Commonsense Psychology: Fodor, Dennett, Baker
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COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY: FODOR, DENNETT, BAKER DIANE REBECCA GALL A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO APRIL 2014 c DIANE REBECCA GALL, 2014 Abstract The predominant conception of our everyday understanding of other people’s actions is as a commonsense psychology that is a (proto-)scientific theory. A central version of this conception is that this theory takes propositional attitudes as mental states which are causally effective in the production of human purposive action. In this essay, I argue that this central version of our commonsense psychology is mistaken. I take Jerry Fodor’s Psychosemantics as a locus classicus of this view. I examine arguments from Daniel Dennett and Lynne Rudder Baker that Fodor (and others who argue along the same lines as Fodor) make serious errors in being committed to a hyper-realist (i.e., physicalist) conception of mental states and causality. I argue that Fodor does not provide an adequate exposition of how his candidate for a scientific theory that vindicates his version of commonsense psychology accounts for the meaning of a propositional attitude. I further argue that our everyday practices that deploy commonsense psychological concepts are inconsistent with characterising commonsense psychology as a (proto-)theory or as part of a (proto-)science. From this investigation, I conclude that Fodor’s conception of commonsense psychology ii psychology is untenable. Finally, I discuss briefly an alternative that is suggested by the rebuttals of Dennett and Baker that commonsense psychology is better conceived as an non-theoretical explanatory practice that deploys an alternative conception of psycholo- gical causality distinct from physical causality. iii For my wife, Andrea iv Acknowledgements I could not have completed this project, and I nearly did not, without the assistance, friendship, and love of those people who have chosen to associate with me. There are, frankly, far too many and in far too many roles for me to adequately represent how I feel about these people, so I shall only say that if you think that you recognise yourself in somewhere in these pages, then you are assuredly right. If you have been there for me these last years, then you are responsible for my success. I single out my committee—Judith Baker, Ian Hacking, and David Jopling— for the obvious reasons and for extraordinary reasons. I came to them in great need and they offered aid and guidance when they didn’t have to do so. Judith and Ian offered guidance in a time of great personal adversity for them, especially on Judith’s part, and I cannot express the depth of my appreciation to them. Tina Strasbourg supported me, without flag or fail, in far more than just my academic pursuits and she cannot be thanked enough. Speranza Dolgetta, my personal physician, gave me a sense of how to deal with the emotional toll that these academic projects v exact. My father-in-law, Bill McIntosh, has been a source of great strength, comfort, and friendship. Much of this was written under his roof and doing so made the work that much more enjoyable. I would be remiss if I did not thank Len Vandervaart and Terry Chapman for the opportunity to earn a living during the writing of this essay. For Karim Dharamsi, I reserve my utmost appreciation and love. He has been the kind of friend, scholar, and colleague I can only strive to be. The unflagging support and faith that this man can show is truly remarkable and this work would never have been completed without him. My respect for him is immeasurable. The kind of personal support and strength that a family provides cannot be adequately acknowledged. So, to my wife, Andi McIntosh and our daughter, Stephanie, I can only say you both mean the world to me. Diane R. Gall Medicine Hat, AB February 2014 vi Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements v Preface ix 1 Commonsense Psychology 1 1.1 So, what are we talking about? . 1 1.2 So, what’s the problem? . 11 1.3 A Few Comments about Method . 16 1.4 The Central Commitments of Commonsense Psychology . 19 1.5 Why Fodor? Why now? . 23 2 Fodor: Intentional Realism 28 2.1 Great Theatre . 29 2.2 The Theory Contention . 45 2.3 Causal Power . 54 vii 2.4 Cause and Content . 57 2.5 Conclusion . 71 3 Dennett on Fodor 72 3.1 The Review . 73 3.2 ‘Industrial Strength’ Realism . 90 3.3 Theory versus Craft . 103 3.4 Facta Non Verba . 108 4 Baker: Practical Realism 118 4.1 The Standard View and Practical Realism . 119 4.2 Indeterminacy (Once Again) . 139 4.3 The Myth of Commonsense Psychology . 148 4.4 Conclusions . 156 Bibliography 168 viii Preface A very popular way of engaging with our everyday understanding of each others’ action is to take what might be called a psychological point of view. By this I mean that what people take as the important question is ‘what psychological theory best accounts for what we do when we predict and explain human purposive behaviour?’ My approach will not be by examining the empirical theories and evidence gathered by cognitive scientists, psy- chologists, and other social and computer scientists. It seems to me that the contribution that philosophers (qua philosopher) can have is in the careful examination of the concep- tual landscape of the empirical endeavour. My view is informed by Wittgenstein’s work in that I will be attempting to get a clear overview of just what is going on conceptually with an eye to ‘dissolving’ the problems (that can be so treated). By examining the pre- suppositions upon which the ‘standard’ account of our commonsense psychology is built and the ‘logic’ of those everyday psychological concepts, I seek to show that the central questions regarding our everyday psychological concepts and the way we use them have been misconstrued. I share Wittgenstein’s view that philosophical problems are not typ- ix ically solved by providing alternative theories but by characterising the problem in a way that suggests a dissolution. Philosophical problems can be compared to locks on safes, which can be opened by dialling a certain word or number, so that no force can open the door until just this word has been hit upon, and once it is hit upon any child can open it.1 Another way to put it it is to call my method ordinary language philosophy (OLP). OLP is characterised, by Baz, as “a particular form of Western philosophy—one that seeks to alleviate philo- sophical entanglements and obscurities by means of consideration of the or- dinary and normal uses of philosophers’ worlds, and the worldly conditions that make those uses possible and give them their specific significance [. ] OLP rests on the claim that philosophical difficulties arise when we take our words to express thoughts, or to otherwise carry commitments or implica- tions [. ] in virtue of something called ‘their meaning’, and irrespective of how we mean or may reasonably be found to mean them (which here just means irrespective of how we use or may reasonably found to use them).”2 There are a couple of things that this essay is not. It is not an attempt to vindicate Wittgenstein’s philosophy or metaphilosophy. I am very sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s methods and aims, but I do not directly rely upon his arguments. The most important reason I have chosen to avoid this way is that the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work is itself a very difficult and often controversial task. 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Big Typescript: TS 213 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) (hereafter cited as BT). 2. Avner Baz, When Words are Called for: A defense of ordinary language philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2012), 2. x This essay is also not a work in cognitive science or psychology. In that respect, I am following Wittgenstein’s adage that philosophy leaves everything as it is.3 I take Wittgenstein to be saying that our everyday understanding is left as it is. If something changes, it is our attitude towards that everyday understanding. I am going to argue by re-arranging what we already accept and will leave the empirical theory-building to those better disposed to do so. As such, I will not be evaluating the empirical evidence or reviewing the empirical experimental results of psychological or cognitive scientific theories. I am concerned with the conceptual presuppositions that inform the literature and those presuppositions are most readily seen in those very first arguments about the nature of common-sense psychology, so it is there I begin. I hope to be able to provide a few of the turns needed to unlock the safe. *** Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.4 3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Revised 4th, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), x120 (hereafter cited as PI). 4. PI, x90. xi 1 Commonsense Psychology How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. So we have to deny the yet uncompre- hended process in the yet uncomprehended medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes.