which we use, since there are no strict rules regarding their employment, it is sometimes difficult to establish how the distinction between criteria and symptoms is to be made; and this problem holds in spite of the fact

that giving a critenon for another person having a particular sensation is to give a grammatical explanation about that sensation. "In practice, if you were asked which phenornenon is the defining criterion and which is a symptom, you would in most cases be unable to answer this question except by making an arbitrary decision ad hoc."3D Thaî Wittgenstein appears to perceive of the role of a criterion as a definitional marker of whether a word is properly applied, even though he clairns that there is no real 'definition' for words or concepts,328makes it difficult to understand clearly the relation between a cntenon and a symptom. He writes.

When we learnt the use of the phrase "so-and-so has toothache" we were pointed out certain kinds of behaviour of those who were said to have toothache. As an instance of these kinds of behaviour let us take holding your cheek. Suppose that by observation I found that in certain cases whenever these first criteria told me a person had toothache, a red patch appeared on the person's cheek. Supposed 1 now said to

325. Ibid., pp. 556 - 562. 326. Ibid... .D. 557. . Ludwig Wittgenstein. Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations: genemlly hown ac The Blue d Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964. p. 25. References to The Blue Book hereafter will be listed either as parenthetical textual notes or as footnotes in the folIowing fashion: BB, p .... 328. Ibid., p. 26. someone "1 see A has toothache, he's got a red patch on his cheek". He may ask me "How do you know A has toouiache when you see a red patch?" 1should then point out that certain phenomena had always coincideci with the appearance of the red patch. (BB, p- 24)

Wittgenstein wants to avoid claiming that we learned that the sensation cded toothache was to be identified with its characteristic behavioural expressions or thaî these expressions serve as a definition of toothache- However, it is not clear that he is successful in using criteria in a way that

achieves this aim. Application of the predicate "has toothache" requires a stronger relation than that of a symptom, one that can consistently convey the meaning of a person king said to have toothache. In other words, correct use of the phrase 30-and-so has toothache" requires pointing

out events which are intricately connected to the rules for using this predicate. Mere empincal correlation of symptoms and events is insufficient for application of the predicate and ascribing the sensation of toothache to A. However, his argument seems to yield the following conclusion, namely, that "al1 of this comes to saying that the person of whom we Say "he has pain" is, by the

rules of the game, the person who cries, contorts his face, et~."~29 This arnbiguity in the distinction between criteria and syrnptoms-and the issue of whether psychological phenomena are to be identified with their behaviourai expressions-not only resides in Wittgenstein's account of thinking in The Blue Book, but surfaces in Philosophical Investigations as well, where Wittgenstein remarks that "the fluctuation in grarnrnar between critena and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at al1 but symptoms." ($354) Yet this fluctuation is not between the inner and the outer. The criteria and symptoms of thinking are both characterised by certain manual bodily habits and behaviour situated in language and tied to certain

situations, conventions, and customs. Aithough psychological concepts may not be circumscribed by certain pattems of behaviour and responses, one finds Wittgenstein emphasising the significance of these pattems for understanding their meaning. Indeed, he directs our attention to nothing else. This, it would seem, led Fodor and Chihara to argue that the criterial relation 'definitively' links certain behavioural characteristics and linguistic operations to these ternis and concepts. This interpretation seems understandable in light of the account of critena given in The

329- Ibid., p. 68. Blue Book which appears to carry over to the examination of mental activities given in

Philosophical Investigations. It also appears to be jusaed by Malcolm's account of critena and his interpretation of Wittgenstein's examination of mental phenomena. Although Malcolm also maintains that for Wittgenstein cnteria are co~ectedwith the rules for the use of terrns and their applicability, he seems to interpret the relation between a cntenon and that of which it is a criterion as one which, due to this grammatical connection, approaches

"definitionW.3~Nonetheless, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that a 'criterion' cannot be taken as a 'definition' in any strict sense because there is no such exactness in the use of language. Another reason for Wittgenstein's refusal to treitt a criterion as a definition is the following. He would not want to count a behaviourial condition as a definition because this would suggest-as the name- object approach which he condemns does-that we could point to the meaning of a mental concept, Le., to the object to which a name or description refers. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein gives priority

to the human form for determining the intelligibility of mental concepts (a point which Maicolm adrnits), a fact which leads Malcolm to interpret Wittgenstein's examination of mental concepts in a way which shows a continuity between Wittgenstein and behaviourism. For example, he remarks:

"counting in the normal way" involves looking, pointing, reaching, fetching, and so on- That is, it requires the human face and body, and human behavior-or something similar. Things which do not have the human form, or anything like it, not merely do not but cannot satisfy the cnteria for thinl~ing-~~l As Malcolm notes, there does not seem to be anything else besides circumstances and behaviour

that could serve as a criterion for mental phenomena. One cannot make one's own case the priority for understanding them or think that they are made intelligible by means of inner identification; yet Malcolm wants to avoid interpreting Wittgenstein as claiming that these phenornena are understood by identifying them with behavioural manifestations instead of their king understood by outward

manifestations which we take as their criteria. As Wittgenstein himself remarks, it makes perfect sense to conceive of the body feeling pain and our giving it instructions to visit a physician or to lie down or to recount the last time it experienced pains. We only think that an expression such as "this body feels pain" is an indirect

330. cf.. Norman Malcolm. "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigationse*.in Knovledge and Cerrainry. p. 113. 331. Malcolm. "Knowledge of Other Minds", in Knowledge and Cerrainty, p. 136. way of getting at the nature and structure of the sensation, because we want to assign it to some mental subject or ego, because we imagine that the sensation must be some immaterial, bodiless

phenornenon. This picnire, this idea, that words must have a reference which is internai, prevents us from having an unbiassed perspective of the facts, which is another way of saying that it severs the co~ectionbetween criteria and our customary employment of language. Wittgenstein has a suggestion for demystifying our conception of supposedly mental activities: "Let's not imagine the meaning as an occult connection the mind makes between a word and a thing, and that this connection contains the whole usage of a word as the seed might be said to contain the tree."332 He even makes the foiiowing proposal:

If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our rninds when we see or hem the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing the by some outward object seen, e.g, a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus the painted image be alive if the wntten sign alone was dead?-In fact, as soon as you think of repIacing the mental image by, say, a painted one. and as soon as the image thereby loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to the sentence at al1. (If was in fact just the occult character of the mental process which you needed for your pur pose^.)^ The objective of Wittgenstein's new philosophical method is to silence the philosophical predilection to view language one-sidedly, to combat the idea that there is a consistent Iaw which govems the use of a word, to "fight against the fascination which foms of expression exert upon

us."334 It could be maintained that he gives an articulation of behaviounsm which was likely

beyond the ability of its classical defenders, and certainly (given that they were psychologists fust and foremost) beyond their intention. However, in his work, for philosophers at least, their aspirations have ken vindicated. 1will now examine this method which 1 contend draws upon the method of behaviourism. Wittgenstein begins The Blue Book with the question, "What is the meaning of a word?"uS However, instead of proceeding to present the reader with definitional accounts of the individual linguistic terms or an account based on first-peson experience, he suggests to the reader that the proper way of deaiing with such queries is not to expect general answers or to look for a thing

332.BB, pp. 73 - 74. 333. Ibid., p. 5. 334. Ibid., p. 27. 335. Ibid., p. 1. correspondhg to a substantive term, but to consider how one attempts to arrive at an explanation of the meaning of tem. In other words, Wittgenstein distances hirnself fiom philosophical tradition by recasting queries about substantives as problerns whkh dlow for practical and objective solutions in terms of Our public language. Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is not engaged in the enterprise of uncovering facts or providing definitions or upholding the view that meaning involves reference; more than that, it is not a purely speculative discipline. Also, Wittgenstein rejects the notion that philosophy is a scientific enterprise, or that its questions can be settled by the application of a scientific procedure, as in the case of the question about sense-data. "Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'," he maintains. "Think of such questions as "Are there ?" and ask: What method is there of determining this? Intro~pection?"~~~Wittgenstein's basic point is that we should not look for interna1 mechanisms or processes to explain the action of language, nor should we beiieve that the signs of language are dead without such accompaniments; instead, we must corne to gnps with the realization that al1 the facts we need concem ourselves with are right before us aii the time and within the public domain. We do not need to think that there are new facts which we have to discover, or that there rnight be things which we are unable to inspect because Our use of the substantive mystifies us. We do not have to look beyond or behind our use of terms for their meaning. In short, Wittgenstein is saying that what we need for Our investigations into the meaning of linguistic terms and concepts is a detailed observation of their use. Wittgenstein's attitudes towards science and particularly 'scirniific' philosophy sharply contrat with those of the behaviourists with their fundarnental commitment to science. To accuse Wittgenstein of behaviourism, it has been contended, is to misunderstand the profundity of his radicd methodological insight. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein's stance is reminiscent of the fundarnental approach taken by the three behaviourists examineci earlier. It is not my intention to claim that Wittgenstein shares with behaviourists the same experimentd goals for pursuing laboratory work or that he is interested in advancing a mechanistic theory of human behaviour that

336. Ibid.. p. 18. draws upon specific sciences. What I want ta claim is that he advances, in a more sophisticated manner, a method which behaviourism adopted in order to fmitseIf fiom the shackles of intemalistic accounts of psychological subjects. Wittgenstein shares with behaviourists the attitude that what we can observe (whether counted as cnterion or symptom) is suffkient for the purposes of investigating psychological subjects and for a philosophical understan&ng of the intelligibility of psychological ternis and concepts. Moreover, he and they both hold the view that the facts as we observe them do not hold hidden meaning, but, that what we see are "activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent." (BB, p. 17) It has been suggested, however, that Wittgenstein's carnpaign against the notion of private language and his remarks on psychological concepts, no matter how much they may appear to display a cornmitment to behaviourism, hover over it instead.337 A. J. Ayer noted that "Wittgenstein's whole flirtation with behaviourism is an attempt, the success of which is open to question, to explain the operations of the mind."338 On the other hand, this flirtation or apparent affinity with behaviourism, when interpreted as an endorsement of this viewpoint, is dismissed by scholars as a faiîure to appreciate Wittgenstein's contributions to philosophical psychology. It is obvious that Wittgenstein's remarks form a sustained attack on Cartesian or intemalist conceptions of meaning, according to which the meaning of words is to be found in the aethereal medium of the mind. For example, he writes:

Weare tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may cal1 understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we dont quite understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could. Thus e.g. a thought (which is such a mental process) can agree or disagree with reality; 1 am able to think of a man who isn't present; 1 am able to imagine him, 'mean him' in a remark which 1 make about him, even if he is thousands of miles away or dead, "What a queer mechanism," one might Say, "the mechanism of wishing must be if 1 can wish that which will never ha~pen.~~~ Instead of adopting a mind-mode1 for understanding the meaning of linguistic ternis or accounting for the nature of mental concepts, Wittgenstein suggests that we look to their customary employment in Our public language. The reason why this approach is more sound, Wittgenstein

. cf.. for cxample, by A. I. Ayer. Wittgenstein. London: George Weidenleld and Nicolson Ltd.. 1985. p. 79. 338. Ibid.. p. 137. 339. BB. p.3 - 4. points out, is that it avoids the philosophical problems which referentalismw engenders. Therefore, instead of speaking of mental concepts as correspondhg to intangible obj~hidden away in the medium of the mind, he concentrates on the activities which makes these concepts intelligible. This reflects Wittgenstein's basic contention thaî language is primady a system of communication, not a system of representation, and that philosophy should not look to science for a paradigm of how to approach questions of meaning and understanding. Witness how he castigates philosophy for goading itself with the mode1 of science. "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness."341 The method of science cannot cure the problems philosophy gets into, because the scientific method itself perpetuates referentialism by trying to give an exhaustive objective description of the world as consisting solely of observable natural phenomena and by seeking to categorise phenornena under strict laws. In this sense, it is correct to contend that Wittgenstein's later work displays a consistent attack on objectivism in this sense and that his conception of the mental does not give way to solipsism. Although Wittgenstein attacks the mentalist conception of meaning, Le., that the meaning of a word is some inner object corresponding to it, an object residing in the medium of the mind, he does not attempt to replace it by a collection of material phenornena described by science.% If he were to have done so he would be repeating the mistake, which he accuses others of making, namely of pretending that philosophy is a kind of science. This interpretation, though it has its merits, does not adequately convey the significant role that behaviourism plays in Wittgenstein's new philosophical approach and bis account of psychological phenomena. The interpretation misleadingly suggests that by criticising philosophy as a science, Wittgenstein was condemning behaviourism as a science, and that by describing

Hans Sluga, in "Wittgenstein on the self '. The Cambridge Contpon to Wittgenstein. ed.. Hans Sluga and David G. Stern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). defines referentialism in the following manner: 'The referentialist view assumes that every meaningful expression which is not a sentence or a logical symbol has meaning by either naming 2 simple object or describing a cornplex." (pp. 328 - 329) 341. BB, p, 18. 342. Op. cit., p. 328. psychological processes and States as activities, he is moving away from behaviourism's tendency to identiQ these with physical objects and patterns of behaviour. However, although this

interpretation does indeed distinguish Wittgenstein's position from objectivism in a referential as

well as metaphysical sense, it ignores the proximity of their views at the level of methodology. While Wittgenstein undercuts science as a definitive or explanatory mode1 for philosophy, he accepts it as a proper methodological one. 1will attempt to illustrate this. Wittgenstein wntes:

The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in al1 its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led CO no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general termm Philosophy must stop "craving for generality" and rid itself of its "contemptuous attitude towards

the particular case"; this elegance which it perceives in science, the elegance of reducing everything to a law, of drawing sharp boundaries around phenomena, this "contempt for what seems the less general case springs from the idea that it is incomplete,"~and is founded on confusions about the ordinary use of words, confusions that inspire attempts to reform it. Impressed by science, philosophy is not satisfied with cataloguing and noticing the various situations and circumstances

in which the meaning of a word is displayed; it craves an exact definition. But, Wittgenstein insists, only when we are given to understand the pictures which perpetuate this view about

meaning can we free philosophy from its straitjacketed admiration of science. 1 would like to contend that Wittgenstein's affinity with behaviounsm not only surfaces in his conception of the nature of philosophical method in The Blue Book but has also detennined for hirn what forms the content of certain mental concepts as well.

A few words should be said about 'methodoIogical objectivism', which was mentioned earlier.345 Watson had stipulated that psychology should limit itself to the objective study of behaviour and that only a certain class of methods were appropnate for this study. These methods would be ones that were fundamentally anti-mentalistic. In other words, psychology from the

343.BB. pp. 19 - 20.

M. lbid.,- a 19. 345. As 1 mentioned earlier in the chapter on Behaviourism, 1 borrow this term from Brian D-Mackenzie's Behaviourism and the Limits of Scienrific Merhod (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) and my own understanding of it follows his analysis. cf., pp. 5 - 15. standpoint of behaviourism would only concem itself with observable events, namely publicly

observable behaviour. By making these stipulations, Watson was not oniy refashioning

psychoiogy afrer the mode1 of the naîural sciences but was nxasting the methods and scope of psychology to those characteristic of the natural sciences. Therefore, "the sarne logical rnethods,

observational techniques, standards of evidence, and cnteria of validity were to apply to psychology as to physics. Hence, the kinds of thing that psychology was to study were to be at the most general level the same kind of thing as physics studied - bodies in motion."x6 It should be remembered that Watson declared that "to be a science, psychology must use the same material that al1 other sciences use. Its facts must be capable of verification by other capable investigators everywhere. Its methods must be the methods of science in generaP47 Wittgenstein's methodological objectivism, however, is not an explicit celebration of scientism or physicalism. In spite of this, the behaviourïsts' admiration of scientific objectivity echoes in his remarks. Wittgenstein does not concern himself with "bodies in motion"; he does, however, look for the operations, activities, circumstances, and responses (which are ali publicly available) that characterise a word's meaning and serve as the criteria for its application. Iust as behaviourism concems itself with the public behavioural activities that give us the meaning of psychological concepts, Wittgenstein urged philosophy to tum away from the assumed privileged sphere of personal expenence and towards the public history of Our primitive behavioural

responses and Our rudirnentary employment of names-these are the foundations of meaning, not

its sufficient conditions. As an exarnple, consider how he treats the meaning of "expectation".

Wittgenstein notes that Our customary inclination is to regard sensation words Mce "expectation", "wishing" "fearing", "longing" as references to indefinable, mental processes, specifically that their object must be already present as a shadow or image "which comes before Our rnind's eye."

(BB, p. 36) However, he asks us to consider what does take place when we "expect" something or someone:

346. Ibid., pp. 13 - 14. 347. Watson. The Ways of Behaviorism. New York: Harpr & Brothers Riblishers. 1928. p. 11. What happens if from 4 ti114.30 A expects B to come to his room? In one sense in which the phrase "to expect something from 4 to 4-30" is used it certainly does not refer to one process or state of mind going on throughout that interval, but to a great many different activities and States of rnind- If for instance 1 expect B to come to tea, what happens may be this: At four o'clock 1look at my diary and see the name "B" against to-&y's date; 1prepare tea for two; 1think for a moment "does B smoke?" and put out cigarettes; towards 4.30 1 kgin to feel impatient; 1 imagine B as he will look when he comes into my room- Al1 this is called "expecting B from 4 to 4.30. And there are endless variations to this process which we al1 describe by the same expression. If one asks what the different processes of expecting someone to tea have in common, the answer is that there is no single feature in common to al1 of hem, though there are many common features overlapping- These cases of expectation form a family; they have family likenesses which are not clearly defined.

There is a totally different use of the word "expectation" if we use it to mean a particular sensation. This use of the words like "wish", "expectation", etc., readily suggests itself. There is an obvious connection between this use and the one described above. There is no doubt that in many cases if we expect some one, in the first sense, some, or all, of the activities described are accompanied by a peculiar feeling, a tension; and it is na& to use the word "expectation" to mean this experience of tension. (BB, p. 20) As the above passages indicate, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the meaning of a word is given by private pictures or images, instead, for him "the use of the word in pructice is its meaning." (BB,

p. 68) Moreover, he suggests two senses for determining the meaning of "expectation". In the first or overt sense the features that come into play are expressly public in character: for example,

checking the diary to see if "B's" name is written in for 4:30; preparing tea; putting out cigarettes, etc., etc.. Besides, this overt sense of "expectation", Wittgenstein notes, as the second passage

shows, that the word also has a related use whereby one can speak of it as a "tension". In this second sense, he is using language any introspectionist would use. That is to Say, a name-object thinker would declare that there is indeed a sense whereby we use the word "expectation" that does not point to characteristic behavioural features as in the first sense described above but rather to a feeling, an inner state. However, in the particular sense which Wittgenstein mentions, expectation

is characterised by a "tension", not some inner, private object. Speaking of expectation as a tension, in this sense, puts it in the realm of the observable, the measurable. In another example about expectation-whether the sound of a gunshot was louder than one expected-Wittgenstein again uses the word tension, treated behaviouristically, to make intelligible the sensation of expectation:

Perhaps in waiting for the report 1 opened my mouth, held on to something to steady myself, and perhaps 1 said: "This is going to be terrible". Then, when the explosion was ovec "It wasn't so loud after alll'.- Certain tensions in my body relax. But what is the connection between these tensions, opening my mouth, etc., and a real louder crash? Perhaps this connection was made by having heard such a crash and having had the experiences rnenti~ned,~~~

It is interesting to note that in this example Wittgenstein implies that the parameters of habit, a notion to which Watson would assent. cm adequately explain the sense of "expecting a louder explosion than occurred". In the comments preceding the ones quoted, he notes ihat, had he been asked if he experienced the louder explosion in his imagination, he would have to dalare: "1 must confess that there was nothing of the son." (p. 40) In this example, he is chalienging the notion that "expectation" must be understood as a private mental event. Instead, he claims that when one examines what does actuaiiy occur in a case of expectation certain behavioural characteristics come to fore. In other words (even for the second sense of expectation) he shows a prediiection for letting the facts, i.e., the public operations and activities where a word is introduced dictate the sense which we should make of it. It is in this manner that methodological objectivity for both behaviourism and Wittgenstein is given via events on the public stage which we all observe and share. In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein offers an analysis of thinking which relies heavily on behaviourist themes, one which rejects the philosophical preoccupation with a "mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of lang~age."~Despite denouncing philosophicai accounts of meaning rnodelled on the paradigm of science, he nonetheless embraces a scientifically-inspired account of the 'grammar' of psychologicai concepts, except that the mode1 for his account is not physics or chemistry but experimental psychology. That is to say, despite The Blue Book's attempt to elude the 'mental crarnps' which result from thinking that a defulltionai approach is the proper means for explaining the meaning of a word, nie Blue Book's use account shares many features with the behaviowist revoit against similar muddles produceci by basing the meaning of psychological terms on first-person expenence. Of such accounts, Wittgenstein writes that:

It seems that there are certain defnite mental processes bound up with the working of language, processes through which alone language can function- I mean the processes of understanding and meaning. The signs of out language seem dead without these mental processes; and it might seem that the only function of the

BB, pp. 40-41. 349. cf.. Watson, Psychology From the Standpoint ofa Behavioris~.pp. 11 - 13. Behavion'sm. pp. 26 - 28. 350. Op. cit.. p. 17. signs is to induce such processes, and that these are things we ought really CO be interested in, Thus, if you are asked what is the relation between a name and the tbing it names, you will be inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one, and perhaps when you say this you think in particular of the mechanism of association. (BB, p. 3) This comment foreshadows a remark which Wittgenstein makes near the end of the private

language discussion in the Phifosophical Investigations, that we should not think that language's only function was to convey thoughts (5304). There, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid the repercussions of adopting the view that either the meaning of a psychological concept

corresponded to some private mental object or that the psychological phenornena were fictitious. "'But surely you must admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour açcompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?'--Admit it? matgreater difference codd there be?" In The Blue Book, however, he is developing an analysis of thinking which more strongly echoes the behaviourist conception of thinking found in Watson and Weiss. Wittgenstein appears to favour a materiai behaviourist account of thinking when he mentions that thinking can be sensibly understood as a manuai activity, one "perfonned by the hand when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking". (BB, p. 6) While this conception seems in sharp contrast to the one found in Philosophical Investigations, that would be to overlook the continuity

between the conceptions of thinking found in both texts. In both cases Wittgenstein makes language and activities involving language the pnmary mechanism of thought.351 This view is

found (in a cruder manner) in Watson's early wntings as weU as in The Blue Book's account

which associates thinking with Myactivities. Watson had maintaineci that speech was the sole mechanism of thinking. Wittgenstein's view is more sophisticated; instead of holding that thinking is sub-vocal speech or that it is any impiicit language activity (or any physical activity substitutable for such activity), he views thinking as "essentially the activity of operating with signs." (BB, p. 6) He further points out that conceiving of thinking as an activity of imagining signs or pictures is to give in to a metaphorical conception of thought, for if indeed we think in this fashion we are assigning to the muid a different sense of agency than when it is said that the hand is the agent when one writes.

351. cf.. for example. PI. $327 - 5332, $338 - 344. and BB. pp. 41 - 44. Wittgenstein implies that this way of considering thinking is a result of the more fiindamental

muddle about meaning, bat a word must mean some corresponding object eu-existing with it. ("One of the reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a 'thing corresponding to a substantive.')" (BB, p. 5) We am thus led to adopt a mode1 of meaning based on the mind understood as an indescribable and unspecifiable medium which we beiieve best explains and accounts for the peculiar nature of psychological phenomena; this is misleading because it only reinforces the idea that thought is a particular 'mental activity'. The mind is thereby conceived to

be a queer medium where the elusive mental activities or processes that are antecedent to, and the causes of, their behavioural manifestations take place. "For what stmck us as king queer about

thought and thinking was not at aii that it had curious effects which we were not able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a mudde felt as a problem." (BB, pp. 5 - 6) Wittgenstein rem& that when we are concemed with causai connections between allegedly pnvate phenomena and public behaviowal activities, we find that these so-called psychological processes are not hidden from us, but instead lie before us in plain view. "And when we are womed about the nature of thinking, the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be one about the nature of a medium is a puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of Our language." (BB, p. 6) Instead of foçusing on the ordinary workings of language and how we are rnisled by certain forms of expressions, we look towards a realm where the perplexing activities of

the mind rnay take place. Our desire to find an object corresponding to the various psychological concepts requires that there be a place where these apparently private objects are located. Thus we

may be led to the notion that the locality of our thoughts is Our head, ignorïng the fan that we may justifiably lay claim to the notion that the proper locality of thought is "the paper on which we wnte or the mouth which speaks." (BB, p. 7) The expressions of our ordinary language seem to presuppose a certain correspondence between physiological and psychological processes, which reinforces the belief that through

observation of physiological processes we can be led to the seat of their psychological counterparts. In other words, what leads us to the notion that Our head is the red seat of the activity of thought is a certain feeling that thù*ing is part of our 'private experience'. We embrace this picture because we do not want to hold that a thought is the same as the statement which expresses it. Afkr aii. staiements made in different languages can be said to express the same thought. "We say, 'The thought is not the same as the sentence; for an English and a French sentence, which are utterly different, can express the same thought'. And now, as the sentences are somewhere, we look for a place for thought." (BB, p. 7) Given that we can place the statements physicaily, cm identify their existence in physical space, we look for an analogous location for the thoughts they express. In similar fashion, the thought must be some object existing in some place that we can iocate. It is the same feeling we have about our sensations, that "another person can't have my pains," (PI, 9253) because my pains are some things over and beyond their behavioural expressions; "they reside somewhere inside my consciousness and if 1 point my attention inwardly, 1can detect them". Wittgenstein's retort to pronouncements like this one may appear mockingly sirnplistic but it is disarmingly therapeutic nonetheless:

There is one way of avoiding at least partly the occult appearance of the processes of thinking, and it is, to replace in these processes any working of the imagination by acts of looking at real objects. Thus it may seern essential that, at least in certain cases, when 1hear the word "red" with understanding, a red image should be before my mind's eye. But why should 1 not substitute seeing a red bit of paper for imagining a red patch? The visual image will only be the more vivid. Imagine a man always carrying a sheet of paper in his pocket on which the names of colours are co-ordinated with coloured patches. You may say that it would be a nuisance to carry such a table of samples about with you, and that the mechanism of association is what we aiways use instead of it. But this is irretevant; and in many cases it is not even tme. If, for instance, you were ordered to paint a particular shade of blue called "Pnissian Blue", you might have to use a table to lead you from the word "Prussian Blue" to a sample of the colour, which would serve you as your copy- (BB, p. 4) As Wittgenstein suggests, we experience an embarrassment when we encounter mentai concepts, owing to the grammar of these terms. We are aware that words describing such concepts are not used as names for material objects. Their peculiarity appean to Mie their expression and point towards a sphere or world different from that of the realm of matenal objects. We thus are led to believe that our psychological statements describe the 'world' of our personal expenences, thai these statements point to private aethereal object~.~*But al1 of this is simply a ruse for our embarrassment about the grammar of psychological words:

352. BB, pp. 46 - 47. At fmt sight it may appear .--that here we have two kinds of worlds, worlds built of different materiais; a mental world and a physical world. Tbe mental world in fact is liable to be hagined as gaseous, or rather, aethereal, But let me remind you here of ihe queer rote which the gaseous and the aethereai play in philosophy,-when we perceive that a substantive is noi used as what in general we should cal1 the name of an object, and when therefore we can't help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an aethereal object- I mean, we already know the idea of 'aetbereal objects' as a subterfuge, when we are embarrasseci about the grammar of certain words, and wkn al1 we know is that they are not used as names of material objects. This is a hint as to how the problem of two materials, mind and mritrer, is going to dissolve. (BB, p. 47) In cases such as these where we encounter sentences of similar structure in which psychological and non-psychological words are used, we make illegitimate wumptions based on this apparent sirnilarity of use. "When words in Our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the andogy hold throughout." (BB, p. 7) Thought, like my sensations, one is tempted to Say, is not a material or physical or public event; it is some event in my private consciousness which 1can introspect, some thing to which 1 can tum my attention inwardly. "It seerns to us sometimes as though the phenomena of personal experience were in a way phenomena in the upper strata of the atmosphere as opposed to the material phenomena which happen on the ground."m Suspicions such as these fuel a metaphysical conviction that, in the course of evolutionary development, mental phenomena appeared in the world and are associated primarily with the human form. that humans can speak of possessing not merely a brain but a mind as well. Thus, the mind appears to possess properties which are somewhat analogous to the functions of the brain located in Our head:

Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly inciined to talk of the head as the locaiity of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words "thinking" and "thought" alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes us look for an activity, different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word "thinking". (BB, p. 7) Consequently, Wittgenstein cautions us against king so quick to assign a locality to thought. We ought to be careh1 about king fooled into thinking that because it makes sense to Say that a sentence can be somewhere, that we can look for a Iocality for thoughts as well. One does not want to cali a thought a fiction, a mere will-O-the-wisp; "surely the thought is something; it is not no thing ". (BB, p. 7) (A similar comment reappears in Philosophical Investigations during Wittgenstein's discussion of private sensations.) What we forget here, Wittgenstein notes, is that

353. lbid., p. 47. the word "locality" is used in many different senses, and that if one supposes that thoughts, although immaterial, must possess locality as materiai objects do, then one is using a grammatical analogy without having worked it out in detail.= Because one is fwled by the picture that thought is an object, one is also puzzled about where a person thinks: "where does he say things to himself? How does it corne about that this question seems senseless; and that no specification of a place is necessary except just that this man is saying something to himself?" (PI, $361) Such capacities perplex us and we wonder about their meaning, we wish to know what happens when a person says something to himseifor when he thinks. As Wittgenstein points out, we certainly do leam the meaning of these expressions as children. but it is not the case that the person who taught them to us specified what happened or where it occurred (§361), nor was their meaning imparted to us without Our king told it directly. (8362) It may seem that hem Wittgenstein is presenting a view which challenges both mentalist and behaviourist conceptions of the meaning of psychological terms, that his diagnosis shows a mistaken analogy drawn from certain ordinary linguistic expressions, and that his own position lies outside both these categories. This conviction seems to be reinforced by remarks in Philosophical Investigations such as 5321, where he notes that one does not grasp the meaning of 'sudden understanding' by looking for its "characteristic psychical accompaniments" or by maintaining that an individual may note or feel the physiological changes. e.g., "the facial movements that go with his expressions", or that we discover what thinking is by self-observation. (PI, $327) In addition, in The Blue Book, he notes that when we force ourselves to address psychological concepts philosophically, it is then we most seem out of kilter with their ordinary employment and to be confronting an unequal challenge. Consider this remark:

Can't 1 believe that someone else has pains? 1s it not quite easy to believe this?---1s it an answer to Say that things are as they appear to common sense?---Again, needless to say, we don't feel these difficulties in ordinary Life. Nor is it meto say that we feel them when we scnitinize our experiences by introspection, or make scienutSc investigations about them. But somehow, when we look at them in a certain way, our expression is liable to get into a tangle. It seems to us as though we had either the wrong pieces, or not enough of them, to put together our jig-saw puzzle. But they are dl there, only al1 mixed up; and there is a further analogy between the jigsaw puzzle and our case: It's no use trying to apply force in fitting pieces together. Al1 we should do is look at them carefully and arrange them. (BB, p. 46)

354. Ibid., pp. 7 - 9. Wittgenstein is clearly right to maintain that any the~qof tneaning which purports to give an account of the nature of psychological concepts must capture the diverse use we make of psychological words in ordinary language, otherwise one does not convey their richness and nsks distorting Our understanding of them through oversimplification, Moreover, this suggests his resistance to adopting too restrictive an account of the nature of thought, for instance, one which is either exclusively physiological or mentalistic. For example, to maintain thaî there must be a seat for mental phenomena hardly contributes to explainhg why it does make sense to Say that thinking is an activity perfomed by the hand, mouth. and the mind. On the other hand, Wittgenstein's explanation of thinking (r the start of The Blue Book) reveals an attitude which is remarkably reminiscent of Watson's ("that ali the facts which concem us fie before usw),* that thinking is essentiaily operating with signs. Furthemore, he proceeds to present an account which grounds thinking in physiology, narnely that it amounts to certain bodily activities, in particular the hand (in wnting), and the mouth and larynx in speaking. "There is an objection to saying that thinking is some such thing as an activity of the hand. Thinking one wants to Say, is part of Our 'private experience'. It is not material, but an event in private consciousness." (BB, p. 16) In opposing this view, Wittgenstein, Like Watson, appears to be arguing that thinking is to be idenrified with its expression. Wittgenstein ailows that it does make sense to claim that thinking is an activity of the mind, provided one understands the grarnmar of this expression. However, he quickly points out that when we look at simple language-games involving this so-calle3 mental activity, we find ihat thinking, like other supposedly private phenomena, is characterised by certain public activities and reactions which are markedly evident. The move to more sophisticated language-games, he notes, does not alter this basic fact.= However, he is unwiliing to accept that any of these public, physiological activities (by themselves) can be said to definitively charactense thinking, as an old- school behaviounst like Watson would have claimed. Wittgenstein issues this caution:

355. Ibid., p. 6. 356. Ibid.. p. 17. It is correct to say that thinking is an activity of our writing band, of our larynx, of our head, and of our mind, so long as we understand the grarnmar of these statements. And it is, furthemore. extremely important to realize how, by misunderstanding the grammat of our expressions, we are led to think of one in particular of these statements as giving the real seat of the activity of thinking, (BB, p. 16) Watson, had claimed that thinking was essentidy physiologicaily based. that we need not look to mystenous mental processes, supposedly reached by introspection, for an explanation of thought. Thinking was readily apparent in what an individual does:

Some writers make a comp1ete mystery of it [thinking]; something that we can talk about and discuss, something whose manifestations we may observe but whose essence we can never discover- Others have considered thought processes as a correlate of cortical activity (a common assumption). They assume that it is something, no one knows quite what, that can go on in absence apparently of al1 muscular activity, If Our view is correct, it is a constituent part of every adjustment process. It is not different in essence from tennis-playing, swimming or any other overt activity exept that it is hidden fiom ordinary observation and is more complex and at the same time more abbreviated so far as its parts are concerned than even the bravest of us could drearn OF.= As Watson proclaimed, somewhat foreshadowing Wittgenstein, it is a mistake to hold the mind to be an agent in thought. for the behaviounst "hopes to give an adequate account of the process in this subject, an account which will show how even those phenornena which the introspectionist describes as his 'consciousness' result from the complexities of behavi0ur."~5~ We tend to overlook the seeerningly mundane behavioural expressions which characterise thinking, Watson declares, and instead search for something more profound which better represents our idea of its meaning. What we forget is that "we have learned to wnte words, sentences and paragraphs, to draw objects and to trace them with the eyes, hands and fingers. We have done this so often thaî the process has become systematized and substitutive. in other words. they come to serve as stimuli substitutable for the object seen, drawn, written or handled."m This viewpoint echoes in Wittgenstein's account of thinking in both The Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigutiuns. Wittgenstein displays the same opposition to conceiving of thought as an intangible object or process. We find him restating the notion found in neBlue Book that Our temptation to regard

357. As noted earlier. Watson changed this conception Iater on and came to regard thinking as having a physiological basis, but that it was not entirely the action of language mechanisms. Watson had earlier taken verbal speech and laryngeal rnovements to be the primary essence of thought. Thinking he maintained was characterised by various sub-vocal or verbal linguistic habits. (cf.. Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behoviorist. p. 356). 358. John B. Watson. Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. pp. 356 - 357. 359. John B. Watson. Ys Thinking merely the action of Language Mechanisms?". British Journul of Psychology. 1920. vol. XI, p. 94. 360. Watson. Prychology From the Standpint of a Belurviorist. p. 355. thought in this manner is a result of Our grammatical embarrassment about its meanllig. Consider PI, $339:

Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach fiom speaking, rather as the Devil took the shadow of Schlemiehl from the ground-- But how "not an incorporeal process'? Am 1acquainted with incorporeal process, then only thinking is not one of them? No; 1called the expression "an incorporeai process" to my aid in my embarrassment when 1was trying to explain the meaning of the word "thinking" in a primitive way. One might want to Say "Thinking is an incorporeal process", however. if one were using this to distinguish the grammar of the word "think" hmthat of, Say, the word "eat". Only that makes the difference between the meanings look too slight, (It is like saying: numerals are actual, and numbers non-actual, objects,) An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as it were bars the way out. Wittgenstein declares that in spite of the fact that it makes sense to hold at times that thought is a mentai process accompanying a sentence, "that accompaniment is not what we mean by a "thought" ($332); "the language itself is the vehicle of thought". (5329) This leads back to the question whether he favoured the view that thought is to be identû~ed with such activities. Consider the following two passages from The Blue Book:

Make the following experiment: Say and mean a sentence. e-g.: "It will probably min tomorrow". Now think the same thought again, mean what you just meant, but without saying anything (either aloud, or to yourself). If thinking that it will rain tomorrow accompanied saying that it will min tomorrow, then just do the first activity and leave out the second.--if thinking and speaking stood in the relation of the words and the rnelody of a Song, we could leave out the speaking and do the thinking just as we can sing the tune without the words. (BB, p. 42)

Put it this way: Speaking a sentence without thinking consists in switching on speech and switching off certain accompaniments of speech. Now ask yourselfi Does thinking the sentence without speaking it consist in tuniing over the switch (switching on what we previously switched off and vice versa); that is: does thinking the sentence without speaking it now simply consist in keeping on what accompanied the words but leaving out the words? Try to think the thoughts of a sentence without the sentence and see whether this is what happens. (BB, p. 45) Wittgenstein completes this comment by noting that it is only because we are blind to the myriad use which we make of psychological words such as "thinking" that we remain attached to the picture that these words represent private acts stored away in the repository of the mind which accompany our public expressions of thinking, willing, wishing, etc.. However, if we do in fa~t examine the public expressions of supposedly private psychological States, he continues, these so- calleci pnvate experiences may simply be nothing more than their public expressions.361 The obstacle which prevents us from coming to this realisation is our desire to make the facts conform

361. cf., BB, p. 45. to certain fixed notions we have about the meaning of words and to make certain analogies hold for ail expressions. To take another example, we are puzzled by the analogy between scrying something and meanhg something. We hold that such an analogy points to two paralle1 processes and that "what we cal1 meaning is a definite conscious process accompanying, preceding, or following the verbal expression and itself a verbal expression of some sort or translatable into one." (BB, p. 35) But (just as he does with other psychological phenornena) he cautions us

against supposing that meaning mus be a pnvate mental accompaniment to our locutions. In fact, he once again chooses to emphasise behavioural manifestations as the proper charactensation of their intelligibility:

A process accompanying Our words which one might cal1 the "process of meaning them" is the modulation of the voice in which we speak the words; or one of the processes similar to this, like the play of facial expression. These accompany the spoken words not in the way a Geman sentence might accompany an English sentence, or writing a sentence accompany speaking a sentence; but in the sense in which the tune of a Song accompanies its words. This tune corresponds to the 'feeling' with which we Say the sentence. And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said, or something similar to this expression. (BB, p. 35) Of course, the substantive point which is so behaviouristic in spirit is not made in an orthodox behaviourist fashion. In the manner of an introspectionist, Wittgenstein invites the reader to "look within" in order to detect and evaluate inner thoughts (images, experiences). This is not the method which Watson employs. However, Wittgenstein's method differs in its pedagogy, not its content. His method is intended to get introspectively inclined philosophers to release their hold on those aspects of experience which are, for Wittgenstein, mere accompaniments of thought and not its essence. As he notes, "we couId perfectly well, for our purposes, replace every process of

imagining by a process of looking at an object or by painting, drawing or modelling; and every process of speaking to oneself by speaking aloud or writing." (BB, p. 4) Although the later Wittgenstein attacks the conception of meaning as a pnvate accompaniment to our public use of words by flirting with the idea that public activities are by themselves sufficient for understanding and applying mental States and processes, the position he takes in Philosophical Investigations may seem to leave unanswered the question of how closely he wishes to connect thought with (e.g.) bodily activities. The examination of thinking presented in 13e Blue Book leaves no room for uncertainty. Wittgenstein is wary about assigning any ontological status to psychoIogicai processes, such as thought and rnemory, as phenomena of private experience, even in the case of persons who lack the ability to speak.x2 Therefore, he responds sardonically when asked whether it is not possible to think without speaking. One can appreciate his refusai to give in to the idea that a psychological activity such as thinking requires a menialist conception fiom the cornments addressed to the interlocutor: "Well, don? you ever think? Can't you observe yourself and see what is going on? It should be quite simple. You do not have to wait for it as for an astronomicai event and then perhaps make your observation in a hurry." (PI, 8327) Thought is not some mercurial accompaniment to our statements which can only be observed by the mind's eye. One unconsciously believes this phantom accompaniment to be the "thought" which gives sense to a statement, to be that which distinguishes a meaningful sentence fiom gibberish. Wittgenstein opposes this picture:

But can't one at any rate speak and leave out the thinking? Certainly--but observe what sort of thing you are doing if you speak without thinking. Observe first of al1 that the process which we might cal1 "speaking and meaning what you speak is not necessarily disringuished from that of speaking thoughtlessly by what happens at the tirne when you speak, What distinguishes the two may very weil be what happens before or after you speak (BB, p. 45)

Say a sentence and think it; Say it with understanding.-And now do not Say it, and just do what you accompanied it with when you said it with understanding!--(Sing this tune with expression. And now dont sing it, but repeat its expression!-And here one actually might repeat something. For example, motions of the body, slower and &ter breathing, and so on-) 363 (PI, 9332) The introspectionist philosopher is one who believes that thought, Like so many other 'mental' phenomena, is a process with which one alone is directly acquainted. It is this picture which Wittgenstein wants to undermine. His audience is not the modem psychologist but the unconverted philosopher who still conceives of philosophy as including the practice of psychology .

362. cf., PI. $327 - $330, 5332 - $349. 363. Compare ais0 his question. when discussing osiensive definitions: Tan one point to a piece in a game as a piece in a game?"

To repeat: in certain cases, especiaily when one points 'to the shape' or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing-'characteristic' because they recur often (not aiways) when shape or number are 'meant'. But do you aIso know of an experience charactenstic of pointing to a piece in a game us a piece in a game? Al1 the same one can Say: "1 mean that this piece is cailed the 'king' not this particular bit of wood 1 am pointing ton. (Recognizing, wishing, remembering, etc..) (PI, $35) The Blue Book illustrates an approach to thinking which treats certain bodily activities as constitutive of thought, constitutive in the sense that these dinerent types of activities-speech as well as bodily activities-are as much (for Wittgenstein) the vehicle as well as the content of thoughts. 1s this repeated in Philosophical Investigations? Does it 'identify' thought with the action of language mechanisms, specificdy speech and writing. or does Wittgenstein only want to emphasise the central role of these activities play in determining the meaning of thinking? Although Wittgenstein does not want to defme thinking as sub-vocal thinking, or regard it as a matter of word-conditioning (as Watson had originally conceived),a his emphasis on the significance of verbalization for deterrnining the intelligibility of thought shares a definite continuity with Watson's early musings about the role of language in thought. "But what constitutes thought

here is not some process which has to accompany the words if they are not to be spoken without thought." (PI, $330) Wittgenstein comments that it only makes sense to assert that a person can

speak silently to himself if he has already mastered a language and can in fact speak, so that the idea that thought could be possible without speech is misleading. One cannot trust the mernories of someone who previously was unable to verbalise, because "the words with which 1 express my memory are my memory-reactions." (PZ, $343) The apparent diffculty regarding Wittgenstein's alleged behaviourism disappears in the light of comments like this one. Watson remarked: "Surely we know that the deafand dumb use no such laryngeal processes, nor does the individual whose

larynx has been removed. Other bodily professes have to take the function of the larynx. Such

functions are usually usurped by the fingers, hands, arms, facial muscles, muscles of the head, etc.."% The notion of thought king applicable in such instances is not uninteiiigible: but one stands in need of critena in order to apply the concept in such cases. "Our criterion for someone's

saying something to himself is what he tells us and the rest of his behaviour; and we only Say that someone speaks to himself if, in the ordinary sense of the words, he cm speak. And we do not Say it of a parrot; nor of a gramophone. " (PI, 9344)

364. cf.. Watson's Behavior. an Introàucrion to Comparative Psychology. New Yok Henry Holt and Company. 1914. pp. 322 - 334. 365. Watson, "1s Thinking Merely the action of Language Mechanisms?", p. 88. When Wittgenstein (both in Ine Blue Book and Philosophical Investigatio~ts)cautions us that the= is no singular use or application for a term or concept, that one must examine the situations and circumstances which give rise to its inteliigibility, that a definitional approach to meaning ieaves one in the lurch (so to speak), that it only makes sense to taik of thinking as an activity which involves operating with signs (whether physical or verbal), he was offerhg a refinement of behaviowist notions which had identifid thinking with bodily activities or regarded speech as the sole mechanism for it. Wittgenstein avoids a sirnplistic reduction of thought to either behaviour or articulate use of language, but in his approach there is nothing besides behaviour and the articulate, nile-guided use of Ianguage with which thinking is to be associated. Such operations constiîuîe Our new picture of thought. At times, though, as the discussion in both the Investigations and The Blue Book indicate, Wittgenstein appears to strictly identa thought with these operations and activities. In The Blue Book he favours characterising it as manual habits and in Philosophical Investigations verbal articulations corne to the fore. Nonetheless, his account of thinking does not erase the fact that his conception of thought not only reproduces similar accounts by earlier behaviourists, it elevates them to a higher plane. What 1 mean here is that instead of trying to define thinking by identifying it with behaviour or language mechanisms, Wittgenstein (presented in his best light) incorporates behaviourist conceptions ihat thinking is to be best understood by means of the operations and circumstances which characterise it; moreover, he strongly impiies that these operations or activities jùlly charactense thinking. In answer to the question, "what is thinking?" (PI, §327), Wittgenstein's response appears to be no more than that various public activities can be said to offer us criteria for determinhg that concepts are correctly applied. Thinking, when one is free of mentalist prejudices, is simply certain bodily motions or variations in breathing (PI, $332) or "just the experience of saying, or may consist of this experience plus others which accompany it." (BB,p. 45) Wittgenstein recognises Our persistence in holding that mental activity truly represents the nature and structure of thought, and in doubting that overt actions could be cnteria for thought (or other mental phenomena) or that thinking is merely a matter of manipulating symbols. The rnind, we seem detennined to think, perforxns the particular psychological activity in a 'rniraculous way' which can not be accomplished otherwise. This is a consequence of our wnceiving of these

phenomena as private experiences. a conhtsion which Wittgenstein was determined to dispel. Watson, too, had recognised the dissatisfaction we have about accepting the notion that it is through their expressions, and not by means of the supposedly pnvate objects behind them, that

life is given to thinking and other mental phenomena. It should be remembered that he noted how we are constantly reinforcd to hold "that thinking is something peculiarly uncorporeal, something very intangible, very evanescent, something peculiarly mentaLW366To such preferences for private

experiences, Wittgenstein offers a behaviouristic reply: "But why shouldn't they be the specific private experiences of writing-the muscular, visual, tactile sensation of wnting or speaking?"367 Note how he converts the word "sensation" here from a private to a public use. If one confines oneself to the uses of the words which express mental phenomena such as "thinking", "meaning",

" wishing", Le., if one scrutinizes their grarnmar, one is spared the temptation to look for peculiar

acts which characterise them independently of their manifestations. If one interprets PI 8342 Iiterdy, Wittgenstein appears to be repudiating the idea that there is such a thing as a "wordless thought" which can be translated into articulate language. He

implies that we are only led to think it feasible that wordless thoughts can be translated into verbal

expressions in the case of persons who were never initiated into the rudiments of public language. This should raise our suspicions, Wittgenstein seems to be saying. Witîgenstein, iike the behaviounsts, wants to combat the cornmitment to privileged access that such notions inspire as well as the idea that introspection is the genuine means of understanding. As he stated years

1 have been trying in ail of this to rernove the temptation to think that there 'musr be' what is called a menta1 process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hop, a wish, etc. And 1 want to give you the following rule of thumb: If you are puzzled about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute for the thought the expression of the thought, etc. nie difficulty which lies in this substitution, and at the same tirne the whole point of it, is

366. Watson, Behaviorism, p. 238. 367. B B. p. 42 this: the expression of belief, thought, etc., is just a sentence;-and the sentence has sense only as a mernber of a system of language; as one expression within a calcul~s.~~~ The language of course is public in nature; and the des which make it a 'calculus' are public rules. These words addressed to his students in the 1930's, express the plain &nt of much of what Wittgenstein would pronounce later to readers of the Invesrlgatiom. Wittgenstein wants us to eschew the picture that psychological processes presuppose imagery which account for their intelligibility; this continual retreat to internalist predilections undermines our understanding of psychological language. One is constantiy tempted to daim that the purpose of language is indeed to picture for others our thoughts, sensations, feelings, beliefs which, although intangible, we can observe within ourselves (PZ, 9304), that the purpose of communication is to dow the other person to grasp the sense of one's words and to take it into his own mind (PI, 363). Wittgenstein counters this view with countless examples of how one's articulate use of language is one's expression of thought, a ciaim which clearly suggests the entrenchment of a fundamentdly behaviouristic attitude towards mental activity . Philosophers, not psychologists, stand in need of the therapy such exarnples provide. Philosophy does not require the science of behaviourism so much as the insight on which behaviourism rests.

368. BB. pp. 41 - 42.

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